Formation of a new system of interstate relations in Europe

End of the Cold War in Europe

The turning point in Europe in the second half of the 80s began with changes in the policy of the USSR, whose leadership gradually abandoned the stereotypes of “class struggle” in the international arena, showed readiness to reduce military potential on the principles of reasonable sufficiency, took the first steps towards democratization of the political system, went to participate in international human rights mechanisms. Of fundamental importance was the USSR’s rejection of the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” which justified direct, including military, intervention in the affairs of countries within the Soviet sphere of influence. Following Poland's partial elections in June 1989, which resulted in the ruling Workers' Party losing its monopoly on power, leaders of a number of orthodox communist regimes called for the PZPR to be forcefully returned to its leadership role in Poland. M. S. Gorbachev’s speech at the Council of Europe on July 6, 1989 finally drew a line under these disputes: “Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states - both friends and allies, and anyone else - are unacceptable.”

The USSR’s rejection of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” opened the way for the democratic revolutions of the second half of 1989, during which, in most cases, the communist regimes in the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Albania fell practically without resistance. These states, like Hungary and Poland before them, embarked on the path of reforms based on the values ​​of democracy, political pluralism, and a market economy. The first free multi-party elections in the post-war period, held in most countries of Eastern Europe in 1990, led to the final collapse of communism in Europe, and with it the post-war Yalta-Potsdam system. One of the most important symbols of the end of the Cold War and the division of Europe was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany, which ended on October 3, 1990.

The rapid changes in Eastern Europe have not gone unnoticed in the West. In May 1989, President George W. Bush told Brussels that the United States was ready to abandon the doctrine of “deterrence,” which formed the basis of its policy in the post-war period. The declaration adopted by the heads of state and government of NATO countries in July 1990 in London outlined significant changes in the bloc's policy. It stated, in particular, the alliance’s lack of aggressive intentions, its commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes and the refusal to be the first to use military force; the need for NATO to abandon its forward defense and flexible response doctrine; readiness to reduce armed forces, to change tasks and numbers nuclear weapons in Europe; agreement to the institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

On November 19–21, 1990, a meeting of the heads of state and government of 34 CSCE participating states was held in Paris, and on the eve of its opening, a meeting of the heads of 22 Warsaw Pact (WTS) and NATO states took place. Paris Charter of the CSCE for new Europe stated the end of the era of confrontation and division in Europe, and the Warsaw and NATO states stated in a joint declaration that “in the new era that is opening in European relations, they are no longer adversaries, they will build new partnerships and extend the hand of friendship to each other.”

Search for mechanisms to manage the situation

Based on those adopted in 1990–1991. decisions were based on the idea that with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the continuation of reforms in the USSR, there was no need to main reason split of Europe. Understanding that reforms in the east of the continent would take time, the CSCE participants assumed that the path to a united democratic Europe could be paved through a gradual rapprochement between East and West based on the values ​​enshrined in the Paris Charter. This was intended to be facilitated by new mechanisms of interaction between European states, the formation of which began at the turn of the 80s and 90s. The following processes are meant:

Institutionalization of political dialogue and interaction within the framework of the CSCE, which was assigned an important role in consolidating common values, norms and standards of behavior of states in relations with each other and in domestic politics; in continuing negotiations on arms control and disarmament; developing mechanisms for emergency response, conflict prevention and crisis management; organizing cooperation in the field of economic and human dimensions of the CSCE;

Reform of multilateral organizations of the countries of the East (CMEA, Warsaw Warsaw) and the West (NATO, EU, WEU);

Establishing cooperation between NATO, the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and the states of Eastern Europe, on the other;

Formation of subregional organizations, which include, in particular, the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative.

The combination of various forms of pan-European, regional and subregional cooperation was supposed to ensure management of the processes of formation of a new system of interstate relations in Europe. However, events in the early 90s cast doubt on the realism of many of the initial calculations.

1. Within a short time, the organizations that ensured the dominance of the USSR in Eastern Europe during the Cold War ceased to exist. These organizations have never been effective instruments for equal cooperation among their participants. In view of the growing fears in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since the end of 1990 about the possible return of the Soviet leadership to one or another form of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, the fate of the CMEA and the Warsaw Warsaw in 1991 was a foregone conclusion. On June 27, 1991, a protocol on the dissolution of the CMEA was signed, and on July 1 of the same year, a protocol on the termination of the Warsaw Pact, which had already existed only on paper since 1990, was signed. In 1991, the CEE countries accelerated the process of revising bilateral political agreements with the USSR. Soviet troops were withdrawn from Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. A new system of foreign policy priorities of the CEE countries was formed, which saw their main task in integration into the Council of Europe, the EU, and NATO.

2. The emergence of the Yugoslav crisis, the beginning in 1991 of a military confrontation between Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia, which declared secession from the federation, and since 1992 - the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991 - all this led to profound changes in the situation in Europe, which the authors of the Paris Charter did not even think about. The main thing among them is the disappearance of the “East”, which was thought of as the counterparty of the “West” in the process of their gradual rapprochement. This led to a decrease in the controllability of domestic and international processes in the post-communist space in the absence of effective regional and subregional mechanisms.

3. In the new conditions, the institutions of Western European (EU, WEU, Council of Europe) and Euro-Atlantic cooperation (NATO) retained their role. However, these organizations also faced the need to define their new role in solving the problems of European development, and also to form new relations with post-communist states.

The main dilemmas of the formation of a new Europe

With the end of the Cold War, previous problems of national and European security and, above all, the danger of a large-scale armed conflict between the two military blocs receded into the background. New problems and challenges that the countries of the continent face individually and collectively have come to the fore. The main dilemmas of European politics, on the resolution of which the future system of interstate relations in Europe largely depends, include the following:

1. The unification of Germany and the removal of the last formal restrictions on its sovereignty contributed to the revival in a number of countries of fears about Germany’s possible claims to a dominant role in Europe. Activation of political and economic ties of Germany with CEE countries and Russia; Its leading role in supporting the reforms carried out here and in ensuring the influx of foreign investment only strengthens the suspicion that at some stage Germany may succumb to the temptation to pursue a policy that is not coordinated with its EU and NATO partners. “Renationalization” of the policy of Germany, and as a result of other states, would lead to a revival of rivalry between European powers, fraught with new conflicts.

During the process of German unification Western countries assumed that the main guarantee of the predictability of its policy was Germany's integration into the EU and NATO. This point of view was eventually accepted by the Soviet leadership, which agreed to the participation of a united Germany in NATO and stipulated a number of restrictions on NATO military activities in the territory of the former GDR. The desire to ensure the deepest possible integration of Germany into multilateral structures has become one of the motivations for accelerating the process of transforming the European Communities into the European Union, the gradual expansion of the supranational powers of the union, within the framework of which it is intended to “dissolve” the increased influence of Germany.

Although in Germany itself the debate about its role in Europe and the world is just beginning, the country's post-unification policy is aimed at allaying the concerns of neighboring states. Since the beginning of the 90s, in the political class of Germany, a consensus has developed regarding the priorities of European policy, which include:

Maintaining commitment to integration into the EU and NATO, Germany's refusal to take unilateral actions; Germany not only agreed with the expansion of EU powers, but is also a supporter of this process;

Promoting the entry of CEE countries into Western structures; Thus, Bonn sought to overcome the contradiction between integration into the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and an active policy in CEE, on the other;

Germany strives to maintain partnership relations with Russia, while avoiding the establishment of “special” ones that could revive concerns about the “revisionist” nature of German policy in Europe; the balance of its own interests, the interests of European states and Russia is seen in determining the optimal ways to integrate Russia into the new system of relations in Europe.

2. For centuries, Russia’s relations with Europe, conceptually and practically, have been characterized by both mutual attraction and mutual repulsion. Democratization first in the USSR and then in Russia, the policy of market reforms and adaptation to world economic processes create the preconditions for the gradual integration of Russia into a new system of European and global relations based on partnership. Nevertheless, the fate and final result of Russian reforms, Russia’s self-identification, and the definition of its place and role in the new Europe are still highly uncertain. Will they end? Russian reforms the creation of a truly democratic society with an effective market economy or, as has happened more than once in history, will the national-patriotic reaction prevail again? Russia itself must answer this question.

3. Overcoming the political and ideological split in Europe at the end of the 80s did not and could not automatically resolve the problem of the gap in the levels of social economic development between the states of Western and Eastern Europe. Decades of communist domination and a planned economy slowed down the development of CEE and threw it to the margins of the world and European economy. The most developed CEE countries in terms of GDP per capita are comparable to the poorest EU countries. The problems and duration of the transition period in CEE were significantly underestimated in the early 90s, so socio-economic dividing lines will remain in Europe for the foreseeable future. The difficulties of the transition period give rise to the danger of internal destabilization in individual countries, which can have transborder consequences. The most alarming example of internal destabilization was the chaos in Albania in 1996–1997.

4. After the end of the Cold War, Europe did not avoid the emergence of local and regional conflicts, including armed ones. The massive use of force in the former Yugoslavia was the most severe shock for Europe, which had not experienced such large-scale upheavals throughout the entire post-war period. Due to the emergence of open conflicts in countries former USSR, the implementation of ethnocratic policies by a number of newly independent states, sometimes taking on the character of “ethnic cleansing”, the latent danger of separatism and irredentism in Central and Eastern Europe, the problem of internal conflicts and “aggressive nationalism” is today considered one of the main challenges to European security.

Most modern conflicts in Europe have taken the form of military confrontation in those countries that, for various reasons, have not gone through the stage of formation of national states (or nation-states), which most European peoples went through in the 19th century. In many countries of South-Eastern Europe and the former USSR, there are other complex factors at work that suggest that conflict and instability are likely to be constant companions to the processes of formation of new nation states and modernization. All this in the early 90s confronted the community of European states with the need to identify effective tools for managing crisis situations, as well as developing a long-term strategy and policy for the prevention of internal conflicts.

5. NATO's military intervention in the conflict in Kosovo (FRY) in March - June 1999 presented Europe with a number of new problems. The first of these is NATO's demonstrated claim to the right of military intervention without the sanction of the UN Security Council or the OSCE outside its area of ​​responsibility in the event (as happened in the FRY) of gross violations of human rights and national minorities.

At the same time, the Kosovo crisis of 1998–1999 exposed another, more serious and long-term problem. It is associated with the lack of tools for the international, in particular the European community of states, to intervene peacefully, without military escalation, in the internal processes in a particular state when they put that state on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe or massive violation of human rights and national minorities. The need to develop appropriate international instruments became obvious precisely and primarily against the backdrop of the Kosovo crisis.

6. New security challenges made it possible in the 90s to talk about non-traditional dimensions of security policy, which can no longer be reduced to the policy of defense, arms limitation and arms control. Among the new security challenges, mass migration of the population, including increased flows of refugees, has recently attracted the most attention; drug trafficking and arms trafficking; terrorism and organized crime becoming international in nature.

If in 1989–1992 Most European states showed caution in assessing possible options for the formation of a new European system, then from 1993–1994. under the influence of a number of objective processes, the set of options under discussion gradually narrowed. By 1997, the discussion phase was over. The contours of the emerging image of Europe have become more obvious, although its details are still the subject of debate. Essentially, in 1993–1997. There has been a “paradigm change” in the formation of a united Europe, which is being born today not on the basis of the “rapprochement” of East and West, but as a result of the gradual expansion of Western organizations. The most significant in this regard is the expansion of the EU and NATO to the East. At the same time, the diversity of European processes does not boil down to the expansion of these organizations, but leads to the formation of a “concert” of European institutions, each of which is unique in its own way and irreplaceable from the point of view of managing European processes.

Institutionalization and transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE

Until 1990, the CSCE was a series of intergovernmental forums. The meeting provided the solution to three main tasks: maintaining an intensive and regular dialogue between East and West; harmonization of norms and standards of behavior of states in mutual relations and in relation to citizens; consideration of issues related to the implementation by states of their obligations. By the early 1990s, the CSCE had become a dynamically developing effective tool regulating relations between East and West. With the fall of communist regimes, the CSCE documents expressed the commitment of all its participants to pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, private property, market economies and social justice. These values ​​were enshrined and concretized in the documents of the Copenhagen (June-July 1990) and Moscow (September-October 1991) meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe (March-April 1990) and in the Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed on November 21, 1990. After 1990, the development of the CSCE, renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on January 1, 1995, was characterized by a number of features.

1. In 1992–1993 The composition of the OSCE participants significantly expanded as a result of the admission of the countries of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania and Andorra. The OSCE is the most universal, pan-European organization, which determines both a number of its advantages and difficulties in its work. Among the problems of the organization, in addition to the difficulty of achieving consensus, there is the cultural and political diversity of the participating states.

