Plan
Introduction
1 Background
1.1 Iranian War of 1722
1.2 Turkish War 1768-1774

2 Conclusion of the contract
3 Treatise in 1783-1787
3.1 Version No. 1
3.2 Version No. 2

4 Manifesto of Paul I
5 The question of annexation under Alexander I
5.1 Opinion State Council
5.2 Report by Vorontsov and Kochubey
5.3 Knorring's mission
5.4 Final decision
5.5 Consequences

Bibliography
Treaty of Georgievsk

Introduction

Treaty of Georgievsk (Georgian: გეორგიევსკის ტრაქტატი) 1783 - an agreement on the patronage and supreme power of the Russian Empire with the united Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (otherwise Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, Eastern Georgia) about the transition of Georgia under the protectorate of Russia. Concluded on July 24 (August 4), 1783 in the Georgievsk fortress (North Caucasus).

1. Background

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Georgia found itself cut off from the entire Christian world, and a little later it was actually divided between Turkey and Iran, and survived by maneuvering between these two states. She managed to achieve an acceptable and sometimes even a privileged position within these states, but the religious barrier was an insurmountable obstacle to final integration. At this time, hope for Russian help gradually formed. The first attempts at rapprochement took place back in the 17th century, but without serious consequences. However, since 1586, the Moscow kings were titled “sovereign of the Iveron land and Georgian kings.” First real try A long-term alliance with Russia occurred in the era of Peter I.

1.1. Iranian War of 1722

In 1720, A. Volynsky was appointed governor of Astrakhan. He was instructed to persuade the Georgian king Vakhtang to side with Russia. Persia was going through a period of crisis and Peter was preparing his Persian campaign. Already in 1721, negotiations began on joint actions. For Russia, the Georgian army was only an auxiliary force, but, apparently, Volynsky promised Vakhtang a lot, almost a permanent alliance and patronage, which was so desired in Georgia. Impressed by these promises, Vakhtang decides to break off relations with Persia.

On March 8, 1722, the Persians were defeated by the Afghans at Gulnabad (Vakhtang’s brother, who commanded the Shah’s guard, was killed) and the siege of Isfahan began. The Shah asked Vakhtang for help. Simultaneously with the messengers from the Shah, ambassadors from Peter I arrived to Vakhtang. Vakhtang refused the Shah and in September the Georgian army set out to join the Russian army.

Vakhtang sincerely trusted Peter I and did not want to establish connections with anyone else. Before the start of a joint war with Russia against Persia, Vakhtang convened a council (darbazi), where the question of whether to take part in the war against Persia or not was to be decided. Most Darbazi members opposed it, fearing that the country would be in an even worse situation. Vakhtang did not share the majority opinion. In August, with an army of 40 thousand, he stood at Ganja and waited for Peter I.

But something happened that was not expected in Georgia - Peter canceled the campaign.

The consequences were tragic. The Shah declared Vakhtang an outlaw, and the Lezgin army ravaged Tbilisi. Taking advantage of this, Turkish army occupied Kartli and Kakheti. The Turkish occupation lasted until 1734.

On June 12, 1724, Russia concluded a treaty on borders with Turkey. In this document, Peter actually recognized the occupation of Georgia by the Turks. "Turkey took possession of Kartli (Tiflis), the Erivan Khanate, Azerbaijani lands (Shemakha, Tabriz) and northern Iranian lands (Qazvin)."

1.2. Turkish War 1768-1774

In the 20s, clergy and entire classes sent requests for help to the Russian government, but without consequences. At one time, the idea arose to resettle Georgians to the North Caucasus (to the Terek), but this proposal was not accepted. In Georgia they could not understand Russia’s pragmatic policy, and, in spite of everything, they believed in its help. A legend even arose that Peter indicated in his will: “Georgia is unhappy, defend it for the sake of faith, send her an army...”, but the intrigues of the courtiers prevented his will from being fulfilled.

The situation changed when the Russian-Turkish war approached. At one of the meetings of the Council, it was decided to raise the entire Christian population of the Balkans, Greece and Georgia against Turkey. The Collegium of Foreign Affairs compiled “a discussion on the ways in which Georgians can be inclined to accept participation in the present Ottoman war with the Porte.” Thus began the second attempt at rapprochement, which failed, but became the first step towards the Treaty of Georgievsk. Sending Totleben’s expeditionary force to Georgia, Panin explained to the general the essence of the upcoming war: “the soul would be local, but the body would be Georgian.” The joint campaign project was doomed to failure from the very beginning: it was impossible to coordinate the actions of the regular Russian and irregular Georgian armies. Despite a number of victories, Catherine II was generally dissatisfied with the results. In Georgia they hoped that it would at least be mentioned during peace negotiations with Turkey - then it was called “include in the treaty.” But this was not done either. The Kuchuk Kaynardzhi Treaty, concluded on July 20, 1774, did not mention a word about the Kakheti and Kartli kingdoms. (The words “Georgia” in paragraph 23 of the treatise mean its Western, Turkish part).

Even during the stay of Russian troops in Georgia, shortly before their recall, Tsar Irakli II sent Catherine a written representation about the conditions under which he wished to enter under the protection of Russia. With this document he sent his son Levan and his brother, Catholicos Anthony. He asked “to honor us now with such patronage so that everyone ... can see that I am an exact subject of the Russian state, and my kingdom has been added to the Russian Empire.” Irakli proposed those forms of dependence that previously had dependence on Iran. He offered to send one of his sons, several princes and nobles to the Russian court as a hostage. The population pays the Empire 70 kopecks per yard, annually sends 14 of the best horses, 2,000 buckets of wine, and also supplies soldiers to Russia. It was from this “idea” that the St. George’s treatise was subsequently formed.

The offer was rejected. On February 8, 1773, Panin reported this to Irakli (“strange and completely out of time proposals,” he wrote). In 1774, Catherine reported in a letter that military assistance to Georgia was currently unprofitable, although she promised to demand guarantees from Turkey for the security of Georgia.

2. Conclusion of an agreement

At the end of 1782, the Kartli-Kakheti king Irakli II turned to the Empress of Russia Catherine II with a request to accept Georgia under the protection of Russia. In an effort to strengthen Russia's position in Transcaucasia, Catherine II granted Pavel Potemkin broad powers to conclude an agreement with Tsar Heraclius. The representatives on the Georgian side were Princes Ivane Bagration-Mukhrani and Garsevan Chavchavadze.

According to the agreement, Tsar Irakli II recognized the patronage of Russia and partially renounced an independent foreign policy, and pledged to serve with his troops Russian Empress. Catherine II, for her part, acted as a guarantor of the independence and integrity of the territories of Kartli-Kakheti. Georgia was granted complete internal independence. The parties exchanged envoys.

The agreement equalized the rights of Georgian and Russian nobles, clergy and merchants (respectively).

Especially important had 4 secret articles of the treaty. According to them, Russia pledged to defend Georgia in the event of war, and during peace negotiations to insist on the return to the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom of possessions that had long belonged to it (but seized by Turkey). Russia has pledged to maintain two infantry battalions in Georgia and to increase the number of its troops in the event of war.

The main political significance of the Treaty of Georgievsk was the establishment of a Russian protectorate in relation to Eastern Georgia, sharply weakening the positions of Iran and Turkey in Transcaucasia, formally destroying their claims to Eastern Georgia.

