In the second half of February 1945, the armies of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, with access to the Oder and Neisse rivers, were almost 200 km ahead of the formations operating on its left wing. The situation that developed on the line of contact between the parties allowed the enemy to launch a counterattack from the area of ​​the Oppel salient, which called into question the prospects for a further offensive in the Berlin direction. In order to exclude such a development of events, the commander of the front troops, Marshal Soviet Union I.S. Konev decided to encircle the formations of the German 17th Army and the Heinrici Army Group, concentrated southwest of Oppeln, which posed a serious danger, and after their defeat, reach the line of Strehlen, Patschau, Opava, that is, in the foothills of the Sudetenland.

The plan of the operation was to strike in directions converging on Neustadt with the forces of two groups - the Oppeln (northern) and the Ratibor (southern) groups. The first of them included the 21st and 4th (from March 17, 1945 - 4th Guards) tank armies of Colonel General D.N. Gusev and D.D. Lelyushenko, 34th Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army (Colonel General A.S. Zhadov) and 4th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General P.P. Poluboyarov). The basis of the southern group was the 59th and 60th armies of Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov and Colonel General P.A. Kurochkin, 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General I.P. Korchagin and the 31st Tank Corps of Major General G.G. Kuznetsova. Support for ground forces was entrusted to the 2nd Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation S.A. Krasovsky. In total, 31 rifle divisions were involved in the offensive ( average number- 3-5 thousand people), 5640 guns and mortars, 988 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1700 aircraft.

The Soviet troops were opposed by up to 15 divisions, over 1,420 guns and mortars, 94 tanks and assault guns, operating with the support of the forces of the 4th air fleet. Taking into account the shallow construction of the enemy’s defense, as well as the great superiority of the front over it in military equipment and weapons, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev planned to achieve the goal of the operation in short time. Therefore, the main role in the offensive was assigned to formations of the 4th Tank Army, 7th Guards Mechanized and 31st Tank Corps. They were supposed to, together with rifle units, break through the enemy’s defenses, and then quickly move into depth in order to deprive the German command of the opportunity to respond in a timely manner to changes in the situation.

On March 15, after artillery preparation, formations of two strike groups attacked the front line of the enemy defense. However, from the very beginning, bad weather made adjustments to the plans of the front-line command. Due to poor weather conditions, aviation began to operate only after noon. Of the total number of 2,995 sorties planned for the day, it was able to carry out only 1,283. During the preparation for the attack and at its start, only artillery carried out fire on the enemy, which was unable to destroy the majority of anti-tank weapons. In such conditions, the expectation of using mobile formations in the first echelon to break through the defense did not justify itself. The tank corps suffered heavy losses. For example, in the 31st Tank Corps they made up more than 30% of combat vehicles.

The actions of the tanks, moreover, were significantly complicated by the spring thaw. They were forced to move mainly along roads on which German units had prepared strong centers of resistance and ambushes in advance. There were battles for every height, road junction, and populated area. As a result, by the end of the day, the northern strike group was able to break through only two enemy defense positions. The southern group was more successful, covering from 8 to 10 km.

The slow advance of Soviet troops allowed the enemy command to take measures to strengthen the threatened areas. During March 15-16, it began to transfer motorized, tank and infantry divisions to them. To forestall them in occupying defensive lines, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev ordered not to stop the offensive at night, for which purpose one reinforced rifle battalion from each division should be allocated every day. As a result measures taken formations of two strike groups completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and on March 18 established contact in the Neustadt area. Units of the 20th SS Infantry Division, the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, the 18th SS Motorized Division, and several separate regiments and battalions were surrounded.

The content of the method of defeating the enemy chosen by the front commander was to immediately deliver several strikes without additional preparation, cut the encircled group into pieces, isolate them from each other, disrupt interaction and disorganize control. He entrusted the implementation of these tasks to the 21st and 59th armies, while simultaneously ordering the 4th Guards Tank Army to exclude the approach of enemy reserves from the area west of Neisse. During March 19-20, this army thwarted all attempts by the German command to release its troops and created the conditions for their liquidation by rifle formations.

Subsequently, the offensive was carried out in separate directions with the goal of reaching the foothills of the Sudetenland. The most favorable situation for pursuing the enemy developed in the zone of the 21st Army. Here, on March 24, its units, together with units of the 4th Guards Tank Army, after intense street fighting, captured a large junction of railways and highways - the city of Neisse. Thus, they deprived the enemy command of the opportunity to exploit the rock gun railway, connecting army groups “Center” and “South”.

In more difficult conditions, at the final stage of the operation, the 60th Army had to operate, which struck in the direction of Ratibor, Opava. If it reached Opava, it would create a threat to the rear of the enemy group covering the Moravska-Ostrava industrial region. Therefore, the German command tried in every possible way to delay the further advance of the army, for which it transferred two additional tank divisions against it. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev decided to withdraw the 4th Guards Tank Army from the battle in the 21st Army zone and regroup it into the 60th Army zone.

