Meanwhile, the strongest catalyst for the collapse was the political events that occurred from August 18 to August 21, 1991 in the Soviet Union, which were assessed by officials and government bodies in the USSR as a conspiracy, a coup, an unconstitutional seizure of power, and a putsch.
It would seem that many participants in the events wrote their memoirs, documents were posted, historians and journalists published many texts, documentaries were made about this, but there is still no consensus in the mass consciousness about these events. However, the materials of the trial of the organizers of the nomenklatura seizure of control are still classified.

Press Secretary of the Russian President Vladimir Peskov stated that “President Putin still believes that this was a disaster for those peoples who lived under the roof of one union state. It was a disaster that set us back significantly in our development” (see Peskov spoke about Putin’s attitude to the collapse of the USSR / Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 12/21/2016).

The qualification of the August events as a demonstrative nomenclature takeover of control is not new in Soviet-Russian history. Let us recall that the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev was removed by the nomenklatura in 1964 due to “health reasons,” although he was healthy. Such an interpretation is not included in the typologies of coups d'etat proposed by political scientists and needs to be comprehended. The paradox is that, like the Yeltsin period, the current political regime in Russia can also be qualified as a nomenclature takeover of control, despite the formal election, the Constitution of the Russian Federation and other attributes consonant with democracy. Public policy, which began to grow in the 80s and 90s, was again replaced by behind-the-scenes fighting in the 2000s. It has long been known that all key decisions in Russia are made in an unconstitutional body - the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, and not in the relevant institutions authorized for this - legislative, judicial and executive authorities. There, the formation of propaganda campaigns in key mass media takes place.

Nomenklatura is the name for a privileged managerial layer of a special kind formed in the USSR (One of those who drew attention to the nomenklatura as the monopolistic ruling class of the Soviet Union was M.S. Voslensky in the book “Nomenklatura. The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union” (published in German language in 1980, published in the USSR in 1991). This composition included not only those who occupied specific positions in government, but also, for example, history teachers in schools and teachers of scientific communism in higher educational institutions, secretaries Union of Writers and other creative associations, since ideological work was no less important than issues of defense or production. Distinctive features of the Soviet nomenklatura: repressiveness, categorical and militarized consciousness; ahistoricality; lack of critical thinking; suppression of initiative in oneself and others; servility to superiors and the mindset of guessing what he should like (in this regard, the mass production of fictitious and demonstrative products); labeling anyone who disagrees with the declared political course as an enemy; boundless conceit; the use of Soviet ideological clichés; collective commitment, not responsibility (if a decision is made to scold someone, then no one should remain on the sidelines, everyone should take part in this).

In the narrow sense of the word, nomenclature is a list of positions, approval for which took place through the relevant body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, there was still an unspoken procedure for approving candidates for important positions through the state security agencies (VChK-OGPU-NKVD-KGB) - this work is now carried out by the presidential administration. Those. in fact, the leading role of the Communist Party was proclaimed, but in reality the centers of power led to the special services, which used this situation to their benefit and to the detriment of the country, as the events of August 1991 showed.

The nomenclature is not only appointed, but also released after consideration by the party (Komsomol) bodies. In addition to the list of positions that were included in the list for consideration by the relevant party body, the practice of considering misconduct in relation to other non-nomenklatura persons was widespread. For example, in most cases, expulsion from the Komsomol could lead to expulsion from a higher educational institution.

In addition, it is important to take into account that for the events described, not some specific type of economy was built, but a militarized economy of a special type, which was no longer manageable and was falling apart before our eyes.
Without understanding such things, it is difficult to understand both the events of August 1991, the collapse of the USSR, and the current situation in the Russian Federation. In addition, there is a high probability of a repetition of the forceful nomenklatura takeover of control in modern Russia, since the features of the Soviet nomenklatura are steadily reproduced not only by the current ruling group, but also by the so-called “systemic opposition” represented by the Communist Party, “liberal democrats”, “A Just Russia” "

Target:

• Expand the educational space of students as part of the development of research skills of students in Russian history lessons;
• Contribute to the formation of creative thinking, development of a personal attitude towards social problems of society;
• Study the events of 1991, the causes and consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

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Municipal educational institution secondary school of the Lenin state farm

Methodological development of the lesson

On the history of Russia, grade 11.

Dukhanina Anna Viktorovna _

Lesson on Russian history, grade 11.

Topic: “The collapse of the USSR: a pattern or an accident.”

Target:

• Expand the educational space of students as part of the development of research skills of students in Russian history lessons;
• Contribute to the formation of creative thinking, development of a personal attitude towards social problems of society;
• Study the events of 1991, the causes and consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

Tasks:

• Continue to develop students’ understanding of the mutual influence of the country’s development trends;
• To develop in students independence, creative activity, initiative, as stable personality traits, and the ability to creatively solve problems that arise in life.
• Develop the ability to study, acquire and deepen or expand knowledge, work with books, multimedia aids, master skills and abilities and creatively apply them in practice;

Planned results
Students will learn about:
- the causes of interethnic conflicts during the years of perestroika;
- objective prerequisites for the formation of national movements to leave the USSR;
- the historical significance of the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia;
- the origins and manifestations of the constitutional crisis in the USSR;

Attempts by the Soviet leadership to preserve a multinational state and the reasons for the failure of these attempts;
- the circumstances of the termination of the existence of the USSR.

Basic knowledge

Dates and events:

March 17, 1991 - all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR; All-Russian referendum on the introduction of the post of President of the RSFSR

Names:

M. S. Gorbachev, N. I. Ryzhkov, B. N. Yeltsin, A. A. Sobchak, R. I. Khasbulatov, A. V. Rutskoy, G. I. Yanaev.

Basic concepts and terms:perestroika, federation, confederation, interethnic conflicts, state sovereignty, constitutional crisis, lease, State Emergency Committee.

Form : combined lesson (updating and deepening previously acquired knowledge (grade 9), learning new material, applying knowledge and developing skills)

Teacher's methods of activity:explanation, story, conversation, organization of individual presentations, work with text,use of multimedia aids,solving cognitive tasks and problematic issues.

Lesson equipment: textbook “” 11th grade, worksheet notebook, multimedia technical teaching aids, Computer textbook “History of Russia. XX century” Antonova T.S., Kharitonova A.L., Danilova A.A., Kosulina L.G.

Zhuravlev V.V. and others. History of modern Russia. 1984-1994 // Teaching history at school. 1995. No. 8. P. 46-47

perestroika collapse of the Soviet Union

In the early 70s, all concepts of a turn to a market economy were dealt a blow. The very word “market” has become a criterion of ideological unreliability. From the second half of the 70s. The organization of industrial production began to change. Industrial research and production associations (NPOs) appeared. The practical result of such measures was only gigantism. The desired merger of science and production did not happen. But during these years there was a rapid and successful merger and interweaving of the official economy with the shadow economy - various kinds of semi-legal and illegal production and trading activities, into which entire enterprises were drawn. The income of the shadow economy amounted to many billions. By the beginning of the 80s. The ineffectiveness of attempts at limited reform of the Soviet system became obvious. The country entered a period of deep crisis.