2. The Charter of Paris marked the beginning of the institutionalization of the CSCE, leading to its transformation into the OSCE. Since 1990, permanent and regularly meeting structures and institutions of the organization have been created. Meetings are held every two years to review the implementation of commitments, culminating in summit meetings (Helsinki, 1992; Budapest, 1994; Lisbon 1996). At first once a year, and now every two years, meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council are held (Berlin, 1991; Prague and Stockholm, 1992; Rome, 1993; Budapest, 1995; Copenhagen, 1997; Oslo, 1998). The body authorized to make independent decisions is the Permanent Council, which meets weekly in Vienna. The institutions of the Chairman-in-Office and the Troika have been created in the OSCE, Secretary General, High Commissioner for National Minorities, and a number of others. The secretariat is located in Vienna, with an office in Prague; in Warsaw - the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in Geneva - the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE. The OSCE Economic Forum is held annually in Prague. The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation operates in Vienna, within the framework of which arms control issues are discussed.

3. Along with maintaining normative functions and shifting the emphasis to monitoring compliance with accepted commitments, the operational activities of the OSCE are expanding in such areas as conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction; the formation of institutions of the rule of law (in particular, the OSCE plays an active role in monitoring elections, and in some cases in their organization) and ensuring human rights.

Since 1992, the OSCE has been sending missions to conflict zones, including long-term ones, whose mandate varies depending on the situation and includes tasks for the prevention and political settlement of conflicts. Long-term missions operate in BiH, Georgia, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo. Since 1995, the OSCE Assistance Group has been working in Chechnya. Since 1998 - in Belarus. The Minsk Group has been mediating in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1992. The OSCE is constantly represented in Albania. Special OSCE missions were sent in 1997 to the FRY to resolve the political conflict over the falsification of municipal election results, as well as to Albania to find a political solution to the Albanian crisis.

Since 1992, by decision of the Helsinki Summit, the OSCE has been a regional agreement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the right to conduct peacekeeping operations has been reserved, excluding the possibility of using coercive measures. However, to date the OSCE has never used this right. In accordance with the decision of the Budapest summit in 1994, an OSCE operation is planned in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, the implementation of which is being delayed due to the lack of agreement between the parties on the principles of a political settlement.

Since 1996, the OSCE has carried out a number of post-conflict reconstruction tasks in accordance with the 1995 Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH. The agreement entrusted the OSCE with such tasks as promoting the development of subregional arms control measures, conducting negotiations on regional arms control measures and confidence-building measures in South-Eastern Europe; determining the availability of necessary conditions, organizing and holding general Bosnian and municipal elections in BiH under international supervision; promoting the formation of democratic institutions and ensuring human rights.

Operational activities to provide early warning of impending conflict are carried out by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in cooperation with the ODIHR. The role of the Chairman-in-Office, the troika, personal representatives and special representatives of the Chairman, acting on behalf of the OSCE in agreement with Permanent Council. Since the 90s, the OSCE has been interacting with other international organizations.

4. Despite the contradictory attitude towards the organization of various participating states, some of which either do not believe in the capabilities of the OSCE, or give priority to other European structures and for this reason are wary of strengthening the operational capabilities of the OSCE, the latter is gradually turning into one of the main instruments for ensuring security based on cooperation. The functions of the OSCE, which determine its unique character and are not characteristic of any other European organization, include the following:

As the only pan-European organization, the OSCE carries out norm-setting activities and is also able to ensure the legitimacy of measures taken by other regional organizations outside the territory of their member states;

Within the framework of the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation or in close coordination with the OSCE, arms control issues are considered and resolved: confidence- and security-building measures; the Open Skies Treaty (formally concluded outside the OSCE), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and OBCE-IA (the composition of the parties to the treaty concluded in November 1990 is already the same as the OSCE participants);

The OSCE's operational activities in the field of early warning, conflict prevention and resolution remain unique;

Despite a certain parallelism in the activities of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the latter remains the only organization designed to ensure respect for human rights and promote the formation of institutions of the rule of law throughout the OSCE region, including in countries that are not members or candidate members of the Council of Europe.

Transformation processes in CEE

The dynamics of internal development and foreign policy of the CEE countries in the 90s were determined by a number of factors. The artificiality of the communist regimes imposed on them predetermined not only the rapid collapse of the latter in the context of weakening bloc confrontation and the USSR’s abandonment of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, but also a relatively painless separation from communist ideology, the transition of former communist workers’ parties to the position of social democracy. By the early 1990s, after a short period of discussion, a more or less broad consensus had emerged in these countries regarding the main domestic and foreign policy goals. Its essence boils down to identifying ways for the reintegration of CEE countries into Europe, which means joining the Council of Europe, the EU and WEU, as well as NATO. The differences between the conservative and left parties that succeed each other in power concern mainly the means and methods of achieving this goal.

A number of factors are increasingly affecting the situation of CEE countries and their internal development. Firstly, the reform process here turned out to be much more complex and lengthy than initially predicted. Secondly, over time, the differentiation of CEE countries in terms of progress in the implementation of political and economic reforms became more and more pronounced. Both of these circumstances determine the emerging differences in both the pace and prospects of reintegration into Europe of individual CEE countries.

The legacy of the planned economy, the complexities of the reforms, and the relatively low level of economic development are among the main problems in implementing reforms in CEE countries. The ongoing transformations are negatively affected by the legacy of communism: the lack of power, the underdevelopment of civil society, the lack of stable value guidelines. Carrying out systemic and structural reforms of the economy is complicated by the strength of the positions of the bureaucracy and interest groups. Stereotypes of behavior generated by the previous system - paternalism, egalitarianism, etc. - interfere with the establishment of a new model of economic behavior. The need for structural reform of the economy predetermined the inevitability of a social shock in any version of the reforms. Many difficulties arise from the simultaneous transition to a market economy and the transformation of the political system.

One of ten CEE countries - Albania, according to the UN classification, belongs to low-income countries (GDP per capita less than 750 US dollars in 1994). Most countries belong to the group with low average incomes (up to 3 thousand US dollars). Only three countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) fall into the group with high average incomes. None of the CEE countries fall into the high-income group. The underdevelopment was aggravated by the decline in production that began after 1989 and was associated with transformation processes, although in the CEE countries this decline was significantly less than in the former USSR, which predetermined a relatively rapid resumption of economic growth. The low level of economic development, the rapid collapse of the communist system, the burden of old problems and the decline in production were, in turn, the cause of many negative socio-economic processes.

During the transformations in CEE countries, depending on the combination of the initial preconditions for reforms, the consistency and focus of the policies implemented, as well as external conditions differentiation of the states of the region has emerged in all areas of transformation. Depending on the progress achieved in the implementation of political and economic transformations, as well as economic recovery in CEE, two groups of states are distinguished, although the boundaries between these groups are sometimes unclear, and within each of them there is its own differentiation. Five CEE countries - the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia - are considered leaders in implementing reforms. The rest of the CEE countries (some of them are making efforts to catch up with the leading group) are in a state of delicate equilibrium, in which positive and negative factors balance each other.

The top five CEE countries have made significant progress in implementing reforms, and their economic situation improved in the second half of the 1990s. Due to more favorable starting conditions, systemic transformations in these countries began faster and turned out to be more successful. From 1993–1994 All five countries are experiencing economic growth. The decline in production here was less significant - the fall in GDP since 1990 was only 15%. Favorable factors for these countries are the growth of investment and moderate inflation rates, which in 1997 ranged from 6.4% (Slovakia) to 10% (Hungary). It is believed that in the future, these five countries, in terms of their economic indicators, can reach the level of the least developed EU countries. Negative factors here include a relatively high unemployment rate (the only exception is the Czech Republic); reduction in the level of real average wages; increasing social differentiation; lack of an effective social security system; impoverishment of part of the population.

The Baltic countries - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are among the countries that can closely join the leading five of CEE. However, they still face serious economic and social challenges, including because the recession has been more profound. Despite numerous short-term problems, the Baltic countries have significantly expanded their freedom of maneuver as a result of a quick, albeit painful exit from the economic space of the former USSR. The transformation processes in the countries of South-Eastern Europe - Albania, Bulgaria and Romania are characterized by instability and fragility of the results achieved, which was most acutely manifested in the conditions of the Albanian crisis of 1996–1997. The overall low level of economic development exacerbates the existing problems in these countries.

In foreign policy terms, the situation in CEE is characterized by the lack of effective mechanisms for regional political and economic cooperation. Almost all CEE countries that are already members of the Council of Europe give priority to unilateral efforts to integrate into the EU and NATO, sometimes entering into competition with each other. After the end of the Cold War, various subregional organizations emerged here, and bilateral interaction between individual states became more intense. CEE countries are members of the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group, CBSS, BSEC, and cooperation of the Carpathian regions (including Ukraine). Bulgaria is taking the initiative to establish regular dialogue between the states of South-Eastern Europe. Romania is pursuing its own policy of subregional cooperation, which in the 90s built a complex system of “triangles” - complementary trilateral cooperation pacts (with Poland and Ukraine, Bulgaria and Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine, Hungary and Austria, Bulgaria and Greece).

Nevertheless, participation in various forms of subregional cooperation was most often considered by CEE countries either as a temporary option for regulating relations with neighboring states for the period before joining the EU, or - in the event of a less favorable scenario - as a backup, although not optimal, option for a foreign policy strategy. An example of intensive, but ultimately ineffective subregional interaction, which, in accordance with the original plans, covered the spheres of economics, foreign policy and security policy, is the interaction of the countries of the Visegrad group, on the basis of which the Central European Free Trade Area was created in 1993 (in 1995 in Slovenia entered it). However, it did not contribute to a significant revival of regional trade.

European Union: deepening and expanding integration

The end of the Cold War, the disappearance of bloc confrontation in Europe, the unification of Germany, and the beginning of systemic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe have confronted EU countries with new challenges. The desire to “dissolve” Germany’s growing influence on European politics pushed Bonn’s partners to deepen integration within the EU. Supporters of this line, although with certain reservations, were, in particular, France, Italy, and a number of small EU countries. From the very beginning, Germany supported this line. The UK, which was most skeptical about deepening integration, preferred a different option for adapting the EU to new conditions, namely, expanding the EU to include CEE countries. For a short period, the main debates within the EU revolved around the dilemma: deepening or widening? Ultimately, the choice was made in favor of deepening integration, which would be accompanied by its subsequent expansion, first at the expense of developed Western European states, and then to CEE countries.

Efforts to deepen integration within the EU were undertaken repeatedly before the end of the Cold War, although due to disagreements between the main member states they were usually limited to half-hearted solutions. In 1985, the heads of state and government of the EU countries agreed on a package of reforms and additions to the EU treaties, consolidated in the Single European Act, which entered into force in 1987. This document provided, in particular, for the completion of the formation of a common internal market by the end of 1992. , a return to making a significant part of decisions in the EU by majority vote, as well as expanding the powers of the European Parliament. At the same time, the EU's remit expanded to include research, technology and conservation policies. environment. With the adoption of the Single European Act, a contractual basis for the activities of the European Council was created, as well as “European political cooperation,” which implied the harmonization of the foreign policies of EU states.

Changes in Europe have pushed EU countries to take more radical steps in deepening integration. On December 9–10, 1991, at a meeting of EU leaders in Maastricht (the Netherlands), a draft treaty on the European Union was approved, signed by the ministers of foreign affairs and finance on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993. The treaty provides for a significant deepening of integration in a number of areas:

1. The European Economic Community, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, became the European Union. The scope of EU activities has been significantly expanded. Customs Union, common market, common agricultural and foreign trade policies have been complemented since 1999 by the European Monetary Union (EMU), harmonized policies in the areas of environment, health, education and social sphere. Due to the compromise nature of the Maastricht Treaty, the competence of EU bodies in the listed areas is unequal and not always unconditional. The treaty provides for the introduction of the institution of “EU citizenship”, which does not abolish the citizenship of individual states. A committee on regional issues has been formed. The powers of the European Parliament have been expanded.

2. A new direction of EU activity has become the implementation of a joint foreign and security policy (CFSP), developing the experience of “European political cooperation” and providing for the coordination and implementation by EU countries of joint foreign policy actions on the basis of unanimously adopted decisions.

3. Cooperation in the field of domestic policy has become a new direction. It's about, in particular, on harmonizing the policies of EU countries on granting political asylum, regulating immigration processes, combating drug trafficking and crime, and closer cooperation between police services. However, in this area too, unanimity in the EU Council of Ministers is required to take agreed measures.

