13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has reached a dead end due to the US's hostile anti-Korean policy. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, determined to eliminate our system at any cost, we will expand our stockpile of nuclear weapons to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism,” the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.

The grin of the “paper tiger”

Potential nuclear threat V different years was assessed by North Korean leaders differently. At one time the country's leadership did not attach any importance to this of great importance. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a “paper tiger.”

Work on creating North Korea's nuclear infrastructure began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States was planning to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first it consisted of training specialists.

“Nuclear weapons appeared in North Korea almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities,” Irina Lantsova, a specialist on North and South Korea, associate professor of the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, said in an interview with RT.

• Statues of North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il during a military parade
• Reuters
• Damir Sagolj

According to Professor of the Russian Peoples' Friendship University Yuri Tavrovsky, main reason The start of North Korea's nuclear development was driven by a "deep sense of threat from Korea's traditional adversaries, such as Japan and the United States, as well as a desire to rely on own strength, Juche policy."

Koreans decided not to rely on a nuclear umbrella Soviet Union and China, says Tavrovsky. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of the destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

“They (North Korean authorities - RT) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can guarantee the non-repetition of war using conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense,” the expert believes.

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on Pyongyang’s creation of its own nuclear weapons. China, in particular, provided significant assistance in this by allowing North Korean scientists to visit its facilities.

The success of the DPRK, according to Tavrovsky, was facilitated by two main factors: “overexertion of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself,” as well as “conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan.” . At the last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought technology or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as “Satan”.

In 1985, counting on USSR assistance in the construction of a nuclear power plant, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors visited the country frequently, and the results of their inspections turned out to be ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK's intention to withdraw from the Treaty was announced, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the reactor in Yongbyon, the largest nuclear facility in North Korea. However, after analyzing the inevitable casualties, Clinton abandoned this idea.

After the visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to the DPRK, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, committed itself to stop building and using uranium enrichment infrastructure and removing plutonium from reactors, removing enriched nuclear fuel outside the DPRK and dismantling all facilities in one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The United States, in accordance with the agreement, was supposed to supply fuel oil to North Korea and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Dashing zeros

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States and included North Korea on the list of “rogue countries.” Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the demands on North Korea grew more and more. Already in 2002, the United States announced Pyongyang’s failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on its nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The six-party negotiations between the DPRK, China, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan, which began in the summer of 2003, also led nowhere. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification regarding South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been underway for four years.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but conducted its first test only in October 2006. North Korea is known to have tested several new weapons from 2006 to 2017.

• Kim Jong-un watches a rocket launch
• Reuters

In 2017, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear weapon, the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a necessary measure.

“After Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there were no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed,” an employee of the Institute’s Center for Korean Studies emphasized in a conversation with RT Far East RAS Konstantin Asmolov.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment; for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK does not exist as a state. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Delivered to the White House

The DPRK began developing a means of delivering a nuclear charge in 1988. To create a ballistic missile medium range Taepodong-1 took ten years to complete, with its first launch in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, North Korea observed a unilateral moratorium on missile tests, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

“The dialogue with the United States ceased in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile tests,” read the text of the statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued launching rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2017, which fell in the Sea of ​​Japan, became the reason for convening the UN Security Council. Soon another one was produced, which fell into Pacific Ocean flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is particularly concerned about the latest version of the Hwasong, the Hwasong-15, which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also a missile exporter. Among its largest buyers are the UAE, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were allegedly made on the basis of the North Korean Taepodong-2.

Sanctions pressure

The DPRK developed its nuclear program under harsh conditions, Japan and South Korea, and the European Union, and even Australia. The UN was created in relation to the DPRK. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that affected almost all spheres of life - from cultural exchanges and money transfers to a ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.

According to Lantsova, North Korea, under the conditions of strict sanctions, has achieved a very good result: significant progress has been made in the work on its nuclear missile program - this applies to both delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves.

From the United States, pressure on North Korea has intensified with the rise to power of Donald Trump, who has already threatened the DPRK with complete destruction.

“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man ( - RT) embarked on a suicide mission,” said the head of the White House, speaking at the UN.

However, the real danger posed by the DPRK raises serious doubts among experts. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to strike nuclear attack, minimal.

“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They achieved what they had been malnourished and overworked for for many years. They have practically created a nuclear missile shield, this has already been recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK,” the expert is confident.

Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.

“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the principle of “strike first,” the expert emphasized.

The North Korean leadership demonstrated its decisive attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the start of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. At the parade intercontinental ballistic missile new type "Hwasong-15".

“As long as the hostile policy of the United States continues, the mission of the people's army, which serves as a powerful sword to defend the country, will continue,” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said in a speech to the military at a parade.

