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Separatism in the USSR: who wanted to separate from most? Russian map

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the Baltic countries, various ultranationalist forces are making themselves known more and more often. They fully identify with the veterans of those organizations that once fought on Hitler’s side.

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the Baltic countries, various ultranationalist forces are making themselves known more and more often. They fully identify with the veterans of both those organizations that once fought on Hitler’s side against the USSR, and others that waged an independent guerrilla war against the Soviet and partly German presence in the region. And this question in itself is not as simple as it seems at first glance.

The USSR has always considered itself the guarantor of the inviolability of the socialist system both at home and in a number of other countries. Any “imbalance” was assessed in Moscow as an anomalous phenomenon that required an immediate response, including with the help of military force.

This force was used on the territory of their own country to fight armed groups of nationalist rebel forces operating in a number of national republics and regions both before the Great Patriotic War(in the 20s - 30s), and after its completion - until the beginning of the 60s. The main goal of the rebels was to achieve independence. At the same time, their actions were quite diverse - from hidden sabotage against the troops of the Red Army and the OGPU-NKVD-MGB of the USSR, local party and Soviet authorities (in the Baltics) to conducting large-scale guerrilla warfare(in the western regions of Ukraine). During the counter-insurgency “Chekist-military operations,” formations and units of the Red Army (hereinafter referred to as the Soviet Army) were used to a limited extent and closely interacted with the internal troops, which played the main role.

During the interwar period, individual military units of the North Caucasus Military District actively participated in such operations: in Checheno-Ingushetia (in 1922-1924, 1925, 1929, 1930, 1932, 1937-1939) and in Dagestan (in 1925).

Height insurgency, in addition to the North Caucasus, was noted in 1939-1940. and in the territories of the annexed western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, Bessarabia and the Baltic states. Therefore, Moscow - as part of repressive measures against its activists - decided to carry out the forcible resettlement of certain categories of citizens of these republics.

With the German attack on the Soviet Union, a surge in anti-Soviet protests was recorded in other regions of the country. For example, in the fall of 1942, armed groups of “peat bogs” operated in the forests and swamps of the Vladimir region, which were liquidated by the NKVD and police forces only at the end of the war. There is evidence of uprisings of the Yakuts and Nenets, against whom in December 1942 the military aviation. The daring and very successful raids of the rebels forced the authorities to create a special body of “operational leadership” to eliminate them.

On September 30, 1941, the Department for Combating Banditry began to function independently within the structure of the NKVD, which for four years was successively headed by S. Klepov, M. Zavgorodny and A. Leontyev. At the end of 1944, the Department was reorganized into the Main Directorate for Combating Banditry (GUBB), the head of which (until March 1947) was the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner (later Lieutenant General) A. Leontyev. By the end of the war, the Department had 156 employees, its work was directly supervised by the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs V. Ryasnoy.

In total, according to the Department for Combating Banditry, in 1941-1943. 7,161 rebel groups (54,130 people) were liquidated throughout the Union, of which 963 groups (17,563 people) were in the North Caucasus. In the first half of 1944, the activities of another 1,727 groups (10,994 people) were suppressed across the country, including 145 groups (3,144 people) in the North Caucasus. Troops from the internal districts of the Red Army were partially involved in the “operations.”

Caucasus

In the North Caucasus region, the center of instability during the war years, until the resettlement of a number of its peoples in 1944, was Checheno-Ingushetia. Its rebels, led by the Special Party of Caucasian Brothers (OPKB), had their units in almost all the republics of the region. In 20 villages of Chechnya alone, the OPKB numbered 6,540 people in February 1943. The most active of them were united into 54 groups consisting of 359 fighters. In addition, by 1942 there were more than 240 “lone bandits” operating in the republic. During the offensive of the German troops, the rebels maintained contacts with Abwehr reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which had the task of creating a broad front of the “anti-Soviet struggle” in the North Caucasus. But their hopes were not justified. By July 1943, as a result of “Chekist-military” operations carried out only in Chechnya and adjacent areas (starting from July 20, 1941), 19 rebel detachments (119 people) were defeated and 4 reconnaissance groups of German paratroopers (49 people) were liquidated.

In February 1944, on the basis of a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR dated January 31, an operation was launched in the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to evict Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In addition to the NKVD troops, which formed the basis of all forces involved, some military units and military schools were involved in its implementation. Their task was to carry out a cordon in the mountainous regions of the republic. Similar events were held in North Ossetia, Dagestan, Georgia, Kabarda, Circassia, Crimea and Kalmykia.

Baltics

Since 1943-1944, with the beginning of the liberation of the western regions of the USSR from fascist troops, an active insurgency began in the Baltic states and the western Belarusian and Ukrainian regions. From the general insurgency in the Baltic states, the Lithuanian resistance of 1944-1956 can be distinguished. as the most large-scale, fierce and organized.

In July-August 1944, following the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, formations and units of the NKVD troops entered the territory of Lithuania. 7 border regiments were deployed in the republic. Their task was to clear the front line and liberated territory from “stragglers and officers of German units, marauders, deserters, enemy agents, anti-Soviet elements and enemy collaborators.” The border guards encountered isolated armed uprisings by the local population directed against the newly formed bodies of Soviet power, some units of the Red Army and the NKVD troops. Mass disobedience began in the republic, often resulting in the murder of “pro-Moscow” activists and various acts of sabotage.

Similar actions were led by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (VKOL - leaders K. Belinis, A. Gineitis and P. Šilas) and its striking force - the Lithuanian liberation army(LLA - Lietuvas Laisves Armia). These organizations arose during the years of the republic’s annexation to the Soviet Union and operated underground. With the arrival of the Germans, the “nationalists” became legalized, hoping for the restoration of their former independence. But in 1943, the German occupation authorities banned everything political parties in Lithuania, which forced VKOL to switch to illegal work again. However, about 40 thousand Lithuanians enlisted in the German army, which allowed the German command to form 23 “auxiliary German battalions” that operated not only in the territory of Lithuania itself, but also in Italy, Yugoslavia and Poland. However, the Germans were never able to form formations and SS units from the Lithuanians, as was done in Estonia and Latvia (the notorious Waffen SS legion).

During the offensive of the Red Army, the main task of the LLA was to fight the retreating German units in order to prevent the looting of the state property of the republic. In addition, the leadership of the “liberation army” sought to prevent the capture of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region by armed forces by Polish underground formations.

With the arrival of the Red Army, the LLA reoriented itself to a passive struggle against the Soviet authorities. The rebels were actively supported by the local Catholic clergy. In the first period (from July to October 1944), the protests were poorly organized, which allowed the NKVD, with the assistance of individual units of the Red Army, to liquidate 23 detachments of Lithuanians (321 people) and arrest 665 only in December 1944 - January 1945 people who evaded conscription into the army.

The armed units of the LLA were called “Vanagai”. The general management of their military operations was carried out by the main headquarters, which divided the territory of Lithuania into districts: Vilnius, Panevezys, Siauliai and Kovno. The real “partisan” region was southern Lithuania, where the poorer strata of the peasantry had long lived. Each district was subordinate to district formations - battalions or regiments. Volost formations - companies or battalions - were subordinate to the district ones, and village formations - platoons or companies - were subordinate to the volost. Village units consisted of 2-3 departments. They included former soldiers of the Lithuanian army, workers, office workers, peasants, students and students, as well as clergy (chaplains) and former police officers who served in the German troops. They had German and Soviet-made weapons. In the initial period of the movement, most fighters wore military uniform Lithuanian army. On average, the duration of their stay in the detachments was about two years, and only a few went through more than a ten-year struggle.

