The decision to mass produce Katyushas in the USSR was made 12 hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, on June 21, 1941. Only then they were still called not “Katyushas”, but BM-13 installations.

Just 10 days later, on July 2, 1941, the first battery of seven BM-13s under the command of Captain I. A. Flerov moved to the front. And two days later she fired the first salvo at the Nazis who occupied the Orsha station.

The commander of one of the guns, Valentin Ovsov, recalled: “The earth shook and lit up.” “The effect of a one-time explosion of 112 mines within a matter of seconds exceeded all expectations,” wrote Marshal A. I. Eremenko, commander of the Western Front. “The enemy soldiers began to run in panic. Our soldiers, who were on the front line, near the explosions, also retreated back (in In order to maintain secrecy, no one was warned about the tests)."

After the salvo, the German General Staff received a telegram from the Eastern Front:

“The Russians used a battery with an unprecedented number of guns. Shells of unusual action. The troops fired at by the Russians testify: the fire raid is like a hurricane. The shells explode simultaneously.

The loss of life is significant."

Destruction of the first installations

After the first salvos, Nazi aircraft began hunting for Captain Flerov’s battery and intensively bombed its supposed base areas. To capture at least one Katyusha, several sabotage groups were sent to our rear and a large reward was announced for the one who would obtain the Russian secret weapon.

As a result of large-scale operations undertaken by the Germans in October 1941, Flerov’s battery found itself surrounded near the Smolensk village of Bogatyr. On October 7, a salvo of the remaining shells was fired. After this, the installations had to be blown up.

Thus the first page of the legendary Katyusha battery was turned.

Chassis search

The deadly BM-13 is actually a frame of eight guide rails connected to each other by welded spars. Rocket mines, each weighing 42.5 kg, launched from the frame, emitting wild grinding sounds. There were 16 of them attached to the frame. You can’t carry such a setup by hand. Therefore, the question of what to carry the Katyusha with arose immediately.

Before the war, only one truck was produced in the USSR - the famous lorry in various modifications. The ZIS-5 truck turned out to be rather weak for the Katyusha, and this became clear almost immediately. 73 hp motor could reach a speed of only 60 km/h, and only on asphalt, while consuming 33 liters of gasoline for every 100 km. But the truck did not have the strength to plow the front-line off-road terrain with a heavy installation.

In addition, the BM-13 from its body only fired in a transverse position; there was no other way. The transverse location of the installation during a salvo rocked the vehicle so much that there was no need to talk about the accuracy of the hit.

Therefore, it was decided to install a rocket launcher on the improved three-axle ZIS-6.

ZIS did not improve the situation

It is interesting that many “one and a half” have survived to this day; you can find them in almost every military museum and in private collections, but the ZIS-6 is a rarity.

The ZIS-6 crew consisted of 5-7 people, and with full ammunition the vehicle weighed more than eight tons. The three-axle truck provided much greater maneuverability. Unlike its two-axle counterpart, the ZIS-6 had a reinforced frame, a larger radiator and a gas tank of up to 105 liters. The car was equipped with brakes with a vacuum booster and a compressor for inflating the tires. Thanks to two rear drive axles, the ZIS-6 was no longer so afraid of wet roads and snow drifts. True, its maximum speed turned out to be lower than that of the ZIS-5: 55 km/h on asphalt and 10 km/h off-road. This is not surprising, because the engine remains the same - 73 hp. Fuel consumption on the highway reached 40 liters per 100 km, on a country road - up to 70.

The ZIS-6 was assembled until October 1941, and in total a little more than 20 thousand of them came off the assembly line.

Studebaker for the Russian miracle

During the war years, the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebakers. No matter how unpatriotic it may sound, it was thanks to powerful and reliable American trucks that our rocket launch batteries received the desired mobility.

The first three-axle army vehicles, designated US-6, rolled off the Studebaker assembly line at the end of 1941. It was then decided to send them to the Allied armies, mainly to the USSR. As a result, most of the 197 thousand trucks produced were delivered to us. They arrived in the USSR mainly in disassembled form. The assembly and installation of rocket launchers was carried out at the evacuated ZIS plant.

The Americans produced a dozen different modifications of the US-6 - some of them were equipped with a driven front axle (6x6), some with a conventional one (6x4). The Red Army preferred vehicles with a 6x6 wheel arrangement. Their six-cylinder carburetor engine developed a power of 95 hp, and the maximum speed of the car with a full load reached 70 km/h on the highway.

In front-line conditions, “Studebakers” (or, as they were also called, “students”) proved themselves to be reliable vehicles, which could easily be loaded with up to five tons of cargo, compared with the three tons recommended by the American manufacturer.

This is how this couple fought until the end of the war: our Katyusha on American wheels.

Armed tractors

History in pictures

In general, in addition to American trucks, since 1942, the Katyusha, as a very respected “woman,” was transported on any suitable vehicle.

The Soviet Katyusha multiple launch rocket system is one of the most recognizable symbols of the Great Patriotic War. In terms of popularity, the legendary Katyusha is not much inferior to the T-34 tank or the PPSh assault rifle. It is still not known for certain where this name came from (there are numerous versions), but the Germans called these installations “Stalinist organs” and were terribly afraid of them.

“Katyusha” is the collective name for several rocket launchers from the Great Patriotic War. Soviet propaganda presented them as exclusively domestic “know-how,” which was not true. Work in this direction was carried out in many countries, and the famous German six-barreled mortars are also MLRS, albeit of a slightly different design. The Americans and the British also used rocket artillery.

However, the Katyusha became the most effective and most mass-produced vehicle of its class during World War II. BM-13 is a real weapon of Victory. She took part in all significant battles on Eastern Front, clearing the way for infantry formations. The first Katyusha salvo was fired in the summer of 1941, and four years later the BM-13 installations were already shelling besieged Berlin.

A little history of the BM-13 Katyusha

Several reasons contributed to the revival of interest in rocket weapons: firstly, more advanced types of gunpowder were invented, which made it possible to significantly increase the flight range of rockets; secondly, the missiles were perfect as weapons for combat aircraft; and thirdly, rockets could be used to deliver toxic substances.

The last reason was the most important: based on the experience of the First World War, the military had little doubt that the next conflict would definitely not happen without military gases.

In the USSR, the creation of rocket weapons began with the experiments of two enthusiasts - Artemyev and Tikhomirov. In 1927, smokeless pyroxylin-TNT gunpowder was created, and in 1928, the first rocket was developed that managed to fly 1,300 meters. At the same time, the targeted development of missile weapons for aviation began.

In 1933, experimental samples of aircraft rockets of two calibers appeared: RS-82 and RS-132. The main drawback of the new weapons, which the military did not like at all, was their low accuracy. The shells had a small tail that did not exceed its caliber, and a pipe was used as a guide, which was very convenient. However, to improve the accuracy of the missiles, their empennage had to be increased and new guides had to be developed.

In addition, pyroxylin-TNT gunpowder was not very suitable for mass production of this type of weapon, so it was decided to use tubular nitroglycerin gunpowder.

In 1937, new missiles with enlarged tails and new open rail-type guides were tested. Innovations significantly improved the accuracy of fire and increased the missile's flight range. In 1938, the RS-82 and RS-132 missiles were put into service and began to be mass-produced.

In the same year, the designers were given a new task: to create a reactive system for ground forces, using a 132 mm caliber rocket as a basis.

In 1939, the 132-mm M-13 high-explosive fragmentation projectile was ready; it had a more powerful warhead and an increased flight range. Such results were achieved by lengthening the ammunition.

In the same year, the first MU-1 rocket launcher was manufactured. Eight short guides were installed across truck, sixteen rockets were attached to them in pairs. This design turned out to be very unsuccessful; during the salvo, the vehicle swayed strongly, which led to a significant decrease in the accuracy of the battle.

In September 1939, testing began on a new rocket launcher, the MU-2. The basis for it was the three-axle ZiS-6 truck; this vehicle provided the combat complex with high maneuverability and allowed it to quickly change positions after each salvo. Now the guides for the missiles were located along the car. In one salvo (about 10 seconds), the MU-2 fired sixteen shells, the weight of the installation with ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range exceeded eight kilometers.

With this design of the guides, the rocking of the car during a salvo became minimal, in addition, two jacks were installed in the rear of the car.

In 1940, state tests of the MU-2 were carried out, and it was put into service under the designation “BM-13 rocket mortar”.

The day before the start of the war (June 21, 1941), the USSR government decided to mass produce BM-13 combat systems, ammunition for them, and form special units for their use.

The first experience of using the BM-13 at the front showed their high efficiency and contributed to the active production of this type of weapon. During the war, “Katyusha” was produced by several factories, and mass production of ammunition for them was established.

Artillery units armed with BM-13 installations were considered elite, and immediately after their formation they received the name Guards. The BM-8, BM-13 and other rocket systems were officially called “Guards mortars.”