The Maastricht Treaty itself was the result of complex compromises between Euro-optimists and Eurosceptics within the union. The agreement provided for the possibility of revision and further development of its provisions by an intergovernmental conference of EU countries, whose competence included consideration of issues of further development of cooperation in the areas of the CFSP, internal politics and justice. The conference opened on 29 March 1996 in Turin (Italy) with a meeting of the European Council at the level of heads of state and government and concluded in Amsterdam on 16–17 June 1997 with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed by the foreign ministers on 2 October 1997. The Treaty formalized progress on a number of areas, including those that were the subject of disagreement during the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty. The agreement, which entered into force on May 1, 1999, provides, in particular:

Expanding the EU's competence in the field of domestic policy. Europol, established in The Hague as a center for the collection, processing and exchange of information, is assigned operational functions. International cooperation between national police and customs departments and justice authorities is expanding. Within five years of the treaty coming into force, border controls between all EU countries (except the UK and Ireland) must be removed and common standards for external border controls must be established. The EU's competence in the field of policy on granting political asylum, immigration, and refugees is expanding;

Regulation of the legal status of citizens of EU countries. The EU's ability to take action against discrimination is being expanded. The principle of equal rights for men and women becomes mandatory for all countries of the union;

Expanding the functions of the union in the field of social policy. For the first time, a chapter on coordination of employment policy appeared in the agreement. For the first time, the UK has agreed to recognize in full the obligations arising from the agreed social policies of the EU countries. The treaty establishes minimum standards in the field of health care. EU policy in any area must comply with environmental criteria - strengthening and improving the CFSP mechanism. The decision-making procedure within the framework of the CFSP has been improved. Although fundamental decisions still require unanimity, so-called executive decisions can now be taken by a majority vote. The position of Secretary General of the European Council was established, responsible for the development and implementation of the CFSP;

New functions for regulating international crises The Treaty of Amsterdam includes within the competence of the EU the implementation of humanitarian actions, as well as operations to maintain and strengthen peace. Based on unanimity, the EU can take political decisions authorizing the WEU to carry out such operations. Since during the intergovernmental conference the issue of the prospect of integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU structures was not resolved, the possibility was provided for the EU to adopt political decisions on the basis of unanimity, authorizing the WEU to conduct peacekeeping operations. After the change in the negative position of England regarding the integration of the WEU into the European Union (which was reflected in the French-British declaration signed in Saint-Malo on December 4, 1998), a fundamental shift emerged in this area of ​​cooperation between EU countries. At the EU summit in Cologne on June 3–4, 1999, a decision was made to develop and implement a joint European security and defense policy within the framework of the CFSP. The Cologne decision, which provides for the granting of powers for the independent implementation of military operations to ensure peace in armed crises, relying on the NATO infrastructure, as well as the creation of the necessary EU bodies for this, including the Security Policy Committee, the Military Committee, EU Headquarters, etc., is essentially means full integration of the WEU into the structures of the European Union, - reform of EU structures and institutions. Its goal is to strengthen the positions of the European Parliament and the European Commission, improve the rules for decision-making, including by expanding the list of issues on which decisions are made by a majority vote.

On July 15, 1997, the EU Commission presented Agenda 2000, containing recommendations on the main directions of reform in the activities of the union, conditioned by the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the forthcoming EU enlargement to the East. These recommendations were approved by the heads of state and government of the EU countries at a special meeting of the European Council in Berlin on 26 March 1999.

The agreement on Agenda 2000 is intended to resolve the contradictions that arise during the simultaneous deepening of integration and expansion of the European Union. The least controversial issue was the entry into the EU of developed European countries. In 1993, an agreement between the EU countries and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) came into force, effectively allowing the EFTA countries to enter the EU single market. However, the SES agreement quickly faded into the background due to the fact that Switzerland did not ratify it in a referendum, and four states - Austria, Norway, Finland and Sweden - began negotiations on joining the EU. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the EU, the number of members of which increased from 12 to 15.

The most difficult and controversial issue was the accession of CEE countries to the EU. For a number of years after the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the EU did not take a clear position on this issue, although it did early on develop a strategy for closer cooperation with CEE countries through association agreements known as “European agreements”. The first such agreements with the EU were signed by Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia on December 16, 1991. Subsequently, they were signed with all 10 CEE countries.

The “European Agreements” granted the countries that signed them the status of associate members and provide for the possibility of their accession to the EU, regulate political and economic relations with the union, including the establishment of a free trade regime. The agreements establish mechanisms for maintaining a constant dialogue between the parties, provide greater access for CEE countries to information about the decision-making process in the EU, and define mechanisms for providing technical and financial assistance to reforms, in particular, within the framework of the PHARE program.

However, the acquisition of associate member status in itself did not guarantee accession to the European Union. It was only at its meeting in Copenhagen on 21–22 June 1993 that the European Council adopted a political decision that “the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe that wish to do so will become members of the European Union.” At the same time, the highest political body The EU has not outlined a time frame for possible accession, stipulating only that in order to become a full member of the union, candidates must meet a number of economic and political criteria. At the same time, the council stipulated that the entry of new members should not harm the viability of the union. In addition to the focus of the PHARE program on preparing CEE countries for accession to the EU, in Copenhagen the candidate countries were invited to enter into a “structured dialogue” with the EU, during which all issues of their relations with the union could be clarified.

A more specific EU strategy for the integration of CEE countries was adopted at the European Council meeting in Essen (Germany) on December 9–10, 1994. The Council noted that negotiations on the accession of CEE countries to the EU could begin only after the completion of the intergovernmental conference, as well as after careful analysis the possible impact of EU enlargement on its viability and the readiness of candidates to join the union. The Council defined a set of short- and long-term measures to prepare CEE countries for joining the union.

Despite the disagreements that existed in the union and the presence of supporters of the simultaneous start of negotiations with all candidate countries, the EU ultimately pursues a differentiated policy towards the CEE countries. The top five candidates from among CEE countries included Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia. On March 31, 1998, negotiations were started with them, as well as with Cyprus. It is believed that they will be able to join the EU in 2001, although the EU Commission is based on a more realistic date - 2003.

The remaining five EU candidate countries were offered a special partnership program and a special conference was established with the participation of all EU candidate countries to ensure closer coordination and harmonization of their policies with those of the union.

NATO: adaptation and expansion

With the end of the Cold War, NATO, more than other European organizations, was faced with the problem of adapting its policies and strategies to the new situation and developing new relations with the countries that were part of the Warsaw Warsaw. The process of adapting NATO policy and strategy began with the London Summit of the NATO Council (July 1990). At the same time, the alliance responded to a number of major challenges that the organization faced.

1. The change in the military-political situation, the disappearance of the danger of a sudden large-scale military conflict between East and West, the emergence of local internal and interstate conflicts that do not directly affect the military security of NATO countries, not only required a revision of the military strategy of the alliance, but also strengthened the mood in the benefit of reducing armed forces and military spending in most NATO countries.

2. The tendency to intensify defense cooperation within the WEU, which intensified in the early 90s in a number of Western European countries, stimulated stratification within NATO.

3. The change since the early 90s in the ratio of traditional and new (mainly non-military) security challenges has called into question the future of NATO as a military organization.

Purpose of the lesson: studying the formation, features, contradictions and growing crisis of the Vienna system international relations in Europe in the 19th century.

Knowledge and skills acquired by the student as a result of mastering the topic, developed competencies or parts thereof:

Know:

- basic historical information on individual problems of the Vienna system of international relations in Europe in the 19th century;

Techniques for compiling reviews and bibliographies on individual problems of the Vienna system of international relations in Europe in the 19th century;

Be able to:

Understand, critically analyze and use basic historical information on selected issues of the Vienna system of international relations in Europe in the 19th century;

Compile reviews and bibliographies on specific issues of the Vienna system of international relations in Europe in the 19th century;

Own:

Ability to understand, critically analyze and use basic historical information on selected issues of the Vienna system of international relations in Europe in the 19th century.

The ability to compile reviews and bibliographies on selected problems of the Vienna system of international relations in Europe in the 19th century.

Relevance of the topic

In the period from the end of the XVIII - early XIX centuries profound changes are taking place in the forms and methods of noble-dynastic diplomacy of European states. Diplomacy of absolute monarchies of the 18th century. underwent changes under the influence of the American bourgeois revolution and the War of Independence of 1775-1783. and finally received a crushing blow from the Great French Revolution of 1789-1794.

The emerging bourgeoisie put forward as a basic principle the principle of the supremacy or sovereignty of the nation, which was first proclaimed in the field of diplomacy in the United States of America during the struggle for independence, and was further developed within the framework of French diplomacy during the French Revolution of the late 18th century. In the struggle against the feudal-monarchical forces, the French bourgeoisie proclaimed the slogans of the equality of peoples, their freedom and brotherhood. She demonstratively rejected the policy of conquest and secret treaties. However, the new foreign policy thus proclaimed was not always implemented in practice and often remained within the framework of verbal declarations, not counting individual attempts to apply it in France in the period before the Thermidorian coup on July 27, 1794.

The leadership of foreign policy was affected by the strengthening of the parliamentary system (primarily in Great Britain) and bourgeois-democratic freedoms in the advanced countries of Europe. Political parties and the press are beginning to have a certain influence on the formation of the foreign policy course of their country. More transparency is being introduced into diplomatic relations. The activities of foreign ministers and ambassadors are beginning to be subject to control. Communication means are being improved, which has an impact on the organization of foreign policy management: greater speed of communication contributes to greater centralization and efficiency of diplomatic leadership.

New methods of diplomacy are also emerging, differing from the period of diplomacy of absolute monarchies. Thus, exchanges of territories between dynasties are becoming rare. Issues of dynastic marriages and inheritances no longer play the same role in international relations. The dynastic wars that were characteristic of the first era are also becoming a thing of the past. half of the XVIII V. in the history of international relations and European diplomacy. During this period, the problem of movements for national liberation became very acute - in Europe and in Latin America. The importance of issues of customs policy and trade agreements, the struggle of the industrial bourgeoisie for markets for their goods is increasing.

The European bourgeoisie put forward a new principle of foreign policy - the “principle of non-interference”, which stemmed from the idea of ​​the supremacy of the nation, and opposed the proclaimed feudal-absolutist principle of open interference in the internal affairs of other powers in order to suppress revolutions, and the principle of legitimism, which justifies the restoration of overthrown monarchies. The struggle between the principles of noble-dynastic diplomacy and the diplomacy of the rising bourgeoisie is a characteristic feature of international relations of the late 18th - first half of the 19th centuries.

The most important events of this period were such as the French bourgeois revolution, in which new foreign policy principles were proclaimed, the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna and the formation of the Holy Alliance. These events led to a new territorial division in Europe and in the colonies and to a regrouping of political forces in Europe - the final assertion of English hegemony on the seas and in the colonies, the loss of France's former influence in Europe, the formation of a close union of European monarchs who established control over the political situation on the continent up to 1830

The most important stages in the development of international relations at the end of the 18th - first half of the 19th centuries. the following can be distinguished:

1) 1789-1794, when the defining event was the struggle of the French Revolution with the counter-revolutionary coalition led by England;

2) 1794-1815, when the main phenomenon of international life was the struggle of bourgeois France with England - in Europe, on the seas and in the colonies. On the European continent, Russia became the main and most powerful enemy of France, striving to subjugate all of Europe to its dominion. A new system of international relations was created - the Vienna System

3) 1815-1830, when with the formation of the “Holy Alliance” and a new regrouping of forces in Europe, the dominance of the great powers was established - the main participants in the Congress of Vienna. After France was accepted, there were five of these powers - England, Russia, Austria, Prussia and France. Until the middle of the 19th century. The first three powers played a decisive role in international relations.

Theoretical part

Preparation of question 1. Congress of Vienna 1814-1815.

Soon after the victory over Napoleon, representatives of all European powers, with the exception of Turkey, gathered in the capital of Austria to resolve issues related to the restoration of feudal orders in Europe and some of the former dynasties overthrown during the Napoleonic wars. All participants of the congress were also united by another common task- fight against revolutionary and democratic movements. In addition, the Congress had to provide stable guarantees that would not allow the restoration of the Bonapartist regime in France and attempts to conquer Europe, as well as satisfy the territorial claims of the victorious powers.

On September 23, a week before the opening of the congress, scheduled for October 1, 1814, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Louis XVIII, Prince Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Périgord, arrived in Vienna along with other French diplomats. Alexander I knew him well. It was not for nothing that he asked and received money from the king so many times, not being very offended if he was refused. But the brilliant mind of Sh.M. Talleyrand, inimitable dexterity, resourcefulness, knowledge of people - all this made him a very dangerous opponent. The weakness of his position was that at the Congress of Vienna he was the representative of a defeated country. He needed to show maximum intelligence and ability to maneuver.

When Sh.M. Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, he already knew which problem would take more attention of the Congress - the so-called key Polish-Saxon question. Alexander I, whose troops occupied the Duchy of Warsaw after Napoleon's retreat, declared quite openly that he would not yield the duchy to anyone. And since it consisted mainly of lands captured by Prussia through three more divisions of Poland and only taken from it by Napoleon in 1807, the Prussian king Frederick William III claimed compensation in the form of annexing the kingdom of Saxony to Prussia. Alexander I agreed with this condition, and planned to take away his possessions from the Saxon king under the pretext of punishment for the fact that he had been a loyal ally of Napoleon for so long. Sh.M. Talleyrand immediately saw that it was most advantageous to fight on this basis. And a diplomatic battle was necessary to achieve its main goal: to break the Chaumont Union, i.e. in other words, to drive wedges between Austria, England, Russia and Prussia.