Due to these and many other reasons, by the mid-80s. the opportunity for a gradual, painless transition to a new system of social relations in Russia was hopelessly missed. The spontaneous degeneration of the system changed the entire way of life of Soviet society: the rights of managers and enterprises were redistributed, departmentalism and social inequality increased. The nature of production relations within enterprises changed, labor discipline began to decline, apathy and indifference, theft, disrespect for honest work, and envy of those who earn more became widespread. At the same time, non-economic coercion to work remained in the country. The Soviet man, alienated from the distribution of the produced product, turned into a performer, working not out of conscience, but out of compulsion. The ideological motivation for work developed in the post-revolutionary years weakened along with the belief in the imminent triumph of communist ideals; in parallel, the flow of petrodollars decreased and the external and internal debt of the state grew.

In the early 80s. Without exception, all layers of Soviet society suffered from lack of freedom and experienced psychological discomfort. The intelligentsia wanted true democracy and individual freedom.

Most workers and employees associated the need for change with better organization and remuneration, and a more equitable distribution of social wealth. Part of the peasantry expected to become the true masters of their land and their labor.

However, ultimately, completely different forces determined the direction and nature of reform of the Soviet system. These forces were the Soviet nomenclature, burdened by communist conventions and the dependence of personal well-being on official position.

Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. the Soviet totalitarian system actually loses support in society and ceases to be legitimate. Its collapse becomes a matter of time.

The first concrete step towards political reform was the decisions of the extraordinary twelfth session of the USSR Supreme Council (eleventh convocation), held on November 29 - December 1, 1988. These decisions provided for a change in the structure of the highest bodies of power and public administration of the country, empowering the newly established Congress of People's Deputies and elected by it The USSR Supreme Council has real power functions, as well as changes in the electoral system, primarily the introduction of elections on an alternative basis.

1989 was a year of radical changes, especially in the political structure of society. The elections of people's deputies of the USSR that took place in 1989 (March - May) were preceded by an election campaign unprecedented in our country, which began at the end of 1988. The opportunity to nominate several alternative candidates (9,505 candidates were nominated for 2,250 deputy seats) finally gave Soviet citizens a truly choose one of several.

A third of the people's deputies were elected from public organizations, which allowed the communists, as the most massive “public organization” at the Congress, to have a majority, or, as they say in civilized countries, a lobby. This was announced as an achievement: the share of communists among people's deputies was 87% against 71.5% of the previous convocation, on the basis of which the resounding conclusion was made that in conditions of freedom of choice the authority of the party was confirmed.

In the elections held on March 26, 1989 in 1,500 territorial and national-territorial constituencies, 89.8% of those included in the voter lists participated. These elections marked a significant shift in society towards democracy, or so it seemed at the time. The work of the Congress was followed by the whole country - a decrease in labor productivity was recorded everywhere.

The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May 25 - June 9, 1989) became a very major political event. This has never happened before in the history of this country.

Of course, now one can look with irony at the battles that took place at the Congress, but then it looked like a victory for democracy. There were few practical results of the Congress, in particular, a new Supreme Council of the USSR was elected. Several general resolutions were adopted, for example the Decree on the main directions of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.

Discussions at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 12-24, 1989) were more businesslike in nature compared to the first Congress. The Second Congress adopted 36 normative acts, incl. 5 laws and 26 regulations. One of the central issues on the agenda of the Second Congress of People's Deputies was the discussion of measures to improve the economy. The issue of combating organized crime was discussed. The congress considered reports by a commission devoted to both foreign policy problems (assessment of the non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939, political assessment of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979) and domestic political issues (about the Gdlyan investigative group, about the events in Tbilisi April 9, 1989, about privileges)...

When the First Congress of People's Deputies opened, many pinned their hopes for a better life on it. But, like many of the hopes of our people, they were not destined to come true. The First Congress is now called a “game of democracy,” which, in fact, it was. By the Second Congress, people's interest had already noticeably subsided. It has already become clear to the people that life cannot be made better in one magical stroke. Reform of the electoral system was a necessary matter, but it gave the people little concrete, urgent value.

Introduction of the presidency.

In the summer-autumn of 1989, reformers in the CPSU, who did not want to get rid of the tenacious embrace of the conservatives, gave the democrats the opportunity to gain political strength and influence, allowing them to present center-right unity in the CPSU as a strategic line, and not as a temporary tactical maneuver. The situation in the country required a decisive development of a course towards a mixed economy, the creation of a rule of law state and the conclusion of a new union treaty. All this objectively worked for the Democrats.

By the winter of 1989/90, the political situation had changed significantly. Gorbachev, not without reason fearing that the spring elections in the republics would lead to the victory of radical forces (Democratic Russia, RUH and others), who would immediately - following the example of the Baltics - try to take an independent position in relation to the Supreme Council of the Union headed by him, took a step , which he and his like-minded people opposed several months ago. Using his authority in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which he headed, he managed - with the resistance of the Interregional Deputy Group - to pass a decision on the establishment of the post of President of the USSR. Having become President, Gorbachev received broad political powers and thereby greatly strengthened his power in the country.

Then the political struggle moved to the state level. A de facto plurality of power arose, in which the union and republican structures could neither act without regard to each other, nor reach an agreement among themselves. The “war of laws” between the Union and the republics was waged with varying success and by the winter of 1990/91 reached its climax due to the tragic events in the Baltic states, the struggle over the Union Treaty and the Union budget. All this happened against the background of the rapid collapse of the economy and interethnic confrontation between the republics and within them.

As a result, there has been another shift in the mentality of society. After democrats came to power in the large industrial centers of Russia and Ukraine, a lot of time passed, but the situation continued to deteriorate. Moreover, democracy was clearly degenerating into anarchy, increasing the longing for a “strong hand.” Similar sentiments took hold of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: in December, fearing unpredictable developments, it delegated additional powers to the President, and at the same time additional responsibility. Gorbachev, in January of this year, formed a new Cabinet of Ministers, in which key positions were occupied by representatives of the “enlightened” bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex.

Speaking about the USSR, it is necessary to make a significant reservation about the first president of the Soviet Union, who became Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, since this also played a role in the history of the USSR, in particular in the collapse. The election of Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was not at all predetermined by the alignment of political forces. There was, as Mikhail Sergeevich himself admitted, another candidate. But as a result of a hidden hardware game, inaccessible to mere mortals, it was his team that won.

