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Battle of Kursk forces of the sides. Battle of Kursk

Battle of Kursk


	Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine
	Victory of the Red Army


Commanders
Georgy Zhukov	Erich von Manstein
Nikolay Vatutin	Gunther Hans von Kluge
Ivan Konev	Walter Model
Konstantin Rokossovsky	Hermann Got
Strengths of the parties
By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve	According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, according to it. according to data - 780 thousand people. 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft

Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317,361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71,611 Hospital - 183,955 General in the battle for the Kursk ledge: Irrevocable - 189,652 Hospital - 406,743 In the Battle of Kursk as a whole ~ 254,470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153 thousand small arms 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5245 guns and mortars 1626 combat aircraft	According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data, less than 1696 aircraft

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 – August 23, 1943, also known as Battle on Kursk Bulge ) in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion with a depth of up to 150 and a width of up to 200 km, facing the west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”) was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. According to the information of the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people. The leadership of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal General Günter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Tank, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Tank Army, 24th Tank Corps and operational group "Kempf" (commander - General Hermann Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets.

To carry out the operation, several elite personnel were sent to the Kursk area. tank divisions SS:

1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Totenkopf)

The troops received a certain amount of new equipment:

134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
190 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 “Ferdinand” (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
a total of 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns (the Tiger was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also, during the Battle of Kursk, German Sd.Kfz.302 teletankettes were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources
Source	Personnel (thousands)	Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft

					about 10000	2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and long-range)
Krivosheev 2001
Glanz, House			2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill.			2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson		5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Nazi Army and secret directives from Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, back on March 27, Stalin informed him in general detail about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel,” of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later, was placed on Stalin’s desk. This data was obtained by a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this man still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luzi agent Rudolf Rössler operating in Switzerland. There is an alternative assumption that Werther is Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

Although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan had already become obvious to the highest Soviet military command four days earlier, and the general details of the existence of such a plan had been known to them for at least another year. eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. ( german army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-artillery preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammunition. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

Operation Citadel - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N.F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of the city of Kursk through counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient, as well as the destruction of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of Prokhorovka station). Main blow with southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Hoth, 48 Tank Tank and 2 Tank SS Tank) with the support of the Army Group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (com: O. von Knobelsdorff, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the most powerful formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 tank divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Greater Germany", 10th tank brigade and 911th division. assault gun division, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassk - Yakovlevo - Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area the 48th Tank Tank would link up with units of the 2nd SS Division (thus encircling the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Infantry Division), change units of the 2nd SS Division Tank Division, after which the SS division units were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army Armies in the area of the station. Prokhorovka, and 48 Tank Corps was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5th. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering obstacles for enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196 Guards battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 grapnel) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 optabr colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 SUP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack Soviet aviation(2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33rd detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the Korovino-Cherkasskoye line for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff’s lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active duty for a long time. fighting.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45 mm guns, the power of 76 mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times shorter than the effective fire range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6 Guards. And, but also in M.E. Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th Tank Brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (they had at their disposal only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 saps) were held in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye for about a day five enemy divisions (three of them tank). In the battle of July 5, 1943 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, 1943 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank (334 tanks) were determined: for the Death's Head TD (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th Infantry Division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for the Leibstandarte TD (brigadeführer T. Wisch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and “Das Reich” (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and access to the line of the bend of the Psel river - the village. Grouse.

At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiment. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify control and communications points of the 51st Guards SD regiments and carry out a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards SD repelled enemy attacks without communication with higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which were the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end several hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiments were driven from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158th Guards Regiment, having folded its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in the 156th Guards Regiment, out of 1,685 people, about 200 people remained in service on July 7, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . There was practically no general leadership of the withdrawing battalions; the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiments reached the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division from the reserve. Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M. N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. M. Shchekal) fought heavy battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the combat groups TD "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. A short but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Division managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6th Guards MSBR 5th Guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After this, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the battle group of the TD "Das Reich" there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards. army capable of holding back its advance: the main forces of the army's anti-tank artillery (namely the 14th, 27th and 28th brigade brigades) were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of the 48th Tank Corps, which, based on the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main strike by the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the strikes of both German tank corps of the 4th TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the attack of the Das Reich TD artillery of the 6th Guards. And by this point there was simply nothing left.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of its offensive sector with Soviet artillery (the regiments of Major Kosachev’s 28th regiments were active), timely attacks by the 1st Guards. Tank Brigade (Colonel V.M. Gorelov) and 49th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 1st TA M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got bogged down for some time.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Tank Tank had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of the 48th Tank Tank. The advanced units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of the station. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Hoth (commander of the 4th TA) was unable to fully implement the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th Tank Corps (O. von Knobelsdorff), which encountered the skillful defense of Katukov’s army, which entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to encircle some regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards SD of the 6th Guards in the afternoon. And in the area between the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having encountered the tough defense of the 3 Mk brigades (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of units of 2nd SS Tank. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 TD (F. Westhoven), which had gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tank crews and artillerymen of the 22 Tank Brigade (Colonel N. G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6 Tank Tank Brigade (Major General A D. Getman) 1 TA.

However, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and especially Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD, between 17 and 19 hours, managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich TD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment TD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

The offensive of the "Dead Head" TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th Infantry Division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd Guards in its sector in the afternoon. Tatsin tank corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some units of the Das Reich TD. However, inflict losses on the Tatsin Corps even approximately comparable to the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the counterattack, even though during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. The total number of tanks for July 6 was: 17 tanks burned out and 11 damaged, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th TA were able to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank and inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions, by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, and of the two tank corps transferred to it, one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards SD and 5th Guards. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed an area not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug with brigades of the 1st TA, using his experience of defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of AG Kempf, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG Kempf was still unable to secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Ttk supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. German losses in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the Greater Germany 48th Tank Division, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered uncombatable ( Soviet troops 59 out of 112 vehicles were disabled, including 12 Tigers out of 14 available), and in the 10th Tank Brigade, by the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4th TA corps was given less ambitious tasks than on July 6—expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army’s flanks.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorff, summed up the results of the day's battle on the evening of July 6:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. Due to the loss of combat effectiveness and failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, general operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of Soviet defense in the area of the breakthrough of the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. A I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st TA M. E. Katukov. The main framework of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Tank Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest (or one of the largest) counter-measures in history took place. tank battle.

According to data from Soviet sources, on the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 Tigers) and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive airstrike, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the heights. 252.2 resembled the sea surf - four Red Army tank brigades, three SAP batteries, two rifle regiment and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves onto the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.

From the memoirs of a battle participant, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:

During the battle, many tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level losses of command personnel in the 32nd Tank Brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of total number), commander of a tank platoon (61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). The command level and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st Tank Brigade, and later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the human condition in those terrible conditions:

... Heavy images remained in my memory... There was such a roar that the eardrums were pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded.

Shots into the gas tanks instantly set the tanks on fire. The hatches opened and tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burned, hanging from his armor. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire - while you’re alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a knocked out German “tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the tank company commander Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out an enemy Tiger, but was also hit. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And we went into battle again

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Wehrmacht Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - in total up to 240 vehicles, including including four "tigers". It was not expected to meet a serious enemy; according to the German command, Rotmistrov’s TA was drawn into battle against the “Death’s Head” division (in reality, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks came as a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but was intended to go behind the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Totenkopf” division was mistaken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to change formation for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy, Model’s 9th Army, lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrecoverable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, we consider the official numbers of the German command to be correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

According to Soviet data, in the Kursk defensive operation alone from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not in any way affect the Battle of Kursk, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, therefore “the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy.”

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of the Germans in the area of the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were killed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at approximately 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut off the railway Kharkov-Poltava, on August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

According to Guderian,

Discrepancies in loss estimates

The casualties of both sides in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops taking part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130 thousand 429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to lower headquarters:

In works of art

Liberation (film epic)

"Battle for Kursk" (eng. BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
“Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) — documentary, produced by Cromwell Productions, 1999
"War of the Generals. Kursk" (English) GeneralsatWar) - documentary film by Keith Barker, 2009
“Kursk Bulge” is a documentary film directed by V. Artemenko.
Composition Panzerkampf by Sabaton

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. Throughout April - June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted according to Gott’s proposal: the 2nd SS Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops. And, based on losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (from the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th Tank Army, General Fangor)

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, took part in it, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle on the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

- During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the enemy’s 2nd Tank and 9th armies in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

- On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory at Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

- It was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - P. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Discrepancies in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500,000 killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even despite the fact that the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to lower headquarters: “Looking at the daily results of the day about the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly inflated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”

Date of battle July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943 This battle was included in modern history as one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. It is also known as the largest tank battle in the history of mankind.
Conditionally the Battle of Kursk can be divided into two stages:

Kursk defensive (July 5 – 23)
Oryol and Kharkov-Belgorod (July 12 – August 23) offensive operations.

The battle lasted 50 days and nights and influenced the entire subsequent course of hostilities.

Forces and means of the warring parties

Before the start of the battle, the Red Army concentrated an army of unprecedented numbers: the Central and Voronezh Front numbered more than 1.2 million soldiers and officers, over 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2800 aircraft different types. In reserve was the Steppe Front with a strength of 580 thousand soldiers, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. Its air cover was provided by over 700 aircraft.
The German command managed to raise reserves and by the beginning of the battle it had fifty divisions with a total number of over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 thousand guns and mortars, as well as approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft. For the first time in the history of World War II, the German command used a large number of its latest equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as heavy self-propelled units- "Ferdinand."
As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army had an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht, being on the defensive it could quickly respond to all offensive actions of the enemy.

