Introduction
The first Soviet-Finnish war - fighting between White Finnish and Soviet troops during the war officially announced on May 15, 1918. the government of Finland war with the Russian Federation after the defeat of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic. The First Soviet-Finnish War was part of the Russian Civil War and Foreign Military Intervention in Northern Russia. However, even before that, during the Civil War in Finland, White Finnish troops pursued the enemy and in a number of places entered Eastern Karelia (see North Karelian state), carrying out military operations that were not always of a partisan nature (see Olonets campaign, Olonets government).
It ended on October 14, 1920 with the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty, which recorded a number of territorial concessions on the part of Soviet Russia.
1. Background
October Revolution 1917 in Petrograd marked the beginning of the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in all major cities of Russia. At the same time, centers of unification of anti-Bolshevik forces emerged throughout the country. A civil war began in Russia.
The fall of the Russian autocracy and the October Revolution of 1917 allowed the Finnish Senate to declare independence on December 6, 1917. On December 18 (31), 1917, the independence of the Republic of Finland was recognized by the Council of People's Commissars. Finland, in turn, recognized the Bolshevik government. At the same time, unrest intensified in the country and the struggle between “reds” and “whites” intensified, which by January 1918 escalated into a civil war. White Finnish detachments controlled the northern and central parts of the country, while the southern part with most of the large cities, where the de-Bolshevik units of the former Russian Imperial Army were concentrated, was occupied by detachments of the Finnish Red Guard.
By the spring of 1919, the Bolshevik government found itself in a difficult situation. The Supreme Ruler of Russia, Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin, were approaching Moscow from the northeast and south. In the Northern region and Estonia, Russian military volunteer units were completing their formation, the goal of which was red Petrograd.
2. Reasons
The Bolsheviks' rise to power caused widespread discontent in rural areas throughout Russia. The peasants were deprived of all political and economic rights, they were banned from trading grain and they began to take it by force. The regions of Karelia, which had never even known serfdom, learned what food detachments and committees were. Since most of the local peasantry fell under the definition of a kulak “saboteur,” cruel measures of requisitioning grain and livestock were applied to them. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, when huge territories were torn away from Russia, showed the weakness of Soviet power and caused discontent among various segments of the population.
Uprisings broke out, such as the Yaroslavl, Izhevsk-Votkinsk, Tambov uprisings, even independent territories were proclaimed. In the case of Ingria, the North Karelian state, Rebolskaya volost, Porayarvi, the rebels hoped for help from neighboring Finland, with which they had a common language and historical ties. On the wave of success in Finland, White hoped for more. Soviet Russia was surrounded by white armies and could not resist Germany. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia were also examples of a successful fight against Bolshevism, relying on foreign support. The idea of Greater Finland became widespread. According to the Finnish researcher Toivo Nigård, General Mannerheim had the opportunity to go down in history as a liberator from the Bolsheviks, if not all of Russia, then certainly Petrograd. Therefore, events can be divided into two stages. First: international struggle against the Bolsheviks, everywhere, in the hope of victory white movement in Russia as a whole. And the second stage, when it became clear that Soviet power would survive, and one could only hope for tactical successes on the ground, relying on the national movement and foreign assistance. The concepts of occupation and liberation during this historical period are extremely relative and vague. In Soviet historiography, it was customary to consider only the territorial and military aspects of the war. But at the same time, 30,000 migrants who went to Finland show the attitude of the population towards Sovietization.
On February 23, 1918, while at Antrea station (now Kamennogorsk), addressing the troops, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, delivered his speech, the “oath of the sword,” in which he stated that “he will not sheathe the sword,... before the last warrior and hooligan of Lenin is expelled from both Finland and East Karelia." However, there was no official declaration of war from Finland. General Manerheim’s desire to become the savior of “old Russia” was viewed negatively in Finland. At a minimum, they demanded the support of Western countries and guarantees that white Russia recognizes Finnish independence. , the white movement was unable to create a united front, which sharply reduced the chances of success. Other leaders of the white movement refused to recognize Finnish independence. And for more active actions, without risk to their country, allies were needed.
On February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the line Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - White Sea.
By the beginning of March, a plan for organizing “national uprisings in Eastern Karelia” was developed at Mannerheim’s headquarters and special Finnish instructors were allocated - career military personnel - to create hotbeds of uprising.
On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria). Russian garrisons were withdrawn from Finland. The Red Finns were defeated and fled to Karelia.
On March 6, the commander of the Northern Military District (Finnish: Pohjolan sotilaspiiri), senior lieutenant of the rangers Kurt Wallenius, suggested that Mannerheim launch an offensive in Eastern Karelia.
On March 6-7, an official statement by the head of the Finnish state, regent Per Evind Svinhufvud, appeared that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on “moderate Brest conditions,” that is, if Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway went to Finland and the entire Kola Peninsula.
On March 7-8, German Emperor Wilhelm II responded to an appeal from the Finnish government that Germany would not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and would not support Finland’s military actions if it moved them beyond its borders.
On March 7, the Finnish Prime Minister declares claims to Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and on March 15, Finnish General Mannerheim approves the “Wallenius Plan”, which provides for the seizure of part of the former territory Russian Empire to the line Petsamo (Pechenga) - Kola Peninsula - White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga.
By mid-May 1918, the White Finns controlled the entire territory of the former Grand Duchy of Finland and began military operations to conquer Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula.
The landing of German troops in Finland and their occupation of Helsingfors caused serious concern among the Entente countries that were at war with Germany. Beginning in March 1918, in agreement with the Bolshevik government, Entente troops landed in Murmansk to protect Murmansk and the railway from a possible offensive by German-Finnish troops. From the Red Finns who retreated to the east, the British formed the Murmansk Legion, led by Oskari Tokoi, to act against the White Finns associated with the Germans.
In November 1918, Germany capitulated and began withdrawing its troops from the territories of the former Russian Empire that fell under German occupation as a result of the fighting of the First World War and the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, including from the territories of the Baltic countries. Taking advantage of this, Soviet Russia immediately attacked these outlying states.
On December 30, 1918, Finnish troops under the command of General Wetzer landed in Estonia, where they assisted the Estonian government in the fight against the Bolshevik troops.
In January 1919, the Finns occupied Porosozerna volost.
On April 21-22, the Olonets Volunteer Army from the territory of Finland launched a massive offensive in Eastern Karelia in the Olonets direction.
On April 21, volunteers occupied Vidlitsa, on April 23 - Tuloksa, in the evening of the same day - the city of Olonets, on April 24 they occupied Veshkelitsa, on April 25 they approached Pryazha, penetrated Sulazhgora and began to threaten Petrozavodsk directly. At the same time, Petrozavodsk was threatened from the north by British, Canadian and White Guard troops. At the end of April, the Red Army managed to hold back the advance of volunteers towards Petrozavodsk.
In May, White Guard troops in Estonia began military operations, threatening Petrograd.
In May and June, on the eastern and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Red Army detachments held back the advance of Finnish volunteers. In May-June 1919, Finnish volunteers advanced on the Lodeynoye Pole area and crossed the Svir.
At the end of June 1919, the Red Army began a counteroffensive in the Vidlitsa direction and on July 8, 1919 in the Olonets sector of the Karelian front. Finnish volunteers were driven back beyond the border line.
On May 18, 1920, units of the Red Army liquidated the North Karelian state with its capital in the village of Ukhta (Arkhangelsk province), which received financial and military assistance from the Finnish government. Only in July 1920 were the Finns able to be driven out of most of eastern Karelia. Finnish troops remained only in the Rebolsk and Porosozersk volosts of Eastern Karelia.
In 1920, according to the Tartu Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia made significant territorial concessions - independent Finland received Western Karelia up to the Sestra River, the Pechenga region in the Arctic, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula.
Bibliography:
(fin.) SUOMI 2.3.-8.3.1918
Pokhlebkin V.V. - Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts: Vol. II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the 1st half of the 20th century. Directory. M., 1999. P. 140.