Naturally, Gorbachev needed to consolidate his hold on power. And in order to ideologically justify his fight against the “sclerotic gerontocrats”, the old party guard, he was forced to proclaim a course towards the renewal of socialism with its leading and guiding force - the CPSU. At first, in April, when people mourned the alcohol campaign, personnel changes began. One after another, the party leaders of the regions and republics went to their well-deserved rest. The cleaning of the apparatus was led by the now half-forgotten Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, and in two years he completed his task - he seated loyal people in all key positions.

This is where all the party “perestroikas” before Gorbachev, as a rule, ended, but Ligachev’s influence in the party increased so much that the secretary general felt his competitor’s breath on the back of his head. And before the new nomenklatura had time to fall to the trough, Gorbachev announced that perestroika was continuing.

However, it was not so easy to “overthrow” Ligachev in the party arena, and Gorbachev, in the end, had to create alternative structures in the form of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People’s Deputies in order to keep the apparatchiks in constant tension. In sitting on two chairs at once, Gorbachev found an undoubted benefit for himself: the partycrats could always be intimidated by the democrats, and the democrats by the glory of the CPSU.

The struggle in the country's political arena was mainly around two points. The first is the general scenario for the development of perestroika. Will this be a gradual ingrowth of established management structures into the market economy and the introduction of state-bureaucratic capitalism “from above”? Or, on the contrary, the liquidation of these structures and the spontaneous formation of capitalism “from below”?

The second key point: since reforms require obviously unpopular measures, responsibility for their adoption and all associated costs are assigned, as a rule, to political opponents. Most often, the Center acted as the scapegoat. This was manifested, for example, during the political scandal that erupted in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, when the Union government announced a decision to introduce negotiated prices for a number of goods (in November 1990). Meanwhile, this decision was agreed upon with B.N. Yeltsin, and with I.S. Silaev. The opposite cases are also known, when

The center itself found the “goat”: the five percent sales tax introduced by decree of the President, which took just under a billion (931.5 million) rubles from the pockets of the population in January-February 1991 alone, was “blamed” on the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.

By the end of 1990, a stalemate had established itself: neither the communist reformers nor the liberals could, individually, achieve positive changes in the economy, politics, or social sphere. The main thing is that they could not stand alone against the threat of general anarchy. The first - because they have largely lost the support of the people, the second - because after their first victories they managed to lose many of their adherents.

Understanding of the need for political compromise was observed in both one and the other camp. Communist reformers (and even communist conservatives represented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR) in their documents of the second half of 1990 called for civil harmony, expressed their readiness to create not just a bloc of forces of “socialist orientation”, but to enter into an alliance with all democratic parties and movements. Their opponents, having had a hard time dealing with the practical issues they faced when they came to power at the local and, in some places, at the republican level, also seemed to be internally ready to cooperate. The idea of ​​a compromise with part of the apparatus and the center and the creation of a strong executive power is, for example, the leitmotif of the December program article by G.Kh. Popov, entitled, not without pretension: “What to do?” The idea of ​​civil harmony through the suspension or complete dissolution of all political parties became popular by the end of 1990 and appeared on different flanks of the liberal democratic movement. A.A. also talked about this. Sobchak, and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia V.V. Zhirinovsky. The liberals apparently realized that their time was running out before it began.

The political wind rose of perestroika has changed once again. An acute crisis of the existing political system broke out. Having proclaimed the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”, the reformers did not even think about the fact that the Soviets, which had ceased to be the transmission belts of the CPSU, were unable to organize a normal process of political development. The CPSU press sharply criticized the “incompetent democrats” who did not know how to organize the work of those Soviets in which they held the majority. “Incompetent democrats” nodded at “sabotage” on the part of the former ruling caste - the executive apparatus, mafia structures. However, the point is deeper. The political crisis of the end of 1990 is the result not so much of incompetence or sabotage as of an outdated type of statehood.

Each political force sought to find its own way out of this crisis. The most painful reaction to it was the “state estates” - those strata whose very existence was now at stake. They increasingly energetically pushed the President and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to establish an authoritarian presidential regime under nominal Soviet power. Gorbachev, although not without hesitation, was forced to do this. He needed support, but there was nowhere to get it: the CPSU had lost its mobilization abilities, and cooperation with the liberals did not work out - the inertia of confrontation affected it.

However, even if it had happened, the authoritarian transformation of the regime could hardly have been avoided. For liberals - at least those of them who determine the weather on the political horizon - considered the strengthening of executive power and authoritarian methods of transition to a market economy as something long-term, and not as a temporary tactical measure, therefore, strictly speaking, not only democrats, but and they were liberals only in quotation marks. It was enough to read the draft Constitution of Russia to see: the totalitarian regime is supposed to be replaced not by universal democracy, but by authoritarian power. At the same time, however, unlike the communist reformers, the liberals aimed at changing the foundation of the political system, at transforming Soviet power into a parliamentary republic.

The year 1990 was marked by the unilateral decision of some union republics (primarily the Baltic ones) on self-determination and the creation of independent national states.

Attempts by the union center to influence these decisions with economic measures were ultimately unsuccessful. A wave of proclamation of the sovereignty of union republics, the election of their presidents, and the introduction of new names swept across the country. The republics sought to get rid of the dictates of the center by declaring their independence.

The real danger of an uncontrolled collapse of the USSR, threatening unpredictable consequences, forced the center and the republics to look for a path to compromises and agreements. The idea of ​​concluding a new union treaty was put forward by the Baltic popular fronts back in 1988. But until mid-1989, it did not find support either from the political leadership of the country or from people's deputies, who had not yet freed themselves from the remnants of imperial sentiments. At that time, it seemed to many that the agreement was not the most important thing. The center finally “ripened” to realize the importance of the Union Treaty only after the “parade of sovereignties” changed the Union beyond recognition, when centrifugal tendencies gained strength.

It is impossible not to mention the putsch in 91, since it accelerated the process of the collapse of the USSR, that is, after the putsch, the USSR actually ceased to exist.

The signing of the new Union Treaty, scheduled for August 20, 1991, prompted conservatives to take decisive action, since the agreement deprived the top of the CPSU of real power, posts and privileges. According to the secret agreement of M. Gorbachev with B. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, which became known to the Chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, after the signing of the agreement it was planned to replace the Prime Minister of the USSR V. Pavlov with N. Nazarbayev. The same fate awaited the Minister of Defense, Kryuchkov himself, and a number of other high-ranking officials.

However, on the night of August 19, 1991, President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was forcibly removed from power. A group of high-ranking officials, which included Vice President G. Yanaev, KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, Defense Minister D. Yazov, and Prime Minister V. Pavlov, formed the self-proclaimed, unconstitutional State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP).

By resolutions of the State Emergency Committee, a state of emergency was introduced in a number of regions of the country, mainly in the RSFSR, and rallies, demonstrations, and strikes were prohibited. The activities of democratic parties and organizations, newspapers were suspended, and control was established over the media.

But the State Emergency Committee was able to hold on to power for only three days, encountering active resistance from the Russians from the first days.