In April-May 1814, Russia, in terms of its military forces, which at that moment were at the disposal of the Russian government, was undoubtedly stronger than all other states of devastated and bloodless continental Europe. That is why the Austrian Foreign Minister K. Metternich did everything possible to postpone the congress until the fall and allow Austria to recover somewhat. Alexander I agreed to such a delay, despite the fact that he could not stand K. Metternich and well understood his intrigues and the game of politicians hostile to Russia, although touchingly flattering the tsar in the eyes - Lord R. Castlereagh and the French king Louis XVIII.

They all looked with concern to see if Alexander I would want to play the role of the new ruler of Europe. Alexander I did not really want the accession of Louis XVIII to the vacant French throne. When he finally reigned, the Russian Tsar resolutely insisted on the need to grant France a constitutional charter. Not, of course, because he liked constitutional institutions. The king was convinced that the Bourbon dynasty would be swept away new revolution, unless a constitutional system is established in France as a lightning rod. Alexander I had a negative attitude towards King Louis XVIII and his brother Charles of Artois, and they, in turn, were afraid of him and were ready to use all sorts of tricks to get rid of his tutelage.

Arriving in Vienna, Sh.M. Talleyrand was invited to take part in a meeting of representatives of the four “great” powers. He did not come there as a representative of a defeated nation. In an arrogant and very self-confident tone, he immediately asked the audience why other members of the French delegation had not received an invitation to this meeting, while Prussia, for example, was represented at it not only by K.A. Hardenberg, but also W. Humboldt. Referring to the fact that the Treaty of Paris was signed by representatives of not four, but eight powers, he demanded that, in addition to representatives of France, representatives of Spain, Portugal and Sweden also be involved in the preliminary meetings. In the end, he achieved that he was admitted to the steering committee and thereby got the opportunity to intrigue in order to push and quarrel the recent allies with each other.

At the beginning of October 1814 Sh.M. Talleyrand came to Emperor Alexander I and put forward his notorious “principle of legitimism.” The Russian Tsar must give up parts of Poland that did not belong to Russia before the revolutionary wars, and Prussia must not lay claim to Saxony. “I put rights above benefits!” - said Sh.M. Talleyrand in response to the Tsar's remark that Russia should receive from its victory the benefits it deserves. Apparently, this blew up Alexander, who, generally speaking, knew how to control himself, but in this case declared - “War is better!”

Negotiations followed with Lord R. Castlereagh. Alexander I told him that he did not set himself the task of immediately, right there, at the Congress of Vienna, to reunite all parts of the former Poland. For now, he can only talk about the Polish territory that is now, in 1814, occupied by his troops. He will create the Kingdom of Poland from this part of Poland, where he himself will be a constitutional monarch. He will not only restore the Kingdom of Poland from areas that, by right of conquest, he could simply annex to Russia; he will even donate to this constitutional kingdom the Bialystok district, acquired by Russia in 1807, as well as the Tarnopol district, acquired by it in 1809.

Lord R. Castlereagh recognized the proposed constitution that the Tsar wants to give to Poland as too “liberal” and therefore dangerous for Austria and Prussia. He expressed fear that the Austrian and Prussian Poles would become agitated, jealous of their fellows enjoying the constitution. The Tsar so stubbornly argued that he cared about the independence and freedom of Poland that the minister of bourgeois England tried to convince him not to be so liberal. The Austrian government, even more than the British, feared the creation of a liberal regime in Poland and, as it seemed to them, an exorbitant increase in the power of Russia by annexing most of the Polish lands. The Austrian Chancellor then offered Lord R. Castlereagh the following solution: to let the Prussian Commissioner K.A. know. Hardenberg that Austria and England agree to give all of Saxony to the Prussian king. But Prussia must immediately betray Alexander I, join Austria and England, and together with him prevent the Tsar from taking possession of the Duchy of Warsaw. Thus, Saxony was supposed to serve as payment to the king for betraying Alexander.

King Frederick William III nevertheless decided to abandon this plan. It was clear that it was not without reason that Prince K. Metternich and Lord R. Castlereagh did not attract S.M. Talleyrand to the intended deal. For the King of Prussia, the full danger of his position was suddenly revealed: what would happen if Talleyrand told Alexander I about everything, and most importantly, he himself proposed joint diplomatic, and perhaps not only diplomatic actions of France and Russia against Prussia? The nightmare of the Franco-Russian alliance, the bitterness of the Tilsit and post-Tilsit times were all too vivid. In the end, King Frederick William III recognized it as good to inform Alexander I about everything in order to prove the nobility of his own intentions. The Tsar called K. Metternich and had a clear conversation with him. Regarding this, Sh.M. Talleyrand gloatingly informed Louis XVIII that even with a guilty lackey they did not speak the same way as Alexander I talked with K. Metternich.

The work of the Congress did not move forward due to persistent internal struggle. Then Sh.M. Talleyrand changed tactics, maintaining the same goal: to deepen the split in the ranks of the winners. France was interested not so much in preventing the strengthening of Russia as in preventing Prussia, France's immediate neighbor and enemy, from strengthening. And so Talleyrand makes it clear to Alexander I that France will not support England and Austria in their opposition against the creation of the Kingdom of Poland within Alexander’s empire; however, France will under no circumstances agree to the transfer of Saxony to the Prussian king. Frederick William III himself, as well as his diplomatic representatives K.A. Hardenberg and W. Humboldt played a very minor role at the congress. He was promised Saxony. Alexander I called the Saxon king a traitor, said that he would send him to Russia, assured that Prussia would receive Saxony in exchange for the part of Poland it had lost, and so on. the king was calm for some time. Talleyrand's activities were facilitated by the acute contradictions of his recent allies and, above all, by the active opposition to the plans of Russia and Prussia on the part of English and Austrian diplomacy. Trying by any means to prevent the strengthening of Russia and limit its influence achieved as a result of the victory over Napoleon, Lord R. Castlereagh and K. Metternich even went so far as to conclude a secret alliance with France. Sh.M. Talleyrand, of course, did not miss the opportunity to separate the recent victors of France.

The Congress of Vienna cemented Germany's political fragmentation. Alexander I, like K. Metternich, considered it expedient to consolidate the feudal fragmentation of Germany. England was completely indifferent to this issue, and Prussia was powerless, even if it wanted to join the fight. The entire state of mind of the leaders of the Vienna Congress testified to the reluctance of the parties, at least in some way, to meet the aspirations of the rising bourgeoisie; the failure of the German people's hopes for the unification of Germany was another characteristic stroke in the picture of the complete triumph of reaction.

According to the plan of K. Metternich, the congress outlined the creation of an organization called the “German Confederation”. To conduct the affairs of this union, the so-called “German Diet” was created. Austria, Prussia and other German states (38 in total) were included in the union. The task of the German Confederation, according to the plans of K. Metternich, included creating a barrier against a possible future advance of France towards the Rhine and at the same time ensuring Austria a leading position in Germany.

The presidency of the Diet, whose seat was the city of Frankfurt am Main, was entrusted to the Austrian representative, and the votes at the Diet were distributed in such a way that Austria was given the final say. Of course, this ugly creation was not at all designed to unite the German people, but, on the contrary, to perpetuate its fragmentation and preserve small feudal monarchies. Germany thereby found itself fragmented again.

The Congress had already begun to sum up the results of its work, when suddenly its participants were shocked by unexpected news. March 1, 1815 Napoleon landed in France. And three weeks later, on March 20, Napoleon had already entered Paris. The Empire was restored. Undoubtedly, rumors about the disagreements that tore apart the Congress of Vienna played a significant role in Napoleon’s decision to leave Fr. Elba. An amazing surprise awaited him in Paris. In the office of the king, who fled Paris only a day before Napoleon's entry, he found that same secret agreement on January 3, 1815, one of three copies of which was sent to Louis XVIII. Napoleon immediately ordered this document to be sent to Vienna and presented to Emperor Alexander I.

Alexander I, having read the secret treaty directed against him, blushed with anger, but restrained himself. When K. Metternich came to him, who since the return of Napoleon had been waiting mainly for the salvation of Europe from the tsar, the tsar silently handed him the secret fruit of the Austrian chancellor's diplomatic creativity. K. Metternich was so confused that, apparently, at first and last time I couldn’t even find something to lie about in my life. The surprise was very great.

However, the fear of Napoleon took over, and Alexander I immediately felt forced to tell K. Metternich that, despite everything, they had a common enemy - namely Napoleon. Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo on June 18, 1815, inflicted by the troops of the Seventh Coalition under the command of Duke A.W. Wellington and Marshal G.L. Blucher, completed the history of the Napoleonic wars.

A few days before Waterloo, June 9, 1815, there was last meeting Congress of Vienna, as well as the signing of its Final Act, which consisted of 121 articles and 17 separate annexes. It seemed to the congress participants that they had created something very lasting. However, the reactionary utopia of the congress was to, regardless of either the new relations of production or the twenty-five-year storm that destroyed the old foundations of feudalism and absolutism in Europe, to keep this part of the world within the framework of an outdated system. This utopia underlay all the activities of the Congress.

Belgium was given to the new Dutch king; Denmark was approved, in addition to the Duchy of Schleswig, and German Holstein; Austria was given the purely Italian population of Lombardy and Venice; Germany remained fragmented into 38 independent states. Poland was again divided into three parts, and from the lands of the former Duchy of Warsaw a new Kingdom of Poland was created, which, according to the decision of the congress, was supposed to be “in inextricably linked with Russia”, and was governed by a constitution granted by the Russian Tsar. Poznan, Gdansk (Danzig) and Torun were left to Prussia, and Western Ukraine (Galicia) was left to Austria. The city of Krakow “with the region belonging to it” was declared “for eternity a free, independent and completely neutral city” under the patronage of Russia, Austria and Prussia.

Prussia, in compensation for the Polish territories it lost, received, in addition to the northern part of Saxony, also about. Rügen and Swedish Pomerania, and in the west - the Rhine-Westphalia region. As a result, the Hohenzollern kingdom, despite resistance from S.M. Talleyrand and K. Metternich, strengthened largely as a result of support from the tsar, as well as the position taken by British diplomats at the congress. Despite the fact that Prussia remained torn into two parts - the old, eastern, and the new, western, - soon after 1815 it began to gain strength and become dangerous for its neighbors.

Austria also gained significant strength, gaining the Tyrol, Valtelina, Trieste, Dalmatia and Illyria. In Modena, Tuscany and Parma, the closest relatives of Emperor Francis I were placed on the throne, binding themselves to close alliance treaties with Austria. The same treaties connected the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with Austria, where Bourbon power was restored, and with the Papal States. Thus, in fact, the power of the Habsburgs extended to almost the entire territory of Italy, which remained in a state of political fragmentation.

The two most powerful European powers - England and Russia - emerged from long wars with France significantly stronger and stronger. England expanded its already huge colonial possessions. She remained in full measure the “mistress of the seas,” having achieved the elimination of her main rival, France, and, forcing other countries to recognize the essentially predatory “law of the sea” established by herself, i.e., the “right” to stop on the high seas and inspect trade ships of neutral countries for the purpose of confiscating goods sent to enemy harbors. The establishment of British rule on the island was especially important. Malta and the Ionian Islands, turned into naval bases, into outposts of the English bourgeoisie on the approaches to the countries of the Near and Middle East. Tsarist Russia emerged from the wars with Napoleonic France having significantly expanded to include the lands of the former Duchy of Warsaw, Finland and Bessarabia. On the European continent, Russia no longer had rivals quite equal to it.

In addition to resolving basic political and territorial issues. The Congress of Vienna adopted a number of special additional regulations in the form of acts attached to the main treatise. Among them, a special place is occupied by the “Declaration of the Powers on the Elimination of Trade in Negroes,” signed on February 8, 1815, as well as the “Regulations on the Ranks of Diplomatic Representatives,” adopted by Congress on March 19, 1815.

The latter for the first time established uniformity in the ranks of various diplomatic representatives, which then entered diplomatic use for many years as a norm of international law. This resolution put an end to the endless quarrels and conflicts over issues of seniority that were common in the diplomatic practice of the 18th century. The ranks were established as follows: 1) Ambassador, papal legate and nuncio; 2) Messenger; 3) Charge d'affaires. Later, in 1818, to these three ranks was added the rank of minister-resident, placed between envoys and chargés d'affaires.

The victorious sovereigns, who gathered in Vienna in September 1814, set themselves three main goals: to create guarantees against a possible repetition of aggression from France; satisfy their own territorial claims; destroy all the consequences of the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century. and restore the old feudal-absolutist order everywhere.