Mannerheim - Russian general, Finnish marshal
Civil war in Finland and German intervention in 1918. Chronos
Toivo Nygård. Itä-Karjalasta Suomeen 1917-1922 tulleet pakolaiset, Suomen Sukututkimusseura www.genealogia.fi. Luetta 8.11. 2006 (fin.)
Text of the order from 1918 in the Finnish Wikisource.
“Pskov Province” No. 7(428)
“Suomi kautta aikojen” 1992. s.40 ISBN 951-8933-60-X
At first it was conducted unofficially. Already in March 1918, during the Civil War in Finland, White Finnish troops, pursuing the enemy (Finnish “Reds”), crossed the Russian-Finnish border and in a number of places entered Eastern Karelia.
At the same time, the combat operations carried out were not always of a partisan nature. Officially, war with the Russian Federation was declared by the democratic government of Finland on May 15, 1918 after the defeat of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic.
The First Soviet-Finnish War was part of the Russian Civil War and Foreign Military Intervention in Northern Russia.
It ended on October 14, 1920 with the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty between the RSFSR and Finland, which recorded a number of territorial concessions from Soviet Russia.
Background
The October Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd marked the beginning of the Bolshevik seizure of power in all major cities of Russia. At the same time, centers of unification of anti-Bolshevik forces emerged throughout the country. A civil war began in Russia.
The fall of the Russian autocracy and the October Revolution of 1917 allowed the Finnish Senate to declare independence on December 6, 1917. On December 18 (31), 1917, the independence of the Republic of Finland was recognized by the Council of People's Commissars. Finland, in turn, recognized the Bolshevik government. At the same time, unrest intensified in the country and the struggle between “reds” and “whites” intensified, which by January 1918 escalated into a civil war. White Finnish detachments controlled the northern and central parts of the country, while the southern part with most of the large cities, where the de-Bolshevik units of the former Russian Imperial Army were concentrated, was occupied by detachments of the Finnish Red Guard.
By the spring of 1919, the Bolshevik government found itself in a difficult situation. The Supreme Ruler of Russia, Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin, were approaching Moscow from the northeast and south. In the Northern region and Estonia, Russian military volunteer units were completing their formation, the goal of which was red Petrograd.
Causes
The Bolsheviks' rise to power caused widespread discontent in rural areas throughout Russia. The peasants were deprived of all political and economic rights, banned the sale of bread and began to take it by force. The regions of Karelia, which had never even known serfdom, learned what food detachments and committees were. Since most of the local peasantry fell under the definition of a kulak “saboteur,” cruel measures of requisitioning grain and livestock were applied to them. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, when huge territories were torn away from Russia, showed the weakness of Soviet power and caused discontent on the part of various social groups.
Uprisings broke out, such as the Yaroslavl, Izhevsk-Votkinsk, Tambov uprisings, even independent territories were proclaimed. In the case of Ingria, the North Karelian state, Rebolskaya volost, Porayarvi, the rebels hoped for help from neighboring Finland, with which they had a common language and historical ties. On the wave of success in Finland, White hoped for more. Soviet Russia was surrounded by white armies and could not resist Germany. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia were also examples of a successful fight against Bolshevism, relying on foreign support. The idea of Greater Finland became widespread. According to the Finnish researcher Toivo Nigård, General Mannerheim had the opportunity to go down in history as a liberator from the Bolsheviks, if not all of Russia, then certainly Petrograd. Therefore, events can be divided into two stages. First: an international struggle against the Bolsheviks, everywhere, in the hope of victory for the white movement in Russia as a whole. And the second stage, when it became clear that Soviet power would survive, and one could only hope for tactical successes on the ground, relying on the national movement and foreign assistance. The concepts of occupation and liberation during this historical period are extremely relative and vague. In Soviet historiography, it was customary to consider only the territorial and military aspects of the war. But at the same time, 30,000 migrants who went to Finland show the attitude of the population towards Sovietization.
1918
On February 23, 1918, while at Antrea station (now Kamennogorsk), addressing the troops, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, delivered his speech, the “oath of the sword,” in which he stated that “he will not sheathe the sword,... before the last warrior and hooligan of Lenin is expelled from both Finland and East Karelia.” However, there was no official declaration of war from Finland. General Manerheim’s desire to become the savior of “old Russia” was viewed negatively in Finland. At a minimum, they demanded the support of Western countries and guarantees that white Russia would recognize Finnish independence. The white movement was unable to create a united front, which sharply reduced the chances of success. Other leaders of the white movement refused to recognize Finnish independence. And for more active actions, without risk to their country, allies were needed.
On February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the line Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - White Sea.
By the beginning of March, a plan for organizing “national uprisings in Eastern Karelia” was developed at Mannerheim’s headquarters and special Finnish instructors were allocated - career military personnel - to create hotbeds of uprising.
On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria). Russian garrisons were withdrawn from Finland. The Red Finns were defeated and fled to Karelia.
On March 6, the commander of the Northern Military District (Finnish: Pohjolan sotilaspiiri), senior lieutenant of the rangers Kurt Wallenius, suggested that Mannerheim launch an offensive in Eastern Karelia.
On March 6-7, an official statement by the head of the Finnish state, regent Per Evind Svinhufvud, appeared that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on “moderate Brest conditions,” that is, if Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway went to Finland and the entire Kola Peninsula.
On March 7-8, German Emperor Wilhelm II responded to an appeal from the Finnish government that Germany would not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and would not support Finland’s military actions if it moved them beyond its borders.
On March 7, the Finnish Prime Minister declares claims to Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and on March 15, Finnish General Mannerheim approves the “Wallenius Plan”, which provides for the seizure of part of the former territory of the Russian Empire up to the line Petsamo (Pechenga) - Kola Peninsula - White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga.
By mid-May 1918, the White Finns controlled the entire territory of the former Grand Duchy of Finland and began military operations to conquer Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula.
Stan Shebs, Public Domain The landing of German troops in Finland and their occupation of Helsingfors caused serious concern among the Entente countries that were at war with Germany. Beginning in March 1918, in agreement with the Bolshevik government, Entente troops landed in Murmansk to protect Murmansk and the railway from a possible offensive by German-Finnish troops. From the Red Finns who retreated to the east, the British formed the Murmansk Legion, led by Oskari Tokoi, to act against the White Finns associated with the Germans.
In November 1918, Germany capitulated and began withdrawing its troops from the territories of the former Russian Empire that fell under German occupation as a result of the fighting of the First World War and the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, including from the territories of the Baltic countries. On December 30, 1918, Finnish troops under the command of General Wetzer landed in Estonia, where they assisted the Estonian government in the fight against the Bolshevik troops.
1919
In January 1919, the Finns occupied the Porosozernaya volost of the Povenets district.
On April 21-22, the Olonets Volunteer Army from the territory of Finland launched a massive offensive in Eastern Karelia in the Olonets direction.
On April 21, volunteers occupied Vidlitsa, on April 23 - Tuloksa, in the evening of the same day - the city of Olonets, on April 24 they occupied Veshkelitsa, on April 25 they approached Pryazha, reached the Sulazhgory area and began to threaten Petrozavodsk directly. At the same time, Petrozavodsk was threatened from the north by British, Canadian and White Guard troops. At the end of April, the Red Army managed to hold back the advance of volunteers towards Petrozavodsk.
unknown, Public Domain In May, White Guard troops in Estonia began military operations, threatening Petrograd.
In May and June, on the eastern and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Red Army detachments held back the advance of Finnish volunteers. In May-June 1919, Finnish volunteers advanced on the Lodeynoye Pole area and crossed the Svir.
At the end of June 1919, the Red Army began a counteroffensive in the Vidlitsa direction and on July 8, 1919 in the Olonets sector of the Karelian front. Finnish volunteers were driven back beyond the border line.
On May 18, 1920, units of the Red Army liquidated the North Karelian state with its capital in the village of Ukhta (Arkhangelsk province), which received financial and military assistance from the Finnish government. Only in July 1920 were the Finns able to be driven out of most of eastern Karelia. Finnish troops remained only in the Rebolsk and Porosozersk volosts of Eastern Karelia.