There is no particular need to prove the importance or topicality of holding a serious conversation on the topic “The Collapse of the USSR: Causes and Consequences.” It is obvious, if only because the collapse of the USSR is also part of our personal biography and drama, and at the same time it is, in my opinion, the most significant dramatic episode in world history.

There is no particular need to prove the importance or topicality of holding a serious conversation on the topic “The Collapse of the USSR: Causes and Consequences.” It is obvious, if only because the collapse of the USSR is also part of our personal biography and drama, and at the same time it is, in my opinion, the most significant dramatic episode in world history. Especially the history of the Russian people of the second half of the 20th century. And yet, as a kind of proof of the topicality of the topic, I will refer to the authority of the famous “new Russian” billionaire and politician B.A. Berezovsky. In the outline of his treatise, entitled “From revolution to evolution without losing the country. Genetic transformation of Russia: economics, politics, mentality”, a treatise interesting with many ideas, the most interesting thing, perhaps, is that in his enlarged historical periodization of the “transformation of Russia (USSR)” in the period from April 1985 to 1997 inclusive, he forgot to mention (or “lost”, using his terminology) the collapse of the USSR, one of the two great superpowers of the 20th century, an integral (and rather artificial, I would even say ugly) part of which was Russia, more precisely the RSFSR, now the Russian Federation. One can, of course, in this regard, sneer at length about Berezovsky’s historical and political science “virginity,” but such irony will be unproductive. Moreover - stupid. After all, when such a very intelligent person, and, by the way, a philanthropist, with billions seemingly suddenly appearing “out of thin air”, forgets about such a historical “detail” as the “collapse of the USSR”, telling about the transformation of Russia at the turn of the 80s - 90s s, then such supposed forgetfulness speaks of many very serious things. And there is no time for ridicule here.

It is precisely this “forgetfulness” about the great country (in which, by the way, he was born) that fuels - and not without reason - the views of those who believe that the collapse of the USSR is not accidental, and not accidental in the precise sense that it is, rather, a consciously planned and implemented process rather than a spontaneous one. By the way, I am not a supporter of such views and included this phrase in the title of the speech, I confess and repent, for the sake of sharpness. Although, of course, I don’t think that this process was primarily spontaneous, much less historically accidental. And if it is random, then only in the understanding of randomness in which it arises at the intersection point of some necessary processes.

Now let's move on from politically sensitive jokes - to an attempt at a sober, scientific understanding of some of the causes and some of the consequences of the collapse of the USSR. For me, this is a difficult problem that has not been fully clarified (for myself).

First of all, I proceed from the fact that it was the USSR that was disintegrating, and not the Russian Empire, which was called something else. The Russian Empire, “recreated” as far as possible by Bolshevik fire and sword, by 1922, after the defeat of the so-called Stalinist idea of ​​“autonomization”, not only legally, but also, so to speak, structurally ceased to exist. And today it can be argued (today, of course, and not in 1922) that historically with the creation of the USSR, that is, a state built, formally speaking, along national-ethnic lines, some foundations were laid (albeit in the form of a formal or abstract possibility) for its collapse, which took place in the era of the great crisis of communism or, more precisely, real socialism. But in order for this opportunity to be realized, many unrelated historical events had to happen, other, internal, inherent and acquired contradictions of the USSR as a great and multinational state had to unfold. Let's talk about them now.

The USSR, despite the international mentality of its creators, is still in many ways a Russian state. And, like everything Russian, it is literally woven from contradictions.

Indeed, in terms of the method and nature of the relationship between the Center and the regions, between large and small peoples, the USSR is, of course, a unitary state, which is largely due to the strictly centralized system of management of the territories and the peoples living here that is characteristic of it (and its necessity cannot be therefore, reduce to the idea of ​​the so-called “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the ensuing mechanisms for the exercise of power). In addition, the USSR is a type of government system that in the second half of the 20th century received the name party-state in political science. Moreover, this is a socialist state, or more precisely: state-administrative socialism (and not fascist Italy or Nazi Germany). From a managerial point of view, such a state is characterized not only in words, but also to a large extent in practice by the principle of the so-called. democratic centralism (in one form or another).

This principle is even recorded in the Constitution of the USSR (both Stalin’s and Brezhnev’s) as the main principle of organizing the entire state and public life of the country. I say “even” because in words or in letter of the Basic Law of the USSR, the state in which you and I were all born is a federal state. Moreover, with serious inclusions of elements or principles of confederalism: for example, the right of union republics to secede from the USSR or the “formula” of “sovereign” states within a single federal state (which in itself is an obvious inconsistency). However, it is quite obvious that, firstly, the principle of democratic centralism cannot regulate relations between large and small nations on a fair, equal basis (without prejudice to the small ones - and in our case, it turned out that it cannot without prejudice to the large ones, for example, for the Russian nation). In the same way, it is impossible to imagine the coexistence in practice of the principle of democratic centralism - with, say, the real right to secede from the USSR, well, let’s say, one or two or three of the 15 republics that were part of the Union.

Another feature of all management problems in the multinational Soviet state (USSR) is a peculiar, I would say, paradoxical attitude towards the national question: its content, forms, prospects for resolution and even its very existence. In my opinion, the paradoxical understanding or paradoxical misunderstanding of the national question - especially the Russian question as a national one - by the leaders of the USSR, especially Gorbachev, became one of the most important subjective reasons that blew up the multinational USSR at the turn of the 80s - 90s.

The history of the theoretical attitude towards whether our national question has been resolved or not resolved is instructive, what is meant by its solution, whether self-determination of nations is possible up to the point of secession, i.e. before the formation of a “own” state within the framework of the federation and whether this right can be extended to... the Russian people, etc.

I will leave aside a very interesting and important question for historians, philosophers and political scientists about the attitude of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev to these problems and will tell you, based on information available to me, previously absolutely confidential, about the solution to these problems in the historical period of L.I. Brezhnev -Yu.V.Andropova-K.U.Chernenko, as well as M.S.Gorbachev.

It is known that in order to break the impasse of the formula for a complete and final solution to the national question in the USSR (which clearly contradicted reality), a clause was introduced in one of Brezhnev’s speeches that this issue had been resolved in the form in which we inherited it from the past (pre-revolutionary past). Such a clause, as it seemed to the ideologists of the CPSU, made it possible to open the “taboo” over the analysis of those real problems and contradictions that in the 70s began to grow in the relations of various nations and peoples of the USSR under the loud crackle of anniversary speeches about the flourishing and rapprochement of all nations in the conditions developed socialism. In reality, the scientific significance of this clause was illusory, as evidenced by the relevant scientific literature from this period of Soviet history. I know, however, that the working group of the Politburo commission of the CPSU Central Committee for the preparation of the new, “Brezhnev” Constitution of the USSR of 1977 tried to take a step forward in solving some real interethnic problems, to “expand” one of them, which, as history has shown, played a fatal role in the collapse of the USSR. I mean the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.

