Chapter 38. Russia and Europe (1904–1905) Japan could not have waged a war without the financial support of British and American capital. Even before the war, English banks financed Japan and its military training. To the New York money market of Japan before the war

Appendix 1. Ships of the Russian fleet (1904–1905) Squadron battleships “Tsarevich” (from March 31, 1917 “Citizen”) Laid down on June 26, 1899 in Toulon (France), launched on February 10, 1901, entered service on 21 August 1903 Torpedoed by the Japanese on the night of January 27, 1904, was damaged.

Appendix 3. Report from the commander of the 4th East Siberian engineer battalion to the chief of staff of the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the combat qualities of the bulletproof “chest armor” that entered the army at the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. September 28, 1905

Essay on the development of the Japanese fleet (From the magazine "Marine Collection", No. 7 for 1898) “In ancient history Japan has preserved many legends telling about the sea power of the Japanese. During the eras of Nobunaga, Nideyoshi and leyasu (in the 16th century, under the rulers Nobunaga Oda (1534-1582), Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-1598),

Designation systems for aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy For more than 30 years of existence, the designation systems for aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy have traveled a rather tortuous path. When studying aircraft designation systems, one must keep in mind the features

Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet

A detachment of cruisers on the roadstead in Vladivostok

Total information

Number of members

Military conflicts

Story

The decision to create

The formation of a detachment of cruisers based in Vladivostok as an independently operating formation was envisaged back in March 1901. The detachment, in addition to the cruisers "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" in different time included other cruisers (“Admiral Nakhimov”, “Varyag”, “Askold”).

The decision in 1901-1903 to create a detachment of cruisers into an independent detachment was motivated by the following:

1. Armored cruisers are not battleships and are built specifically for cruising warfare. The effect of their action on a wide theater should be much greater than as part of a squadron.
2. By distracting 6 Japanese armored cruisers, the detachment will weaken the superiority of the main forces of the Japanese fleet over the Russian one.
3. Raiding along the enemy's coast, thereby disrupting the supply of enemy troops in the continental theater of operations.

This was also the task that was assigned to the detachment.

The correctness of this allocation of the best cruisers into a separate detachment was confirmed by the experience of the Russian-Japanese War.

Formation

Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich"

The final composition of the Pacific squadron was announced at a meeting in Port Arthur on April 17, 1903. As a result of this meeting, naval forces in the Far East were distributed as follows:

1. “Combat squadron” based in Port Arthur (I and II squads of battleships, detachments of long-range and short-range reconnaissance ships (cruisers), 1st squadron of destroyers) and a defensive detachment.

2. A separate cruising detachment and a defensive detachment based in Vladivostok.

In addition, groups of auxiliary vessels (transports) were formed based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

The separate cruising detachment in Vladivostok was to include the armored cruisers "Russia" (flag of the 1st junior flagship of the squadron), "Gromoboy" and "Rurik", the armored cruiser "Bogatyr" and the steamships of the Voluntary Fleet "Moscow" and "Kherson". In addition to the designated ships, the Vladivostok detachment included: gunboats “Koreets”, “Mandzhur”, “Beaver” and “Sivuch”, mine transport “Aleut”, military transports “Kamchadal” and “Yakut”, destroyers No. 201, 202 and 209 , as well as six destroyers.

In July-August, 6 more numbered destroyers transferred by the cruisers Boyarin and Rurik arrived in Vladivostok, but the gunboats and the 20-knot steamship Moskva never reached Vladivostok. At the same time, “Kherson” (renamed “Lena”), due to defects in the boilers, was unable to develop a full 19.5 knot speed, which had a negative impact on the initial plans for using the detachment.

Armored cruiser "Russia"

Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on May 20, 1895. Launched April 30, 1896. Entered service on September 13, 1897. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. The flagship of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.

Displacement 12580 tons. Armament - 4 - 203/45, 22 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47/43, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 5 NTA. Speed ​​- 19.74 knots, cruising range 7740 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 811 sailors.

Armored cruiser "Gromoboy"

Laid down on July 14, 1897 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Launched April 26, 1889. Entered service in October 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.

Displacement 12455 tons. Dimensions: 146.6/144.2/140.6x20.9x7.9 m. Initial armament - 4 - 203/45, 16 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47 mm, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 4 PTA. Speed ​​20.1 knots; cruising range 8100 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 846 sailors.

Armored cruiser "Rurik"

Unofficial construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down on May 19, 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service on October 16, 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.

Displacement 11930 t. Dimensions: 132.6x20.4x8.3 m. Armament - 4 - 203/35, 16 - 152/35, 6 - 120/45, 6 - 47/43, 10 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des ., 6 NTA. Speed ​​18.84 knots; cruising range 7790 miles. Crew of 27 officers and 692 sailors

Armored cruiser "Bogatyr"

Laid down in December 1898 in Stettin (Germany) on the shipyard of the Vulcan company. Launched on January 17, 1901. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. On May 2, 1904, in the fog, he jumped onto the coastal rocks at Cape Bruce in the Amur Bay and, having received a hole in the hull, lay down on the ground. On June 18, 1904, she was refloated and docked for repairs, where she remained until the end of the war.

Displacement 6650 t. Dimensions: 134.1x16.6x6.3 m. Armament 12 - 152/45, 12 - 75/50, 8 - 47 mm, 2 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm (des), 2 NTA, 2 PTA. Test speed up to 23.55 knots; cruising range 4900 miles. Crew: 23 officers and 550 sailors.

During design and construction, all of these cruisers were designed for raider operations on the enemy’s ocean lines of communication. Because of this, in order to increase their cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect protection for deck artillery.

Squad names

The order to form the detachment was signed on June 7, 1903. In which it was given its first name: “Detachment of Cruisers of the Pacific Ocean Squadron.”

After the start of the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the squadron was given the rights of fleet commander. As a result, on February 25, 1904, the detachment was transformed into a “Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.”

On May 12, 1904, the structure of the fleet was changed and the detachment received a new name: “Separate detachment of cruisers of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet.”

On December 20, 1904, after the death of the remnants of the squadron in Port Arthur, the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers was given a new name “Cruiser Detachment in the Pacific Ocean”.

