By the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, Denis Vasilyevich, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, commanded a battalion of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment in Bagration’s 2nd Western Army. After Napoleon's invasion of Russia, he took part in heated defensive battles, and together with the commander he passionately experienced the protracted retreat. Shortly before the Battle of Borodino, Davydov turned to Bagration with a request, given the fragility of communications of the French army, to allow him to organize partisan raids on the enemy’s rear with the support of the population. 5 It was, in essence, a people's war project. Davydov asked to give him one thousand people (cavalrymen), but “for experience” he was given only fifty hussars and eighty Cossacks. From Davydov’s letter to Prince General Bagration:

“Your Excellency! You know that I, leaving the position of your adjutant, so flattering for my pride, joining the hussar regiment, had the subject of partisan service both according to the strength of my years, and because of my experience, and, if I dare say, because of my courage... You are my only benefactor ; allow me to appear before you to explain my intentions; if they are pleasing to you, use me according to my desire and be hopeful that the one who bears the title of Bagration’s adjutant for five years in a row will support this honor with all the zeal that the plight of our dear fatherland requires...” 6

Bagration's order to create a flying partisan detachment was one of his last before the Battle of Borodino, where he was mortally wounded. On the very first night, Davydov’s detachment of 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks was ambushed by peasants, and Denis almost died. The peasants had little understanding of the details of military uniforms, which were similar among the French and Russians. Moreover, the officers spoke, as a rule, French. After this, Davydov put on a peasant's caftan and grew a beard. In the portrait by A. Orlovsky (1814), Davydov is dressed in Caucasian fashion: a checkmen, a clearly non-Russian hat, a Circassian saber. With 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks in one of the forays, he managed to capture 370 French, while repelling 200 Russian prisoners, a cart with ammunition and nine carts with provisions. His detachment grew rapidly at the expense of peasants and freed prisoners.

On his first raid, September 1, when the French were preparing to enter Moscow, Davydov and his detachment defeated one of the enemy’s rear groups on the Smolensk road, near Tsarev Zaymishche, repelling a convoy with property looted from residents and a transport with military equipment, taking more than two hundred people were captured. The success was impressive. The captured weapons were distributed to the peasants here.

His rapid successes convinced Kutuzov of the advisability of guerrilla warfare, and he was not slow to give it wider development and constantly sent reinforcements. The second time Davydov saw Napoleon was when he and his partisans were in ambush in the forest, and a dormez with Napoleon drove past him. But at that moment he had too little strength to attack Napoleon’s guards. Napoleon hated Davydov and ordered him to be shot on the spot upon his arrest. For the sake of his capture, he allocated one of his best detachments of two thousand horsemen with eight chief officers and one staff officer. Davydov, who had half as many people, managed to drive the detachment into a trap and take him prisoner along with all the officers.

Davydov’s guerrilla tactics consisted of avoiding open attacks, attacking by surprise, changing the direction of attacks, probing the enemy’s weak spots. The partisan hussar was helped by his close connection with the population: the peasants served him as scouts, guides, and themselves took part in the extermination of French foragers. Since the uniform of the Russian and French hussars was very similar, at first residents often mistook Davydov’s cavalrymen for the French, and then he dressed his subordinates in caftans, he himself also dressed in peasant clothes, grew a beard, and hung the image of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker on his chest. Knowing that some people were laughing at the new appearance of the hussar commander and that this angered Davydov, Kutuzov, on occasion, calmed him down with a smile, saying: “In a people’s war this is necessary. Act as you act. There is a time for everything, and you will be in your shoes.” shuffle at court balls." One of Davydov’s outstanding feats during this time was the case near Lyakhov, where he, along with other partisans, captured General Augereau’s two-thousand-strong detachment; then, near the city of Kopys, he destroyed the French cavalry depot, scattered the enemy detachment near Belynichi and, continuing the search to the Neman, occupied Grodno.

