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Russian infantry tactics. Special Forces Hand-to-Hand Combat: USMC Martial Arts Program

Infantry in modern armies is the backbone of the armed forces. Despite the rapid introduction of high technologies in military equipment, the increase in its firepower and mobility, the outcome of the war is still decided on the battlefield by the infantry in interaction with other branches of the military and branches of the armed forces. As combat experience shows, infantry is the only branch of the military capable of acting completely independently in case of emergency. The history of wars knows cases when they tried to achieve the goals of war without involving infantry; even corresponding military theories appeared (“air war,” for example), but combat practice showed the inconsistency of such approaches.

Today, abroad, and even in Russia, among some “armchair” strategists, old theories are being revived under the new sauces of “high-precision weapons,” “high technology,” “excess firepower,” etc. Their essence is that precision, mainly aviation And rocket weapon enormous destructive power can supposedly decide the outcome of the war without attracting large masses of infantry and tanks with reinforcements.

We must pay tribute to military specialists who have the right to make decisions about the direction of development of the armed forces - almost all of them are very distrustful of newfangled theories. Infantry in the armies of even the most developed countries continues to be the basis of the armed forces, its structure and weapons are being improved, and modern methods are being developed combat use.

Today, infantry has different organizational structures depending on the nature of combat missions. The infantry, operating on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, is consolidated into mechanized, motorized, motorized infantry and motorized rifle units, units, and formations. Infantry, operating on light vehicles and having additional equipment, is included in light infantry and mountain infantry formations. Infantry, adapted for airlift and landing, is part of the airborne troops, airborne assault, airmobile formations and units. Finally, the infantry intended for landing from the sea on the coast was called naval.

Thus, infantry today is multifaceted and multifunctional. Until recently, the battalion was considered the main infantry unit. However, now it is increasingly evolving towards a combined arms structure. It includes tanks, artillery, etc.

Nowadays, a company remains a relatively “pure” infantry unit, however, more and more heavy weapons are appearing in it. Apparently, over time, “heavy” infantry operating on armored combat vehicles will practically merge organizationally and technically with tank forces, direct fire support artillery, military air defense and other first-line weapons operating on the battlefield under direct fire from the enemy. There will also remain a “light” type of infantry, designed to solve specific tasks (landing from the air and sea, operations in mountainous and other terrain difficult to reach for equipment, participation in low-intensity conflicts).

The organizational structure of infantry units in the developed armies of the world is very similar. The primary organizational unit is a department (group) of seven to twelve people. The basis is shooters armed with a standard assault rifle (machine gun). In “heavy” infantry, crew members of combat vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers) on which the squad is transported are equipped with pistols, submachine guns or shortened versions of an assault rifle (machine gun). Typically, several people in the squad have under-barrel grenade launchers on their main weapons. Each squad must be equipped with at least one close combat anti-tank weapon. These can be rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades or grenade launchers. As a rule, the department has a light machine gun. In the Russian and some other armies there is a sniper in each squad. Almost all soldiers in the squad are equipped with hand grenades.

Depending on the tasks to be solved, the department may receive additional sets of weapons. For example, an under-barrel grenade launcher can be installed on every rifle (machine gun), an RPG can be issued to every soldier, etc. In addition, in war, infantry quickly adapts to the peculiarities of combat operations and adapts a standard set of weapons in relation to local conditions, not disdaining successful captured samples.

The next step up in infantry organization is considered to be a platoon. Usually the position of its commander is the primary position for the officer (although in some armies platoons are commanded by non-commissioned or non-commissioned officers). A typical group weapon appears in the platoon - a heavy machine gun. In many armies, the platoon has short-range ATGM crews.

The company is considered in the infantry to be the main link in training, combat coordination, and organization of the routine of army life. In combat conditions, it is capable of acting relatively independently, since it has in its structure units equipped with heavy weapons. As a rule, depending on the views of the national command on battle tactics, these are mortars, small ATGMs or medium range, automatic mounted grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, etc.

A battalion in foreign armies, unlike the Russian one, is already considered an independent unit (in our country this applies only to individual battalions). It has its own fire support units (mortar battery or company, fire support company), and closely cooperates with units of other branches of the military. In some armies, infantry battalions (no matter what they are called) organizationally include tanks, air defense units, reconnaissance units and others, reinforcing the tactical independence of the battalion. As mentioned above, the battalion today has become the organizational core around which modern battle tactics are developed. Unfortunately, in the Russian army this process is far from complete; here, due to well-known difficulties, we are significantly behind the most developed countries.

The basis for defeating the enemy in combined arms combat is his destruction by fire of all types of weapons. Naturally, infantry mainly uses fire small arms, as the most widespread and quite effective in close combat. The following are the basics of the tactical use of infantry weapons in various types battle in accordance with the views prevailing in the Russian army.

In defense, the capabilities of small arms can be used most fully, since fire, as a rule, is conducted from prepared positions from stable positions. The boundaries of opening fire are outlined in advance and the distances to landmarks and local objects are determined, amendments to the initial settings are calculated sighting devices based on shooting conditions, areas of concentrated fire from units are targeted, lines and sectors of fire and tasks for machine gunners, submachine gunners, grenade launchers and all crew commanders of other fire weapons are specified on the ground. Strong points are equipped in engineering terms, main and temporary (spare) positions for firing are prepared; cartridge belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with the required types of bullets. All this makes it possible to reliably hit ground targets at maximum ranges of effective fire: from machine guns and concentrated fire from motorized rifle squads - up to 800 m, from machine guns - up to 500 m, and also to successfully combat air targets at low altitudes.

Before the start of the enemy's offensive, fire weapons on duty are assigned to the platoons, the personnel of which are in constant readiness to open fire. During the day, duty personnel occupy temporary or reserve positions. From them, individual enemy groups attempting to conduct reconnaissance or engineering work are hit by small arms fire. Snipers destroy enemy officers, observers, and snipers at their location.