The arrival of tank formations made it possible to increase the overall pace of the offensive. On March 27, the divisions of the 60th Army liberated the city of Rybnik, but were stopped on the approaches to Ratibor. The turning point in the fighting came after two breakthrough artillery divisions and most of the army artillery were concentrated here. Their massive use left the enemy no chance of success. March 31 Soviet troops completed the liberation of the city.

As a result of the operation, the armies of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia and occupied an advantageous position for subsequent attacks on the Dresden and Prague directions. They destroyed more than 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, captured 14 thousand people, disabled 280 tanks and assault guns (including those that arrived during the fighting), up to 600 field guns, a large number of another military equipment. At the same time, the front's casualties in people amounted to 66,801 people, of which 15,876 were killed, dead or missing.

Anatoly Borschov,
senior Researcher Research
Institute ( military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Frontline offensive Red Army anti-German troops during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from March 15 to March 31, 1945 by part of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front with the aim of eliminating the threat of a flank attack and capturing the Silesian industrial region.

General situation

The configuration of the front line formed as a result of the Lower Silesian offensive operation by Soviet troops provided both sides with the opportunity to conduct offensive operations. The southern wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front loomed menacingly from the north over a group of German troops in the Oppeln-Ratibor area. The German command, in turn, had the opportunity to launch a flank attack in the direction of Breslau with the aim of unblocking it.

VGK rate and General base The Red Army was concerned about the potential for the Germans to recapture the lost part of the Silesian industrial region. In his memoirs, I. S. Konev quotes the words of I. V. Stalin on this matter:

In order to eliminate the threat to the southern wing of the front, the commander decided to develop and conduct a private offensive operation.

Operation plan

The operation plan provided for a simultaneous offensive in converging directions by two front strike groups with the aim of encircling part of the German troops in the Oppeln area. The first group deployed north of Oppeln included: the 21st Army, the 4th Tank Army and the 34th Guards Rifle Corps. A second group was concentrated south of Oppeln, consisting of the 59th and 60th armies, the 93rd Rifle Corps, the 31st Tank Corps and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps.

Defense of German troops

The front line of defense consisted of field-type fortifications and engineering barriers. In the immediate rear, most settlements were prepared for long-term defense and formed strong centers of resistance. The area was densely mined and almost the entire space between populated areas was covered by artillery and machine-gun fire. Special attention The German command paid attention to anti-tank defense. Reserve firing positions were prepared for the artillery.

Composition and strengths of the parties

USSR

Part of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front (commander Marshal I. S. Konev, chief of staff General of the Army V. D. Sokolovsky) consisting of:

• 5th Guards Army (Colonel General Zhadov A.S.)
• 21st Army (Colonel General Gusev D.N.)
• 4th Tank Army, from March 17, 4th Guards Tank Army, (Colonel General Lelyushenko D. D.)
• 59th Army (Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov)
• 60th Army (Colonel General P. A. Kurochkin)
• 7th Guards Mechanized Corps (Major General of Tank Forces Korchagin I.P.)
• 31st Tank Corps (Major General of Tank Forces Kuznetsov G. G.)
• 4th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces P. P. Poluboyarov)
• 34th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General G. V. Baklanov)
• 2nd Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation Krasovsky S.A.)

Total: 408,400 people, 988 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,640 guns and mortars, 1,737 aircraft.

Germany

Part of the forces of Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal F. Schörner):

• 17th Army;
• army group "Heinrici" (Colonel General G. Heinrici), from March 22, 1st Tank Army (General of Tank Forces V. Nehring)

Aviation support ground forces carried out by the 4th Air Fleet.

In total before the start of the battle: 20 divisions, 1420 guns and mortars, 94 tanks and assault guns.

Progress of hostilities

The offensive of the strike forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front began on the morning of March 15 after a 40-minute artillery preparation. Having encountered stubborn resistance, by the end of the day the Soviet troops managed to penetrate 8-10 km into the enemy’s defenses. At the same time, tank units operating as part of both northern and southern groupings suffered serious losses. So the 7th Mechanized Corps lost a quarter, and the 31st Tank Corps lost a third of its tanks. For the first time, Soviet tankers were faced with the massive use by the defenders of the latest modifications of Faust cartridges - Panzerfausts, which were especially effective during battles in populated areas. In order to fend off the attack of the 1st Ukrainian Front and prevent it from reaching the city of Neisse, the German command began to transfer new formations to the battle area. On March 16, fierce fighting broke out between the advancing Soviet and counterattacking German troops. Despite this, by the end of March 17, the tactical defense zone of the German troops was broken through and mobile formations of strike groups rushed into the resulting gap: the 10th Guards Tank Corps and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. On the afternoon of March 18, they met near the city of Neustadt, closing the ring around the Wehrmacht Oppeln group. The cauldron included the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, the 20th SS Infantry Division and part of the 18th SS Motorized Division. On March 19, the German command made the first attempt to release the encircled forces. tank division"Hermann Goering". The next day, larger forces were brought in for this purpose: the 10th Army Corps, the 20th Tank and the 45th Infantry Divisions. The German counter-offensive was met by three Soviet corps: the 118th Rifle Corps, the 6th Mechanized Corps and the 4th Guards Tank Corps. While the Soviet formations operating on the external front of the encirclement repelled German counterattacks, the main forces of the 21st Army by the evening of March 20 had actually completed the liquidation of the encircled German group.