Denis Davydov was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class, and St. George, 4th class, for the 1812 campaign. With Davydov’s successes, his squad also grew. Denis Vasilyevich was given two Cossack regiments, in addition, the detachment was constantly replenished with volunteers and soldiers repulsed from captivity. 7

On November 4, near Krasnoye, Davydov captured generals Almeron and Byurt, many other prisoners and a large convoy. On November 9 near Kopys and November 14 near Belynichi he also celebrated victories. On December 9 he forced the Austrian general Fröhlich to surrender Grodno to him. Davydov was not distinguished by cruelty and did not execute prisoners, as Figner did, for example; on the contrary, he restrained others from arbitrary reprisals and demanded a humane attitude towards surrendered enemies. After crossing the border, Davydov was assigned to the corps of General Wintzingerode, participated in the defeat of the Saxons near Kalisz and, having entered Saxony with an advanced detachment, occupied Dresden. For which he was put under house arrest by General Wintzingerode, since he took the city without permission, without orders. Throughout Europe, legends were made about Davydov’s courage and luck. When Russian troops entered a city, all the residents went out into the street and asked about him in order to see him.

For the battle on the approach to Paris, when five horses were killed under him, but he, together with his Cossacks, still broke through the hussars of the Jacquinot brigade to the French artillery battery and, having chopped up the servants, decided the outcome of the battle, Davydov was awarded the rank of major general.

He achieved wide popularity in 1812 as the head of a partisan detachment, organized on his own initiative. At first, the higher authorities reacted to Davydov’s idea with some skepticism, but the partisan actions turned out to be very useful and brought a lot of harm to the French. Davydov had imitators - Figner, Seslavin and others.

Russian partisans in 1812

Victor Bezotosny

The term “partisans” in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history – the people’s war that unfolded in Russian territories in 1812 and the mass partisan movement during the Second World War. Both of these periods were called the Patriotic Wars. A long time ago, a persistent stereotype arose that partisans first appeared in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812, and their founder was the dashing hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. His poetic works were practically forgotten, but everyone from school remembers that he created the first partisan detachment in 1812.

Historical reality was somewhat different. The term itself existed long before 1812. Partisans were called partisans in the Russian army back in XVIII century military personnel sent as part of independent small separate detachments, or parties (from the Latin word partis, from the French parti) for operations on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. Naturally, this phenomenon cannot be considered a purely Russian invention. Both Russian and french army even before 1812 they experienced the irritating actions of partisans. For example, the French in Spain against the Guerillas, the Russians in 1808–1809. during Russo-Swedish War against detachments of Finnish peasants. Moreover, many, both Russian and French officers, who adhered to the rules of the medieval knightly code of conduct in war, considered partisan methods (surprise attacks from behind on a weak enemy) not entirely worthy. Nevertheless, one of the leaders of Russian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich, in an analytical note submitted to the command before the start of the war, proposed launching active partisan operations on the flanks and behind enemy lines and using Cossack units for this.

The success of the Russian partisans in the campaign of 1812 was facilitated by the huge territory of the theater of military operations, their length, elongation and poor coverage of the communication line Great Army.

And of course, huge forested areas. But still, I think the main thing is the support of the population. Guerrilla actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Observation Army, General A.P. Tormasov, who in July sent a detachment of Colonel K.B. Knorring to Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. A little later, M.B. Barclay de Tolly formed the “flying corps” of Adjutant General F.F. Wintzingerode. By order of Russian military leaders, raiding partisan detachments began to actively operate on the flanks of the Great Army in July-August 1812. Only on August 25 (September 6), on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, with the permission of Kutuzov, a party (50 Akhtyrsky hussars and 80 Cossacks) of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, the Davydov to whom Soviet historians attributed the role of the initiator and founder of this movement, was sent on a “search” .

The main purpose of the partisans was considered to be actions against the enemy’s operational (communication) line. The party commander enjoyed great independence, receiving only the most general instructions from the command. The partisans' actions were almost exclusively offensive in nature. The key to their success was secrecy and speed of movement, surprise of attack and lightning withdrawal. This, in turn, determined the composition of the partisan parties: they included predominantly light regular (hussars, lancers) and irregular (Don, Bug and other Cossacks, Kalmyks, Bashkirs) cavalry, sometimes reinforced by several pieces of horse artillery. The party size did not exceed several hundred people, this ensured mobility. Infantry was rarely supplied: at the very beginning of the offensive, the detachments of A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner received one Jaeger company each. The party of D.V. Davydov operated behind enemy lines for the longest time – 6 weeks.