Application of BM-13 "Katyusha"

The first combat use of rocket launchers took place in mid-July 1941. The Germans occupied Orsha, a large junction station in Belarus. A large amount of enemy military equipment and manpower had accumulated on it. It was for this purpose that the battery of rocket launchers (seven units) of Captain Flerov fired two salvos.

As a result of the actions of the artillerymen, the railway junction was practically wiped off the face of the earth, and the Nazis suffered severe losses in people and equipment.

"Katyusha" was also used in other sectors of the front. The new Soviet weapon was a very unpleasant surprise for the German command. The pyrotechnic effect of the use of shells had a particularly strong psychological impact on Wehrmacht soldiers: after a Katyusha salvo, literally everything that could burn burned. This effect was achieved through the use of TNT blocks in the shells, which upon explosion formed thousands of burning fragments.

Rocket artillery was actively used in the battle of Moscow, Katyushas destroyed the enemy at Stalingrad, and they were tried to be used as anti-tank weapons on the Kursk Bulge. To do this, special recesses were made under the front wheels of the vehicle, so the Katyusha could fire directly. However, the use of the BM-13 against tanks was less effective, since the M-13 rocket was a high-explosive fragmentation projectile, and not armor-piercing. In addition, "Katyusha" has never been distinguished by high accuracy of fire. But if its shell hit a tank, all the vehicle’s attachments were destroyed, the turret often jammed, and the crew received severe concussion.

Rocket launchers were used with great success until the Victory; they took part in the storming of Berlin and other operations in the final stage of the war.

In addition to the famous BM-13 MLRS, there was also a BM-8 rocket launcher, which used 82 mm caliber rockets, and over time, heavy rocket systems appeared that launched 310 mm caliber rockets.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet soldiers actively used the experience of street fighting they gained during the capture of Poznan and Königsberg. It consisted of firing single heavy rockets M-31, M-13 and M-20 direct fire. Special assault groups were created, which included an electrical engineer. The rocket was launched from machine guns, wooden caps, or simply from any flat surface. A hit from such a shell could easily destroy a house or be guaranteed to suppress an enemy firing point.

During the war years, about 1,400 BM-8, 3,400 BM-13 and 100 BM-31 units were lost.

However, the story of the BM-13 did not end there: in the early 60s, the USSR supplied these installations to Afghanistan, where they were actively used by government troops.

Device BM-13 "Katyusha"

The main advantage of the BM-13 rocket launcher is its extreme simplicity both in production and in use. The artillery part of the installation consists of eight guides, the frame on which they are located, rotating and lifting mechanisms, sighting devices and electrical equipment.

The guides were a five-meter I-beam with special overlays. A locking device and an electric igniter were installed in the breech of each of the guides, with the help of which the shot was fired.

The guides were mounted on a rotating frame, which, using simple lifting and rotating mechanisms, provided vertical and horizontal guidance.

Each Katyusha was equipped with an artillery sight.

The crew of the vehicle (BM-13) consisted of 5-7 people.

The M-13 rocket consisted of two parts: a combat and a jet powder engine. The warhead, which contained an explosive and a contact fuse, is very reminiscent of the warhead of a conventional high-explosive fragmentation artillery projectile.

The powder engine of the M-13 projectile consisted of a chamber with a powder charge, a nozzle, a special grille, stabilizers and a fuse.

The main problem faced by the developers missile systems(and not only in the USSR), the accuracy of the rocket projectiles became low. To stabilize their flight, the designers took two paths. German six-barreled mortar rockets rotated in flight due to obliquely located nozzles, and flat stabilizers were installed on Soviet RSakhs. To give the projectile greater accuracy, it was necessary to increase its initial speed; for this, the guides on the BM-13 were longer.

The German stabilization method made it possible to reduce the size of both the projectile itself and the weapon from which it was fired. However, this significantly reduced the firing range. Although, it should be said that the German six-barreled mortars were more accurate than the Katyushas.

The Soviet system was simpler and allowed shooting over considerable distances. Later, installations began to use spiral guides, which further increased accuracy.

Modifications of "Katyusha"

During the war, numerous modifications of both rocket launchers and ammunition were created. Here are just a few of them:

BM-13-SN - this installation had spiral guides that imparted a rotational movement to the projectile, which significantly increased its accuracy.

BM-8-48 - this rocket launcher used 82 mm caliber projectiles and had 48 guides.

BM-31-12 - this rocket launcher used 310 mm caliber shells for firing.

310 mm caliber rockets were initially used for firing from the ground, only then self-propelled guns appeared.

The first systems were created on the basis of the ZiS-6 car, then they were most often installed on vehicles received under Lend-Lease. It must be said that with the beginning of Lend-Lease, only foreign cars were used to create rocket launchers.

In addition, rocket launchers (from M-8 shells) were installed on motorcycles, snowmobiles, and armored boats. The guides were installed on railway platforms, T-40, T-60, KV-1 tanks.

To understand how widespread the Katyusha weapons were, it is enough to cite two figures: from 1941 to the end of 1944, Soviet industry produced 30 thousand launchers of various types and 12 million shells for them.

During the war years, several types of 132 mm caliber rockets were developed. The main directions of modernization were to increase the accuracy of fire, increase the range of the projectile and its power.

Advantages and disadvantages of the BM-13 Katyusha missile launcher

The main advantage of rocket launchers was the large number of projectiles they fired in one salvo. If several MLRS were operating in one area at once, the destructive effect was increased due to the interference of shock waves.

Easy to use. “Katyushas” were distinguished by an extremely simple design, and the sighting devices of this installation were also uncomplicated.

Low cost and easy to manufacture. During the war, the production of rocket launchers was established in dozens of factories. The production of ammunition for these complexes did not present any particular difficulties. Particularly eloquent is the comparison between the cost of the BM-13 and a conventional artillery gun of a similar caliber.

Installation mobility. The time of one BM-13 salvo is approximately 10 seconds; after the salvo, the vehicle left the firing line without exposing itself to enemy return fire.

However, this weapon also had disadvantages, the main one being low shooting accuracy due to the large dispersion of projectiles. This problem was partially solved by the BM-13SN, but it has not been completely resolved for modern MLRS.

Insufficient high-explosive effect of M-13 shells. "Katyusha" was not very effective against long-term defensive fortifications and armored vehicles.

Short firing range compared to cannon artillery.

Large consumption of gunpowder in the manufacture of rockets.

There was heavy smoke during the salvo, which served as an unmasking factor.

The high center of gravity of the BM-13 installations led to frequent rollovers of the vehicle during the march.

Technical characteristics of "Katyusha"

Characteristics of the combat vehicle

Characteristics of the M-13 missile

Video about MLRS "Katyusha"

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Katyusha - Weapon of Victory

The history of the creation of Katyusha dates back to pre-Petrine times. In Rus', the first rockets appeared in the 15th century. By the end of the 16th century, Russia was well aware of the design, methods of manufacturing and combat use of missiles. This is convincingly evidenced by the “Charter of Military, Cannon and Other Affairs Relating to Military Science,” written in 1607-1621 by Onisim Mikhailov. Since 1680, a special rocket establishment already existed in Russia. In the 19th century, missiles designed to destroy enemy personnel and materiel were created by Major General Alexander Dmitrievich Zasyadko. Zasyadko began work on creating rockets in 1815 on his own initiative using his own funds. By 1817, he managed to create a high-explosive and incendiary combat rocket based on a lighting rocket.
At the end of August 1828, a guards corps arrived from St. Petersburg under the besieged Turkish fortress of Varna. Together with the corps, the first Russian missile company arrived under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Vnukov. The company was formed on the initiative of Major General Zasyadko. The rocket company received its first baptism of fire near Varna on August 31, 1828 during an attack on a Turkish redoubt located by the sea south of Varna. Cannonballs and bombs from field and naval guns, as well as rocket explosions, forced the defenders of the redoubt to take cover in holes made in the ditch. Therefore, when the hunters (volunteers) of the Simbirsk regiment rushed to the redoubt, the Turks did not have time to take their places and provide effective resistance to the attackers.

On March 5, 1850, Colonel Konstantin Ivanovich Konstantinov, the illegitimate son of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich from his relationship with actress Clara Anna Lawrence, was appointed commander of the Rocket Establishment. During his tenure in this position, 2-, 2.5- and 4-inch missiles of the Konstantinov system were adopted by the Russian army. The weight of combat missiles depended on the type of warhead and was characterized by the following data: a 2-inch missile weighed from 2.9 to 5 kg; 2.5-inch - from 6 to 14 kg and 4-inch - from 18.4 to 32 kg.