On September 9, 2016, North Korea celebrated the 68th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear weapons test.

First, several countries at once on the territory of North Korea, which could mean the explosion of a nuclear charge.

Then the fact of nuclear testing was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. “The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen national nuclear forces in quantitative and qualitative terms to ensure the dignity and right to exist of the country in the face of the growing nuclear threat from the United States,” said a statement issued by the official North Korean news agency KCNA.

South Korea, the United States and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, at which the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang is expected to be raised.

The problem, however, is that sanctions on North Korea have virtually no effect. Moreover, there has been significant progress in North Korea's nuclear missile program.

How it all began

Even during the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of launching nuclear strikes on the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.

The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.

Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.

In the 1970s, Pyongyang, with the support of China, began the first work on creating nuclear weapons.

In 1985, the Soviet Union obtained the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor to Korea. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.

President Clinton's Failed War

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while at the same time conducting peace negotiations with it in hopes of liberalizing the political system and its dismantling according to the version of Eastern Europe.

The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang economic and technical assistance in the development of peaceful atoms. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.

Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected that a certain amount of plutonium was being hidden. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities that had not been declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities were in no way connected with the nuclear program and were of a military nature.

As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the agreement, but also withdrew from the IAEA.

During this period, as Newsweek magazine argued in 2006, the administration US President Bill Clinton ordered the study of the issue of conducting a military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would require expenditures of $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, with the losses of the US Army amounting to at least 100,000 people killed.

As a result, the United States returned to negotiation tactics.

Threats and promises

At the end of 1994, with the assistance of the former head of the United States Jimmy Carter A “framework agreement” was reached, according to which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for supplies of fuel oil and the creation of two new light water nuclear reactors that cannot be used for nuclear weapons work.

Stability was established for several years. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States to other problems ensured a stable situation.

A new escalation began in 2002, when the US came to power President George W. Bush.

In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called “axis of evil.” Coupled with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.

In 2003, negotiations began on the DPRK's nuclear program with the participation of the PRC, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

No real progress was achieved on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it was possible to ensure its own security only if it had its own atomic bomb.

North Korea has made no secret of the fact that nuclear research continues.

Bomb: birth

Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a South Korean reconnaissance satellite recorded a powerful explosion in a remote area of ​​the DPRK (Yangang Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew above the scene.

On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom as explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.

Neither South Korean nor American experts confirmed that it was indeed a nuclear explosion.

Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the necessary resources and technologies to create a full-fledged atomic bomb, and we were talking about a potential, not an immediate danger.

On September 28, 2004, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister told the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into nuclear weapons. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrent force in conditions when the United States declared its goal to destroy the DPRK and threatened preventive nuclear strikes.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation in the country atomic weapons. The world treated this statement as another bluff by Pyongyang.

A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that it had successfully tested a nuclear charge, and its preparation had been publicly announced before. The low power of the charge (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a nuclear device and not ordinary TNT.

North Korean acceleration

On May 25, 2009, the DPRK held regular nuclear tests. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to Russian military estimates, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.

Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.

Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion remained that Pyongyang is far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.

December 10, 2015 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant a new step in the creation of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK declared to be a test of a hydrogen bomb.

South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests was the shortest in all years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in improving technology.

Most importantly, North Korea stated that this test was carried out as part of the development of nuclear warheads that can be placed on ballistic missiles.

If this is indeed the case, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating real military nuclear weapons, which will radically change the situation in the region.

The rockets are flying further and further

Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.

People talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - they exploded again, missed the target again, fell again.

Military experts monitoring the situation claim that North Korean specialists are behind last years made a powerful technological breakthrough.

By 2016, the DPRK had created a mobile single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, the Hwasong-10, with a firing range of about three thousand kilometers.

In the summer of this year, the Pukkyukson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid-fuel missile is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was carried out precisely from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.

This does not at all fit with the idea of ​​North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet aircraft and Chinese tanks.

Experts point out that the number of tests in the DPRK has been rapidly increasing in recent years, and the technology is becoming more and more complex.

Within a few years, North Korea is capable of creating a missile with a flight range of up to 5,000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.

What to do with North Korea?

There is almost no doubt that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened. But previous experience shows that this does not in any way affect Pyongyang.

Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Moreover, he is not stopped even by the outright irritation of his main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region.

The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who have an extremely negative perception of Comrade Kim’s regime are convinced that it will not be possible to shake up the situation from within. Neither friends nor enemies can convince Pyongyang to “behave well.”

A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war on their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.

In theory, Pyongyang could be satisfied with guarantees that would ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.

That's just recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in the modern world is the “nuclear baton”, which North Korea is working to create.

The media of the United States and a number of other Western European countries, clearly at the instigation of US intelligence services, began to draw the attention of the world community to the state and potential consequences of the development of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).