In 1783, in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty of Georgievsk, the construction of the Georgian Military Road between Georgia and Russia began, along which several fortifications were built, including the Vladikavkaz fortress (1784).

3. Treatise in 1783-1787

From the moment of its conclusion, the treaty operated without interference for about 3-4 years. However, then strong opposition from Turkey began. Under her influence, the raids of the Lezgins and the Akhaltsikhe Pasha became more frequent. Russia expressed protests, but they did not have the desired impact. Moreover, Turkey demanded that Russia cancel the Treaty of Georgievsk and demolish the fortifications of Vladikavkaz. As a result, in 1787, Russian troops were withdrawn from Georgia. There are two versions of the reasons for this conclusion.

3.1. Version No. 1

According to this version, Georgia was the first to violate the treaty by entering into separate negotiations with the Turks. Accordingly, Russia withdrew its troops upon the cancellation of the treaty.

In September 1786, Suleiman Pasha of Akhaltsi sent a letter to the King of Georgia, Heraclius II, proposing to conclude a separate peace treaty.

From Colonel Burnashev’s report to Pavel Potemkin:

His Highness... intends to send the amanats (hostages) required to Akhaltsikhe by Suleiman Pasha, apologizing that he was forced to do this by his subjects and by the extreme need to get rid of the devastation of his lands from the Turkish side. To this end, I have the honor to report to His Highness that after the conclusion of the Treaty of the 4th Article with Georgia, in the case of sending envoys or letters from neighbors, one must agree with the main border commander, and moreover, with all the circumstances that require diligent consideration «.

Currently, Georgia is laying the historical foundation for a new interpretation of Russian-Georgian relations. In the direction of the main blow, a treaty was signed on June 24, 1783 in the city of Georgievsk, according to which Eastern Georgia - the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom - came under the protection of Russia as a protectorate, but while maintaining state sovereignty. A similar change of milestones began after E. Shevardnadze came to power as a result of a coup in December 1991 - January 1992 and is developing today.

The Georgian people are being taught that the Treaty of Georgievsk is fatal mistake good-natured Georgian rulers who trusted the treacherous Russian emperors that from their northern neighbor Georgia always received only black ingratitude in response to kindness, and then lost any attributes of sovereignty. Mikheil Saakashvili is trying to create an image of a proud people, continuously subjected to deprivation and humiliation, but in the end freed from the Russian yoke and finding new and true friends.

Brief historical background

The Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783 is an agreement on the voluntary entry of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom (Eastern Georgia) under the protection of Russia.

In 1453, after the fall of Constantinople, Georgia was cut off from the entire Christian world, and a little later it was actually divided between Turkey and Iran. In the XVI - XVIII centuries it was the arena of the struggle between Iran and Turkey for dominance in Transcaucasia.

By the end of the 18th century, eastern Georgia was under Persian control.

During the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774, the Kartli-Kakheti and Imereti kingdoms opposed the Turks on the side of Russia. General Totleben's corps of 3,500 people was sent to help them. The victory of Russia over Turkey in 1774 significantly eased the situation of the Georgian lands subject to the Turks, and the payment of tribute to the Sultan by the Kingdom of Imereti was abolished.

On December 21, 1782, the Kartli-Kakheti king Irakli II turned to Catherine II with a request to accept Georgia under the protection of Russia.

The agreement was concluded on July 24 (August 4), 1783 in the Georgievsk fortress (North Caucasus) and signed on behalf of Russia by the general-in-chief, Prince Pavel Potemkin, on behalf of Georgia - by princes Ivan Bagration-Mukhransky and Garsevan Chavchavadze. On January 24, 1784, the treaty came into force...

The Georgian king recognized the “supreme power and patronage” of Russia, which in turn guaranteed the preservation territorial integrity possessions of Irakli II and his heirs...

Other Transcaucasian countries also sought to rely on Russia in the fight against Muslim Persia and Turkey. In 1803, Mingrelia came under Russian citizenship, in 1804 - Imereti and Guria, the Ganja Khanate and Dzharo Belokan region were also annexed, in 1805 - the Karabakh, Sheki and Shirvan khanates and the territory of Shirak, in 1806 - the khanates of Derbent, Kuba and Baku, in 1810 - Abkhazia, in 1813 - Talysh Khanate. Thus, within short term Almost all of Transcaucasia went to the Russian Empire.

There will be no complete answer to all these questions if we cannot understand the state of the Georgian people in the second half of the 18th century. The emergence of the Georgian state dates back to 487, when King Vakhtang I Gorgasal united Georgia politically and, with the consent of Byzantium, declared the Georgian church autocephalous. In the 12th and early 13th centuries, Georgia as a feudal state reached its highest development and became one of the most powerful powers in the region. The leading role in transforming Georgia into a strong state belonged to the Abkhazian kingdom. Abkhazian king Leon II at the end of the 8th century. moved the capital of the Abkhazian kingdom from Anakopia (Psyrdekh) to Kutaisi. “The city of Kutatisi (now Kutaisi) became the residence of the Abkhaz kings. Having subjugated the regions of not only Lazika itself, but also the Argvet region, the Abkhaz kings thereby embarked on the path of unifying not only Western Georgia, but also Georgia as a whole, since the Argvet region had always belonged to the Kartli (Iberian) kingdom... The new Western Georgian entity accepted name of the Abkhazian kingdom." Cultural, economic and political successes of the Abkhazian kingdom in the 8th-10th centuries. prepared the ground for annexing not only Kartli, but also parts of South Georgia in Tao, and thereby for the formation of a united Georgian kingdom at the end of the 10th - beginning of the 11th century.

But at the beginning of the 16th century, Georgia was divided into independent territories, hostile to each other and microstates (principalities) at war with each other - Kartli, Kakheti, Imereti, Guria, Abkhazia, Mingrelia, Svaneti and Samtskhe. In 1555, Turkey and Persia divided the entire country between themselves without declaring war. Eastern Georgia fell under the rule of Persia, and Western Georgia (especially Abkhazia) came under Turkey.

Türkiye had a detrimental effect on further economic development Abkhazia, and in particular, on the cultural life of the Abkhaz people.

The first contact between Rus' and Georgia recorded by chroniclers dates back to the 70s of the 12th century, when Prince Yuri Andreevich, the son of the Suzdal prince Andrei Bogolyubsky and the grandson of the great Kiev Yuri Dolgoruky, the husband of Queen Tamara, actually became the Georgian king. The Georgian king George III, concerned that he did not have a son-heir, made his daughter Tamara queen during his lifetime.

The Kakhetian prince Leon was the first to voluntarily turn to the Muscovite kingdom for protection in 1564 under Ivan the Terrible.

Under Peter I, one of his favorite friends and associates was the Imeretian prince Alexander. During Peter's lifetime, King Vakhtang of Kartli, overthrown from the throne by the Turks, moved with his entire family, at Peter's call, to Russia. Over 100 Georgians - princes, princes, warriors, and clergy - went to Russia with him.