At night, two-thirds of the personnel of each motorized rifle platoon squad are in position ready to open fire with night sights or at illuminated targets. For shooting at night, belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with ordinary and grade bullets in a ratio of 4:1. In advance, before the enemy approaches, the opening lines of fire for each type of weapon are outlined, and areas of concentrated fire from units are prepared. The distances to them should not exceed the range of effective fire against the advancing enemy personnel. All unit personnel must know the 400 m line in front of the front line on the ground in their zones and firing sectors: frontal, flank and cross fire are prepared in the zone of this line.

When the enemy goes on the attack in armored vehicles without dismounting, his armored targets are destroyed by fire from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Small arms fire hits infantry and crews leaving damaged vehicles. If enemy armored vehicles approach at a distance of up to 200 m, small arms fire can be fired at their observation devices. When attacking the enemy on foot with fire from machine guns and machine guns, the enemy infantry is cut off from the tanks and destroyed together with the flamethrowers and other means assigned to the unit. From a line of 400 m from the front line of the defense, from machine guns with under-barrel grenade launchers, at the commands of the squad commanders, they hit the advancing infantry with grenades. As the enemy approaches the front line, the fire of all types of weapons is brought to the highest intensity.

An enemy who breaks into a strong point is destroyed by point-blank fire, grenades and in hand-to-hand combat with a bayonet and butt, and pistol fire. At all stages of the battle, commanders control the fire of their units, setting fire missions, issuing commands and established signals for the concentration and transfer of fire. In this case, the most important thing is the soldier’s ability to independently choose the most important goals and open fire on them from a range that ensures their reliable defeat, and also skillfully adjust the fire. Unit commanders must use fire maneuvers in a timely manner, concentrating most of the firepower to defeat the enemy in the threatened area, or dispersing fire on several important targets. During air raids, some of the assets of motorized rifle platoons from less threatened areas can conduct concentrated fire on helicopters and airplanes at ranges of up to 500 m, and on helicopters in a hovering position up to 900 m. Note that for the successful use of small arms in defense, as in other types of combat, important has timely replenishment of ammunition, equipping belts for machine guns and magazines for machine guns and light machine guns with cartridges.

Let us give examples of the use of small arms in defensive combat. In July 1943, German troops launched an offensive on the Oryol-Kursk arc. On one of the sections of the front, a strong point at a height was defended by a rifle platoon. It was reinforced by two crews of heavy machine guns. The platoon commander assigned tasks to the squads and machine gun crews, indicated lines of fire and additional sectors of fire, areas of concentrated platoon fire, and lines of opening fire for machine guns and submachine gunners. Special attention he paid attention to the interaction of machine gunners and machine gunners in order to create the greatest density of fire at the line 400 m from the front edge of the defense.

With the beginning of the enemy’s offensive, his tanks fired at the platoon’s positions with cannons, and artillery opened fire on the strong point. The personnel, at the command of the platoon commander, ran across the trench that surrounded the height to its eastern side. This area was covered from fascist shells by the crest of a height. The platoon commander and observers remained on the ground. When the fascist infantry approached 400 m, the soldiers, at the commander’s signal, took up positions and opened fire: machine guns from the flanks, machine gunners from the front. Under crossfire, the attackers rolled back. Enemy artillery opened fire on the strong point again, and its tanks began to move around the heights from the flanks. Now the platoon commander did not withdraw the people behind the height, but ordered them to take cover in niches dug in the walls of trenches and communication passages.

When the enemy stopped the fire raid and his infantry again launched an attack on the strong point, the platoon commander ordered to open fire on the infantry from light machine guns and machine guns. He ordered the heavy machine guns not to fire for now, since tanks could quickly suppress them with their fire. When two tanks were hit anti-tank guns battalion, heavy machine guns, which had been silent until that time, opened fire on the enemy infantry. The enemy did not expect this, suffered heavy losses from their flanking fire and retreated again. The platoon's mission was accomplished thanks to the skillful use of small arms fire and, mainly, the power of heavy machine gun fire.

Captain I. N. Sukharev, a participant in the events, talks about the use of small arms in combat operations in Afghanistan. In 1986, he was the head of a guard outpost in one of the mountainous regions. The outpost, with fire from mortars, heavy machine guns of the NSV, PK machine guns and machine guns, covered the junction of mountain roads from the penetration of the Mujahideen. NSV machine guns were used as stationary fire weapons to destroy enemy groups on open sections of roads at a distance of about 1800 m. They were placed in strong shelters made of stones, the legs of the machine guns were half buried in the ground and strengthened in it for better stability. The assigned area was constantly monitored, and fire was immediately opened on the groups of dushmans found there. The sudden use of NSV machine guns, as a rule, achieved the goal. The mortar fire did not bring success - upon hearing the shots, the Mujahideen managed to hide.

PK machine guns were used at the outpost as a maneuverable fire weapon. Several positions were equipped for them in different firing directions. If necessary, crews quickly occupied designated positions in order to destroy the enemy in the threatened direction with concentrated fire.

For some time, the outpost was subjected to systematic shelling by snipers from the area of the destroyed village. The range to it was about 800 m. However, it was not possible to detect the snipers. At the request of the head of the outpost, two sniper rifles were delivered to him. SVD rifles. Having checked their battle and shot one of them personally, Sukharev carefully examined the outskirts of the destroyed village with binoculars and made a diagram of the location of suspicious places where the shooters could hide. With sunrise, the outskirts of the village were brightly illuminated, and through the optical sight sniper rifle dark spots of breaks in the walls of houses and ducts were clearly visible. It was in them that Sukharev discovered the Mujahideen. Just a few shots and the enemy fled, carrying away the dead and wounded. As a result, the sniper fire on the outpost stopped.

