At a time when the Germans were conducting a decisive assault on Sevastopol, the forces of the defenders were uncontrollably melting away. The supply of reinforcements and ammunition by sea by transports and warships did not have time to compensate for the loss. There was a threat that the city would fall in the first week of January 1942. In such a difficult situation, the Soviet command decides to conduct a landing operation in the area of ​​​​Kerch and Feodosia in order to pull enemy forces away from Sevastopol.

The Kerch enemy group consisted of units of the 46th Infantry Division of the 11th German army, 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade, two tank battalions, two field artillery regiments and five anti-aircraft artillery battalions. By the beginning of January 1942, the enemy group was reinforced by the 73rd Infantry Division. Its total number did not exceed 25 thousand people. The troops were covered from the air by two air groups. It was taken into account that with the start of the operation the enemy could transfer reinforcements to the Kerch Peninsula from near Sevastopol. The basis of defense on the peninsula was a system of fortified strongholds, which were located along the coast and consisted of field-type fortifications that were in fire interconnection. The city of Feodosia was turned into an anti-landing defense hub. Its garrison numbered more than 2 thousand people. The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula reached: personnel - up to 25 thousand people, guns - up to 180, tanks - 118.

In addition, two aviation groups with up to 100 aircraft were based at airfields in the Kerch region. It could also be supported by aviation from airfields located in the areas of Simferopol and Saki. The enemy naval forces operating in the Black Sea were based in the ports of Romania and Bulgaria and did not undertake active military operations against the Black Sea Fleet, limiting themselves to providing maritime communications along the coasts of Bulgaria and Romania.

The idea of ​​the operation was to simultaneously land the 51st (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov) and 44th (Major General A.N. Pervushin) armies in the Kerch region and in the Feodosia port to encircle and destroy the Kerch enemy group . In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive deep into the peninsula, release the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region and completely liberate Crimea. The landing of troops was entrusted to

The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla that was part of it. The general leadership of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Transcaucasian (from December 30 - Caucasian) Front, General D.T. Kozlov.

The development of the operation plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, taking into account its addition by proposals from the command of the Black Sea Fleet. To carry it out, the lion's share of all combat-ready forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla, a number of marine units, as well as the 51st and 44th combined arms armies were involved. The landing detachments included several tank companies equipped with T-26 light tanks and T-38 amphibious tankettes.

The landing was planned to be carried out simultaneously on a wide 250-km front of the coast of the Kerch Peninsula (from Arabatskaya Strelka to Feodosia), which was supposed to disperse the attention and efforts of the defending enemy troops. The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Feodosia direction by the forces of the 44th Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet. The second blow was to be delivered by the 51st Army in cooperation with the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base in the Kerch direction. Preparations for the operation were ordered to be completed by December 19 in order to begin on December 21.

In addition, the plan for the Kerch-Feodosia operation also provided for the use of airborne troops of up to a brigade to capture Vladislavovka. Options for a more daring use of paratroopers were also explored, including an airborne assault on Dzhankoy, the largest railway junction in Crimea north of Simferopol.

In accordance with the operation plan, on December 26-27, landing troops were landed on several bridgeheads north and south of Kerch. However, during their landing, the paratroopers suffered serious losses, and then, having already captured the bridgeheads, they were surrounded by the enemy. The position of the landed troops especially worsened in the next two days, when a strong storm and freezing of the Azov Sea disrupted the delivery of reinforcements and supplies to the bridgeheads. As a result, the goal of the landing troops - the capture of Kerch - was not achieved in the first three days.

Despite this, it was decided, in accordance with the plan, to carry out a landing in the Feodosia area. At the same time, the ships of the squadron were given the following tasks: to land vanguard landing of two regiments to the port of Feodosia, suppress enemy opposition at the landing sites with artillery fire, and then support the landing operations with artillery.

To solve these problems, two detachments of ships were formed under the overall command of Captain 1st Rank N.E. Basistogo. To the landing and artillery support detachment, commanded by Captain 1st Rank V.A. Andreev, included the cruisers "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea", the destroyers "Nezamozhnik", "Zheleznyakov" and "Shaumyan" (all three are of the "Novik" type), as well as the transport "Kuban". This detachment was assigned the letter "A". A detachment of landing craft under the command of Lieutenant Commander A.I. Ivanov was formed from the minesweepers “Shield”, “Vzryv” and 12 hunting boats of the MO-4 type.

In total, the first (assault) landing echelon included two cruisers, three destroyers, two minesweepers and 12 MO-4 boats. The landing force itself consisted of units of the 251st mountain rifle and 633rd rifle regiments with a total number of more than 5 thousand soldiers and commanders.

After the landing of the first echelon and the capture of the bridgehead, two detachments of transports with security forces were supposed to deliver the main forces of the 44th Army - the 263rd Rifle and 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions - to Feodosia. Also, on the “Jean Zhores” transport, 20 T-38 light amphibious tanks were delivered to the landing site, and on the “Kalinin” transport - 14 T-26 tanks.

In total, the operation plan provided for the landing of almost 23 thousand soldiers of the 44th Army in three echelons in Feodosia. But the sailors had to play a vital role in this landing operation - to ensure the capture of the landing bridgehead.

To solve this problem, a Marine assault detachment of 600 people was formed as part of the first echelon of the landing force under the command of Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinova. Together with the assault detachment, reconnaissance detachments of the fleet headquarters and the hydrographic department of the fleet, as well as adjustment groups of ships of the landing detachment and artillery support, also landed. This detachment was supposed to be landed on land from the MO-4 boat.

Landing detachment “A” approached Feodosia on the night of December 29, and at 3 hours 48 minutes N.E. Basisty ordered the start of artillery preparations for the landing.

The ships opened fire on the port and artillery batteries. The destroyers fired the first salvo of illuminating shells, then the cruisers opened fire. At 4 o'clock the landing craft began moving into the port.

The first to break into the waters of the Feodosia port was the boat “MO-0131” (commander - Lieutenant I.G. Chernyak), the second was “MO-013” (commander - Lieutenant

N.N. Vlasov) with the commander of the landing craft detachment, Lieutenant Commander A.I. Ivanov on board. They landed marines and spotters on the Protective (Long) pier.

The landing group was led by the commander of the small hunter detachment, Senior Lieutenant V.I. Chupov. The Marines quickly captured the lighthouse building on the pier, and then began to advance along the pier towards the shore. The hydrographers who were part of this group measured the depths at the pier to determine the mooring places for ships.

After the lighthouse was captured, the signal “Free entry” was transmitted from it to the ships. Having received it, at 4 hours 10 minutes N.E. Basisty gave the order for minesweepers and destroyers to break into the port.

The destroyer “Shaumyan” was the first to moor at the Shiroky Pier at 4:26 a.m. and began landing paratroopers. But at this time, having recovered from the unexpected invasion, the enemy concentrated fire on the stationary ship. And although the landing of the paratroopers took only a few minutes, the unloading of cargo, mainly ammunition, required much more time. Therefore, the ship was hit by several shells, the fragments of which killed and wounded about 20 people. However, only after completely unloading the cargo did the Shaumyan leave the port. In the same difficult conditions, troops landed at the port from the destroyers Nezamozhnik and Zheleznyakov.

The time has come to land troops from the cruisers "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea". To do this, in accordance with the plan, the “Red Caucasus” was supposed to moor on its left side to the outer side of the Shirokoy Mole. However, due to the strong squeezing wind, he was not immediately able to perform this maneuver. Then, at 5 hours 08 minutes, two mines hit this cruiser, their explosion killed several people, and a fire started in the first pipe. Then an enemy shell hit the foremast and caused a fire in the chart room area. At 5:23 a.m., an artillery shell pierced the armor and exploded inside the fighting compartment of the second turret. Despite this, the cruiser began landing troops.

All this time, the cruiser fired at the enemy using a 180 mm main caliber cannon, 100 mm and 76 mm guns. He suppressed enemy batteries located on the heights around the city, and also dispersed a column of vehicles with infantry approaching the city. At 8:15 a.m., having completed the landing and unloading of equipment, “Red Caucasus” moved away from the pier to the outer roadstead, from where it continued to fire at the enemy based on data from correction posts.

The cruiser "Red Crimea" anchored in the outer roadstead, three cable lengths from the entrance to the port, and at 4:50 a.m. also began landing troops, using first the ship's watercraft, and then the MO-4 boats and the minesweeper "Shield". The landing from this cruiser was completed at 9:30 am.

At 7:20 a.m., the Kuban transport moored in the port captured by the assault detachment, from which 627 troops were disembarked and 9 guns, 6 mortars, 15 vehicles and about 112 tons of ammunition, food, etc. were unloaded.

Thus, in the period from December 28 to 31, the 157th and 236th rifle divisions, the 63rd mountain rifle division and the 251st were transported and landed in the Feodosia area. rifle regiment 9th Mountain Rifle Division. In total, these forces included 23 thousand personnel, 1,550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 vehicles and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo.

By that time, from 5 o’clock in the morning, street battles were already taking place in Feodosia. By the end of December 29, the paratroopers captured the city, although individual enemy groups continued to resist on December 30.

Writer Konstantin Simonov, who arrived in Feodosia on January 1, 1942, saw the following picture: “All the piers, the entire shore were cluttered with boxes of ammunition, some other boxes and cars. In the distance one could see the fantastic outlines of shattered warehouses, blown-up iron, and roofs bent and raised into the sky. Near the low port wall, which I remembered in Feodosia from childhood, from the year twenty-four, the twisted corpses of Germans lay scattered.

Having wandered a little among this entire labyrinth of ruins and debris - the result of our artillery shelling on the night of the landing and the German bombing that followed our landing - we got out of the port... By the appearance and number of vehicles it was not difficult to determine what and where the Germans were located . The corpses lying on the streets were sometimes half naked: the Germans, taken by surprise, often jumped out of the houses in anything they could find, and many were killed right in their houses.”

Having landed in Feodosia and gained a foothold in this city, the landing forces began to advance to the west and southwest, in the directions to Old Crimea, Karagoz and Koktebel, as well as in the northern direction to Vladislavovka, which was a major road junction.

At that time, the Kerch Peninsula was held by the German 42nd Army Corps from the 11th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Count von Sponeck. This corps included the 46th Infantry Division and a number of separate units. In addition, the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade and a very capable motorized brigade under the command of Colonel Radu Corne, which was better known as the Cornet Brigade, were also subordinate to von Sponeck. According to estimates, the total number of troops under Sponeck's control reached 35 thousand people. But since the enemy did not expect a landing, only the duty units actually carried out the defense, and both Romanian brigades were on the march at that time, far east of Feodosia. In the event of a successful attack by the landing forces on Vladislavovka and further north, there was a threat that the 42nd Army Corps and Romanian units could be cut off on the Kerch Peninsula.

In such a situation, the commander of the 42nd Army Corps decides to withdraw troops from Kerch in order to, together with the Romanian brigades, attack the paratroopers in the area of ​​​​Vladislavovka and Feodosia in order to avoid encirclement and connect with the main forces of the 11th Army. This allowed Soviet troops to capture Kerch with minimal effort, essentially without bloodshed.

At the same time, the main battles between the advanced units of the 44th Soviet Army and the enemy 42nd Army Corps on December 30 - January 1, 1942 took place in the vicinity of Vladislavovka and in the village itself. In addition to infantry, artillery and Romanian cavalry, Soviet T-26 tanks, Romanian R-1 tankettes and several German StuG assault guns took part in these battles. III. A witness to these battles, the German historian Paul Karel, described what happened near Vladislavovka as follows:

“On the morning of December 31, 1941, the leading battalions of the 46th Infantry Division reached the Parpach Isthmus. But the head units of the Soviet 63rd Rifle Division got there before them and captured Vladislavovka, north of Feodosia...