But only the first of these goals was actually fully achieved. As for the second - the satisfaction of territorial claims - only a few victorious countries emerged from the long and bloody wars with France having actually expanded at the expense of other, weaker states of Europe. The third goal of the Congress of Vienna - the eradication of revolutionary principles and the complete establishment of the principles of legitimism - could not be achieved by its participants. The Holy Alliance of European monarchs, created to suppress the national liberation movement in Europe, symbolized the onset of reaction.

The Congress of Vienna decided the fate of France, secured the redistribution of colonies and territories of European countries in the interests of the victorious states. Thus, a new system of international relations, called the Vienna system, was established in Europe and in the world as a whole, consolidating new approaches and forms of relations and laying down new nodes contradictions on the continent.

Preparation of question 2. Congresses of the Holy Alliance - Aachen, Troppau, Laibach, Verona.

The people's struggle against Napoleon ended with the collapse of the French Empire. The victory over Napoleon was used to its advantage by a coalition of monarchical, feudal-absolutist states. The destruction of the Napoleonic Empire led to the triumph of the noble-monarchist reaction in Europe.

The peace treaty with France, the renewed Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna formed the basis of international relations after the Napoleonic era, which went down in history as the “Viennese system”. The interests of the victorious powers were contradictory. But at the final stage of the Congress of Vienna, members of the anti-Napoleonic coalition had to overcome mutual contradictions and make compromise decisions. The decisions of the Congress of Vienna contributed to the strengthening of the noble-monarchist reaction in Europe. To intensify the fight against revolutionary and national liberation movements, the reactionary governments of European states concluded a Holy Alliance among themselves.

The Holy Alliance entered the history of European diplomacy as an organization with a clerical-monarchist ideology, created on the basis of the idea of ​​​​suppressing the revolutionary spirit and political and religious love of freedom, wherever they manifest themselves. The Holy Alliance of the victorious countries became the stronghold of the new international political system established by the Congress of Vienna. The act of this union, drawn up by the Russian Emperor Alexander I, was signed on September 26, 1815 by the Austrian Emperor Franz I, the Prussian King Frederick William III, and was sent on their behalf to other European powers. In November 1815, the French king Louis XVIII joined the Holy Alliance. Subsequently, almost all European states joined it, with the exception of England, which was not formally part of it, but its government often coordinated its policies with the general line of the Holy Alliance.

The Pope did not sign the act, fearing the discontent of Catholics in different countries. The text of the document stated that by the sacred bonds of true brotherhood and the principles of the Christian religion they undertake to provide each other with assistance, reinforcement and assistance. The goal of the participants was to preserve the European borders established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and to fight against all manifestations of the “revolutionary spirit”.

In the Holy Alliance, especially in the first years of its existence, the main role was played by the major diplomat and Austrian Chancellor K. Metternich, and the entire policy of the Holy Alliance is sometimes called “Metternichian”. Russian Emperor Alexander I also played a major role in the union. The participants of the Holy Alliance adhered to the principles of legitimism in their policies, i.e. the most complete restoration of the old dynasties and regimes overthrown by the French Revolution and Napoleon's armies, and proceeded from the recognition of an absolute monarchy. The struggle of the Holy Alliance, as an organ of pan-European reaction against any liberal, much less revolutionary and national liberation aspirations, was expressed in the resolutions of its congresses.

In the political life of the Holy Alliance, three periods should be distinguished.

The first period - the period of actual power - lasted seven years - from September 1815, when the union was created, until the end of 1822, when the fourth congress of the Holy Alliance took place. This period of his activity is characterized by the greatest activity.

The second period of activity of the Holy Alliance begins in 1823, when it achieves its last victory by organizing an intervention in Spain. At the same time, the consequences of the coming to power of the British Foreign Minister George Canning in mid-1822 began to appear. This period lasted until the July Revolution of 1830 in France, after which the Holy Alliance was already in ruins.

The third period of activity of the Holy Alliance 1830-1856. - the period of its formal existence in the presence of serious disagreements among its participants.

In total, four congresses of the Holy Alliance took place: the Aachen Congress in 1818, the Troppau Congress in 1820, the Laibach Congress in 1821, the Verona Congress in 1822. In addition to the heads of the three powers - the founders of the Holy Alliance, representatives of England and France took part in them.

The first congress of the Holy Alliance took place in Aachen in 1818. It was convened in order to further strengthen the political balance in Europe. A proposal for a meeting of the allied courts to discuss the situation in France was made by the Austrian Chancellor K. Metternich in March 1817. He had far-reaching goals; he sought, firstly, to weaken the political opposition to the Bourbons and stop the growth of revolutionary sentiment in Europe; secondly, by advocating the return of France to the ranks of the great powers, to reduce Russia’s influence on it; thirdly, by tying France with treaty obligations with England, Austria and Prussia, to prevent the strengthening of Russian-French influence in Europe. It was he who proposed choosing the quiet German town of Aachen as the meeting place for the allies, where the German rulers could not influence the course of the meeting.

During the preparation of the Aachen Congress, disagreements emerged between the Allied powers regarding the agenda of the congress and the composition of its participants. All the Allied powers understood that French problems would take center stage at the upcoming meeting.

The Russian side believed that such a meeting should help strengthen the “Vienna system” and sought to bring up a wide range of European problems for discussion. According to the St. Petersburg cabinet, most European countries could take part in its work. But Alexander I agreed to limit the number of participants in the meeting if only one issue was considered - the withdrawal of allied troops from France. Alexander I considered it necessary to quickly withdraw foreign troops from France, which, after their evacuation, would take its proper place in the European community.

Austrian Chancellor Metternich argued that the main purpose of the meeting should be to consider the internal political situation in France. The Austrian court expected to hold the meeting only on the basis of the Quadruple Alliance, which limited the number of its participants and did not give Russian diplomacy the opportunity to maneuver. If the St. Petersburg court sought to avoid the principle of excluding small states when holding a future meeting, the governments of Austria, Prussia and England were of the opposite opinion.

During the preparations for the Congress of Aachen, Austrian memoranda of 1818 stated that the four Allied powers had the exclusive right to change the conventions and treaties of 1815, as well as to reject requests from European countries to participate in the meeting. However, this program could undermine the political balance in Europe. Therefore, K. Metternich was forced to make changes to it. The new version indicated that all questions, except for questions about the timing of the end of the occupation of France and its role in the “Vienna system,” should have been considered with the direct participation of interested parties.

On the eve of the Congress of Aachen, diplomats from the allied countries met in the allied town of Carlsbad. The last round of diplomatic preparations for the Congress took place here, the main purpose of which was to try to find out the weak and strengths programs with which allies and rivals went to the upcoming meeting. By the beginning of the congress, the program of the Russian delegation had not changed. Austria's position also remained the same, but changes were made to the program of the British delegation. The memorandum, drawn up by Lord R. Castlereagh and approved as instructions for English representatives, noted the advisability of the complete withdrawal of allied troops from France while fulfilling its financial obligations. It was further emphasized that it was necessary to preserve the Quadruple Alliance in its original form, and, therefore, France could not become its full member.

The Aachen Congress opened on September 20, 1818, in which Russia, Austria, England, Prussia and France took part. The participants of the congress were respectively represented by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs K.V. Nesselrode, Chancellor of Austria K. Metternich, Foreign Minister of England Lord R. Castlereagh, Foreign Minister of Prussia K.A. Hardenberg, Prime Minister of France, Duke of Richelieu. The delegations of Russia, Austria and Prussia were headed by Emperors Alexander I, Franz I and Friedrich Wilhelm III. In addition to them, many English, Austrian, Prussian, Russian and French diplomats of lower ranks gathered in Aachen.

During the work of the congress, French and Spanish issues, problems of prohibiting the slave trade and protecting merchant shipping, and a number of others were considered. The first to be resolved was the withdrawal of occupation forces from France. On September 27, 1818, conventions were signed between France and members of the Quadruple Alliance on the withdrawal of all allied troops by November 30, 1818 and the timely payment of indemnity in the amount of 260 million francs.

The Duke of Richelieu insisted on turning the Quadruple Alliance into an alliance of five powers, however, at the request of Lord R. Castlereagh and the German courts, a special convention of the four powers was signed on November 1, 1818, which confirmed the Quadruple Alliance, created to preserve the order established in France. Only after this, on November 3, 1818, the allies invited France to join the four powers in maintaining state borders and the political system established by the Congress of Vienna.

The Declaration of November 3, 1818, signed by all participants in the congress, proclaimed their solidarity in maintaining the principles of " International law, tranquility, faith and morality, whose beneficial effect has been so shaken in our times.” Behind this phrase was hidden the desire of the five monarchies to jointly strengthen the absolutist system in Europe and combine their forces to suppress revolutionary movements.

Despite the fact that officially there were only two issues related to French problems on the agenda of the meeting, other aspects of international relations were simultaneously considered at the congress: the issue of mediation of powers in the conflict between Spain and its colonies, issues of freedom of merchant shipping and the cessation of the slave trade. A specific decision was made only on the issue of protecting merchant shipping from piracy. It was recommended that England and France contact the North African regencies with a warning that piracy was damaging world trade and could lead to dire consequences for them.

The Congress of Aachen was the first major event in the history of European diplomacy after the creation of the “Vienna System”. His decisions strengthened it and showed that the great powers were interested in preserving their alliance. The decisions of the Aachen Congress were aimed at preserving the Restoration order in Europe.

The second congress of the five allied powers - Austria, Russia, Prussia, France and England, opened in Troppau on October 11, 1820 (Silesia). The Congress was convened on the initiative of K. Metternich in connection with the revolution of 1820 in the Kingdom of Naples, which posed a threat to Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venice.

The Congress took place in an atmosphere of intense diplomatic struggle. At the first meeting, Chancellor K. Metternich presented a “Note”, which substantiated “the right of the Allied powers to intervene in the internal affairs of states in order to suppress revolutions in them.” He sought moral support for the Austrian proposals and emphasized that there was no other way to fight the Neapolitan revolution other than military intervention.

The Russian delegation proposed to take joint moral action against the Neapolitan revolution. Prussian representatives supported the Austrian point of view, and the representatives of England and France refused to take part in the formalization of any decisions. On November 7, 1820, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed the Preliminary Protocol and its amendments, which proclaimed the right of armed intervention in the internal affairs of other states (without an invitation from their governments) to suppress revolutionary uprisings there.

The representatives of England and France were familiarized with the texts of the Preliminary Protocol and its additions. They recognized the right of the Allies to intervene in the Neapolitan events, but refused to officially accede to these documents. Thus, despite the formal refusal to approve the decisions taken at Troppau, neither the British nor the French representatives condemned the very right of intervention in the internal affairs of an independent state. The protocol signed by the participants of the congress authorized the occupation of the Kingdom of Naples by Austria. At the insistence of Alexander I, the protocol ensured the preservation of the integrity of the kingdom and the possibility for the Neapolitan king to voluntarily grant a constitution to his people. Discussion of the issue of combating revolutions in Europe continued at the third congress of the Holy Alliance in Laibach, which opened on January 11, 1821.

Representatives of the Italian states invited to the congress sought to suppress the Neapolitan revolution and thought little about the consequences of the Austrian intervention for the whole of Italy. England was outwardly neutral, but in fact approved the Austrian plan, as did Prussia. France supported the very idea of ​​intervention. In February 1821, the campaign of Austrian troops against Naples began.

The official closing of the congress in Laibach took place on February 26, and in fact on May 12, 1821. Most of the participants remained in Laibach, monitoring the actions of the Austrian troops and the Viennese court in Piedmont. After the suppression of the Italian revolutions, the representatives of Austria, Prussia and Russia signed a declaration to extend the occupation of Naples and Piedmont and confirmed their determination to use violent methods to restore the power of legitimate monarchs. The Declaration, together with the Preliminary Protocol and its amendments, reflected the ideological principles of the Holy Alliance.

The situation in Europe after the suppression of the Italian revolutions continued to remain turbulent. In the spring of 1822, participants in the Troppau-Laibach Congress began a diplomatic probe in order to find out each other’s positions on the fight against the revolution in Spain. The next meeting of the monarchs of the allied powers was envisaged at the congress in Laibach. A proposal to convene a new meeting was made by Emperor Francis I to Russian Tsar Alexander I at the beginning of June 1822. Verona was chosen as the venue for the new congress. The monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia, Italian sovereigns, and numerous diplomats gathered in this ancient city. England was represented by a prominent statesman, Duke Arthur of Wellington.

The Congress in Verona took place from October 20 to November 14, 1822. It was the last and most representative among the diplomatic congresses of the Holy Alliance. The main role was played by five great powers who called themselves allies. Representatives of Italian states were assigned a secondary role: they participated in the discussion of Italian problems. Formally, the alliance of the five powers still existed, but there was no longer unity between them. The beginning of the Eastern crisis led to deepening contradictions. England was the first to retreat. France pursued a cautious policy. The program of the Russian delegation was conservative in nature.