As is known, Nagorno-Karabakh, having come under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan after October 1917, the further it went, the more it became a tangled knot of Armenian-Azerbaijani contradictions. A constructive form of easing this tension could be to raise the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug to an Autonomous Republic. Such a proposal (based, naturally, on numerous “letters from workers” - in this case, actually existing ones) was made. Its authors (and they were: A. Lukyanov, A. Bovin, Academician V. Kudryavtsev, Professor V. Sobakin) believed - and not without reason - that this long-standing problem could be solved without much fuss, as they say, within the framework ongoing constitutional reform (adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR). The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, however, rejected this proposal: the point of view, popular in those years, prevailed (from which, by the way, M.S. Gorbachev later proceeded) that it was better not to touch upon interethnic problems, in any case, not to bring the matter to the adoption of any structural, status changes in the existing national-state structure of the USSR.

Life has shown the myopia and shortsightedness of such a point of view. The spontaneously developing process of aggravation of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations around the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh led, as we know, first to the Sumgayit tragedy in 1988. Not only was it not stopped in time by M.S. Gorbachev, but it did not even receive public or, indeed, any serious political assessment. The next stage of this drama, in the context of the progressive weakening of central power during Gorbachev’s perestroika, was the first bloody war in the Soviet and then post-Soviet space - the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the collapse of first “de facto” and then “de jure” an important part of the USSR in Transcaucasia.

During the “late” Brezhnev period, another attempt, unknown to the public, was made to move the attitude towards the national question, which was not only brewing, but was gradually heating up. As a member of that narrow group that finalized the Report of the Central Committee to the XXVI Party Congress in January 1981 at the residence of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Zavidovo, I can report that in the first version of this report, which was sent out to members of the Politburo by the so-called. “to a narrow circle (i.e. not to everyone and, as it were, unofficially) on behalf of L.I. Brezhnev, in the section of the report devoted to organizational and party work, there was a proposal to create a new department within the CPSU Central Committee - the Department of Social and National Policy, as well as a proposal to create a State Committee for Nationalities Affairs within the structure of the USSR Council of Ministers (by analogy with the Lenin-Stalin People's Commissariat). There is no doubt that the adoption of such innovations in 1981 could have played a positive role in preventing a threat that was not yet recognized by any of us - the threat of the collapse of the USSR. However, both of these proposals were not included either in the final draft of the report of the CPSU Central Committee or in the report itself. As far as I remember, these proposals were unanimously buried by almost all members of the Politburo from M.A. Suslov to Yu.V. Andropov and K.U. Chernenko inclusive. As is known, the department for national policy was nevertheless created in the Central Committee of the CPSU in the late 80s, when not only the USSR, but, as it turned out, the CPSU also had a very short time to live, and there were already very few real opportunities for saving them (if they still existed, of course).

Theoretically or ideologically significant advances in relation to the national question at that time were made during the period when the party ideology and the entire party were controlled by Andropov-Chernenko. I take these completely different people in pairs with each other because, in particular, it was in 1983, when Yu. Andropov was the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the report of K. Chernenko (at that time the second secretary of the CPSU Central Committee) at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee it was clearly formulated that “the solution to the national question in the form in which it was inherited from the past does not at all mean that the national question is completely removed from the agenda.” A little earlier, Andropov’s report on the 60th anniversary of the USSR said that success in resolving the national question does not mean that all problems in interethnic relations have disappeared, that they must be resolved in a timely manner, otherwise they may worsen. In this spirit, the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program, serious work on which began only when Chernenko was elected General Secretary, stated that at the present stage, i.e. in the conditions of the so-called developed socialism, the national issue is not removed from the agenda, has its own content and form, etc. and so on.

It is characteristic that it was M.S. Gorbachev, who in 1984-85. on behalf of the Politburo, I supervised the activities of the working group to prepare a new edition of the CPSU Program (I was the leader of that part of this group that outlined the internal problems of our development), and opposed even such flexible formulations. The text of the letter with comments from M.S. Gorbachev (addressed to me personally) is stored in my personal archive. It literally says the following: “when we talk about the national question at the present stage and that we are talking about it as it exists under the conditions of developed socialism, here, it seems to me, there is an implication that we must avoid.” He easily imposed this point of view on the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, where our program texts were discussed.

So we avoided the subtext by declaring through the mouth of M.S. Gorbachev at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, which was still completely controlled by him, that our national question had been “successfully resolved.” But they got it as soon as the old command-administrative “brakes” weakened and the country’s monetary and financial system began to fall apart under the conditions of perestroika and for many other reasons, Sumgait, Karabakh, January (1991) Baku, Vilnius, the Baltic complex as a whole, Moldavian -Transnistrian problems, etc. and so on. And ultimately - the collapse of the USSR, almost uncontrollable since the late 80s - early 90s.

The August 1991 putsch plus the Belovezhskaya Accords led to the final landslide collapse of the state, which, as it turned out, was built not on democratic centralism, as the creators of the Brezhnev constitution believed, but on the national-ethnic principle, which made it easier for the new ethno-political elites in the republics to flee, which was completely constitutional in these conditions from each other.

A few words about the conceptual features of governing the multinational USSR, without which it is difficult to understand some of the reasons and consequences of its collapse.

We noted that the basis for the regulation of interethnic relations in the USSR was the principle of unitarism in the form of a kind of democratic centralism. Its content in certain specific cases was interpreted by the party, more precisely by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics (except for the RSFSR, where the Communist Party did not exist until the 90s), and in difficult cases by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. No matter what they say today about this highest body of party and state power in the USSR, it was a collective body. It was, of course, led by the Secretary General, endowed with enormous power, but objectively speaking, this power was less than the power and powers that the President of the Russian Federation has today, both according to the Constitution and de facto. The main instrument, the main lever of control of this body in calm times (60-70s) was not repression or violence, but personnel policy, which quite flexibly combined professional-political and national-ethnic qualities, vertical and horizontal rotation of these personnel throughout the country, etc.

Another feature of the management of the multinational Union of the USSR was that the legal basis for regulating interethnic relations was virtually absent, unless, of course, you count the general principles of the Constitution, which provided assessments, boundaries and limits of what was permissible and unacceptable in interethnic relations.

However, in solving the national question, a huge regulatory (and effectively regulating) role belonged to ideology and propaganda and educational work, carried out very professionally. On the surface, two principles prevail here: friendship of peoples (or internationalism) and respect for the national dignity of small nations, non-discrimination of so-called nationalities. Moreover, real conditions are created, even privileged conditions, for their national and cultural development within the framework, of course, of state socialist values. Despite all the odiousness of many aspects of the propaganda and educational work of the party and the state in the spirit of these principles, their importance cannot be underestimated.

As for turbulent, bad times, conflictual relationships between nations, they were clearly resolved not with the help of law, but with force or the threat of its use (in various forms).