Attack, break through and take Vladislavovka! - General Gimer ordered the 46th Infantry Division. The troops quickly lined up for the attack on a flat snow-covered plateau. The icy wind blowing from the Caucasus pierced their thin overcoats and made their blood run cold. Tears of weakness and helplessness flowed down her unshaven cheeks.

The exhausted regiments advanced another six and a half kilometers. Then they stopped. Exhausted, the soldiers simply fell into the snow.”

But this is poetry, albeit a bitter one... In the battles near Vladislavovka, the German 42nd Army Corps suffered a heavy defeat, almost all of its heavy material was lost, and above all all its artillery. Soviet troops retained Kerch, Feodosia, and the entire Kerch Peninsula. However, subsequently the troops of the 44th and 51st armies failed to advance further to the west - to Dzhankoy and Simferopol. Manstein, having removed several divisions from near Sevastopol, was able to stop the Soviet offensive in the area of ​​​​Vladislavovka and Kiet.

In order to develop the offensive, by decision of the Soviet command, on December 31, in the area of ​​​​the village of Ak-Monaya, located at the base of the Arabatskaya Strelka spit, northeast of Vladislavovka, an airborne assault force up to a battalion was landed under the command of Major Nyashin. The landing was carried out by a group of 19 heavy special-purpose TB-3 bombers from the 250th and 14th heavy bomber air regiments.

Immediately after the landing, Soviet paratroopers captured a German stronghold and a coastal battery in the Ak-Monaya area. Participant of the landing, S.P., later recalled how this happened. Vyskubov:

“The Nazis abandoned their vehicles, weapons, property and fled to the west of the Crimean Peninsula...

A group led by battalion commander Nyashin was operating next to us. The paratroopers attacked a convoy accompanying a column of Soviet prisoners of war and destroyed it, freeing sixty people, some of whom were immediately armed with captured weapons.

Soon everyone together raided the village of Kiet, where the Romanian infantry regiment. This operation was so swift that the enemy left all his property, staff documents, military maps and fled in horror, suffering heavy losses...

A few days later, on the ship Anatoly Serov, we returned from our first raid to Krasnodar, presenting the front intelligence department with a valuable trophy - staff documents of the 46th German Infantry Division and the Romanian regiment, as well as operational intelligence reports and orders for the 42nd Corps of the 11th. th German army, two encryption machines."

As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, over several days of combat operations, the Soviet marines, ground army, and paratroopers were able to recapture the ports of Kerch and Feodosia, as well as many other settlements, from the enemy and advance 100-110 km to the west.

In the battles, the enemy suffered significant casualties, 100 various guns and mortars, as well as over 800 trucks and cars were captured. But the main thing was that the most important strategic task was solved: the German command was forced to interrupt the assault on Sevastopol at the most critical moment.

Hitler was very dissatisfied with the actions of the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, General von Sponeck. For his panicked abandonment of Kerch, he was removed from office, put on trial and sentenced to death. True, at the last moment, Hitler, by personal decree, replaced the execution of the general with imprisonment, but on July 23, 1944, von Sponeck was nevertheless executed during the mass repressions that followed the assassination attempt on Hitler.

Of particular interest is how the commander of the 11th German Army E. von Manstein describes the events that took place in the region of Kerch and Feodosia in his memoirs in his book “Lost Victories.” This material is offered to the reader with minor abbreviations:

“On December 26, the enemy, having transported two divisions across the Kerch Gulf, landed troops on both sides of the city of Kerch. This was followed by the landing of smaller troops on the northern coast of the peninsula.

The command of the 42nd Army Corps (General Count Sponeck), which had only one 46th Infantry Division at its disposal for the defense of the peninsula, found itself, of course, in an unenviable position. Count Sponeck therefore requested permission from the army command to leave the Kerch Peninsula, meaning to block the exits from it at the Parpach Isthmus. But the army command did not share his opinion...

The army command ordered the 42nd Army Corps, taking advantage of the weakness of the enemy that had just landed, to throw it into the sea. In order to/fulfill this task/the army command sent to the Feodosia area... the 4th Romanian mountain brigade... the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade and... the last of the regiments of the 73rd infantry regiment withdrawn from the Crimea (reinforced 213th infantry regiment ).

The 46th Infantry Division actually managed to eliminate enemy bridgeheads north and south of Kerch by December 28, with the exception of a small strip of land on the northern coast. Nevertheless, Count Sponeck again requested permission to leave the Kerch Peninsula. The army command categorically objected to this.

On December 29, we received a report from Feodosia that at night the enemy had landed troops there under the cover of significant naval forces. The small forces of our troops stationed near Feodosia (one engineer battalion, anti-tank destroyer artillery and several coastal batteries; the Romanians arrived in Feodosia only during the first half of the day) were not able to prevent the landing. Telephone communication with the headquarters of the 42nd Corps, located approximately in the center of the peninsula, was interrupted.

At 10 o'clock a radiogram was received from him stating that Count Sponeck, in view of the enemy's landing at Feodosia, ordered the immediate abandonment of the Kerch Peninsula. The order of the army command prohibiting this withdrawal was no longer accepted by the radio station of the corps headquarters. Although it was possible to agree with the fears of the corps headquarters, which was afraid of being cut off from the 46th Infantry Division on the Kerch Peninsula by an enemy landing force, we still believed that an overly hasty withdrawal could in no way contribute to improving the situation...

Simultaneously with the order prohibiting the abandonment of the Kerch Peninsula (this order, as mentioned above, could no longer be accepted by the headquarters of the 42nd Army Corps), the army command gave the order to the Romanian mountain corps with the forces of the two brigades mentioned above and the Romanian motorized regiment that was on the way to immediately reset An enemy landing force landed in the sea near Feodosia. We, however, had no illusions about the offensive spirit of the Romanian formations. But the enemy could not yet have large forces on land near Feodosia. Decisive action could take advantage of this weakness. We had reason to hope that the Romanians would at least be able to keep the enemy within a small bridgehead near Feodosia until German troops arrived. But this hope was not destined to come true. The offensive of the Romanian mountain corps on Feodosia was not only unsuccessful, but moreover, the Romanians retreated before a few Soviet tanks, moving away from the line east of the city Old Crimea.

The 46th Infantry Division with a forced march reached the Parpach Isthmus. But at the same time she had to leave most of her guns on the icy roads. Moreover, its personnel were completely exhausted by the hardships of this retreat.

Following the 46th Infantry Division, the enemy was immediately able to begin pursuit from the small bridgeheads remaining behind him. Kerch Strait froze, which allowed the enemy to quickly bring up new forces. If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector Eastern Front 11th Army. The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided. A more decisive enemy could have paralyzed all the army's supplies with a rapid breakthrough on Dzhankoy. The troops recalled from Sevastopol - the 170th Infantry Division, and after the cessation of the offensive from the north, the 132nd Infantry Division - could arrive in the area west or north-west of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later.

But the enemy failed to take advantage of the favorable moment... From the operational maps we captured, it was clear that the 4th Army that landed at Feodosia had only one goal - to reach the area west and north-west of the city of Stary Krym by January 4 with the forces available by that time in at its disposal with six divisions, in order to then take up defense at the achieved line... But the enemy did not actually even reach the above-mentioned line west of the city of Old Crimea.

The 51st Army advancing through Kerch pursued the 46th Infantry Division very hesitantly. The 44th Army, which landed at Feodosia... to our surprise, sent its main forces... to the east, towards the 51st Army. The enemy clearly saw only his tactical goal - the destruction of our forces on the Kerch Peninsula - and completely lost sight of the operational goal - crossing the main vital artery of the 11th Army.

Thus, we managed to create from the exhausted 46th Infantry Division, the reinforced 213th Infantry Division, which had arrived in the meantime, and the Romanian units, a very fragile covering front at the line between the northern spurs of Yayla near the Old Crimea - the coast of Sivash west of Ak-Monai. All officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers (including from the army headquarters) who could be released were sent to strengthen the Romanian units, and they were also supposed to ensure the correct use of heavy weapons by the Romanians...

Finally, on January 15, everything was ready for a counterattack on Feodosia with the forces of the 30th and 42nd AK. It was not easy to decide on this attack. It was to be carried out by three and a half German divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade against the enemy, whose forces had now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. While the enemy had tanks, albeit in limited numbers, we had none. Air support was in question due to bad weather. Nevertheless... thanks to the bravery of the troops... the offensive was a success... By January 18, Feodosia was in our hands. The enemy lost 6,700 people killed, 10,000 prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks."

Also of some interest is the opinion of E. von Manstein regarding the case of General Sponeck, who was his direct subordinate. In particular, he wrote that “the case of Count Sponeck shows how tragic the conflict between the obligation to carry out an order and his own opinion about operational necessity can be for a military leader. He knows that by disobeying an order he is risking his life, and yet he may be forced to act contrary to the order...

Having received a report that, contrary to the repeated orders of the army commander prohibiting withdrawal from the Kerch Peninsula, the corps commander nevertheless ordered his troops to withdraw, I removed Count Sponeck from command... because I was not sure that he was capable of doing so. time to cope with the critical situation on the Kerch Peninsula...

As a circumstance mitigating Count Sponeck's guilt, it was necessary to admit that he found himself in an extremely difficult situation, that, having found himself in an extremely difficult situation, he was deeply convinced that it was impossible to do otherwise.

As soon as I learned of the verdict, in a report addressed to the commander of the army group, I stood up for Count Sponeck and demanded that, first of all, they listen to me again. Field Marshal von Bock fully supported my position. However, we only received Keitel's response, which rejected our point of view in a completely unjustifiably harsh form... My repeated attempts to achieve the complete rehabilitation of Sponeck remained unsuccessful. Then he was vilely shot by order of Himmler after July 20, 1944.” .

Thus, as a superior commander, Field Marshal General E. von Manstein, to a certain extent, even justifies the unauthorized act of his subordinate, referring to the operational rationality of his decision in the current situation. On the one hand, this is a somewhat new approach to the relationship between boss and subordinate, on the other hand - and this should not be forgotten - Manstein wrote the book after the end of the war, at a time when it was no longer dangerous to openly accuse Hitler of injustice. It is possible that it was the latter circumstance that played a decisive role in his assessments and conclusions.

In general, if we talk about the Kerch-Feodosia operation, it should be noted that this is the first major landing operation of the Red Army since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Its implementation significantly contributed to improving the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front and led to the disruption of the enemy’s second offensive on Sevastopol. With the capture of the Kerch Peninsula at the beginning of 1942, Soviet troops eliminated the threat of an enemy offensive from the Crimea to the Kuban and the Caucasus.

It lasted for nine days and was fought at a front of about 250 km. The maximum depth of advance of Soviet troops was 110 km, the average daily rate of advance of rifle formations fluctuated between 10-12 km per day. During this operation Soviet troops(together with the fleet) irrevocably lost almost 35 thousand people killed, captured and missing, and about 9.5 thousand people wounded and sick.

At the same time, this landing operation, as the most complex method of combat operations, showed the need for special precision in its preparation and conduct, especially in the field of control of ground, sea and air forces.

It must be admitted that in this operation there was essentially no unified command. The commander of the Caucasian Front had command post in Tbilisi, and the operational group in Krasnodar. The command of the Black Sea Fleet was located in Novorossiysk and also could not exercise overall control of the operation, since the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base were operationally subordinate to the commander of the 51st Army. At the same time, the commander of the Azov military flotilla and the commander of the Kerch naval base were on land and, therefore, could not control all the detachments at sea. In addition, the detachments of ships at sea were not united under a single command.