During the scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK in the field of nuclear production, the Soviet side trained a significant number of North Korean specialists. True, it should be noted that they were trained exclusively for work in the nuclear industry. In addition, in 1965, the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a small pool-type IRT-2000 uranium research reactor with a capacity of 2 MW. After being put into operation in 1966, at the insistence of the USSR, it was placed under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Again, at the insistence of the USSR, the DPRK had to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed on December 12, 1985. In response to this “concession,” the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a 5 MW gas-graphite uranium research reactor (installed in Nenbyon and put into operation in 1986 after becoming under IAEA guarantees), and also signed an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type. By the way, in 1992 this agreement was clarified - instead of four VVER-440 reactors, it was decided to supply three, but more powerful VVER-640 reactors, which were considered the safest.

In addition, in 1991, a contract was signed by the Soviet Union for the supply of fuel assemblies (fuel rods) to the DPRK for a total amount of $185 thousand. Such assistance from the Soviet Union contributed to significant progress in the North Korean nuclear program.

However, Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy unexpectedly underwent dramatic changes. And the subsequent rapprochement between the USSR and the United States since 1987, and in particular the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Soviet Union with South Korea in 1990, dealt a serious blow to Pyongyang’s nuclear plans. In addition, the USSR began to transfer relations with the DPRK into an economic direction. As a result, Pyongyang's hopes of receiving free nuclear reactors from the USSR failed. At the same time, Pyongyang’s strategic alliance with Beijing began to crack.

In the late 1980s, the Kim Il Sung regime, deprived of traditional allies and seemingly room for further maneuver, found itself backed into a corner. But according to an ancient Chinese proverb, a "scared cat" can "turn into a tiger."

Does North Korea have nuclear weapons?

Back in the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung made a political decision to begin work on the creation of nuclear weapons - largely based on information about the presence of a military nuclear program in South Korea obtained by North Korean intelligence. And also based on Pyongyang’s confidence that Seoul’s economic war is lost, and the diplomatic war is also fraught with defeat.

Indeed, as it has now become known, in the 1970s, South Korea carried out independent and fairly successful developments to create nuclear weapons, by the way, being a member of the NPT (it signed this treaty on June 1, 1968, and ratified it on April 23, 1975) . South Korea was supposed to have nuclear weapons in 1981. The project was close to implementation, but the assassination of South Korean President Park Jong Hee (October 1979) and strong pressure from the United States prevented it.

The CIA received the first confirmation of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions in 1982. It was then that the United States raised the question with the USSR about the need to develop joint approaches to the DPRK’s nuclear plans. But the Soviet leadership did not share American concerns and intensified joint activities with the DPRK in the field of nuclear energy. Gorbachev's fatal mistake was agreeing to supply North Korea with a 5 MW graphite reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium

In 1989, the Americans expressed suspicion that the North Koreans had rebooted the nuclear reactor operating at Nyeongbyon, then processed the nuclear fuel and, most likely, obtained up to 12 kg of weapons-grade plutonium - an amount sufficient to make two nuclear explosive devices. On March 12, 1993, the North Korean side sent a letter to the NPT depository countries about the decision to withdraw from this treaty - this is how the first crisis surrounding the North Korean nuclear program began.

After a round of negotiations with the United States, the DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993 (one day before the expiration of the 90-day period established by paragraph I of Article X of this treaty). But at the same time, the DPRK stated that it does not consider itself a full member of the IAEA and does not recognize its right to carry out inspections of its nuclear facilities. On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement was concluded in Geneva between the United States and the DPRK, according to which Pyongyang first “frozen” and then dismantled its graphite uranium reactors. The United States, in turn, pledged to provide KEDR with modern energy light water reactors with a total capacity of 2000 MW, and before their commissioning (in 2003) - to supply oil for heating and electricity production in the amount of 500 thousand tons annually.

According to experts, the total amount of weapons-grade plutonium in the DPRK at the end of 2002 could be 15-20 kg, which is enough to manufacture 3-4 nuclear warheads. Some experts do not rule out the possibility that the DPRK is also developing high-tech methods of uranium enrichment. In particular, US experts are paying increased attention to the activities of the Laser Institute of the DPRK Academy of Sciences in Pyongyang, believing that appropriate uranium enrichment technology is being developed here.

However, based on the available information, it is not possible to draw an unambiguous conclusion not only about the possible scale of the North Korean uranium enrichment program, but also about the location of enterprises engaged in uranium enrichment. If we assume that these enterprises are intended to meet the fuel needs of the two light water reactors of the Sinpo Nuclear Power Plant under construction, then their capacity will be sufficient to produce weapons-grade uranium in quantities sufficient to produce six nuclear warheads annually.