The Georgian king Archil turned to Peter I with a request to help the Georgian press. “Tsar Peter ordered to immediately cast Georgian letters for printing, and the first printed books in the Georgian language came out of the Moscow state printing house. Then Russian craftsmen and teachers opened a printing house in the capital of Kartolinia - Tiflis. From the Russians they learned how to organize schools and icon painting.” (Russia under the scepter of the Romanovs. 1613-1913. St. Petersburg, 1912. - Reprint. - M.; Interbook, 1990, p. 165.)

During the reign of Catherine II, under the rule of one king, Erekle II, the two main Georgian kingdoms - Kartli and Kakheti - united. Imereti, Mingrelia and Guria paid the Turks annually shameful tribute: not only in money, but also in “live goods”, sending a certain number of girls. Kartli and Kakheti paid the same tribute to Persia.

Regularly repeated invasions of the Turks and Persians, as well as bloody internecine clashes among the scattered Georgian principalities, led to the fact that the Georgians, already small in number, were brought to the brink of physical extinction, or, at best, assimilation by the Muslim environment (Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, mountainous Caucasian peoples). The king of Kartli and Kakheti, Irakli II, could barely field 10 thousand troops, poorly armed, completely untrained and not knowing any discipline. Therefore, Tsar Irakli II turned to Russia for help.

In accordance with the Treaty of Georgievsk, Russians military units in Georgia were first stationed in 1784 - “to preserve the possessions of Kartli and Kakheti from any touch from their neighbors and to reinforce the troops of His Grace King Erekle II for defense.”

The text of the agreement, in particular, stated: “Any new ruler of Georgia can ascend the throne only with the consent of Russia; Georgia's relations with foreign countries must take place under the supervision of the Russian representative in Tiflis; citizens of both countries have the same rights before the laws; Russia undertakes to keep a detachment of its troops in Tiflis.”

The Shah of Iran, Agha Mohammed Khan Qajar, sent his ambassadors to Heraclius II with a demand to break all relations with Russia. “Not only Agha Mohammed Khan, but even if everyone Asian states go to war against us, and even then I will not give up allegiance to Russia“, - this was the answer of the Georgian king to the Persians. (Abashidze G. Decree. Op. P. 172)

The acceptance of Georgia under Russian protectorate set Persia and Turkey against Russia. “Persia, which was losing its long-time vassal in the person of the Georgian king, protested openly and even gathered troops, but Turkey, which had no reason to clearly interfere in our relations with Georgia, resorted to its usual method - to raise the Caucasian peoples against us. The Kabardians, who had recently experienced the power of Russian weapons, did not accept the Turkish emissaries, but the Chechens rebelled almost without exception.” (Potto V.A. Two centuries of the Terek Cossacks (1577-1801). T.2 P.145. Vladikavkaz. 1912. - Reprint. - Stavropol, 1991.

On September 11, 1995, Shah Agha Mohamed Khan captured Tiflis, and “the entire East trembled from the horrors that accompanied the capture of the capital of Iveria. In a flourishing city, turned into a heap of ruins, no stone was left unturned; Most of the inhabitants were slaughtered in the most barbaric manner, and the rest, numbering 22 thousand souls, were taken into slavery.” (Ibid. pp. 204-205)

All churches were desecrated or destroyed, the Georgian Metropolitan Dosifei was thrown from the bridge into the Kura River.

To this day, Georgian authors sharply reproach Russia for not providing assistance during the invasion of 1795. According to Georgiy Abashidze, the real threat of an attack by Agha Mohamed Khan, enraged by Georgia’s political orientation towards Russia, arose earlier: in 1792, Irakli II first turned to Catherine II with a request for military assistance in the hope of fulfilling their obligations in accordance with the Treaty of Georgievsk.

Why didn’t Russia provide assistance to Georgia in 1795?

Firstly, a difficult war with Turkey has just ended. Secondly, a significant part of the Russian troops remained in Poland. Simultaneously with the Turkish war, there was a war with the Swedes. Third, Austria withdrew from its alliance with Russia and made peace with the Turks, while England and Prussia negotiated an armed alliance with Poland against Russia. Fourthly, the formidable shadow of Napoleon Bonaparte has already loomed on the western borders of Russia. All these factors give reason to consider Russia’s position to be constrained.

Another important circumstance was that Georgia could not then support the Russian troops allied to it. “Under Catherine the Great, Russian troops were sent to Georgia twice; but the internal unrest there was so strong that King Heraclius could not collect food supplies even for several battalions, and King Solomon of Imereti, instead of the promised abundant supplies, delivered only a few bulls to feed the Russian army. The army had to be recalled, but nevertheless, under an agreement with Russia, Turkey was forced to refuse the shameful tribute of people from Georgian lands. This was the first relief wrested for Georgia by the weapons of fellow believer Russia.” (Russia under the scepter of the Romanovs S.168).

In fact, the treaty was in force in the fall of 1795. On September 4, 1795, Catherine ordered “to reinforce Tsar Heraclius, as a Russian vassal, against hostile attempts on his life, stipulated by the treaty with them with two full battalions of infantry.”

After 8 days, Tbilisi was destroyed by the troops of Agha-Magomed Khan. General Gudovich received the Empress's order only on October 1.
By 1795, Agha Mohammed Khan had just managed to unite Iran and defeat his rivals, and the question arose of returning Georgia to Iran, which had actually separated from it after the signing of the Treaty of Georgievsk.

“At the repeated requests of Tsar Irakli, in April 1796, Russia sent the 13,000-strong Caspian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General V. A. Zubov from Kizlyar to the Azerbaijani provinces of Iran. On May 10, Derbent was taken by storm, and on June 15, Baku and Cuba were occupied without a fight. In November, Russian troops reached the confluence of the Kura and Araks rivers. However, on November 6, 1796, Catherine died. Only a small detachment of General Rimsky-Korsakov remained in Georgia, which was recalled at the beginning of 1797.”

If the events in Tbilisi in the summer of 1795 may raise questions for Russia, then Russia’s accusation that Emperor Alexander I, as the Tbilisi newspaper “Sakartvelos Republic” (Republic of Georgia) reported in 2006, quoting I. Javakhishvili, “trampled on the treatise , abolishing the kingdom in Georgia and completing its annexation” is controversial. Exist historical facts and they cannot be cast aside if they do not fit into someone’s ahistorical scheme.

In 1797, two years after the defeat of Tbilisi, an envoy from the Georgian king arrived in St. Petersburg to assure Emperor Paul of the king's devotion to Georgia and ask for help and protection.

George XII asked the Emperor of the Russian Empire to accept Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom) into Russia: He feared that the Georgian princes would start an internecine struggle, as a result of which Georgia would be conquered by Persia. Therefore, George XII wanted his son, David XII Georgievich, to take the throne after his death.

It should be noted that the accession to the throne of George XII was marked by a new onslaught of intra-feudal reaction. The king's brothers, incited by their mother, the queen Darejana, forced George XII to approve the order of succession to the throne, according to which the throne passed to the eldest in the family. Thus, the prince became the heir to the throne Yulon, son of Heraclius. George XII soon abolished the new order of succession to the throne. As a result of this, irreconcilable enmity arose between the king and his brothers. Those dissatisfied with George began to group around the princes. The royal court was divided into two camps; The split took on an extremely dangerous character in the context of the political crisis the country was experiencing.