Priests in most parishes provided material and moral assistance to participants in the rebel formations. In a number of places they became direct organizers of resistance. For example, in 1945, the NKVD of the LSSR arrested the rector of the Valkininsky parish, Bardisauskas, who led the local organization “Union of Lithuanian Partisans”; in 1946, the rector of the Geguzhinsky parish, Rudzhenis, who was the commander of the LLA battalion, was arrested. In total, from August 1944 to January 1947, 103 priests were arrested.

According to Soviet authorities, the Catholic clergy for about 10 years conducted “subversive anti-Soviet” propaganda among the local population and “forest brothers,” who, since 1944, were supported by the German intelligence services, sending sabotage and subversive groups, weapons and ammunition to the rear of the active Red Army. Thus, from November 1944 to mid-February 1945, anti-sabotage formations of the Red Army and the NKVD killed 4,176 saboteurs and bandits, while 4,045 people were liquidated in Lithuania alone. In the fight against them Soviet troops lost 177 people, of which 151 died on Lithuanian soil.

“Vanagai” support committees were organized in the places where LLA detachments were deployed. In particular, they provided the economic base of the formations and, in the event of a transition to armed struggle, were supposed to provide administrative and logistical services.

In the order of the main headquarters of the LLA No. 4 of December 10, 1944, its commanders were given the following tasks: “To unite all armed forces operating in the country - and with united forces to conduct active underground work against Bolshevik terror. With the fall of the occupation regime and the defeat of the Red Army, go into open struggle, mobilizing the entire people for this purpose.” In this regard, it was envisaged to unite all disorganized detachments, take an oath by them, establish connections between them, create new detachments in places where they did not yet exist; organization of a hidden active struggle against the NKVD, agents and local administration employees. Vanagai commanders were especially recommended, without instructions from headquarters, not to conduct combat operations against those units of the Red Army that did not have missions to fight against the rebels. It was also not allowed to destroy communications and military equipment without an order, unless this was required by the situation related to ensuring the immediate safety of the corresponding detachment. Moreover, the order contained a requirement to help the Red Army troops entering the territory of Lithuania, but lists of personnel and leaders of the LLA, as well as weapons, were prohibited from being transferred.

To accomplish the assigned tasks, the main headquarters gave instructions to intimidate the local administration, police and individual activists and keep them in suspense so that, under the threat of death, they could not conscientiously perform their duties. Only the most convinced “supporters of Moscow” should have been removed. The main goal of the resistance was determined by the LLA leadership to be “the fight for the property and lives of its people.”

Following these instructions, the formations of the Lithuanian Liberation Army intensified from December 1944 fighting. In the spring of 1945, the total number of rebels reached 30 thousand people. In general, in the post-war years, about 70-80 thousand people “partisand” or hid in the forests. However, despite all attempts, the rebels were never able to achieve complete centralization of the movement (the first major meeting of the commanders of the rebel districts took place only in the summer of 1946, and the last in 1949). The movement continued to be largely fragmented, distinguished by the great autonomy of the various detachments and their independence from the leadership center. Resistance was expressed in the form of terrorist attacks against local party and Soviet workers, propagandists and agitators responsible for collectivization, and ordinary Lithuanians suspected of collaborating with the new authorities. It is no coincidence that from 1944 until the final suppression of the uprising (in 1956) in Lithuania, out of 25,108 people killed and 2,965 people wounded, more than 23 thousand people were Lithuanians.

To eliminate the rebels, on the instructions of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, State Security Commissioner of the 2nd Rank S. Kruglov, in December 1944, the headquarters of the main leadership was formed, headed by the head of the internal troops of the NKVD of the Baltic Military District, Major General Golovko. The headquarters coordinated activities with the command of the rear formations and units of the Red Army stationed in the republic. The entire territory of the Lithuanian SSR was divided into 9 operational sectors. In order to organize and conduct joint operations and control the service and combat activities of the troops, senior military commanders were appointed. The immediate superiors of the operative sectors were state security officers and the NKVD.

From the beginning of August 1944, the most equipped and combat-ready unit of the NKVD troops operated in Lithuania - the 4th Rifle Division under the command of Major General P. Vetrov, previously based in the North Caucasus and participating in the eviction of Chechens, Ingush and Crimean Tatars. Every day, search and search and security and military groups were assigned from the division, which combed the forests and made arrests of suspects in “banditry.” In July-December 1944 alone, in response to 631 “gang manifestations,” the command of the 4th division planned and carried out 1,243 security and military operations.

However, there were clearly not enough troops. Therefore, local self-defense units (“exterminators”) were also involved in the fight against the rebels, which in October 1945, by decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, were renamed into “people's defenders” units. At first they were under the jurisdiction of the NKVD, and from 1947 they began to be subordinate to state security agencies. The detachments were formed from among activists and were armed mainly with captured weapons. “Fighters” were freed from military service and received various benefits. Their formations were created in all 300 of the then Lithuanian parishes. Each detachment consisted of approximately 30 fighters. In total, throughout Lithuania their number was about 8-10 thousand people. These detachments participated in combat operations together with operational groups of the NKVD and army troops.

The use of brutal repressive measures - taking hostages, arresting relatives, destroying houses and property - forced part of the population to go into the forests with the rebels, often with entire families. Evasion from conscription into the Red Army reached significant proportions. According to the Commissariat of the Lithuanian SSR, as of December 1, 1944, 45,648 people evaded conscription.

As a result of the strengthening of the operational combat activities of troops stationed in Lithuania (about 50 thousand people), in December 1944 - January 1945. they carried out 841 security and military operations, during which 27,923 rebels were killed, 4,177 people were captured, 161 people surrendered to the Red Army, 777 people were detained by military detachments, voluntarily came to the Soviet commandant's offices - 702 people At the same time, 2,613 “Lithuanian and Polish nationalists” were arrested, 74 “German proxies, traitors, agents and spies” were caught, 46 German paratroopers and 189 deserters of the Red Army were detained. The number of detained draft dodgers was 15,170 people. Was seized a large number of weapons, ammunition and “illegal literature”. At the same time, Soviet troops lost 42 people. killed and 94 wounded (5).

In June 1945, on the instructions of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria, 4 additional special forces of a separate special purpose detachment (UN) of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR were sent to Lithuania “to uncover and eliminate counter-revolutionary Lithuanian nationalist gangs.” Their personnel were equipped with captured uniforms, including the Vlasovites from the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). The armament consisted of both Soviet and captured weapons, including company mortars, machine guns, machine guns and grenades. Each unit was provided with detailed information about the situation in the county in which it was to operate. The main task of the UNO commanders was “to detect and eliminate the formations of the nationalist underground, bases and headquarters of the LLA.”