North Korea's missile program is on the brink of crisis

The DPRK's military nuclear program was not the only headache for the world community. The development of the DPRK's missile program in conjunction with its nuclear program has created a threat to the national security of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and to a number of other states. North Korea was one of the first countries in this region to begin work on mastering missile technology. In the 1960s, the DPRK purchased from the USSR unguided tactical solid-propellant missiles with warheads in conventional equipment, “Luna” and “Luna-M” (North Korean designation “Frog-5” and “Frog-7”). Their range did not exceed 50-70 km, and the weight of the warhead was 400-420 kg.

Lacking the necessary scientific and technical potential, the DPRK tried to use the opportunities for fairly close cooperation with China. In the second half of the 1990s, North Korean specialists took an active part in the Chinese program to create a ballistic missile with a range of up to 600 km and a payload of about 600 kg.

In 1980, three operational-tactical missile systems with the 8K14 (Scud-B) missile were purchased from Egypt. In this case, a twofold problem was solved. In 1984, the first flight tests of the North Korean-made Scud-B missile were carried out, and a year later they began to enter service with the army. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with an integral warhead has a launch weight of 5.9 tons, a length of 11.25 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m and provides delivery of a payload weighing 1000 kg over a range of up to 300 km with an accuracy of about 450 m .

A new incentive to expand missile production was given shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iran offered to finance the development of an upgraded Scud-B missile to North Korea with the condition of supplying it with 100 missiles of this type. Financial injections helped to quickly solve the problem of modifying the Scud-B rocket. Its range was increased to 340 km, and its payload increased by 15%. However, it was not possible to overcome the traditional disadvantage of North Korean missiles - low accuracy.

Another attempt to modernize the Scud-B missile was made after Iran transferred the wreckage of the Iraqi Al-Hussein ballistic missile to North Korea. Using Iraqi technology, the DPRK defense industry, with the help of China, created in 1989 an improved model of an operational-tactical missile, called Scud-C. Its tests were carried out in 1990, and after that it was put into service. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket has a launch weight of 6.4 tons, a length of 12 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m, a payload of 750 kg and a range of 600-650 km. The accuracy of the hit is 700-1000 m. North Korea began developing its own missile in 1988-1989. Purpose new program was the creation of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a detachable warhead. Iran and Libya participated in the implementation of this missile project, called Nodon-I. These countries purchased various necessary materials and technical equipment from Western countries through intermediaries.

The first successful test launch of the Nodong-I IRBM was carried out in May 1993 at the Taipoteng test site on the east coast of the DPRK. This missile was put into service in 1997. "Nodon-I BRSD" is a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with a detachable warhead and an inertial control system. Its launch weight is ~ 16 tons, length - 16 m, maximum diameter - 1.34 m. Maximum range - 1300-1500 km with a payload of 700-1000 kg. Firing accuracy is 2000-3000 m. When creating the Nodon-I IRBM, Scud missile technology was used. Its propulsion system is a combination of 4 liquid rocket engines of the Scud-B rocket. The energy capabilities of the Nodon-I IRBM make it possible to hit targets in Japan, Eastern China (including Beijing) and the Russian Far East (including Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Chita).

The North Korean army has formed three separate missile brigades armed with missile systems with Scud-B, Scud-C and Nodong-I missiles. A total of 54 launchers. Assessing the capabilities of the DPRK missile industry, it can be argued that the North Korean army does not experience a shortage of missiles. Concerning missile systems with tactical missiles, their number can be 60-90 units.

Currently, North Korea is developing new long-range ballistic missiles (over 2000 km). The design of the two-stage Nodon-2 IRBM uses the Nodon-I missile's sustainer stage as the first stage, and the Scud-C missile's sustainer stage as the second stage. It is assumed that this rocket will have a launch mass of 21-22 tons, length - 27 m, maximum diameter - 1.34 m. Its range should be 2200-2300 km with a payload of 1000 kg or 3000 km with a payload of 500 kg. Firing accuracy is 3,700 m. This IRBM will be capable of hitting targets in Japan (including the Okinawa islands), China, Mongolia, and Russia (including the territory up to Krasnoyarsk).

The three-stage version of this missile, called Taepodong-I, uses a solid rocket motor as the third stage. This rocket can have a launch weight of 24 tons, a length of 30 m, a maximum diameter of 1.34 m. Its range will be 3200 km with a payload of 1000 kg or 5700 km with a payload of 500 kg. Firing accuracy is 3700-3800 m. The Taepodong-I missile is capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Russia (up to the Urals), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii, and reaching Alaska.

The adoption of the Nodong-2 MRBM and its three-stage modification Taepodong-I was expected in 2003-2004. However, to date only one test has been carried out. The Taepodong-2 ICBM will be capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Russia (all the way to Moscow), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii and reaching not only Alaska, but also California.