Fighting

First campaign (January 27 - February 1, 1904)

On the night of January 26-27, 1904, an order was received from the command, which read: “The detachment should begin military operations and inflict the most sensitive blow and damage to Japan’s communications with Korea.” The ships were prepared for combat operations in advance and went to sea on the same day. But the campaign was not particularly successful, despite the absence of serious enemy forces. During the voyage, only one steamer IJN Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) was sunk and another one was shelled. A storm at sea forced us to return to our home port.

Second campaign (February 11 - 14, 1904)

The next trip to sea took place on February 11, 1904. The area of ​​the second campaign was the coast from the border with Korea to the port of Genzan. But this campaign was even less effective - apart from small coastal vessels, the cruisers did not meet anyone.

Third campaign (February 24 - March 1, 1904)

Having gone to sea on February 24, the detachment again headed to the shores of Korea, to the ports and bays located in the Korean Gulf and to the north of it, as well as to the approaches to them from the coast of Japan, in particular, from the ports of Wakasa Bay.

Based on the results of a very superficial inspection of a number of bays on the Korean coast, the commander of the detachment, Reizenstein, reported the following information to the governor: “Two-time cruising gave the right to assume that the presence of our detachment here will not prevent the Japanese from conducting operations in the Sea of ​​Japan; they are not conducting them here. Troops to Genzan they do not transport, there is no trade or transportation of goods along the Korean coast; having walked along the entire coast of Korea, seeing all the bays clearly, not a single signal station was seen, which also confirms the absence of operations."

Bombardment of Vladivostok by Japanese cruisers (March 6, 1904)

But even such small successes of the detachment were enough to alarm the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against the detachment. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored and two armored cruisers entered the Ussuri Gulf on March 6, 1904 and shelled Vladivostok. Immediately after the shelling of the city began, a detachment of Vladivostok cruisers began to weigh anchor, but leaving the bay was complicated by ice conditions and minefields. Upon entering the Ussuri Gulf, the ships saw only the smoke of the Japanese squadron on the horizon, so they did not pursue it and returned to the roadstead. The shelling resulted in the death of one woman and the injury of five sailors.

Inactivity (March 1 – April 9, 1904)

Among the first measures taken by S.O. Makarov to increase the combat effectiveness and intensify the actions of the fleet, the order of February 24 was the appointment of Rear Admiral K.P. as head of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. Jessena. And Jessen was given a new task for the detachment: to actively prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Korea.

But Jessen, for a number of reasons, could not begin to carry out orders:

1. It took time to master units that were new to him and to train them appropriately for combat.
2. It was necessary to choose the direction in which the cruiser detachment should strike. This required reliable information about the intentions and actions of the Japanese fleet.

However, the information about the enemy that the Russian command had during this period was very contradictory.

Fourth campaign (April 10 - 14, 1904)

But due to ice conditions, the detachment was able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. The detachment headed to the Korean coast to attack the port of Genzan. But Jessen did not know that on April 9, Admiral Kamimura sent his squadron to Vladivostok, after entering the same Genzan to replenish water and coal supplies. The reports note that there was thick fog at sea. On the morning of April 12, the detachment, entering Genzana Bay, sank the steamer IJN Goyo-Maru, which was stationed in the roadstead, and then in the afternoon they sank the coaster IJN Haginura-Maru. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22:20, the IJN Kinsu-Maru transport appeared on the way of the Vladivostok detachment. He was also sunk. After this, the detachment commander, having numerous prisoners from sunken ships on board the cruisers, decided to return to Vladivostok.

Second approach of Kamimura's squadron to Vladivostok (April 16, 1904)

Admiral H. Kamimura

On April 15, 1904, the Japanese squadron approached Shkota Island, where it remained for some time, producing signals, then went south. On April 16, the destroyers IJN Sirakumo, IJN Asasivo, IJN Akatsuki and IJN Asagiri laid three mine banks at the entrance to Ussuri Bay. Russian cruisers did not go to sea for fear of running into mines. Eight Russian destroyers were sent to monitor the Japanese ships. The trawling of Japanese mines was very poorly organized. Because of this, on July 4, destroyer No. 208 hit a mine in the Ussuri Gulf and sank.

Accident of the cruiser "Bogatyr" (May 2, 1904)

On May 2, 1904, the cruiser Bogatyr hit rocks at Cape Bruce in Slavyanka Bay. Soon the cruiser was removed from the rocks and docked for repairs. But due to a poorly equipped port and a lack of materials for repairs, the cruiser remained in dock until the end of the war.

Fifth campaign (May 30 - June 7, 1904)

The next time the cruisers went to sea and headed for the eastern passage of the Korean Strait only on May 30. On June 1, the detachment went to about. Tsushima, where Japan's main communications routes were located and where Admiral Kamimura's base was located in Ozaki Bay. On the same day, the steamships IJN Idzuma-Maru and IJN Hitachi-Maru were sunk by the Thunderbolt. IJN Hitachi-Maru carried 1,095 Japanese Army soldiers and officers, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers, which were intended to bombard Port Arthur. Another IJN transport, Sado-Maru (with 1,350 soldiers and officers, was stopped by warning shots from the Rurik. The Japanese officers refused to surrender and the Russians had no choice but to sink the transport, which was done. A detachment of cruisers went into the Sea of ​​Japan. Kamimura, who was at the base, received a report about the Russian detachment and went out to search for it. But to no avail. On June 3, Russian cruisers inspected the English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with smuggled cargo to Japan.

On June 6, Russian cruisers returned from a successful raid in Vladivostok. Kamimura also returned to his base.

Sixth campaign (June 15 - 20, 1904)

On June 15, the detachment again went to Genzan. In order to achieve great success in the campaign, the auxiliary cruiser Lena and eight numbered destroyers joined the detachment. On June 17, the detachment entered Genzan and sank the schooner IJN Seiho-Maru and the coastal steamer IJN Koun-Maru in the roadstead, losing one destroyer due to the accident. After this, the Lena and the destroyers went to Vladivostok, and the cruisers to the Korean Strait. But having met Kamimura’s squadron in the Tsushima area, the detachment did not accept the battle and retreated. On June 19, on the way to their native shores, the English steamer Cheltenham, which was transporting timber for the construction project, was detained and delivered to Vladivostok. railway Fuzan - Seoul - Chemulpo. On June 20, the detachment entered the port of Vladivostok.

Seventh campaign (July 4-19, 1904)

The active actions of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers under the command of Jessen forced the Japanese government to send the bulk of transports with troops and military cargo to Korea and Manchuria through the Yellow Sea. Because of this, an order was received from Alekseev to proceed to the east coast of Japan for active operations on the routes of communication with America.