On September 29, 1945, L. Beria, based on reports from the Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) for Lithuania M. Suslov and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Lithuania A. Snechkus, as well as a number of responsible representatives of the state security of the USSR, presented a memorandum to I. Stalin, in which informed the latter that in the republic, in accordance with the decisions Central Committee on August 15 and the VII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Lithuanian SSR, the property of the families of the rebels and their accomplices was confiscated. Further, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs reported that the “bandits” continue to “spread various anti-Soviet fabrications among the population.” In this regard, he proposed “to allow the NKVD-NKGB to evict 300 families (up to 900 people) of gang leaders and members of the anti-Soviet underground from the Lithuanian SSR to the logging areas of the Molotov and Sverdlovsk regions.” I. Stalin agreed. By the end of 1949, the number of “evictees and special settlers” amounted to 148,079 people. Eviction measures were carried out seven times (in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948 and twice in 1949).

According to information from the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, presented at the XI Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, already in January-October 1946, “339 partisan detachments and 436 anti-Soviet organizations were tracked down and liquidated, over 10,000 partisans, underground participants and other anti-Soviet elements.”

As a result of targeted counterinsurgency measures by the NKVD-NKGB troops (with the assistance of formations and units of the Red Army), the “nationalist” movement in the Lithuanian SSR began to weaken. For example, units of the 4th Infantry Division of the NKVD VV participated in 1944-1954. in 1,764 operations and had 1,413 combat engagements. During them, 30,596 “bandits” were killed and captured and 17,968 units were collected small arms. Units of the division lost 533 people. killed and 784 wounded (6).

The rebel underground, of course, was not limited to Lithuania. In total, in the Baltic republics only in 1941-1950. The rebel forces carried out 3,426 armed attacks, during which 5,155 “Soviet activists” were killed. State security agencies and troops eliminated 878 “armed gangs.”

For a long time, the Lithuanian nationalist underground, according to Soviet authorities, enjoyed the support of catholic church and emigration. According to the 4th (Secret Political) Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1953, 800 thousand Lithuanians lived abroad. At the same time, the number of repressed citizens was 270 thousand people. Destabilization in the republic was facilitated by forced collectivization and the destruction of farmsteads. All this was discussed in detail at one of the meetings of the CPSU Central Committee.

In 1952, the rebel commander of the Southern District of Lithuania, A. Ramanauskas, issued an order to end the “partisan war.” However, the resistance continued until 1956. Individual rebels waged an underground struggle until the mid-60s.

Ukraine

The most “powerful, irreconcilable, experienced and sophisticated in methods of action” was the military-political organization of Ukrainian nationalists. Created in the late 20s, it pursued a single goal - to achieve “by any means necessary” the independence of Ukraine. For a long time the movement was supported by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church(UAOC), which arose in 1919 on the initiative of Archpriest Vasily Lipkovsky. In the republic, the Church had a certain influence until the 30s, until it was “completely destroyed” by Soviet power. There were quite representative “branches” of the UAOC in Kharkov, Lubny and a number of other Ukrainian cities. The radicalism of Ukrainian nationalism was most clearly manifested in the western regions, which for many centuries had no connections with Russian lands. In addition, here (with its center in Galicia) the influence of the Greek Catholic Church prevailed. The annexation of these territories to the Soviet Union on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was perceived by a significant part of the local population as another change from one occupation regime to another.

On the eve of the war, the Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist movements, which were secretly supported by Germany, became noticeably more active. Polish nationalists also made themselves known. All of them did not have a common platform and often fought with each other. Objectively, this led to an “exacerbation interethnic relations in USSR". On this occasion, the XV Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (May 1940) determined the “cardinal” task - to show revolutionary vigilance towards “Ukrainian, Polish and Jewish bourgeois nationalists.”

The Polish armed underground, represented by the Union of Armed Struggle (UAW), was active until the summer of 1940. Its command was in France. It ordered subordinates to commit “acts of terror and sabotage” on transport, communication lines, fuel depots, to work to disorganize and demoralize administrative bodies, and to create obstacles to the mobilization of conscripts into the Red Army. Intelligence was being collected.

Moscow responded with harsh repressions. So, from the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in 1939-1940. and in 1941-1951. More than 10% of the local population was evicted to remote areas of the USSR. In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the NKVD bodies shot several thousand local residents (in Lviv prisons - all prisoners, in Drohobych - 540 people, in Stanislav (present-day Ivano-Frankivsk) - more than 500 people, dozens - in Ternopil, etc. .).

In the initial period of occupation, the German command tried to turn the powerful nationalist-religious potential of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) against Soviet power and the Red Army. Not without the help of the Germans in 1942, the OUN created its own military structure, forming the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army (UNRA). Before this (June 30, 1941), a Ukrainian government was created in Lviv, headed by Stetsko, which, however, was soon dispersed by the occupation authorities - the restoration of Ukrainian statehood was not part of Germany’s plans. Around the spring of 1942, the OUN began to gradually withdraw from cooperation with the Germans. The organization launched a fight against two enemies - Soviet Union and Germany. At their III Congress (1943), the OUN leaders formulated the immediate tasks as follows: all-out preparation of the UPA for an armed uprising in the rear of the Soviet troops with the goal of creating a “Ukrainian independent conciliar power”; committing acts of sabotage and terrorism and raids on the headquarters and units of the Red Army and NKVD troops; extermination officers, employees of state security agencies, party and Soviet functionaries; disabling rear facilities; destruction of means of production, property, transport, etc.

In April 1943, in Silesia, the 14th division of the SS “Galicia” troops, numbering about 20 thousand people, was formed from Ukrainian nationalists. In the spring of 1944, she fought in the Carpathians. Then it was included in the German 13th Army Corps, which was surrounded in July 1944 in the Western Bug region (out of 18 thousand people, only 3 thousand remained alive). In August 1944, separate units of the division participated in the suppression of the Slovak national movement, and in the winter and spring of 1945, on their basis, the 1st UPA Division was formed under the command of P. Shandruk. Until the end of the war, it operated in Northern Yugoslavia against Josip Broz Tito's partisans. Since 1943, 10 thousand Ukrainians were part of the SS “Totenkopf” units, intended to guard concentration camps, including Buchenwald and Auschwitz.

In 1942-1944. The so-called Self-Defense Legion, numbering up to 180 thousand people, operated on the territory of Ukraine. The Ukrainian police existed until November 1944 (it was disbanded by order of the head of the SS and police of the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine, H. A. Prützmann). Some Ukrainian police joined the ranks of the 14th and 30th German SS divisions. The last division was formed on the basis of the Siegling police brigade, the backbone of which was Ukrainians and Belarusians. In August 1944, the division took part in the suppression of the French resistance movement (“Maquis”). In November it was withdrawn to Germany and disbanded. Its personnel joined the ranks of the Vlasov Russian Liberation Army and the German 25th and 38th SS divisions. In total, about 246 thousand Ukrainians served in the German army.

After the expulsion of the Germans, the remnants of the OUN immediately launched sabotage and combat activities against Soviet troops and authorities. The nationalist movement, which was led by S. Bandera, covered the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Volyn regions. From February 1944 to December 1945, the rebels committed more than 6,600 acts of sabotage and terrorism, and until 1956 their number reached 14,500.

In the territory of the Lvov Military District alone, from October 1944 to March 1945, NKVD troops, with the support of army units, carried out over 150 counter-insurgency operations with the participation of up to 16,000 people. As a result, 1,199 rebels were killed, 135 people were wounded, and 1,526 people were captured. and 374 people turned themselves in. At the same time, Soviet troops lost 45 killed and 70 wounded.