As a result of major deficiencies in management, the landing forces landed in the Kerch region and in Feodosia were delayed at the landing points and slowly advanced deeper into the Kerch Peninsula. The enemy was forced out of the peninsula, but was not surrounded and destroyed.

The operation failed to achieve the secrecy of preparation, surprise and swiftness of the landing. The landing of troops on ships was discovered by enemy aerial reconnaissance, as it was carried out not only at night, but also during the day. The secrecy of the transition of detachments by the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base was also violated - most of them did not have time to complete the transition by sea by the morning.

To provide fire support for the landing, a special naval support detachment was not formed in the Azov military flotilla; the detachments of ships did not have sufficient firepower, and therefore the landing forces suffered significant losses from enemy fire during the landing.

The operations clearly demonstrated the enormous importance of air support for landing forces, as well as the importance of the air defense system. The Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task of gaining air supremacy. Due to the remoteness of the airfields, our fighter aircraft could not organize reliable air cover for the landing detachments during the sea crossing, in the landing areas, especially in the most remote places (Cape Zyuk, Feodosia), as well as during the development of the operation on land. Having refused an airborne landing in Vladislavovka, the Soviet command was deprived of the opportunity to quickly relocate part of the fighter aircraft to the local airfield, from where it was possible to organize effective support for the troops. At the same time activity Soviet aviation was quite high. Thus, during the period from December 26 to January 2, it carried out 1,250 sorties.

The operation did not pay due attention to organizing the defense of the landing points captured by the first landings. Often the units that made up these forces sought to advance as deep as possible while leaving their flanks exposed. The enemy, striking on the flanks, prevented the landing of subsequent echelons.

The Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base did not pay sufficient attention to organizing communications with the floating assets involved in the operation (seiners, tugs). When going to sea, communication with these means, as a rule, ceased. The weather service did not work satisfactorily. All this as a whole significantly reduced the effectiveness of the operation and negatively affected its progress and outcome.

Notes

. Manstein E. Lost victories. M.: AST, 2003. pp. 255-258.

. Manstein E. Lost victories. pp. 258-264.

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Statistical research. M., 2001. P. 277.

Kerch landing operation- a major landing operation of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. It took place from December 26, 1941 to May 20, 1942.

Despite its initial success, the operation ended in major failure: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated; total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as significant amount heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing party had a serious impact on the fate of besieged Sevastopol and made it easier for the Wehrmacht to attack the Caucasus in the summer.

Previous Events

The battles for Crimea began at the end of September 1941. On September 26, units of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht broke through the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus and entered the peninsula. The remnants of the 51st Army were evacuated to Kuban by November 16. The only center of resistance remained Sevastopol with the adjacent fortified area. The Wehrmacht's attempt to take Sevastopol on the move during October 30 - November 21, 1941 failed. To continue the siege of Sevastopol, the commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, pulled most of his available forces to the city, leaving only one infantry division to cover the Kerch region. The Soviet command decided to use this circumstance to launch a retaliatory strike with the forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet.

Operation plan

On December 7, the Supreme High Command Headquarters set the command of the Transcaucasian Front (commander - D. T. Kozlov, chief of staff - F. I. Tolbukhin) the task of preparing and conducting an amphibious operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula within two weeks. The operation plan drawn up by Tolbukhin was to encircle and destroy the Kerch enemy group by simultaneously landing the 51st and 44th armies in the Kerch area and in the Feodosia port. In the future, it was planned to develop an offensive deeper into the peninsula, unblock Sevastopol and completely liberate Crimea.

The main blow, in the Feodosia region, was to be delivered by the 44th Army (Gen. A. N. Pervushin), removed from the Iranian border, and the auxiliary blow, in the Kerch region, by the 51st Army (Gen. V. N. Lvov). The landing of troops was planned to be carried out on a wide front (up to 250 km) at several points simultaneously in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to maneuver reserves and tie him down in all the most important directions.

Stage 1: landing

Strengths of the parties

Soviet troops

The landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars:

• 44th Army (Major General A. N. Pervushin) consisting of: 157th, 236th, 345th and 404th rifle divisions, 9th and 63rd mountain rifle divisions, 1st and 2nd detachments of sailors 9th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet under the 44th Army.
• 51st Army (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov)) consisting of: 224th, 302nd, 390th and 396th rifle divisions, 12th rifle brigade, 83rd marine brigade

To support them, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, a total of over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:

• Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky)
• Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)

As of December 20, the air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula totaled about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft); the Black Sea Fleet had approximately 200 aircraft.

The 156th, 398th and 400th rifle divisions and the 72nd cavalry division were also in reserve on the Taman Peninsula.

German troops:

The oranization of the Kerch Peninsula was carried out by:

• Part of the troops of the 46th Division (42nd Army Corps of the 11th Army)
• 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade
• 4th Mountain Infantry Brigade
• 2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery divisions

Landing

At the end of December 1941, units of the Transcaucasian Front, with the support of ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov-Black Sea Flotilla, carried out an amphibious landing: on December 26 in the Kerch area and on December 29 in the Feodosia area. The initial number of troops was more than 40 thousand people,

In Feodosia, the unloading of landing forces took place at the port. The resistance of the German garrison (3 thousand people) was broken by the end of the day on December 29, after which reinforcements began to arrive in Feodosia.

In the Kerch area, the landing was much more complicated: the infantry landed directly into the icy sea and walked to the shore in chest-deep water. Hypothermia caused heavy losses. A few days after the landing began, frost struck and most of the 51st Army crossed the ice of the frozen Kerch Strait.

At this moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian regiment of mountain riflemen guarding the Parpach ridge area. The landing forces in Kerch were many times greater than the Wehrmacht forces in the area; in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, Manstein received an order to hold the defense, but it was no longer possible to carry it out. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving all their heavy weapons behind. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

results

As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, wrote:

However, the 51st Army advancing from Kerch did not advance fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia moved with its main forces not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yayla spur - the coast of Sivash west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th Wehrmacht Division, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers from the rear units of the German army, including from army headquarters, were included in their composition.

Planning errors

Significant miscalculations were made when planning the operation:

• There was not a single medical facility on the bridgehead; the nearest hospital was in Kuban. The wounded soldiers, having received initial dressings in the regimental medical service, were transported from positions to Kerch, from there they independently traveled by steamship to Novorossiysk.
• Air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, until January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: “Krasnogvardeets”, “Zyryanin”, etc.; The cruiser "Red Caucasus" received heavy damage.

Losses

During the operation, the total losses amounted to 40 thousand people, of which more than 30 thousand were irrevocable: killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

Stage 2: battles for the Parpach ridge

By January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. Considering the weakness of the German defense, Headquarters pointed out to General Kozlov the need to quickly reach Perekop and strike at the rear of the Sevastopol enemy group.

The enemy also understood the danger of a possible offensive. According to E. von Manstein:

However, front commander D.T. Kozlov postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

Loss of Feodosia

In the first half of January 1942, the troops of the Crimean Front were preparing for a further offensive deep into the Crimea. To support the future offensive, the Sudak landing force was landed. However, Manstein was several days ahead of Kozlov. On January 15, the Germans suddenly went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to the junction of the 51st and 44th armies in the Vladislavovka area. Despite the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops and the presence of armored vehicles, the enemy broke through the positions of General Pervushin and recaptured Feodosia on January 18. The troops of the Caucasian Front were forced to abandon their positions and retreat beyond the Ak-Monai Isthmus. Among other losses suffered by the Soviet side was the transport "Jean Zhores" with a load of ammunition. The Sudak landing force, which heroically defended the captured bridgehead for almost two weeks, was also almost completely lost.

Despite the loss of the port in Feodosia, the Soviet command retained the ability to deliver reinforcements across the ice of the Kerch Strait.

Crimean Front

On January 28, the Headquarters decided to allocate troops operating in the Kerch direction to the independent Crimean Front under the command of General Kozlov. The front was reinforced with new rifle divisions, tank units and artillery. At the beginning of February, the 47th Army of Major General K. S. Kolganov, withdrawn from Iran, crossed the strait and became part of the front. The troops in Crimea were significantly reinforced with armored vehicles. The 39th and 40th tank brigades each had ten KB, ten T-34s and 25 T-60s, the 55th and 56th tank brigades had 66 T-26s and 27 flamethrower tanks. The 226th separate tank battalion consisted of 16 heavy KV tanks.

The headquarters also decided to strengthen the headquarters of the new front. Army Commissar 1st Rank L.Z. Mehlis arrived in Kerch, accompanied by a group of officers as a representative of Headquarters.

Advance of the Red Army

The headquarters approved the start date for the offensive on February 26-27, 1942. By the beginning of the offensive, the Crimean Front had twelve rifle divisions, one cavalry division, several separate tank battalions with heavy KV and medium T-34 and artillery units of the RGK. From total number troops of 9 divisions were part of the first echelon of the front.

The offensive began on February 27. At the same time, the Primorsky Army launched attacks from Sevastopol, but failed to break through the encirclement. The offensive on the Kerch bridgehead developed very slowly: the tanks’ actions were hampered heavy rains and the enemy repulsed all attacks of the attackers. Only the 18th Romanian division, on the northern section of the isthmus, did not survive. Manstein had to throw his last reserve into battle - the 213th Infantry Regiment and headquarters units. Stubborn fighting continued until March 3. The troops of the Crimean Front failed to break through the enemy defenses to the full depth.

Between 13 and 19 March the offensive resumed. Stubborn battles ensued, which E. von Manstein recalled:

This time, 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades attacked in the first echelon. Of the latter, 136 tanks were knocked out during the first three days of the offensive. However, a critical situation was created in a number of areas. How stubborn the fighting was is evidenced by the fact that the regiments of the 46th [Infantry Division], in whose zone the main attack was carried out, repelled from 10 to 22 attacks during the first three days.

Despite all efforts, it was not possible to achieve decisive success this time either.

Stage 3: German counter-offensive

At the beginning of April, reinforcements began to arrive in Manstein's army: for the first time since the beginning of the offensive on Crimea, it was assigned a tank division (22nd etc.) - 180 tanks.

At the insistence of L.Z. Mehlis, Soviet troops were concentrated in close proximity to the front line, without sufficient depth. In addition, most of the forces of the Crimean Front were concentrated in the north of the Parpach Isthmus. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command planned a roundabout maneuver from the south (Operation “Hunting for Bustards”). Aviation played an important role in the operation, for which purpose, by special order of Hitler, the 8th Luftwaffe Air Corps (commander Wolfram von Richthofen) was transferred to Crimea.

The offensive began on May 8. As a result of a targeted air strike, the command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, the commander, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, was killed, and the deputy commander, General K.I. Baranov, was seriously wounded. A diversionary maneuver was carried out in the north, while the main attack was launched from the south. As a result, within two weeks the main forces of the Crimean Front were pressed against the Kerch Strait. On May 18, the resistance of the encircled Red Army group ceased.

Consequences

According to German data, the number of prisoners was about 170,000 people. The plans of the Soviet command to liberate Crimea did not come true. After the liquidation of the Crimean Front, Manstein was able to concentrate his forces against the besieged Sevastopol.

Kerch defensive operation - fighting Soviet troops in Crimea in May 1942. The German offensive in the Kerch region received the code name “Hunting for Bustards” (Trappenjagd).

Kerch defensive operation

On May 8, after artillery preparation, the German offensive of the 30th Army Corps began. Enemy aviation also joined in the artillery barrage. The troops of the 44th Army were subjected to especially heavy shelling and bombing. As a result, many command and observation posts, communication centers, communications, and firing positions were destroyed. Due to the large number of gusts, telephone communications ceased to exist, and many radio stations also went out of order.