Similar fire combing of suspicious places where enemy ambushes could be hiding was carried out using mortars, machine guns and underbarrel grenade launchers. So, before sending people for drinking water to a source located about 400 m from the outpost, the bushes located on the road to the source and near it and an invisible section of the bend of the path were fired upon. Only after this did the soldiers go for water. Such actions by the head of the outpost made it possible to avoid the death of personnel.

In an offensive, the peculiarities of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops, from armored vehicles or on foot. These conditions make it difficult to carry out combat missions and reduce the effectiveness of fire. Great importance here they acquire not only fire skills, but also the ability of personnel to board and disembark from vehicles, occupy and change positions in shortest time, that is, make full use of the maneuverable capabilities of the weapon. When attacking, you often have to operate in unfamiliar terrain. This makes it difficult to navigate, especially when driving cars; The issues of fire control, observation of the battlefield and detection of targets, determination of distances to them, target designation and shooting adjustments become more complicated. Therefore, the independence of soldiers in finding and hitting targets, taking into account the position of neighboring units, is of particular importance, especially when fighting in the depths of enemy defenses.

Let us consider the issue of the combat use of small arms at the main stages of the actions of motorized rifle units in the offensive. In an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, motorized rifles are located in the first trench of the unit’s starting position, and combat vehicles- next to your squads or at a distance of up to 50 m from them. During fire preparation for an attack, when our artillery fire is transferred into depth, machine gun fire and machine gun fire hits the enemy’s fire weapons and manpower in the direction of the platoons’ advance. Unit commanders control the fire of their subordinates, issuing commands to destroy detected targets to individual fire weapons or concentrating the fire of a squad (platoon) on the most important target.

When approaching the established dismounting line (when attacking on foot), infantry fighting vehicles catch up with the tanks, the personnel put their weapons on safety, remove them from the loopholes and prepare to dismount. After him motorized rifle platoons deploy in a chain and advance directly behind the battle line of tanks. Submachine gunners and machine gunners, operating in a chain, fire on the move and from short stops at the enemy in the trenches of the unit’s target of attack.

For ease of firing and better adaptation to the terrain, soldiers in the chain can move slightly forward or to the side without disturbing the general direction of the unit’s advance. When overcoming a barrier in front of the enemy's front line of defense, the personnel of motorized rifle units, at the commands of platoon commanders, put their weapons on safety and in columns of two (three) following the tanks along their ruts, they run along the passages in the mine-explosive barriers.

Having overcome them, the motorized riflemen deploy in a chain, open massive fire from their weapons and quickly attack the enemy. Soldiers fire, as a rule, independently choosing a target in the area of the enemy stronghold indicated by the commander before the attack. Having approached the enemy trench to 25–40 meters, the personnel throw grenades at him, destroy him with point-blank fire from machine guns, machine guns, pistols and continue the attack non-stop in the indicated direction.

When attacking with infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), their battle line operates behind the tanks at a distance of 100–200 m. Machine gunners and machine gunners fire through loopholes (over hatches) at targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense in the gap between their tanks. The effective range of small arms fire from short stops is 400 m, and on the move 200 m.

For shooting, cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets are used (in a ratio of three to one), especially to engage fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones. Following the tanks, combat vehicles rush into the front line of the enemy’s defense and, using the results of fire damage, quickly advance into the depths.

When fighting in the depths of enemy defenses, the advancement of units occurs unevenly, so small arms fire usually has to be fired into the gaps and from behind the flanks of friendly units. At the same time, it is necessary to comply with shooting rules that ensure the safety of your troops. Thus, the mandatory rule for firing from behind the flanks is two conditions.

Firstly, the smallest angle between the direction of the target and the nearest flank of friendly troops should be 50 thousandths, in order to exclude direct hits of bullets on friendly troops due to errors in aiming and lateral dispersion. Secondly, when moving your troops ahead of those shooting up to 200 m, the target must be chosen at a distance of at least 500 m. This is necessary to prevent bullets from hitting your troops in the event of possible ricochets. Shooting from behind the flanks is only allowed from a standing position.

In an offensive in hard-to-reach areas of terrain, where motorized rifles operate in front of tanks, small arms should first of all hit anti-tank grenade launchers, recoilless rifles and other close-combat anti-tank weapons. Directed fire from machine guns and machine guns should be fired at bushes and various masks behind which one can assume the presence of fire weapons.

During an enemy counterattack, small arms fire is conducted in conjunction with the fire of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Submachine gunners and machine gunners destroy groups of infantry and fire crews, starting from a range of 800 m (with concentrated fire from squads). Snipers hit officers, ATGM crews and other important targets. Then the defeat of the enemy ends with an attack. At the same time, small arms fire is conducted on the move at its lying down and retreating groups.

When pursuing, motorized riflemen usually take seats in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and fire their weapons through loopholes (on top of hatches) at groups of infantry and anti-tank weapons on the move and from short stops.

When motorized rifle units operate as part of tactical airborne assault forces, small arms can be used in flight, for example, from helicopters against ground targets. As the landing force approaches the landing site, the enemy on it is destroyed by airborne weapon fire, and from a range of 400–500 m by small arms fire through observation windows and entrance doors helicopter.

Various tasks had to be solved with small arms during the offensive of our troops during the Great Patriotic War. For example, in January 1944, a rifle company of the 155th Guards rifle regiment The 52nd Guards Rifle Division was given the task of capturing the enemy's fortified heights. It was planned to support the company's attack with a 15-minute artillery raid, and support the offensive with a sufficient number of artillery units. For the purpose of better camouflage in winter conditions, the personnel were dressed in white camouflage robes, the weapons were wrapped in white cloth, and the heavy machine guns were painted in White color and installed on skis. At dawn, our artillery began a fire attack; 45-mm guns fired directly at targets on the front line. Rifle units and machine gun crews began moving from the starting line to the attack line. After a salvo from the rocket battalion, the artillery moved its fire into the depths, and rifle platoons began to overcome the obstacles along the passages.