George XII and the diplomats who took his side sensibly assessed the situation created in the state; they understood that the only way to prevent civil strife in the country was armed assistance from Russia, in the amount necessary to ensure the external and internal security of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom. George XII decided to persistently seek from the Russian government the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under the treaty of 1783.

In April 1799 Emperor Paul I renewed the agreement on patronage with the king of Kartli and Kakheti. In the autumn, Russian troops arrived in Georgia.

From a letter from the last king of Kartli-Kakheti, George XII, to his ambassador Garsevan Chavchavadze dated September 7, 1799:

“Give them my entire kingdom and my possession, as a sincere and righteous sacrifice, and offer it not only under the protection of the highest Russian imperial throne, but also leave it completely to their power and care, so that from now on the kingdom of the Kartlosians is considered to belong to the Russian state with the same rights enjoyed by other regions located in Russia ».

Emperor Paul I ordered the immediate dispatch of the 17th Jaeger Regiment to Tiflis to defend Georgia under the command of General I.P. Lazareva “to remain in it forever.”

On November 26, 1799, Russian troops entered Tbilisi. George XII met Russian troops three kilometers from Tbilisi.

The day after General Lazarev arrived in Tbilisi, November 27, 1799 A meeting of the highest clergy and nobility of Georgia took place. The ambassador of Emperor Paul I solemnly announced that the All-Russian autocrat was taking Georgia under his patronage and protection, and King George XII was establishing himself on the throne. On behalf of Paul, the Georgian king was presented with a diploma, a royal crown, porphyry and a banner with the image of a Russian double-headed eagle. George XII took the oath of allegiance to the Emperor of Russia.

First, the 17th Jaeger (later Life Grenadier Erivan) regiment of Major General Ivan Lazarev marched to Tiflis and a little later - Kabardinsky infantry regiment Major General Vasily Gulyakov.

The feudal reaction that was raging in the country was ready, for the sake of personal interests, to agree to any agreement with Georgia’s age-old enemies - Turkey and Iran. It was clear to supporters of Tsar George XII that the assistance provided for by the treaty of 1783 was clearly insufficient to curb feudal anarchy and ensure the external security of Georgia, and George XII, firmly adhering to the Russian orientation, began to revise the points of the Treaty of Georgievsk.

In the note presented June 24, 1800 The Georgian ambassador in St. Petersburg, the king of Kartli and Kakheti proposed to retain only the right of limited autonomous self-government for Kartli and Kakheti, subject to the preservation of the royal throne by George XII and his heirs. The king of Kartli and Kakheti agreed to submit to the authority of the Russian emperor not only in matters of foreign policy, but also in the field of internal administration.

In St. Petersburg, the Georgian embassy on June 24, 1800 handed over to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs a draft document on citizenship. The first point read: Tsar George XII “zealously desires with his descendants, the clergy, nobles and all the people subject to him to one day forever accept citizenship of the Russian Empire, promising to sacredly fulfill everything that the Russians do.”

At an audience on November 14, 1800, Count Rostopchin and S.L. Lashkarev announced to the Georgian ambassadors that Emperor Paul I accepted the Tsar and the entire Georgian people into eternal citizenship and agreed to satisfy all the requests of George XII, “but not otherwise than when one of the envoys will go back to Georgia to announce to the tsar and people there the consent of the Russian emperor, and when the Georgians again declare by letter their desire to become Russian citizens.”

November 23, 1800 Emperor gave a rescript addressed to George XII, about the acceptance of his kingdom into Russian citizenship, he further wrote:

« “We accepted what was revealed to us with our highest royal favor and also honored our most merciful approval of your petitions to accept you into Our citizenship.”

December 22, 1800 Emperor Paul I signed a manifesto on the annexation of Georgia to Russia.

The Georgian ambassadors read out the “petition clauses” that declared David XII temporary ruler of the country until he was confirmed as king by the Russian emperor.

On November 7 of the same year, two Russian regiments under the command of General Lazarev, together with Georgian detachments near the village of Kakabeti, on the banks of the Iori River, inflicted a severe defeat on the troops (15 thousand) of the Avar Khan Omar, who had his son, who had invaded Georgia. Irakli, Tsarevich Alexander.

Time after time, the mountaineers rushed into desperate attacks, trying to crush the detachment that stood in their way, but rifle volleys and grapeshot constantly drove back the enemy. Up to 2 thousand highlanders fell in battle, Omar himself received a serious wound and soon died.

When, incited by the former masters of Georgia, the Persians, a huge horde of Lezgins rushed into Georgia for the usual robbery, 700 people of the Russian infantry of General Lazarev familiarized the Lezgins with Russian bayonet fighting. Supported by 1000 Georgian militia horsemen, they crushed the Lezgin cavalry and put it to flight.

At the end of 1800, Tsar George XII became seriously ill. During his illness, supreme power gradually passed into the hands of the plenipotentiary minister of the Russian government under the Georgian tsar, Kovalensky, and the commander of the Russian troops in Georgia, General Lazarev. During this tense time, which required the unification of all the living forces of the country, the comrades-in-arms of the princes pretending to the royal throne, even during the life of George XII, began a fierce internecine struggle that threatened the existence of the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom.

George XII was promised to retain the right of king for the rest of his life. However, after his death, the Russian government intended to approve David XII Georgievich as governor-general with the title of tsar, and to classify Georgia among the Russian provinces under the name of the kingdom of Georgia.

In the 30-50s of the 19th century. Georgians settled scores with their neighbors who had long been at enmity with them, taking an active part in Caucasian War against Chechnya and Dagestan on the side of Russian troops. In 1944, the Georgian Lavrentiy Beria carried out a lightning-fast operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush from Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Then the Georgian Joseph Stalin changed the Borders of the Georgian SSR, to whose territory the lands of the mountain republics of the North Caucasus were “added”.

The Georgian SSR included part of the abolished Karachay Autonomous Region and the Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

What was Georgia like before it was annexed to Russia in 1801?

The Russian ambassador reported to St. Petersburg from Georgia that “73 members of the ruling dynasty, including six brothers and eight sons of Tsar George XII, constitute mutually warring parties and “ constantly stir up civil strife and put pressure on the people, tormenting an already devastated country».

(The death of King George XII and the transfer of power to David XII in December 1800 aggravated the situation in the country. Queen Darejan (widow of Heraclius II) and her sonscategorically refused to recognize the authority of Prince David XII , as well as the annexation of Georgia to Russia.

After the death of Paul I, the decree was confirmed by Alexander I on September 12, 1801. The Georgian nobility did not recognize the decree until April 1802, when Knorring gathered everyone in the Zion Cathedral in Tbilisi and forced them to take an oath to the Russian throne. Those who refused were arrested.

In the summer of 1802, Alexander I appointed a relative of Queen Mariam, wife of George XII, Pavel Tsitsianov (Tsitsishvili), as Commander-in-Chief of Georgia in the summer of 1802. The consolidation of the new government, according to P. Tsitsianov and Emperor Alexander I himself, was hampered by the presence of numerous Georgian princes in their homeland. Therefore, Alexander I sent letters to queens Darejan and Mariam inviting them to move to St. Petersburg. However, members of the Kartli-Kakheti royal house did not agree to leave their homeland. In April 1803, General Lazarev arrived at the palace of Queen Mariam with the aim of arresting and deporting her. The queen killed the general with a dagger, for which she was exiled to Voronezh. Until 1805, all Georgian princes were also sent to Russia, most of whom settled in St. Petersburg, living on a pension assigned by the emperor, engaged only in scientific and literary activities.)