Kerch under German artillery fire

At about 5.00, in the sector of the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division, enemy infantry and tanks (up to 100 vehicles) went on the attack. The first chains of attackers were essentially completely destroyed by the fire of our artillery and machine guns. However, strong artillery fire and enemy air operations soon suppressed our firepower and infantry in the first position.

Attack on Kerch

Almost simultaneously with this attack, in our rear on the eastern slopes of Mount As-Chalule, the enemy landed troops from the sea in 30 boats (up to 500 machine gunners). On the approach to the shore, the enemy landing force was met by machine gun and artillery fire, and on the shore by flamethrowers. However, despite the losses, the Nazis managed to land on the shore and gain a foothold on it.

In the very first hours of the offensive, fascist aviation gained air supremacy. She managed to achieve this thanks to the massive use of her aircraft, which were concentrated here from the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front.

German Ju-87D dive bombers fly accompanied by Bf.109 fighters

In the afternoon, the 404th Rifle Division and the 39th Tank Brigade entered the battle with the enemy who had broken through. But they fought the oncoming battle in separate units and without proper interaction. In connection with the breakthrough in the neighboring sector, the enemy began to cover the left flank of the division, going to its rear. By evening, the division had used up all its mortar ammunition, and the riflemen were running out of ammunition. In a number of sectors, the enemy penetrated the division's battle formations, as a result of which the 871st Regiment was surrounded, but continued to fiercely resist. At 18.00, having determined that it was impossible to hold out any longer, the division commander gave the order to withdraw.

By the end of the day, the Nazis had advanced 7–8 km into the defense of the 44th Army and penetrated the second position. The enemy's advance deep into our defense in a narrow area towards the end of May 8 created conditions for a convenient counterattack on the enemy's flank from the north from the 51st Army. By 21.00, the command of the Crimean Front came to the decision to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 51st Army. Moreover, the forces and means that were initially transferred by order of the 44th Army were transferred to the 51st Army by a new order for a counterattack. In conditions of unstable communications, this reassignment did not justify itself; it introduced disorganization into the command and control of troops and led to catastrophic consequences.

This reorientation of the main attack by forces not of the 44th Army, but of the 51st Army, was, as it were, the “moment of truth” of the entire Kerch defensive operation.

The defeat in Kerch was reminiscent of the British at Dunkirk

Source of photo information.

Tragedy of the Crimean Front

Possession of the Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. Hitler called it a Soviet unsinkable aircraft carrier threatening Romanian oil.

October 18, 1941The 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Infantry General Erich von Manstein began an operation to seize Crimea. After ten days of stubborn fighting, the Germans reached operational space. TO November 16, 1941 all of Crimea, except Sevastopol, was occupied.

December 26, 1941started Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The troops of the Soviet 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front recaptured the Kerch Peninsula, advancing to 100-110 km behind 8 days.

Soviet troops stopped January 2, 1942 at the line Kiet - Novaya Pokrovka - Koktebel. The Soviet 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades and 2 tank battalions were opposed there by one German infantry division, a reinforced infantry regiment and Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades.

Mansteinwrote in his memoirs:

“If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and began to quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division, and also decisively hit the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would have been created not only for this new section of the 11th Army’s front. The fate of the entire 11th Army would have been decided 1st Army. A more decisive enemy could have paralyzed all the army's supplies with a rapid breakthrough on Dzhankoy. Troops recalled from Sevastopol– 170th and 132nd PD– could arrive in the area west or north-west of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later."

The command of the Transcaucasian Front nevertheless planned to carry out operations to liberate Crimea. The operation plan was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense January 1, 1942. The attack of the motorized mechanized group (2 tank brigades and a cavalry division) and the 51st Army (4 rifle divisions and 2 brigades) was planned to reach Perekop, where it was planned to drop an airborne assault force in advance. 44th Army (3 rifle divisions) - reach Simferopol. Two mountain rifle divisions were to strike along Black Sea coast. The Primorsky Army was supposed to pin down the enemy near Sevastopol and land troops in Yevpatoria, followed by a direction to Simferopol. General task –destruction of all enemy forces in Crimea. The operation began on January 8-12, 1942.

However, the operation was not started on time, and January 15, 1942 The Germans and Romanians launched a counterattack, recapturing Feodosia on January 18. Soviet troops were pushed back 10-20 km, to the Karpacz Isthmus.

February 27, 1942The Soviet offensive began both from Sevastopol and from the Karpacz Isthmus. There, Soviet 7 rifle divisions and 2 brigades, and several tank battalions acted against 3 German and 1 Romanian infantry divisions. The second echelon of Soviet troops included 6 rifle divisions, one cavalry division and two tank brigades. The Romanian division on the northern flank retreated again to Kiet, 10 km. March 3, 1942 the front stabilized - now it arched to the west.

On March 13, 1942, Soviet troops (8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades) again went on the offensive. The Germans held out, and on March 20, 1942 they tried to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 22nd Panzer Division (which had just been reorganized from an infantry division) and two infantry divisions. The Germans were repulsed.

On March 26, 1942, four Soviet divisions attempted to advance, but were in turn repulsed.

The last attempt at a Soviet offensive in Crimea was April 9-11, 1942.

“There will be no increase in the forces of the Crimean Front at the present time. Therefore, the troops of the Crimean Front will firmly gain a foothold on the occupied lines, improving their defensive structures in engineering terms and improving the tactical position of the troops in individual sectors, in particular by capturing the Koi-Asan node.”

By this time, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle divisions and 3 brigades, a cavalry division, 4 tank brigades, and 9 reinforcement artillery regiments. The front had 225 bombers and 176 fighters (serviceable). The enemy had 5 German infantry and 1 tank divisions, 2 Romanian infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, as well as the Groddeck motorized brigade, which consisted mainly of Romanian units under the command of the German headquarters.

With such a balance of forces (Manstein assessed Soviet superiority in forces as double) the Germans and Romanians crossed May 8, 1942 on the offensive.

Mansteindecided to reverse the factor of the numerical superiority of Soviet troops in St. oh good. The front line consisted of two sections. The southern section from Koi-Asan to the Black Sea coast (8 km) consisted of well-equipped (since January 1942) Soviet defensive positions, occupied by the 44th Army. The northern section from Koi-Asan to Kiet (16 km) curved to the west. The Soviet command should have expected that the Germans would strike in the Koi-Asan area in order to cut off the northern group (47th and 51st armies).

Indeed, given the small number of his forces, Manstein could only count on environment as many Soviet forces as possible in as small a territory as possible and then destroying them with aviation and artillery. His forces were sufficient for operations on a narrow section of the front, but further east the Kerch Peninsula expands, and there the numerical superiority of Soviet forces could cost the Germans dearly.

The idea of ​​the German operation "Hunting for Bustards" was based on delivering the main attack not in the Koi-Asan area, but at the southern end of the front line, where it was least expected. Moreover, three German infantry and tank divisions, as well as the Groddeck brigade, were supposed to attack here, that is, at least half all German-Romanian forces. In the northern and central sectors of the front, the Germans and Romanians were supposed to conduct a demonstration of the offensive, truly moving into it only after the breakthrough of the southern group. In addition, in the first hours of the operation, massive air strikes were carried out on the headquarters of units of the 47th and 51st armies.

The German ploy worked - Soviet reserves remained in the north after the start of the offensive. On May 8, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses in a 5 km section, to a depth of 8 km. On May 9, heavy rain began to fall, which prevented the Germans from bringing a tank division into battle, but before the downpour, the Groddeck motorized brigade managed to advance, cutting off the 44th Army from its rear positions.In addition, a German boat landing force landed in the rear of the 44th Army. This was only one battalion, but it assisted the German offensive.

May 11, 1942The German 22nd Panzer Division reached the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. It was followed by the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade. 8 Soviet divisions found themselves in the resulting cauldron, and on that day the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, died. On the same day, Stalin and Vasilevsky sent an angry directive to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, which began with the words

“The Military Council of the Crimean Front, including Kozlov, Mekhlis, have lost their heads, and to this day cannot contact the armies...”

And ending by order:

"don't let the enemy pass".

However, the Germans and Romanians advanced rapidly. On the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered:

“Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.”

However, already May 16, 1942 The German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. May 19, 1942 fighting on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, with the exception of the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkai quarries.

From 270 thousand fighters and commanders of the Crimean Front for 12 days battles were lost forever 162.282 person - 65% . German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in “History of the Great Patriotic War”:

"it was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol".

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters declared the command of the Crimean Front to be responsible for the “unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation.”

Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis was removed from his posts as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to the rank of Corps Commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from his post as front commander and demoted to the rank of major general.

Divisional Commissar Shamanin was removed from his post as a member of the Front's Military Council and demoted to the rank of brigade commissar.

Major General Vechny was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from their posts as army commanders and demoted to the rank of colonel.

Major General Nikolayenko was removed from his post as commander of the front air force and demoted to the rank of colonel.

July 1, 1942 (even before the capture of Sevastopol) Manstein received the title Field Marshal General.

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photo from the Internet, Kerch region. prisoners of war

I "d say it"s rather May 1942 (17-19), after Operation Trappenjagd.

Clarification

It is after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Image attached is from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Krim. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of world historical importance), which describes an international delegation who came to see how the German-Romanian troops conquered Sevastopol.

Text translation:

It was after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Images taken from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Crimea. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of World-Historical Significance), which describes the international delegations that came to see German-Romanian troops capture Sevastopol.

Presumably this is Marfovka.

Also Marfovka.

Soviet ammunition, the first two are high-explosive, the rest are fragmentation.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

my excavations

Spent cartridges

Akmonai positions. Dota.

bullet marks

Personal weapon of a soldier 633 SP, 157 SD.

Fragment sniper rifle Mosin.

Kerch area, May 1942, in the photo Il-2.

May 1942, Kerch region.

All 5 photos from the Bundesarchiv, Germany

“Alarmists will be shot on the spot...”

FROM THE TRAGEDY of the Crimean Front during the reign of Khrushchev, one of the most confusing myths about the Great Patriotic War was created - the myth that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief specifically sent his mediocrity in military affairs to various fronts, but “ faithful dog“Mehlis and he kept the command in fear. As a result, in particular, the Crimean disaster of May 1942 occurred.

On the cover of the book by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Rubtsov “Mekhlis. Shadow of the Leader" (M., 2007) the following summary about the hero of the work was made: "The mere mention of the name of Lev Mekhlis caused horror in many brave and honored generals. For many years this man was Stalin’s real shadow, his “second self” and, in fact, the master of the Red Army. He was so fanatically devoted to his leader and country that he stopped at nothing to complete his task. On the one hand, Mehlis is accused of having the blood of hundreds of innocent commanders on his hands, some of whom he personally shot. On the other hand, he was respected by ordinary soldiers, whom he always took care of. On the one hand, Mehlis was one of the main culprits for the defeat of the first months of the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942. On the other hand, his inflexibility and firmness more than once saved troops in the most desperate situations. Was Mehlis the embodiment of evil? Or did he simply personify his controversial times?

The documents cited in the book by a respected colleague did not allow either the author or the readers to draw an unambiguous conclusion. Although, I note that our historiography is dominated by a persistent hostility towards the personality of this deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The majority of the creative intelligentsia evaluates this historical figure with a minus sign.