On July 7, 1904, a detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait and turned south. On July 9, the cruiser was inspected by the English steamer Arabiya; it was carrying contraband cargo; the ship was sent to Vladivostok. On July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here the English steamer Night Commender was inspected, carrying smuggled cargo, and sunk due to the lack of opportunity to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners were sunk, the German steamer Tea, which was traveling with smuggling, and the English steamer Kalhas was also captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. After this, the cruisers headed back to Vladivostok. On July 19, the cruisers arrived in Vladivostok.

The actions of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, excited the whole world. The world stock exchange reacted very actively to the actions of our cruisers; the price of freight increased greatly, but even high price could not stop some companies from refusing to operate flights to the shores of Japan.

Eighth campaign (July 30 - August 4). Battle in the Korean Strait (August 1, 1904)

On July 29, a telegram came from Admiral Alekseev to Vladivostok (which did not yet know about the results of the tragic battle on July 28), stating the order for the cruisers to immediately proceed to the Korean Strait. The purpose of this campaign for the detachment was to meet with Vitgeft’s squadron and provide assistance to him. But the telegram did not indicate which will go the way Vitgeft's detachment, as well as the exact time of his departure to sea is also unknown. Therefore, it was reported that the meeting was expected to take place north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were prohibited from entering south of the Fuzan parallel. According to the instructions, when meeting with Kamimura, the cruisers should retreat to Vladivostok, taking the Japanese with them. The cruiser should not be distracted by any other tasks during the cruise.

Early in the morning of July 30, "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" left Vladivostok. On the morning of August 1, in the southern part of the Korea Strait, as was written in the order, a detachment of cruisers stopped to wait for Vitgeft's squadron.

Cruiser IJN Iwate

When it began to get light, at 4:50 a.m., signalmen from the Rossiya spotted four ships that were sailing parallel to the detachment. The cruisers IJN Izumo, IJN Tokiwa, IJN Azuma and IJN Iwate were soon identified. Enemy ships cut off the detachment's path to retreat to Vladivostok. The fight was inevitable.

The battle began at 5:20 am. The Japanese cruisers were the first to open fire. Soon retaliatory salvos followed from "Russia" and "Gromoboya". Immediately there were strong explosions at IJN Iwate and at IJN Azuma. The beginning of the battle was left to the Russian cruisers. As it became known later, a heavy shell hit IJN Iwate, destroying three 152 mm and one 75 mm guns.

But soon the Japanese artillerymen took aim and began hitting Russian ships, killing and wounded appeared. Around the fourteenth minute of the battle, a fire started on the Rurik. The fire disabled the cruiser, but not for long. The fire was soon put out. About 40 minutes after the start of the battle, the light cruiser IJN Naniwa approached the Japanese to help. The Russian cruisers changed course and headed northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, took a parallel course.

About an hour after the start of the battle, “Rurik” suffered the fate that experts predicted immediately upon entering service: a Japanese shell, hitting the unprotected tiller compartment, disabled the steering. And the cruiser raised a signal: “The steering wheel does not work.” The cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboy" turned around to help the damaged "Rurik". But they could not fix the damage on the Rurik.

Seeing that there was no way to help the damaged cruiser, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment decided to break through to Vladivostok. Kamimura, with his detachment, pursued the Russian cruisers, but the light cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho remained to fight the immobilized Rurik.

The battle ended at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy ships ceased fire and turned back.

Kamimura’s decision was influenced by the following factors: casualties among personnel; shortage of shells and damage to ships. In addition, he did not know about the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea and had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or start a battle with the Russian squadron that had broken through from Port Arthur.

Cruiser "Rurik"

"Rurik" continued to fight the Japanese cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho, but soon all its guns were knocked out, almost the entire command staff was killed or wounded. The cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Trusov, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Khlodovsky died from their wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; almost half of the entire crew was out of action.

When Kamimura's cruisers, who had returned from the chase, began to approach the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, in order to prevent the ship from being captured, decided to scuttle it by opening the seams.

According to data from Japanese cruisers, at half past ten o'clock the cruiser "Rurik" completely disappeared under water. Outdated and poorly armored, it fought for five hours against superior enemy ships. The behavior of his team was heroic.

According to Japanese official figures, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. But according to other sources, on IJN Iwate alone, one shell killed 40 people and wounded 37. The flagship IJN Izuma had up to 20 holes; the cruiser IJN Azuma received 10 shells, IJN Tokiwa - several shells.

Last actions (August 1904 - November 1905)

The battle in the Korea Strait was actually the detachment's last active combat action. Due to the weak capacity of the repair base of the Vladivostok port, the repair of serious damage on the Rossiya and Gromoboe took a long time.

On October 13, 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy, immediately after repairs, ran into rocks while moving to Posyet Bay and spent the entire winter in the dock undergoing repairs.

In the spring of 1905, the detachment made a small raid on Hokkaido and sank the schooners IJN Yaya-Maru, IJN Senrio-Maru, IJN Koyo-Maru and IJN Hokuzey-Maru.

In the summer of 1905, in view of the real threat of the war spreading to the Russian mainland (Sakhalin was captured by the Japanese in July 1905) and the creation of a unified regional defense command headed by the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General G.N. Kazbek subordinated the detachment of cruisers to the head of the Separate detachment of ships assigned to protect the waters of the Ussuri region (led by the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve).

On November 11, 1905, in accordance with the instructions of the General Naval Staff (dated October 11), a detachment of cruisers set out for the European part of Russia. On March 30, 1906, upon arrival in Libau, the detachment's headquarters ended the campaign, and the detachment itself was disbanded.

Conclusion

The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers did not fully live up to the hopes that the Admiralty had placed on it. But still, during the entire raid, the detachment sunk 3 Japanese transports, 5 Japanese steamers, 1 English steamer, 1 German steamer and 14 sailing schooners. In addition, 4 foreign ships were captured (2 of which were later released) and 1 Japanese schooner.

But the experience of raiding enemy communications during the Russo-Japanese War was the basis for the German action plan for their raiders (auxiliary cruisers) at the very beginning of the First World War.