On March 24, as a result of a rapid offensive and after intense street fighting, units of the 21st and 4th Tank Armies captured the city of Neisse.

On March 24, 1945, a tank platoon of Guard Lieutenant Nazip Khazipov was the first to break into the village of Vladen, suppress the fire of three assault guns, knock out a tank and an armored personnel carrier and destroy over a company of enemy soldiers.

The next day, during the battle for a heavily fortified height, the Germans launched a strong counterattack, repelling which Khazipov’s tank was hit and he himself was wounded. Despite this, the brave officer evacuated the wounded members of his crew and fought the enemy alone for four hours. Having destroyed another enemy assault gun and more than a platoon of infantry, he fought until he died from a direct hit from an enemy shell.

The next and last large settlement that was to be taken during the operation was the city of Ratibor. The 60th Army of Colonel General A.P. Kurochkin operated in this direction. However, the offensive in this direction developed extremely difficult. March 22 weather allowed the aviation of the 2nd Air Army to resume support for the attacking Soviet infantry. Despite this, the German units defended themselves with great tenacity. In addition, the German command transferred the 8th and 17th tank divisions from other directions and brought them into battle. In the current situation, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to reinforce the advancing units of the 60th Army with two corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army. This had a positive effect on the pace of the Soviet offensive. On March 24, the 38th Army of the neighboring 4th Ukrainian Front resumed its offensive in the Moravian-Ostrava direction, creating a threat of encirclement of the German group in the Rybnik and Ratibor area and thereby changing the operational situation in favor of the Red Army. On March 27, the 60th Army took Rybnik. Then, for two days on March 29 and 30 Soviet aviation carried out massive bombing and assault attacks on the positions of German troops in the Ratibor area. To strengthen the firepower of the attackers, the 17th and 25th artillery breakthrough divisions were transferred to the Ratibor area. On March 31, after powerful artillery preparation, the 15th and 106th Rifle Corps of the 60th Army began the decisive assault on the city. They were supported by tankers of the 31st Tank Corps and the army of D. D. Lelyushenko. Unable to withstand the onslaught, the enemy began to withdraw his troops. Having captured Ratibor, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive.

Losses of the parties

USSR

During the operation, the Red Army lost 66,801 people, of which 15,876 were irretrievable. During the battle, the commander of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, Nil Danilovich Chuprov, and the commander of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, Vasily Fedorovich Orlov, were killed.

Germany

German troops lost almost 60 thousand people, of whom about a third were taken prisoner. 80 tanks and assault guns, up to 1,300 guns, 26 aircraft, and 243 military equipment warehouses were lost.

Results of the operation

As a result of the Upper Silesian operation, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front destroyed more than 5 Wehrmacht divisions, eliminated the threat of a German counteroffensive and significantly undermined the military-economic potential of Germany. According to the Minister of Armaments A. Speer, with the loss of Upper Silesia, Germany lost a quarter of its military production.

During the Great Patriotic War, Silesia played an extremely important role for Hitler's Germany. This area is rich in many minerals: coal, iron and lead-zinc ores, magnesites. Comparatively small area there were several large industrial centers located almost close to each other: mines, mines, blast furnaces, metallurgical and chemical enterprises. Military factories were also concentrated here. In addition, the Nazis transferred a number of enterprises from the Ruhr to Silesia, away from the bombing of Allied aircraft. This made Silesia even more important for the Reich. Besides, through Silesia lay the route of our troops to Czechoslovakia and Berlin. Thus, the struggle for this industrial region of Germany was of great importance for both sides.

By the beginning of 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the 500-kilometer section of the front towards the Oder and managed to capture a number of areas on the left bank of the river northwest and southeast of Breslau and north of Ratibor. Fighting in Silesia began in January 1945, as part of the Vistula-Oder operation. The Lower Silesian offensive operation became its logical continuation.

The German command, anticipating the Soviet offensive in Silesia, strengthened this area, preparing a powerful defensive line, the key nodes of which were the fortified cities of Breslau, Glogau and Liegnitz. Each city had two defensive contours (internal and external). The enemy managed to create a powerful line of defense, bringing the rear reserves at its disposal into the region.

It was up to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I.S. Konev to break the enemy’s resistance on this section of the front. And although the armies were weakened in the previous offensive and had some difficulties with logistical support, it was extremely undesirable to delay active actions. The enemy grouping in the Berlin direction increased every day. It was impossible to allow the enemy to gain a strong foothold on the left bank of the Oder.

The difficulty of the upcoming offensive also lay in maintaining the integrity of the industrial base of the region. The commanders conveyed this idea of ​​the upcoming combat operation to all fighters.

On January 28, 1945, the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front presented an operation plan, the goal of which was to defeat the Breslau-Dresden enemy group and reach the Elbe River by February 25-28. By the beginning of the operation, front troops were occupying positions along the Oder River.