At the present stage, the pause taken by Pyongyang in the development of long-range ballistic missiles indicates a certain crisis in the North Korean missile program. The industry has encountered a number of objective difficulties, primarily related to the lack of qualified scientists and engineers. Therefore, the moratorium on missile tests announced by North Korea should be regarded as a forced measure, and not the good will of Pyongyang.

Security interests

The second crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program erupted in October 2002. During a visit to Pyongyang, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, at a meeting on October 4, 2002, with the head of the DPRK Parliament, Kim Yong Nam, presented the North Koreans with intelligence information that he had, which indicated that North Korea was carrying out a secret program to obtain highly enriched uranium for the creation of nuclear weapons . According to James Kelly, the North Korean side did not even try to refute his information, but, on the contrary, calmly admitted that it was enriching uranium.

Further events developed progressively. At the end of October 2002, North Korea officially announced its right to have “nuclear and more powerful weapons” for self-defense. In response, the United States and its partners stopped supplies of heating oil to North Korea in November 2002. On December 12, 2002, Pyongyang issued a statement about the resumption of its nuclear program, and at the end of the same month it removed IAEA inspectors from all “frozen” nuclear facilities and re-opened the gas-graphite uranium reactor at Nengbyon. These actions had no effect, and on January 10, 2003, the DPRK leadership made an official statement about North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and termination of cooperation with the IAEA.

On April 18, 2003, Pyongyang announced that the reprocessing of 8,000 rods containing irradiated nuclear fuel from the Nengbyon reactor was in its final stages. This meant official recognition of the fact that the DPRK has a significant amount of weapons-grade plutonium that is not subject to IAEA guarantees. Consultations held on April 23-25, 2003 in Beijing (China) in the trilateral China-DPRK-USA format did not lead to any agreements. According to the American delegation, the North Koreans at this meeting recognized their intention to create nuclear weapons. On May 12, 2003, Pyongyang announced its unilateral withdrawal from the agreement on declaring the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, concluded in January 1992 with South Korea.

In the summer of 2003, primarily thanks to the active work of China and Russia with the DPRK and the United States, it was possible to achieve Pyongyang’s consent to begin negotiations in a six-party format (China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the United States, Japan). The negotiations, which began in August 2003, were held in Beijing. The first two rounds of negotiations ended without any significant results.

The United States demanded that North Korea agree to the “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all nuclear programs.” North Korea rejected this approach and agreed only to “freeze” its military nuclear programs. Pyongyang also demanded immediate “reward” for freezing military nuclear projects in the form of large-scale economic assistance, primarily energy supplies (up to 2.7 million tons of heating oil annually), as well as security guarantees from the United States. The latter involve the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea, the conclusion of a bilateral non-aggression pact between them and the exclusion of the DPRK from the US list of states that support terrorism.

The situation changed slightly for the better after the third round of negotiations, which took place in June 2004. Great hopes for further progress were pinned on the fourth round of negotiations (late 2004). However, the planned plan was thwarted.

Three scenarios

On this moment There are three possible scenarios for the development of the Korean crisis. Scenario one- "Pacification." The implementation of this scenario is the real goal of the DPRK leadership in the current crisis. The North Koreans “opened their cards” and indicated both their product and the expected price for it. No less than the national security of the DPRK is now up for sale, and it is proposed to pay for it with something no less adequate - guarantees of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and recognition of the DPRK by the United States. In this case, the condition remains the unconditional elimination of all components of the DPRK's military nuclear program. The question of a peaceful nuclear program under the control of the IAEA remains open.

So that the United States would not have any illusions that Pyongyang would “surrender without a fight,” the North Koreans played their main trump card - they declared Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons.

The main result of the three rounds of the six-party talks in Beijing should be considered that they showed the possibility of resolving the crisis through negotiations, and that this has now become more likely than before. But to implement the “Pacification” scenario, a political decision by the US administration is required that the DPRK, in the event of a complete and verifiable renunciation of nuclear weapons (or all types of weapons of mass destruction), will not be considered as a state whose existence is contrary to American interests.

If George W. Bush's team has the political will to make such a decision, then the "Pacification" scenario has hope of being realized. True, for this the “five” (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan) will have to offer the DPRK a price that it could not refuse. However, it is not at all necessary that the main costs be borne by the United States. Quite the opposite.

Scenario two- increased tension with continued limited political dialogue. This scenario means that the United States refuses to carry out an armed action against the DPRK, but firmly insists on the conditions set for resolving the crisis and does not make concessions to the North Korean leadership. At the same time, it is possible to strengthen the American military presence on the territory of South Korea, and under certain conditions of the development of the situation, the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.