The Russo-Japanese War is one of the darkest pages in Russian fleet. This is probably why it still attracts the attention of military historians and simply people interested military history Russia. Yes, it included not only victories, but also the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese Imperial Fleet, a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70-80s of the 20th century. So why did this happen? Why did the very modest Japanese fleet manage to completely defeat its superior Russian fleet without significant losses? Although “on paper” it should have turned out exactly the opposite? These questions will be discussed in this article. The reader is waiting for a lot of bare figures and facts. Without any tales about “outdated and weak battleships”, “ short range shooting", " large area reservations Japanese ships"and others, others, others beautiful fairy tales. That allegedly they did not allow such “geniuses of naval thought” as Z.P. Rozhestvensky and V.K. Vitgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technology or the people who were entrusted with this technology? The military always first of all blames the unfit, in their opinion, for their failures. military equipment. The people who created this technology, on the contrary, point to the unprofessionalism and unsuitability of the military. This is how it has always been, and this is how it will continue to be. Let us analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.

Fleet compositions

Before moving on to listing the military equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In that era when artillery was the god of war, all types of naval weapon systems could be counted on one hand:

- Classic artillery pieces various calibers and purposes. At that time, they had already reached a fully mature level of development and in their design were not much different from modern artillery systems, although they were less powerful.

- Torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and lethality.

- Mines. At that time, this marine species was already fully developed and effective means fight against enemy ships.

- Aviation. It was in its infancy at that time. Actually, it can be called aviation with great stretch, because... it was just balloons that were used only for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment over long distances.

In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:

1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period were battleships. During their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbette battleship, turret battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka pre-dreadnought), dreadnought, super-dreadnought and finally, battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. During the period described, squadron battleships, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement from 4,000 tons to 16,000 tons, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo weapons. At the same time, they could reach a speed of 14-18 knots. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable the fleet was.

2. Also to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000 tons, also have good protection, although not as powerful as that of battleships. The artillery armament was also weaker, but such ships could reach a speed of 18-22 knots. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was the battleships and armored cruisers who had the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops with fire in coastal operations.

3. Auxiliary tasks of reconnaissance, patrol, interception, combat against small enemy ships and its transport and landing fleet fell on armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks. These are ships with a displacement of 4000-6000 tons, had light armor and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach a speed of 20-25 knots and had a long cruising range. An example - the famous 1st rank cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of ​​this type of warship.

4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of some of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyers, Further destroyers, basic destroyers(destroyers), further torpedo boats And submarines. Destroyers are small ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small guns. They reached speeds of 25-30 knots and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, due to their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.

The 1st rank cruiser "Aurora" took a direct part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The 123-meter-long ship is still in decent technical condition, although it is no longer underway.

5. Also in the fleets of that time there could be balloon carriers, minelayers And transport ships. Balloon carriers, the predecessors of aircraft carriers, were designed to host reconnaissance balloons and were equipped with hangars for storing them. Minelayers were used to lay mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons or other goods. They could have several small guns or no weapons at all. Their sizes could vary widely.

After short excursion In the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, we will move on to comparing the forces of both sides.

Russian Imperial Fleet (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan he was a formidable force. Since there is no way to list the entire combat personnel with all auxiliary ships and support vessels in the format of this article, we will dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:

Table 1

The main striking power of the Russian fleet lay precisely in these 38 ships. In total they had 88 guns of 305mm caliber, 26 guns of 254mm caliber, 8 – 229mm and 28 guns of 203mm caliber. Smaller-caliber guns even then belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained important combat significance at that stage of the development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Forel", "Sturgeon" and "Som" and others ships. Subsequently, submarines (submarines) became one of the main classes of warships of the fleet.

The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. Its power can be felt literally in its appearance - even today it looks quite modern. The ship was built according to latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of the 2nd World War: a high side of an optimal, seaworthy shape, developed tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and elements of the control system at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in twin tower gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large aiming angles. The very complex, multi-row differentiated armor was very powerful. The ship could see far on the horizon and could operate effectively and conduct targeted fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was waiting for 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines and 4 7.62mm Maxim machine guns. All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet were installed on it. The control system of this ship was also first-class.

The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian Navy at the start of the war with Japan is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates, it was about ~300 ships of various classes. To destroy such a large armored force, even today it would require the involvement of very serious naval missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not a cardboard-plastic Sheffield and it will not burn and sink after being hit by a single Exocet anti-ship missile. It would also not be a strong exaggeration to say that that fleet was more powerful than, say, the Patriotic Navy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War10. For a predominantly agricultural country like Tsarist Russia, creating such a large ocean-going fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest squadron battleship "Tsesarevich". The strike core of the Baltic Fleet were four Borodino-class battleships. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type, Slava.

"Eagle" is one of the ships of the "Borodino" series. It was an improved model of the “Tsarevich”. The outlines of its hull are somewhat reminiscent of the hulls of today's URO frigates built using Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype in a new hull 121 meters long, improved armor, an improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype, at the time of construction it was considered one of the most powerful and advanced warships of its time.

Imperial Japanese Navy(IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly increase its combat potential. When building its fleet, Japan relied on British assistance. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a group of six squadron battleships with similar characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old I-class battleships: “Chin-Yen” and “Fuso”, of which “Chin-Yen” was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of attack warships was small, some of the large-caliber guns were placed on light armored cruisers such as Matsushima and Takasago, which were poorly suited for this purpose. List of warships Japanese Navy, which carried more or less large calibers on board, it turns out like this:

table 2

Thus, the Japanese fleet, along with battleships and light cruisers that were absolutely unsuitable for confrontation, could oppose the might of the Russian fleet: 3 guns of 320mm caliber, 28 of 305mm caliber, 4 – 240mm guns and 30 – 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that in terms of heavy weapons, the potential of the Japanese fleet was at least three times inferior to the Russian one. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the others did not leave them any decent chance of survival under fire even from the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian attack ships, 35, that is, 92%, could be considered to one degree or another suitable for a general battle. The flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the battleship Mikasa.

Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Structurally, it repeated the British models: low side, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, turret gun mounts of only the main caliber. Relatively low-powered medium-caliber guns were located in on-board casemate installations low above the water. The ship was more optimized for combat on flat water rather than for movement. In the same time big sizes its hulls made all its characteristics very decent. Its displacement is 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian Navy is the squadron battleship Retvizan.

The entire Japanese fleet consisted of about 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships were concentrated like a fist in one theater of operations. Of the ~300 warships of the Russian fleet, about 100 took direct part in the war with Japan, that is, about 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two Italian-built armored cruisers: Nissin and Kassuga.