The main attack was planned to be delivered from two bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder, north and south of Breslau in the general direction of Sprottau - Cottbus - Jüterbog. The northern fist was the most powerful and consisted of four combined arms and two tank armies - the 3rd Guards Army under the command of General V.N. Gordov, the 13th Army under the command of General N.P. Pukhov, the 52nd Army under the command of General K .A. Koroteev, the 6th Army under the command of General V.A. Gluzdovsky, the 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.S. Rybalko and the 4th Tank Army under the command of General D.D. Lelyushenko - as well as 25th Tank and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. The 2nd Air Army supported the offensive from the air.

Two combined arms armies (5th Guards under the command of General A.S. Zhadov and 21st under the command of General D.N. Gusev) had to bypass Breslau from the south with the support of two tank corps (4th Guards and 31st) in in the general direction of Striegau - Görlitz - Grossen-hain - Leipzig.

The capture of the city of Breslau was entrusted to the 6th Army with the support of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. After completing the assigned task, they were supposed to link up with units of the 5th Guards Army, which was advancing to the south.

Thanks to the regrouping of troops, I.S. Konev managed to achieve superiority over the enemy in the direction of the main attack, especially in tanks and artillery - Soviet troops outnumbered German troops by almost 6 times. In total, the front had the following forces: about 981 thousand people, 6,776 guns, 782 tanks, 572 self-propelled artillery units and 1,951 aircraft. Our troops were required to strike at open area, at crossings, away from industrial centers.