After military defeats and disorganization, the Ukrainian “rebels” (about 100 thousand people in 1944) abandoned the practice of concentrated attacks, similar to the actions of the Soviet troops opposing them, and in 1946-1948. switched to purely guerrilla tactics using small maneuverable groups. If at the first stage the troops had to fight with detachments of up to 500-600 people, then in subsequent years their number rarely exceeded 30-50 people.

In an effort to wrest religious and ideological ground from under the rebels' feet, from March 1946 Moscow waged an open struggle with the Greek Catholic Church. Its goal was to force the Uniate clergy to convert to Orthodoxy. As a result of harsh ideological pressure from the Center, as well as a series of repressive measures against the disobedient, by the middle of the year, 997 out of 1,270 Uniate priests decided to reunite with the Orthodox Church, which was officially announced at the Lviv Council of Greek Catholic clergy and laity. The Union of Brest of 1596 was actually abolished, which caused sharp discontent from the Vatican. The campaign was directly supervised by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) N. Khrushchev, who personally requested sanctions from I. Stalin for all actions. It was N. Khrushchev who reported to Moscow what the a short time about 3 thousand parishes joined the Russian Church. 230 “rebellious” parishes and 48 Greek Catholic monasteries were liquidated. 344 Uniate priests and monks who refused to convert to Orthodoxy were arrested.

The “measures” taken by the Soviet government against the Uniates partly undermined the influence of Catholicism on the ground. However, they also caused significant harm to general reconciliation in the region. The forceful intervention of the state in church affairs objectively alienated part of the Uniate population from Orthodoxy and brought new fighters into the ranks of the rebels, united by the idea of “fighting the Muscovites” in the name of saving their own church. The Greek Catholic Church went underground. The problem was driven deep. The resistance of the OUN members until the early 60s is largely explained by the religious factor. The Greek Catholic doctrine was a kind of ideological basis for resistance, as was concluded in one of the analytical notes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

In the post-war period, the OUN actually turned their weapons against civilians, as a rule, Orthodox Christians. In 1946, over 2 thousand people died at their hands, in 1947 - 1.5 thousand people. Total for 1945-1953 On the territory of the western regions of Ukraine, the rebels committed 14,424 acts of sabotage and terrorism. Over ten years (1945-1955), 17,000 Soviet citizens were killed. Only during 1948-1955. 329 chairmen of village councils, 231 collective farm chairmen, 436 workers of district party committees, employees of district organizations and activists, as well as 50 priests were killed. In total, UPA fighters destroyed from 30 to 40 thousand people. (according to other sources, about 60 thousand people). In turn, Soviet troops in only three western regions from August 1944 to December 1950 killed, captured and detained more than 250 thousand rebels, including the liquidation of 55 thousand active “Banderaites”. The losses of the Center for the entire period of the fight against the OUN in Western Ukraine amounted to 25 thousand military personnel (8).

OUN detachments were also active in the Belarusian, Moldavian and even Polish regions adjacent to Ukraine. As a rule, they committed sabotage and terrorist attacks against the population that supported the “Soviet regime” and soldiers of the Red Army. In Poland, OUN members, together with units of the Home Army and with the support of the nationalist organization “Union of Armed Struggle,” openly fought the new government and the “Russian occupiers.” They repeatedly attacked Soviet military units and garrisons of the Polish Army. There were cases when entire Polish units went with weapons to the “forest brothers,” and the commanders of the Red Army, who held officer positions in them, were court-martialed. Only after the amnesty of the Polish government in 1946, 60 thousand “armed militants” came out of the forests, several batteries of field guns and hundreds of mortars were removed. The “Little War” lasted until 1947 and was characterized by numerous casualties.

Since 1947, the eviction of rebel leaders and active participants, members of their families and those who were suspected of this began from the territory of Western Ukraine. Over two years, 100,310 people were deported to remote areas of the country. In total, from Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova in 1947-1952. 278,718 people were evicted, some of whom were arrested. After rehabilitation (1957), 65 thousand people returned to their homeland.

The insurgency along the western borders of the Soviet Union was a powerful factor of military-political destabilization in the country. Naturally, this presented Moscow with the problem of finding adequate proportions of both non-military means of struggle and the use of merciless armed violence. As for the latest measures, the main burden of their implementation was borne by the internal troops, who in 1941-1956. carried out, according to official data, 56,323 combat operations and clashes with the rebels. As a result, the nationalist opposition lost 89,678 people. killed and wounded. The losses of internal troops (killed and wounded) amounted to 8,688 people.

PS. It is noteworthy that the Latvian “Waffen SS” legion, about which so much is said today in Russian media, in the war and post-war years was actually not mentioned in any of the numerous reports to the country's top leadership. And in general, Latvia, as can be concluded from archival documents, was considered “the most calm and pro-Soviet republic” of the rest of the Baltic states, not to mention Western Ukraine.

Valery Yaremenko

The Soviet principle “every nation has the right to self-determination” assumed the creation of a unitary multi-ethnic state. However, some nations wanted to self-determinate in their own way, including by secession.

Cut to the quick

One of the leaders of the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, Stepan Shaumyan, warned Lenin: “Nations have become so mixed up with each other that there are no longer national territories within which national federal or autonomous regions could easily be established.” However, the leader of the proletariat did not heed the warning and began to cut borders to the quick, even where it was impossible to draw them.

Having received a certain freedom, the heads of national-territorial entities began to think about greater autonomy, up to the acquisition of state sovereignty. In some regions of the country this resulted in aggravation of internal political and interethnic relations.

Separatist sentiments flared up with particular force during the Great Patriotic War, primarily affecting such multi-ethnic regions as the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. Echoes of separatism also swept across the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. There is information about uprisings of the Yakuts and Nenets, which were suppressed, including with the help of aviation.

After the end of the war, until perestroika, the “independents” practically did not show themselves in any way, and only with the advent of glasnost, when the central authorities allowed certain freedoms to the regions, separatism went on the offensive.

Siberia

The history of Siberian separatism dates back to the 1860s, when independence-hungry Siberians published a proclamation declaring that “A special territory demands the independence of Siberia, and it must separate from Russia.”

In December 1917, not wanting to strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks, supporters of Siberian autonomy - regionalists - held an emergency congress in Tomsk, at which they decided to create an independent government body - the Provisional Siberian Government (VSP). And in 1918, the VSP, which received broad powers, issued the “Declaration on the State Independence of Siberia.”

However, by the middle of 1918, the regionalists were losing their positions and leaving the political arena, despite the desperate calls of the radicals to take up arms against the Bolsheviks. Novosibirsk historian M.V. Shilovsky will note that this is what was going on. According to him, regionalism failed to create an effective program of action; they did not propose any specific ways for the region to exit the current political and social crisis.

Caucasus

In addition to the Caucasian component itself, the liberation struggle contributed to the maturation of the ideology of pan-Turkism, which substantiates the unity of all Turkic peoples and the need for their unification in the so-called “Great Turan” state, stretching from the Balkans to Siberia.

However, Napoleonic plans quickly narrowed to the idea of separating exclusively the Caucasus from Soviet Russia. However, this struggle had far-reaching consequences: continuing until the start of the war, it was transformed into the activities of pro-fascist gangs.