After this, turning into a chain, firing on the move and from short stops at the first trench of the strong point, the riflemen attacked the enemy. Heavy machine guns, operating on the flanks of the platoons, fired from stops at detected fire weapons in the strong point. Unexpectedly, a machine gun from the enemy bunker opened fire on the attackers. The platoon operating in this direction suffered losses and lay down. The platoon commander set the task for the crew of the heavy machine gun, using tracer bullets, to fire at the embrasure of the bunker and in front of it, so that snow dust from bullets falling into the snow would interfere with enemy observation.

Indeed, after this the machine gun fire became less effective and the platoon commander raised the lying squads to attack. In dashes, they approached the bunker at 150–200 m and also opened fire from light machine guns and submachine guns at its embrasure. Under cover of fire, sappers crawled to the bunker and blew it up. At this time, other platoons of the company fought in trenches and communication passages, successfully using point-blank fire from submachine guns to defeat the enemy. Thus, with the combined efforts of artillerymen, machine gunners, submachine gunners and sappers, the company captured the enemy stronghold.

On the march, in anticipation of entering into battle, motorized rifle units move in columns with distances between vehicles of 25–50 m, and if necessary, they can move on foot or on skis. At the same time, personnel and weapons must be in constant readiness to repel enemy airborne forces, airborne and sabotage and reconnaissance groups with fire.

An enemy air attack is repelled by air defense systems and small arms fire. Submachine gunners and machine gunners assigned to fire at low-flying aircraft, helicopters and other air targets are prepared to fire through the hatches of combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) upon a warning signal. Fire is conducted at the commands of the squad commanders at targets on a collision course from machine guns and machine guns with continuous fire for 3–4 seconds (the time the target is in the affected area).

When moving on foot during an enemy air raid, a motorized rifle unit, at the commands of its commanders, takes the nearest shelter and opens fire on low-flying aircraft and helicopters.

At rest stops, machine gunners (gunners) on duty remain in the vehicles, and fire weapons are assigned to repel enemy air, including small arms.

Motorized rifle units assigned to march guard duty use small arms in conjunction with the armament of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). When meeting with an enemy of superior strength, they use fire to ensure that the guarded column maintains its position, deploys and enters the battle.

When starting and conducting an oncoming battle, small arms are used together with all other fire weapons to create fire superiority over the enemy. At the same time, small arms, as the most maneuverable, allow you to open fire on the enemy in as soon as possible, destroy his advanced infantry groups, foot reconnaissance groups and other targets with fire on the move from loopholes.

When meeting with an enemy of superior strength, the head marching outpost occupies an advantageous position and, with fire from all means, ensures the deployment of the main forces of the vanguard ( forward detachment). Small arms fire at infantry groups advancing behind sneakers, fire crews, and infantry in vehicles.

As the main forces go on the attack, motorized rifle subunits use fire on the move from infantry fighting vehicles and small arms to destroy the enemy's marching guards.

In the event that the enemy, with superior forces, has forestalled our lead marching outpost in deployment and is conducting an offensive, motorized rifle subunits dismount and defeat the enemy with fire from the spot, together with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that occupy positions behind the nearest shelters.

During air raids, submachine gunners and machine gunners, appointed by commanders to fire at low-flying aircraft and helicopters, take part in repelling them.

In general, small arms remain the most important weapon of fire in modern combined arms combat. Its role is especially great when acting in special conditions when the capabilities of other fire weapons are limited. For example, in the city, in the forest, in the mountains, etc.

No less important is the importance of small arms in “low-intensity conflicts,” which are understood as local wars, counterinsurgency operations, the fight against terrorists and other types of armed conflicts in which heavy weapons are little used due to their ineffectiveness or limited quantities among the warring parties. In the future, the important role of infantry weapons will continue.

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In an offensive, the peculiarities of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops, from armored vehicles or on foot. These conditions make it difficult to carry out combat missions and reduce the effectiveness of fire. Not only fire skills are of great importance here, but also the ability of personnel to board and disembark vehicles, occupy and change positions in the shortest possible time, that is, make full use of the maneuverable capabilities of weapons. When attacking, you often have to operate in unfamiliar terrain. This makes it difficult to navigate, especially when driving cars; The issues of fire control, observation of the battlefield and detection of targets, determination of distances to them, target designation and shooting adjustments become more complicated.

Therefore, the independence of soldiers in finding and hitting targets, taking into account the position of neighboring units, is of particular importance, especially when fighting in the depths of enemy defenses.

Let us consider the issue of the combat use of small arms at the main stages of the actions of motorized rifle units in the offensive. In an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, motorized rifles are located in the first trench of the unit’s starting position, and combat vehicles are located next to their squads or at a distance of up to 50 m from them. During fire preparation for an attack, when the fire of our artillery is transferred into depth, machine gun fire and machine guns hit enemy fire weapons and manpower in the direction of the platoons' advance. Unit commanders control the fire of their subordinates, issuing commands to destroy detected targets to individual fire weapons or concentrating the fire of a squad (platoon) on the most important target.

When advancing on the move, motorized rifles, during the period of fire preparation for the attack, advance to the line of transition to attack in columns on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). As they approach the line of attack, the platoons, at the command of the company commander, deploy into battle formation. From this moment on, small arms fire through loopholes and over hatches hits targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense. When approaching the established dismounting line (when attacking on foot), infantry fighting vehicles catch up with the tanks, the personnel put their weapons on safety, remove them from the loopholes and prepare to dismount. After this, motorized rifle platoons are deployed in a chain and advance directly behind the battle line of tanks. Submachine gunners and machine gunners, operating in a chain, fire on the move and from short stops at the enemy in the trenches of the unit’s target of attack.