Despite the defeats, the enemy still had quite serious forces. The German group in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of the 4th Panzer, 17th Field Armies and the Heinrici Army Group (1st Panzer Army), which were part of Army Group Center (commanded by Colonel General F. Scherner ). By February 8, 26 infantry, four tank and two motorized divisions, as well as a tank brigade and the Breslau corps group, were operating in front of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Fulfilling the instructions of the Headquarters, mentioned above, the front commander decided to destroy the enemy in front of the center and left wing and throw him back into the Sudeten Mountains. The offensive was planned to be carried out by forces of the 5th Guards, 21st, 59th, 60th Combined Arms and 4th Panzer Army. The plan was to encircle and destroy the enemy Oppeln group and advance to the Strehlen, Münsterberg, Troppau line. Action was scheduled to begin at March 15th.
To achieve the intended goal, groups were created: Oppel grouping as part of the 21st combined arms and 4th Panzer Army, a rifle corps from the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps for a strike from the Grottkau area to the southwest in the direction of Neustadt and Ratiborskaya as part of the 59th and 60th Armies, the 7th Guards Mechanized, the 31st tank corps, which was to advance towards the Oppeln group in the western and northwestern directions.
March 8 1945 war council 4th Tank Army received a directive from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which ordered: “The commander of the 4th Tank Army, from the breakthrough site of the 21st Army, strike in the direction of Neisse, Neustadt and, in cooperation with the 21st and 59th armies, destroy the opposing enemy group. On the first day of the operation, capture the Neisse area, on the second day, capture Neustadt and Sultz and connect with units of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of Major General I.P. Korchagin.” He was advancing towards us from the sector of the 59th Army of Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov, of which he was a member.
Before 4th Tank Army Units of the enemy's 45th, 344th, 20th SS and 168th Infantry Divisions defended. In the depths were his 10th Motorized and 100th Light Infantry Divisions. Operational reserves: 16th, 17th, “Hermann Goering” tank divisions were located south of Neisse.
The first position of the Nazis’ main line of defense was equipped with full-profile trenches and wire fences, the second was located 3-5 km deep from the front edge.
From 10 to 12 March two night crossings 4th Tank Army was regrouped from the forests north of Luben to the Olau region (40 km southeast of Breslau) as the initial area for the offensive.
We had 7 days to plan the operation. The army headquarters under the leadership of K.I. Upman worked like clockwork. Material support for the operation and party-political work under the leadership of A.K. Yarkov and N.G. Kladovoy were carried out at the proper level.
Tense creative work of the entire field administration made it possible to assign tasks to the troops in a timely manner.
The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the 118th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army, was to advance in the direction of Kalkau, to capture the Otmahau area by the end of the first day, and the Neustadt area on the second day.
The 10th Guards Tank Corps with the 117th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army struck in the direction of Neisse. By the end of the first day, he was supposed to capture the area of ​​​​this city, and with part of his forces, together with the 93rd separate tank brigade, to capture the crossings across the river. Neisse (southern) in the Rothaus area, the next day to link up with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. One brigade of the corps should remain in the Neisse area until the infantry of the 21st Army approaches. 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade c. as an army reserve it followed the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps.
The tasks of the troops in the Upper Silesian operation differed from the previous ones in that our tank army had to break through the enemy’s defenses together with the infantry from the very beginning and only after breaking through to its entire tactical depth would it break away from the rifle units and quickly reach the area of ​​Neustadt, Sülz and together with the 59th Army of General I.T. Korovnikov, complete the encirclement of the enemy group. The front commander apparently used this method of interaction in order to break through the entire depth of the enemy’s defense, which, by the way, was relatively small but strong, as quickly as possible.
The fighting has begun March 15th 1945 21st Army Colonel General D.N. Gusev and 4th Tank Army went on the offensive simultaneously after 40 minutes of artillery preparation.
We could see from the observation post how the troops, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy and repelling repeated counterattacks of his tactical reserves, broke the front line of his defense and went forward. 4th Tank Army By the end of the first day, in cooperation with the infantry, Guseva broke through 2 fortified enemy positions on an 8-kilometer section of the front and advanced 9 km into the depth of his defense.
On the second and third days, the offensive of our troops was successful. Due to the improvement in the weather, the aviation of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to provide active assistance to ground troops, carrying out bombing and assault attacks on the Nazi strongholds, headquarters and communications centers.
March 17 The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, having broken through into the operational depths of enemy troops, captured the village of Stefansdorf. The 10th Guards Tank Corps crossed the river. Neisse at Rothaus and expanded his success to Neustadt. Here, near Rothaus, the commander of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Nil Danilovich Chuprov, who had gone through a glorious battle path since the beginning of the war, died in battle. It was a very difficult loss for us. Together with Chuprov, his adjutant Lieutenant Bazylev died, and the commander of the armored personnel carrier, Sergeant A.V. Chenchikov, was shell-shocked. Major General E. E. Belov, deputy commander of the 4th Tank Army, again took command of the corps.
March 17 The operational group and I were at the location of the 10th Guards Tank Corps at the crossing of the river. Neisse (south) at Rothaus. At this moment, the enemy pulled up tanks and, from behind the copses, fired aimed fire with armor-piercing shells at our tanks, which were facing the pontoon bridge that we had built across the river. Neisse. I immediately instructed Belov to cover the flank and increase the pace of movement. Within 3 hours, 2 brigades were on the eastern bank of the Neisse. The enemy's fire on the bridge began to weaken, apparently, he began to retreat. The remaining 2 brigades of the 10th Corps began to cross the river.
At this time, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, arrived at us. I reported the situation. Ivan Stepanovich began to observe the crossing of the troops. Suddenly, a shell whistled from the opposite bank and hit the Willys vehicle, which was carrying the front commander’s guard. The car jumped, but everything went well, the shell did not explode, it was probably armor-piercing. Soon I. S. Konev went to see D. N. Gusev.