North Korea, for its part, will carry out actions demonstrating the seriousness of its intentions to resist American dictatorship. For example, it will resume testing ballistic missiles. A nuclear test involving the detonation of a nuclear explosive device cannot be ruled out.

That is, the situation is “frozen” until the moment when the foreign policy situation changes, as well as the situation in the United States itself. It is likely that the “unfreezing” of the situation will occur only after George W. Bush’s team leaves the scene.

This scenario seems quite dangerous. On the one hand, it allows the DPRK to conduct military nuclear research, completely removing its nuclear program from international monitoring. On the other hand, the United States, as part of achieving its goals, will increase pressure on the DPRK, seeking complete political and economic isolation of the republic. Taken together, such actions by the DPRK and the United States could become a transitional phase to the start of real hostilities.

Scenario three- US military action. This option is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although it is likely that the political legitimization of such an operation may encounter fewer difficulties than in the case of Iraq.

The main problem of implementing this scenario is that, unlike S. Hussein, the North Korean leadership, both from a military point of view and from the point of view of political will, is quite ready for a preventive invasion of the territory of South Korea in order to prevent the formation of an “army” on its territory invasion" by the United States and its allies. Although it seems obvious that Pyongyang is not clearly targeting the military option. Despite the obvious preference of the first scenario, unfortunately, the likelihood of events developing under it today is lower than under the second scenario. And the main reason for this lies in the persistently demonstrated intolerance by the George W. Bush team towards the regime of Kim Jong Il.

How to prevent global consequences?

The question of the possible consequences of the DPRK acquiring the status of a state that actually possesses nuclear weapons deserves special consideration.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying: “We have already taken decisive action to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have produced our own self-defense nuclear weapons in response to the policies of the administration of US President George W. Bush, which has not hidden its desire to isolate and strangle the DPRK." It also states that “North Korean nuclear weapons will remain a deterrent force under any circumstances.”

It should be noted that earlier, individual representatives of the DPRK stated that their country has “nuclear deterrent forces.” More recently, on January 24, 2005, Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK Kim Kye Gwan, at a meeting with American Congressman Curt Weldon, said that Pyongyang has nuclear weapons, but will use them “solely for defense purposes.” However, this time the recognition of the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons sounded like an official position.

Can we believe this statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry? The North Koreans did not provide evidence of possessing nuclear weapons. The former head of the US Los Alamos laboratory, Siegfried Hacker, who visited North Korean nuclear facilities in early 2004, doubts Pyongyang’s ability to create nuclear weapons in the near future. In his opinion, the North Koreans have failed to solve a number of technical problems, primarily related to the creation of effective detonators to activate the main warhead.

But, on the other hand, one cannot ignore the already mentioned confession of the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A.K. Khan is that the North Korean uranium program is much more advanced than the world community assumes. Moreover, this program, unlike the plutonium program, was in no way controlled by the IAEA. Therefore, it can be assumed that under the cover of the plutonium weapons project, which, albeit in doses, was still monitored by IAEA inspectors until December 2002, Pyongyang was able to implement a uranium weapons project.

Taking into account the above, it would be rash to agree with the assessments of a number of Russian and foreign experts that the statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry of February 10, 2005 is another manifestation of a policy of blackmail with elements of bluff. The following assessment seems more balanced: it is unlikely that the North Koreans have made nuclear weapons, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that work is underway to create nuclear weapons in the DPRK, and if the world community does not take coordinated measures that take into account the security interests of the DPRK, sooner or later this country may still have them (if they have not already appeared). And this event, if there is strong evidence of its occurrence, will have far-reaching consequences for security not only in Northeast Asia, but also on a global scale.

Firstly, the likelihood of attempts to resolve the Korean “nuclear crisis” by force is increasing, including due to the growing threat of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons - after all, Pyongyang trades in ballistic missiles, why shouldn’t it also trade in nuclear weapons and technologies for their production? Secondly, crisis stability on the Korean Peninsula will significantly decrease. The United States cannot ignore the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons, albeit on the territories of South Korea and Japan, and therefore, if the crisis escalates, it could cause preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. Pyongyang, in turn, in this situation can act on the principle of “to use or to lose.”

Third, a “nuclear domino” process will begin in the North-Eastern region. In a short time, literally in 4-6 months, Japan will create its own nuclear weapons. This country has all the technologies necessary for this, and its plutonium reserves of 5.6 tons are suitable for creating 1000-1200 nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are likely to intensify their efforts to create missile defense in cooperation with the United States. The United States itself will increase its efforts to protect against nuclear missile weapons both its territory and the territory of its allies, including by deploying ships with anti-missile defenses in waters adjacent to North Korea. Under these conditions, both China and Russia will be forced, in turn, to increase their own efforts in the nuclear missile field. Brewing new race in the field of nuclear missile weapons.