Having overcome them, the motorized riflemen deploy in a chain, open massive fire from their weapons and quickly attack the enemy. Soldiers fire, as a rule, independently choosing a target in the area of the enemy stronghold indicated by the commander before the attack. Having approached the enemy trench to 25-40 meters, the personnel throw grenades at him, destroy him with point-blank fire from machine guns, machine guns, pistols and continuously continue the attack in the indicated direction.

When attacking with infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), their battle line operates behind the tanks at a distance of 100-200 m. Machine gunners and machine gunners fire through loopholes (over hatches) at targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense in the gap between their tanks. The effective range of small arms fire from short stops is 400 m, on the move 200 m. For firing, cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets are used (in a ratio of three to one), especially to engage fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones. Following the tanks, combat vehicles rush into the front line of the enemy’s defense and, using the results of fire damage, quickly advance into the depths.

With all the variety of combat situations, the solution to any tactical problem is based on three main elements: the movement of infantry while suppressing enemy fire, fire to kill and suppression and support.

Movement of infantry while suppressing effective enemy fire

Infantry solves problems at distances close to the enemy. This could be the throwing range of a grenade, the distance to the next bend in the trench or to the nearest building, or the maximum effective range of small arms fire when operating on treeless, flat terrain, and so on. From this follows the main condition for the infantry to carry out its tasks - the need to approach the enemy at a short distance for the given situation.

Closing with the enemy means that infantry, with rare exceptions, is forced to operate within range of enemy fire.

Fire modern weapons, if nothing interferes with it, is capable of completely destroying enemy infantry located in its zone of action. Neither the speed of approach nor the number of attacking soldiers matters under these conditions. One machine gun, under certain conditions, is capable of stopping the advance of an infantry battalion.

Movement in the area of enemy fire is possible only if this fire is rendered ineffective or its fire is stopped completely.
Thus, main principle infantry actions - movement across the battlefield (approach, withdrawal, etc.) is possible only by significantly complicating the enemy’s firing, making it ineffective or eliminating it completely.
At every moment of the battle, the infantryman must look for the answer to the question of what needs to be done to make it difficult for the enemy to conduct effective fire.
When planning actions at each moment in time, a procedure for interfering with enemy fire must be developed.

Ways to interfere with enemy fire a bunch of. These include such different tactics as:

Shelter from fire behind an obstacle impenetrable by enemy weapons, in particular, in folds of terrain, in buildings or in prepared positions, enemy fire is ineffective, since even with correct aiming it hits the obstacle and not the soldier.
Obstruction of surveillance the enemy by hiding behind an opaque barrier, by setting smoke, camouflage, etc. - the enemy does not see or sees poorly where he is shooting, it is difficult for him to aim and adjust the fire, which means that the probability of his miss increases. At night, dazzle can be used by shining a strong light directly at the enemy, or parallel to his trench, ahead of the attacking soldiers. As a very exotic method, we can mention approaching the enemy along the bottom of a reservoir (river) with a bag of stones over the shoulder, a weapon hermetically packed in plastic and a breathing tube on the surface.
Reducing the time given to the enemy to organize fire. This method includes sudden actions and short dashes across the battlefield - the enemy does not have time to take aim or even pick up a weapon to open fire.
Impact on the psyche the enemy by arousing fear and/or a desire not to open fire and even to stop resistance. This includes the tactics of sniper terror, when the sniper does not allow anyone to lean out of the trench, exposure to loud sound, and even propaganda.
Distracting activities. Activity in one place is depicted while another object is being attacked.
Finally, the method of suppression by fire is fundamental to infantry operations. Its essence is that fire is fired at the enemy in such a way that the enemy is forced to hide behind cover and not lean out from behind it to aim, or his aiming should be hampered by explosions or impacts of bullets around him.

Enemy fire can also be hampered as a result of “self-suppression,” that is, the actions of the enemy himself. The most common example of "self-suppression" is movement in terrain, for example, moving a machine gun to another place and routinely reloading a weapon. Especially at the beginning of combat contact, the need for reloading arises almost instantly for most of the enemy unit, since the fire is fired at approximately the same intensity from the same type of weapon, and the cartridges in the magazine run out approximately simultaneously. There is a sharp short-term decrease in fire intensity.
Such pauses can also be used for movement. Of course, the enemy strives to avoid “self-suppression” by establishing a firing order “one shoots - the other reloads,” but it is not so easy to withstand it.

The principle of combining fire and maneuver, often mentioned in regulations and manuals, cannot be perceived simply as the simultaneous performance of two actions - firing at the enemy and moving across the battlefield. Your fire must suppress the enemy's fire.
Of course, 100% suppression of all enemy fire weapons without exception cannot be achieved in most cases, although this must be strived for, but enemy fire must be suppressed to such an extent that its impact is minimal.

Particularly in connection with the principle under discussion, I would like to highlight tactics of attacking infantry with chains, enshrined in Soviet combat manuals. Let me remind you that outwardly this tactic does not fully correspond to the specified principle. Indeed, my memory paints a picture of full-length infantry running across the field, firing from machine guns approximately in the direction of the enemy. It would seem, what a combination of movement and suppression of enemy fire is about? we're talking about in this case?!. Only the simple simultaneity of the actions being performed is obvious. It seems that the task of effectively suppressing enemy fire is not set at all.

In fact, it must be remembered that Soviet combat manuals were written for the situation of combined arms combat taking place in the breakthrough area, when artillery and aviation, as well as tanks, carry out the main fire suppression of the attacked position, and the infantry only has to suppress individual foci of enemy fire. In this situation, automatic fire from a mass of infantry concentrated in a narrow area was considered a sufficient means to complete the task of finally suppressing the enemy.