After 1.5 hours, the entire 10th Guards Tank Corps crossed the river and moved towards Neustadt, and with part of its forces towards Sultz, towards Korchagin’s 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. Together with Belov, we moved in the battle formations of his main forces, leading the troops in order to complete the encirclement of the enemy’s Oppeln group as quickly as possible.
Our 93rd separate tank brigade of A. A. Dementyev, advancing along the eastern bank of the river. Neisse, encountered fierce resistance from the 20th SS Infantry Division. Yet 18th of March The brigade managed to break the resistance of the SS men and reach the eastern Rothaus area. By the evening of the same day, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade of V.I. Zaitsev immediately captured the city of Neustadt, where there were a lot of fascists armed with Faustpatrons. We had to take proper measures. The main forces of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, led by E.E. Belov, reached the Sülz area, where they linked up with units of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of General I.P. Korchagin, advancing from the east, completing the encirclement of the enemy Oppeln group. 4 fascist German divisions, several separate regiments and separate battalions, an artillery regiment, 9 artillery divisions and other units ended up in the cauldron and were defeated.
It was obvious that the enemy would try to release the encircled group, and we took measures to strengthen the outer front of the encirclement. This task fell to the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. The assumption was confirmed: on the night of 18th of March The enemy brought into action its reserve: the 16th, 17th, 20th Panzer and 45th Infantry Divisions, the Hermann Goering Division and the 184th Assault Gun Brigade in the direction of the cities of Neisse to Rothaus. Since morning 18th of March Our 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, V. F. Orlov, entered into a fierce battle with these formations. An army artillery brigade was sent here for reinforcements. The fight lasted 2 days. The enemy continuously launched furious attacks one after another. Individual settlements and borders repeatedly changed hands. However, despite all efforts, the fascists failed to unblock their group, and their units were thrown back with heavy losses.
In these bloody battles, the commander of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, Colonel Vasily Fedorovich Orlov, and the commander of the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Leonid Dmitrievich Churilov, were seriously wounded, but they did not leave the battlefield and continued to control the troops. A few hours after being wounded, a brave warrior, a talented commander, a favorite of the entire army, 28-year-old communist corps commander Vasily Fedorovich Orlov, died. His warriors vowed to take revenge on the enemy for the death of their commander. Colonel Vasily Ignatievich Koretsky, chief of staff of the corps, took command of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps.
Intense fighting continued. We pushed the enemy to the west.
In the midst of the Upper Silesian battle, news was received that excited all the soldiers and commanders. At 3 o'clock. 10 min. 18th of March addressed to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the commander 4th Tank Army a telegram was received signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin:
“In the battles for our Soviet Motherland against the German invaders, the 4th Tank Army showed examples of courage and perseverance, bravery and courage, discipline and organization.
During the battles on the fronts of the Patriotic War with the German invaders, the 4th Tank Army, with its crushing blows, destroying enemy manpower and equipment, inflicted heavy losses on the fascist troops. For the courage shown in battles for the fatherland, perseverance, courage, courage, discipline, organization and skillful execution of combat missions, transform the 4th Tank Army into the 4th Guards Tank Army and... present the transformed tank army with the Guards Banner.”
The good news caused a new surge of strength among the entire army personnel. Briefly, rallies were held in all parts.
Events at the front developed successfully.
March 19 The 10th Guards Tank Corps with the 93rd separate tank and 22nd artillery-self-propelled brigades, in cooperation with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of I.P. Korchagin and the rifle divisions of the 21st and 59th armies, dismembered the enemy, got into the cauldron, and by morning March 22 the surrounded group was completely eliminated.
After the destruction of the enemy in the Neustadt area and the entry of our troops to the Neisse-Leobschütz line, the threat to the left flank of the front was largely eliminated. However, in the area of ​​Ratibor, Jägerndorf, Troppau, the enemy forces the 78th and 75th Infantry, 100th Light Infantry and 8th Tank Divisions, having a reserve in the depths of the defense consisting of the Fuhrer's Guard division and the remnants of the 16th and 17th th tank divisions, continued to hold the occupied area, covering the western part of the Upper Silesian region.
There was to be another blow to the enemy in Upper Silesia. Before dawn March 24 we received a directive from the front commander to prepare for a new operation. It stated that it included 5th Guards Mechanized and the 10th Guards Tank Corps, in cooperation with the 60th Army, were to defeat the enemy’s Ratibor group and, by the end of March 25, capture the Egordorf, Troppau, Steuberwitz area, and strike with the main forces in the direction of Troppau.
From March 24, 1945, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps was included in the 4th Guards Tank Army. He was supposed to advance with his main forces in the direction of Troppau, and with part of his forces to capture Jägerndorf. On the night of March 25, the 10th Guards Tank Corps was ordered to concentrate in the Leobschütz area in readiness to develop an attack in the direction of Troppau. For the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, the task remained the same (it, together with the 21st Army, cleared the area of ​​enemy remnants). The start of the operation was scheduled for 12 o'clock. 30 min. March 25. Inclusion in our army further raised the spirit of the tank guards. I have long sought to have a third corps in the tank army, but the most important thing was that a mechanized corps was introduced into the army. This increased the combat effectiveness and, most importantly, the survivability of the army due to artillery, motorized infantry and tanks. Two mechanized and one tank corps - at that time, from my point of view, the most profitable organization of a tank army.
Included 5th Guards Mechanized Corps in addition to artillery and motorized infantry, there were 150 tanks. The corps was commanded by Major General Boris Mikhailovich Skvortsov, and from April 14 - Major General Ivan Prokhorovich Ermakov, the head of the political department was Colonel Leonid Ivanovich Okhlopkov, the chief of staff was Ivan Vasilyevich Shabarov, and from April 14 Colonel Alexander Pavlovich Ryazansky. The corps did not yet have experience operating as part of a tank army. From December 1944 to February 1945 it was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and from February to March 1945 - in the reserve of the 4th Ukrainian Front and was previously attached to combined arms armies.