Defensive operation

This phase of the battle began with a preemptive massive artillery preparation by the Red Army at 2.30 a.m., which was repeated at 4.30 a.m. German artillery preparation began at 5 am and the first divisions went on the offensive after it...
During bloody battles, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers along the entire front line. The main attack took place at Ponyri station, a key railway junction on the Orel-Kursk line, and the village of Cherkasskoye, on the Belgorod-Oboyan highway section. In these directions, German troops managed to advance to Prokhorovka station. It was here that the largest tank battle of this war took place. On the Soviet side, 800 tanks under the command of General Zhadov took part in the battle, against 450 German tanks under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser. In the battle at Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost about 270 tanks - German losses amounted to over 80 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Offensive

On July 12, 1943, the Soviet command launched Operation Kutuzov. During which, after bloody local battles, Red Army troops on July 17-18 pushed the Germans to the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Fierce resistance by German troops continued until August 4, when the Belgorod group of fascists was liquidated and Belgorod was liberated.
On August 10, the Red Army launched an offensive in the Kharkov direction, and on August 23, the city was stormed. Urban fighting continued until August 30, but the day of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be August 23, 1943.

In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis’ dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, airplanes - this was Adolf Hitler's order - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, demonstrably, taking revenge for all previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was no match for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: “We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks.”

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5 and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the “Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of Victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.”

Moiarussia has collected the most Interesting Facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved military operation codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"). To carry it out, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk ledge.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk salient seemed a particularly suitable place for such a strike. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful group of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to destroy those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge will significantly shorten the front line... True, some even then argued that the enemy was expecting a German offensive in this area and... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that Operation Citadel would be a success if undertaken soon."

The Germans prepared for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. Its start was postponed twice: the guns were not ready, the new tanks were not delivered, and the new aircraft did not have time to pass tests. On top of that, Hitler feared that Italy was about to leave the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. The fanatical Hitler believed that if you strike in the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this battle, then

“The victory at Kursk,” he said, “will capture the imagination of the whole world.”

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk salient, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that in terms of the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to an ambitious, strategically correct plan and the latest weapons, which, according to military experts of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time. The Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin’s initial support for Vatutin’s plan, they approved Rokossovsky’s safer plan - “to wait, wear down and go on a counteroffensive.” Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and primarily by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Having waited for the latest equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, the Germans began their offensive on the night of July 5, 1943.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent "Werther"

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was Hitler’s own visa. He installed it three days after he got acquainted with it Soviet leader. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of an alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even as part of the top of the Third Reich during World War II, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. During the entire time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not make a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler’s personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The leaders of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss station as if they were requesting information from some information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that during all phases of the war in Russia, agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Some of the information transmitted could only have been obtained from the highest German military circles

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”

The largest tank battle

"Kursk Bulge": T-34 tank against "Tigers" and "Panthers"

The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.

Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number Soviet tanks and reduce the number of Germans.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company and a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on an armistice.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.

Unexpected attack on a deep-seated point German offensive- units of the 5th Guards Tank Army deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed."

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.”

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded - as he had not lived up to the high hopes placed on him by Headquarters.

One way or another, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself gave the order to end the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and the need to send German reinforcements to Italy loomed.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95

When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.

On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing Nazi forces and reached Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. Painting “The Tale of a Real Man.” Photo: Kommersant

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the fame of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him as his partner. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of both sides

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops exceeded the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irrevocable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of those who died, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge"

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 - is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the most extensive and long routes of retreat on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and steadfastness of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts or hesitations about the correct choice of side in this war. And the thoughts that let the Russians and Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the outside, faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which will receive vast territories at the end of the war. However, that's another story...

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August 23 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The Red Army was led to this important victory by almost two months of intense and bloody battles, the outcome of which was by no means a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it in a little more detail.

Fact 1

The salient in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February–March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of the Second World War, not only because of the scale of the fighting that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. This means that from now on we are advancing. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November–December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if we attack, how large-scale tasks should we set ourselves? Both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military actions in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defense, destroying as many as possible more tanks, and then bring in reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after it was discovered that Hitler's army was preparing for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense on the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge.

In a situation with a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to maintain the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops intended to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger group would attack in the Orel area against the Central Front. In reality, the southern group operating against the Voronezh Front turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was not accurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the German command’s plan to encircle and destroy Soviet armies on the Kursk ledge. It was planned to deliver converging attacks from the north from the Orel area and from the south from the Belgorod area. The impact wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Hoth's tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspect a damaged Tiger

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23–30) 1941 was larger in terms of the number of tanks participating. It occurred in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides fought at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual new product was the “Goliath” wedges. This tracked self-propelled mine without a crew was controlled remotely via wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these wedges were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

Battle of Kursk forces of the sides. Battle of Kursk

Preparing for battle

Plans and strengths of the parties

The role of intelligence

Kursk defensive operation

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Losses

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

Results of the Battle of Kursk

Discrepancies in loss estimates

In works of art

Plans and strengths of the parties

Kursk defensive operation

Battle of Prokhorovka

Losses

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

- During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

- On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory at Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

- It was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - P. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Discrepancies in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500,000 killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

Forces and means of the warring parties

Defensive operation

Offensive

Operation Citadel

“The victory at Kursk,” he said, “will capture the imagination of the whole world.”

Agent "Werther"

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”

The largest tank battle

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of both sides