Our information. Lev Zakharovich Mehlis was born in 1889 in Odessa. He graduated from 6 classes of the Jewish commercial school. Since 1911 in the army, he served in the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In 1918 he joined communist party and was on political work in the Red Army. In 1921-1922 - in the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, which was headed by Stalin. In 1922-1926 - one of the personal secretaries of the General Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin, in 1926-1930 he studied at courses at the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors. In 1930, he became the head of the press and publishing department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda. In 1937-1940 - Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in 1940-1941 - People's Commissar of State Control. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, “he was truly an honest man, but in some ways crazy,” because he had a mania for seeing enemies and saboteurs everywhere. On the eve of the war, he was reappointed head of the Main Political Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (while retaining the post of People's Commissar of State Control). In 1942 he was a representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the Crimean Front. After the defeat of the Crimean Front troops in May 1942, he was removed from his posts, and in 1942-1946 he was a member of the military councils of a number of armies and fronts. In 1946-1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR. Died February 13, 1953.

Konstantin Simonov is sometimes credited with the following statement about Mehlis: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the army and front commanders, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military affairs... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere and never have I seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because a madman commanded the front ... "

BUT THIS, I note, is not Simonov’s personal assessment. Here is how it was. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Victory, on April 28, 1965, the front-line writer decided to express some thoughts related to the history of the Great Patriotic War. There is such a fragment in the material. It is worth citing in full (I quote from: K. Simonov. “Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin.” M., APN, 1989).

“I would like to give an example of an operation in which the true interests of waging war and false, sloganeering ideas about how a war should be waged, based not only on military illiteracy, but also on the lack of faith in people generated in 1937, clearly collided. I'm talking about the sad memory of the Kerch events of the winter - spring of 1942.

Seven years ago, one of our front-line writers wrote to me the following: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the commanders of the armies and the front, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mehlis, a man illiterate in military matters... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the most advanced positions, etc. Three armies stood on a front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere have I ever seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because the front was commanded not by a commander, but by a madman...” (I emphasize that these are not the words of Simonov, but of a writer he knew. - A.M.)

I didn’t talk about this at all to once again an unkind word to remember Mehlis, who, by the way, was a man of impeccable personal courage and everything he did was not done with the intention of personally becoming famous. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and that is why, from a historical point of view, his actions on the Kerch Peninsula are fundamentally interesting. This was a man who, during that period of the war, regardless of any circumstances, considered anyone who preferred a convenient position a hundred meters from the enemy to an uncomfortable position fifty meters away, a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible failure to be an alarmist; considered everyone who realistically assessed the enemy's strength to be unsure of own strength. Mehlis, for all his personal readiness to give his life for his Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.

And the front commander, to whom he came as a representative of Headquarters, an educated and experienced military man, in turn also turned out to be a product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938, only in a different sense - in the sense of fear of taking full responsibility, fear of contrasting a reasonable military decision with an illiterate one. the onslaught of “everything and everything - forward”, fear of transferring his dispute with Mehlis to Headquarters at the risk of himself.

The difficult events of Kerch from a historical point of view are interesting in that they seem to screw together both halves of the consequences of 1937-1938 - both the one that was presented by Mehlis and the one that was presented by the then commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov.”

I WILL NOT argue with the great writer. Everyone has their own view of the past. I will express my personal opinion about Mehlis, supported by familiarity with the documents of that time. Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich is a very difficult and controversial political figure. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in his assessments and demands. To put it mildly, he did not like to be diplomatic. He was tough, even to the point of cruelty, and during the war he went beyond this line in a difficult front-line situation.

Several examples can be given in this regard. September 12, 1941. 34th Army of the North-Western Front. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mehlis personally draws up order No. 057 for front troops: “...For demonstrated cowardice and personal withdrawal from the battlefield to the rear, for violation of military discipline, expressed in direct failure to comply with the front order to come to the aid of units advancing from the west, for failure to take measures to save the material part of the artillery... Major General of Artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 270, is to be publicly shot in front of the formation of the commanders of the headquarters of the 34th Army.” Moreover, the general had already been extrajudicially shot the day before on the basis of an oral order from Mehlis and Army General K.A. Meretskova.

Cruel? Yes, it's cruel. But this is war, and we were talking about the fate of the entire state... Moreover, in those tragic months, a very nervous situation reigned at the front in the conditions of retreat under the pressure of German troops.

In this regard, it should also be noted that Stalin did not condone this kind of reprisals. At the beginning of October, he harshly reprimanded commanders and commissars who practiced lynching and assault instead of educational work. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0391 of October 4, 1941, signed by Stalin and Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, was called: “On the facts of the replacement of educational work with repression.” In it, Stalin demanded “in the most decisive manner, right up to bringing the perpetrators to trial in a military tribunal, to fight all phenomena of illegal repression, assault and lynching.”

I'LL ALLOW myself a little digression. Since the time of perestroika, historical literature and journalism have been dominated by the desire to evaluate the actions of statesmen and their motives from the standpoint of the realities of the present time - a time of peace and goodness. Then the situation was fundamentally different, and the life school of that generation was different. Many were tested in the fight against the special services of Imperial Russia and in the fratricidal Civil War. This embittered the future Soviet leaders; there were no sentimental people among them.

It is also impossible to understand the reasons for the extreme cruelty towards other military leaders in 1941 - the same command of the Western Front - without the context of the circumstances of the dramatic beginning of repelling the aggression of Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, despite the decisions made to declassify documents from the Great Patriotic War, we do not know everything about them.

Specific example: telegram from the boss General Staff Army General G.K. Zhukov to the troops of the western military districts on June 18, 1941. This document remains inaccessible to researchers - even to employees of the Institute of World History Russian Academy sciences involved in the preparation of a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

And such a telegram existed. In 2008, the Kuchkovo Pole publishing house published a book by counterintelligence veteran Vladimir Yampolsky, “...Destroy Russia in the Spring of 1941,” which included materials on the case of the commander of the Western Front, Army General D.G. Pavlova. There is such an episode in the protocol of a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on July 22, 1941. Member of the court A.M. Orlov reads out the testimony of the defendant - the former communications chief of the Western Front headquarters, Major General A.T. Grigoriev at the investigation: “...And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff of June 18, the district troops were not put on combat readiness.” Grigoriev confirms: “All this is true.”

There is every reason to assert that on June 18, 1941, Stalin allowed the troops of the first strategic echelon to be brought to full combat readiness, but the directive of the General Staff authorized by him turned out to be, for some reason, unfulfilled by the command of the western military districts, and primarily in the Western Special.

Another document has survived, indicating that on June 18, 1941, a telegram was sent from the Chief of the General Staff to the command of the western military districts. This research was carried out in the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s by the military scientific department of the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky. Then, while Stalin was still alive, it was decided to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops of the western military districts according to the plan for covering the state border on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. For this purpose, five questions were asked to the participants in those tragic events who held command positions in the troops of the western districts before the war (fragmentary answers to some questions were published in the Military Historical Journal in 1989).

The questions were formulated as follows: 1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border communicated to the troops, as far as they were concerned; when and what was done by the command and headquarters to ensure the implementation of this plan? 2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to reach state border and how many of them were deployed before the outbreak of hostilities? 3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when were the instructions given to carry out this order and what was done by the troops? 4. Why was most of the artillery located in training centers? 5. To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control of troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war?

The editors of the Military Historical Journal managed to publish answers to the first two questions, but when it was the turn to answer the third question: “When was the order received to put the troops on combat readiness?”, the editor-in-chief of the magazine, Major General V.I. Filatov received a command from above to stop further publication of responses from participants in the events of June 1941. But even from the first two answers it follows that the telegram (or directive) of the Chief of the General Staff existed...

NOW about the behavior of Mehlis himself at the front.

From the memoirs of Colonel General of the Engineering Troops Arkady Khrenov: “In one of the companies he was caught by an order to attack. Without hesitation, he became the head of the company and led it behind him. None of those around him were able to dissuade Mehlis from this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich..."

From the memoirs of Major General David Ortenberg, who edited the newspaper of the 11th Army during the war with Finland (1939-1940) Heroic March"And together with Mehlis, being in one of our divisions, he was surrounded: "The army commissar of the 1st rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, and gave several soldiers for security: “Get through.” And they broke through the still fragile ice of the lake. And Mehlis himself, together with the division commander, led its exit from the encirclement... Seeing that ours could not knock down the Finnish barrier near the road, Mehlis placed the soldiers in a chain, got into the tank and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and machine gun. The soldiers followed. The enemy was knocked out of his position.”

The statement of Army General Alexander Gorbatov about Mehlis has also been preserved: “At every meeting with me until the liberation of Orel, Mehlis did not miss an opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that, although with difficulty, he was changing his previous attitude towards me for the better. When we were already behind the Eagle, he suddenly said:

I have been looking closely at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after you left Moscow and didn’t quite believe the good things I heard about you. Now I see that I was wrong.”

Mehlis, of course, did not have an academic military education and did not possess military leadership talents like the great Rokossovsky. By the way, he highly valued this commander and, shortly before the disaster of the Crimean Front, which became obvious to him in the spring of 1942, he asked Stalin to appoint Konstantin Konstantinovich as commander of the Crimean Front. Alas, due to a serious wound, Rokossovsky was still in the hospital at that time (on March 8, 1942, the commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front, Rokossovsky, was wounded by a shell fragment and was treated until May 23. - Ed.).

At the same time, Mehlis knew what war was. After all, during the Civil War he was at the front, was a commissar of a brigade, then the 46th Infantry Division and the Right Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine, participated in battles against the gangs of Ataman Grigoriev and one of the most talented commanders of the White Army - General Ya.A. Slashchev, was wounded.

WITH Civil War Mehlis had a habit of telling people directly about mistakes and miscalculations. Naturally, he made many enemies from this. Mehlis always spoke with pathos, but sincerely. Of course, he could not do without his characteristic manner of seeing everything either in white or in black. It should be noted that as People's Commissar (Minister) of State Control, he was forced to engage in what today would be called anti-corruption measures, and as a result of inspections, many Soviet officials had to change their warm offices to barracks in Kolyma. Even under Stalin, officials stole and ruled at the expense of the state. Is this not where the origins of hatred towards Stalin’s “chief controller” come from on the part of the descendants of the families of the Soviet nomenklatura, most of whom have adapted well to the new life?..

And then the Great Patriotic War began. Mehlis is back in the army. On January 20, 1942, he arrived at the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942, the front was called the Caucasian Front) in the status of an authorized representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On the eve of his arrival, the troops successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 26 - February 2) and captured a vast bridgehead.

Commander of the Caucasian Front, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov received instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters to speed up the concentration of troops on the bridgehead in every possible way. They decided to transfer additional forces there (47th Army) and, no later than January 12, launch a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet. The point was to reach Perekop as soon as possible and strike at the rear of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group. By the summer of 1942, Crimea could actually become Soviet again.

Our information. As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, by January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. As the commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, admitted after the war, “in the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army was actually open - railway Dzhankoy - Simferopol. The weak covering front (of the Sevastopol Wehrmacht group - Ed.), which we managed to create, could not withstand the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia area.” The German general also believed that “if the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector ... However, the front command postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

The offensive of the Soviet troops nevertheless began, but it was not possible to break through the positions of the German divisions. This breakdown is usually described as saying that our command underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy. Historians try not to name the specific culprits for the failure of the offensive, which could have led to the liberation of all of Crimea, so as not to offend anyone.

It is kept silent that the offensive failed due to the lack of a well-thought-out plan, as well as clear logistical and combat support for the troops landing in Crimea. This was primarily manifested in the lack of transport ships for the transfer of manpower and artillery from the “mainland”. The situation with the provision of ammunition and fuel to the troops was also catastrophic. This is the testimony of Major General A.N. Pervushin, commander of the 44th Army participating in this operation (he was seriously wounded in January 1942 - Ed.).