In 1920, according to the Tartu Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia made significant territorial concessions - independent Finland received Western Karelia up to the Sestra River, the Pechenga region in the Arctic, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula.
RSFSRThe first Soviet-Finnish war- fighting between the White Finnish troops and units of the Red Army on the territory of Soviet Russia (March 1918 - October 1920).
Background
1918
On February 23, 1918, while at Antrea station (now Kamennogorsk), addressing the troops, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, delivered his speech, the “oath of the sword,” in which he stated that “he will not sheathe the sword,... before the last warrior and hooligan of Lenin is expelled from both Finland and East Karelia." However, there was no official declaration of war from Finland. General Mannerheim's desire to become the savior of “old Russia” was viewed negatively in Finland. At a minimum, they demanded the support of Western countries and guarantees that White Russia would recognize Finnish independence. , the white movement was unable to create a united front, which sharply reduced the chances of success. Other leaders of the white movement refused to recognize Finnish independence. And for more active actions, without risk to their country, allies were needed.
On February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the line Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - White Sea.
By the beginning of March, a plan for organizing “national uprisings in Eastern Karelia” was developed at Mannerheim’s headquarters and special Finnish instructors were allocated - career military personnel - to create hotbeds of uprising.
On March 6-7, an official statement by the head of the Finnish state, regent Per Evind Svinhufvud, appeared that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on “moderate Brest conditions,” that is, if Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway went to Finland and the entire Kola Peninsula.
On March 7-8, German Emperor Wilhelm II responded to an appeal from the Finnish government that Germany would not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and would not support Finland’s military actions if it moved them beyond its borders.
On March 7, the Finnish Prime Minister declares claims to Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and on March 15, Finnish General Mannerheim approves the “Wallenius Plan”, which provides for the seizure of part of the former territory of the Russian Empire up to the line Petsamo (Pechenga) - Kola Peninsula - White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga.
In May, White Guard troops in Estonia began military operations, threatening Petrograd.
In May and June, on the eastern and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Red Army detachments held back the advance of Finnish volunteers. In May-June 1919, Finnish volunteers advanced on the Lodeynoye Pole area and crossed the Svir.
At the end of June 1919, the Red Army began a counteroffensive in the Vidlitsa direction and on July 8, 1919 in the Olonets sector of the Karelian front. Finnish volunteers were driven back beyond the border line.
On May 18, 1920, units of the Red Army liquidated the North Karelian state with its capital in the village of Ukhta (Arkhangelsk province), which received financial and military assistance from the Finnish government. Only in July 1920 were the Finns able to be driven out of most of eastern Karelia. Finnish troops remained only in the Rebolsk and Porosozersk volosts of Eastern Karelia.
Notes
see also
Literature and sources
- For Soviet Karelia, 1918-1920: memories of the civil war / collection, ed. V. I. Mazeshersky. Petrozavodsk, Karelian book. publishing house, 1963-535 pp.
- Karelia during the civil war and foreign intervention 1918-1920. Sat., documents and materials / ed. d.ist. n. Y. A. Balagurov, V. I. Mazeshersky. Petrozavodsk, Karelian book. publishing house, 1964-648 pp.
Links
- Pokhlebkin V.V.
Everything that I will talk about further was collected by me bit by bit from the memories and letters of our relatives in France, England, as well as from the stories and memories of my relatives and friends in Russia and Lithuania.
To my great regret, I was able to do this only after my father’s death, many, many years later...
Grandfather’s sister Alexandra Obolensky (later Alexis Obolensky) and Vasily and Anna Seryogin, who voluntarily went, were also exiled with them, who followed their grandfather by their own choice, since Vasily Nikandrovich for many years was grandfather’s attorney in all his affairs and one of the most his close friends.
Alexandra (Alexis) Obolenskaya Vasily and Anna Seryogin
Probably, you had to be truly a FRIEND in order to find the strength to make such a choice and go along at will where they were going, as if they were going only to their own death. And this “death”, unfortunately, was then called Siberia...
I have always been very sad and painful for our beautiful Siberia, so proud, but so mercilessly trampled by the Bolshevik boots! ... And no words can tell how much suffering, pain, lives and tears this proud, but tormented land has absorbed... Is it because it was once the heart of our ancestral home that the “far-sighted revolutionaries” decided to denigrate and destroy this land, choosing it for their own devilish purposes?... After all, for many people, even many years later, Siberia still remained a “cursed” land, where someone’s father, someone’s brother, someone’s died. then a son... or maybe even someone's entire family.
My grandmother, whom I, to my great chagrin, never knew, was pregnant with my dad at that time and had a very difficult time with the journey. But, of course, there was no need to wait for help from anywhere... So the young Princess Elena, instead of the quiet rustling of books in the family library or the usual sounds of the piano when she played her favorite works, this time she listened only to the ominous sound of wheels, which seemed to menacingly They were counting down the remaining hours of her life, so fragile and which had become a real nightmare... She sat on some bags by the dirty carriage window and incessantly looked at the last pathetic traces of the “civilization” that was so familiar and familiar to her, going further and further away...
Grandfather's sister, Alexandra, with the help of friends, managed to escape at one of the stops. By general agreement, she was supposed to get (if she was lucky) to France, where this moment her whole family lived there. True, none of those present had any idea how she could do this, but since this was their only, albeit small, but certainly last hope, giving it up was too great a luxury for their completely hopeless situation. Alexandra’s husband, Dmitry, was also in France at that moment, with the help of whom they hoped, from there, to try to help her grandfather’s family get out of the nightmare into which life had so mercilessly thrown them, at the vile hands of brutal people...
Upon arrival in Kurgan, they were placed in a cold basement, without explaining anything and without answering any questions. Two days later, some people came for my grandfather and said that they allegedly came to “escort” him to another “destination”... They took him away like a criminal, without allowing him to take any things with him, and without deigning to explain, where and for how long he is being taken. No one ever saw grandfather again. After some time, an unknown military man brought his grandfather’s personal belongings to the grandmother in a dirty coal sack... without explaining anything and leaving no hope of seeing him alive. At this point, any information about my grandfather’s fate ceased, as if he had disappeared from the face of the earth without any traces or evidence...
The tormented, tormented heart of poor Princess Elena did not want to come to terms with such a terrible loss, and she literally bombarded the local staff officer with requests to clarify the circumstances of the death of her beloved Nicholas. But the “red” officers were blind and deaf to the requests of a lonely woman, as they called her, “of the nobles,” who was for them just one of thousands and thousands of nameless “license” units that meant nothing in their cold and cruel world ...It was a real inferno, from which there was no way out back into that familiar and kind world in which her home, her friends, and everything that she had been accustomed to from an early age remained, and that she loved so strongly and sincerely... And there was no one who could help or at least give the slightest hope of survival.
The Seryogins tried to maintain presence of mind for the three of them, and tried by any means to lift the mood of Princess Elena, but she went deeper and deeper into an almost complete stupor, and sometimes sat all day long in an indifferently frozen state, almost not reacting to her friends’ attempts to save her heart. and the mind from final depression. There were only two things that briefly brought her back to the real world - if someone started talking about her unborn child or if any, even the slightest, new details came about the supposed death of her beloved Nikolai. She desperately wanted to know (while she was still alive) what really happened, and where her husband was, or at least where his body was buried (or dumped).
Unfortunately, there is almost no information left about the life of these two courageous and bright people, Elena and Nicholas de Rohan-Hesse-Obolensky, but even those few lines from Elena’s two remaining letters to her daughter-in-law, Alexandra, which were somehow preserved in family archives Alexandra in France, show how deeply and tenderly the princess loved her missing husband. Only a few handwritten sheets have survived, some of the lines of which, unfortunately, cannot be deciphered at all. But even what was successful screams with deep pain about a great human misfortune, which, without experiencing, is not easy to understand and impossible to accept.