The firing ranges of the Konstantinov system missiles, created by him in 1850-1853, were very significant for that time. Thus, a 4-inch rocket equipped with 10-pound (4.095 kg) grenades had a maximum firing range of 4150 m, and a 4-inch incendiary rocket - 4260 m, while a quarter-pound mountain unicorn mod. 1838 had a maximum firing range of only 1810 meters. Konstantinov's dream was to create an airborne rocket launcher shooting rockets from a balloon. The experiments carried out proved the long range of missiles fired from a tethered balloon. However, it was not possible to achieve acceptable accuracy.
After the death of K.I. Konstantinov in 1871, rocketry in the Russian army fell into decline. Combat missiles were used sporadically and in small quantities in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Missiles were used more successfully during the conquest of Central Asia in the 70-80s of the 19th century. Decisive role they played during the capture of Tashkent. IN last time Konstantinov's missiles were used in Turkestan in the 90s of the 19th century. And in 1898, combat missiles were officially removed from service with the Russian army.
A new impetus for the development of rocket weapons was given during the First World War: in 1916, Professor Ivan Platonovich Grave created gelatin gunpowder, improving the smokeless gunpowder of the French inventor Paul Viel. In 1921, developers N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev from the gas dynamic laboratory began developing rockets based on this gunpowder.

At first, the gas-dynamic laboratory, where rocket weapons were created, had more difficulties and failures than successes. However, enthusiasts - engineers N.I. Tikhomirov, V.A. Artemyev, and then G.E. Langemak and B.S. Petropavlovsky persistently improved their “brainchild”, firmly believing in the success of the business. Extensive theoretical development and countless experiments were required, which ultimately led to the creation at the end of 1927 of an 82-mm fragmentation rocket with a powder engine, and after it a more powerful one, with a caliber of 132 mm. Test firing conducted near Leningrad in March 1928 was encouraging - the range was already 5-6 km, although dispersion was still large. For many years it was not possible to significantly reduce it: the original concept assumed a projectile with tails that did not exceed its caliber. After all, a pipe served as a guide for it - simple, light, convenient for installation.

In 1933, engineer I.T. Kleimenov proposed making a more developed tail, more than twice the caliber of the projectile in scope. The accuracy of fire increased, and the flight range also increased, but it was necessary to design new open - in particular, rail - guides for projectiles. And again, years of experiments, searches...
By 1938, the main difficulties in creating mobile rocket artillery had been overcome. Employees of the Moscow RNII Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, F. N. Poyda, L. E. Schwartz and others developed 82-mm fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and thermite shells (PC) with a solid propellant (powder) engine, which was started by a remote electric igniter.

The baptism of fire of the RS-82, mounted on the I-16 and I-153 fighter aircraft, took place on August 20, 1939 on the Khalkhin Gol River. This event is described in detail here.

At the same time, for firing at ground targets, the designers proposed several options for mobile multi-charge multiple rocket launchers (by area). Engineers V.N. Galkovsky, I.I. Gvai, A.P. Pavlenko, A.S. Popov took part in their creation under the leadership of A.G. Kostikov.
The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single unit by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles weighing 42.5 kg each were fixed using T-shaped pins on top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided the ability to change the angle of elevation and azimuth rotation. Aiming at the target was carried out through the sight by rotating the handles of the lifting and rotating mechanisms. The installation was mounted on the chassis of a ZiS-5 truck, and in the first version, relatively short guides were located across the vehicle, which received the general name MU-1 (mechanized installation). This decision was unsuccessful - when firing, the vehicle swayed, which significantly reduced the accuracy of the battle.

M-13 shells, containing 4.9 kg of explosive, provided a radius of continuous damage by fragments of 8-10 meters (when the fuse was set to “O” - fragmentation) and an actual damage radius of 25-30 meters. In soil of medium hardness, when the fuse was set to “3” (slowdown), a funnel with a diameter of 2-2.5 meters and a depth of 0.8-1 meter was created.
In September 1939, the MU-2 rocket system was created on the ZIS-6 three-axle truck, which was more suitable for this purpose. The car was an all-terrain truck with double tires on the rear axles. Its length with a 4980 mm wheelbase was 6600 mm, and its width was 2235 mm. The car was equipped with the same in-line six-cylinder water-cooled carburetor engine that was installed on the ZiS-5. Its cylinder diameter was 101.6 mm and its piston stroke was 114.3 mm. Thus, its working volume was equal to 5560 cubic centimeters, so that the volume indicated in most sources is 5555 cubic centimeters. cm is the result of someone’s mistake, which was subsequently replicated by many serious publications. At 2300 rpm, the engine, which had a 4.6-fold compression ratio, developed 73 horsepower, which was good for those times, but due to the heavy load, the maximum speed was limited to 55 kilometers per hour.

In this version, elongated guides were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before firing. The weight of the vehicle with a crew (5-7 people) and full ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range reached 8470 m. In just one salvo lasting 8-10 seconds, the combat vehicle fired 16 shells containing 78.4 kg of highly effective explosives at enemy positions substances. The three-axle ZIS-6 provided the MU-2 with quite satisfactory mobility on the ground, allowing it to quickly perform a march maneuver and change position. And to transfer the vehicle from the traveling position to the combat position, 2-3 minutes were enough. However, the installation acquired another drawback - the impossibility of direct fire and, as a result, a large dead space. However, our artillerymen subsequently learned to overcome it and even began to use Katyushas against tanks.
On December 25, 1939, the Red Army Artillery Directorate approved the 132 mm M-13 rocket and launcher, called the BM-13. NII-Z received an order for the production of five such installations and a batch of missiles for military testing. In addition, the artillery department of the Navy also ordered one BM-13 launcher to test it in the coastal defense system. During the summer and autumn of 1940, NII-3 manufactured six BM-13 launchers. In the autumn of the same year launchers BM-13 and a batch of M-13 shells were ready for testing.

On June 17, 1941, at a training ground near Moscow, during the inspection of samples of new weapons of the Red Army, salvo launches were made from BM-13 combat vehicles. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Army General Zhukov, who were present at the tests, praised the new weapon. Two prototypes of the BM-13 combat vehicle were prepared for the show. One of them was loaded with high-explosive fragmentation rockets, and the second with illumination rockets. Salvo launches of fragmentation rockets were made. All targets in the area where the shells fell were hit, everything that could burn on this section of the artillery route burned. The shooting participants praised the new missile weapons. Immediately at the firing position, an opinion was expressed about the need to quickly adopt the first domestic MLRS installation.
On June 21, 1941, literally a few hours before the start of the war, after examining samples of missile weapons, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin decided to launch mass production of M-13 missiles and the BM-13 launcher and to begin the formation missile forces new parts. Due to the threat of an impending war, this decision was made despite the fact that the BM-13 launcher had not yet passed military tests and had not been developed to the stage allowing mass industrial production.

On July 2, 1941, the first experimental battery of rocket artillery in the Red Army under the command of Captain Flerov set out from Moscow to the Western Front. On July 4, the battery became part of the 20th Army, whose troops occupied the defense along the Dnieper near the city of Orsha.

In most books about the war - both scientific and fiction - Wednesday, July 16, 1941, is named as the day of the first use of the Katyusha. On that day, a battery under the command of Captain Flerov attacked the Orsha railway station that had just been occupied by the enemy and destroyed the trains that had accumulated there.
However, in fact, Flerov’s battery was first deployed at the front two days earlier: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large amount of military equipment accumulated in the market square of the town. At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, a battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a direction unexpected for the enemy in the west, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa. On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how missile launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about Flerov’s completion of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said: “Katyusha sang perfectly.”

On August 2, 1941, the chief of artillery of the Western Front, Major General I.P. Kramar, reported: “According to the statements of the command staff of the rifle units and the observations of the artillerymen, the surprise of such massive fire inflicts heavy losses on the enemy and has such a strong moral effect that enemy units flee in panic. It was also noted there that the enemy is fleeing not only from the areas fired by new weapons, but also from neighboring ones, located at a distance of 1-1.5 km from the shelling zone.
And here’s how the enemies talked about the Katyusha: “After the volley of Stalin’s organ, from our company of 120 people,” German Chief Corporal Hart said during interrogation, “12 remained alive. Of the 12 heavy machine guns, only one remained intact, and even that one was without a carriage, and out of five heavy mortars - not a single one.”
A stunning debut for the enemy rocket weapons prompted our industry to speed up the serial production of a new mortar. However, for the Katyushas, ​​at first there were not enough self-propelled chassis - carriers of rocket launchers. They tried to restore production of the ZIS-6 at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, where the Moscow ZIS was evacuated in October 1941, but the lack of specialized equipment for the production of worm axles did not allow this to be done. In October 1941, the T-60 tank with a BM-8-24 installation mounted in place of the turret was put into service. It was armed with RS-82 missiles.
In September 1941 - February 1942, NII-3 developed a new modification of the 82-mm M-8 projectile, which had the same range (about 5000 m), but almost twice as much explosive (581 g) compared to the aircraft projectile (375 g).
By the end of the war, the 82-mm M-8 projectile with a ballistic index TS-34 and a firing range of 5.5 km was adopted.
In the first modifications of the M-8 missile, a rocket charge made of nitroglycerin ballistic gunpowder, grade N, was used. The charge consisted of seven cylindrical blocks with an outer diameter of 24 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm. The length of the charge was 230 mm, and the weight was 1040 g.
To increase the projectile's flight range, the rocket engine chamber was increased to 290 mm, and after testing a number of charge design options, OTB specialists from Plant No. 98 tested a charge made from NM-2 gunpowder, which consisted of five blocks with an outer diameter of 26.6 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm and length 287 mm. The weight of the charge was 1180 g. With the use of this charge, the projectile range increased to 5.5 km. The radius of continuous destruction by fragments of the M-8 (TS-34) projectile was 3-4 m, and the radius of actual destruction by fragments was 12-15 meters.