Even on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian command was thinking about how to attract the huge masses of peasants to resist the enemy, making the war truly popular. It was obvious that religious and patriotic propaganda was needed, an appeal to the peasant masses was needed, a call to them. Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich believed, for example, that the people “must be armed and adjusted, as in Spain, with the help of the clergy.” And Barclay de Tolly, as the commander at the theater of military operations, without waiting for anyone’s help, turned on August 1 (13) to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces with calls for “universal armament.”

First of all, armed detachments began to be created on the initiative of the nobility in the Smolensk province. But since the Smolensk region was very soon completely occupied, the resistance here was local and episodic, as in other places where landowners fought off looters with the support of army detachments. In other provinces bordering the theater of military operations, “cordons” were created, consisting of armed peasants, whose main task was to fight looters and small detachments of enemy foragers.

During the stay of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp, the people's war reached its greatest extent. At this time, enemy marauders and foragers are rampant, their outrages and robberies become widespread, and partisan parties, individual militia units and army detachments begin to support the cordon chain. The cordon system was created in Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir, Tula and part of Moscow provinces. It was at this time that the extermination of marauders by armed peasants acquired a massive scale, and among the leaders of peasant detachments, G. M. Urin and E. S. Stulov, E. V. Chetvertakov and F. Potapov, and the elder Vasilisa Kozhina became famous throughout Russia. According to D.V. Davydov, the extermination of marauders and foragers “was more the work of the villagers than of the parties rushing to inform the enemy for a much more important purpose, which was only to protect property.”

Contemporaries distinguished a people's war from a guerrilla war. Partisan parties, consisting of regular troops and Cossacks, acted offensively in the territory occupied by the enemy, attacking his convoys, transports, artillery parks, and small detachments. Cordons and people's squads, consisting of peasants and townspeople led by retired military and civil officials, were located in a zone not occupied by the enemy, defending their villages from plunder by marauders and foragers.

The partisans became especially active in the fall of 1812, during the stay of Napoleon's army in Moscow. Their constant raids caused irreparable harm to the enemy and kept him in constant tension. In addition, they delivered operational information to the command. Particularly valuable was the information promptly reported by Captain Seslavin about the French exit from Moscow and about the direction of movement of Napoleonic units to Kaluga. These data allowed Kutuzov to urgently transfer the Russian army to Maloyaroslavets and block the path of Napoleon’s army.

With the beginning of the retreat of the Great Army, the partisan parties were strengthened and on October 8 (20) they were given the task of preventing the enemy from retreating. During the pursuit, partisans often acted together with the vanguard of the Russian army - for example, in the battles of Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Krasny, Berezina, Vilna; and acted actively right up to the borders Russian Empire, where some of them were disbanded. Contemporaries appreciated the activities of the army partisans and gave them full credit. As a result of the 1812 campaign, all detachment commanders were generously awarded ranks and orders, and the practice of guerrilla warfare continued in 1813–1814.

It is indisputable that the partisans became one of those important factors (hunger, cold, heroic actions of the Russian army and the Russian people) that ultimately led Napoleon's Grand Army to disaster in Russia. It is almost impossible to calculate the number of enemy soldiers killed and captured by the partisans. In 1812, there was an unspoken practice - not to take prisoners (with the exception of important persons and “tongues”), since the commanders were not interested in separating a convoy from their few parties. The peasants, who were under the influence of official propaganda (all the French are “unchrists”, and Napoleon is “a fiend of hell and the son of Satan”), destroyed all the prisoners, sometimes in savage ways (they buried them alive or burned them, drowned them, etc.). But, it must be said that among army commanders partisan detachments According to some contemporaries, cruel methods towards prisoners were used only by Figner.