According to the OGPU, from 1920 to 1941, 12 armed uprisings took place in Checheno-Ingushetia alone, in which from 500 to 5,000 militants took part. Three more major anti-Soviet protests were prevented thanks to the operational work of the Cheka.

As a rule, the gangs were led by former party workers from local authorities. For example, at the beginning of 1942, in Shatoi and Itum-Kale, the former prosecutor of Checheno-Ingushetia Mairbek Sheripov started a rebellion. Together with the troops of the collaborator Khasan Israilov, he organized a joint headquarters and a rebel government. In their appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus, the separatists called for welcoming German troops as guests, in return expecting to receive recognition of the independence of the Caucasus from the occupiers.

By the end of 1944, the NKVD forces defeated almost 200 gangs that existed in the territories of Checheno-Ingushetia. Isolated clashes continued until 1957, when deported Chechens and the Ingush returned home.

Turkestan

In the early 1920s, the ideology of pan-Turkism also spread to Soviet Turkestan, stimulating such an anti-Soviet movement as the Basmachi movement. The leader of the Turkish nationalist organization “Teshkilyati Mahsus” Enver Pasha, who headed the Basmachi, seriously hoped to implement the “Turan strategy” under the leadership of Istanbul. However, his dreams of uniting Turkey, the Caucasus, Iran, Turkestan, the Volga region and Crimea into one state were not destined to come true. It was not possible to bring the idea of free Turkestan to life. Almost all pockets of Basmachism were eliminated by 1932.

Baltics

The most serious resistance to the Soviet border guards was provided by the Lithuanian Liberation Army, which was led by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. This organization existed underground from the moment Lithuania joined forces, and now, taking advantage of the favorable moment, it set Lithuanians against pro-Moscow activists and representatives of the Soviet government.

The fight against the separatists continued until 1956. It is interesting that in addition to conducting hostilities, Beria proposed evicting the families of the leaders of the anti-Soviet underground to the logging areas of the Perm and Sverdlovsk regions. However, this measure was not necessary.

Ukraine

In their geopolitical appetites, the OUN members were not inferior to the supporters of the “Great Turan”. Their dream was a “sovereign conciliar Ukrainian state,” which was supposed to stretch from the Carpathian Mountains to the Volga and from the foothills of the Caucasus to the upper reaches of the Dnieper.

What failed with the Lithuanians, they did with the Ukrainian nationalists. Since 1947, active eviction of the leaders of the rebel groups, as well as members of their families, to remote areas of the country began. Over two years, more than 100 thousand people were displaced.

Parade of sovereignties

Before the August putsch, the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia took the path of independence. Kyrgyzstan was the last country to break away from the USSR on December 15, 1990. Echoes of the parade of sovereignties echoed in the Volga region. However, the activities of the nationalist party “Ittifak”, which campaigned for the independence of Tatarstan, were stopped in time.

The division of the state along national lines was new in world history. In practice, according to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, “the communist regime began to consciously and deliberately create ethnolinguistic territorial “national administrative units” where they had not previously existed or where no one had seriously thought about them, for example among the Muslims of Central Asia or the Belarusians.” .
One of the leaders of the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, Stepan Shaumyan, warned Lenin: “Nations have become so mixed up with each other that there are no longer national territories within which national federal or autonomous regions could easily be established.” However, the leader of the proletariat did not heed the warning and began to cut borders to the quick, even where it was impossible to draw them.
Having received a certain freedom, the heads of national-territorial entities began to think about greater autonomy, up to the acquisition of state sovereignty. In some regions of the country this resulted in aggravation of internal political and interethnic relations.
Separatist sentiment flared up with particular force during the Great Patriotic War, primarily affecting such multi-ethnic regions as the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. Echoes of separatism also swept through the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. There is information about uprisings of the Yakuts and Nenets, which were suppressed, including with the help of aviation.
After the end of the war, until perestroika, the “independents” practically did not show themselves in any way, and only with the advent of glasnost, when the central authorities allowed certain freedoms to the regions, separatism went on the offensive.

Siberia

The history of Siberian separatism dates back to the 1860s, when Siberians yearning for independence published a proclamation in which they declared: “ A special territory requires the independence of Siberia, and it must separate from Russia».
In December 1917, not wanting to strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks, supporters of Siberian autonomy - regionalists - held an emergency congress in Tomsk, at which they decided to create an independent government body - the Provisional Siberian Government (VSP). And in 1918, the VSP, which received broad powers, issued the “Declaration on the State Independence of Siberia.”
However, by the middle of 1918, the regionalists were losing their positions and leaving the political arena, despite the desperate calls of the radicals to take up arms against the Bolsheviks. Novosibirsk historian M.V. Shilovsky notes that this is what everything was leading to. According to him, regionalism failed to create an effective program of action; they did not propose any specific ways for the region to exit the current political and social crisis.

Caucasus

With the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus, active armed resistance began in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia, one of the organizers of which was the grandson of Imam Shamil, Said Bey. According to historians, this rebellion largely revived the goals and objectives of the Caucasian War of the 19th century.
In addition to the Caucasian component itself, the liberation struggle contributed to the maturation of the ideology of pan-Turkism, which substantiates the unity of all Turkic peoples and the need for their unity in the so-called “Great Turan” state, stretching from the Balkans to Siberia.
However, Napoleonic plans quickly narrowed to the idea of separating exclusively the Caucasus from Soviet Russia. However, this struggle had far-reaching consequences: continuing until the start of the war, it was transformed into the activities of pro-fascist gangs.
According to the OGPU, from 1920 to 1941, 12 armed uprisings took place in Checheno-Ingushetia alone, in which from 500 to 5,000 militants took part. Three more major anti-Soviet protests were prevented thanks to the operational work of the Cheka.
As a rule, the gangs were led by former party workers from local authorities. For example, at the beginning of 1942, in Shatoi and Itum-Kale, the former prosecutor of Checheno-Ingushetia Mairbek Sheripov started a rebellion. Together with the troops of the collaborator Khasan Israilov, he organized a joint headquarters and a rebel government. In their appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus, the separatists called for welcoming German troops as guests, in return expecting to receive recognition of the independence of the Caucasus from the occupiers.
By the end of 1944, the NKVD forces defeated almost 200 gangs that existed in the territories of Checheno-Ingushetia. Isolated clashes continued until 1957, when deported Chechens and Ingush returned home.

Turkestan

Baltics

Separatist forces awoke in the Baltic states during its liberation from Nazi troops. In the summer of 1944, following the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, NKVD formations entered the territory of Lithuania. Their task was to clear the front line from the Wehrmacht soldiers, Nazi collaborators, deserters, looters and anti-Soviet elements who remained there.
The most serious resistance to the Soviet border guards was provided by the Lithuanian Liberation Army, which was led by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. This organization existed underground from the moment Lithuania joined the USSR, and now, taking advantage of the favorable moment, it set Lithuanians against pro-Moscow activists and representatives of the Soviet government.
The fight against the separatists continued until 1956. It is interesting that in addition to conducting hostilities, Beria proposed evicting the families of the leaders of the anti-Soviet underground to the logging areas of the Perm and Sverdlovsk regions. However, this measure was not necessary.