Results: Without going deep at this stage into all the nuances of manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, choosing commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply laconically noting that “at some stage something went wrong” , we can say that all this gigantic armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre way. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. Data on the losses of the Japanese fleet are shown in Table 3. They only cause a bitter smile.

Table 3

Total 24 combat and auxiliary ships. Of these, 13 ships were sunk by mines (54%), 6 ships by artillery (25%), 0 ships by torpedoes (0%), and 1 ship by the combined action of artillery and torpedoes (<1%) и от навигационных происшествий потери составили 4 корабля (17%). Затоплено и брошено экипажами в результате полученных повреждений 0 кораблей (0%). Сдано в плен так же 0 кораблей (0%). Тот факт, что более половины всех безвозвратно потерянных Японией кораблей флота было уничтожено минами – оружием по своему характеру пассивно - оборонительно типа, говорит о крайней пассивности и бездействии ударного Российского флота в период БД на море. Все боевые действия на море свелись к двум крупным сражениям, нескольким приличным боям и локальным боестолкновениям отдельных крупных кораблей и легких сил. Такое ощущение, что даже в бою, наши корабли воевали как будто из под палки, нехотя, без инициативно и всячески стараясь уклониться от сражения. В дальнейшем этому будет приведено не одно подтверждение, как будут и рассмотрены все случае отдельных «вспышек» прояснения сознания и боевого духа. Такая тактика наших высших адмиралов привела к потерям, с которыми можно ознакомиться в таблице 4.

Table 4

The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy exceeded the losses of the US Navy during the four years of the Pacific War of 1941-1945. Sad list of 64 lost ships distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire, the Japanese did not manage to sink a single Russian ship with torpedoes alone - 0 (0%), the combined action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed 3 ships (5%), 6 were killed by mines ships (9%). Abandoned/sunk/exploded by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire/torpedoes/mines/simply hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), 5 ships were captured by the enemy (8%), lost as a result of navigational damage 3 ships (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, lies with very specific people. These are admirals: Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark. It was in their hands that all the power and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were made or not made were concentrated. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be blamed for a lack of courage/will/spirit, but he cannot be blamed for lack of professionalism or lack of knowledge of his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov generally proved himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his business perfectly and was confident in his weapon. Admiral O.A. Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for one reason or another he was unable to prove himself. We will consider the contribution to increasing the combat effectiveness of the fleet of some of these people below.

Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848. He died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (he was the flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron during the repair of the Tsesarevich). The cause of death from one single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of Petropavlovsk. It was booked primarily as a citadel, similar to the British and Japanese EDBs. When a mine exploded in the bow of the ship, a sequential detonation of the torpedo ammunition occurred, then the barrage mines stored in the bow, and finally, the entire ammunition of the 1st main caliber gun mount. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. A fatal coincidence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.

However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn that situation upside down. His “Holiness,” “Adjutant General” Z.P. Rozhestvensky simply cannot be guilty of anything. It’s all the fault of the outdated and, in their opinion, worthless equipment, as well as the illiterate crews of these “floating galoshes” who know nothing about war. To justify this position, many myths were invented, designed to “shift the needle” of blame for the shameful defeat on civilian specialists, factories, MTC, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:

Half-myth No. 1: Overload of Russian battleships. Because of this, they say, they died “so quickly.” Here it is necessary to understand the difference. Civilian specialists create military equipment and carry out current/medium/overhaul repairs, while military specialists operate it, fight with it, and carry out various maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish between construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload is the fault of civilians. Operational overload is the fault of the military. Regarding construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was widespread and therefore it could even be called “normal.” Indeed, the Borodino-class battleships were designed to have a displacement of 13,516 tons, but in reality they contained 14,150 tons of iron. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow us to calculate all the loads absolutely accurately. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship "Mikasa" was even greater - 785 tons, and yet none of the Japanese military complained about the deterioration of stability or other performance characteristics of the "Mikasa". Operational overload – exceeding the ship's carrying capacity. During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, all battleships were so filled with coal, water, provisions and other supplies that the displacement of Borodino-class battleships, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17,000 tons! What fighting qualities are there with such a “weight”! No measures were taken to correct the situation even before the battle, as a result of which the displacement of the Borodino-class attack ships before the Battle of Tsushima was unacceptably large - 15,275 tons. The proposal of the "Eagle" officers to prepare the ships for battle before the general battle, coupled with their radical unloading, was rejected for idiotic reasons: "The "Eagle" officers love to play war too much." This is the fault of the military, namely Z.P. Rozhestvensky.

Myth No. 2: Low speed of Russian ships. This myth has a simple explanation. Speed ​​is needed for active actions. Those who do not take any active actions do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called “to the fullest.” The Russians used it only when their ships, for one reason or another (usually damage), were deprived of the “guardianship” of the commander (and it was too late) and just to escape, and not to overtake. In addition, the maximum speed of a ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on its specific technical condition, and on the combat damage it received. The maximum squadron speed of the Japanese squadron was 15 knots, at most 15.5 knots and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRB 1 "Fuji" (for technical reasons it could not develop more than 15.5 knots). The squadron speed of the 1st Pacific Squadron was 14.5-15 knots. The EBR "Sevastopol" did not produce more than 15kt due to a bent propeller blade. The squadron speed of the 2nd Pacific Squadron has not been tested in practice, but theoretically it could have been about 15-15.5 knots because there was no ship in the squadron slower than 15.5 kts (“Nikolai-I” - 15.5 kts, “Navarin” - 15.8 kts, “Sisoy the Great” - 15.6 kts, 2nd type BRBO “Ushakov” all issued 16 kts). During the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, the heavily damaged Orel, the Sevyanin and Apraksin ballistic missile carriers, as well as the II-rank cruiser Izumrud easily supported speed 13-14kt. Conclusion: The squadron speed of Russian attack ships, if at all, was lower than the Japanese, it was not by much. The fact that Z.P. Rozhestvensky trudged along in battle at a speed of 9 knots (only 17 km/h - slower than a river pleasure boat), dragging transports behind him, is his fault, not the low speed capabilities of his warships.