In addition, such tactics made it possible to use poorly trained infantrymen and simplified control over the attack. It must be remembered that the use of this tactic in the absence of two essential conditions for its use - a) effective suppression of enemy fire by other branches of the military and b) significant quantitative superiority over the enemy in the attacked area - leads to significant losses in personnel.
The rule remains the same - first suppress, then move.

If a significant part of the task of suppressing the enemy falls on the infantry, then the most obvious solution would be to allocate a special group of infantrymen who suppress enemy fire (fire group) so that another group can move at this time (maneuver group). During the battle, their role may change. Here is the basis of the tactics of combat groups, which consists in the division of functions, not only between types of weapons, but also between soldiers who have the same weapons. One covers - the other runs.

Fire to kill and suppress

In battle, it is necessary to evaluate the actual effect achieved by fire - the destruction of an enemy group/unit or the suppression of its fire weapons and deprivation of the opportunity to maneuver. After the suppressive fire ceases, the enemy is usually able to return to approximately the same level of impact on our troops that he had before. Of course, suppressive fire can knock out individual enemy soldiers and destroy some of their firepower, but it cannot disable the enemy combat unit as a whole. The practical consequence of this is the following rule: suppressive fire should be carried out only when its effect can be at least somehow used during its execution or immediately after its termination; and the same rule, stated from a slightly different point of view - while suppressive fire is being conducted, something must be done to exploit its effect. Otherwise, it is an ineffective waste of ammunition and chatter, affecting the enemy mainly only psychologically.

You cannot confuse the suppression of the enemy with the partial loss of his combat capability. If, let’s say, 20 or 30% of the enemy’s personnel are knocked out, this does not mean that he will not be able to conduct effective fire, and accordingly the enemy may not be suppressed, although the decrease in his combat effectiveness is obvious.
The infantryman must understand that the bulk of the fire brought down on the enemy only suppresses him, inflicting some losses on the enemy, but does not completely destroy him. Even artillery fire on enemy positions, as a rule, allows the enemy to restore the strength of his position after the shelling has ceased, especially if the artillery hits areas rather than trying to fire at previously exposed targets. Artillery is capable of destroying the enemy only when it is openly positioned.

Essentially, in most combat situations, for a specific weapon, destruction fire can only be considered shooting at short distances for a given type of weapon: 50-70 meters for machine guns, 100 meters for machine guns. For artillery, this distance is measured in hundreds of meters, but not in kilometers. That is, this is such a distance when a bullet or shell practically cannot miss or miss the target. And only long-term and/or concentrated firing at long distances can make shooting from this type of weapon a fire of destruction. The effective fire range figures given in the manuals can be taken into account only in cases where the enemy is in an ideally covered and observed area, that is, in conditions like a target at a shooting range. At medium and long distances for this type of weapon, the effect of shooting for the most part will only be suppression of the enemy.

The range of effective fire increases slightly when conducting concentrated fire from an entire unit at one target using the “heap on one” principle. But even concentrated fire from a certain range becomes only suppressive fire.

If the tactical situation says that it is impossible to use suppression of the enemy or it is pointless and will not give any tactical effect, it is better not to fire at all, or to fire infrequently harassing fire. The latter does not even suppress the enemy, although it somewhat constrains his actions. The same rule, stated from the point of view of someone who has come under fire: if the enemy is firing suppressing fire, but obviously will not be able to take advantage of its effect, then such fire need not be returned.

You also don’t have to respond to harassing fire if you come under fire. This shelling is relatively harmless and the response to it will only reveal the location of our fire weapons to the enemy, and will not have a significant impact on the battle. It is recommended to respond only to effective enemy fire. Of course, depending on the situation, a decision may be made to take cover from effective enemy fire (for example, during shelling), but this should not be allowed to ultimately lead to passivity and inaction.

One of the “non-statutory” types of combat—combat to deplete the enemy’s ammunition—is based on a misunderstanding of the difference between suppressive fire and destruction fire.
Its essence is as follows. One of the sides, which has more ammunition or a better ammunition system, fires at the enemy from a distance when the enemy's return fire will not be able to complete the tasks of destroying the attackers. The enemy is lured into conducting a full-fledged fire battle. Psychologically, I want to respond with fire of the same intensity. If this is successful, the enemy begins to quickly consume ammunition and does this until his ammunition runs out. And only after this, the side with the best ammunition approaches and destroys the practically helpless enemy. Often, only after the ammunition is close to exhaustion does the enemy try to leave the battle (break out of the encirclement, retreat). The side with the best ammunition tries to use this attempt to destroy the enemy. In a situation where the attacker has a clear advantage in ammunition, it is more correct to respond with intense fire only directly to the attack of the occupied position, and the rest of the time to conduct rare harassing fire.

Security

The essence of the provision is simple. The infantryman must make every effort to:

promptly replenish ammunition supplies, promptly repair weapons and equipment (or replace them with serviceable ones)
receive (obtain) information about the enemy, timely receive information about the actions of your unit and neighboring units, convey information about your actions to neighboring soldiers (groups of soldiers), and, depending on the situation, to neighboring units
understand (establish) the procedure for exchanging messages and using means of their transmission (radio, signal flares, field telephones, whistles, signal lights, shots in the air, etc.)
receive (obtain) water, food, clothing, medicine, fuel and lubricants for equipment, and do everything possible to organize accommodation at the location in normal sanitary conditions.

The better the support, the easier it is in a combat situation. You cannot count on anyone to provide this “security.” Whenever possible, personal contact should be made to obtain support from other departments. This helps you get what you need. However, everyone must take care of their own provision. Of course, if someone suddenly helps, it will be nice, but you still need to rely on your own strength. If one or another type of security should be provided from above, but for some reason is not provided, then it is necessary to take the initiative, including through independent actions, to obtain what is required. The principle of self-sufficiency must be respected. For example, you need to establish the exchange of information with neighboring groups of soldiers or, according to circumstances, even with neighboring units and establish the procedure for transmitting messages to them independently, without waiting for special instructions from above.