April 12, 1927. From a letter from Princess Elena to Alexandra (Alix) Obolenskaya:
“I’m very tired today. I returned from Sinyachikha completely broken. The carriages are filled with people, it would be a shame to even carry livestock in them…………………………….. We stopped in the forest - there was such a delicious smell of mushrooms and strawberries... It’s hard to believe that it was there that these unfortunates were killed! Poor Ellochka (meaning Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna, who was a relative of my grandfather along the Hesse line) was killed nearby, in this terrible Staroselim mine... what a horror! My soul cannot accept this. Do you remember we said: “may the earth rest in peace”?.. Great God, how can such a land rest in peace?!..
Oh Alix, my dear Alix! How can one get used to such horror? ...................... ..................... I'm so tired of begging and humiliating myself... Everything will be completely useless if the Cheka does not agree to send a request to Alapaevsk...... I will never know where to look for him, and I will never know what they did to him. Not an hour goes by without me thinking about such a dear face to me... What a horror it is to imagine that he lies in some abandoned pit or at the bottom of a mine!.. How can one endure this everyday nightmare, knowing that he has already will I never see him?!.. Just like my poor Vasilek (the name that was given to my dad at birth) will never see him... Where is the limit of cruelty? And why do they call themselves people?..
My dear, kind Alix, how I miss you!.. At least I would like to know that everything is fine with you, and that Dmitry, dear to your soul, does not leave you in these difficult moments......... ................................... If I had even a drop of hope left to find my dear Nikolai, I would seems to have endured everything. My soul seems to have gotten used to this terrible loss, but it still hurts a lot... Everything without him is different and so desolate.”
May 18, 1927. An excerpt from Princess Elena’s letter to Alexandra (Alix) Obolenskaya:
“The same dear doctor came again. I can’t prove to him that I simply don’t have any more strength. He says that I should live for the sake of little Vasilko... Is this so?.. What will he find on this terrible earth, my poor baby? ........................................ The cough has returned, and sometimes it becomes impossible to breathe. The doctor always leaves some drops, but I’m ashamed that I can’t thank him in any way. ................................... Sometimes I dream about our favorite room. And my piano... God, how far it all is! And did all this even happen? ........................... and the cherries in the garden, and our nanny, so affectionate and kind. Where is all this now? ................................ (out the window?) I don’t want to look, it’s all covered in soot and you can only see dirty boots… I hate damp.”
My poor grandmother, from the dampness in the room, which was not warmed up even in summer, soon fell ill with tuberculosis. And, apparently weakened by the shocks she had suffered, starvation and illness, she died during childbirth, without ever seeing her baby, and without finding (at least!) the grave of his father. Literally before her death, she took the word from the Seryogins that, no matter how difficult it was for them, they would take the newborn (if he survived, of course) to France, to his grandfather’s sister. Which, in that wild time, to promise, of course, was almost “wrong”, since there was no way to do it real possibility The Seryogins, unfortunately, didn’t have it... But they still promised her in order to somehow make it easier last minutes her, so brutally ruined, still very young life, and so that her soul, tormented by pain, could, at least with little hope, leave this cruel world... And even knowing that they would do everything possible to keep their word to Elena, the Seryogins still didn’t really believe in their hearts that they would ever be able to bring this whole crazy idea to life...
So, in 1927, in the city of Kurgan, in a damp, unheated basement, a little boy was born, and his name was Prince Vasily Nikolaevich de Rohan-Hesse-Obolensky, Lord of Sanbury... He was the only son of Duke de'Rohan-Hesse-Obolensky and Princess Elena Larina.
Then he still could not understand that he was left completely alone in this world and that his fragile life was now completely dependent on the goodwill of a man named Vasily Seryogin...
And this kid also didn’t know that on his father’s side, he was given a stunningly “colorful” Family Tree, which his distant ancestors wove for him, as if preparing the boy in advance to accomplish some special, “great” deeds... and, thereby placing on his then still very fragile shoulders a huge responsibility to those who once so diligently wove his “genetic thread”, connecting their lives into one strong and proud tree...
He was a direct descendant of the great Merovingians, born in pain and poverty, surrounded by the death of his relatives and the ruthless cruelty of the people who destroyed them... But this did not change who this little man who had just been born really was.
And his amazing family began in the 300th (!) year, with the Merovingian king Conon the First (Conan I). (This is confirmed in a handwritten four-volume volume - a manuscript book by the famous French genealogist Norigres, which is located in our family library in France). His Family Tree grew and expanded, weaving into its branches such names as Dukes Rohan in France, Marquises Farnese in Italy, Lords Strafford in England, Russian princes Dolgoruky, Odoevsky... and many, many others , some of which could not be traced even by the world’s most highly qualified genealogists in the UK (Royal College of Arms), who jokingly said that this was the most “international” family tree they had ever compiled.
And it seems to me that this “mix” also did not happen so accidentally... After all, all the so-called noble families had very high-quality genetics, and its correct mixing could have a positive impact on the creation of a very high-quality genetic foundation for the essence of their descendants, which, according to happy circumstances, and my father appeared.
Apparently, mixing “international” gave much better genetic result than purely “family” mixing, which for a long time was almost an “unwritten law” of all European high-born families, and very often ended in hereditary hemophilia...
But no matter how “international” the physical foundation of my father was, his SOUL (and I can say this with full responsibility) until the end of his life was truly Russian, despite all, even the most amazing, genetic connections...
But let’s return to Siberia, where this “little prince”, born in a basement, in order to simply survive, with the consent of the broad and kind soul of Vasily Nikandrovich Seregin, one fine day became simply Vasily Vasilyevich Seregin, a citizen of the Soviet Union... In which he lived his entire adult life, died, and was buried under the tombstone: “The Seryogin Family,” in the small Lithuanian town of Alytus, far from his family castles, which he had never heard of...
I learned all this, unfortunately, only in 1997, when dad was no longer alive. I was invited to the island of Malta by my cousin, Prince Pierre de Rohan-Brissac, who had been looking for me for a long time, and he also told me who I and my family really are. But I will talk about this much later.
In the meantime, let's go back to where in 1927, kindest soul people - Anna and Vasily Seryogin, there was only one concern - to keep the word given to their dead friends, and, at all costs, to take little Vasilko out of this land, “cursed by God and people” to at least some safe place, and later, to try to fulfill their promise and deliver him to distant and completely unfamiliar France... So they began their difficult journey, and, with the help of local connections and friends, they took my little dad to Perm, where, as far as I know, they lived some years.
Armed attack of Finland on Soviet Karelia in 1918-1920 Belofinsky intervention in Soviet Karelia in 1919 East Karelian adventure 1919-1920
Date of declaration of war by Finland: May 15, 1918
Start date of peace negotiations: April 12, 1920
Date of actual liberation of Karelia from Finnish troops: July 20, 1920
Date of formal end of the war: October 14, 1920
"Nonexistent war."
Statement of a question.
There is no mention of such a war in either Finnish or Soviet historical literature.
In the right-wing, sharply anti-Soviet Finnish military-historical literature, the period 1918-1920. characterized as the period of the “war of liberation”. This term combines several different events that have their own special temporal, spatial effect, and even a divergent composition of participants (the civil war in Finland, the class struggle after the end of the civil war, the intervention of White Finnish troops in Soviet Russia and the occupation of Eastern Karelia by Finland).
In Finnish liberal-bourgeois historical literature, as well as in Finnish official historical textbooks, the period 1918-1920. in relations with Soviet Russia is characterized as “unclear”.
In Soviet historical literature, a distinction is usually made between the “civil war in Finland,” the chronological framework of which is only one year, 1918, and the “White-Finnish intervention in Soviet Russia,” limited to 1919, i.e. two events - internal Finnish and foreign policy. But there is usually no talk about any Soviet-Finnish war of 1918-1920.
Thus, despite all the discrepancies in assessments of this period in Soviet (Russian) and Finnish bourgeois historical literature, there is no general assessment of it in both camps, and, moreover, it is not considered as a single, whole period by either Finnish or Russian (Soviet) historians .