Ukraine

Ukrainian separatism intensified literally immediately after Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia became part of the Ukrainian SSR. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) specialized in the fight against the Soviets, declaring its main goal as “the national liberation of the Ukrainian people and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.”
In their geopolitical appetites, the OUN members were not inferior to the supporters of the “Great Turan”. Their dream was a “sovereign conciliar Ukrainian state,” which was supposed to stretch from the Carpathian Mountains to the Volga and from the foothills of the Caucasus to the upper reaches of the Dnieper.
What failed with the Lithuanians, they did with the Ukrainian nationalists. Since 1947, the active allocation of leaders of rebel groups, as well as members of their families, to remote areas of the country began. Over two years, more than 100 thousand people were displaced.

Parade of sovereignties

At the end of perestroika, it was the places of separatist fault lines - the Baltic states and the Caucasus - that began to crack first. Gorbachev delayed too much in resolving the national issue. The plenum took place in September 1989, but the republican elites had already started. It is curious that the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to declare its independence - this is how it responded to the forceful suppression of the political opposition in Baku.
Before the August putsch, the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia took the path of independence. Kyrgyzstan was the last country to break away from the USSR on December 15, 1990. Echoes of the parade of sovereignties echoed in the Volga region. However, the activities of the nationalist party “Ittifak”, which campaigned for the independence of Tatarstan, were stopped in time.

Cut to the quick

The division of the state along national lines was new in world history. In practice, according to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, “the communist regime began to deliberately and deliberately create ethnolinguistic territorial “national administrative units” where they had not previously existed or where no one had seriously thought about them, for example, among the Muslims of Central Asia or the Belarusians "

Separatist sentiments flared up with particular force during the Great Patriotic War, primarily affecting such multi-ethnic regions as the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. Echoes of separatism also swept through the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. There is information about uprisings of the Yakuts and Nenets, which were suppressed, including with the help of aviation.

However, by the middle of 1918, the regionalists were losing their positions and leaving the political arena, despite the desperate calls of the radicals to take up arms against the Bolsheviks. Novosibirsk historian M.V. Shilovsky will note that this is what everything was leading to. According to him, regionalism failed to create an effective program of action; they did not propose any specific ways for the region to exit the current political and social crisis.

In addition to the Caucasian component itself, the liberation struggle contributed to the maturation of the ideology of pan-Turkism, which substantiates the unity of all Turkic peoples and the need for their unity in the so-called “Great Turan” state, stretching from the Balkans to Siberia.

Turkestan

Baltics

The most serious resistance to the Soviet border guards was provided by the Lithuanian Liberation Army, which was led by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. This organization existed underground from the moment Lithuania joined the USSR, and now, taking advantage of the favorable moment, it set Lithuanians against pro-Moscow activists and representatives of the Soviet government.

Parade of sovereignties

The Caucasus and the Baltic States became different in temperament in 1989-1990

the first poles of national tension in the vast political

space of restructuring. As is typical for any empires (ideological

empire into which the Soviet Union turned from colonial Russian into

in this sense was no exception), the outskirts “awakened” earlier than the Center.

While Gorbachev was busy stirring up his calls to restructure

Russian province and hardware hinterland, the republican elites took

fast start.

The popular fronts that arose in the Baltic states began as a “great initiative”

spread throughout the entire territory of the USSR, capturing after the Caucasus

Moldova, Central Asia, and reached Ukraine, where in December 1989 a

Congress of Rukh. Since initially their leaders declared themselves to be convinced

supporters and “legitimate sons” of perestroika, Gorbachev to a large extent

under the influence of A. Yakovlev, who returned from his Baltic trip with

a reassuring diagnosis - “active restructuring processes are underway” -

treated them complacently and even encouragingly. "Popular fronts are not

opposition to the CPSU,” he said at the Politburo. - You just have to go in them

work so as not to be thrown into a camp hostile to the CPSU. We need to act

confidently cut off extremists, but do not identify the majority with them,

which is 90 percent. Where will they go? They'll go crazy! Behind us -

However, as the “front-line soldiers” began to get a taste for more than one

only political struggle, but also won positions from the state

authorities, and therefore Moscow, the tone of his statements began to change.

Especially after, having won the leading

positions in the republican parliaments, representatives of the “fronts” began

the same Balts were advancing in the same direction. Soon with his decision about

Georgia joined them in the right to veto union laws.

By 1989, the national issue had moved into the category of major

political priorities. Gorbachev, completely absorbed in the storms,

played out in the newborn Union Parliament and the political ice break

V Eastern Europe, reacted to the cracking of the outer shell of the Union with

a clear lag. At first he decided to get away with transferring to an earlier

term of the Plenum of the Central Committee national question, which everyone never got around to.

It was held in September 1989, but the decisions it made are no longer widely known.

interested and, most importantly, could not influence almost anything. And although formally

the question of a new union treaty was raised at the Plenum, only next

in the spring, Gorbachev spoke about the need to speed up its development in order to

"neutralize the desire of the republics to leave the USSR." He saw the future Union

diverse, allowing “to hold some by the collar, others on a short,

third on a long leash." He himself actively joined this process

only in the spring of 1991, when the Union had only a few years left to live

And yet the main thing that he looked through during this period were those that were not included

to the taste of the Republican separatists, and the awakening and, of course,

the idea of a Russian

sovereignty. In principle, the Soviet Union could survive the rise

national and regional separatism and even the “falling away” of individual bad

“pieces” that have taken root, but not betrayal of the union idea on the part of Russia.

Meanwhile, it was precisely this seemingly unthinkable prospect that became

real outlines, becoming first psychological and only then

political reflection of the resentment of millions of Russians for being enrolled in

"occupiers" in the country, which they considered from time immemorial to be their Fatherland, and in

"colonizers" inside an empire where they felt nothing at all

a privileged nation. And he was the first to express this feeling of resentment towards

It is not the politician who is treating the Russians unfairly, but the writer Valentin Rasputin.

Speaking at the First Congress of People's Deputies in June 1989, he unexpectedly

threw in the faces of the representatives of the republics: “Maybe Russia should secede from

Union, if you blame her for all your troubles and if her underdevelopment and

clumsiness weighs down your progressive aspirations?"* Then these words

many, including Gorbachev, perceived it as a forgivable manifestation of emotions

creative person, far from politics. Divide the traditional age-old

Russia and the Soviet Union, which became its legal heir after 1717 and,

essentially just a new reincarnation seemed simply impossible.

But less than a year had passed, as it turned out that in the situation of the beginning of the collapse

former multinational state his “titular nation” is Russians,

having sensed both within the country and on the world stage a threat to their inheritance

great power status, begin to transform from an “imperial nation” into

ethnic, "national". Having become accustomed to the position of the undisputed "senior"

brother", towards whom the "younger brothers" in the Soviet family behave

themselves respectfully and fearfully, the Russians could not help but react painfully to

"costs" of true equality, and especially those that are offensive and undeserved, according to

in the opinion of many, attempts to settle historical scores with Russia from the outside

nationals This aggressive, accumulated in the Russian people's environment

the potential of wounded national pride was quickly enough

in demand by politicians of various orientations, and above all Gorbachev’s

competitors.

From the Russian, more precisely, the Russian card is almost against him

At the same time, although from different sides, two main opponents entered at once -

E. Ligachev and B. Yeltsin. At the same time, one accused him of conniving

nationalists, collapses the Union and thereby destroys the historical heritage

Russian people, throwing away the gains of several generations of Soviet

people, provided for by their selfless labor and paid for by hardships and

victims. The other, on the contrary, is that the Secretary General-President is not enough

decisively breaks with the past and clings to archaic structures

centralized union state with the sole purpose of strengthening its

personal power.