Despite all the costs, life in Georgia, after its inclusion in Russia, as well as in the Caucasus as a whole, became safe for the peoples living here. Famous English traveler Harold Buxton confirmed this in his book “Travel and Policy of Russia in Transcaucasia and Armenia” (1914): “What the Russians have done here over the last century is a matter of enormous scale. Thanks to the peace they established here, the population increased, culture developed, and rich cities and villages arose. Russian officials do not show cruelty and arrogance towards the tribes they rule, so characteristic of our officials.”

Just as in chess, when sacrificing a piece in the opening, one gets a winning position in the future, so Georgia, having sacrificed in early XIX century with its sovereignty, by the end of the 20th century, thanks to being part of Russia and the USSR, it was able to save itself as a people from complete assimilation or wholesale extermination. And ultimately, typing vitality under the protection of Russian weapons, as a union republic, it formed the basis for state education.

Agreement on the patronage and supreme power of the Russian Empire with the united Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (otherwise the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, Eastern Georgia) on the transition of Georgia under the protectorate of Russia. Concluded on July 24 (August 4), 1783 in the Georgievsk fortress (North Caucasus).

Background

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Georgia found itself cut off from the entire Christian world, and a little later actually divided between Turkey and Iran, and survived by maneuvering between these two states. She managed to achieve an acceptable and sometimes even a privileged position within these states, but the religious barrier was an insurmountable obstacle to final integration. At this time, hope for Russian help gradually formed. The first attempts at rapprochement took place back in the 17th century, but without serious consequences. The first real attempt at a long-term alliance with Russia occurred in the era of Peter I.

Iranian War of 1722

In 1720, A. Volynsky was appointed governor of Astrakhan. He was instructed to persuade the Georgian king Vakhtang to side with Russia. Persia was going through a period of crisis and Peter was preparing his Persian campaign. Already in 1721, negotiations began on joint actions. For Russia, the Georgian army was only an auxiliary force, but, apparently, Volynsky promised Vakhtang a lot, almost a permanent alliance and patronage, which was so desired in Georgia. Impressed by these promises, Vakhtang decides to break off relations with Persia.

But something happened that was not expected in Georgia - Peter canceled the campaign.

The consequences were tragic. The Shah declared Vakhtang outlawed, the Dagestan [ ] the crowds ravaged Tbilisi . Taking advantage of this, the Turkish army occupied Kartli and Kakheti. The Turkish occupation lasted until 1734.

Turkish War 1768-1774

In the 20s, clergy and entire classes sent requests for help to the Russian government, but without consequences. At one time, the idea arose to resettle Georgians to the North Caucasus (to the Terek), but this proposal was not accepted. In Georgia they could not understand Russia’s pragmatic policy, and, in spite of everything, they believed in its help. A legend even arose that Peter indicated in his will: “Georgia is unhappy, defend it for the sake of faith, send her an army...”, but the intrigues of the courtiers prevented his will from being fulfilled.

The situation changed when the Russo-Turkish War approached. At one of the meetings of the Council, it was decided to raise the entire Christian population of the Balkans, Greece and Georgia against Turkey. The Collegium of Foreign Affairs compiled “a discussion on the ways in which Georgians can be inclined to accept participation in the present Ottoman war with the Porte.” Thus began the second attempt at rapprochement, which failed, but became the first step towards the Treaty of Georgievsk.

Sending Totleben's expeditionary force to Georgia, Panin explained to the general the essence of the upcoming war: “the soul would be local, but the body would be Georgian.” The joint campaign project was doomed to failure from the very beginning: it was impossible to coordinate the actions of the regular Russian and irregular Georgian armies. Despite a number of victories, Catherine II was generally dissatisfied with the results. In Georgia they hoped that it would at least be mentioned during peace negotiations with Turkey - then it was called “include in the treaty.” But this was not done either. The Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty, concluded on July 20, 1774, did not mention a word about the Kakheti and Kartli kingdoms. (The words “Georgia” in paragraph 23 of the treatise mean its Western, vassal part of Turkey). Having recognized the vassal dependence of the West. Georgia (Imereti) from Ottoman Empire, thereby Russia prevented the reunification of Georgia in single state, and the alliance agreement between the kings (kings) of Kartl-Kakheti Erekle (Irakli) II and Imereti Solomon I of 1773 remained unfulfilled.

Even during the stay of Russian troops in Georgia, shortly before their recall, Tsar Irakli II sent Catherine a written representation about the conditions under which he wished to enter under the protection of Russia. With this document he sent his son Levan and his brother, Catholicos Anthony. He asked “to honor us now with such patronage so that everyone ... can see that I am an exact subject of the Russian state, and my kingdom has been added to the Russian Empire.” Irakli proposed those forms of dependence that previously had dependence on Iran. He offered to send one of his sons, several princes and nobles to the Russian court as a hostage. The population pays the Empire 70 kopecks per yard, annually sends 14 of the best horses, 2,000 buckets of wine, and also supplies soldiers to Russia. It was from this “idea” that the St. George’s treatise was subsequently formed.

The offer was rejected. On February 8, 1773, Panin reported this to Irakli (“strange and completely out of time proposals,” he wrote). In 1774, Catherine reported in a letter that military assistance to Georgia was currently unprofitable, although she promised to demand guarantees from Turkey for the security of Georgia [ ] .

Conclusion of an agreement

Commemorative medal, 1790

According to the agreement, Tsar Irakli II recognized the patronage of Russia and partially renounced an independent foreign policy, pledging to serve the Russian Empress with his troops. Catherine II, for her part, acted as a guarantor of the independence and integrity of the territories of Kartli-Kakheti. Georgia was granted complete internal independence. The parties exchanged envoys.

The agreement equalized the rights of Georgian and Russian nobles, clergy and merchants (respectively).

Four secret articles of the treaty were of particular importance. According to them, Russia pledged to defend Georgia in the event of war, and during peace negotiations to insist on the return to the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom of possessions that had long belonged to it (but seized by Turkey). Russia pledged to keep two infantry battalions with 4 cannons in Georgia and, in the event of war, to increase the number of its troops.

At the same time, Georgians were strongly recommended to maintain unity and avoid internecine strife, for which Heraclius II had to make peace with King Solomon I of Imereti.

The main political significance of the Treaty of Georgievsk was the establishment of a Russian protectorate in relation to Eastern Georgia, sharply weakening the positions of Iran and Turkey in Transcaucasia, formally destroying their claims to Eastern Georgia.

Treatise in 1783-1787

From the moment of its conclusion, the Treaty operated without interference for 3-4 years. However, then strong opposition from Turkey began. Under her influence, raids by the Dagestanis and the Akhaltsikhe Pasha became more frequent. Russia expressed protests, but they did not have the desired impact. Moreover, Turkey demanded that Russia cancel the Treaty of Georgievsk and demolish the fortifications of Vladikavkaz. As a result, in 1787, Russian troops were withdrawn from Georgia, which was a gross violation of the terms of the treaty and thereby actually denounced it. There are two versions of the reasons for this conclusion.