Were there any advantages to such a system of governing a multinational state? The main advantage (inconceivable from the point of view of the 90s) is the absence of armed interethnic mass conflicts, and especially wars on an interethnic basis. Is it a lot or a little? Probably people who survived such conflicts, and even more so those who died, will answer this question differently than those who were on the sidelines and did not fall into this interethnic “meat grinder” of the late 20th century.

Let's draw some conclusions. The reasons for the landslide (I emphasize: landslide) collapse of the USSR were predominantly subjective (political) in nature (and the role of the subjective factor in a totalitarian or authoritarian state is extremely large). Of these it is worth highlighting:

1. Lack of understanding by the leadership of the former USSR of the contradictions of its state structure. And first of all, the fact that the USSR in form represented a federation (with some even interspersed in its constitution - both Stalin's and Brezhnev's - confederal elements, for example, the right to secede from the USSR), but in essence it was a unitary, strictly centralized state. No political efforts were made to overcome this contradiction, which sooner or later was bound to explode the state.

2. The USSR is a multinational state. However, the legal basis for state regulation of national relations was virtually absent. The CPSU tried to compensate for this basis, merging with state structures, built as a single transnational or international organization, striving (for good or bad) to create the ideological and political basis of a single multinational state. With the liquidation, first of the legal and then of the actual role of the CPSU, that axial core was pulled out, the structure that cemented interethnic relations collapsed, and no other was created.

3. Another contradiction, or rather a fundamental flaw of our previous state system, was the focus on ensuring the priority of the so-called indigenous or titular nationality (with the exception of Russian). As a result, the formally proclaimed idea of ​​a union of equal peoples was replaced by the idea of ​​a kind of chosen (“titular”, “nomenklatura”) nations.

In the conditions of a sharp weakening of the central state power, all this could not but cause the well-known “parade of sovereignties”, which contributed to the collapse of the USSR, almost collapsed the RSFSR, and objectively laid the foundation for the growth of Russian nationalism, capable in the future of either demolishing everything standing in its way, or (in its healthy form) to recreate Russia as a historically Russian, great, multinational state.

4. At the end of the 80s, i.e. Even during the years of Gorbachev-Ryzhkov’s rule, the country’s monetary and financial system essentially collapsed. After this, the collapse of the USSR was only a matter of time. August 1991 was simply the last straw here. T.N. The “Belovezhskaya Conspiracy” was in this sense not only and not so much the cause of the collapse of the USSR, but rather a statement of this fact and its consolidation (rather hasty and largely unsuccessful).

Some consequences:

The collapse of the country's economy as a single national economic complex, which was, for obvious reasons, the main factor in the catastrophic decline in production and living standards in all republics of the former USSR, including the RSFSR (according to some estimates, a 50% drop in production in our country was caused by this) ;

The Russian people, the largest, most numerous in Europe, contrary to global integration trends, unexpectedly became a divided, torn nation (more than 17% of the total Russian population of the former USSR, i.e. about 25 million Russians ended up in states foreign to Russia , and in some of them they became foreigners, deprived of internationally recognized human rights). For the first time in history, Russians turned out to be “nationals,” including in the original Russian territories - Crimea, Northern Kazakhstan, etc.

The colossal geopolitical losses of the Russian state, which in many respects in this regard were thrown back almost in pre-Petrine times.

All this poses challenges to healthy socio-political forces and domestic business circles, incl. including large Russian capital, the task of reviving Russia. The essence of this task is the revival of Russia as a great power, otherwise its main state-forming people - the Russian people - are doomed to historical extinction. Hence the significance of the Russian national idea, which has been developed historically and so far exists objectively (and subjectively!). Its components: sovereignty, patriotism (Russian - up to self-sacrifice in the name of the Motherland), statism (a special attitude towards the state and it (the state) towards the people). Finally, the idea of ​​human solidarity and social justice, rooted in Russian historical truth-seeking.

Representative power: monitoring, analysis, information, 1998. - Special. release.

Krupa Tatyana Albertovna, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Russian History and Archival Science, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok [email protected] Okhonko Olga Ivanovna, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Russian History and Archival Science, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok

The collapse of the USSR in the context of random and natural factors

Abstract. The article examines the random and natural factors of the collapse of the USSR. The role and place of the United States in the destruction of the USSR is assessed. The impact of internal political factors on the collapse of the USSR is analyzed. A complex of internal and foreign policy consequences of the collapse of the USSR is given. Key words: domestic political, foreign policy, natural, perestroika, putsch, collapse, union treaty, accidental, USSR, factors.

The appeal to this topic is due to memorable dates: 90 years since the formation of the USSR and 21 years since its collapse. The collapse of a huge state that existed on the territory of Europe and Asia had a lot of obvious and hidden reasons, as well as a complex of negative consequences. The purpose of this article is to try to understand the domestic and foreign policy factors of the collapse of the USSR, to determine whether these factors were natural or random. In theoretical terms, the problem remains not fully studied. The lack of archival materials and the presence of closed sources causes ambiguity and understatement; discrepancies in assessments of this catastrophe raise many questions. When studying this problem, the points of view of not only Russian historians and politicians were analyzed, but also the positions of foreign leaders who had a direct influence on the events taking place. In the content of this article, a book called “WorldTransformed” is analyzed, its authors are George W. Bush (senior) and his security adviser B .Scowcroft.The book provides answers to important questions of history and modern times - how the conditions were created for the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Warfare, which led to serious consequences in the balance of power in the world. From a number of factors that influenced the collapse of the USSR, the role of the United States cannot be excluded, which understood the real threat contained in the military potential Soviet Union. This is confirmed by the facts reflected in the above-mentioned book, written in 1998. It assesses the role and place of George W. Bush in the history of the United States and in world history. It is emphasized that the George W. Bush administration has achieved the fulfillment of the national goal that many Americans strived for - the liberation of Eastern Europe and the destruction of the mortal threat to the United States. The USSR, having a huge stockpile of nuclear missile weapons, theoretically posed a threat to the military-political structures of the United States. The perestroika started in the Soviet Union and the new foreign policy course of M. Gobachev suited the United States. M. Gorbachev's reforms made it possible to strengthen the position of the United States in Eastern Europe. G. Bush and B. Scowcroft note that, having begun to implement perestroika, “Gorbachev set in motion forces whose consequences were unpredictable - they were unknown even to himself.” Largely unexpected for the United States were the numerous concessions made by M. Gorbachev in relations with the countries of the former “socialist camp” that were members of the Warsaw Department. In this book, George Bush writes that “Gorbachev does not understand the actual situation in Eastern Europe. It appears he was trying to cultivate “little Gorbachevs” who would win public support.” Obviously, he hoped for a multiplier effect from perestroika, which would be extended to all countries of Eastern Europe. However, the process of the collapse of the Department of Internal Affairs was irreversible, American plans to blow up the Department of Internal Affairs from the inside were implemented, thereby, as they believe in the United States, the split in Europe was put to an end. In such a context, the conclusion suggests itself about the formation of random factors that played a certain role in the collapse of the USSR; they did not prevent the process of collapse did not delay, but on the contrary, accelerated it. Analyzing their impression of the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the authors of the book exclaim: “Even in their dreams they could not have dreamed that throughout their lives they would see this: Europe is united and free.” Losing control of Eastern Europe had enormous negative consequences for the Soviet Union. In particular, the GDR was a “prize” for the USSR after the end of World War II, a reliable military ally and an important economic partner. The loss of the GDR meant the end of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's foreign policy position caused a negative reaction among Soviet politicians, military officers, diplomats and in broad circles of the USSR public. Gorbachev gave up one position after another. He made concessions to American pressure on many foreign policy issues, and this was disastrous for the USSR. For many years, throughout the Cold War, plans were developed in the United States to destroy the Soviet Union. For this purpose, huge amounts of money were spent, nuclear arsenals were created, radio stations were financed in third countries, etc. When Perestroika and glasnost began, the USSR became more open to the world. In conditions of worsening economic difficulties and changes, which made it possible to talk about everything out loud, it would be strange if the United States suddenly abruptly abandoned the idea of ​​​​destroying the USSR and did not take advantage of the opportunities that opened up before them. It turns out that the United States had a better handle on the situation in the USSR than in the Union itself. Unfortunately, Gorbachev largely did not understand the seriousness of the danger that threatened the Soviet Union. By 1991, an internal political crisis was rapidly developing in Moscow. The American side was informed about the impending putsch by the State Emergency Committee. The US Ambassador to the USSR J. Matlock was notified of the upcoming putsch by the mayor of Moscow G. Kh. Popov. US politicians in their memoirs about the collapse of the USSR note that the American side immediately informed M. about the impending putsch. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin. To this day, in Russian literature, the putsch is presented as an emergency situation, and this is stated in history textbooks. In this context, it becomes clear why Gorbachev stated that he would never tell the whole truth about the August events.