The main problem at the congress was the preparation, on the initiative of the French king, of intervention to suppress the revolution in Spain. At a meeting of the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers on October 20, 1822, the French Foreign Minister asked for “moral support” for his government to intervene in Spain in order to protect France from the influence of the revolution. Representatives of England, Prussia and Russia reacted positively to this initiative. A. Wellington stated that the French proposal contradicts the English position of non-intervention, so it cannot be approved.

Behind this statement lay the fear of the British side that France would strengthen its position in Spain and in the Mediterranean as a whole. On November 19, 1822, a protocol was signed, which was a secret agreement between the four powers on measures to overthrow the revolutionary government in Spain. A. Wellington refused to sign it under the pretext that it could create a danger to the life of the Spanish king.

Preparation of question 3. Polish and German questions. Creation of the German Confederation

The French Revolution of 1830 also gave impetus to the Polish movement, and an uprising broke out in Warsaw late that year. The entire Polish army joined the uprising. The Polish Sejm, meeting in Warsaw, declared the Romanov dynasty deprived of the Polish throne and established a provisional revolutionary government. The history of the Polish uprising can be divided into two periods.

The first period of the uprising from its beginning, that is, from November 29, 1830 to January 25, 1831, when, by a resolution of the Warsaw Sejm, Emperor Nicholas I was declared dethroned from the throne of the Kingdom of Poland. During this period, European diplomacy had a formal basis to inquire from Nicholas I whether he intended, despite the fact of the uprising, to recognize the state structure of the Kingdom of Poland, which was granted by Alexander I at the Congress of Vienna, and which Nicholas I himself swore to protect in the Manifesto to the Poles. accession to the throne on December 13, 1825

During the second period of the uprising, foreign representatives could only speak privately with the tsar about Polish affairs. Having deposed Nicholas I from the throne, the Poles, in the opinion of European diplomacy, themselves destroyed the constitution of 1815. From now on, that is, after January 25, 1831, there was a war between Russian Empire and the Polish state, which arose by revolutionary means and was not recognized by any of the European powers. None of the European powers considered it possible for themselves to intervene in this war diplomatically or with weapons in their hands, and all of them remained only in the position of spectators until the end of the uprising.

The government of Nicholas I had to enter into an armed conflict with Poland. Polish patriots were not satisfied with the constitution of 1815 and could not come to terms with the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; they sought to restore the complete state independence of Poland, and, moreover, within the borders of 1772. However, disagreements and discord soon began among the leaders of the revolution, and the Polish army was not strong enough to fight the Russian one. In 1831 the uprising was suppressed.

After the suppression of the uprising, the constitutional charter of 1815 was canceled, a separate Polish army was destroyed, and Polish universities in Warsaw and Vilna were closed. The Kingdom of Poland was divided into provinces and subordinated to the imperial governor, who ruled the country with the help of a council of the main officials of the region. In the Western Russian regions, many lands that belonged to participants in the uprising were confiscated and transferred to the hands of the Russian government.

Thus, in 1830-1831. A wave of revolutions swept across Europe, which had a decisive impact on the pan-European situation in Europe. The three "glorious days" of the July 1830 uprising in Paris brought an end to the Restoration regime in France. It took no more than four months for all members of the European Areopagus to recognize in principle the rebellious Belgium’s right to secede from the Kingdom of the Netherlands and to exist independently, thereby allowing for the revision of one of the “inviolable” resolutions of the Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance ceased to be a pan-European security system. Under the new monarch, the “bourgeois king” Louis Philippe, France could no longer be part of the conservative alliance. The difference in the nature of the state system between the two parliamentary monarchies of the West - Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and the absolutist powers of Eastern Europe - Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the other, affected their approaches to solving the problems brought by the revolutionary wave, and, ultimately, In general, it determined the composition of the unions into which the European pentarchy was breaking up at this time.

Preparation of question 4. Second Peace of Paris (1815).

On January 3, 1815, a secret agreement was signed by representatives of the three powers. It was directed against Russia and Prussia and obliged Austria, France and England, in the event “if... one of the high contracting parties were in danger from one or more powers,” to come to the aid of each other, deploying armies of 150 each for this purpose. thousand soldiers each. All three participants pledged not to conclude separate peace treaties with their opponents. Of course, the agreement had to be kept in the strictest confidence from Alexander I and from anyone else in general.

This secret agreement so strengthened the energy of resistance to the Saxon project that Alexander I could either decide to break and, perhaps, go to war, or give in. Having received everything he wanted in Poland, Alexander I did not want to quarrel over Prussia, much less fight with the three great powers. He conceded: Prussia was given only part of Saxony. The Saxon king finally settled in his possessions, which, however, were significantly curtailed.

Preparation of question 5. Features of the Vienna system of international relations (“European concert”)

In the mid-70s. XIX century The national liberation movement in the Balkans flared up with renewed vigor. It was caused by the strengthening of the economic and political oppression of the Turks and the socio-economic development of the peoples under their control. The July uprising of 1875 in Herzegovina and the anti-Turkish uprising in August of the same year in Bosnia marked the beginning of a powerful liberation movement of the Balkan peoples. The Eastern crisis began.

In an effort to help the rebels, but not wanting to bring the matter to a military conflict, Russia proposed that Austria-Hungary jointly demand that Turkey grant autonomy to the rebels. Austria-Hungary feared the spread of the national liberation movement to its territory, which threatened its imperial foundations. However, she failed to maintain this position. There were influential elements in Austria who hoped to resolve the South Slav question differently: they thought of incorporating the South Slav areas of the western half of the Balkans into the Habsburg state, starting with the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Supporters of this plan were ready to agree that Russia would receive the eastern part of the Balkans. Emperor Franz Joseph really wanted to at least somehow compensate himself for the losses suffered in Italy and Germany. Therefore, he listened with great sympathy to the voice of the annexationists. These politicians energetically encouraged the anti-Turkish movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia advocated supporting the uprising, but without entering into conflict with Austria-Hungary. A. Gorchakov decided to intervene in Balkan affairs in contact with Austria-Hungary. This policy was also consistent with the principles of the agreement of the three emperors. In August 1875, the European powers offered the Turkish Sultan their mediation in resolving relations between the Porte and the rebels. Moreover, A. Gorchakov insisted that Turkey fulfill all its obligations regarding the Christian population of its regions. D. Andrássy, with the consent of A. Gorchakov, prepared a note containing a draft reform for Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to this project, it was provided for the provision of complete freedom of religion to the population, the abolition of the tax farming system, the use of regional income for local needs, the establishment of a mixed commission of Christians and Muslims to monitor the implementation of reforms, and the provision of land to the Christian population.

On December 30, 1875, Andrássy presented to the governments of all powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris of 1856 a note outlining this project of reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All powers expressed their agreement with D. Andrassy's proposals. On January 31, 1876, D. Andrássy’s project in the form of the Vienna Ultimatum was presented by Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany, England, France and Italy to the Turkish government. The Porte gave its consent to the introduction of the reforms proposed in D. Andrássy’s note. But the rebels put forward a number of more radical demands: an immediate truce, the transfer of a third of the land to the peasants, a guarantee from the powers on the issue of reforms. The Turkish government rejected these demands. Thus, D. Andrássy’s diplomatic enterprise failed.

Then Russian diplomacy appeared on the scene again. A. Gorchakov suggested that Andrássy and Bismarck arrange a meeting of the three ministers in Berlin, timed to coincide with the upcoming visit of the Tsar. In May 1876 the meeting took place. A. Gorchakov’s project, in contrast to D. Andrássy’s note, demanded not reforms, but autonomy for individual Slavic regions of the Balkan Peninsula. However, D. Andrassy failed Gorchakov's plan, making so many amendments to it that it lost its original character. The finally agreed proposal of the three governments, called the Berlin Memorandum of 1876, provided that if the steps outlined in it did not produce the desired results, the three imperial courts would agree to take “effective measures to prevent the further development of evil.”

So, the Berlin Memorandum, adopted on May 13, 1876 by Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France and Italy who joined them, was transferred to the Turkish government. The Berlin Memorandum demanded that the Turkish government conclude a two-month truce with the rebels, provide them with assistance in restoring their homes and farms, and recognize the rebels’ right to retain weapons. The purpose of the three imperial courts was to preserve the integrity Ottoman Empire However, this was conditioned by an alleviation of the lot of Christians, in other words, an “improved” status quo. This was the new diplomatic term with which A. Gorchakov expressed the main idea of ​​the Berlin Memorandum.

France and Italy agreed with the program of the three emperors. The British government, represented by B. Disraeli, disagreed with the Berlin Memorandum, spoke out against new interference in Turkish affairs and thereby supported the struggle of the Turkish Sultan. In addition, England did not want Russia to establish itself in the straits and increase its influence in the Balkans.

England saw the Balkans as a springboard from which to threaten Constantinople. At the same time, she began to take possession of the Suez Canal and establish English dominance in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. With the passage of the straits into Russian hands, the main lines of communication of the British Empire could be threatened by the Russian fleet. Therefore, England sought to bring under its control not only Egypt, but also Turkey. In the event of a conflict over the Balkans, she could count on Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Therefore, it was more profitable for England to start a fight with Russia not in Central Asia, where she alone stood face to face with Russia, and in the Middle East. By his refusal to accept the Berlin Memorandum, B. Disraeli gained dominant influence in the Turkish capital, upset the European “concert” in Constantinople and encouraged Turkey to resist the demand of the three emperors.

Preparation of question 6. Creation of a new European order based on the principle of legitimism.

Sh.M. Talleyrand, even before the start of the Lieutenant Congress, understood well that from the point of view of the interests of France, it was most rational to put forward the so-called “principle of legitimism.” This principle was as follows: Europe, which gathered in the person of its sovereigns and diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, must, when redistributing lands and changing territorial boundaries, leave inviolate what legally existed before the outbreak of revolutionary wars, i.e. until 1792

If this principle had been accepted and implemented, not only would France have gained confidence in the integrity of her territory, which she was not at that moment in a position to defend by military force, but also Prussia and Russia would have been curbed in their desires for territorial expansion. Sh.M. It would, of course, be beneficial for Talleyrand to first come to an agreement with K. Metternich, who also did not want to give Poland to Russia, and Saxony to Prussia, and with Lord R. Castlereagh, who held the same opinion on this issue as K. Metternich. But such a general conspiracy had not yet taken place, and it was rather difficult to establish. Both Prince K. Metternich and Lord R. Castlereagh belonged to Sh.M. Talleyrand with suspicion, admitting the possibility of new betrayal on his part.

Preparation of question 7. Formation of the “Holy Alliance”, the pentarchy as guarantors of the Vienna system of international relations

Almost simultaneously with the appearance of the Berlin Memorandum, the Turks brutally suppressed the uprising in Bulgaria. B. Disraeli tried to somehow gloss over the Turkish atrocities. Meanwhile, Serbia and Montenegro were already preparing for armed intervention in favor of the Slavic rebels. Representatives of Russia and Austria in Belgrade officially warned against this. But on June 30, 1876, the war of Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey began. Under these conditions, the delivery of the Berlin Memorandum was delayed, and soon it lost all meaning and was no longer put forward.

There were about 4 thousand Russian volunteers in Serbia, including many officers. In addition, financial assistance came from Russia. By secretly encouraging both the rebels and the Serbian government, Russian tsarism risked a conflict with the great powers, for which Russia was not prepared either militarily or financially. Although the tsarist government feared such a conflict and, nevertheless, pursued such a policy.

The Serbo-Turkish war increased the danger of a pan-European explosion. If Turkey had won, Russia would inevitably have had to intervene and would have had to face Austria-Hungary. If Serbia had won, it most likely would have caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this case, it would hardly have been possible to prevent a brutal fight between the great powers over the Turkish inheritance. The policy of Russian diplomats in the second half of 1876 tried to solve a difficult diplomatic task: to provide support to the Balkan Slavs, but not to clash with Austria-Hungary. The Serbian-Turkish War confronted the Russian government with the need to secure an agreement with Austria-Hungary in the event of an expansion of the political crisis in the Balkans. The meeting of Alexander II and A. Gorchakov with Franz Joseph and D. Andrássy in Bohemia, at Reichstadt Castle, on July 8, 1876, was devoted to the solution of this problem.

The Russian government achieved an agreement with Austria-Hungary, although no formal convention or even a protocol was signed at Reichstadt. The results of the Austro-Russian conspiracy on behalf of A. Gorchakov and D. Andrássy were recorded. According to both records, it was agreed at Reichstadt that both powers would for the time being adhere to the “principle of non-intervention.” If the Turks were successful, both sides pledged to act mutual agreement, demand the restoration of the pre-war situation in Serbia, as well as reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event of a Serbian victory, the parties pledged that “the powers will not assist in the formation of a large Slavic state.” Due to discrepancies in the records of Russian and Austro-Hungarian diplomats, the Reichstadt Agreement harbored the seeds of many misunderstandings and conflicts.