IN Soviet time the concept of “guerrilla warfare” was reinterpreted in accordance with Marxist ideology, and under the influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, it began to be interpreted as “the armed struggle of the people, mainly peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of Napoleonic troops and on their communications." Soviet authors began to view partisan warfare “as a people’s struggle, generated by the creativity of the masses,” and saw in it “one of the manifestations decisive role people in war." The peasantry was declared to be the initiator of the “people's” guerrilla war, which supposedly began immediately after the invasion of the Great Army into the territory of the Russian Empire, and it was argued that it was under their influence that the Russian command later began to create army partisan detachments.

The statements of a number of Soviet historians that the “partisan” people’s war began in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, that the government banned the arming of the people, that peasant detachments attacked enemy reserves, garrisons and communications and partially joined the army partisan detachments do not correspond to the truth. . The significance and scale of the people's war were enormously exaggerated: it was argued that the partisans and peasants “kept the enemy army under siege” in Moscow, that “the club of the people’s war nailed the enemy” right up to the Russian border. At the same time, the activities of the army partisan detachments turned out to be obscured, and it was they who made a tangible contribution to the defeat of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812. Today, historians are re-opening archives and reading documents, now without the ideology and instructions of the leaders that dominate them. And reality reveals itself in an unvarnished and unclouded form.

author Belskaya G.P.

Victor Bezotosny Russia and France in Europe before the War of 1812 Why did the French and Russians fight with each other? Is it really out of a feeling of national hatred? Or maybe Russia was possessed by a thirst to expand its borders, to increase its territory? Of course not. Moreover, among

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Victor Bezotosny Preventive war? When talking about the beginning of the 1812 campaign, the question often arises about the preventive nature of Napoleon's war against Russia. They say that the French emperor really did not want this war, but was forced to be the first to cross the border due to

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Victor Bezotosny Beginning of hostilities The famous order of Napoleon, dictated by him in Vilkovishki, was read out to the corps of the Great Army: “Soldiers! The Second Polish War began. The first ended at Friedland and Tilsit. In Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal

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Russia and France in Europe before the War of 1812 Viktor Bezotosny Why did the French and Russians fight with each other? Is it really out of a feeling of national hatred? Or maybe Russia was possessed by a thirst to expand its borders, to increase its territory? Of course not. Moreover, among

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French influence in Russia Victor Bezotosny The beginning of the reign of Emperor Alexander I was associated with hopes. Society was thirsty for change, ideas related to reform were in the air. And indeed, transformations began in the higher education system

From the book Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little known facts author Team of authors

Preventive war? Victor Bezotosny When people talk about the beginning of the 1812 campaign, the question often arises about the preventive nature of Napoleon's war against Russia. They say that the French emperor really did not want this war, but was forced to be the first to cross the border due to

From the book Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little known facts author Team of authors

The beginning of hostilities Viktor Bezotosny The famous order of Napoleon, dictated by him in Vilkovishki, was read out to the corps of the Great Army: “Soldiers! The Second Polish War began. The first ended at Friedland and Tilsit. In Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal

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From the book Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little known facts author Team of authors

Russian intelligence in 1812 Viktor Bezotosny “The storm of the twelfth year has arrived - who helped us here? The frenzy of the people, Barclay, winter or the Russian god? It is interesting that in this quatrain Pushkin, listing the main factors of the defeat of Napoleon’s “Great Army” in 1812

From the book Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little known facts author Team of authors

Indian campaign. Project of the century Victor Bezotosny If the Indian campaign had happened, history would have taken a different path, and there would not have been the Patriotic War of 1812 and everything connected with it. Of course, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, but... Judge for yourself. Worsening relations

From the book Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little known facts author Team of authors

The price of victory Victor Bezotosny The country, of course, is elevated by the victory. And it educates and strengthens - the grueling path to it. It is the task of the historian to analyze the consequences of the most important historical events and trace their influence on the subsequent course of history. But

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, Napoleon's tattered and frozen army was brutally beaten by Russian flying and peasant partisan detachments.

Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants

The greatly extended Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile units to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive them of food and fodder.

During the Patriotic War, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of partisan peasants, uniting spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to actual acts of sabotage, flying detachments also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces mainly repelled the enemy from their villages.

Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and proposed it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, and beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. Davydov’s cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.

Over time, Denis Davydov’s detachment increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked French units, which sometimes had a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking convoys and freeing prisoners, and sometimes even captured enemy artillery.

After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. These were mainly Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. United partisan groups could resist large military formations Napoleon's army. Thus, at the end of October, during a battle in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat turned out to be a terrible blow. This success, on the contrary, encouraged the Russian troops and set them up for further victories.

Peasant initiative

A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of French units was made by peasants who self-organized into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov’s instructions. While willingly helping flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the men at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, and often, when the enemy approached, they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce local resistance intensified as the demoralized French army increasingly turned into a crowd of robbers and marauders.

One of these detachments was assembled by dragoons Ermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many acts of sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy convoys with food and livestock. At one time, Chetvertakov’s unit included up to 4 thousand people. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by career military men and noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of Napoleonic troops were not isolated.

The term “partisans” in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history - the people’s war that unfolded in Russian territories in 1812 and the mass partisan movement during the Second World War. Both of these periods were called the Patriotic Wars. A long time ago, a persistent stereotype arose that partisans first appeared in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812, and their founder was the dashing hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. His poetic works turned out to be practically forgotten, but everyone from school remembers what he created the first partisan detachment in 1812.

Historical reality was somewhat different. The term itself existed long before 1812. In the Russian army back in the 18th century, partisans were called military personnel who were sent as part of independent small separate detachments, or parties (from the Latin word partis from French parti) for operations on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. Naturally, this phenomenon cannot be considered a purely Russian invention.

Even before 1812, both the Russian and French armies experienced the irritating actions of the partisans. For example, the French in Spain against the Guerillas, the Russians in 1808-1809. during the Russian-Swedish war against detachments of Finnish peasants. Moreover, many, both Russian and French officers, who adhered to the rules of the medieval knightly code of conduct in war, considered partisan methods (surprise attacks from behind on a weak enemy) not entirely worthy. Nevertheless, one of the leaders of Russian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich, in an analytical note submitted to the command before the start of the war, proposed launching active partisan operations on the flanks and behind enemy lines and using Cossack units for this.

success Russian partisans in the campaign of 1812 contributed to the huge territory of the theater of military operations, their length, elongation and weak cover of the communication line of the Great Army. And of course, huge forests. But still, I think the main thing is the support of the population. Guerrilla actions were first used by the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Observation Army, General A.P. Tormasov, who in July sent a detachment of Colonel K.B. Knorring to Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. A little later M.B. Barclay de Tolly formed the “flying corps” of Adjutant General F.F. Wintzingerode. By order of Russian military leaders, raiding partisan detachments began to actively operate on the flanks of the Great Army in July-August 1812. Only on August 25 (September 6), on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, with the permission of Kutuzov, a party (50 Akhtyrka Hussars and 80 Cossacks) of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. was sent on a “search”. Davydov, that Davydov to whom Soviet historians attributed the role of the initiator and founder of this movement.

The main purpose of the partisans was considered to be actions against the enemy’s operational (communication) line. The party commander enjoyed great independence, receiving only the most general instructions from the command. The partisans' actions were almost exclusively offensive in nature. The key to their success was secrecy and speed of movement, surprise of attack and lightning withdrawal. This, in turn, determined the composition of the partisan parties: they included predominantly light regular (hussars, lancers) and irregular (Don, Bug and other Cossacks, Kalmyks, Bashkirs) cavalry, sometimes reinforced by several pieces of horse artillery. The party size did not exceed several hundred people, this ensured mobility. Infantry was rarely supplied: at the very beginning of the offensive, A.N.’s detachments received one Jaeger company each. Seslavin and A.S. Figner. D.V.’s party operated behind enemy lines for the longest time - 6 weeks. Davydova.