Fourthly, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the DPRK and the beginning of the “nuclear domino” process in the North-East region will lead to the actual collapse of the NPT, and moreover, the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. Those states parties to the NPT that, for one reason or another, would like to acquire nuclear weapons will become convinced that a demonstrative withdrawal from this treaty remains virtually unpunished, and the leading states of the world are unable or unwilling to bring a country that is challenging the international community to reason.

What conclusions should be drawn from the analysis of North Korea's nuclear and missile policy? There are four of them. Firstly, despite all the rhetoric about the possibility of North Korea delivering an “all-crushing” strike on the territories of countries unfriendly to it, Kim Jong Il clearly understands that as a result of retaliatory actions he will lose everything at once. The presence of nuclear missile weapons is an extremely important factor for him in maintaining his regime under predicted actions international coalition led by the United States in putting forceful pressure on totalitarian states. This refers to the crusade declared by Washington against countries included in the “axis of evil” by the United States.

Secondly, it is impossible to reliably say that the DPRK has nuclear weapons. Yes, it probably has everything necessary to create nuclear weapons, primarily based on highly enriched uranium (the design of this type of nuclear charge is much simpler than that based on weapons-grade plutonium). Only one thing can be said with certainty: the DPRK has not yet carried out nuclear explosions, although it did not undertake obligations not to carry them out (it did not sign the CTBT).

Third, North Korea is ready to curtail its military nuclear program if the United States, in turn, abandons its hostile policy towards it. Whether Pyongyang will continue to have a peaceful nuclear program, which essentially does not exist now, is a matter of future agreements. There is a wide choice of possible solutions, including the construction of nuclear power plants on the territory of other states with a share of North Korean ownership and the participation of North Korean specialists in the operation of such nuclear power plants.

Fourth, the development (or curtailment) of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs will be determined by the results of the six-party talks, including whether they will be continued after the pause in mid-2004.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea officially announced the creation of nuclear weapons. This caused concern in the United States and Japan and led to the introduction of harsh sanctions against the republic. Restrictive measures did not stop the leadership of the DPRK, and in 2017 the country acquired a ballistic missile, which, according to experts, is capable of delivering a deadly charge to the territory of the United States. However, according to experts, the likelihood that North Korea will strike first is minimal. How the DPRK created a nuclear missile shield - in the RT material. 13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has reached a dead end due to the US's hostile anti-Korean policy. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, determined to eliminate our system at any cost, we will expand our stockpile of nuclear weapons to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism,” the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.

The grin of the “paper tiger”

The potential nuclear threat has been assessed differently by North Korean leaders over the years. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach much importance to this. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a “paper tiger.”

The start of work on creating a nuclear infrastructure in North Korea began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States was going to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic during the Korean War of 1950-1953. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first it consisted of training specialists.

“Nuclear weapons appeared in North Korea almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities,” Irina Lantsova, a specialist on North and South Korea, associate professor of the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, said in an interview with RT.

According to Yuri Tavrovsky, a professor at the Russian Peoples' Friendship University, the main reason for the start of North Korea's nuclear development was "a deep sense of threat from Korea's traditional enemies, such as Japan and the United States, as well as the desire to rely on one's own forces, the Juche policy."

The Koreans decided not to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and China, Tavrovsky believes. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of the destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

“They (the North Korean authorities - RT) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can guarantee the non-repetition of war using conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense,” the expert believes .

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on Pyongyang’s creation of its own nuclear weapons. China, in particular, provided significant assistance in this by allowing North Korean scientists to visit its facilities.

The success of the DPRK, according to Tavrovsky, was facilitated by two main factors: “overexertion of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself,” as well as “conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan.” . At the last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought technology or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as “Satan”.

In 1985, counting on USSR assistance in the construction of a nuclear power plant, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors visited the country frequently, and the results of their inspections turned out to be ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK's intention to withdraw from the Treaty was announced, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the reactor in Yongbyon, the largest nuclear facility in North Korea. However, after analyzing the inevitable casualties, Clinton abandoned this idea.

After the visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to the DPRK, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, committed itself to stop building and using uranium enrichment infrastructure and removing plutonium from reactors, removing enriched nuclear fuel outside the DPRK and dismantling all facilities in one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The United States, in accordance with the agreement, was supposed to supply fuel oil to North Korea and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Dashing zeros

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States and included North Korea on the list of “rogue countries.” Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the demands on North Korea grew more and more. Already in 2002, the United States announced Pyongyang’s failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on its nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The six-party negotiations between the DPRK, China, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan, which began in the summer of 2003, also led nowhere. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification regarding South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been underway for four years.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but conducted its first test only in October 2006. North Korea is known to have tested several new weapons from 2006 to 2017.