Myth No. 3. Russian ships were inferior in range to Japanese ones. There were figures about the Japanese firing range at 82 cables and even 100(!) cables. The myth is explained in the same way as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery 100%. Of course, there could be no talk of any targeted shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But the Japanese did sometimes shoot at long distances. Domestic ships almost always only fired back and stopped firing as soon as the enemy stopped firing. All without initiative and sluggishly (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot at long distances, three conditions must be met:

1. Artillery must have the technical ability to fire at such distances, in other words, be sufficiently long-range. Civilian specialists are responsible for this.
2. The fire control system of warships must provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. Civilian specialists are also responsible for this.
3. Artillerymen of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting shooting at such distances. Have good command of the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is already responsible for this.

Unfortunately, it was the military that turned out to be the “weak link” here. Regarding technical issues. Only one Japanese ship could fire at 100 kbt - the Italian-built armored cruiser Kassuga. And only from one single 254mm cannon. Its 203mm cannon, like its twin brother the Nissin, fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main caliber artillery was of two types. The 305mm/L42.5 EBR guns “Fuji” and “Yashima” at a maximum angle of +13.5° could fire at a maximum of 77 kbt. The slightly more powerful 305mm/L42.5 guns of Mikasa, Asahi, Hatsuse and Shikishima had a lower maximum elevation angle - +12.5° and fired at maximum 74kbt. Maximum firing range of 203mm main caliber guns of Japanese armored cruisers such as Asama, Yakumo, etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm medium-caliber gun mounts on Russian ships. Russian experts paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet to the issue of ensuring at least the technical ability to fire at the maximum possible distances. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships was +15°, +25° and even +35°. The squadron battleship Pobeda was considered the longest-range in the entire Russian fleet. It was equipped with more modern 254mm/L45 guns, which differed from the previous 10-inch guns in increased weight, strength and barrel rigidity. As a result, its 225-kilogram main-caliber projectiles, with an initial speed increased to 777 m/s, flew at 113 kbt. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, “Oslyab” and “Peresvet,” as well as the ballistic missile launcher “Admiral Apraksin,” fired at 91 kbt. All “12-inch” battleships with 305mm/L40 guns fired at 80kbt at an angle of +15°. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" fired at 63 kbt. The firing range of the old squadron battleships was shorter: the Navarin had 54 kbt, the Nikolai-I had 51 kbt for 229mm/L35 and 49 kbt for 305mm/L30 guns.

As for the fire control system, its 4x optics and rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm even then made it possible to conduct more or less effective fire at a distance of up to ~60 kbt (10-12 km). Russian battleships of new and latest types received the latest fire control system “mod.1899”. Its structure can be judged from the description of the squadron battleship "Eagle":

SUAO mod.1899. The set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of modern central guidance systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one per side.

Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - central aiming sights (VCN) had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x. The search for the target and pointing the weapon at it was carried out by the VP operator. When pointing the VCN at a target, the elevation angle of the target relative to the center plane of the ship was determined on a scale, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8 turret guns and batteries of the ship’s 75 mm guns. After this, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the gun was aligned with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called “arrow alignment” principle) and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x and a field of view angle changing in accordance with it - 6 - 8 degrees. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this purpose, there were two rangefinder stations in the conning tower - one per side. They were equipped with horizontal base rangefinders “Barr and Studd” with a base of 1200 mm.

The rangefinder measured the distance and, using the rangefinder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To monitor the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. Sighting posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left sides (a pair on each side), which is why the Eagle's conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye.” Having data on his own speed and course, direction and strength of wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target - the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, made the necessary calculations manually (on paper) and calculated the necessary corrections for the leads for VN and GN. I also chose the type of gun and the type of shells needed to hit a given target. After this, the senior artillery officer transmitted guidance data to the control unit, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master indicator devices, which transmitted data through 47 cable cores to receiving devices in the AC and 75 mm batteries. The entire system operated at voltage Uр=23V through a 105/23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on vertical and horizontal guidance angles and the type of projectiles used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected guns installed the guns at specified angles (corrected the initial installation according to the VCN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer, who was in the conning tower at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, positioned the handle of the fire indicator device in the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Shot”, “Attack” or “Short alarm”, in accordance with which The guns opened fire. This centralized fire control mode was the most effective. In the event of the failure of the senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm artillery guns and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, the direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, and the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the gun or battery. This fire mode was less effective. In the event of complete destruction of fire control devices, conning tower personnel and data transmission circuits, all guns switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of target and targeting it was carried out by calculating a specific gun using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. The torpedo tubes were aimed using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm torpedo tubes or by turning the entire hull of the vessel for the bow and stern 381mm torpedo tubes. This fire control system ensured high efficiency in the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and made it possible to simultaneously “drive” two targets - one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and gunners of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron have poorly mastered this system. For external communications, the ship had a Slyabi-Arco radio station. It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the bow superstructure and provided communications at a distance of 180-200 km.

The third point remains. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet certainly lagged behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and practiced shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too complex for ordinary sailors to understand their operation (much less integrate them into a system), fire control and fire control methods were developed, if not the most ideal, but at least the most effective from the point of view of those specific conditions. shooting. One of them is the so-called. "the art of massive fire." Its essence is that without any use of the fire control system (measuring the distance only once), they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After this, they wait for the target to be covered. All fire adjustments are carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer - further to the target). Despite the enormous consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics bore fruit at that time. Moreover, the Japanese targets (that is, our ships) contributed in the best possible way to its success. At the same time, this method of “massive fire” was never used by anyone again. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our artillerymen, they worked according to instructions. And they tried to master the work of the control system. Not everyone succeeded. If the lower ranks of the artillery were somehow still able to master their subject, then almost no effort was made to this by the higher ranks. As for the firing range, the command of the 1st Pacific Squadron, although belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as a modern fire control system. And it seems that we began to develop measures adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still blissfully unaware of the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare practice shootings were carried out at a distance of no further than 20 kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese without any long-range shooting practice at all. The exception is the 3rd Pacific Squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (joined the 2nd Pacific Squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his gunners well to fire from the widest possible ranges. As luck would have it, Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov’s squadron consisted only of outdated or small ships. However, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was essentially the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still firing charges of black powder, achieved hits at distances of up to 50 cables, i.e. at the maximum possible range for your artillery! In all likelihood, it was its 305mm and 229mm shells that caused heavy damage to the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battle. Thus, the cruiser “Varyag” was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training did not affect the crews of the newest attack ships; otherwise, even with such a “brilliant” commander as Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably have been crushed by the power of the Borodintsev.