Then they intervened weather- the ensuing thaw rendered field airfields completely unusable. The lack of normal communications and air defense systems also had an impact. They “forgot” to deliver anti-aircraft artillery to the port of Feodosia, and as a result, until January 4, 5 transports were killed from unpunished actions of German aviation, and the cruiser “Red Caucasus” was seriously damaged.

On January 18, the Germans, taking advantage of the passivity of the Soviet troops, recaptured Feodosia. Then General Kozlov decided to withdraw troops to the Ak-Monai positions - a defensive line approximately 80 kilometers from Kerch. It was in this situation that Mehlis arrived at the front.

Two days after his arrival, he sent Stalin a telegram with the following content: “We arrived in Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unsightly picture of the organization of command and control... Komfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy grouping. There is no data on any division numerical strength people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front have been in the troops since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula...”

Our information. Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich (1896–1967). On military service since 1915, graduated from the school of warrant officers. Participant of the First World War. In the Red Army since 1918, he commanded a battalion and a regiment. After the Civil War he studied at the Frunze Military Academy. During Soviet-Finnish war commanded the 1st Rifle Corps of the 8th Army. Since 1940 - Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District, then - Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army. Since 1941 - commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. After the disaster in Crimea, it was reduced to military rank to major general. In August 1942, he was appointed commander of the 24th Army of the Stalingrad Front, and from August 1943, deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Front. Participated in battles against Japan.

Mehlis’s telegram is usually characterized as follows: two days were “enough” for the arrogant People’s Commissar of State Control to get an idea of ​​the state of affairs at the front. However, in essence Mehlis was right. The main provisions of his telegram corresponded, by the way, to the contents of the order of the front command itself No. 12 of January 23, 1942. The order was signed by Kozlov, a member of the Military Council of the front F.A. Shamanin and Mehlis.

To this we must add that the command of the Caucasian Front at that time was in Tbilisi. And from there he directed the fighting. From a thousand kilometers away.

Mehlis really quickly figured out what was going on. And he immediately raised before Headquarters the question of separating an independent Crimean Front from the Caucasus Front and transferring command and control of troops to the Kerch Peninsula. At the same time, he demanded replenishment of manpower (3 rifle divisions), and began to demand that the front-line command urgently restore order in artillery, air defense, and logistics support.

"1. The command of armies, divisions, regiments should take into account the experience of the battles of January 15-18, 1942, immediately restore order in the units... Have regimental artillery and anti-tank artillery (anti-tank - A.M.) in infantry battle formations...

2. Alarmists and deserters should be shot on the spot as traitors. Those caught intentionally wounding left-handed crossbowmen should be shot in front of the line.

3. Within three days, visit full order in the rear..."

Mehlis especially carefully checked the condition of the air force and artillery of the front, from which decisive degree the combat effectiveness of the entire group of our troops depended. It turned out that due to poor logistics, 110 faulty aircraft accumulated on the Kerch Peninsula, so less than one sortie was carried out per day.

Mehlis, using his official status, obtained additional weapons from the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff - the front received 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 mortars of 82 mm caliber, two divisions of M-8 rocket launchers. The issue of allocating an additional number of tanks to the front, including heavy KVs, anti-tank rifles and ammunition, was being resolved.

On January 24, a new commander of the front air force was appointed - Major General E.M. Nikolaenko. A little later, the new chief of the engineering troops arrived - Major General A.F. Khrenov. In anticipation of the planned offensive, Mehlis also ensured that a large number of political workers at various levels were sent to the front, including specialists in special propaganda against the Germans.

The 47th Army (commander - Major General K.S. Kalganov), transferred from northern Iran, crossed the ice of the Kerch Strait to the peninsula.

On February 15, Stalin received Mehlis. At the meeting, to the displeasure of the Supreme, he asked for additional time to prepare the front for the offensive. This relates to the question of whether Mehlis thoughtlessly carried out the orders of Headquarters. And Stalin agreed with him - apparently, Mehlis’s arguments worked.

On February 27, 1942, the planned offensive began. The Crimean Front had 12 rifle divisions, four tank brigades, and one cavalry division. But the command of the Crimean Front, instead of actively using tanks, including KV and T-34, to break through the German defense in the treeless terrain of the Kerch Peninsula, sent forward infantry, whose attacks the Germans repulsed with machine-gun fire.

For three days they drove the infantry into senseless attacks, killing thousands of people. 13 Soviet divisions advanced against three German and one Romanian. And the irretrievable losses are enormous (by April already 225 thousand people).

On March 9, Mehlis sent Stalin a proposal to immediately remove Kozlov and the staff of Major General F.I. Tolbukhin from his posts. Only the chief of staff of the front was replaced - with Major General P.P. Eternal. On March 29, Mehlis again insisted in writing to Stalin on the removal of Kozlov. The description given to the commander is unflattering: he is lazy, “a gluttonous gentleman of the peasants,” is not interested in operational issues, regards trips to the troops as “punishment,” in frontline troops, does not enjoy authority, does not like painstaking, everyday work.

Instead, Mehlis asked to appoint one of the following generals: N.K. Klykov, but he commanded the 2nd Shock Army breaking through to Leningrad and at that moment it was impossible to change him; K.K. Rokossovsky, who was still recovering in the hospital; Commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, whom he met on the Kerch Peninsula. But for some reason the latter’s candidacy did not find Stalin’s support.

By the beginning of May, the front group of troops prepared for an offensive, but it was postponed. On May 6, 1942, Headquarters ordered the front to go on the defensive, apparently having information about the upcoming German offensive. But the front command did not have time to reorganize the troops for defense. Their group remained offensive.

Meanwhile, the German command strengthened its 11th Army. Back in early April, the 22nd Tank Division appeared in its composition (180 Czech tanks LT vz.38: weight - 9.5 tons, frontal armor - from 25 to 50 mm, 37 mm gun). On May 8, the Germans went on the offensive with massive air support (Operation “Hunting for Bustards”). The command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, and General Lvov was killed on May 11.

Already during the May breakthrough of our defense by the Germans, Headquarters gave General Kozlov the following instructions:

“1) The entire 47th Army must immediately begin to withdraw beyond the Turkish Wall, organizing a rearguard and covering the retreat with aviation. Without this there will be a risk of being captured...

3) You can organize a strike with the forces of the 51st Army so that this army is gradually withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

4) The remnants of the 44th Army also need to be withdrawn beyond the Turkish Wall.

5) Mehlis and Kozlov must immediately begin organizing defense along the Turkish Wall.

6) We do not object to the transfer of headquarters to the place you indicated.

7) We strongly object to the departure of Kozlov and Mekhlis to the Lvov group.

8) Take all measures to ensure that artillery, especially large artillery, is concentrated behind the Turkish Wall, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments.

9) If you are able and manage to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement...”

But neither the Turkish Wall nor the Kerch contours were equipped in engineering terms and did not pose a serious obstacle for the Germans.

Worse than that. All three armies of the front (44th, 47th and 51st), prepared for the offensive, were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and sharply limited the ability to repel enemy attacks in the event of a breakthrough. When the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main blow fell precisely on the most unsuccessful formation of troops - on the 44th Army (commander - Lieutenant General S.I. Chernyak). The second echelon of this army was located only 3–4 km from the front line, which gave the Germans the opportunity, even without changing the positions of their artillery, to inflict fire on our units throughout the entire operational depth. Which is what they did.

In addition, most of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the northern sector of the Crimean Front. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command, imitating the main efforts in the north, delivered the main blow from the south, where the 44th Army was located.

Here is Mehlis’s sharp and emotional opinion about her commander: “Chernyak. Illiterate man, unable to lead an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand nominated Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.”

“Failures in wars are always inevitable, but they cannot be justified if they arose due to the carelessness of the people entrusted with the conduct of the war. This apparent disregard for the enemy served as a tragic prelude to the fateful turns of May 1942.”

Valentin Pikul. "Square of fallen fighters."

On the night of May 7, the military council of the Crimean Front, with the approval of Mehlis, sent the necessary orders to the troops (in connection with the expected German offensive - Ed.). Alas, the workers at the front headquarters were not concerned with the speed of their transfer. As a result, by morning they had not even reached all the army commanders!

On May 7, the Germans began intensive air strikes against Soviet positions, especially control posts. The next day, under cover of artillery fire, infantry units launched an attack.

On May 8, Mehlis sent a telegram to Stalin in which he wrote: “Now is not the time to complain, but I must report so that Headquarters knows the front commander. On May 7, that is, on the eve of the enemy’s offensive, Kozlov convened a military council to discuss the project for a future operation to capture Koi-Aksan. I recommended that this project be postponed and that instructions be immediately given to the armies in connection with the expected enemy advance. In the signed order of the front commander, he stated in several places that the offensive was expected on May 10–15, and proposed to work until May 10 and study the army defense plan with all command personnel, unit commanders and headquarters. This was done when the entire situation of the previous day showed that the enemy would advance in the morning. At my insistence, the erroneous timing was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the movement of additional forces to the 44th Army sector.”

All the data is stark: tomorrow the Germans will launch an offensive, and the commander in the order indicates the period of May 10–15. Obviously, the reconnaissance of the front headquarters did not work.

In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to replace Kozlov, Mehlis received a very irritated message from Stalin: “You are holding the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is completely rotten. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the command’s mistakes on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a resistance, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters.

You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot help but know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve... If you had used attack aircraft not for side activities, but against the enemy’s tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have gotten through. You don’t need to be Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.”

Mekhlis seems to have deservedly received the nuts. Especially considering that Stalin then recalled him from the front and demoted him. The Supreme’s irritation is understandable: despite the numerical superiority of our troops in the Kerch region, they were unable to stop the German offensive. But let's figure out what in Mehlis's position could have caused Stalin's anger? In my opinion, first of all, Mehlis limited himself to the position of an observer and did not interfere in the decision-making process, which was obvious even to a non-professional military man. Having attack aircraft, anti-tank artillery, and T-34 and KV, superior to German Czechoslovak-made tanks with a weak 37-mm cannon, the Soviet command could stop the German 22nd Panzer Division.

Today all the pressure is falling on the head of Mehlis, on the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, who supposedly “created tricks for the Crimean Front,” against the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny, to Headquarters. And the front command had nothing to do with it... Without justifying Mehlis’s mistakes, for which he was punished by Stalin, I note that until the last he tried to reverse the rapidly deteriorating situation in May 1942.

It is known how the German “hunt for bustards” ended: on May 13, the defense of our troops was broken through, on the night of May 14, Marshal Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula, on May 15, the enemy occupied Kerch. This allowed the Germans to concentrate their efforts on taking Sevastopol.

This is the price of the disaster on the Crimean front. But we will not “savor” its details and will keep in our hearts the bright memory of all the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died on Crimean soil.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

About the facts of replacing educational work with repression

Behind Lately There are frequent cases of illegal repression and gross abuse of power on the part of individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates.

Lieutenant of the 288th joint venture Komissarov, without any reason, killed Red Army soldier Kubica with a revolver shot.

The former chief of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot and killed Jr. Sergeant Pershikov because he was slow to get out of the car due to a hand problem.

The platoon commander of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot and killed his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.

The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitser, beat one sergeant for smoking at night; He also beat up Major Zanozny for having an incontinent conversation with him.

The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur, without any reason, hit Art. Lieutenant Sergeev.