Ligachev’s “army” was made up of the party nomenklatura, who were convinced that

that further progress along the path of Gorbachev’s political reform, depriving it

power and cover of the state security shield, will leave one on one with

the population she was used to commanding, but with whom she had forgotten how

talk. She had every reason to fear his vengeful wrath.

Yeltsin’s “militia” included those awakened by the trumpets of perestroika, but not

attracted by Gorbachev to the process of redistribution of power in the country

Soviet "raznochintsy" - journalists, employees of scientific institutes,

junior scientists who later became famous in ministerial positions

employees, teachers of political economy, historical mathematics and other social scientists, and

also simply active and proactive representatives of the creative intelligentsia

and semi-legal businesses, which for various reasons were barred from entering

nomenclature. The main advantages of this “light cavalry” of the Democrats over

the party "warriors" clad in hardware armor were professional

education, the ability to survive in any environment, brought up by a difficult

Soviet reality, and, not least, age. Besides, in

Unlike party functionaries, they had practically nothing to lose,

They could have acquired, perhaps without knowing it, everything.

In addition to the syndrome of national resentment and humiliation in one’s own home,

gathered people around Yeltsin, who raised the flag of the defender of Russian

interests, the philistine belief that, having gotten rid of the “freeloaders” in the person of

union republics, which are not only protected, but also “fed and watered” by Russia,

in 3-4 years she herself will be able to become one of the most developed, prosperous

nations of the world. These promises given to them right and left, combined with

skillfully exploited image of an almost repressed party member

"dissident" and fighter against apparatus privileges allowed him by the spring of 1990

year to become the most popular political figure in the country.

Gorbachev finally discovered the political

potential of the "Russian question". True to his method of sliding forward on two

skiing", he timed it to coincide with the Plenum of the Central Committee on national policy

the decision to create a Russian Bureau in the Central Committee, which he himself headed,

hoping that in Once again, having split into two, like Janus, can with his own hands

neutralize new threats. Following Yeltsin and Ligachev, he too, in his own way

used the “Russian card”: he introduced the same

V. Rasputin, who threatened Russia with secession from the Soviet Union. However,

remaining the President of the union state, who saw his main mission in

its preservation, he could not be as successful as in the political sphere

reforms, simultaneously playing the role of Pope and Luther: on the one hand,

to protect and protect the integrity of the country, and on the other hand, to provoke the Russian

nationalism (even in this nomenclatural form) in populist, that is,

destructive purposes for the Union, as its opponents did.

An intense struggle over who, in Eventually, will be able to take possession

"Russian bridgehead" - the main strategic position from which

excellent opportunities opened up for shelling the allied center and “views of

Kremlin," unfolded at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR around

candidacies for the Chairman of the Supreme Council. Of the two favorites - Ivan

Polozkov and Boris Yeltsin - Gorbachev made an open bet on the first not

because he was truly his creature: he rightly saw in this

an orthodox party apparatchik is a lesser potential threat to himself than in

the rapidly gaining popularity of the “converted Russian” Yeltsin.

But Gorbachev lost this battle for a version that suited him more (so,

By the way, it happened more than once when, succumbing to natural temptation, he chose

a deceptively “easy” path, such as, for example, later with one’s own election

majority). His unusual, not provided for by the protocol, did not help either.

coming to a meeting of the Congress of Russian Deputies to inspire

supporters of the party candidacy. The subsequent election of Boris Yeltsin

brought the latter a double victory, because it happened despite open pressure

President of the USSR.

Together with Gorbachev, the election of his protege to the post of Russian

E. Ligachev also lost the speakership. Apparently, therefore, on the eve of the XXVIII Congress

The CPSU, secretly headed by him and already in fact an autonomous part of the party, is not

having captured the parliamentary bridgehead, she decided to throw away conventions in relations

with its own secretary general. Thus, at the peasant congress, the “curator” of the rural

economy Ligachev openly called the president a traitor who ruined

country and the socialist community, and promised to fight to the end. And in

In June 1990, a congress was held that was anti-Gorbachev in spirit and ideological platform

Russian Communist Party, at which I. Polozkov was elected its first secretary.

Mikhail Sergeevich, who participated in his work, listened to rudeness, “could not bear

only rudeness, but complete wildness... answered questions - provocative,

stupid, malicious... - confused, verbose, chaotic, sometimes unable to express

what he wanted, or, as always, afraid of certainty, deliberately lost his way,

so that it is not clear,” recalls A. Chernyaev.

number of positions Gorbachev was not sorry to part with purely

symbolic and little-known post of chairman of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee

CPSU. But the trouble was the beginning: he had to part with the rest in

over the next year and a half...

Despite the fact that there was always a sparkle in their relationship, in the summer of 1990

Gorbachev and Yeltsin, having stepped over the incident with Polozkov, proved that they

true politicians, that is, people for whom personal likes and dislikes

retreat before state interests. It was then between them

a short “summer romance” began, the reason for which was

"500 days" program. The fact that both Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who are actually both

could not please that part of their environment that pulled each of the leaders into

your side. The government took the initiative for the funeral program

N. Ryzhkova - the Prime Minister and his deputy L. Abalkin threatened if it was adopted

were going to cut down significantly, and now headed by A. Lukyanov, the union

parliament.

According to the People's Deputy of the USSR, Academician Yu. Ryzhov, “Gorbachev’s

this moment was obviously pressed very hard, and maybe even staged

ultimatum." He is one of the five co-chairs of the interregional parliamentary

group, (MDG) - said that he received a call from a person “from the authorities” who knew

him at the Moscow Aviation Institute, and suggested meeting

confidentially near the Sokol metro station. During a five-minute meeting, he, without entering

in detail, “strongly advised” to leave Moscow in September and

generally “disappear from view” for a while. Then, says the academician, I don’t

attached importance to this “comradely advice” and remembered it only one day

September morning, when a friend called and said that he was heading to the center of Moscow

armored personnel carriers are moving. Later there was an explanation of what was happening

planned deployment of troops pulled up to the capital for "cleaning

potatoes." Does this mean that the August coup could have turned out to be September?

One way or another, faced with sharp opposition to the “500 days” program and

his tactical "engagement" with the Russian leader, he retreated, instructing

academician A. Aganbegyan to reflect the main

elements of the Shatalin-Yavlinsky document and the considerations of Ryzhkov-Abalkin.

As has happened in the past, compromise, instead of satisfying everyone, does not

satisfied no one, and most importantly, gave Yeltsin a reason to declare in October that

Gorbachev “changed the previous agreement” that “his behavior is considered

as a betrayal," and from now on Russia is free from obligations and will

develop your own options economic reform. In his speech at the Supreme

Council of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin announced that the republic would have to choose from three

options: secede from the Union, demand from the Center the creation of a coalition

government or the introduction of a card system, since the program,

presented by Gorbachev to the Union Parliament is impossible to implement. It was

official declaration of war. The hypothetical margin was upset and never

having reached the marriage ceremony, and with it the chances disappeared (if they existed at all)

for a “soft” reform of the Union with the complicity or at least without active

opposition from the Russian leadership.