The corps included: 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade Colonel V. N. Buslaev (Head of the Political Department, Major A. I. Panchenko), 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel I. T. Noskov (Head of the Political Department, Major T. A. Bogdanov), 12th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel G. Ya Borisenko (head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Dmitriev), 24th Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel V. P. Ryazantsev (head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel N. V. Orlov).
An interesting detail - in the corps there were many volunteer sailors of the Pacific Fleet who wished to fight the enemy on land combat “ships”, and they did not compromise the dignity of the sailors and showed high valor in the Berlin and Prague operations.
Carrying out the order 5th Guards Mechanized Corps at 8 o'clock. on the morning of March 24, 1945 attacked the enemy in the direction of Leobschütz - Troppau. On the right, the 93rd separate tank brigade attacked the city of Egerndorf, and the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade of Lieutenant Colonel N.F. Kornyushkin attacked the city of Biskau.
The 10th Guards Tank Corps, constituting the second echelon of the army, built on its success 5th Guards Mechanized Corps towards Troppau. However, the first attacks had only limited success. Relying on previously prepared positions, the Nazis fanatically resisted. Location on 5th Guards Mechanized Corps we managed to advance only 3-4 km.
Warriors 5th [Guards Mechanized] Corps were zealous in fulfilling their task. On March 24, the commander of a tank platoon of the 24th Guards Tank Brigade, Lieutenant N. Kh. Khazipov, was the first to break into the enemy’s battle formations during the capture of the village of Vladey and destroyed 3 enemy troops there combat vehicles and up to the infantry platoon. The next day, developing the offensive, Khazipov’s guards burned a Tiger tank and a self-propelled gun and destroyed up to a company of Nazis. Tankmen V. Ya. Iksar, G. S. Gorokhovsky, A. Kolovertnykh, L. I. Salyukov and G. D. Volkov showed outstanding courage and combat skill in this battle. While performing his military duty, Volkov died the death of a hero. Soon an enemy shell hit the command tank. The entire crew was wounded. Khazipov, bleeding, helped evacuate his subordinates. Then, having gathered his last strength, he returned to the tank and destroyed more than a platoon of infantry with a machine gun; Communist Nazip Khazipovich Khazipov died a heroic death. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
To build up the blow to the left 5th [Guards Mechanized] Corps March 25 We brought the 10th Guards Tank Corps into battle. The enemy command, in turn, sent its 16th and 17th tank divisions here against our 93rd separate tank brigade, and ordered the Fuhrer's Guard division to wedge between 5th Guards Mechanized and the 10th Guards Tank Corps. The situation became more complicated and it was necessary to take the necessary measures immediately.
Taking advantage of the fact that March 27 The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, after completing the combat mission, transferred the area it occupied near the city of Neisse to the 21st Army, and by the next morning concentrated in the Stein area (9 km northeast of Leobschütz), I decide March 28 bring the corps into battle in the direction of Steuberwitz, where the enemy did not expect our attack at all. This was an exit to the rear of the Fuhrer's Guard division.
In order for the supporting artillery fire to be most effective, artillery spotters were placed in the tanks. Heavy tanks IS and self-propelled units SU-122s covered the flanks. This played a very important role in breaking through the enemy defense to its entire depth. The enemy, trying to launch a counterattack on the flanks of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, encountered the barriers of our artillery fire, powerful tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. The success of our actions was facilitated by the aviation of Colonel General S. A. Krasovsky. Our maneuver yielded results. The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps advanced 10 km deep into the enemy’s defenses and created an immediate threat of encirclement of the Fuhrer’s Guard tank division, which until that time had been holding back the advance of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. The enemy defenses began to fall apart, and the Fuhrer's vaunted bodyguards began to hastily retreat.
Over the next 3 days, we completed the encirclement of the enemy in the Biskau area. The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps continued its offensive between Ratibor and Biskau to Steuberwitz and further to Resnitz. With this blow, the enemy’s battle formations were cut into pieces: his 97th Mountain Division was thrown to the east and there destroyed by the troops of our 60th Army, and the 8th Tank and 75th Infantry Divisions of the enemy were pressed to Biscau, where they were surrounded by units of the 10th Army. th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps our army. The 6th Corps intercepted the enemy's main communications between Ratibor and Moravsko-Ostrova, the 93rd separate tank and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades pushed the enemy from the north.
April 1 The incoming flanks united in Resnitz and began to destroy the enemy’s Biskau group. The surrounded enemy was cut into two parts here too. April 2 and 3 connections 4th Guards Tank and the 60th Army destroyed this enemy group.
As a result of two operations in Upper Silesia 4th Guards Tank Army in cooperation with the 21st, 59th and 60th armies and other troops, they contributed to the liberation of the western part of the Upper Silesian industrial region. A large enemy group hanging over the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front was now completely eliminated. This is what Hitler’s general K. Tippelskirch said about the importance of the Upper Silesian industrial region for Nazi Germany:
“The 17th Army entered fierce battles for the Upper Silesian industrial region. Meanwhile, work was still going on underground, and trains with coal were leaving for the west every day. The army was only handing over the last operating German weapons forge step by step. With the loss of Upper Silesia, the Reich, also in the field of armament, was deprived of its last opportunity to continue the fight for any length of time.”
In Upper Silesia, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which included 4th Guards Tank Army played an important role, inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy, destroyed about 40 thousand of his soldiers and officers, captured 14 thousand, destroyed and captured about 80 tanks, thousands of guns and mortars, more than 1000 machine guns and much other military equipment.
We have enriched our combat experience. The breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense was carried out both in cooperation with combined arms formations and independently.
The depth of the operation was small. It was determined by the plan of the command, the nature of the terrain and the enemy defense system. The enemy, trying to hold the western part of the Upper Silesian Basin - the only coal and metallurgical base remaining in his hands after the loss of the Ruhr, densely saturated the defense with tanks, artillery and infantry, and widely used faust cartridges. The Nazis stubbornly resisted, clinging to every settlement and border. They brought here several formations removed from other sectors of the front, including the 16th, 17th tank divisions, the Fuhrer's Guard tank division, etc.