Version No. 1

According to this version, Georgia was the first to violate the treaty by entering into separate negotiations with the Turks. In September 1786, Suleiman Pasha of Akhaltsi sent a letter to the King of Georgia, Heraclius II, proposing to conclude a separate peace treaty.

From Colonel Burnashev’s report to Pavel Potemkin:

His Highness... intends to send the amanats (hostages) required to Akhaltsikhe by Suleiman Pasha, apologizing that he was forced to do this by his subjects and by the extreme need to get rid of the devastation of his lands from the Turkish side. To this end, I had the honor to report to His Highness that after the conclusion of the Treaty of the 4th Article with Georgia, in the case of sending envoys or letters from neighbors, one must agree with the main border commander, and especially in this circumstance, which requires diligent consideration«.

Thus, the king retreated from the treaty, starting negotiations with the Turkish authorities. In December 1786, Irakli wrote to Pavel Potemkin: “ ... and so that we do not go to extreme extremes, for this we send two princes to the pasha to approve the agreements“ .

Potemkin was extremely alarmed: “... extremely grieving that your Highness and the advice of your nobles are allowed to be ready to fulfill the demands of Soleyman Pasha of Akhaltsikhe... I humbly ask your Highness to consider all the demands of Soleyman Pasha and all his relations with you. From the very moment he began to correspond with Your Highness, his demands were as follows: 1. By deceiving you with various imaginary benefits, to shake your loyalty to Russia; 2nd To withdraw Russian troops from Georgia and get rid of the formidable defenders, to strip it from defense; for if our troops were not threatening to them, he would not have had the need to seek their withdrawal from Georgia... I advise, for your benefit, I earnestly ask you not to give the amanats to your pasha, for by doing this you will offend the dependence you have sworn on oath and will cause harm to your own kingdom.”

But, despite the warnings of P. Potemkin, the conditions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Georgievsk, Tsar Heraclius concluded an agreement with the Pasha, which was ratified by the Sultan in the summer of 1787 (just during the war between Russia and Turkey). From that moment on, the Treaty of Georgievsk lost its force. Russian troops had to leave Georgia; on October 26, 1787, Russian troops were already in Vladikavkaz. This point of view was voiced, in particular, in the article by A. Epifantsev.

Version No. 2

According to the second version, Russia withdrew its troops because it made concessions to Turkey. Not wanting to bring matters to war at that time, she withdrew the battalions, sent the Georgian ambassador from St. Petersburg and agreed to demolish the fortifications of Vladikavkaz.

A.V. Potto writes about the same thing:

The two battalions left in Georgia could not bring significant benefit in the event of a new enemy invasion, but they themselves could easily fall victim to it. And since there was absolutely nothing to strengthen them with, Colonel Burnashev was ordered to leave Tiflis and return to the Line. At the same time, all the fortifications built by Potemkin on the road to Georgia were destroyed. Russia's first attempt to firmly establish itself in Georgia thus ended in failure.

D. Zhukov adheres to the same version. Z. D. Avalov writes that Russia considered it more reliable for Georgia to protect itself “by renewing its previous alliances, which were destroyed solely by staying in the country Russian troops“. In other words, at that time the Treaty of Georgievsk turned out to be unprofitable for Russia.

According to the first version, the king of Georgia violated the Treaty of Georgievsk and thereby left Georgia without protection from the troops of Agha-Magomed Khan. In fact, the treaty was in force in the fall of 1795. On September 4, 1795, Catherine, after much delay, finally ordered “to reinforce Tsar Heraclius, as a Russian vassal against hostile attempts on his life, stipulated by the treatise with them two full battalions of infantry." After 8 days, Tbilisi was destroyed by the troops of Agha-Magomed Khan. General Gudovich received the Empress's order only on October 1.

In St. Petersburg, the Georgian embassy on June 24, 1800 handed over to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs a draft document on citizenship. The first point read: Tsar George XII “zealously desires with his descendants, clergy, nobles and all the people subject to him to one day forever accept citizenship of the Russian Empire, promising to sacredly fulfill everything that the Russians do.”

Manifesto of Paul I

Handwritten copy of the manifesto

In the fall of 1800, the Georgian delegation made an attempt to propose to Russia a project for closer unity. On November 17, Prince Chavchavadze submitted a note and “petitions” on behalf of Tsar George. This proposal was considered at the College of Foreign Affairs and on November 19 was approved by the emperor on all counts.

On November 23, 1800, the emperor gave a rescript addressed to George XII on the acceptance of his kingdom into Russian citizenship, then he wrote “we accepted what was expressed to us with our high-monarchal favor and were also honored with our most merciful approval of your petitions to accept you into Our citizenship.”

George was promised to retain his royal rights for the rest of his life. However, after his death, the Russian government intended to confirm the heir to the throne, David Georgievich, as governor-general with the title of tsar, and to classify Georgia among the Russian provinces under the name of the kingdom of Georgia.

Everything was moving towards a bilateral agreement, which could become a legally flawless solution to the issue. However, 2 days before the audience, an imperial rescript to General Knorring followed. He was ordered to send troops into Georgia and, in the event of the death of King George, not to appoint a successor until a special order. This order was contrary to the principles of the treaty of 1783, which left the issue of appointing an heir within the competence of the king of Georgia. On December 18, even before the ambassadors arrived in Georgia, a manifesto on the annexation of Georgia was signed. Thus, the issue was resolved unilaterally, even before the death of Tsar George, which followed on December 28.

Ambassadors with “points” arrived in Georgia at the beginning of January, and on January 15, Prince David published an appeal: “I have been commanded by the highest to approach the throne of Georgia by inheritance, with the rank of its ruler.” On January 18, the manifesto of Paul I was published in St. Petersburg. The text of the manifesto itself was compiled somewhat vaguely and vaguely, without mentioning the fate of the Georgian dynasty.

We hereby declare with our imperial word that upon the annexation of the Kingdom of Georgia for eternity under our power, not only will all rights, advantages and property legally belong to everyone be granted and will be intact, but that from now on every state of the people of the above-mentioned regions has the enjoyment of those rights, liberties, benefits and advantages, which the ancient Russian subjects, by the grace of our ancestors and Ours, enjoy under Our protection.

How complex the issue was can be seen from the fact that the issue was considered at a meeting of the Council of Emperor Paul, and then for another six months at the Council of Alexander I.

Vorontsov and Kochubey proposed: to elect one of the princes to the kingdom according to the order of inheritance or based on personal qualities, if necessary, remove other contenders, and leave a certain number of troops in Georgia “to feed the land.” It was also proposed to appoint a minister under the king.

Knorring's mission

“General Knorring could not find anything other than the confusion that he reported to the sovereign…. he falls into the same mistake as other observing officers: their eyes, accustomed to the order of the parade ground and the office, saw nothing but chaos and disorder in Georgia.”

After staying in Georgia for 22 days, Knorring returned to St. Petersburg and on June 28 submitted his report to the emperor. He spoke negatively to the question of whether Georgia could survive without help, and positively to the question of whether Georgians unanimously desire citizenship.