At an emergency meeting of the Presidential Council, Gorbachev gave free rein

emotions, deciding to immediately appear on television: “This cannot be allowed to happen.

This paranoid man is striving to become president, and those around him are egging him on. If I remain silent,

what will the people say?" His own circle, in turn, was divided into

two camps. A. Lukyanov, V. Kryuchkov and N. Ryzhkov “incited” their president

don't let Yeltsin down. E. Shevardnadze, V. Medvedev, V. Osipyan, to whom

then the assistants joined in and tried to persuade me not to give in to emotions and not

lose self-control. Eventually cooling down, he came to the conclusion that “we must

rise above this provocation." The television "bang" was ordered to be done

A. Lukyanov.

Convinced a few days later that the Russian leader was bluffing and his

a barely disguised threat to “raise the people” to strikes and demonstrations

against the Union center was not realized, Gorbachev decided once again

offer him a peace settlement, instructing Boldin to organize their unofficial

meeting. According to Gorbachev himself, although it was “difficult,” it was still

allowed tensions to ease. V. Boldin, who was present at the meeting

two leaders, believes that it took place too late and nothing will happen

could improve their relationship: “Yeltsin was not able to step over

accumulated grievances and wounded pride."

Raising the banner of the anti-union uprising, Russia led the "parade"

sovereignties", captivating by its example not only other union republics,

but also some of its own autonomy. The calculation was obvious: “we’ll deal with

union power, and then we will see." Hidden in the heads of the members

Yeltsin's entourage, looking at the Kremlin, sounded the phrase, carelessly

thrown by Mikhail Sergeevich: “Where will they go?!”

Until it came to a complete break with the Russian leadership, Gorbachev

could react relatively calmly, if not mockingly, to the epidemic

declarations of sovereignty, which followed Russia after June 1990

performed by Ukraine, Belarus, North Ossetia, Armenia, Turkmenistan,

Tajikistan, Komi, Karelia, Gagauz Republic, Udmurtia, Yakutia,

Transnistria, South Ossetia and Irkutsk region. However, by October

the “sovereigns” who had acquired a taste began, in addition to purely declarative political

statements to make decisions that could not leave the union indifferent

those who died defending Kazan from the troops of Ivan the Terrible could be leniently

ignore that statement Popular Front Moldova about the need

the annexation of the republic to Romania or introduced by the Supreme Council

Kazakhstan ban on conducting nuclear test explosions at the test site in

Semipalatinsk, represented a direct challenge to the authority and powers

head of state.

As a matter of fact, by doing this, the new government in the republics

only imitated the Russian one, which, with its decisions, seemed to be trying

using the method of arbitrary seizure to “cut off” additional political

territory, taking it away from the Center. There was an impression that in Yeltsin's

headquarters announced a competition for populist steps that would create

Gorbachev's political problems made it possible to bypass him with "democratic"

flank. This is how improvisations on the theme of farming in the Russian village were born,

announcement of the resumption of Christmas celebrations and a promise to find a way out

protracted dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands.

The USSR Council adopted a law confirming the priority of union laws over

Republican and local. And on the same day, either teasingly or

Provoking the Center, the Russian parliament voted for the law,

establishing on the territory of the RSFSR the priority of republican

legislation before the Union.

A stalemate arose in which Gorbachev could either

come to terms with the audacity of the republics he set free and capitulate, or

hit the table with his fist and remind his subjects that “he is still a king.”

This could be done either by trying to return to the recent

General Secretary's past, which some party conservatives were pushing for

from his entourage, or with a powerful breakthrough forward, regain his political

initiative. Of two mutually exclusive options, Gorbachev chose... both. But

since it was difficult to combine them, he began to act like a driver

of a car stuck in the mud: he backed up and then accelerated to overcome

let.

Trapped in the ring of centers of republican unrest, squeezed between

government and the Supreme Council, enraged by his flirtation with

Yeltsin, on the one hand, and those who began openly persecuting him for “conservatism”

radical democrats, on the other hand, besieged by worsening economic

problems and haunted by the specter of an approaching cold and probably

hungry winter, Gorbachev decided to “overwinter” in the “dugout of the strong

states."

The final impetus that prompted him to make this decision was the November

demonstrative obstruction on the part of deputies of the Supreme Council. Discussion

"went wild." In criticizing the “weak power” of the president and his demands

After resignations, the antipodes - the orthodox and the radical - began to come closer together. And again, as already

It was noted that this sense of danger mobilized and energized Gorbachev.

Whether responding to the panic reaction of members of the Politburo, who claimed that

he was presented with an ultimatum, either due to “friendly pressure” from the leaders of a number of

union republics, and most likely, reacting to a close to open rebellion

atmosphere in the meeting room of the Supreme Council, he appeared the next morning before

parliamentarians in the war paint of a “strong leader”.

In an unusually short twenty-minute speech, he

points out the program of the upcoming “military campaign” under the general motto

strengthening the executive vertical. The government was transformed into

Cabinet working under the direct supervision of the President of the USSR

ministers, the Federation Council, which unites republican secretaries, increased

its status, and the Presidential Council, which irritated the parliamentary majority

by the number of “liberals” warmed up in it, led by A. Yakovlev, dissolved

and gave way to the “formidable” Security Council. It is this “iconic”

a step that symbolized Gorbachev's readiness to break with his

democratic confessors and go under the wing of statist guards, with

The parliamentary group "Union" applauded with enthusiasm, which the day before had demanded

his resignation.

“We will have to get better,” said Mikhail Sergeevich in his circle,

leaving the meeting. He explained this tilt towards conservatives before

only to myself that the country was not ready to maintain the pace taken

reforms, the democrats showed themselves to be “irresponsible critics”,

because of which the center of society’s moods and expectations began to shift to the right.

Accordingly, the one who was responsible for

maintaining social balance - to the centrist Gorbachev. Nevertheless,

despite all his efforts (as well as his political adviser

G. Shakhnazarov) clothe new course in terms of the new philosophy of centrism,

rhetorically reconciling reforms and stability, the “political class” listened

half-listened to him. The nomenklatura, as always, was interested not in words, but in personnel

decisions: who will leave and who will be appointed.

The first personnel victim of the “new course” was the Minister of Internal Affairs

V. Bakatin, whom the conservative opposition has long accused of

softness and connivance with the “nationalists”. During the "very emotional

conversation" Gorbachev explained to him that the time had come to leave. Second, spectacularly

slamming the door, declaring at the Congress of People's Deputies to hooting

colonels from the "Union" group about the "impending dictatorship", left

E. Shevardnadze. Finally, after the New Year was removed from the Constitution

mention of the Presidential Council, without official position or work

A. Yakovlev, E. Primakov, S. Shatalin, V. Medvedev remained. N. Petrakov, whose

the position of economic assistant was not mentioned in the Constitution,

I decided not to wait for the “black mark” and submitted my resignation myself. Next up

there were new appointments and new names that would become notorious in

August 1991. The year 91 itself was approaching, the last in the historical century

Soviet Union and political biography its first President.

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

Separatism in the USSR: who wanted to separate from most? Russian map

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the Baltic countries, various ultranationalist forces are making themselves known more and more often. They fully identify with the veterans of those organizations that once fought on Hitler’s side.

Siberia

Caucasus

Turkestan

Baltics

Ukraine

Parade of sovereignties