STZ-5 tracked tractors and Ford-Marmont, International Jiemsi and Austin all-terrain vehicles received under Lend-Lease were also equipped with jet launchers. But the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker cars. In 1943, M-13 projectiles with a welded body, with a ballistic index TS-39, were put into production. The shells had a GVMZ fuse. NM-4 gunpowder was used as fuel.
The main reason for the low accuracy of M-13 (TS-13) type rockets was the eccentricity of the thrust of the jet engine, that is, the displacement of the thrust vector from the rocket axis due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs. This phenomenon is easily eliminated when the rocket rotates. In this case, the thrust impulse will always coincide with the axis of the rocket. The rotation imparted to the finned rocket in order to improve accuracy is called rotation. Twist rockets should not be confused with turbojet rockets. The turning speed of the finned missiles was several tens, in extreme cases hundreds, of revolutions per minute, which is not enough to stabilize the projectile by rotation (moreover, rotation occurs during the active phase of the flight while the engine is running, and then stops). The angular velocity of turbojet projectiles that do not have fins is several thousand revolutions per minute, which creates a gyroscopic effect and, accordingly, higher hit accuracy than that of finned projectiles, both non-rotating and with rotation. In both types of projectiles, rotation occurs due to the outflow of powder gases from the main engine through small (several millimeters in diameter) nozzles directed at an angle to the axis of the projectile.

We called rockets with rotation due to the energy of powder gases UK - improved accuracy, for example M-13UK and M-31UK.
The M-13UK projectile differed in design from the M-13 projectile in that there were 12 tangential holes on the front centering thickening, through which part of the powder gases flowed out. The holes were drilled so that the powder gases flowing out of them created a torque. The M-13UK-1 projectiles differed from the M-13UK projectiles in the design of their stabilizers. In particular, the M-13UK-1 stabilizers were made of steel sheet.
Since 1944, based on Studebakers, new, more powerful BM-31-12 installations with 12 M-30 and M-31 mines of 301 mm caliber, weighing 91.5 kg each (firing range - up to 4325 m), began to be produced. To improve the accuracy of fire, M-13UK and M-31UK projectiles with improved accuracy that rotated in flight were created and developed.
The projectiles were launched from honeycomb-type tubular guides. The time to transfer to a combat position was 10 minutes. When a 301-mm projectile containing 28.5 kg of explosives exploded, a crater 2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter was formed. A total of 1,184 BM-31-12 vehicles were produced during the war years.

The share of rocket artillery on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War was constantly increasing. If in November 1941 45 Katyusha divisions were formed, then on January 1, 1942 there were already 87 of them, in October 1942 - 350, and at the beginning of 1945 - 519. By the end of the war, there were 7 divisions in the Red Army, 40 separate brigades, 105 regiments and 40 separate divisions of guards mortars. Not a single major artillery barrage took place without Katyushas.

The first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word “Katyusha” is a deadly artillery vehicle used by the Soviet Union during the. These vehicles were widely used during the war and were known for the force of the jet strike.

The technical purpose of the Katyusha was a rocket artillery combat vehicle (BMRA), such installations cost less than a full-fledged artillery gun, but at the same time they could literally bring hell down on the enemy’s head in a few seconds. Soviet engineers achieved a balance between firepower, mobility, accuracy and cost-effectiveness in creating this system, which made it world famous.

Creation of a combat vehicle

Work on the creation of Katyusha began in early 1938, when the Jet Research Institute (RNII) in Leningrad received permission to develop its own BMRA. Initially, large-scale testing of weapons began at the end of 1938, but the huge number of shortcomings in the machine did not impress the Soviet army, however, after the system was refined, in 1940, Katyusha was released in a small batch.

You are probably wondering where the artillery vehicle got its special name - the history of the Katyusha is quite unique. The existence of this weapon was a secret until the very end of the war, during which the combat vehicle, in order to hide its true nature, was marked with the letters “KAT”, which stood for “Kostikova automatic termite”, which is why the soldiers dubbed it Katyusha, in honor of the patriotic songs by Mikhail Isakovsky.

Katyusha also made a loud howling sound when fired, and the arrangement of missiles on the gun resembled a church organ, which is why German soldiers called the car “Stalin’s Organ” for the sound and fear that it generated in the ranks of the enemy. The weapon itself was so secret that only NKVD operatives and the most trusted people were trained to operate it, and had permission to do so, but when Katyusha went into mass production, the restrictions were lifted, and the machine came into the possession of the Soviet troops.

Capabilities of BMRA "Katyusha"

Katyusha used an improved aircraft rocket, the RS-132, adapted for ground installation - the M-13.

• The shell contained five kilograms of explosive.
• The car that was used artillery installation– BM-13 – was created specifically for rocket field artillery.
• The missile's flight range reached 8.5 kilometers.
• The dispersion of the projectile after a shot with fragmentation action reached ten meters.
• The installation contained 16 rockets.

A new, improved and enlarged version of the M-13 projectile, the three-hundred-millimeter M-30/31, was developed in 1942. This projectile was also launched from a specialized vehicle called BM-31.

• The bulbous warhead contained more explosive material and was launched, unlike the M-13, not from a rail installation, but from a frame.
• The frame on the BM-31 lacked mobility compared to the BM-13, since the original versions of such a launcher were not designed for mobile platforms.
• The explosive content of the M-31 increased to 29 kilograms, but at the cost of reducing the range to 4.3 km.
• Each frame contained 12 warheads.

A smaller projectile, the M-8, 82 millimeter caliber, attached to a mount on the BM-8, was also used.

• The range of the M-8 reached almost six kilometers, and the projectile itself contained half a kilo of explosive.
• To launch this warhead, a rail installation was used, on which, due to the smaller size of the projectiles, many more missiles could be placed.
• A machine that could hold thirty-six missiles was called BM-8-36, a vehicle that could hold forty-eight was called BM-8-48, and so on.

Initially, the M-13 was equipped only with explosive warheads and was used against concentrations of enemy troops, but the Katyusha, which proved its functionality during the war, began to be equipped with armor-piercing missiles to counter tank troops. Smoke, flare, and other missiles were also developed to complement explosive and armor-piercing warheads. However, the M-31 was still equipped exclusively with explosive shells. With a salvo of more than a hundred missiles, they inflicted not only maximum physical destruction, but also psychological damage to the enemy.

But all such missiles had one drawback - they were not accurate and were effective only in large quantities and in attacks on large targets spread over a territory.

Initially, Katyusha launchers were mounted on a ZIS-5 truck, but as the war progressed, the launchers were mounted on a variety of vehicles, including trains and boats, as well as on thousands of American trucks received during Lend-Lease.

The first battles of the BMRA "Katyusha"

The Katyusha made its combat debut in 1941, during the surprise invasion of the Soviet Union by German troops. This was not the best time to deploy the vehicle, as the single battery had only four days of training and the factories for mass production were barely established.

However, the first battery, consisting of seven BM-13 launchers and six hundred M-13 missiles, was sent into battle. At that time, Katyusha was a secret development, so a huge number of measures were taken to hide the installation before participating in battle.

On July 7, 1941, the first battery went into battle, attacking the attacking German troops near the Berezina River. The German soldiers panicked as a shower of explosive shells rained down on their heads, shell fragments flying several meters wounded and shell-shocked the soldiers, and the howling sound of the shot demoralized not only recruits, but also seasoned soldiers.

The first battery continued to participate in the battle, time after time justifying the expectations placed on it, but in October the enemy soldiers were able to surround the battery - however, they failed to capture it, since the retreating troops Soviet army destroyed shells and launchers to prevent secret weapons from falling into enemy hands.

A salvo of M-13 missiles fired by a battery of four BM-13s within 7-10 seconds launched 4.35 tons of explosives over an area of ​​more than 400 square meters, which was approximately equal to the destructive power of seventy-two single-caliber artillery batteries.

The excellent demonstration of the combat capabilities of the first BM-13 battery led to mass production of the weapon, and already in 1942 an impressive number of launchers and missiles were available to the Soviet army. They were widely used in the defense of USSR territories and the subsequent attack on Berlin. More than five hundred Katyusha batteries served in the war with great success, and by the end of the war, more than ten thousand launchers and more than twelve million missiles were produced using about two hundred different factories.

The rapid production of guns benefited from the fact that the creation of Katyusha required only light equipment, and the time and resources spent on production were much less than those necessary to create howitzers.

Heirs BMRA " Katyusha"

The success of Katyusha in battle, its simple design and profitable production ensured that this weapon is still being manufactured and used to this day. “Katyusha” has become a common name for Russian BMRAs of various calibers, along with the prefix “BM”.