Such facts of perversion of disciplinary practice, excesses [the word “excesses” was written by Stalin instead of “violations”, intolerable in the Red Army. - Ed.] granted rights and power, lynchings and assault are explained by the fact that:

a) the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression in relation to subordinates took first place;

b) everyday educational work in units in a number of cases is replaced by abuse, repression and assault;

c) the method of explanations and conversations between commanders, commissars, political workers and Red Army soldiers has been abandoned, and clarification of issues incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;

d) individual commanders and political workers in difficult battle conditions become confused, panic and cover up their own confusion by using weapons without any reason;

e) the truth has been forgotten that the use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars and political workers must remember that without the correct combination of the method of persuasion with the method of coercion, it is unthinkable to impose Soviet military discipline and strengthen the political and moral condition of the troops.

Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and obvious enemies must be combined with a careful analysis of all cases of violation of discipline that require detailed clarification of the circumstances of the case.

Unreasonable repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and lack of arms, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to the decline of military discipline and the political and moral state of the troops and can push unstable fighters to defect to the enemy’s side.

I order:

1. Restore your rights educational work, widely use the method of persuasion, do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repression.

2. All commanders, political workers and superiors should talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the need for iron military discipline, honest performance of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and superior. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat hangs over our Motherland, that defeating the enemy requires the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless fight against cowards, deserters, self-harmers, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland.

3. Widely explain to the commanding staff that lynchings, assault and public abuse, which humiliates the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.

At the front I found unimaginable panic. All cannons, machine guns, and anti-tank rifles were abandoned on the battlefield, and people fled in groups and alone to the Kerch Strait. And if they saw a board or log floating near the shore, several people immediately jumped on this object and immediately drowned. The same thing happened if they managed to find any floating craft on the shore or saw an approaching boat - they rushed in like a cloud, immediately everything was flooded, and people died.

I have never seen such panic in my life - this has never happened in my military experience.

It was some kind of disaster, although the enemy did not particularly attack. His aviation worked well, and it created panic. But she managed to do this only because our aviation was inactive, and the front command was confused and lost control.

Despite this, I managed to occupy the near defensive Kerch perimeter and gain a foothold on it. I ordered Mehlis and Kozlov to lead this defense, and if we have to evacuate, they must be the last to leave Kerch land.

Some people have already reached the Taman Peninsula through the Kerch Strait. There I had a three-regiment rifle brigade stationed. I ordered her to detain everyone crossing and put them on the defensive line of Taman.

After all this, I called HF I.V. Stalin and reported on the situation. He asked, “What do you think you’ll do next?” I replied that we would fight on the near defensive line (to defend Kerch). But Stalin said: “You must now firmly defend the Taman Peninsula and evacuate Kerch.”

I nevertheless decided to defend Kerch for as long as possible, because the fall of Kerch would immediately affect the defense of Sevastopol, which had half of its combat ammunition in this direction when I arrived. And I brought it to 15.5.42 to 6 rounds of ammunition...

I was at the front command post when I.A. approached me. Serov (Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - Ed.) and introduced himself as an NKVD commissioner from Beria. Serov asked me what the orders would be. I replied that during the evacuation he should sink the locomotives so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans.

After 2-3 hours, Serov came up to me and reported that my order had been carried out and the locomotives were flooded. I asked: “How?!” He replied that he lowered them from the pier. I said: “What a fool. I told you that this needs to be done during the evacuation, but we are not going to leave yet, and we need steam locomotives.” I ordered him to leave Kerch and not complicate matters.”

Then we moved to Taman, where my command post was. And suddenly I lost contact with Kerch, with which we were connected by a single wire - a high-frequency telephone. It turned out that Serov ordered him to be cut.

When I asked why he did this, Serov replied that this connection belonged to the NKVD and he had the right to dispose of it.

I told him: “But, unfortunately, you don’t know how to manage things. Therefore, I will put you on trial as a traitor to the Motherland, because you deprived me of the opportunity to manage the front, I was left without communication.”

The next day, Beria called me from Moscow and asked me to settle the matter with Serov. I repeated that Serov would be brought to justice. Then Beria said that he was recalling Serov to Moscow and would punish him himself.”

From Marshall's diary entries Soviet Union CM. Budyonny,
in May 1942, commander-in-chief of the troops
North Caucasian direction.

Letter from the “disgraced general”

“11.2.66 Hello, Alexander Ivanovich!

Thank you very much for not forgetting the old disgraced general. My fall from grace has lasted for almost 25 years.

The events of those days often appear in my memory. It’s hard to remember them, especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was exercised over us. I don’t mean Mehlis, a layman in operational art, but the commander of the North Caucasus direction and Headquarters. I also mean Oktyabrsky The outstanding writer of the twentieth century, Konstantin Simonov, who repeatedly visited the Kerch Peninsula during the days of military confrontations reflected in his famous “Different Days of the War,” had every right to declare: “You can’t film a war from afar, a war can only be filmed up close.” With these words, K. Simonov once again emphasized the invaluable role of film and photographic documents, which left for posterity the heroism and tragedy of the people's victory over fascism.

One of such genuine evidence of the horrors of the Great Patriotic War was the photograph of military photojournalist Anatoly Garanin, “The Death of a Soldier,” which became a classic of Soviet military photography.

Assigned to the headquarters of the Crimean Front, A. Garanin, as a representative of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in the spring of 1942 once again went to the front line to film the attack of soldiers on the enemy during the battle.

The unit, carried away by the commander, rushed forward. Anatoly pointed his “watering can” at a group of soldiers. The shot should have been successful - several people were caught in the lens, rushing forward in a single impulse towards the enemy. But at that very moment, before the camera shutter was released, an enemy shell suddenly exploded a few meters from the attackers. The frame instantly became different. The explosion disrupted the picture of the battle and made terrible adjustments to the photo. Instead of the intended image of the attack, the film captured the tragedy. The mortally wounded soldier closest to us slowly sinks to the Crimean soil. For him, the war was over - his body accepted the deadly metal.

Somewhere far from here there will be the tears of a wife, mother, children and relatives and the eternal hope for the return of a loved one from that damned war - a hope that fades away every day after the Victory...

An archive of film and photographic documents helped establish that the famous Ak-Monai positions, located in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula, became the location where the photograph “Death of a Soldier” was taken. Unfortunately, no one yet knows the exact location of filming. A strip of land from the village of Ak-Monay (Kamenskoye) to the Black Sea itself, almost 17 kilometers long, bears witness to the death of a soldier. The very place where from January to May 1942 there were fierce battles with varying success, ending in tragedy for the troops of the Crimean Front.

Who is the fighter whose death we see in the picture? His name remains unknown. He was most likely buried in one of the many mass graves located in the Ak-Monai Isthmus area. The remains of a soldier may rest in Semisotka, Kamenskoye, Batalny, Yachmennoye, Uvarovo and other villages, in which there are several mass graves with thousands buried. The majority, despite the almost seventy years that have passed since the end of hostilities in Crimea, remain nameless. And the main reason for this is the destruction of archival documents.

The photograph “Death of a Soldier” once again makes us think about the cruelty of the most barbaric war in the history of mankind, where the death of one is a tragedy, and the death of millions is a statistic. The same imperturbable statistics that consider more than seventy percent of those who did not return from the war to be missing in action. In combat - Marines of the 83rd Brigade (1942).

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ended with the capture of an important operational bridgehead in Crimea - the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of important enemy strongholds in Crimea - the cities and seaports of Kerch and Feodosia, the troops advanced 100-110 km to the west.

During the period when the Red Army counteroffensive was underway on the western (near Moscow) and northwestern (near Tikhvin) directions of the Soviet-German front in December 1941, the situation on the southern wing was characterized by stabilization, in particular in the Donbass direction. At the same time, in the Sevastopol area, Soviet troops, during heavy and stubborn defensive battles, repelled the second offensive of the 11th German Army. But the enemy approached 6-7 km to the city, and the position of its defenders became significantly more difficult. Almost the entire territory defended by our troops came under enemy artillery fire.

In this situation, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to expand the front of the counteroffensive and involve the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet in active operations. On December 7, the Headquarters set the command of the Transcaucasian Front the task of preparing and conducting an amphibious operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula within two weeks.

The operation plan presented by the command of the Transcaucasian Front (commander - Lieutenant General D. T. Kozlov, member of the Military Council - divisional commissar F. A. Shamanin, chief of staff - Major General F. I. Tolbukhin) was approved by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

The idea of ​​the operation was to simultaneously land the 51st and 44th armies in the Kerch region and in the Feodosia port to encircle and destroy the enemy Kerch group. In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive deep into the peninsula, release the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region and completely liberate Crimea. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, which was part of it. The general leadership of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Transcaucasian (from December 30 - Caucasian) Front, General D. T. Kozlov.

In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, a revised operation plan was drawn up, and on December 13, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front issued a directive to conduct the landing operation.

The landing was planned to be carried out simultaneously on a wide 250-km front of the coast of the Kerch Peninsula (from Arabatskaya Strelka to Feodosia), which was supposed to disperse the attention and efforts of the defending enemy troops. The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Feodosia direction by the forces of the 44th Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet.

The second blow was to be delivered by the 51st Army in cooperation with the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base in the Kerch direction. Preparations for the operation were ordered to be completed by December 19. The start of the operation was scheduled for December 21.

It should be noted that the six days allotted for preparing the landing operation were clearly not enough to fully prepare forces and means.

The Kerch enemy group consisted of units of the 46th Infantry Division of the 11th German Army, the 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade, two tank battalions, two field artillery regiments and five anti-aircraft artillery battalions. By the beginning of January 1942, the enemy group was reinforced by the 73rd Infantry Division. Its total number did not exceed 25 thousand people. The troops were covered from the air by two air groups. It was taken into account that with the start of the operation the enemy could transfer reinforcements to the Kerch Peninsula from near Sevastopol. The basis of defense on the Kerch Peninsula was a system of fortified strongholds, which were located along the coast and consisted of field-type fortifications that were in fire interconnection. The city of Feodosia was turned into an anti-landing defense hub. Its garrison numbered more than 2 thousand people.

The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula reached: personnel - up to 25 thousand people, guns - up to 180, tanks - 118.

Two aviation groups with up to 100 aircraft were based at airfields in the Kerch region. In addition, the grouping of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula could be supported by aviation from airfields located in the areas of Simferopol and Saki.

The enemy naval forces operating in the Black Sea were based in the ports of Romania and Bulgaria and did not undertake active military operations against the Black Sea Fleet, limiting themselves to providing maritime communications along the coasts of Bulgaria and Romania.

To blockade besieged Sevastopol from the sea, 2-3 submarines and up to 20 torpedo boats. In Kerch and Feodosia the enemy had no ships. Minefields were placed only in Feodosia Bay.

The Kerch enemy group was opposed by part of the forces of the Transcaucasian Front located on the Taman Peninsula - the 51st and the newly formed 44th armies. The 51st Army, commanded by Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, consisted of four rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, and a marine brigade. The 44th Army under the command of Major General A. N. Pervushin was formed in the Anapa, Novorossiysk, and Tuapse regions, consisting of four rifle and two mountain rifle divisions, and a marine brigade. The reserve of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front on the Taman Peninsula included three rifle and cavalry divisions and a tank battalion.

Thus, in total, on the 20th of December, there were 14 divisions and 3 brigades on the Taman Peninsula as part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front.

As of December 20, the air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and armies numbered about 500 aircraft. However, 2/3 of the aircraft were outdated designs. High-speed fighters and bombers numbered no more than 15%. There were no crews prepared for dive bombing. The bulk of the aircraft were based at airfields in the Caucasus remote from the combat area - in Mozdok, Salsk, Tikhoretsk, Armavir, Stavropol.