Concluding the review of the three main elements that make up the solution to almost any tactical infantry task, I would like to dwell on one more thing - the concept of combined arms combat. Yes, indeed, interaction with other branches of the military - artillery, tanks, aviation, greatly increases the effectiveness of infantry operations. The fact is that each type of weapon has its own advantages and disadvantages, its own strengths and weaknesses, and when used together, there is mutual reinforcement and mutual compensation for disadvantages different types weapons. A classic example is the interaction of infantry with tanks. The tanks suppress enemy fire points, and the infantry protects the tanks from being destroyed by the enemy, who is trying to take advantage of the presence of dead space around the tank and the fact that the tankers' field of view is narrowing.

However, the infantry must be prepared for the fact that it will have to operate without the support of other branches of the military, that is, be ready not only for combined arms, but also for anti-personnel, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft combat. As practice shows, the command’s ability to leave infantry without real support from other branches of the military is limitless: artillery preparation and air bombing are carried out for show, without real targets, across areas; tanks and artillery are not placed at direct fire to avoid damage to the sights; During the battle, tanks fight with tanks, artillery with artillery, etc.
The infantry must be ready to act independently.


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In the last period of hostilities on the Eastern Front (1943–1945), both warring sides had such a sharp disproportion in the forces of infantry, artillery, tanks and aviation that not all the experience of that time can be used in determining infantry tactics in the future. In addition, the German troops were insufficiently trained and equipped, and also did not have full-fledged leadership. On the other hand, using combat experience infantry of the armies of the Western victorious countries can easily lead to false conclusions. The experience of these armies relates mainly to the final period of the war, when the German troops were already badly battered or were fighting fighting on a greatly extended front in conditions of overwhelming material superiority of the enemy. For example, one regiment, defending in Normandy in the direction of the main attack of the Anglo-American troops north of Saint-Lo, was forced to hold a defense sector at a front of 24 km. It would not be surprising if, based on this experience, the West concludes that future infantry tactics will resemble “police action.”

Therefore, further research, along with the experience of the German army, should primarily be based on the views prevailing in Russia, the second major land power that actively participated in the last war.

In the future, the offensive, as the most effective type of combat, will, just as before, belong to a vital role. In this case, the outcome of the infantry battle will be decided by the attack. In light of this, it is important to determine what factors in modern conditions influence the conduct of offensive combat by infantry. Since World War II, there are no known new weapons other than napalm and radar that would have had an impact significant influence on the tactics of infantry fighting in direct contact with the enemy. Direct contact with the enemy, at least for the present time, is some protection against atomic weapons and missiles long range. However, compared to the past, the number of infantry weapons involved in combat and their rate of fire have increased immeasurably. The firepower of a modern infantry battalion with 50 machine guns and 500 automatic rifles is theoretically approximately 5,000 rounds per second, while a 1945 infantry battalion could fire about 1,000 rounds per second. An increase in the number of mortars and their caliber, as well as an improvement in ammunition, ensures an increase in the firepower of the battalion's heavy weapons in approximately the same proportion. Increasing the firepower of the infantry is primarily beneficial to the defender, since the fire system is the basis of defense. The attacker, on the contrary, must first of all take advantage of the element of mobility.

New infantry capabilities

What new opportunities compared to 1945? What does modern technology provide in this regard?

Motorization. Motorization makes it possible to deliver infantry to the battlefield in off-road vehicles. Thanks to this, the infantry is able to enter the battle fresh and full of strength.

Tanks. No infantry attack should be carried out without sufficient support from tanks and assault guns! The necessary prerequisites for this create the possibilities of the modern tank industry.

Soldier's weapons and equipment. Conditions modern combat require that the infantryman be lightly armed and prepared for independent, proactive actions. He must skillfully adapt to the terrain. An infantryman should not be overloaded, as an overloaded infantryman quickly gets tired and loses combat effectiveness. Unlike the previous loadout weighing 30 kg, in our time not a single soldier of a rifle company should carry more than 10 kg of weapons, equipment and food. And this requirement must be met despite the enormous increase in infantry firepower. Nylon protective vests, which proved their worth during the Korean War, are designed to relieve the attacking soldier from the feeling of defenselessness against enemy fire and significantly reduce infantry losses.

Delivery of ammunition and evacuation of the wounded. Lightly armored all-terrain tracked vehicles must deliver ammunition to the infantry to a line that provides camouflage from enemy ground surveillance. On the way back they are required to evacuate the wounded. Both of these points have important psychological and practical significance.

Fulfillment of all of the above conditions is an indispensable requirement for modern infantry and an elementary prerequisite for requiring infantry to conduct offensive combat in modern conditions.

What can a tactician say about the new situation that has arisen in connection with the further development of technology?

Offensive

In modern conditions, there can be three methods of conducting an offensive with the participation of infantry.

"Police Action" Before the start of an offensive, aviation, tanks, artillery, including self-propelled artillery, mortars and other means suppress the enemy with intense concentrated fire in a fairly wide area throughout the entire depth of the defense.

The infantry, moving from line to line behind a barrage of fire, which often alternates with its throws throughout the whole day, clears the captured areas of the terrain from the remnants of the enemy’s defending units or reaches the goal of the offensive without a fight at all. This is undoubtedly the ideal method of warfare. However, against a strong, selfless and well-prepared enemy for defense, it is, at least at the initial stage of the war, inapplicable.

"Percolation." If the appropriate means of support are not available to organize an offensive, and the enemy needs to be deceived about his own intentions, or it is necessary to create starting positions for a subsequent breakthrough, then "infiltration" can often be the best way to achieve such goals. The essence of “infiltration” is that small groups of the attacker penetrate into the depths of the enemy’s defenses, gain a foothold there, and, at the beginning of the offensive, attack firing positions, command posts, or even entire sections of defense. Individual fighters or pairs of shooters can gradually move closer to the enemy in short bursts at intervals of several minutes, until after a few hours, and sometimes after a few days, entire units or even units accumulate at the attack line. In this case, first of all, the possibilities of cover are taken into account, and then the possibilities of firing.