The most famous variant, the post-war BM-21 Grad, which entered the army arsenal in 1962, is still in use today. Like the BM-13, the BM-21 is based on simplicity, combat power and efficiency, which ensured its popularity both among the state military and among the militarized opposition, revolutionaries and other illegal groups. The BM-21 has forty missiles, which it launches at a distance of up to 35 kilometers, depending on the type of projectile.

There is also another option that appeared before the BM-21, namely in 1952 - BM-14, with a caliber of 140 mm. Interestingly, this weapon is widely used by extremists because it has a cheap, compact and mobile version. The last confirmed use of BM-14 was in 2013, in Civil War in Syria, where it has once again demonstrated the ability to provide enormous firepower in massive attacks.

This was inherited by the BM-27 and BM-30 BMRAs, which use 220 and 300 mm calibers, respectively. Such Katyushas can be equipped with long-range, system-guided missiles, allowing them to attack the enemy with much greater accuracy at greater distances than during World War II. The range of the BM-27 reaches 20 km, and the range of the BM-30 is up to 90 km. These installations can launch a huge number of projectiles in a very short time, making the old BM-13 look like an innocent toy. A well-coordinated 300-caliber salvo from several batteries can easily level an entire enemy division.

The latest successor to Katyusha, the Tornado MLRS, is a universal missile launcher that combines BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30 missiles on an eight-wheeled chassis. It uses automatic ammunition placement, targeting, satellite navigation and positioning systems, allowing it to fire with much greater accuracy than its predecessors. The Tornado MLRS is the future of Russian rocket artillery, ensuring that Katyusha will always remain in demand in the future.

Weapon of Victory - “Katyusha”

The first combat use of Katyushas is now quite well known: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland, on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large amount of military equipment accumulated in the market square of the town.

At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, a battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a direction unexpected for the enemy in the west, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa.

On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how missile launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about Flerov’s fulfillment of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said:

“Katyusha sang perfectly.”

In the photo: Commander of the first experimental Katyusha battery Captain Flerov. Died on October 7, 1941. But historians differ on who was the first to use Katyusha against tanks - too often in the initial period of the war, the situation forced such desperate decisions to be made.

The systematic use of the BM-13 to destroy tanks is associated with the name of the commander of the 14th separate guards mortar division, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin. This unit, made up of naval sailors, was originally called the 200th OAS Division and was armed with 130 mm fixed naval guns. Both guns and artillerymen performed well in the fight against tanks, but on October 9, 1941, by written order from the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General Vishnevsky, the 200th Artillery Division, having blown up stationary guns and ammunition for them, retreated to the east, but On October 12, he ended up in the Vyazemsky cauldron.

Having emerged from encirclement on October 26, the division was sent for reorganization, during which it was rearmed with Katyushas. The division was headed by the former commander of one of his batteries, Senior Lieutenant Moskvin, who was immediately awarded the rank of lieutenant commander. The 14th Separate Guards Mortar Division was included in the 1st Moscow Separate Detachment of Sailors, which took part in the Counter-Offensive Soviet troops near Moscow. At the end of May - beginning of June 1942, during a period of relative calm, Moskvin summed up the experience of fighting enemy armored vehicles and found a new way to destroy them. He was supported by the GMCH inspector, Colonel Alexey Ivanovich Nesterenko. Test firing was carried out. To give the guides a minimum elevation angle, the Katyushas drove their front wheels into dug recesses, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, smashed plywood mock-ups of tanks. So what if you break plywood? – skeptics doubted. – You still can’t defeat real tanks!

In the photo: shortly before death. There was some truth in these doubts, because the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. However, it turned out that when their fragments get into the engine part or gas tanks, a fire occurs, the tracks are interrupted, the turrets jam, and sometimes they are torn off the shoulder strap. An explosion of a 4.95-kilogram charge, even if it occurred behind the armor, incapacitates the crew due to severe concussion.

On July 22, 1942, in a battle north of Novocherkassk, Moskvin’s division, which by that time had been transferred to the Southern Front and included in the 3rd Rifle Corps, destroyed 11 tanks with two direct fire salvoes - 1.1 per installation, while a good result for the anti-tank division out of 18 guns, it was believed that two or three enemy tanks were destroyed.

Often, the mortar guards were considered the only force capable of providing organized resistance to the enemy. This forced front commander R.Ya. Malinovsky to create on July 25, 1942, on the basis of such units, a Mobile Mechanized Group (PMG) led by the commander of the GMC A.I. Nesterenko. It included three regiments and a BM-13 division, the 176th Infantry Division mounted on vehicles, a combined tank battalion, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery divisions. There were no such units before or since.

At the end of July, near the village of Mechetinskaya, the PMG encountered the main forces of the 1st German Tank Army, Colonel General Ewald Kleist. Intelligence reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry was moving,” Moskvin reported. “We chose a position near the road so that the batteries could fire at the same time. Motorcyclists appeared, followed by cars and tanks. Battery salvoes covered the entire depth of the column, damaged and smoking vehicles stopped, tanks flew at them like blind people and caught fire. The enemy's advance along this road stopped.

Several such attacks forced the Germans to change tactics. They left supplies of fuel and ammunition in the rear and moved in small groups: 15–20 tanks in front, followed by trucks with infantry. This slowed down the pace of the offensive, but created the threat of our PMG being bypassed from the flanks. In response to this threat, ours created their own small groups, each of which included a Katyusha division, a company of motorized rifles, anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries. One of these groups, Captain Puzik’s group, created on the basis of the 269th division of the 49th GMP, using the Moskvin method, destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 35 vehicles in two days of fighting near Peschanokopskaya and Belaya Glina.

The advance of enemy tanks and motorized infantry was stopped. The regiments of the 176th Infantry Division took up defense along the ridge of the hills at the Belaya Glina, Razvilnoe line. The front has temporarily stabilized.

A method of observation invented Captain-Lieutenant Moskvin. Not a single frontal attack by enemy tanks, much less motorized infantry, against the salvo fire of guards mortar units reached the target. Only flank detours and attacks forced the mobile group to retreat to other lines. That's why German tanks and the motorized infantry began to accumulate in the folds of the terrain, provoked a salvo of BM-13s with a false attack, and while they were reloading, which took five to six minutes, they made a rush. If the division did not respond to a false attack or fired with one installation, the Germans did not leave the shelters, waiting for the Katyushas to use up their ammunition. In response to this, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin used his own method of adjusting the fire. Having climbed to the top of the guide trusses, Moskvin monitored the area from this height.

The adjustment method proposed by Moskov was recommended to other units, and soon the schedule German offensive to the Caucasus was disrupted. A few more days of fighting - and the word “tank” could be removed from the name of the 1st Tank Army. The losses of the mortar guards were minimal.

At first, the guards fired at tanks from the slopes of the hills facing the enemy, but when our troops retreated to the Salsky steppes during the Battle of the Caucasus, the hills ended, and on the plain the Katyusha could not fire direct fire, and dig a corresponding hole under fire approaching enemy tanks was not always possible.

A way out of this situation was found on August 3 in a battle fought by the battery of Senior Lieutenant Koifman from the 271st Division of Captain Kashkin. She took up firing positions south of the farmstead. Soon observers noticed that enemy tanks and motorized infantry approached the village of Nikolaevskaya. The combat vehicles were aimed at a target that was clearly visible and within reach. A few minutes later, groups of tanks began to emerge from the village and descend into the ravine. Obviously, the Germans decided to covertly approach the battery and attack it. This roundabout maneuver was first noticed by the guard, Private Levin. The battery commander ordered the flank unit to be deployed towards the tanks. However, the tanks had already entered the dead zone, and even at the lowest angle of inclination of the RS-132 guide trusses they would have flown over them. And then, to reduce the aiming angle, Lieutenant Alexey Bartenyev ordered driver Fomin to drive his front wheels into the trench trench.

When there were about two hundred meters left to the nearest tank, guardsmen Arzhanov, Kuznetsov, Suprunov and Khilich opened direct fire. Sixteen shells exploded. The tanks were filled with smoke. Two of them stopped, the rest quickly turned around and retreated into the gully at high speed. There were no new attacks. 19-year-old Lieutenant Bartenyev, who invented this method of firing, died in the same battle, but since then the mortar guards began to use infantry trenches to give the guides a position parallel to the ground.

In early August, the movement of Army Group A slowed down, posing a threat to the right flank of Army Group B, which was marching on Stalingrad. Therefore, in Berlin, the 40th Tank Corps of Group B was redirected to the Caucasus, which should have broken into Stalingrad from the south. He turned to Kuban, made a raid on the Rural steppes (bypassing the PMG coverage area) and found himself on the approaches to Armavir and Stavropol.

Because of this, the commander of the North Caucasus Front, Budyonny, was forced to divide the PMG in two: one part of it was thrown into the Armaviro-Stavropol direction, the other covered Krasnodar and Maykop. For the battles near Maikop (but not for victories in the steppes), Moskvin was awarded the Order of Lenin. A year later he would be mortally wounded near the village of Krymskaya. Now this is the same Krymsk that suffered from the recent flood.