Semi myth #4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They allegedly did not penetrate armor well and practically did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model, weighing 331.7 kg. The “10-inch” ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the 1892 model, weighing 225.2 kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing ones. Their comparative characteristics are shown in Table 5.

Table 5

As can be seen from Table 5, all shells are quite worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships, with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, were nevertheless almost as good as them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, Table 5 shows that the characteristics of both Russian and Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited by distance<20-30 кабельтовых. На больших расстояниях шансов пробить защиту ЖВЧ любого броненосца практически не было. Эти данные подтвердила и реальная практика. Несмотря на все усилия русских и японских артиллеристов за время сражений так ни разу и не удалось пробить Крупповскую броневую плиту толще чем 152мм. Так же стоит отметить, что для 305мм/L35 орудий «Наварина» существовали и более тяжелые 305мм снаряды массой 455кг. Но они почему то не были включены в боекомплект этого корабля. Использование таких «чемоданов» в современных артустановках с орудиями 305мм/L40 у новых кораблей – вопрос требующий дальнейших исследований, так как доподлинно не известно, были ли приспособлены лотки МЗ 9 у новейших «Бородинцев» и «Цесаревича» к приему таких более длинных снарядов. Потому на расстояниях свыше 30 кабельтовых имело смысл переходить на осколочные и фугасные снаряды. Их сравнительные характеристики приведены в таблице 6.

Table 6

At first glance, it seems that Japanese high-explosive shells are completely superior to Russian ones3. This is partly true. Especially if we add to our shells the humidity of pyroxylin increased from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. Firstly, the fuses on Japanese high-explosive shells were set to instantaneous action at the slightest touch. This led to a number of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of the Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, for any armored vehicle, it is the explosion inside its armored body that is most dangerous. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion from outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but will only spoil the “cosmetics”. Therefore, for combating armored targets, armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with delayed-action fuses are primarily good. Japanese NOT-shells were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the Borodintsy, which were armored from head to toe, albeit overloaded. The Japanese themselves understood this very well, which is why, along with landmines, they actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth about the bad shells of Russian ships is, of course, not a myth in the full sense of the word - it is partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but its significance should not be exaggerated beyond measure either. The opponents’ shells were not so ideal either.

Myth #5. Small armor area of ​​Russian ships. At that time, there were two main armoring schemes for heavy ships in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme, and the French one, which was widespread. According to the first, the ship’s high-resistance cores are covered with the thickest possible armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection or lack it at all. It was according to this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series, domestic designers, taking the best of both schemes as a basis, brought the armor of these ships to perfection. The protection of the Tsarevich and the Borodino series turned out to be so powerful, so modern that, in principle, it corresponded to the battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. This provided reliable protection for these ships even from dreadnought “suitcases”. The battle between Slava and the powerful German dreadnoughts König and Kronprinz Wilhelm in 1917 clearly proved this. Despite receiving seven 305mm shells (each weighing 405.5 kg), three of which hit the underwater part of the hull below the waist, the battleship Slava did not receive serious damage. And if it weren’t for the watertight door that was not closed due to someone’s carelessness (and if it weren’t for the revolution), then we could have continued to fight. The armor scheme of the battleship "Eagle" is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 8

The most heavily protected area in the center of the ship at the waterline, approximately 60m long and about 0.8m high, has protection of: 194mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 314mm Krupp armor4. This was more than enough to withstand any armor-piercing shells of the time. At the same time, all high-velocity units, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by fairly powerful armor. And the total armor thickness of all armored decks ranged from 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - not bad figures even for huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvizan, Sisoy the Great, etc. projects. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of the Mikasa were clad in Harvey armor. The projectile resistance of Harvey's armor correlates with Krupp's armor as 0.8 to 1, that is, Harvey's armor was inferior in projectile resistance to Krupp's (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Only the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa had truly powerful armor. In addition, we should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower in comparison with squadron battleships.

Half-myth No. 6: Large sizes of sighting slits and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slits on the battleship “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series was a huge 380mm. This was a necessary measure because the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the control system of these ships, incl. DS, VP and ring sights of onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure normal visibility of all this optics, it was necessary to make slits of this width. The desire of the designers to place the entire control system under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the control system had not yet developed so much and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still made it possible to arrange them in the ballistic missile system - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.

Secondly, the typical combat distances of that time: 30-60 kbt meant that in addition to rare single hits from large-caliber shells, the ship was simultaneously under a hail of small and medium caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. It is obvious that bulky and poorly protected control towers, sighting guidance posts and other elements of the control system, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly harmless shells in the very first minutes of the battle. However, with regard to protection from shells, the conning towers of domestic ships were designed well.

They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor of the wheelhouse and anti-fragmentation visors. As a result, the penetration of shells into the conning tower was practically eliminated, which was confirmed in real combat practice. Despite the enormous number of hits suffered by Russian battleships, virtually no cases of shells penetrating into ballistic missiles have been recorded. However, the command staff nevertheless suffered greatly from shrapnel, while being inside the conning towers. But this is primarily due to the gigantic number of hits and the high characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells. But, as you know, everything is learned by comparison. The famous Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “Inspection slits in Japanese ships were made in such a way that even a small fragment could not penetrate through them into the conning tower...” With all due respect to Alexey Silych, you need to understand that that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only evaluate the perfection of the design of the conning towers of Japanese ships purely visually. A photograph will help you estimate the size of the sighting slits of Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not be Japanese if they had not decided on a very original step from the point of view of straightforward European logic - the commanders of the Japanese attack ships, Vice Admiral Togo and Rear Admiral Kamimura, chose not to “get into” the conning towers of their ships at all! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle exposing his chest, covered with epaulettes and medals, to all the winds (and shells) on the upper navigation bridge of the Mikasa. That is, completely openly... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm fragmentation shell that exploded right above the bridge killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Except…. EXCEPT…. Of course, Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura also spent the entire battle on the combat top of the mainmast and also remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals survived and did not even receive serious injuries testifies only to the extreme luck that accompanied them and the evil fate that haunted Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, the very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells also had an impact.

The conning tower of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slits is also quite decent, although smaller than those of our ships. In addition, this cabin does not have “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so penetration of shells falling at an angle is in principle possible. Admiral Togo stood two floors above throughout the battle...