Final decision

On August 8, 1801, a regular meeting of the Council on the issue of Georgia was held. Time was working for the “imperial” party: according to the reports of Russian envoys, during the year of anarchy, Georgia had already lost any semblance of a state. In addition, a clumsy justification for annexation was used with statements that “in the world” Georgia was already considered part of Russia and it was inconvenient to retreat from annexation from the point of view of the dignity of the empire.

At the meeting, a report by Knorring and a report by Vorontsov and Kochubey were heard. The council sided with Knorring. They talked about the need to forestall the Turks and Persians, who were capable of capturing Georgia, and that annexation would help “curb the predatory mountain peoples.” Kochubey insisted on his opinion: in his final speech he drew attention to the danger of expanding borders, to the injustice of annexation from a monarchical point of view and insisted on maintaining the vassal status of Georgia. And yet the Council decided the issue of accession in the affirmative.

Alexander still hesitated. On August 12, he received a note from V. Zubov and sent it to Novosiltsev for consideration. On August 13, the issue was discussed at a meeting of the Secret Committee. The committee members were still against it, but Alexander gradually leaned towards the Council's decision.

Meanwhile, the Georgian commissioners were still trying to ensure that “the essentially voluntary annexation of Georgia was truly voluntary in form.” They sent notes to the emperor with their proposals and generally wanted the decision on the issue of Georgia to be made in their presence as representatives of the voluntarily annexed Georgian people. But no one was interested in their opinion.

On August 4 (July 24, old style), 1783, the Treaty of Georgievsk was concluded on the patronage and supreme power of the Russian Empire over the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom.

“The annexation of Georgia to Russia was a political event of paramount importance. It was from the time of this annexation that Russia embarked on a path that, perhaps, would lead it to the shores of the Persian Gulf. The future is always guesswork, but the possibility of such a future is enough, the possession of what Russia now has in the Caucasus is enough to see the full significance of the event, with which, in fact, the spread of Russian possessions in this part of Asia begins,”- this is how the future ardent separatist Zurab Avalov, who ended his days in Germany as Hitler’s henchman, wrote about the significance of Georgia’s annexation to Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Georgia found itself cut off from the entire Christian world, and a little later it was actually divided between Turkey and Iran, and survived by maneuvering between these two states. At this time, hope for Russian help gradually formed. The first attempts at rapprochement took place back in the 16th century. So, in 1586, under Tsar Theodore Ioannovich, Georgia was formally accepted into the Russian state, and the royal title was added: “Sovereign of the Iveron land and Georgian kings.”

However, Russia’s geopolitical position at that time did not allow it to provide any effective assistance to the Georgians. The situation changed only after the defeat of the Crimean Khanate and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, and after the Kartli-Kakheti king Irakli II Once again appealed to Catherine II with a request to accept Georgia under the protection of Russia, the empress entrusted Lieutenant General Pavel Sergeevich Potemkin (a distant relative of Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin Tauride) with all powers to conclude an agreement. On the Georgian side, princes Ivane Bagration-Mukhransky and Garsevan Chavchavadze acted as plenipotentiaries.

According to the agreement, Tsar Irakli II recognized the patronage of Russia and partially renounced an independent foreign policy, obliging himself to serve the Russian Empress with his troops. Catherine II, for her part, acted as a guarantor of the independence and integrity of the territories of Kartli-Kakheti. Georgia was granted complete internal independence. The parties exchanged envoys. The agreement equalized the rights of Georgian nobles, priests and merchants with Russian representatives of the corresponding classes.

Four secret articles of the treaty were of particular importance. According to them, Russia pledged to defend Georgia in the event of war, and during peace negotiations to insist on the return to the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom of possessions that had long belonged to it but were seized by Turkey. Russia has pledged to maintain two infantry battalions in Georgia and to increase the number of its troops in the event of war. At the same time, Georgians were strongly recommended to maintain unity and avoid internecine strife, for which Heraclius II had to make peace with the Imeretian king Solomon I.

The main political significance of the Treaty of Georgievsk was the establishment of a Russian protectorate over eastern Georgia. This protectorate sharply weakened the position of Iran andTurkey in Transcaucasia, formally destroying their claims to Eastern Georgia. In 1783,In connection with the conclusion of the Treaty of Georgievsk, the construction of the Georgian Military Road between Georgia and Russia began, along which several fortifications were built, including the Vladikavkaz fortress.


However, the treaty did not last long: in September 1786, Suleiman Pasha of Akhaltsikhe sent a letter to the King of Georgia, Heraclius II, proposing to conclude a separate peace treaty. Despite the conditions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Georgievsk, King Heraclius concluded an agreement with the Pasha, which was ratified by the Sultan in the summer of 1787.

This happened just before the start of the next Russian-Turkish war: on August 13 (24), 1787, the Porte declared war on Russia, and the Turkish flotilla attacked two Russian ships stationed near Kinburn.

Under these conditions, Irakli’s peace with Turkey could not be assessed other than as a betrayal, and Lieutenant General Potemkin ordered the withdrawal of Russian units from Georgia.

The departure of the Russian troops did not take long to have an impact: while we were fighting with Turkey, the former rulers of Georgia, the Persians, raised their heads. In 1795, the Persian Shah Agha Mohammed marches on Georgia, using the pretext of its alliance with Russia, defeats the army of Tsar Heraclius II in the Battle of Krtsanis, then enters the Georgian capital without a fight and subjects it to complete defeat: the majority of the population was killed, and 22 thousand were killed. people, mainly women and children, were taken into slavery.

Irakli again sent tearful pleas to Russia, and in April 1796, the 13,000-strong Caspian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Valerian Zubov moved from Kizlyar to the Azerbaijani provinces of Iran. On May 10, Derbent was taken by storm, and on June 15, Baku and Cuba were occupied without a fight. In November, Russian troops reached the confluence of the Kura and Araks rivers. However, on November 6, 1796, Catherine died, and with her the projects for the conquest of Iran became a thing of the past. Only a small detachment of General Rimsky-Korsakov remained in Georgia, but even that was recalled at the beginning of 1797. Georgia was again left to its own fate, and only the death of Aga Mohammed, who was killed by a blow to the head with a melon by his own servant, who was jealous of the Shah for one of his concubines, saved the Georgians from a new terrible invasion.

After the death of Irakli II, which followed on January 11, 1798, Georgia, which had just suffered the pogrom of Agha Mohammed, was left in the most disastrous situation, being outside under the threat of invasion by the Turks, Persians and Lezgins, and inside torn apart by unrest and the struggle for succession to the throne. The legal heir of Heraclius was the eldest son from his second marriage, George XII.

Having ascended the throne, George did not have sufficient strength and firmness to resist the internal turmoil that flourished around him. His stepmother, Queen Daria, who had already forced Heraclius to divide the entire kingdom into inheritances not in favor of George and his offspring, now became the center of intrigue and plotted to completely remove George’s offspring from the throne. She and her sons did not want to recognize the supreme power of the king and sought protection in Persia.

In these difficult circumstances, in order to finally calm down the homeland, exhausted by the overwhelming struggle with enemies, and at the same time foreseeing all the difficulty of retaining the throne for one’s home,George asked Emperor Paul I to accept Georgia into eternal Russian citizenship and send troops to protect it from enemies, both external and internal. The Emperor ordered the commander of the Caucasian Line, Lieutenant General Knorring, to send the seventeenth Jaeger Regiment to Tiflis, under the command of Major General Lazarev.