Meanwhile, the label of “obscurity” attached to this period by Finnish bourgeois historiography, and the tendency in both countries - the USSR and Finland - to study Soviet-Finnish relations for 1918-1920. Only problematically, according to politically isolated thematic headings, and not holistically, in the entire temporal, chronological sequence, prompted the serious Finnish historian Professor Juhani Paasivirt to write a chronologically structured study “Finland in 1918.” (1957), where he brilliantly showed the complex interconnectedness of various aspects of the historical development of Finland over this short period and especially highlighted the genesis of Finnish foreign policy for the entire first half of the 20th century.
The work of Professor J. Paasivirt, however, was not continued and did not cover the years 1919 and 1920, because it encountered the inaccessibility of archives opened for this period only at the end of the 70s, and even more so - political obstacles, and with both sides - both Finnish and Soviet.
The fact is that such a study, willy-nilly, would raise the question of what kind of war ended the Tartu Peace of 1920. After all, peace treaties usually end this or that war. But the Tartu Peace of 1920 was viewed as if in isolation, outside the events that preceded it, and in 1947, after the conclusion of a peace treaty that ended Finland’s participation in the Second World War against the USSR, it was believed that both sides should finally stop all talk about each other’s wars with a friend, and therefore their relationship, as unnatural as it turned out, officially began with two isolated acts: Lenin’s recognition of the independence of Finland in 1917 and the Tartu Peace of 1920.
For “internal use”, both countries retained their terminology for the period 1918-1920, but for the external, and even more so for the common Soviet-Finnish “historical and literary market” with these estimates in the 50-80s of the 20th century. tried not to go out.
In Finnish historical literature, Finnish military actions in 1918-1920. against the RSFSR were qualified not as an armed uprising against another, foreign, state, but as a “struggle for Eastern Karelia”, as a national, historical internal Finnish task, supposedly lying outside the sphere of international relations and outside the laws of international law.
In Soviet historical literature, the assessment was given more specifically and, although it was clearly class-based, it was limited in time and space: “the White Finnish adventure in Karelia in 1919.”
Thus, these events did not receive the status of “war” on both sides. This was explained by a number of factors, including formal ones.
First, there was no clearly identifiable beginning or end to these hostilities (although there is a date for the official declaration of war).
Secondly, regular people took part in them to a very small extent. military formations state type - the Finnish Mannerheim Army and the Red Army of the RSFSR, and to a greater extent military detachments that formally fell under the definition of “volunteer” participated, i.e. actual volunteers, volunteers from the Finnish side, as well as openly mercenary troops, including dubious gangs of foreigners recruited by Finnish nationalist organizations in Estonia, Sweden, Germany and in Finland itself or in Russia.
On the Soviet side, local, Karelian, residents, partisans, Russian communist volunteers, as well as Finnish communists who fled from the White Terror from Finland took part in the hostilities. All this did not make it possible to define these military actions as a “Russian-Finnish war,” much less a Soviet-Finnish war waged at the state level.
Thirdly, during military clashes in Karelia, due to geographical and political conditions, there were almost no clear, defined fronts and between separate, isolated areas of hostilities there were “gaps” and “voids” stretching for several hundred kilometers, which also did not exist outwardly it looks like a regular war.
Finally, fourthly, military operations from 1918 to 1920 took place on the territory of Karelia not continuously, but in separate “outbreaks”, interrupted by several months of “calm”, so they did not produce the impression of “war”, but created a situation of unpredictability and the randomness of everything that was happening, because no one could predict the duration of these “lulls” or determine the possibility of a resumption or cessation of hostilities.
All these circumstances, taken together, prevented both military specialists and historians from talking and writing about the “Soviet-Finnish war of 1918-1920”, and therefore everyone defined it in their own way and all together avoided mentioning and recognizing it as a war.
However, the very fact of concluding a peace treaty in Tartu forces the historian to inevitably raise the question: what did this peace actually accomplish? What war did he end? What exactly did he sum up in international legal terms, whose victory and whose defeat did he record and for whom, therefore, was he honorable and for whom was he “shameful”?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to systematize the diplomatic and military history of Russian-Finnish relations in 1918-1920, establish a clear chronological framework of military actions during this period and define the current situation as “an armed attack of Finland on Soviet Karelia in 1918-1920 .”, which began in March 1918 and ended in May 1920. In fact, it was still a Soviet-Finnish war, especially since there is even an official date for its declaration by Finland. But the involvement of Soviet Russia in this war occurred gradually, and the conduct of the war was delayed and “smeared.”
Actions of the parties that led to the creation of a military situation
(Chronological overview)
The second half of January 1918. The beginning of the penetration, without a declaration of war, into the territory of Russia by Finnish detachments aimed at the silent occupation of Eastern Karelia. The main directions of movement of the Finns: the cities of Ukhta and Kem.
On February 23, 1918, the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, General K. G. Mannerheim, stated that “he will not sheathe his sword until Eastern Karelia is liberated from the Bolsheviks.” However, there was no official declaration of war from Finland.
On February 27, 1918, the Government of Finland sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany
nii, would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga. - Lake Onega - White Sea.
Beginning of March 1918. At Mannerheim’s headquarters, a plan was developed for organizing “national uprisings in Eastern Karelia” and special Finnish instructors were allocated - professional military personnel to create centers of uprising.
March 6, 1918 The “Provisional Committee of Eastern Karelia” was created in Helsinki - a body for the introduction of occupation administration in Soviet Karelia. Three invasion groups have been prepared.
March 6-7, 1918 Official statement by the head of the Finnish state, Regent Svinhuvud, that Finland is ready to make peace with Russia on the so-called. “moderate Brest conditions”, i.e. in the event that Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway go to Finland. and the entire Kola Peninsula.
March 7-8, 1918 Statement by German Emperor Wilhelm II that Germany will not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and will not support Finland’s military actions if it moves them beyond its borders.
On March 15, 1918, General Mannerheim signed an order for three Finnish invasion groups to set out to conquer Eastern Karelia.
Mannerheim approved the “Wallenius plan”, i.e. plan for the seizure of Russian territory along the line Petsamo-Kola Peninsula-White Sea-Lake Onega-r. Svir-Ladoga lake.
Mannerheim also put forward, in connection with the start of hostilities of the Finnish armed forces against Soviet Russia, a plan for the liquidation of Petrograd as the capital of Russia and the transformation of the city and the surrounding territory of satellite cities (Tsarskoe Selo, Gatchina, Peterhof, etc.) into a “free city-republic” like Danzig .
March 17-18, 1918 In the city of Ukhta, occupied by Finnish troops, the “Provisional Committee for Eastern Karelia” met and adopted a resolution on the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. (Other names of Eastern Karelia in documents of 1918-1920: Arkhangelsk, White Sea, Far Karelia.)
On May 5-7, 1918, the Finnish White Army, after suppressing the revolution in Helsingfors, reached the old Russian-Finnish border near Sestroretsk and found itself 30 km from Petrograd, hoping to break into the capital of Russia on the move, on the shoulders of the retreating Red Finnish detachments. However, at the border, having received strong resistance from units of the Red Army of the Petrograd garrison, they stopped and did not resume their offensive on this section of the Russian-Finnish border.
May 15, 1918 Nevertheless, on May 15, Mannerheim Headquarters published the decision of the Finnish government to declare war on Soviet Russia.
The main goal of the Finnish military command was the capture of Karelia. However, the aggressive actions and intentions of the Finnish command at this time came into conflict with the intentions and plans of the German command, which sought to facilitate the exchange of the territory of the Vyborg province, reserved for Russia, for the Pechenga region with access to the Barents Sea, which was necessary for Germany to wage war in the North with England, whose troops began the occupation of Russian Pomerania.
May 22, 1918 Justifying the decision of the Finnish leadership to start a war against Soviet Russia at a meeting of the Sejm, deputy and one of the leaders of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (later, in 1921-1922, Deputy Prime Minister) prof. Rafael Waldemar Erich stated: “Finland will sue Russia for losses caused by the war (meaning the civil war in Finland in 1918 - V.P.). The size of these losses can only be covered by the annexation of Eastern Karelia and the Murmansk coast (Kola Peninsula) to Finland.”