Even on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian command was thinking about how to attract the huge masses of peasants to resist the enemy, making the war truly popular. It was obvious that religious and patriotic propaganda was needed, an appeal to the peasant masses was needed, a call to them. Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich believed, for example, that the people “must be armed and adjusted, as in Spain, with the help of the clergy.” And Barclay de Tolly, as the commander at the theater of military operations, without waiting for anyone’s help, turned on August 1 (13) to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces with calls for “universal armament.”

First of all, armed detachments began to be created on the initiative of the nobility in the Smolensk province. But since the Smolensk region was very soon completely occupied, the resistance here was local and episodic, as in other places where landowners fought off looters with the support of army detachments. In other provinces bordering the theater of military operations, “cordons” were created, consisting of armed peasants, whose main task was to fight looters and small detachments of enemy foragers.

During the stay of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp, the people's war reached its greatest extent. At this time, enemy marauders and foragers are rampant, their outrages and robberies become widespread, and partisan parties, individual militia units and army detachments begin to support the cordon chain. The cordon system was created in Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir, Tula and part of Moscow provinces. It was at this time that the extermination of marauders by armed peasants acquired a massive scale, and among the leaders of peasant detachments G.M. became famous throughout Russia. Urin and E.S. Stulov, E.V. Chetvertakov and F. Potapov, elder Vasilisa Kozhin. According to D.V. Davydov, the extermination of marauders and foragers “was more the work of the villagers than of the parties rushed to inform the enemy for a much more important purpose, which was only to protect property.”

Contemporaries distinguished a people's war from a guerrilla war. Partisan parties, consisting of regular troops and Cossacks, acted offensively in the territory occupied by the enemy, attacking his convoys, transports, artillery parks, and small detachments. Cordons and people's squads, consisting of peasants and townspeople led by retired military and civil officials, were located in a zone not occupied by the enemy, defending their villages from plunder by marauders and foragers.

The partisans became especially active in the fall of 1812, during the stay of Napoleon's army in Moscow. Their constant raids caused irreparable harm to the enemy and kept him in constant tension. In addition, they delivered operational information to the command. Particularly valuable was the information promptly reported by Captain Seslavin about the French exit from Moscow and about the direction of movement of Napoleonic units to Kaluga. These data allowed Kutuzov to urgently transfer the Russian army to Maloyaroslavets and block the path of Napoleon’s army.

With the beginning of the retreat of the Great Army, the partisan parties were strengthened and on October 8 (20) they were given the task of preventing the enemy from retreating. During the pursuit, partisans often acted together with the vanguard of the Russian army - for example, in the battles of Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Krasny, Berezina, Vilna; and were active right up to the borders of the Russian Empire, where some of them were disbanded. Contemporaries appreciated the activities of the army partisans and gave them full credit. Following the results of the 1812 campaign, all detachment commanders were generously awarded ranks and orders, and the practice of guerrilla warfare continued in 1813-1814.

It is indisputable that the partisans became one of those important factors (hunger, cold, heroic actions of the Russian army and the Russian people) that ultimately led Napoleon's Grand Army to disaster in Russia. It is almost impossible to calculate the number of enemy soldiers killed and captured by the partisans. In 1812, there was an unspoken practice - not to take prisoners (with the exception of important persons and “tongues”), since the commanders were not interested in separating a convoy from their few parties. The peasants, who were under the influence of official propaganda (all the French are “unchrists”, and Napoleon is “a fiend of hell and the son of Satan”), destroyed all the prisoners, sometimes in savage ways (they buried them alive or burned them, drowned them, etc.). But, it must be said that among the commanders of army partisan detachments, only Figner, according to some contemporaries, used cruel methods towards prisoners.

In Soviet times, the concept of “partisan war” was reinterpreted in accordance with Marxist ideology, and under the influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, it began to be interpreted as “the armed struggle of the people, mainly peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of Napoleonic troops and on their communications." Soviet authors began to view partisan warfare “as a people’s struggle, generated by the creativity of the masses,” and saw in it “one of the manifestations of the decisive role of the people in the war.” The peasantry was declared to be the initiator of the “people's” guerrilla war, which supposedly began immediately after the invasion of the Great Army into the territory of the Russian Empire, and it was argued that it was under their influence that the Russian command later began to create army partisan detachments.