After the death of Moskvin, under the impression of his experience in fighting enemy tanks with the help of Katyushas, ​​cumulative shells RSB-8 and RSB-13 were created. Such shells took the armor of any tank of that time. However, they rarely found their way into Katyusha regiments - they were originally used to supply the Il-2 attack aircraft with rocket launchers.

THE LEGENDARY KATYUSHA IS 75 YEARS OLD!

June 30, 2016 will mark 75 years since the day when, by decision of the State Defense Committee, a design bureau for the production of the legendary Katyushas was created at the Moscow Kompressor plant. This rocket launcher terrified the enemy with its powerful salvoes and decided the outcome of many battles of the Great Patriotic War, including the battle for Moscow in October - December 1941. At that time, BM-13 combat vehicles went to defensive lines directly from the Moscow factory workshops.

Multiple launch rocket systems fought on different fronts, from Stalingrad to Berlin. At the same time, “Katyusha” is a weapon with a distinctly Moscow “pedigree”, rooted in pre-revolutionary times. Back in 1915, a graduate of the Faculty of Chemistry of Moscow University, engineer and inventor Nikolai Tikhomirov patented a “self-propelled rocket mine,” i.e. rocket-projectile, usable in water and in the air. The conclusion on the security certificate was signed by the famous N.E. Zhukovsky, at that time chairman of the invention department of the Moscow Military-Industrial Committee.

While the examinations were underway, the October Revolution happened. The new government, however, recognized Tikhomirov’s missile as having great defensive significance. To develop self-propelled mines, a Gas Dynamics Laboratory was created in Moscow in 1921, which Tikhomirov headed: for the first six years it worked in the capital, then moved to Leningrad and was located, by the way, in one of the ravelins of the Peter and Paul Fortress.

Nikolai Tikhomirov died in 1931 and was buried in Moscow at the Vagankovskoye cemetery. An interesting fact: in his other, “civilian” life, Nikolai Ivanovich designed equipment for sugar refineries, distilleries and oil mills.

The next stage of work on the future Katyusha also took place in the capital. On September 21, 1933, the Jet Research Institute was created in Moscow. Friedrich Zander was at the origins of the institute, and S.P. was the deputy director. Korolev. RNII maintained close contact with K.E. Tsiolkovsky. As we can see, the fathers of the Guards mortar were almost all the pioneers of domestic rocket technology of the 20th century.

One of the prominent names on this list is Vladimir Barmin. At the time when his work on new jet weapons began, the future academician and professor was a little over 30 years old. Shortly before the war he was appointed chief designer.

Who could have foreseen in 1940 that this young refrigeration engineer would become one of the creators of the world-famous weapons of World War II?

Vladimir Barmin retrained as a rocket scientist on June 30, 1941. On this day, a special design bureau was created at the plant, which became the main “think tank” for the production of Katyushas. Let us remember: work on the rocket launcher continued throughout the pre-war years and was completed literally on the eve of Hitler’s invasion. The People's Commissariat of Defense was looking forward to this miracle weapon, but not everything went smoothly.

In 1939, the first samples of aircraft rockets were successfully used during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In March 1941, successful field tests of the BM-13 installations (with the M-13 high-explosive fragmentation projectile of 132 mm caliber) were carried out, and already on June 21, literally a few hours before the war, a decree on their mass production was signed. Already on the eighth day of the war, production of Katyushas for the front began at Kompressor.

On July 14, 1941, the first Separate experimental battery of field rocket artillery of the Red Army was formed, led by Captain Ivan Flerov, armed with seven combat installations. On July 14, 1941, the battery fired a salvo at the railway junction of the city of Orsha, captured by fascist troops. Soon she successfully fought in the battles of Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk.

At the beginning of October 1941, while moving to the front line from the rear, Flerov's battery was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr (Smolensk region). Having shot all the ammunition and blown up the combat vehicles, most of the fighters and their commander Ivan Flerov died.

219 Katyusha divisions took part in the battles for Berlin. Since the fall of 1941, these units were given the title of Guards upon formation. Since the Battle of Moscow, not a single major offensive operation of the Red Army could have been carried out without fire support from Katyusha rockets. The first batches of them were completely manufactured at the capital's enterprises in those days when the enemy stood at the city walls. According to production veterans and historians, this was a real labor feat.

When the war began, it was the Kompressor specialists who were tasked with launching the production of Katyushas as soon as possible. Previously it was planned that these combat vehicles would be produced by the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern, however, the difficult situation at the fronts forced adjustments to this plan.

At the front, Katyusha represented a significant fighting force and was capable of single-handedly determining the outcome of an entire battle. 16 conventional heavy guns from the times of the Great Patriotic War could fire 16 high-power shells in 2 - 3 minutes. In addition, moving such a number of conventional guns from one firing position to another requires a lot of time. “Katyusha” mounted on a truck requires just a few minutes. So the uniqueness of the installations was in their high firepower and mobility. The noise effect also played a certain psychological role: it was not for nothing that the Germans, because of the strong roar that accompanied the Katyusha salvos, nicknamed it the “Stalinist organ.”

The work was complicated by the fact that in the fall of 1941 many Moscow enterprises were being evacuated. Some of the workshops and the Compressor itself were relocated to the Urals. But all the Katyusha production facilities remained in the capital. There were not enough qualified workers (they went to the front and the militia), equipment, and materials.

Many Moscow enterprises in those days worked in close cooperation with Kompressor, producing everything necessary for Katyushas. Machine-building plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich made rocket shells. Car repair plant named after. Voitovicha and the Krasnaya Presnya plant manufactured parts for the launchers. Precise mechanisms were supplied by the 1st watch factory.

All of Moscow united in difficult times to create a unique weapon capable of bringing Victory closer. And the role of “Katyusha” in the defense of the capital has not been forgotten by the descendants of the victors: monuments to the legendary guards mortar have been erected near several museums in Moscow and on the territory of the Kompressor plant. And many of its creators were awarded high state awards during the war.

The history of the creation of "Katyusha"

In the list of contractual work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Directorate (ABTU), the final payment for which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618с dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT tank -5 with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered a proven fact that the idea of ​​​​creating a mechanized multiple-charging installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of this period. Confirmation of the idea of ​​using cars to fire missiles in general was also found in the book “Rockets, their design and use,” authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the conclusion of this book, in particular, the following is written: “The main area of ​​application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, such as airplanes, small ships, vehicles of all kinds, and finally escort artillery.”

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, commissioned by the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical shells. It was necessary to make non-rapid-firing machines (such as a pipe). According to the agreement with the Artillery Department, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a stand and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was manufactured, which was then recognized as not meeting the requirements. At the same time, Research Institute No. 3 developed a mechanized multiple rocket launcher mounted on a modified ZIS-5 truck chassis with 24 rounds of ammunition. According to other data from the archives of the State Scientific Center FSUE “Keldysh Center” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations on vehicles were manufactured. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artillery Ground and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." Based on factory tests, it could be stated: the flight range of the RHS (depending on the specific gravity of the explosive agent) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000 m, Vd = (1/100)X and Vb = (1/70)X, useful volume of the explosive agent in a projectile - 6.5 liters, metal consumption per 1 liter of explosive agent - 3.4 kg/l, radius of dispersion of explosive agent when a projectile explodes on the ground is 15-20 liters, the maximum time required to fire the entire ammunition load of the vehicle is 3-4 seconds.

The mechanized rocket launcher was intended to provide a chemical attack with chemical rocket projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire across areas with both single shots and a salvo of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. “The installations, combined into batteries of 4–6 vehicles, represent a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers.”

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of toxic substance passed successful field and state tests; its adoption was planned in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of chemical missile projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, illuminating and other missile projectiles. 1st option without a guidance device - the number of shells in one salvo is 24, total weight toxic substance released in one salvo - 168 kg, 6 vehicle installations replace one hundred twenty howitzers of 152 mm caliber, vehicle reload speed is 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery Regiments. II-version with control device. Data not provided.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, tests were carried out on unguided 132 mm caliber rockets and an automatic launcher. However, the installation was submitted for testing unfinished and did not withstand them: a large number of failures were discovered when the missiles were discharged due to the imperfections of the corresponding installation components; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time-consuming; the rotating and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sighting devices did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See the gallery Tests of an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, designed by NII-3, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Test time: from 12/8/38 to 02/04/39).

The letter about the bonus for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for chemical attack (out. Scientific Research Institute No. 3, number 733c dated May 25, 1939 from the director of Scientific Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Ammunition comrade I.P. Sergeev) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gwai I.I. – leading designer; Popov A. A. – design technician; Isachenkov – installation mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. – prof. advised the subject; Luzhin V. – engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 rounds.

In a letter dated 14.II.1939 to Comrade Matveev (V.P.K. of the Defense Committee under the Supreme Soviet of the S.S.S.R.) signed by the Director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer and Deputy. Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer 1st rank Kostikov, says: “For ground forces, use the experience of a chemical mechanized installation for:

• the use of high-explosive fragmentation missiles to create massive fire in areas;
• the use of incendiary, illuminating and propaganda projectiles;
• development of a 203mm caliber chemical projectile and a mechanized installation providing double the firing range compared to existing chemicals.”