On May 23, 1918, the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry informed the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin that Germany would do everything to facilitate the achievement of a truce between Finland and Soviet Russia, the establishment of Russian- Finnish border and peace negotiations between Finland and the RSFSR
On May 25, 1918, G.V. Chicherin informed Germany that the Soviet government accepted the German proposal for peace negotiations with Finland and proposed to conduct them in Moscow. However, the Finns suggested Tallinn as a place for negotiations. But negotiations on preliminary conditions began with German mediation, eventually in Berlin in August 1918. Not only the participation of German diplomats in them, but also the process of preparing these negotiations revealed large differences in the foreign policy plans and goals of Germany and Finland.
May 31, 1918. Under pressure from the German command, K.G. Mannerheim, as an anthophile, was forced to resign. This automatically led to the fact that his order to start a war with the RSFSR practically ceased to be valid just two weeks after its publication.
The pro-German Finnish government of Svinhuvud-Paasikivi officially informed Germany that it agreed to negotiate with the RSFSR through German mediation and on the condition of the annexation of Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula to Finland.
June 2-5, 1918 The Soviet government, while not refusing to negotiate peace, insisted that they be conducted without any preconditions.
June 11, 1918 The peace committee created in Finland under the leadership of K. Enkel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, completed the drafting of a peace treaty between Russia and Finland.
Mid-June - June 20, 1918 England and France began the occupation of Pechenga, where Canadian, English and Polish troops were sent.
On June 27, 1918, the pro-German government of Finland sent an ultimatum to the Entente to clear Pechenga as supposedly Finnish territory (at that time it still belonged to the RSFSR).
June 30, 1918. This caused the Entente (England) to declare war on Finland for the daring note, but this idea was not implemented due to the fact that British troops could not even operate successfully in the Arkhangelsk North, where they were helped by the White Guards.
On July 1, 1918, Sweden offered Finland its mediation in settling relations with England and achieving peace with Soviet Russia.
On July 6, 1918, the Finnish government announced that it was inclined to accept Swedish mediation and therefore would not take military action against Russia.
On July 11, 1918, the German command announced its agreement to establish peace between Finland and Russia, but not between Finland and England. Therefore, Swedish mediation was no longer necessary.
On July 12, 1918, the Finnish General Staff prepared a project for moving the Finnish border with Russia on the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for generous compensation with the territory of Eastern Karelia. The project was signed by Major General Karl F. Wilkmann (Vilkamaa), approved by the German commander General Ludendorff.
On July 19, 1918, Ludendorff proposed to State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs P. Ginze that Finland cede to Russia part of the Karelian Isthmus beyond Eastern Karelia and the Murmansk region; The German command hoped to expel the British from the North with joint Finnish-German forces, since the Russians alone could not do this. So Germany, again, trying to solve its problems, unwittingly distracted the Finnish threat to Soviet Russia and took a more advantageous position for the RSFSR.
July 24, 1918 The Germans recommended that Finland not create a threat to Petrograd, so that the Soviet government could withdraw troops from Petrograd and send them against the Czechoslovaks and the British in the North.
July 27, 1918 Germany is going to conclude a military treaty with Finland on joint actions against England. This would automatically cancel out any Finnish action against the RSFSR.
Peace negotiations between the RSFSR and Finland.
Start date of negotiations: August 3, 1918
End date of negotiations: August 21, 1918
Place of negotiations: Berlin.
Composition of the Soviet delegation:
Chairman, head of the delegation: V.V. Vorovsky.
Members of the delegation:
Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky,
Yakov Stanislavovich Ganetsky (Furstenberg).
Composition of the Finnish delegation:
Head of delegation:
Karl Enckel, second foreign minister.
Members of the delegation:
Hugo Rautanpää, head of the government's foreign policy office, government lawyer,
Raphael Woldemar Erich, professor of international law, Walter Oswald Siewen, chairman of the AK, representative of Finland in Sweden, August Ramsay, chairman of the board of the United and Northern
Banks,
Jonathan Vartiovaara, director of the department.
German representative and negotiator:
von Stumm, deputy State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.
August 21, 1918 Negotiations were interrupted due to the reluctance of the Finns to meet the Soviet draft agreement, despite German attempts to force them to abandon the war with the RSFSR. The Finns, however, did not conduct military operations at this time, but they decisively refused peace with Soviet Russia.
August 27, 1918 Conclusion of the Soviet-German Additional Treaty to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (see above). Article 5 of this document related to Finland and stated: “Russia is immediately taking all measures to remove Entente combat forces from the North of Russia. Germany undertakes to guarantee that during these operations there will be no attack from Finland on Russian territory. If the Russian army is unable to repel the Entente troops from the North, then Germany will be forced to do this with its own troops with the involvement of Finnish troops. After the expulsion of the Entente troops, it will, if possible, be established Russian management in this territory."
However, Finland did not agree with the Germans' commitment to Finland and protested.
On September 13, 1918, a representative of the German Foreign Ministry told the Finnish ambassador in Berlin that Germany strongly warns Finland against attacking the RSFSR, which is busy fighting the Entente forces.
September 16, 1918 In connection with the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war and the defeat of Germany at the fronts, the Finnish government stopped focusing on Germany and strengthened its anti-Soviet policy. It began a movement for the annexation of the Rebolskaya volost in Karelia to Finland.
On October 15, 1918, the Rebolskaya volost in the RSFSR was occupied by the Finns.
January 1919. The Finns captured the Porosozerskaya volost, adjacent to Rebolskaya, on their own.
Finland's war against Soviet Russia thus actually began with the annexation of these two regions in Karelia.
February 1919 At the conference in Versailles, Finland presented a demand for all of Karelia and the Kola Peninsula.
During January-March 1919, Finland did not conduct military operations on a large scale. Only small detachments of its volunteers infiltrated Rebolu and Poros Lake to strengthen the white power there. But at the same time a plan was being prepared for a broad Finnish invasion of Russia, which was to be carried out in three directions.
Progress of hostilities
Finnish war plan:
1. The southern group of troops delivers the main blow. It consisted mainly of regular units of Mannerheim's Finnish army and was supposed to operate in the direction of Olonets-Lodeynoye Pole.
2. The northern group, consisting of units formed from Karelian kulaks, Finnish and partly Swedish volunteers and units of the Finnish military unit, operates in the direction of Veshkelitsa-Kungozero-Syamozero.
3. The middle group of troops, entirely from units of the Olonets Volunteer Corps, as well as White Estonian units, operates in the direction of Tulom Lake-Vedlozero-Petrozavodsk.
A month later, this plan was implemented.
Beginning of military operations: April 21-22, 1919 so-called. Olonets Volunteer Army
1. During the indicated two days, White Finnish troops unexpectedly crossed the Russian-Finnish state border at several points and, without encountering any resistance due to their absence in this area Soviet troops, occupied Vidlitsa on April 21, Tuloksa on April 23, Olonets on the evening of April 23, on April 24 large forces captured Veshkelitsa and by April 25 approached Pryazha, threatening Petrozavodsk directly. Individual Finnish units, despite the fierce battles that ensued around Pryazha and Manga, covering Petrozavodsk, penetrated over the next two or three days to Sulazh Mountain, 7 km from Petrozavodsk. A critical situation had arisen: the Karelian region could have fallen literally in a matter of days, given that Anglo-Canadian troops and White Guard units were advancing from the north in the direction of Kondopoga-Petrozavodsk. Therefore in last days In April, fierce battles broke out on the approaches to Petrozavodsk, as a result of which the Finnish offensive was temporarily suspended.
2. On May 2, 1919, the Defense Council of the RSFSR declared the Petrograd, Olonets and Cherepovets provinces in a state of siege.
3. On May 4, 1919, the general mobilization of the North-Western region of the RSFSR was announced.
Throughout May and June, stubborn battles took place east and north of Lake Ladoga, during which small detachments of the Red Army held back well-trained, fully equipped and heavily armed White Finnish troops, who also had a significant numerical superiority.