At this time, Turkey's atrocities in Bulgaria were made public in England, which forced the government of B. Disraeli to somewhat change its foreign policy course. The predicament of the British government could not have come at a more opportune time for Russia. Russian diplomacy needed to save Serbia, since already in August 1876, Prince Milan turned to representatives of the powers in Belgrade with a request for mediation to end the war. All powers agreed. During the Constantinople Conference, the English ambassador conveyed to the Porte the proposal of the powers to grant Serbia a truce for a period of one month and immediately begin peace negotiations. Türkiye announced its agreement. However, at the same time, she put forward very strict conditions for the future peace treaty. European powers rejected Turkish demands. The ensuing discussion did not advance the issue of ending the Serbo-Turkish war. Meanwhile, the successes of the Turks forced Russia to rush to save Serbia.

In order to achieve an agreement with Austria-Hungary, Alexander II undertook a diplomatic probe to clarify Germany’s position in the event of a Russian-Turkish war. The aggravation of the “Eastern Question” came in very handy for O. Bismarck. These complications were supposed to quarrel between Russia and England and Austria. As a result, the Chancellor hoped to deprive France of those allies that had emerged for it in 1874-1875. and thus consolidate its diplomatic isolation. The Eastern crisis posed some danger for O. Bismarck, which consisted in a possible Russian-Austrian war. He really wanted a Russian-Turkish, and even more - an Anglo-Russian war, but he was afraid of a complete break between both of his partners in the alliance of the three emperors

In these diplomatic negotiations, more clearly than anywhere else, the balance of power that gradually began to be determined as a result of the Franco-Prussian War was outlined: Russia and France, on the one hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the other. In 1876, both of these groups had not yet found their formalization in any treaties, but they had already become quite clearly visible in the international arena.

Chancellor Bismarck's refusal to force Austria-Hungary to become Russia's ally in the event of a Russo-Turkish war convinced the Russian government of the need to ensure Austria-Hungary's neutrality. On January 15, 1877, a secret convention was signed in Budapest, stipulating that in the event of a Russian-Turkish war, Austria-Hungary would maintain benevolent neutrality towards Russia. In exchange, she was given the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina with her troops. Thus, in January 1877, the tsarist government secured the neutrality of Austria-Hungary, and in March, Romania’s consent to allow Russian troops to pass through its territory.

After the failure of the Constantinople Conference, Russian-Turkish relations deteriorated sharply. Things were heading towards war. Nevertheless, the Russian government made another attempt to force Turkey to make some concessions to the great powers. The success of this diplomatic attempt depended on the position of the British government. In February 1877, Ignatiev was sent to European governments on a special mission, who was tasked with persuading them to sign a protocol that would confirm the decisions of the Constantinople Conference. On March 31, 1877, representatives of Russia, England, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy signed the London Protocol. Despite the fact that the British government signed this protocol, it encouraged Turkey to reject it. In response, on April 12, 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey.

Preparation of question 8. Problems and contradictions of the Vienna system

The five “great powers” ​​- England, Russia, Austria, Prussia and France formed an important stronghold of the “Viennese system” of 1815. But over the course of three decades (1815-1848), the interests of these powers increasingly diverged.

In the 40s XIX century There was a sharp deterioration in relations between Prussia and Austria, and even more between Prussia and Russia. Until the early 40s, the tsar favored Prussia, not Austria, and was in the closest relations with the Berlin court. There were no disputes between Prussia and Russia that would lead to disagreements. But, starting in 1840, the center of the bourgeois-liberal movement in Germany began to move to Prussia. Among the Prussian bourgeoisie, the desire for the unification of Germany under the leadership of Prussia intensified.

These new facts have caused concern in Russia. It was more profitable for Nicholas I for Germany to remain fragmented, for it to have a system of counterbalance between Prussia and Austria, which mutually neutralized each other and allowed tsarism to play the role of arbiter in German affairs. By 1848, the unity of the three “northern courtyards” was shaken. In Vienna and St. Petersburg, distrust of Prussia grew. Nicholas I drew closer and closer to Austria, seeing in it a counterbalance to the liberal and national unification aspirations of the German bourgeoisie.

The foreign policy of the French government at this time was consistently reactionary in nature. Peace at all costs, peace based on unquestioning compliance with the treaties of 1815 was one of the foundations of French foreign policy.

The British bourgeoisie in 1848 still benefited from preserving the treaties of 1815. “System of 1815” excluded the possibility of dangerous domination of any one power on the mainland for England and provided England with the opportunity to exert significant influence on European affairs by intervening in the mutual struggle of Russia, Austria, France and Prussia.

England's main opponents were Russia and France. The British Foreign Minister G. Palmerston opposed French influence in the Italian states, Switzerland, and Spain. Protecting the neutrality of Belgium and Switzerland from encroachments by France was one of the foundations of his policy. He tried to prevent armed French intervention in Italian affairs. Strengthening the Kingdom of Sardinia as a barrier between France and Austria, strengthening Prussia as a counterweight to France and Russia - these were the few significant changes in the “Viennese system” that G. Palmerston found in 1848-1849. acceptable and desirable in the interests of the traditional British policy of “European balance”.

Preparation of question 9. The growing crisis of the Vienna system

Revolutions of 1848-1849 flared up not only against internal reaction, but also threatened to radically undermine the entire European system of international relations, which had developed on the basis of the reactionary Viennese treaties of 1815.

In France, the revolution of 1848 put the French bourgeois class in power, whose circles pursued an aggressive policy, a policy of expanding colonial possessions, which sooner or later was bound to lead to international clashes.

The revolutions in Italy and Germany were aimed at eliminating feudal fragmentation and creating strong national states: a united Italy and a united Germany.

The Italian and Hungarian revolutions led to the collapse of the Austrian Empire. The Polish revolutionary movement, whose goal was the restoration of an independent Poland, threatened not only the Austrian Empire, but also the Prussian monarchy and Tsarist Russia.

In international relations 1848-1849. The central question was whether the system of 1815 would survive or whether it would collapse and the reunification of Germany and Italy into independent states would take place. Creation

The victory of the Allied powers over Napoleonic France ended a turbulent period in European history that began with the French Revolution of the 18th century. Peace has come. The winners had to resolve many issues regarding the political structure of post-war Europe. To do this, they organized a large diplomatic congress (congress), which consolidated the new balance of power in Europe that had developed by that time.

Principles and objectives of the Congress of Vienna

This was the first international congress of representatives from all European countries (except Turkey). It opened in September 1814 in the Austrian capital of Vienna.

The Congress of Vienna was guided by the principles of legitimacy and political balance. Legitimism (legality) meant the restoration of the rights of legitimate dynasties overthrown by the French Revolution and Napoleon. It was also assumed that there would be at least a partial restoration of the previous positions of the nobility and feudal order. European balance meant preventing the rise of any one great power to the detriment of others.

Based on these principles, the congress solved specific problems: what borders to define for France; to whom and what lands to transfer; which dynasties to restore.

Conflicts between great powers

The main role in the negotiations was played by meetings of representatives of the four great victorious powers: England, Austria, Russia and Prussia. Later, a representative of France, also a great but defeated power, managed to enter this committee of four. A committee of five was formed - the leadership headquarters of the congress. The opinions of other state representatives did not matter much.

From the very beginning, many controversial issues arose. The most important of them is Polish-Saxon. Russia wanted to get almost all of the Polish lands, and Prussia wanted all of Saxony. Austria, England and France strongly objected, citing a violation of the European balance in favor of Russia and Prussia. Disagreements between the powers became so acute that in January 1815 England, Austria and France entered into a secret treaty of alliance directed against Russia and Prussia. Therefore, the latter had to abandon their intentions and make concessions.

Final Act

On June 9, 1815, the main document was signed - the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, which consisted of 121 articles. This was the most extensive agreement of all international agreements that have been concluded so far.

It provided for the territorial redistribution of Europe in the interests of the victorious powers. Defeated France was deprived of all conquests and returned to the pre-war borders of 1792. Most of the Polish lands with Warsaw went to Russia. Prussia received the northern part of Saxony, the richest German regions - the Rhine Province and Westphalia, as well as Swedish Pomerania and western Polish lands with the city of Poznan.

North-Eastern Italy (Lombardy, Venice) was transferred to Austria. Sovereigns from the Austrian House of Habsburg were placed on the thrones of the small Italian duchies. The Duchy of Parma, for example, was given for life to the daughter of the Austrian emperor, Napoleon's second wife Maria Louise. Austria gained predominant influence in Italian affairs.
England received nothing on the European continent, but it retained the island of Malta and the recently captured possessions of other countries - the Cape Colony in southern Africa and the island of Ceylon.

In distributing lands and drawing new borders, the main participants in the Congress of Vienna paid no attention to religion, nationality, or the desires of peoples. The main thing for them was the number of square kilometers and inhabitants. Catholic Belgium united with Protestant Holland into a single Kingdom of the Netherlands. Norway was taken from Denmark, which supported Napoleon, and given to Sweden. Contrary to the aspirations of the Germans and Italians for unification, the fragmentation of Germany and Italy was maintained. The non-German population of the multinational Austrian Empire (Hungarians, Slavs, Italians) found itself in an unequal position with the German one and was subjected to national oppression.

The new international order established by the Vienna and some other agreements was called the “Vienna system”. This was the first attempt to establish peace in Europe based on collective agreement, principles of legitimacy and balance.

Creation of the Holy Alliance

The “Viennese system” was reinforced by the act of creating the Holy Alliance (1815-1833), signed in September 1815 by the Russian and Austrian emperors and the Prussian king. Soon almost all the monarchs of Europe joined him. It was a semi-religious association of sovereigns who pledged to be guided in their relations with each other and with their people by the “commandments of love, truth and peace” and to establish true Christian brotherhood.

European sovereigns pursued very specific political goals: to provide each other with mutual assistance always and everywhere. What kind of help were you talking about? First of all, about the joint struggle against revolutions and any upheavals that could change the existing order of things. The main goal of the Holy Alliance is to preserve everything in Europe as it is and, above all, the thrones, to prevent significant changes in inner life states Many European rulers were well aware that changes and reforms in economics and politics were inevitable and even desirable, but they wanted to reduce them to a minimum and carry them out with their own hands.

Thus, the “Viennese system” and the Holy Alliance gave Europe a completely new look. Its political map has changed. The nature of relations between states has changed. An attack began on the ideas and slogans of the French Revolution (freedom, equality, fraternity), on the Napoleonic bourgeois heritage.

In Europe, political reaction triumphed, openly manifested in the desire to forcibly return the old orders, morals and customs.

In the first years after Napoleon's defeat, the great powers acted in concert. To discuss pressing problems, congresses of representatives of the participating countries of the Holy Alliance met several times. In accordance with their decisions in the early 20s. XIX century Austrian troops suppressed anti-absolutist uprisings in the Italian states of Naples and Piedmont, and the French army strangled the Spanish revolution. In Italy and Spain, absolutist orders were restored and measures were strengthened against supporters of constitutional government. In 1820, the monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia signed a joint declaration on the right of sovereigns to armed intervention in the internal affairs of other countries without the consent of their governments to combat the revolutionary movement.

The aggravation of relations between the participants of the Holy Alliance in the 20-40s. XIX century
After the reprisal of the Italian and Spanish revolutions, relations between the great powers began to deteriorate. During this period, the eastern question intensified, that is, the question of the fate of the Balkan peoples who were under Turkish rule, and of control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, which connected the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and belonged to Turkey.

The struggle of the Greek people for independence inspired the work of many famous Europeans. In E. Delacroix’s painting “The Greek Revolt,” Greece appears in the form of a simple peasant girl, symbolizing freedom. In the background is an exotic figure of a Turk, representing centuries of enslavement

In 1821-1829. In the Balkans, a national liberation revolutionary uprising of the Greeks against Turkish rule took place. The rules of the "Vienna System" and the Holy Alliance required European monarchs to consider the uprising as a rebellion against the rightful sovereign. But each of the great powers sought to take advantage of the events in Greece primarily to strengthen their positions in the Middle East and weaken the influence of other countries there. Ultimately, an agreement was reached to recognize the independence of Greece, but a monarchical system was imposed on it.

In the early 30s. There was a new aggravation of the international situation in Europe in connection with the revolutions in France and Belgium, which was then part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Disagreements between European states did not allow organizing a joint action and maintaining the previous regimes and borders. The Holy Alliance actually disintegrated; it was impossible to convene new congresses. As a result of the revolution, Belgium became an independent kingdom. This meant that the system of boundaries established by the Congress of Vienna began to collapse.

The next blow to the “Viennese system” was dealt by the revolutions of 1848-1849. It was not possible to cope with them at the very beginning. Only at the final stage was Russia able to provide military assistance to the Austrian Habsburgs against the rebel Hungary, and France and Austria took part in the defeat of the revolution in Italy.