When the State Emergency Committee arose on August 19, 1991, George W. Bush was the first of the leaders of Western states to support Yeltsin. As Gorbachev's real power diminished, the US President's attitude towards the two rival leaders gradually changed towards Yeltsin. The Americans had a good opportunity to observe from the outside the internal political struggle in the USSR, especially since B. Yeltsin kept G. Bush informed of all the details related to the State Emergency Committee. On August 21, B. Yeltsin had a conversation with G. Bush, in which he congratulated the US President on the fact that in our country “Democracy has won a great victory, thank you very much for providing us with colossal assistance.” This act of B. Yeltsin can be regarded as a betrayal of the Soviet Union. Even George Bush refused to comment on what was done. B. Yeltsin expected congratulations, and G. Bush simply replied that he understood him and felt “a little awkward.” B. Yeltsin was confident that the country was now freed from “the global center that commanded us for more than seventy years.” He launched a frontal attack on the USSR and openly “took away the Union brick by brick in order to then transfer most of the rights of the Union to Russia.” Much of what has been analyzed suggests that given the crisis situation in the USSR on the eve of its collapse (economic crisis, political crisis, party crisis, etc.), this process was initiated artificially both from within and from without. The impact of the information factor on the collapse of the USSR cannot be ruled out. Glasnost as a structural element of perestroika played a decisive role; it consisted in weakening censorship and removing the numerous information barriers that existed in Soviet society. The people were in a state of shock and bewilderment for a long period; it was difficult to understand “who is who.” All information means were put into use, because glasnost, democratization swept the USSR, everyone reveled in it, not understanding what was really happening. Discussions were launched about the horrors of the Soviet system; they were aimed primarily at the ideological destruction of the foundations of Soviet society, the press was inundated with negative information, where the image of a terrible homeland and wonderful abroad clearly emerged. Performances on the street and publications in the press, the meaning of many works of culture had a certain informational component: criticism of Soviet political and ideological system and the Soviet Union in general. Such a similar direction of action of various factors could only be explained by leadership from a single center. In other words, an information attack was carried out on our country, and it produced devastating results. Signs of ideological collapse began to appear throughout the country. The leadership of the USSR did not take effective measures to stop this destructive process; it was split. Many researchers characterize the actions of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin as a policy of “purposeful inaction.” On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, tension grew in the union republics. The positions of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin on the issue of the fate of the republics were completely different. M. Gorbachev was a supporter of a gradual transition to their independence. B. Yeltsin spoke about the right of the union republics to secede from the USSR, as a result of which we can conclude that he “hit the backbone of the Soviet state, shaking its political structure to the core.” When the union republics declared sovereignty in 1991, the question was raised about the continued existence of the Soviet Union and its transformation into a democratic federal state. In the same year, a resolution was adopted “On the general concept of the union treaty and the procedure for its conclusion.” But at the beginning of the preparation of the new union treaty, the extreme aggravation of relations between the leadership of the USSR and Russia played a role. In April-May 1991, negotiations between M. Gorbachev and the leaders of nine union republics on the issue of a new union treaty took place in Novo-Ogarevo (the residence of the President of the USSR near Moscow). Doctor of Historical Sciences Z.A. Stankevich emphasized that by the spring of 1990, “the tendency towards “chaotic decentralization of economic, political and socio-cultural life in the USSR” had intensified.” It became obvious that a radical renewal of the Union was necessary on the basis of a new union treaty. At the fifth (last) Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, it was proposed to prepare an agreement on the Union of Sovereign States, in which each of the republics “would independently determine the form of its participation in the Union.” On November 6, 1991, the President of the USSR sent to the State Council a draft Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States (USS), a union democratic state exercising state power. Until December 1991, the agonizing process of saving the Union in some form continued, but the situation became more and more uncontrollable every day.

Ukraine pointedly distanced itself from even participating in the preliminary discussion of the union treaty. In mid-November in NovoOgarevo, only 7 participants remained at the negotiating table: Russia, Belarus and five Central Asian republics. On December 1, in a referendum in Ukraine, 90.3% of participants voted for its independence. The United States immediately declared its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it, and Boris Yeltsin was the first to recognize the independence of Ukraine. Thus, the Union Treaty, before it was born, died. Events were coming to a close. The USSR locomotive approached the crash site in the little-known Belarusian village of Vaskuli, in the wilds of Belovezhskaya Pushcha, where back in the days of N. Khrushchev a hunting lodge was built for the rest of former party officials: here it was easier to keep their plans secret. The main characters B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk, S. Shushkevich were in fear. They understood that their actions were not entirely legal and even to some extent criminal. On December 25, 1991, M. Gorbachev made a statement on television: “Due to the current situation with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I am ceasing my activities as President of the USSR.” At 19:38 on December 25, 1991, the red flag of the USSR was replaced over the Kremlin tricolor Russian. Of course, one can assume that the Soviet Union has outlived its usefulness, and Gorbachev has become a brake on the path of reform, but in this situation it would be legal at the negotiating table for all leaders of the republics to officially declare the abolition of the treaty on the creation of the USSR of December 30, 1922. The Belovezh Treaty was illegal and criminal, because three people did not have the legal authority to decide the fate of the entire state.