4. Only on June 27, 1919, the Red Army was able to launch a counteroffensive, launching a planned operation to defeat the enemy’s Olonets group on the eastern coast of Lake Ladoga.
By July 8, 1919, the Olonets section of the Karelian Front was completely liquidated: Finnish troops retreated beyond the state border line. The Red Army received orders not to pursue Finnish troops beyond the state border. But peace was not established on this border then.
5. Firstly, the Finnish government refused to enter into negotiations for a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement. Secondly, Finnish troops continuously continued to concentrate there, thereby creating a constant threat of renewed aggression, which tied the hands of the command of the troops of the Petrograd district and the front, taking into account the need for military forces in other sectors of the North-Western Front and the situation on other fronts of the civil war at that time time.
6. Since August 1919, the Karelian Front arose again, but not as a Finnish-Soviet one, but as a front in the struggle against the British occupiers and their White Guard retreats in Zaonezhye.
7. During September-October 1919, on two directions of this front - Pudozh and Zaonezh, as well as along the Murmansk railway. Fierce fighting broke out.
8. By mid-February 1920, this front had finally stabilized: the fighting had entered the positional stage, mainly due to weather conditions.
9. Starting from February 23, 1920, units of the Red Army went on the offensive along the entire strip of the Murmansk railway. and already on March 2, 1920 they liberated the city of Soroka and reached the coast of the White Sea.
10. After this, on March 27, 1920, the entire Pechenga region in the Arctic (Petsamo) was liberated right up to the Russian-Norwegian border, and on May 18, 1920, Ukhta was taken - the “capital” of Finnish-occupied North Karelia, where since the summer of 1919 settled so-called The Provisional Government of Arkhangelsk Karelia, which sought to seize this region and annex it to Finland with the aim of creating Greater Finland from sea to sea (from the Barents to the Baltic).
Finally, by mid-July 1920, all of Karelia was liberated from the interventionist troops, except for two volosts - Reboly and Poros Lake.
Diplomatic background to the peace negotiations with Finland that led to the Peace of Tartu.
Already in progress undeclared war Finland against Soviet Russia, the Soviet government, starting in the fall of 1919, repeatedly tried to begin negotiations with the Finnish side on the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace.
On September 14, 1919, the Soviet government for the first time invited Finland to begin peace negotiations. However, it was met with a sharp refusal, after which a new aggravation of the situation at the front occurred (see above, paragraph 7).
On October 16, 1919, the Soviet government again turned to Finland with peace proposals, immediately after the heavy defeat of the Finnish troops. This time, the Eduskunta (Finnish parliament) approved the decision of the Finnish government “to consider this issue at an appropriate time,” but nevertheless, hostilities continued, since the Finnish side wanted to begin peace negotiations only after another victory of the Finnish troops.
April 12-24, 1920 Preliminary Soviet-Finnish peace negotiations took place in Rajajoki (Sestroretsk).
June 10, 1920 Beginning of peace negotiations, moved to Estonia (Tartu, Yuryev).
On July 14, 1920, the Soviet delegation was forced to interrupt the negotiations due to the obstructionist tactics of the Finns, which actually disrupted the discussion of any issue.
This ended the first round of Soviet-Finnish peace negotiations, which did not produce any results.
July 14-21, 1920 The Red Army finally drove the last Finnish armed forces out of the territory of Karelia, with the exception of two northern regions - Rebola and Poros Lake. Southern section Soviet border was thus reliably fortified against new invasions. The Finnish side could no longer hope for military revenge. This immediately changed the mood in the Finnish peace delegation. She turned to the chairman of the Soviet delegation Ya. Berzin with a request to start the second round of negotiations.
July 28, 1920 Negotiations were resumed. J.A. Berzin warned the head of the Finnish peace delegation, J.K. Paasikivi, that if the Finns disrupt the negotiation process again, the Russian delegation will leave Tartu completely. From this time on, negotiations proceeded normally and ended in October 1920 with the signing of a peace treaty.
To understand what explained the ambiguity and confusion of Russian-Finnish relations at this time, including repeated interruptions in the conduct of the war, in peace negotiations and the inconsistency in Finland’s orientation either towards Germany or towards England, and in connection with this the constant change in dispositions in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1918-1920, which, despite everything, was fought, it must be borne in mind that from May 1918 to November 1920, the foreign policy of Finland was determined by 5 (five) governments that had different foreign policy guidelines .
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Stay time |
Determining Policies |
Orientation |
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Regent P.E.Svinhufvud Prime Minister J.K.Laasi-kiwi Minister of Foreign Affairs O.E.Stenruth |
Germany |
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Regent KG. Mannerheim Prime Minister L. Y. Ingman Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Enkel |
Entente |
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Regent K.G. Mannerheim Prime Minister C. Castrén Foreign Minister K. Enkel |
Course for war with Russia |
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President K.J. Stolberg Prime Minister JHVennola Minister of Foreign Affairs r.canvas |
For securing annexation without war |
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President KJ Stolberg Prime Minister R. Erich Minister of Foreign Affairs R. KHOLSTI |
The struggle within the government of two tendencies: war and peace |
TARTU PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE RSFSR AND FINLAND.
Peace Treaty between the Russian Socialist Federative
The Soviet Republic and the Finnish Republic, concluded in Yuryev.
Treaty of Yuryevsk 1920
Soviet-Finnish Yuryev Peace Treaty
Soviet-Finnish peace treaty 1920
Peace of Tartu 1920
Date of signing: October 14, 1920
Place of signing: Yuryev (until 1893 - Dorpat, Dorpat, from 1920 - Tartu), st. Vilyavdi, Knight's House.
Language of the document: The text of the agreement is drawn up in Russian, Finnish and Swedish, in 2 copies of each. All texts are authentic and equal. In addition, during the exchange of instruments of ratification on December 31, 1920, the text of the treaty was signed French, also in 2 copies, authentic, equal for interpretation. Thus, each side received the text of the treaty in four languages - the only case in world diplomatic history of an agreement between two countries.
Entry into force: From the moment of exchange of instruments of ratification.
Composition of the agreement: The agreement has 39 articles, 2 (two) geographic Maps: one depicts the line of the land Soviet-Finnish border, the other - only the line of the sea border. Attached to the agreement is a Protocol, which contains 4 (four) Statements of the Soviet delegation at the peace negotiations.
Ratification:
From the RSFSR: Ratified by the Presidium and the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
Date of ratification: October 23, 1920
Place of ratification: Moscow, Kremlin.
From Finland: Approved by the Parliament of Finland: for - 163 deputies, against - 27 deputies, abstained - 10 deputies.
Date of ratification by parliament: December 1, 1920 (in the third reading!)
Place of ratification: Helsingfors, Eduskunta. Ratified by Finnish President Kaarlo Juho Stolberg.
Date of Ratification by President: December 11, 1920
Place of ratification: Helsingfors, Presidential Palace.
Exchange of instruments of ratification: Date of exchange: December 31, 1920
Place of exchange: Moscow, Kremlin.
Authorized parties:
From Russia:
Berzin (Berzins-Ziemelis) Jan Antonovich, Secretary of the ECCI, Chairman of the RSFSR delegation at the peace negotiations,
Kerzhentsev Platon Mikhailovich, responsible head of ROSTA,
Tikhmenev Nikolai Sergeevich, Soviet diplomat, Samoilo Alexander Alexandrovich, major general, commander of the 6th Army, military expert, Berens Evgeniy Andreevich, captain 1st rank, former commander of the naval forces of the Republic (until February 1920).
From Finland:
Paasikivi Juho Kusti, Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Diet of Finland, head of the delegation, Vennola Juho Heikki, former Prime Minister of Finland (until March 1920), Frei Alexander, banker, member of the board of the Nordic Bank, Walden Karl Rudolf, Major General, Head of Department fortification of the Ministry of War, Tanner Väino Alfred, Chairman of the Social Democratic faction in the Sejm,
Voionmaa Kaarlo Väine, Member of Parliament, Professor of History,
Kivilinna Väine Gabriel, member of the Sejm, university teacher.