THIS IS INTERESTING TO KNOW

During the congress of representatives of Napoleon's victorious powers, Vienna became the main city of all monarchical Europe, to which the attention of all governments and the public was attracted. 2 emperors (Russian and Austrian), 4 kings, 2 crown princes and 3 grand duchesses gathered here. 450 diplomats and officials with numerous support staff arrived at the congress. The negotiations were accompanied by solemn and magnificent balls. Congress was jokingly called "dancing". At the same time, hard work was carried out, complex issues were resolved.

References:
V. S. Koshelev, I. V. Orzhekhovsky, V. I. Sinitsa / The World History Modern times XIX - early XX century, 1998.

The international political development of Europe over the past two decades has demonstrated very stable dynamics, both intraregional and of the system of international relations as a whole. Moreover, European development leads to an adjustment of the very structure of the modern world system.
The dynamics of European political and economic processes due to a number of circumstances, which primarily include the maximum maturity of the European system and most of its regional and subregional components, is not momentary, but strategic in nature.
The interconnected logic of various trends in European development can be clearly seen from the very beginning of the 1990s, where the Charter of Paris for a New Europe can be taken as a conditional starting point.
The stage of European development that began two decades ago organically accumulated changes that took place in several important dimensions of the continental structure. The evolution of these dimensions, ultimately leading to the overcoming of their original characteristics, represents the essence of the dynamics of the European system.
The Yalta-Potsdam, or historical and legal, dimension. Exactly at geographical areas and the functional areas of greatest localization of solutions in Yalta and Potsdam over the past twenty years, the most significant changes have occurred. The breakdown of “border” agreements as a result of the unification of Germany, the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia; the erosion of the long-decorative phenomenon of European neutrality associated with the early post-war period; the beginning of convergence, and then the self-liquidation of one of the two socio-economic systems - all this led to the marginalization of the original Yalta-Potsdam dimension by the beginning of the 1990s.
Let us make a reservation that the Yalta-Potsdam dimension introduced at least three elements into the treasury of European politics that remain to this day. Often they are understood as those values ​​that Russia supposedly does not share, although surprisingly it took an active part in their formation.
The first is the inevitability of punishment of the military aggressor, including through positive collusion of the most powerful participants in the system, and the rejection of large-scale military actions in Europe. That is why the bombing of Belgrade or the events of 2008 in Transcaucasia caused such a serious resonance.
Secondly, Yalta gave birth to Helsinki and the pan-European process, one of key elements which was the voluntary consent of the former victors, who had reached a dead end in bipolar confrontation, to democratize the system of multilateral relations in Europe. Democracy, as far as possible, is beyond nation state became a characteristic feature of the European system. Many European institutions are representative in form and often in essence.
Third, the international legal doctrine and historical and political logic of the Yalta-Potsdam regulations became guarantors of stability even for those borders that they did not directly affect. This concerns, first of all, state-territorial demarcation in the post-Soviet space, the boundaries between former proto-sovereign entities that were part of the Soviet state.
The next background dimension at the time of the adoption of the Charter of Paris existed as one of the successful paradigms, but had a significantly greater variability of competing alternatives. We are talking about Western European (at that time) integration, which later became one of the central and even dominant directions of continental development. Compared to today, the then twelve-nation European Communities look like a geopolitical dwarf.
At the same time, it was the Communities that were the very phenomenon that emphasized the special identity of the European system in world economic relations. It was the existence of the EU that made possible the emergence of the phenomenon of centro-power relations in the Western world and pluralistic multipolarity in the post-confrontational world.
Over the past two decades, the European Union's political ambitions have expanded beyond its original geographical and conceptual boundaries, thanks both to its own efforts and to a supportive international context.
The third dimension of the European situation is related to US policy in Europe and Euro-Atlantic relations, the core element of which was, and partly remains, NATO. The maturity of the European system, combined with more or less regular manifestations of opposition from European partner-competitors; the elimination of the European theater as the main arena of potential military confrontation; involvement in new geographical and functional spheres of world politics and economics - all this reduced the role of the United States on the continent. This trend strengthened in subsequent years. Deviations from it in the form of ad hoc intervention in European affairs (attempts to Americanize the elites of small post-socialist countries, Kosovo, “color revolutions”, missile defense) cannot be underestimated. However, they cannot be compared with the level of extremely close and attentive US guardianship over European policy, which was characteristic of several post-war European decades. Without equating the US and NATO, we can state that it is largely due to changes in US policy that the loss of NATO’s clear identity and the permanent search for the Alliance’s place in modern world have become so obvious.
The institutional landscape of modern Europe, especially “greater” Europe, which includes part of geographical Asia, is extremely mosaic, absorbing multidirectional trends, as well as giving rise to many proposals for their systematization. One of these proposals was the well-known Russian initiative on a new European security architecture.
In the series of European security institutions, the OSCE still nominally occupies first place. This is partly a tribute to tradition, and partly the result of the intensification of this direction, the manifestation of which was primarily the Corfu process and the summit in Astana. The OSCE faces two fundamental tasks. The first is internal consolidation. The second is a significant update of the content of traditional “baskets”. Thus, if the humanitarian “basket” demonstrates enviable dynamics, then the problems that fall into the first and second “baskets” run up against the procedural and legal ineffectiveness of the OSCE and often the lack of political will of the leading players in the European system.
At the same time, issues such as conflict management, peacebuilding, and the problems of the emergence of new state or quasi-state entities in the post-Soviet space are associated with these areas.
The third “basket” largely contains potential related to issues of economic security and its energy segment. In other words, the OSCE, from an organization with de facto reduced functions, can, if desired, turn into a full-fledged dialogue mechanism on a wide range of subjects.
Regardless of subjective desires, it is the OSCE that remains the structure of the most complete European participation.
The Atlantic dimension of European politics, symbolized by NATO, has over the past two years demonstrated increasing pragmatism and self-criticism regarding extensive enlargement, including the “new Eastern Europe" This was confirmed by the adoption of the new strategic concept of the Alliance and the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon.
In the meantime, the bid for a de facto expansion of NATO's responsibility faces an extremely difficult situation in Afghanistan and throughout the political area at the junction of Central and South Asia. NATO's activity in other segments of the “greater” Middle East is limited by the difference in approaches and real interests of the Alliance member countries. Complexes and prejudices that have accumulated over decades hinder the Alliance’s interaction both with Russia and with other significant regional actors, including institutional ones - the SCO, the CSTO.
Improving the general political climate so far has little added value in the practical dimension of relations between Russia and the Alliance. Obvious, but constantly postponed “for later” topics here are the issues of the European segment of missile defense, conventional weapons and armed forces, a coordinated understanding of military-strategic threats, legal registration of mutual interests of the Alliance and post-Soviet security structures.
The logic of the development of the European Union and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty position the EU in a completely different way in the new security architecture. Already, EU activities almost completely fill the “soft security” niche. The EU’s activity provokes discussions about security in the “common neighborhood”/“Eastern Partnership” space and the nature of relations with Russia.
It is in relations with the European Union that Russia and its neighbors in the CIS may be able to find a consensus on energy aspects of security, on the movement of citizens, and issues related to the reliability and at the same time transparency of borders will be resolved. Russia's accession to the WTO has actually brought our country closer to the scenario of economic functioning of the European Union.
Most EU states do not feel the need to abandon a system of stability and security that relies exclusively on the growing capabilities of the European Union in the field of foreign policy and defense and on the traditional resources of NATO. However, we must remember that modern “greater” Europe is wider than the western part of the continent. If countries that, for one reason or another, are not associated with the EU and NATO are dissatisfied with the parameters of the current situation, it is necessary to look for options for mutual adaptation of interests and institutions.
The European security system, which is not comprehensive, becomes a palliative, which tends to provoke political tension when trying to solve real problems with its help both in its own geographical area and in neighboring regions - in the Greater Middle East or South Asia.
It is in this regard that Europeans are faced with the task of collecting, creating an “intermodal” scheme of institutions for the large European space. This scheme should include various regional and subregional structures (from the “classical” European and Euro-Atlantic - EU, CE, NATO to the “big” CIS, EurAsEC/Customs Union, CSTO) with the necessary support for niche structures like the BSEC, CBSS, long-term contact mechanisms.
Obviously, one can only dream of complete institutional harmony, but some kind of revision and coordination of actions, at a minimum, can lead to a reduction in cross-waste of time, diplomatic and material resources.
The understanding of European stability and security has traditionally included issues of military security, control over arms and armed forces. Many people think that this is a problem of yesterday. But an unresolved problem has a chance to “shoot” at the most inopportune moment. This is exactly the situation with the CFE Treaty. It is paradoxical, but on the continent, which is still the most militarized, and at the level of the highest technological standards, there has been no modern rules regulation of military activities.
Additional elements of stability of the European system are various stable, both bilateral and multilateral configurations of interstate relations. These include the traditional axes: Moscow-Paris, Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Rome. Apparently, the Moscow-Warsaw dialogue channel was starting to work. Traditional are the Franco-German tandem and the slightly less stable Franco-British tandem, which have given rise to a significant number of initiatives in the field European integration, EU foreign policy and security. The Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), which once had its own integration prospects, has become a mechanism for coordinating the interests of the CEE countries, and the Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany, France) helps coordinate the positions of the Franco-German motor of Europe with largest country Of Eastern Europe.

The decisive role in European foreign policy belonged to five states; France, England, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The main area of ​​struggle between these powers was the fragmented Italy and Germany, Poland and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, which were under Turkish rule.

During the 18th century. The main conflicts between the European powers were the struggle of England and France for naval and colonial hegemony, Austria and Prussia for dominance in Germany, Russia for access to the Baltic and Black Seas, which pitted it primarily against Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.

North War. Back in the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia tried to take control of the Baltic coast. Its main opponent was Sweden, whose territory included Livonia, Finland and Estland, as well as former Russian possessions - the Izhora lands and Karelia. In preparation for war, Peter I entered into an alliance with Denmark, Saxony and Poland in 1699, and in 1700 he signed a truce with Turkey and declared war on Sweden. In 1700, the Northern War began, which lasted until 1721.

Peter I moved a 35,000-strong army to the Swedish fortress of Narva, but its siege dragged on. The Swedish army was led by King Charles XII (1697-1718), a young and skilled commander. In November 1700, near Narva, the Russian army was defeated. Charles XII, considering that Russia was finished, moved to Poland to defeat Russia’s ally, the Saxon elector and, at the same time, since 1697, the Polish king Augustus II (1670-1733).

However, Peter I did not accept defeat and began to reorganize the army. Since 1702, the military initiative passed into the hands of Peter I. By the spring of 1703, the Russian army liberated the entire river basin. Neva and reached the shores of the Baltic Sea.

At this time, the Swedes captured Warsaw and Krakow. In 1704, the Polish Sejm deposed Augustus II and proclaimed Stanisław I Leszczynski (1677-1766) king. In 1704-1706. The Swedes inflicted a number of defeats on the Saxon, Polish and Russian troops and forced Poland to withdraw from the war (Treaty of Altranstadt 1706).

Russia was left alone with Sweden; the search for allies led to nothing. The Swedes attempted to recapture the Izhora lands, but failed. The main forces of Charles XII concentrated on Ukraine, he intended to move them to Moscow. In April 1709, the Swedes besieged Poltava. On June 27 (July 8) the Battle of Poltava took place. Swedish army was destroyed.

Charles XII with the remnants of his army fled to Turkey. A turning point in the war has come. The Northern Alliance was renewed and Prussia joined. On March 31, 1710, Russia and Sweden signed a commitment in The Hague not to conduct military operations in Swedish possessions in Germany; England and Holland insisted on this. In the same year, Livonia and Estonia were occupied, Russian troops captured Vyborg, Kexholm and Vilmanstrand - the exit from the Gulf of Finland was free.

In 1712-1714. Russia's allies, with its support, won a number of victories in the European theater of operations. In 1713-1714 Russia occupied part of the territory of Finland. On July 27 (August 7), 1714, the Russian galley fleet defeated the Swedish one at Cape Gangut. On land, the Russian army reached Luleå.

In 1718, Charles XII died in Norway. In 1719, Russia transferred military operations to the territory of Sweden, whose human and financial resources were depleted. In January 1720, Sweden concluded an alliance with England and peace with Prussia, and in June with Denmark. In May 1720, an English squadron entered the Baltic Sea, but its attempts to attack Revel were unsuccessful. In 1720, the Russian fleet won a victory near the island of Grengam. On August 30 (September 10) a peace treaty with Sweden was signed in Nystadt.

As a result of the military victory, Russia gained access to the Baltic Sea and thereby solved one of the most important tasks of its foreign policy. October 11 (October 22), 1721 The Senate and the Holy Synod assign Peter I the titles of “Father of the Fatherland, Emperor of All Russia” and “Great”, and Russia becomes an empire.

Between the “Glorious English” of 1688 and the Great French Revolution, about 35 years were spent in wars between France and England. War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738), War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Moreover, other states were drawn into the orbit of these wars.

• Wars of succession
• Seven Years' War
• Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774
• Foreign policy of Catherine II in the 80s.