Our commanders and staffs acquired skills in command and control of troops in specific battle conditions determined by the nature of the terrain, where there were many settlements with stone buildings, ravines, rivers, streams, and copses.
During the fighting, starting from the Vistula, i.e. from January 12 to February 15, 1945, 4th Tank Army covered more than 600 km, and taking into account the Silesian operation - over 800 km. But it wasn't easy. The replenishment has still not arrived. There was a growing need to pause in order to increase reserves and replenish the troops with personnel, military equipment and all types of supplies, especially ammunition and fuel. In addition, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were too stretched (a distance of about 400 km) from Guben on the Oder to Upper Silesia. The situation was approximately the same with the neighbors.
Meanwhile, all of us, from soldier to general, felt that the final defeat of the enemy and the capture of the fascist lair - Berlin - would require substantial forces and resources, extreme tension, and therefore we needed to prepare properly.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to take a break.
Per month 4th Tank Army destroyed 780 enemy tanks, 378 armored personnel carriers, 385 guns and mortars, 47 aircraft, 35 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, captured serviceable 84 tanks, 62 armored personnel carriers, 288 aircraft, captured 6,779 Nazis (excluding the Silesian operation).
Together and in cooperation with other armies, troops 4th Guards Tank defeated the 31st SS, 45th, 68th, 168th, 29th, 291st, 408th infantry divisions, 16th, 17th, 25th tank, 20th motorized divisions, dozens of Volkssturm battalions and inflicted heavy defeats on the 6th, 73th, 76th, 158th and 214th infantry divisions, tank division "Hermann Goering", motorized division "Brandenburg", etc.
The Army Military Council, formation commanders, headquarters and political agencies have increased the experience of rapidly developing success in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense with open flanks, in isolation from combined arms armies, as well as reliable command and control of troops in these conditions, holding captured lines until the approach of combined arms armies. The average rate of advance at the first stage of the operation (during the encirclement and destruction of the Kielce-Radom enemy group) was 23-25 ​​km per day. At the second stage (during the pursuit of the defeated enemy to the Oder and Neisse rivers) - up to 50 km per day, and in some cases up to 70 km.
Large water obstacles were crossed: Charna Nida, Pilica, Warta, Prosna, Oder, Bober, both Neisses. Many of them were overcome on the move along captured bridges and crossings, for example, on January 17 by the 93rd separate tank brigade of the river. Pilica near the town of Sulejów, January 19th. Warta near Osyakow, January 20, 61st Guards Tank Brigade r. Varta near the town of Burzenin, February 11, 29th Guards Rifle Brigade r. Bober, February 14, 49th mechanized brigade of the river. Neisse near Gross-Gastrose, March 17 by the 10th Tank Corps r. South Neisse.
Successful capture of bridges was usually achieved through swift night attacks. Where it was not possible to capture serviceable crossings, river crossings were carried out using improvised means or using ferries and built bridges.
Army troops, in cooperation with other units, stormed dozens of cities on the territory of Nazi Germany. There we encountered the widespread use of new enemy weapons, which posed a serious threat to tanks, especially when fighting in populated areas - the so-called faustpatrons. Hitler's command massively armed not only the troops with Faustpatrons, but also the population, mainly teenagers, united in the Volkssturm organization. This required special vigilance, constant tension and tactical art.
The flanking maneuvers we used created a threat to the city being surrounded. If necessary, we used the following tactics to operate in the city: units with machine guns and anti-tank rifles followed in front, supported by individual tanks; they combed all suspicious places, destroying faustian nests. If necessary, assault groups were created.
Experience was accumulated in the actions of tank formations and the entire army at night. The work of rear institutions in providing combat support to troops in conditions of rapid advance of tank and motorized rifle units has become clearer.
The great depth of the operation and the rapid advance of troops were a serious test of the survivability of the T-34 and IS tanks. The tank technical service was up to par. The combat effectiveness of the tanks during the month-long battles was maintained primarily by the crews themselves, as well as by the workers of the repair units. Thus, most of the damaged tanks were restored by the army.
In the conditions of dynamic actions of the tank army on the territory of Poland and Nazi Germany, political agencies and party organizations enriched the experience of political and educational work in the troops. Party and Komsomol organizations grew continuously. Only in January 1945, compared to December 1944, the ranks of communists increased by more than 1.5 times, and Komsomol members - doubled.
Successful actions of the troops 4th Guards Tank Army as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they were noted 6 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the 1st Ukrainian Front: January 15 - for the capture of a communications hub and stronghold of the Nazi defense, a large administrative and economic center of Poland - the city of Koltse; January 18 - for the capture of the city and the railway station Piotrkow (Petrokov) - an important communications hub and stronghold of the Nazi defense in the Lodz direction; January 23 - for the capture of the cities of Milich and Bernstadt; January 24 - for the capture of the cities of Ravich, Trachenberg; February 15 - for the capture of the cities of Sommerfeld, Sorau; March 22 - for the capture of Neustadt.
Several thousand soldiers, sergeants and army officers were awarded orders and medals for heroism shown in battle, and 72 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
For valor and exploits, the 62nd Guards Tank, 71st Light Artillery Brigade, 241st Guards Mortar and 2 regiments of the 68th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division received the honorary names of Keletsky; Petrokovskikh - 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards Corps, 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Guards Corps and 2 regiments of the 68th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division.
The awarding of the rank of guards to our army raised the morale of the soldiers even higher on the eve of the Berlin operation.
The Vistula-Oder operation, carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, is one of the outstanding in the Great Patriotic War. Fascist General F. Mellenthin is forced to admit:
“The Russian offensive developed with unprecedented force and speed. It was clear that their Supreme Command had completely mastered the technique of organizing an offensive huge armies... It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe has not known anything like this since the fall of the Roman Empire.” This recognition of the beaten general is not beneficial to those bourgeois historians who are trying to belittle the significance of the Vistula-Oder operation and deliberately keep silent about it in their works. decisive role in ridding the Allied forces of the disaster in the Ardennes.