To ratify the Belovezhskaya Agreement, it was necessary to convene the highest body of state power - the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, since the agreement affected the state structure of the republic and entailed changes to the constitution. In April 1992, the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies three times refused to ratify the agreement and exclude references to the constitution and laws of the USSR from the text of the Constitution of the RSFSR, which would subsequently become one of the reasons for the confrontation between the Congress of People's Deputies and President Yeltsin, which would subsequently lead to the tragic events of October 1993. Thus, Despite the fact that the de facto USSR ceased to exist, the Constitution of the USSR of 1977 de jure continued to operate on the territory of Russia until December 25, 1993, when the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted by popular vote, came into force, which did not contain any mention of the Constitution and laws of the USSR. After 21 year after the collapse of the USSR, an interview with ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Pyotr Kravchenko appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda under the heading “It is not true that the document on the CIS was waved without looking by the half-drunk B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk and S. Shushkevich.” He claims that the document is based on the Russian-Ukrainian and Belarusian-Russian agreements on friendship and cooperation of 1990, i.e. “from bilateral documents we made a multilateral one, which allowed us to create the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Disputes over assessing the significance of the Belovezhskaya Agreement continue to this day. The Belovezhskaya Agreement became one of the episodes of the accusation against Boris Yeltsin. A special commission of the State Duma stated that B. Yeltsin, having signed the Belovezhskaya Agreement, committed a gross violation of Article 7476 of the USSR Constitution and committed these actions contrary to the will of the peoples of the RSFSR about the need to preserve the USSR, expressed during the popular vote (referendum) held on March 17, 1991. The commission also accused Boris Yeltsin of treason by preparing and organizing a conspiracy to unconstitutionally seize union power, abolish the then existing union institutions of power, and illegally change the constitutional status of the RSFSR. In search of an answer to the question: “was the collapse of the USSR the result of objective processes or the result of the destructive actions of specific historical individuals and forces?”, one should proceed only from an analysis of specific facts and circumstances of that time. And the most important argument in this dispute should be the position of the peoples of the USSR; it is the people who are the bearers of sovereignty, the will of the people is the highest power in the country. But this did not play a decisive role, although it should be taken into account that the referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held late. And the main thing, in our opinion, was that the will of the people did not correspond to the personal interests of the group of then politicians led by Boris Yeltsin. They were not stopped even by the fact that these separatist actions contradicted the Constitution and were not approved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, the highest body of state power. The RSFSR did not have legal force insofar as it related to the termination of the existence of the USSR. After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR did not experience major shocks, but in the 1990s of the twentieth century it experienced events that, in their consequences for the population, can be compared with a real war. This is what current President Vladimir Putin thinks. Vast territories were lost, the population decreased, industry fell into decay, and devastation reigned for many years. Summing up, it should be noted that in the problems of the collapse of the USSR, the patterns or accidents of this fact, it is too early to draw any deep conclusions. Many questions remain unclear to this day. We need archival materials, documents of that period and a truthful, objective interpretation of them. Our convictions do not exclude serious economic, political, ideological and many other factors that undermined the power of a great power. But at the same time, we believe that the collapse of the USSR is a consequence of gross miscalculations and mistakes of politicians, the action of destructive centrifugal forces that made Belovezhskaya Pushcha a symbol of irresponsibility and voluntarism in politics. Particular responsibility for this deed falls on two leaders - the President of the USSR - M. Gorbachev and the President Russian Federation - B. Yeltsin, who in 1996 stated that he regretted signing the Belovezhskaya Agreement. M. Gorbachev also admitted his mistakes, but no one has yet told the whole truth about what he did. Historical analysis of previous eras shows that our country is for a period of more than a thousand years of history faced the threat of collapse during the period of feudal fragmentation in the 13th century, and during the Time of Troubles in the 17th century, and during the years of great social upheaval in 1917-1922. External and internal enemies tried to destroy the state through non-recognition, blockade, famine, and destructive wars. They did not succeed, since there were always forces within the state that opposed this threat. The greatness of Russia at all times rested on the spiritual potential of the nation.

V. Putin called the collapse of the USSR the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. And he emphasized that in order to survive in an era of upheaval, it is precisely “spiritual bonds” and the unity of the people that are needed. In general, one can note the domestic and foreign policy consequences of the collapse of the USSR. Foreign policy ones include: the loss of control over the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Department, the unification of Germany, the formation of a number of independent states in place of the former USSR. Among the internal political factors, three groups can be distinguished: territorial, demographic, economic, internal political and social. Territorial factors include a decrease in the territory of the Russian Federation compared to the territory of the USSR by 24% (from 22.4 to 17 million km²), while the territory of Russia has remained virtually unchanged compared to the territory of the RSFSR. Demographic factors include a decrease in population by 49% (from 290 to 148 million people). Flows of refugees and forced migrants were formed, not only of the Russian-speaking population of the republics of the former USSR, but also of many other ethnic groups of the huge disintegrated country, the regions of their exit: Central Asia, Transcaucasia, North Caucasus. Economic factors include: the collapse of the ruble zone, the decline in production that occurred, the depreciation of the ruble, destruction of economic relationships between enterprises. Political factors include: the cessation of the existence of the unified Armed Forces of the USSR, there was a massive reduction in the military. The termination of the legal powers of the USSR and the lack of a legislative framework in the newly created Russian Federation led to a “war of laws,” which resulted in the tragic events of October 1993. Significant changes occurred in the social structure of Soviet society. New social strata appeared, including “poor working people”, homeless people, street children and many others who were unable to adapt and adapt to other living conditions within the new state. There was a deep stratification of society, at one pole - oligarchs, officials, high-ranking entrepreneurs; on the other are low-income and low-income citizens of Russia. Was the collapse of the USSR a historical inevitability, a coincidence or a betrayal of leading Soviet politicians led by M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin? Questions that are usually classified as debatable problems of history. In any case, it is too early to put an end to this issue, especially considering the dire consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

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Krupa Tatiana, PhD in sociology, assistant professor of Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok [email protected] Okhonko Olga, PhD in history, assistant professor of Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok Disintegration of USSR in context casual and natural factors.Abstract. In the article are considered casual and natural factors of the disintegration of the USSR. The role and place USA are Valued in destruction USSR. The influence of domestic political factors is analyzed on the decay of the USSR. Happens to the complex inwardly and outward politicalconsequence wreckages USSR.Keywords: inside political,outward political, natural, realignment, putsch, disintegration, union agreement, casual, USSR, factors.