Agreement conditions:
Political
1. The state of war ends upon the entry into force of the treaty (i.e. from December 31, 1920, 2.5 months after its conclusion - also an unprecedented fact in the history of international agreements).
2. Both states undertake to continue to maintain good neighborly relations.
Territorial
1. The entire Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, from Vaida Bay to Motovsky Bay, and most of the Sredny Peninsula, along a line passing through the middle of both of its isthmuses, went to Finland in the North, in the Arctic. All islands to the west of the demarcation line in the Barents Sea also went to Finland (Kiy Island and Ainovskie Islands).
2. The border on the Karelian Isthmus was established from the Gulf of Finland along the river. Sister (Sisterbeck, Rajajoki) and further went north along the line of the old Russian-Finnish border, separating the Grand Duchy of Finland from the Russian provinces proper.
3. The Karelian volosts of Rebola (Repola) and Poros-Ozerskaya (Poros-Jarvi) occupied by Finnish troops were cleared of troops and returned to the Karelian Labor Commune (later the Karelian Autonomous Region).
4. Maritime border in the Gulf of Finland between the RSFSR and Finland went from the mouth of the river. Sisters to Stirsudden along the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland, then turned to the island of Seskar and the Lavensaari islands and, bypassing them from the south, turned straight to the mouth of the river. Narova on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland. (Thus, this border cut off Russia from access to the international waters of the Gulf of Finland.)
5. The width of Finnish territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland was set at 4 nautical miles along the coast and 3 nautical miles around the Finnish islands in the eastern part of the gulf. In addition, in more than ten cases an exception was made to increase the width of Finnish territorial waters in the skerry area of Finland, up to 6 miles. 6. To draw the border line, a Mixed Demarcation Commission was created.
Military
1. Troops of the RSFSR and Finland are withdrawn within 45 days from the territory of Petsamo and the volosts of Rebola and Poros Lake, respectively.
2. The parties contribute to the neutralization of the Baltic Sea and especially the Gulf of Finland. They then provide for the neutralization of Lake Ladoga.
3. Finland will neutralize militarily the islands of the Gulf of Finland, with the exception of the islands of the skerry area. This means that it undertakes not to build fortifications, naval bases, port facilities, radio stations, military warehouses on the islands and not to maintain troops there.
4. Gogland Island will be neutralized only under an international guarantee, and Russia will assist in obtaining such a guarantee.
5. Finland does not have the right to maintain aviation and submarine fleet in the Arctic Ocean.
6. Finland may keep in the North up to 15 conventional military vessels with a displacement of no more than 400 tons each, as well as any armed vessels with a displacement of up to 100 tons each. In accordance with them, Finland can have ports and repair bases.
7. Finland is obliged to destroy the forts Ino and Puumala on the Karelian Isthmus within one year.
8. Finland does not have the right to build artillery installations with a firing sector extending beyond the boundaries of Finnish territorial waters; and on the coast of the Gulf of Finland between Steersudden and Inoniemi - at a distance of less than 20 km from the coastal edge, as well as any structures between Inoniemi and the mouth of the river. Sisters.
9. Both sides may have on Lake Ladoga and the rivers and canals flowing into it military vessels with a displacement of no more than 100 tons, and with artillery not exceeding a caliber of 47 mm.
10. Both parties are prohibited from having military installations serving aggressive purposes on Lake Ladoga and the watercourses flowing into it.
11. The RSFSR has the right to conduct military ships through the southern part of Lake Ladoga and through the bypass canal into its internal waters.
12. Prisoners of war of both sides will be returned mutually as soon as possible.
Financial
1. The parties are not liable for the public debts of the opposing party.
2. Mutual debts are recognized as mutually repaid.
3. Terminates action currency agreement between the Finnish Bank and the Russian Special Office for Loans.
4. The parties mutually refuse to reimburse each other for military expenses.
5. Finland does not participate in covering Russian expenses for the world war.
6. Finnish state property in Russia becomes the property of Russia free of charge, and, conversely, Russian state property in Finland automatically becomes Finnish property. An exception in both cases is made only for diplomatic and consular property, which remains with its owners.
Economic (economic)
1. All mutual economic relations between the two countries are resumed upon the entry into force of the peace treaty.
2. Until the conclusion of a trade agreement, temporary rules on import, export, parking in ports, freight and free transit apply.
3. The agreement on the supply of grain products from Russia to Finland is terminated.
4. Finland returns to Russia all Russian ships located on its territory immediately upon the entry into force of the peace treaty (i.e. from January 1, 1921).
5. Russia will reimburse individuals and companies for their claims to ownership of any vessels, and will also return to owners in Finland those vessels that were requisitioned during the war.
(The lists were published in the “Collection of Legislations”, No. 71, dated December 1, 1921, pp. 700-704.)
6. Fishermen of both countries have the right to fish and build shelters from bad weather and warehouses within the Pechenga coast and the Rybachy Peninsula to Cape Sharapov and their corresponding territorial waters.
7. Russia will compensate for the losses of nationals of third countries if, while in Finland during the war, they suffered these losses from orders of the Russian authorities.
8. Finland undertakes to provide half of the hospital beds in the Holila sanatorium for the RSFSR within 10 years.
Communication (transport and communications)
1. With the entry into force of the peace treaty, railway communication between Russia and Finland is restored.
2. Postal and telegraph communications are being restored.
3. Finland provides Russia with three telegraph wires under the same numbers - 13, 42, 60 until the end of 1946, and for the same period Russia retains two cables from Uusikaupunki (Nystad) to Grislehamn (Sweden).
4. Finnish merchant ships with peaceful cargo are given the right of free passage along the river. Neva to Lake Ladoga from the Gulf of Finland and back.
5. Russia has the right to free transit of goods to Norway through the Pechenga region.
Cultural
1. The parties mutually return to each other archives and documents relating to the other party located on their territory.
2. Russia transfers to Finland the archive of the former State Secretariat for the Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland, located in Petrograd, retaining only documents relating to and relating mainly to Russia.
Hydrological
1. The height of the level of Lake Ladoga should not be changed using technical means without a preliminary agreement between the RSFSR and Finland (Article 18).
Legal
1. To implement the peace treaty, a Mixed Commission is created on a parity basis, which allocates various subcommittees on individual specific issues.
2. Those imprisoned for political reasons in both countries in connection with the war that arose between the parties will be mutually released and returned.
3. Upon entry into force of the peace treaty, the parties undertake to negotiate with each other in order to conclude the following agreements:
a) On trade and navigation;
b) About fishing;
c) On the rafting of timber along adjacent and common water systems;
d) On maintaining the main fairway in the Gulf of Finland and carrying out dredging work.
APPENDIX TO THE PEACE AGREEMENT:
STATEMENTS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE RSFSR AND FINLAND, INCLUDED INTO THE PROTOCOL WHEN SIGNING THE SOVIET-FINLAND PEACE TREATY OF OCTOBER 14, 1920
Date of signing of the Protocol: October 14, 1920
Place of signing of the Protocol: Tartu (Yuryev), Republic of Estonia.
Composition of the Protocol: Consists of 4 (four) Statements.
1. About self-government of Eastern Karelia. (National self-determination, autonomy within the RSFSR (national statehood), national language, local economic interests are guaranteed.)
2. About Ingrians.
(Their right to national-cultural autonomy and community self-government is guaranteed.)
3. About refugees.
(Amnesty for Finns and Karelians who participated in the civil war, their right to return to their homeland and immunity.)
4. About Rebolskaya and Poros-Ozerskaya volosts. (The Soviet government would maintain no troops in the area for two years, with the exception of regular border and customs guards.)
friend of your enemy
Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.
In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.
Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was in intense debate about the form government system, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that total local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).
Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.
Yes, at that time the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. Soviet Union model 1939 did not look like a formidable opponent at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.