In 1939, Research Institute No. 3 developed two versions of experimental installations on a modified ZIS-6 truck chassis for launching 24 and 16 unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber. The installation of sample II differed from the installation of sample I in the longitudinal arrangement of the guides.

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 missile shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to fire a salvo of 16 missiles is 3.5 – 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes with a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the design load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Test Site (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see photos taken at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the first model cannot be allowed for military testing due to technical imperfections. The installation of model II, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the conclusion of the commission members, could be allowed for military testing after making significant design changes. Tests have shown that when firing, the installation of sample II sways and the elevation angle reaches 15″30′, which increases the dispersion of projectiles; when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it is necessary to note the characteristic directions in which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is further development of the II sample installation in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of a more advanced installation, different from the II sample installation. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“upgraded installation for RS” in the terminology of documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, provided for: constructive improvements to the lifting and rotating device, increasing the horizontal guidance angle, and simplifying the sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even to 7000 mm. The delivery date for the drawings was set for October 1941. Nevertheless, to conduct various types of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for RS were manufactured. Total number Different sources indicate different things: some say six, others say seven. The data from the archive of Research Institute No. 3 as of January 10, 1941 contains data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the superplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See letter UANA GAU No. 668059) Based on the available documents - the source states that there were eight installations, but at different times.On February 28, 1941 there were six of them.

The thematic plan of research and development work for 1940 of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB provided for the transfer to the customer - the Red Army AU - of six automatic installations for the RS-132mm. The report on the implementation of experimental orders in production for the month of November 1940 by Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB indicates that with the delivery batch of six installations to the customer by November 1940, the quality control department accepted 5 units, and the military representative - 4 units.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was tasked with developing a powerful rocket and rocket launcher in a short period of time to carry out the tasks of destroying the enemy’s long-term defensive structures on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the institute's team was a finned missile with a flight range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton of explosives and an installation with four guides on a T-34 tank or on a sled towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and missiles were sent to the combat area, but a decision was soon made to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad Scientific Testing Artillery Range. The war with Finland soon ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells disappeared. Further work on the installation and projectile was stopped.

In 1940, the department of 2n Research Institute No. 3 was asked to carry out work on the following objects:

• Object 213 – Electrified installation on a ZIS for firing lighting and signal signals. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 combat vehicle of the M-21 field rocket system).
• Object 214 – Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (remodeling and adaptation of object 204)
• Object 215 – Electrified installation on a ZIS-6 with a transportable reserve of R.S. and with a large range of aiming angles.
• Object 216 – Charging box for PC on trailer
• Object 217 – Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
• Object 218 – Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
• Object 219 – Anti-aircraft stationary installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
• Object 220 – Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with an electric current generator, aiming and firing control panel
• Object 221 – Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible range shooting of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
• Object 222 – Mechanized unit for tank escort
• Object 223 – Introduction of mass production of mechanized installations into industry.

In the letter to the acting Director of Research Institute No. 3 Kostikov A.G. about the possibility of submitting to K.V.Sh. with the USSR Council of People's Commissars for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

• rocket launcher for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate GB PR No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 dated February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvai Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilievich.
• tactical and technical justification for the scheme and design of the automatic installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
• testing of high-explosive fragmentation chemical rocket projectiles of 132 mm caliber. – Schwartz Leonid Emilievich, Artemyev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich.

The basis for nominating Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB dated December 26, 1940.

№1923

scheme 1, scheme 2

galleries

On April 25, 1941, tactical and technical requirements No. 1923 were approved for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made to urgently launch the production of M-13 rockets and M-13 installations (see. Scheme 1, Scheme 2). The production of M-13 units was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow Kompressor plant. One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of component installations and shells and the transition from mass production to mass production required the creation of a broad structure of cooperation in the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Nizhny Tagil, Krasnoyarsk, Kolpino, Murom, Kolomna and, possibly , other). It was necessary to organize a separate military acceptance of guards mortar units. For more information about the production of shells and their elements during the war, see our gallery website (follow the links below).

According to various sources, the formation of Guards mortar units began at the end of July - beginning of August (see:). In the first months of the war, the Germans already had information about the new Soviet weapons (see:).

In September-October 1941, on the instructions of the Main Armament Directorate of the Guards Mortar Units, the M-13 installation was developed on the STZ-5 NATI tractor chassis modified for installation. The development was entrusted to the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and SKB at the Moscow plant “Compressor”. SKB carried out the development more efficiently, and prototypes were manufactured and tested in a short time. As a result, the installation was put into service and put into mass production.

In the December days of 1941, SKB, on the instructions of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, developed, in particular, for the defense of the city of Moscow, a 16-round installation on an armored railway platform. The installation was a missile launcher of the serial M-13 installation on a modified ZIS-6 truck chassis with a modified base. (for more information about other works of this period and the war period in general, see: and).

At a technical meeting at SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The goal of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes previously made to various modifications of the M-13 installation and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and, when assembled, installed and assembled on a chassis cars of any brand without extensive processing of technical documentation, as was the case previously. The goal was achieved by dividing the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

When testing components and parts for the normalized combat installation BM-13N, the following were obtained:

• increase in the firing sector by 20%
• reduction of forces on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;
• doubling the vertical aiming speed;
• increasing the survivability of the combat installation by armoring the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas lines;
• increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;
• increasing the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;
• significant reduction in the volume of welding work, machining, elimination of bending of truss rods;
• reducing the weight of the unit by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cabin and the gas tank;
• reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation due to the assembly of the artillery part separately from the vehicle chassis and installation of the installation on the vehicle chassis using fastening clamps, which made it possible to eliminate the drilling of holes in the side members;
• reducing by several times the idle time of the chassis of vehicles arriving at the plant for installation of the unit;
• reduction in the number of standard sizes of fasteners from 206 to 96, as well as the number of part names: in the rotary frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to use a high-performance in-line method for assembling and installing the installation.

The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebaker series truck (see photo) with a 6x6 wheel arrangement, which was supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N mount was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified chassis of foreign-made trucks were also used.

At the end of 1942 V.V. Aborenkov proposed adding two additional pins to the M-13 projectile in order to launch it from dual guides. For this purpose, a prototype was made, which was a serial M-13 installation, in which the swinging part (guides and truss) was replaced. The guide consisted of two steel strips placed on an edge, each of them had a groove cut for the drive pin. Each pair of strips was fastened opposite each other with grooves in a vertical plane. The field tests carried out did not give the expected improvement in the accuracy of fire and the work was stopped.

At the beginning of 1943, SKB specialists carried out work to create installations with a normalized propellant installation for the M-13 installation on modified chassis of Chevrolet and ZIS-6 trucks. During January - May 1943, a prototype was manufactured on a modified Chevrolet truck chassis and field tests were carried out. The installations were adopted by the Red Army. However, due to the availability of sufficient quantities of chassis of these brands, they did not go into mass production.

In 1944, SKB specialists developed the M-13 installation on an armored chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle, modified for installation of a missile launcher, for launching M-13 projectiles. For this purpose, the normalized “beam” type guides of the M-13N installation were shortened to 2.5 meters and assembled into a package on two spars. The truss was made of shortened pipes in the form of a pyramidal frame, turned upside down, and served mainly as a support for fastening the screw of the lifting mechanism. The elevation angle of the guide package was changed from the cockpit using handwheels and the cardan shaft of the vertical guidance mechanism. A prototype was made. However, due to the weight of the armor, the front axle and springs of the ZIS-6 vehicle were overloaded, as a result of which further installation work was stopped.

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, SKB specialists and rocket projectile developers were faced with the question of improving the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber projectiles. To impart rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the projectile design along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the standard M-31 projectile, and was proposed for the M-8 projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the flight range indicator. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, designated M-13UK, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

During the same period, NII-1 specialists (Lead Designer V.G. Bessonov) developed and then tested the M-13DD projectile. The projectile had the best accuracy, but it could not be fired from the standard M-13 mounts, since the projectile had a rotational motion and, when launched from the usual standard guides, destroyed them, tearing off the linings from them. To a lesser extent, this also occurred when launching M-13UK projectiles. The M-13DD projectile was adopted by the Red Army at the end of the war. Mass production of the projectile was not organized.