The Black Sea Fleet (commander - Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, member of the Military Council - divisional commissar P. M. Kulakov, chief of staff - Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev, numbered about 100 surface ships and more than 50 submarines. Landing craft There was no special building. The main forces of the fleet were dispersed in the bases of the Caucasian coast - Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Poti, Batumi. A small part of the combat and auxiliary ships was in Sevastopol.

The Azov military flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, had up to 25 ships. The ships of the flotilla carried out patrols off the northern coast of the Taman Peninsula and provided maritime communications in the southeastern part of the Sea of ​​Azov.

The Kerch naval base (commander - Rear Admiral A.S. Frolov, after leaving Kerch, was relocated to Taman. The base included 26 torpedo and patrol boats that carried patrol in the Kerch Strait.

In general, the overall superiority in surface ships and submarines in the Black Sea was on the side of our fleet.

Implementation decision taken was somewhat postponed due to the fact that the situation near Sevastopol required the transfer there on December 20 and 21 of part of the forces (345th Infantry Division and 79th Marine Brigade) intended for the landing in Feodosia. To transport the formations, some of the warships and fleet transports prepared for the transportation of troops were used. In this regard, the landing operation plan had to be clarified.

The changes made by the front command to the operation plan were set out in the directives of the front headquarters issued on December 23, and boiled down to ensuring that the landing of airborne troops was carried out sequentially.

Formations of the 51st Army and part of the forces of the 44th Army were supposed to land on the morning of December 26 on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula, and the main forces of the 44th Army - on December 29 in Feodosia, as well as airborne assault in the Vladislavovka area.

The 51st Army was to land troops north and south of Kerch, capture the city and the Kerch port, and then the Turkish Wall, and develop an attack on Vladislavovka. The landing of army troops was carried out by the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base. In order to achieve surprise, the landing was planned to begin two hours before dawn on December 26, without artillery and aviation preparation.

The 44th Army was supposed to land with the main forces in the Feodosia area, capture and firmly defend the city and the Ak-Monai Isthmus, and with part of the forces advance eastward towards Marfovka with the task of, in cooperation with the troops of the 51st Army, destroying the enemy group on the Kerch Peninsula. Then develop success in a western direction to Belozersk (Karasubazar). The landing of the 44th Army was ensured by the Black Sea Fleet. Marine units were allocated to capture the port of Feodosia. The landing was planned to be carried out from warships after a short but powerful fire attack by naval artillery.

In addition, it was planned to land troops in the area of ​​Mount Opuk and, with a strike in the direction of Ortaeli, to facilitate the crossing of the Kerch Strait by the 51st Army and in the Koktebel area to prevent the approach of enemy reserves from Sudak.

The airborne assault force, consisting of a parachute battalion, was supposed to be dropped on the night of December 30 in the Vladislavovka area, capture the enemy airfield and ensure the landing and further actions of its front-line aviation.

All forces of the Black Sea Fleet were divided into two groups: group “A”, intended for landing at Feodosia, and group “B” - for landing at Mount Opuk. In addition, a special cover detachment was allocated. Both groups and the cover detachment were subordinate to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

The front and naval air forces were supposed to strike enemy airfields in the Crimea and on the northern coast of the Sea of ​​Azov; cover the regrouping and concentration of troops and ships; ensure the embarkation of troops on ships, the passage of landing forces by sea and their landing on the shore, support the actions of front troops to encircle and destroy the enemy group.

The regrouping and concentration of troops of the 51st and 44th armies took place from December 3 to 26. Due to the poor condition of the roads (after prolonged rains and snowfalls), preparations for the operation were delayed and were not always carried out secretly. Especially great difficulties arose with the basing of aviation. The airfields of the Krasnodar Territory and the Taman Peninsula were unprepared for the start of the operation. The landing sites, wet from the rain, did not allow aircraft to be received from rear airfields. Part of the Black Sea Fleet's aviation had to be used to cover the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region. As a result, much fewer aircraft took part in the operation than planned. Therefore, it was not possible to gain air superiority over the landing areas.

The landing operation began on schedule.

On the night of December 25, 1941, troops of the 224th Infantry Division and the 83rd Infantry Brigade of the 51st Army landed in Temryuk and Kuchugury. On the afternoon of December 25, the 1st-5th airborne detachments began moving along assigned courses with the expectation of arriving at the designated landing areas two hours before dawn on December 26.

However, due to the onset of a strong storm and continuous raids by enemy aircraft, the 1st and 2nd detachments were unable to fully land in the area of ​​Cape Zyuk. Most of the detachment units returned to Temryuk. The landing of the 3rd and 5th detachments failed.

The most successful was the landing of the 4th detachment in the area of ​​​​Cape Khroni. This detachment arrived at the designated area at 6:30 a.m. and immediately began the landing, which was carried out under the cover of fire from two gunboats. By 13:00 on December 26, the landing of the detachment was completely completed, and the troops gained a foothold on the captured bridgehead.

Attempts made on December 27 and 29 to continue the landing were unsuccessful due to stormy seas and strong enemy resistance. Further landing of troops of the 51st Army became possible only on December 30.

In total, from December 26 to 31, the Azov military flotilla landed more than 6 thousand people and transferred 9 tanks, 10 guns (37-, 76-mm caliber), 28 mortars and 204 tons of ammunition. The landing of the troops of the 51st Army on the ships of the Kerch naval base was unorganized. Only one of the three completed the landing at the appointed time.

The delay in landing led to a disruption in the schedule for the detachments to cross the Kerch Strait. In addition, the ships arrived at the landing areas at different times.

On the first day, the landing was most successful in the Kamysh-Burun area. It was carried out under the cover of a smoke screen delivered by specially designated boats, and with the support of artillery fire from the Taman Peninsula. On December 27, the landing was not carried out due to a strong storm (7-8 points). It resumed on December 28 and continued until December 30.

In total, from December 26 to 29, in the Kamysh-Burun region, more than 11,200 people were landed from the 302nd Infantry Division and 47 guns, 229 machine guns, 198 mortars, 12 vehicles, and 210 horses were unloaded.

The landing of the 44th Army in the area of ​​Mount Opuk, carried out by the Black Sea Fleet, failed.

In general, from December 26 to 31, the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base and partly the Black Sea Fleet, despite a number of serious shortcomings in organizing the landing and landing of troops, strong enemy resistance, as well as extremely unfavorable meteorological conditions, landed part of the troops on the Kerch Peninsula and military equipment. However, the landing forces had very little artillery and tanks. Therefore, instead of the planned offensive, they were forced to go on the defensive, waging stubborn battles with the enemy, who took all measures to throw them into the sea.

The air forces of the front and navy did not provide sufficient assistance to the troops. On December 26, the aviation of the 51st Army made only 80 sorties, the aviation of the 44th Army - 21 sorties, and the naval air forces - 24 sorties.

Fighter aviation, due to the remoteness of the airfields, could not organize reliable air cover for the landing troops in the landing areas, especially in the most remote ones (Cape Zyuk). The tasks of covering the troops during their passage by sea, landing and development of combat operations on the shore were also not completed.

The operation did not develop in the first days after the landing of the troops of the 51st Army.

Only after the capture of Feodosia and the creation of a threat to the communications of the enemy group operating on the peninsula, there was a sharp change in the situation on the Kerch Peninsula in favor of the Soviet troops.

The landing of the 44th Army in the Feodosia area was more successful. It began at 4 a.m. on December 29 after a short artillery preparation. Thanks to the surprise achieved, the assault troops quickly captured important port facilities and created favorable conditions for the operations of the first echelon troops. In a short time, landing units were transferred from the cruisers "Red Crimea" and "Red Caucasus", from the destroyer "Shaumyan" and other ships. At the same time, these ships supported the landing operations on the shore with the fire of their guns.

The enemy air raids that began after dawn were repelled by naval anti-aircraft artillery fire and fighter aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet. Warships On December 29, they maneuvered in the bay and conducted artillery fire, supporting the landing operations.

On the evening of December 29, the landing of troops from transports began in the Feodosia port. By the morning of December 30, Feodosia was completely liberated from the enemy.

On December 30 and 31, the remaining forces of the 44th Army landed, which began an offensive to the north to occupy the Ak-Monai Isthmus.

From December 28 to 31, the 157th and 236th Rifle Divisions, the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division and the 251st Rifle Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division were transported and landed in the Feodosia area. In total, 23 thousand people were delivered, 1,550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 cars and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo.

The successful landing of troops of the 44th Army in Feodosia dramatically changed the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. The entire enemy group located in the eastern part of the peninsula faced the threat of encirclement. The command of the 11th German Army was forced to decide to withdraw its troops from the peninsula. On December 30, the enemy left Kerch without a fight.

The commander of the 51st Army did not use the previously landed units of the 224th Infantry Division and the 83rd Infantry Brigade to immediately pursue the retreating enemy. The enemy managed to break away from the troops of the 51st Army, which continued further landing and deployment in the Kerch region.

At this time, the troops of the 44th Army could play a decisive role, capturing the Ak-Monai Isthmus and preventing the enemy from leaving the Kerch Peninsula. However, their advance developed extremely slowly. The fascist German command, ensuring the withdrawal of its troops from the Kerch Peninsula, organized a stubborn defense in the area north of Feodosia with reserves urgently pulled up from other regions of Crimea, in particular with troops transferred from near Sevastopol.

By the end of December 31, the troops of the 44th Army, as a result of heavy fighting, managed to advance only 10-15 km and capture Vladislavovka. On January 1, 1942, the troops of the 44th Army were unable to advance northward.

The airborne assault, launched only on December 31 in the Arabat area (instead of Vladislavovka), was small in number (one parachute battalion). His actions were limited to occupying a small area and did not have a significant impact on the course of the operation.

The attempt of the command of the 51st Army to cut off the enemy’s escape route was made belatedly and was not successful, since the decision of the commander of the 51st Army to land an amphibious assault as part of one brigade in the Ak-Monaya area was made only on December 31, and its implementation was not carried out was provided with the required number of landing craft. The transports that left on January 1 with one battalion of this brigade on the way to Ak-Monai were covered in ice and did not reach the landing area.

On December 30-31 and January 1, the enemy withdrew units of the 46th Infantry Division from the Kerch Peninsula. During the retreat, the division suffered significant losses from our aviation, which attacked enemy columns.

The fascist German command was forced to urgently strengthen its troops in the Feodosia direction. In early January, northwest and west of Feodosia, in addition to the 46th Infantry Division, units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Rifle Corps were already operating. In addition, on the approach to this area were the 132nd and 170th infantry divisions, transferred from near Sevastopol, where the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the Sevastopol defensive region were thwarted by the second offensive of the Nazi troops.

By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the Kiet-Koktebel line, where they encountered organized enemy resistance. This concluded the operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ended with the capture of an important operational bridgehead in Crimea - the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of important enemy strongholds in Crimea - the cities and seaports of Kerch and Feodosia, the troops advanced 100-110 km to the west. As a result of the operation, the position of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region was strengthened. On January 1, 1942, the German command was forced to stop its second attack on Sevastopol and transfer part of its forces from there to the Feodosia region. The Kerch enemy group suffered heavy losses.

These results were achieved through heroic actions ground forces and the fleet. The operation, carried out as part of the Red Army's counteroffensive in December 1941, was the largest amphibious landing operation during the Great Patriotic War. Its main significance was that the enemy lost the opportunity to use the Kerch Peninsula as a springboard for penetration into the Caucasus. At the same time, it diverted part of the enemy’s forces from near Sevastopol, making it easier for its defenders to repel the second enemy assault.

Despite a number of shortcomings in the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, the Soviet Armed Forces gained experience in organizing and conducting such operations, which was used in subsequent landing operations of the Great Patriotic War.