The statements of a number of Soviet historians that the “partisan” people’s war began in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, that the government banned the arming of the people, that peasant detachments attacked enemy reserves, garrisons and communications and partially joined the army partisan detachments do not correspond to the truth. . The significance and scale of the people's war were enormously exaggerated: it was argued that the partisans and peasants “kept the enemy army under siege” in Moscow, that “the club of the people’s war nailed the enemy” right up to the Russian border. At the same time, the activities of the army partisan detachments turned out to be obscured, and it was they who made a tangible contribution to the defeat of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812. Today, historians are re-opening archives and reading documents, now without the ideology and instructions of the leaders that dominate them. And reality reveals itself in an unvarnished and unclouded form.

The partisan movement is the “club of the people’s war”

“... the club of the people’s war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone’s tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but with expediency, without considering anything, it rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion was destroyed”
. L.N. Tolstoy, "War and Peace"

The Patriotic War of 1812 remained in the memory of all Russian people as a people's war.

Don't hesitate! Let me come! Hood. V.V.Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

It is no coincidence that this definition has firmly stuck to her. Not only the regular army took part in it - for the first time in history Russian state the entire Russian people stood up to defend their homeland. Various volunteer detachments were formed that took part in many major battles. Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov called on the Russian militias to provide assistance to the active army. The partisan movement developed greatly throughout Russia, where the French were located.

Passive resistance
The population of Russia began to resist the French invasion from the very first days of the war. The so-called passive resistance. The Russian people left their homes, villages, and entire cities. At the same time, people often emptied all warehouses, all food supplies, destroyed their farms - they were firmly convinced that nothing should fall into the hands of the enemy.

A.P. Butenev recalled how Russian peasants fought the French: “The further the army went into the interior of the country, the more deserted the villages encountered were, and especially after Smolensk. The peasants sent their women and children, belongings and livestock to the neighboring forests; they themselves, with the exception of only the decrepit old men, armed themselves with scythes and axes, and then began to burn their huts, set up ambushes and attacked lagging and wandering enemy soldiers. IN small towns, which we passed, we met almost no one on the streets: only the local authorities remained, who for the most part left with us, having previously set fire to supplies and shops, where this was possible and time allowed ... "

“They punish villains without any mercy”
Gradually, peasant resistance took on other forms. Some organized groups of several people, caught soldiers of the Grand Army and killed them. Naturally, they could not act against large quantity French at the same time. But this was quite enough to strike terror into the ranks of the enemy army. As a result, the soldiers tried not to walk alone, so as not to fall into the hands of “Russian partisans.”


With a weapon in your hands - shoot! Hood. V.V.Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

In some provinces abandoned by the Russian army, the first organized partisan detachments were formed. One of these detachments operated in the Sychevsk province. It was headed by Major Emelyanov, who was the first to excite the people to accept weapons: “Many began to pester him, from day to day the number of accomplices multiplied, and then, armed with whatever they could, they elected the brave Emelyanov over them, swearing an oath not to spare their lives for the faith, the Tsar and the Russian land and to obey him in everything... Then Emelyanov introduced There is amazing order and structure between the warrior-villagers. According to one sign, when the enemy was advancing in superior strength, the villages became empty; according to another, people gathered in their houses again. Sometimes an excellent beacon and the ringing of bells announced when to go on horseback or on foot to battle. He himself, as a leader, encouraging by example, was always with them in all dangers and pursued evil enemies everywhere, beat many, and took more prisoners, and finally, in one hot skirmish, in the very splendor of military actions of the peasants, he sealed his love with his life to the fatherland..."

There were many such examples, and they could not escape the attention of the leaders of the Russian army. M.B. In August 1812, Barclay de Tolly made an appeal to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces: “...but many of the inhabitants of the Smolensk province have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the Russian name, punish the villains without any mercy. Imitate them all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign. Your army will not leave your borders until it drives out or destroys the enemy forces. It has decided to fight them to the extreme, and you will only have to reinforce it by protecting your own homes from attacks more daring than terrible.”