At the same time, SKB specialists began exploratory design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of fire of M-13 and M-8 rockets by testing the guides. It was based on a new principle of launching rockets and ensuring they were strong enough to fire M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since imparting rotation to finned unguided rocket projectiles at the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born of imparting rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide took the form of a barrel formed by four spiral rods, three of which were smooth steel pipes, and the fourth, the leading one, was made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped cross-section profile. The rods were welded to the legs of the ring clips. In the breech there was a lock for holding the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. Special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting and welding of guide barrels along their length. Initially, the installation had 12 guides, rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of the 12-round M-13-CH installation were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the vehicle chassis was overloaded, and a decision was made to remove two guides from the upper cassettes. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of guides, a truss, a rotating frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. Except for the cassettes with guides and the truss, all other components were unified with the corresponding components of the M-13N normalized combat installation. Using the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD projectiles of 132 mm caliber. Significantly better indicators were obtained in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times) . With the improvement in the accuracy of firing M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK projectiles from M-13 installations that had “beam” type guides. There was no longer a need to manufacture M-13UK projectiles, which were complicated by drilling in the engine casing. Installation of the M-13-SN was simpler, less labor-intensive and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine operations have been eliminated: gouging long guides, drilling large quantity rivet holes, riveting of linings to guides, turning, calibration, manufacturing and threading of spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. The prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow Kompressor plant (No. 733) and were subjected to field and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation passed military tests in 1945 with good results. Due to the fact that the M-13 type projectiles had to be modernized, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of NCOM order No. 27 of October 24, 1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 a Brief Guide to the BM-13-SN combat vehicle was published

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, one of the directions in the development of rocket artillery was the use of missile launchers developed during the war for installation on modified types of domestically produced chassis. Several variants were created based on the installation of the M-13N on modified chassis of the ZIS-151 (see photo), ZIL-151 (see photo), ZIL-157 (see photo), ZIL-131 (see photo) trucks. .

M-13 type installations were exported to different countries after the war. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion of National Day 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing).

In 1959, while working on a projectile for the future M-21 Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of the ROFS M-13. This is what was written in the letter to the deputy director for scientific affairs of NII-147 (now FSUE SNPP Splav (Tula), signed by the chief engineer of plant No. 63 SSNH Toporov (State plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959с): “In response to your request No. 3265 dated 3/UII-59 about sending technical documentation on the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, and the security classification has been removed from the technical documentation.

The plant has outdated tracing papers of the technological process of machining the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopying machine, the album of technical processes will be blueprinted and sent to you no earlier than in a month.”

Compound:

Main cast:

• M-13 installations (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
• The main missiles are M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.

• Machines for transporting ammunition (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the rocket part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The projectile's jet powder engine consisted of a chamber, a nozzle cover that closed to seal the powder charge with two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering bulges with guide pins screwed into them. Guide pins held the projectile on the combat vehicle's guide before firing and directed its movement along the guide. The chamber contained a powder charge of nitroglycerin powder, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel bombs. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on a grate. To ignite a powder charge in top part The chamber contains an igniter made of black gunpowder. The gunpowder was placed in a special case. Stabilization of the M-13 projectile in flight was carried out using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, designated M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13-UK projectile has 12 tangentially located holes in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which, during operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escapes, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile’s flight range decreased somewhat (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and an increase in fire density by 3 times compared to M-13 projectiles. In addition, the M-13-UK projectile has a nozzle critical section diameter that is slightly smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Performance characteristics:

Characteristic	M-13	BM-13N	BM-13NM	BM-13NMM
Chassis	ZIS-6	ZIS-151,ZIL-151	ZIL-157	ZIL-131
Number of guides	8	8	8	8
Elevation angle, degrees: - minimal — maximum	+7 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45
Angle of horizontal fire, degrees: - to the right of the chassis - to the left of the chassis	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10
Handle force, kg: - lifting mechanism - rotary mechanism	8-10 8-10	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8
Dimensions in stowed position, mm: - length - width - height	6700 2300 2800	7200 2300 2900	7200 2330 3000	7200 2500 3200
Weight, kg: - package of guides - artillery unit - installations in combat position — installations in stowed position (without calculations)	815 2200 6200 —	815 2350 7890 7210	815 2350 7770 7090	815 2350 9030 8350
	2-3
	5-10
Full salvo time, s	7-10

Basic tactical and technical data of the BM-13 combat vehicle (on Studebaker) 1946
Number of guides	16
Projectile used	M-13, M-13-UK and 8 M-20 shells
Guide length, m	5
Guide type	straight
Minimum elevation angle, °	+7
Maximum elevation angle, °	+45
Horizontal guidance angle, °	20
	8
Also, on a rotating mechanism, kg	10
Overall dimensions, kg:
length	6780
height	2880
width	2270
Guide set weight, kg	790
Weight of artillery unit without shells and without chassis, kg	2250
The weight of a combat vehicle without shells, without crews, with a full tank of gasoline, snow chains, tools and spare parts. wheel, kg	5940
Weight of a set of shells, kg
M13 and M13-UK	680 (16 rounds)
M20	480 (8 shells)
Weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people. (2 in the cabin, 2 on the rear wings and 1 on the gas tank) with full refueling, tools, snow chains, spare wheel and M-13 shells, kg	6770
Axle loads from the weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people, fully loaded with spare parts and M-13 shells, kg:
to the front	1890
to the back	4880

Basic data of BM-13 combat vehicles
Characteristic	BM-13N on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13N on a modified Studebaker truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified Studebaker truck chassis
Number of guides*	16	16	16	16
Guide length, m	5	5	5	5
Maximum elevation angle, degrees	45	45	45	45
Minimum elevation angle, degrees	8±1°	4±30 ‘	7	7
Horizontal aiming angle, degrees	±10	±10	±10	±10
Force on the handle of the lifting mechanism, kg	up to 12	up to 13	to 10	8-10
Force on the rotating mechanism handle, kg	up to 8	up to 8	8-10	8-10
Guide package weight, kg	815	815	815	815
Artillery unit weight, kg	2350	2350	2200	2200
Weight of the combat vehicle in the stowed position (without people), kg	7210	7210	5520	5520
Weight of the combat vehicle in combat position with shells, kg	7890	7890	6200	6200
Length in stowed position, m	7,2	7,2	6,7	6,7
Width in stowed position, m	2,3	2,3	2,3	2,3
Height in stowed position, m	2,9	3,0	2,8	2,8
Time to transfer from traveling to combat position, min	2-3	2-3	2-3	2-3
Time required to load a combat vehicle, min	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
Time required to fire a salvo, sec	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10
Combat vehicle index	52-U-9416	8U34	52-U-9411	52-TR-492B

NURS M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1
Ballistic index	TS-13
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation
Fuse type	GVMZ-1
Caliber, mm	132
Total projectile length, mm	1465
Stabilizer blade span, mm	300
Weight, kg: - finally equipped projectile - equipped warhead — explosive charge of the warhead - powder rocket charge - equipped jet engine	42.36 21.3 4.9 7.05-7.13 20.1
Projectile weight coefficient, kg/dm3	18.48
Head filling coefficient, %	23
Current required to ignite the squib, A	2.5-3
	0.7
Average reactive force, kgf	2000
Projectile exit speed from the guide, m/s	70
	125
Maximum projectile flight speed, m/s	355
Tabular maximum projectile range, m	8195
Deviation at maximum range, m: - by range - lateral	135 300
Powder charge burning time, s	0.7
Average reaction force, kg	2000 (1900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Muzzle velocity of the projectile, m/s	70
Length of the active trajectory section, m	125 (120 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Highest projectile flight speed, m/s	335 (for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Maximum projectile flight range, m	8470 (7900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)

According to the English catalog Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section of Egypt, in the mid-90s of the 20th century due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type Arab Organization for Industrialization was engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets. Analysis of the data presented below allows us to conclude that we're talking about about the M-13UK type projectile.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with the majority of production facilities located in Egypt and with major funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three Gulf states withdrew their funds earmarked for the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and at that time (Jane's Armor and Artillery catalog data 1982-1983) Egypt received other aid in projects.

Characteristics of the Sakr 132 mm caliber missile (RS type M-13UK)
Caliber, mm	132
Length, mm
full shell	1500
head part	483
rocket engine	1000
Weight, kg:
starting	42
head part	21
fuse	0,5
rocket engine	21
fuel (charge)	7
Maximum tail span, mm	305
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation (with 4.8 kg of explosive)
Fuse type	inertial cocked, contact
Fuel type (charge)	dibasic
Maximum range (at an elevation angle of 45º), m	8000
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	340
Fuel (charge) burning time, s	0,5
Projectile speed when meeting an obstacle, m/s	235-320
Minimum fuse arming speed, m/s	300
Distance from the combat vehicle for arming the fuse, m	100-200
Number of oblique holes in the rocket engine housing, pcs.	12

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941 under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations manufactured in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3. With its first salvo at 15:15 on July 14, 1941 year, the battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction from the face of the earth, along with the German trains with troops and military equipment located on it.

The exceptional efficiency of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 three-battery divisions with four launchers per battery operated at the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 M-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with M-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1,414 personnel, 36 M-13 launchers and 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The regiment's salvo amounted to 576 132mm shells. At the same time, enemy manpower and military equipment were destroyed over an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Regiments of the Reserve Artillery of the Supreme High Command. Unofficially, the rocket artillery installations were called "Katyusha". According to the memoirs of Evgeny Mikhailovich Martynov (Tula), former child During the war, in Tula at first they were called hellish machines. We would like to note that multi-charge machines were also called hellish machines and in the 19th century.

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