Together with the regiment, in the fall of 1799, State Councilor Kovalensky also went for a permanent stay in Georgia as a plenipotentiary minister, bringing the king a crown and other signs of royal investiture, since all the precious regalia used during the coronation of the Georgian kings were stolen during the invasion Agi Mohammed.

Despite the late season, the cold and snowstorms that raged at the pass across the Main Caucasus Range, the regiment successfully completed a difficult campaign and on November 26, the very day of George’s name day, approached Tiflis. His meeting was accompanied by extraordinary solemnity. Tsar George himself, together with the heir to the throne, the princes and a large retinue, received him with bread and salt outside the city outpost.

And a year later On November 23, 1800, the emperor issued a rescript addressed to George XII on the acceptance of his kingdom into Russian citizenship.

On August 4, we could together celebrate the 225th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Georgievsk. But, alas, the relationship between Russia and Georgia today is playing out according to a different scenario. Although, it would seem, nothing foreshadowed such a development of events.


Relations between Russia and the Georgian people arose and were formed in the X-XV centuries. At that time, Georgia was a single state and was a significant political force in the Caucasus. The Georgian people were already Orthodox and had cultural and spiritual contacts with Byzantium. Trade, political, and cultural relations were established between Orthodox states.

Georgian craftsmen participated in the painting of churches in Rus' (for example, the Church of the Savior Nereditsa in Novgorod). The most famous dynastic marriage In 1185, Queen Tamar of Georgia chose the son of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky, Yuri, as her husband.

The Mongol invasion interrupted Russian-Georgian ties, but after the overthrow of the yoke in the 15th century, they were gradually restored. Territory expansion Russian state led to the approach of its borders to the North Caucasus.

The situation in Georgia was different. In the 15th century, the country was tormented by invasions by Timur’s hordes and captured by the Ottoman Turks and Persians. It was the Turks and Persians who became its main opponents at the end of the 15th - 18th centuries. Constant wars and devastation, feudal strife led to the disintegration of Georgia into separate kingdoms (Kartli, Kakheti, Imereti) and principalities (Guria, Megrelia).

The domination of Turkish and Persian invaders on Georgian territory threatened not only with ruin, but also with physical destruction of the Orthodox people. Only the heroic struggle of the Georgian people thwarted these plans. But for a decisive and final victory over the enemies of Georgia, a strong and reliable ally was needed. Only Russia could become such an ally, since Russia itself fought with Turkey, Persia, and the Crimean Khanate. The emerging alliance was based on a community of interests.

Russian tsars Ivan IV the Terrible, Boris Godunov, Mikhail Romanov, Peter I provided patronage to the Georgian rulers and their families. Under Peter I, the beginning of a Georgian colony was laid in Moscow.

For almost the entire 18th century, the Georgian people fought with the Turkish and Persian conquerors for their physical existence. European powers, primarily England, supported the enslavers of Georgia and tried to weaken Russia's influence in Europe.

The tenacity of the Georgians’ struggle against the invaders by the end of the 18th century led to a turning point in the situation. The most influential kingdoms in Georgia at this time were Kartli and Kakheti, ruled by the father and son Teimuraz II and Irakli II. Taking advantage of the internecine struggle in Persia, Teimuraz II turned to Russia with a request for protection. He arrived in St. Petersburg for negotiations, during which, in 1762, he died. Kartli and Kakheti united into one state under the rule of Erekle II. Soon he was joined by the energetic king of Imereti, Solomon I. As a result of the successful outcome of the Russian-Turkish wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1791, the borders of Russia came close to the Georgian lands. To implement further policy in the Transcaucasus, Russia needed a reliable ally. The Kartli-Kakheti kingdom also needed an ally in the fight against the Turks. The interests of the two states coincided.

On July 24 (August 4, New Art.), 1783, in the St. George Fortress (now the city of Georgievsk), an agreement (treaty) on a military-political union between Russia and Kartli-Kakheti (Eastern Georgia) was signed. On the same day, a prayer service was solemnly served in St. Nicholas Church in honor of the signing of the Treaty of St. George. It was performed by the Georgian Archimandrite Gayoz with two regimental priests.


The essence of the treatise was as follows:

Georgia was obliged to coordinate its foreign policy with Russia, to assist the Russian army with its military forces;

Russia pledged to be always ready to protect Georgian lands from the threat of conquest and to seek the return of lands taken from Kartli-Kakheti;

In domestic policy Irakli II retained complete independence; Russia could not interfere in Georgian affairs;

Residents, merchants, nobility, church leaders enjoyed the same privileges and advantages on the territory of Russia and Georgia;

The Catholicos (head of the Orthodox Church of Georgia) was introduced into the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Treaty of Georgievsk was concluded according to the norms international law: Georgia voluntarily entered under Russian protection. Georgian historians of the Soviet era, for example, Professor G. G. Paichadze, noted the foresight of Georgian patriots, who sought to obtain a legal guarantee that Russia would henceforth be the defender of the sovereignty of the Georgian state and ensure its security from the invasion of external enemies.

As noted by an outstanding representative of church historical science late XIX- the beginning of the 20th century, Professor P.V. Znamensky, since the 16th century, the Georgian Church had placed its hopes in Russia for its disasters and never ceased to enjoy the sympathetic attention of the Russian government and the church. In the 18th century, Russia cordially hosted Georgian emigrants, took care of the publication of the Bible and liturgical books in Georgian (under Empresses Anna and Elizabeth) and helped the Georgian Church material means. According to the Treaty of Georgievsk, from 1783 the Georgian Church came under the jurisdiction of Holy Synod, and its Catholicos Anthony was elevated to the rank of synodal member. After the final annexation of both Georgia and Imereti and Kakheti to Russia (1801), the misfortunes of the Georgian Church ceased completely. She lost her autocephaly (independence), but gained the opportunity not only to physically survive, but also to actively develop.

In 1809, the position of Catholicos was replaced by the position of Exarch of the Holy Synod. In 1817, a Russian bishop, His Eminence Theophylact (Rusanov), was appointed exarch for the first time, who did a lot for the arrangement of the Georgian Exarchate. Under the direct leadership of him and subsequent exarchs, active construction and restoration took place for a hundred years. Orthodox churches, missionary work was successfully carried out (despite the strong opposition of the mullahs sent from Turkey, especially in Russian-Turkish war 1876-1877) and educational activities of mountain peoples. By 1870, everything necessary for Orthodox worship. In 1868, the Tiflis Seminary opened.
Whatever they say today, for at least 100 years after the signing of the Treaty of Georgievsk in Georgia there were no signs that usually accompany occupation and infringement national interests its indigenous population. However, in February 1917 in Russia there was February Revolution, and already on March 12 of the same year, representatives of the Georgian clergy and laity independently decided to restore the autocephaly of the Georgian Church.

Further relations between the two states, Russia and Georgia, as well as between the two Orthodox churches, behind past century you can’t describe it clearly. If the 200th anniversary of the Treaty of Georgievsk in both Russia and Georgia was celebrated on a grand scale, then no one even remembered the 225th anniversary of its signing on August 4, 2008. Well, or almost no one...