The wide scope of the “small war”
Leaving Moscow, Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov intended to wage a “small war” in order to create a constant threat for the enemy to encircle him in Moscow. This task was to be solved by detachments of military partisans and people's militias.

While at the Tarutino position, Kutuzov took control of the partisans’ activities: “...I placed ten partisans on that leg in order to be able to take away all the ways from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of contentment in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, the partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food...”


Davydov Denis Vasilievich. Engraving by A. Afanasyev
from the original by V. Langer. 1820s.

Such actions required brave and decisive commanders and troops capable of operating in any conditions. The first detachment that was created by Kutuzov to wage a small war was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydova, formed at the end of August with 130 people. With this detachment, Davydov set out through Yegoryevskoye, Medyn to the village of Skugarevo, which was turned into one of the bases of partisan warfare. He acted together with various armed peasant detachments.

Denis Davydov did not just fulfill his military duty. He tried to understand the Russian peasant, because he represented his interests and acted on his behalf: “Then I learned from experience that in a people’s war one must not only speak the language of the mob, but adapt to it, to its customs and its clothing. I put on a man's caftan, began to let my beard down, and instead of the Order of St. Anna I hung an image of St. Nicholas and spoke in a completely folk language...”

Another partisan detachment was concentrated near the Mozhaisk road, led by Major General I.S. Dorokhov. Kutuzov wrote to Dorokhov about the methods of partisan warfare. And when information was received at army headquarters that Dorokhov’s detachment was surrounded, Kutuzov reported: “The partisan can never come to this situation, because his duty is to stay in one place for as long as he needs to feed the people and horses. The flying detachment of partisans must make marches secretly, along small roads... During the day, hide in forests and low-lying places. In a word, the partisan must be decisive, fast and tireless.”


Figner Alexander Samoilovich. Engraving by G.I. Grachev from a lithograph from the collection of P.A. Erofeeva, 1889.

At the end of August 1812, a detachment was also formed Winzengerode, consisting of 3200 people. Initially, his tasks included monitoring the corps of Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more partisan detachments: detachments of A.S. Fignera, I.M. Vadbolsky, N.D. Kudashev and A.N. Seslavina.

In total, in September, the flying detachments included 36 Cossack regiments and one team, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and one light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Kutuzov managed to give the partisan war a wide scope. He assigned them the task of observing the enemy and delivering continuous attacks on his troops.


Caricature from 1912.

It was thanks to the actions of the partisans that Kutuzov had complete information about the movements of French troops, on the basis of which it was possible to draw conclusions about Napoleon's intentions.

Due to the continuous attacks of flying partisan detachments, the French had to always keep some troops at the ready. According to the military operations log, from September 14 to October 13, 1812, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, about 6.5 thousand French were captured.

Peasant partisan units
The activities of military partisan detachments would not have been so successful without the participation of peasant partisan detachments, which had been operating everywhere since July 1812.

The names of their “leaders” will remain in the memory of the Russian people for a long time: G. Kurin, Samus, Chetvertakov and many others.


Kurin Gerasim Matveevich
Hood. A. Smirnov


Portrait of partisan Yegor Stulov. Hood. Terebenev I.I., 1813

Samusya's detachment operated near Moscow. He managed to exterminate more than three thousand French: “Samus introduced an amazing order in all the villages under his command. With him, everything was performed according to signs, which were given through the ringing of bells and other conventional signs.”

The exploits of Vasilisa Kozhina, who led a detachment in Sychevsky district and fought against French marauders, became very famous.


Vasilisa Kozhina. Hood. A. Smirnov, 1813

M.I. wrote about the patriotism of Russian peasants. Kutuzov’s report to Alexander I dated October 24, 1812 about the patriotism of Russian peasants: “With martyrdom they endured all the blows associated with the enemy’s invasion, hid their families and young children in the forests, and the armed themselves sought defeat in their peaceful homes against the emerging predators. Often the women themselves cunningly caught these villains and punished their attempts with death, and often armed villagers, joining our partisans, greatly assisted them in exterminating the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by peasants. These feats are so numerous and delightful to the spirit of a Russian...”