Night, fog, difficult terrain or snow favor the implementation of such actions, which require great persistence, considerable time and excellent training of troops. This method of attack gives good results. However, if we consider these results on the scale of the operation, they are too insignificant. Therefore, “infiltration” should be considered only as an auxiliary method of conducting offensive combat.

Defense breakthrough. During the last war, German infantry often broke through the enemy's prepared defenses in the following way.

The starting position for the attack was either in the trenches created during previous defensive battles, or directly behind them. The distance from the starting position from the front edge of the enemy defense, as a rule, did not exceed several hundred meters.

The artillery secretly carried out sightings for several days before the offensive. Immediately before the start of the offensive, usually at dawn, a short artillery preparation lasting 15–30 minutes was carried out in the form of a short fire raid of all available artillery. The fire was conducted mainly on the first enemy trenches. Then the infantry went on the attack. She was tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defenses to the full depth. This method of breakthrough fully justified itself in 1941 and even in 1942.

Modern conditions require certain adjustments to be made to it, which we will try to do in the future.

At present, two points are of decisive importance. Firstly, artillery preparation in the form of a short fire raid, with modern weapons and the effectiveness of the defender’s fire, in many cases may turn out to be insufficient. The need for ammunition for artillery preparation will increase at least twice. Its main task will be to create favorable conditions for subsequent close combat. However, artillery preparation cannot be expected to completely defeat the enemy, providing the opportunity to conduct “police operations.” Secondly, in modern combat conditions, only in very rare cases will it be possible to destroy or suppress the defender’s firepower so much that the infantry has the opportunity, under observed enemy fire, to approach him from a distance of 1000 m to an attack distance of approximately 100–200 m.

Based on this, attacking at night or in conditions of limited visibility becomes crucial for infantry. A daytime attack must be supported by setting up smoke screens, which within a few hours could create visibility conditions close to night-time in an area of sufficient width and depth.

Thus, the procedure for preparing and carrying out an attack can be formulated as follows:

a) on the eve of the attack, all types of weapons fight the enemy’s artillery and destroy his defensive structures at the front line;

b) on the night before the attack, the infantry, with continuous fire support, reaches the attack line, digs in and prepares for the attack;

c) at dawn, the infantry, trying not to open fire, strives to reach the attack line as quickly as possible. After reaching this milestone, an attack immediately begins, accompanied by rifle and machine-gun fire.

It goes without saying that the third method of attack - breaking through the defense - cannot be taken as a template and cannot be applied in any situation. In different directions and at different stages of the offensive, alternating “infiltration” and breaking through the defense can be practiced, or a new, intermediate method of conducting offensive combat can be used. Both of these methods are described separately only in order to more clearly emphasize the difference between them.

When breaking through a deeply echeloned enemy defense, the infantry must be concentrated in a narrow area and have a deeply echeloned battle formation. It may often become necessary to break through a defense by sequentially committing one company after another into battle, supported by massive fire from the battalion's heavy weapons.

Based on the foregoing, it is also possible to determine the order of attack on the move against the enemy, who hastily went over to the defensive. This type of offensive combat can still be used today, especially by motorized infantry after a successful breakthrough, when striking on the flank or in the rear, as well as during the destruction of an encircled enemy. Advancing on the move has always been the strength of the German infantry. It should especially clearly demonstrate the efficiency of management, high level combat training and offensive impulse of troops.

Defensive battle

Defense consists mainly of artillery fire and heavy infantry weapons. The defender's fire should choke the enemy's attack in front of the front line or between the strong points of the first position and in any case no further than on the line of strong points covering the area of artillery firing positions. Therefore, infantry defending resistance nodes or strong points opens fire from automatic weapons only at actual fire range.

Firing points and individual riflemen in trenches must support each other with fire in such a way as to create a zone of continuous fire that is insurmountable for the attacking enemy.

Well-entrenched and camouflaged riflemen can fire from cover or ambushes. In this case, they are difficult to detect. It is necessary to strive to force the enemy to disperse his forces and force him to conduct a series of separate battles for each firing point. In this case, the enemy comes under flank fire and fire from the rear.

In such a battle, when infantry faces enemy infantry one-on-one, success depends on the endurance and perseverance of each shooter.

Each defensive structure must be equipped for all-round defense so that, in the event of encirclement, it is possible to fight an enemy attacking from any direction.

The enemy who has broken through must be immediately and decisively counterattacked even by the smallest units with the task, using all available means, to destroy him before he has time to gain a foothold. Once the battle begins, platoons and companies allocate forces and means to carry out immediate counterattacks. Units allocated for counterattacks, operating with the support of tanks and assault guns, must push back the enemy that has penetrated and restore the situation. Lengthy preparations and indecisiveness when launching counterattacks lead to a dangerous waste of time. In this case, every minute counts.

If the enemy attacks with tanks, then infantry fire is concentrated primarily on the enemy infantry. If the enemy infantry has been separated from the tanks and suppressed, all efforts are concentrated on fighting the tanks. Each defensive structure must be provided with a sufficient number of close combat anti-tank weapons. When fighting tanks, you must remember that they mutually cover each other. In this case, every opportunity should be used to hit tanks from the side or rear. For this purpose, bends in trenches, communication passages and anti-tank ditches can best be used. Enemy tanks that retain the ability to move must be destroyed by concentrated fire from all directions.

If units defending individual nodes of resistance received an order to withdraw, fire from strong points covering the withdrawal should be primarily directed at the flanks and rear of the advancing enemy. The withdrawal of infantry without the use of cover dooms it to destruction.

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