In 2017, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear weapon, the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a necessary measure.

“After Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there were no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed,” Konstantin Asmolov, an employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, emphasized in a conversation with RT.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment; for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK does not exist as a state. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Delivered to the White House

The DPRK began developing a means of delivering a nuclear charge in 1988. It took ten years to create the Taepodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile - the first launch was made in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, North Korea observed a unilateral moratorium on missile tests, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

“The dialogue with the United States ceased in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile tests,” read the text of the statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued launching rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2017, the launch of the Hwasong-14 missile, which fell into the Sea of ​​Japan, became the reason for convening the UN Security Council. Soon, another launch was made of the North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is particularly concerned about the latest version of the Hwasong, the Hwasong-15, which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also a missile exporter. Among its largest buyers are the UAE, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were allegedly made on the basis of the North Korean Taepodong-2.

Sanctions pressure

The DPRK developed its nuclear program under conditions of tough sanctions imposed by the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as the European Union, and even Australia. The UN has created a Security Council committee on sanctions against the DPRK. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that affected almost all spheres of life - from cultural exchanges and money transfers to a ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.

According to Lantsova, North Korea, under the conditions of strict sanctions, has achieved a very good result: significant progress has been made in the work on its nuclear missile program - this applies to both delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves.

From the United States, pressure on North Korea intensified with the coming to power of Donald Trump, who had already threatened the DPRK with complete destruction.

“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man (Kim Jong-un - RT) has embarked on a suicide mission,” said the head of the White House, speaking at the UN.

However, the real danger posed by the DPRK raises serious doubts among experts. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to launch a nuclear strike is minimal.

“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They achieved what they had been malnourished and overworked for for many years. They have practically created a nuclear missile shield, this has already been recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK,” the expert is confident.

Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.

“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the principle of “strike first,” the expert emphasized.

The North Korean leadership demonstrated its decisive attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the start of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. The new type of intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15, was demonstrated at the parade.

“As long as the hostile policy of the United States continues, the mission of the people's army, serving as a powerful sword to defend the country, will continue,” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said while speaking to the military at a parade.

Since the opening of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK in 1965, the world has been arguing about how dangerous Korea's policy is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that weapons are being developed and tested in the republic mass destruction, which will be used in the event of a threat to the formation. However, experts disagree on how great North Korea's power really is. Questions also arise over whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who is the ally in creating weapons that could cause untold casualties.

Military potential of the DPRK

North Korea is one of the twenty poorest countries on the globe. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Juche political system, aimed at militarizing the country.

The needs of the army come first economically, and this is bearing fruit: North Korea’s army is the largest in the world.

But the number of soldiers is not a guarantee of success. Insufficient funding leads to the army using outdated equipment and weapons.

At the same time, the North Korean government has claimed since 1974 that the country is conducting continuous work to create nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this has become an additional reason for dissatisfaction among countries trying to resolve the conflict. North Korea claims that the weapons are being created solely for defensive purposes, but it is difficult to confirm the veracity of the claims.

At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermonuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb, was demonstrated. The government claimed that it existed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, a powerful earthquake was recorded in China near the border with the DPRK. Pyongyang authorities explained this as a test of a hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.

Sources of financing

The question of where North Korea got its nuclear weapons is closely related to the economic state of the country. Testing requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. This raises thoughts about outside financial help. China is considered North Korea's official partner, but during Kim Jong-un's reign, relations between the countries have deteriorated. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.

It is assumed that a new alliance – the DPRK and Russia – will enter the world political arena, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more reciprocal “courtesy” from Moscow. This means that financing comes from internal sources.

Experts suggest that money for the development of nuclear weapons comes from the following industries:

• social;
• agricultural;
• energy;
• heavy industrial.

There are reports in the media that North Korea is facing an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings They are turned on only for 3-4 hours a day; the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night images of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.

Claims that North Koreans are starving are unfounded. In the last decade, there has been economic growth in the country, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards that previously used to issue food rations. So the information that missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.

North Korea's nuclear potential

The times when threats about the presence of weapons of mass destruction were considered a bluff are behind us. The presence of powerful weapons in the DPRK is a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create 6 to 12 new missiles.

However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:

• the materials required to assemble nuclear warheads are not produced in North Korea and must be imported into the country;
• even with the creation of new charges, the problem remains with the construction of carriers for them;
• waste generated during the production of nuclear fuel is not exported from the country, and the conditions for its safe storage can only be met in small volumes.

However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing its experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts of the country, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Under threat from the United States, the DPRK can only afford one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un responded that the DPRK would strike if necessary.