As for the size of the embrasures... The dimensions of the embrasures in the turrets of the Japanese main battery gun mounts were smaller than those of the Russians, but the vertical pumping angle of their guns was also smaller, this should not be forgotten. In addition, the AU GK turrets of Russian battleships were streamlined and protected by 254mm thick Krupp armor, which made them invulnerable to any shells of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese main guns of the Fuji and Yashima EBR main guns were much more modestly armored - only 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to AP shells from Russian ships. The Japanese battleship Fuji, which ours actually penetrated through the 152mm armor of the 12” gun mount (thus confirming my logical conclusions), almost exploded because... After this, a fire started and the charges in the tower and supply pipe had already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a broken pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil fate. But all this applies only to large (main) caliber artillery. The level of any type of protection for the 152mm turret gun mounts of the newest Russian battleships was two orders of magnitude higher than the protection of medium-caliber guns and their crews on Japanese ships. This photo doesn’t really need any comments, but still:

Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You don’t need to have a wild imagination to imagine what would happen to the crews of all these guns if even one more or less decent shell exploded here... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their “embrasures” also seems to hint... A good gate. On the Russian Borodino-class battleships, 75mm anti-mine guns were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor on their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin turret guns of the newest Russian battleships. They somehow forgot that all the medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as on the Mikas, was completely destroyed just 20 minutes after the start of the battle.

The obvious conclusion is that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (with all their shortcomings), and not super invulnerable conning towers, ultra-small embrasures or anything else. And most importantly, the Japanese samurai fought, and did not weakly fight back like ours. There is a good phrase from the film “Antikiller”. In this case, of course, it is exaggerated, but it reflects the essence quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work...” Comparative characteristics of the most basic types of attack ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are given in Table 7.

Table 7

Having analyzed all the myths and facts listed, we gradually come to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, they also had sins. The main ones are weak OFS 5 and weak torpedo weapons. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only by battleships of the Poltava class.

The rest made do with more modest ones, 381mm caliber. But there is a difference - either approaching the “wounded animal” at 2-3 km, or at 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened the Americans quite a bit with their huge Long Lances (which did not help the Japanese in other respects). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame for this? The main responsibility for such a defeat lies with:

1. Admirals Z.P.Rozhestvensky, V.K.Vitgeft, O.V.Stark.
2. The evil fate that has been pursuing our fleet throughout this war.

Let's look at these two main causes of defeat. Point one. Were these three people really clinical idiots who, with their own hands, strangled all the foundations of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and vessels entrusted to them? They really strangled all the bases, but they still weren’t idiots. These were people of a kind of ability that were in demand in the then royal fleet. The fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that victory could only be achieved by demonstrating the latest weapons to the enemy, did not need warriors. And they needed business executives. So that the ships would clearly keep in formation, not be delayed, they would always shine with new paint, the borders on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned over with the bright side up for the visit of “His Majesty”. All three were perfectly suited to carrying out such activities. Well, it’s worth admitting that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving long distances). Logistics, to some extent, became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. The Japanese fleet entered the battle fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of difficult voyage, immediately entered the battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet decreases by N% for every 1000 km away from its home base has been known for quite some time.

As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war - what could we do then? The author of these lines had to read many “alternative” versions of the Battle of Tsushima. They all started with the same thing: “But if only - (Makarov was in command / the battleships were not overloaded / the shells exploded well / Your version), then OOO………” What followed, perhaps quite logical, but completely delusional from the historical perspective point of view of reasoning. Historical processes have enormous inertia and by changing just one fact of history, it is simply unrealistic to radically change the entire subsequent chain of events. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and fateful decisions in historical retrospect many years BEFORE a significant date in order to change the very logical chain that preceded it. This simply does not make any sense, as is clear to any schoolchild. The most “tasty” alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1st Pacific Squadron. But it is practically impossible to calculate what would be reliably in this case. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1st Pacific squadron, which is inactive and operating in cooperation with ground forces, we will dwell in detail on the 2nd squadron of Z.P. Rozhestvensky. What could she count on as she exhausted herself into the Tsushima Strait on the evening of May 13, 1905, when the ship's radio stations had already detected the presence of the enemy fleet over the horizon? So let’s try to calculate what the 2nd Pacific Squadron could have done if... No, no - don’t be alarmed. If only she had just been lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he would not have replaced himself with another, equally gifted figure, but would have simply fallen seriously ill and spent the entire battle in the ship's first-aid post, without interfering with anyone's fight. Calculations show that in this case it would have been impossible to win anyway. The maximum that the 2nd Pacific Squadron could hope for in this case was to reduce the game to a draw.

So. A virtual reality. Morning of May 14th. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhdestvensky is in serious condition in his cabin. Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist do not know about this and therefore are not even a little worried. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship “Prince Suvorov”. And so:

“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed a steamer on the right, quickly approaching us. Having approached forty cable lengths, he laid down on a course parallel to us. But he walked like this for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning darkness. It had a speed of at least sixteen knots. They could not identify him, but his behavior immediately aroused suspicion - undoubtedly, he was a Japanese intelligence officer. It would be necessary to immediately send two fast cruisers after him. Whether they sank it or not, they would at least clarify an extremely important question: are we discovered by the enemy or are we still in the dark? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious ship.

"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells undershot or overshot, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov was jubilant. When the senior artilleryman Nozikov approached him, he, trying to drown out the hubbub of the chickens that had not yet calmed down, spoke solemnly:
- But we cleverly butchered him! How asked the streaker! He rushed away from us at full speed.”

In place of the previously sunk cruiser Izumi, there was another similar cruiser. After he turned to the right and, having increased his speed, began to move away, already having a trim on the bow and serious damage, the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh", squeezing out all 16-17 knots from his old worn-out vehicles, caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and there was nothing to stand around stupidly watching as he ran away. 32nd place. The destroyers were also lucky:

“About eleven o’clock a second destroyer appeared ahead on the right, intending to cross the course of the Loud.” Kern ordered to develop the full speed. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle ahead with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something daring to get out of a difficult situation. And Commander Kern went for it. The miner's specialty suggested to the commander that the time had come to discharge the two surviving mine vehicles on the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. By his order, both mines were prepared for firing. “Loud” made a sharp turn and rushed towards the enemy walking behind. As we later learned, it was a Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between Shiranui and Loud was quickly closing. The team realized that the decisive moment had arrived. The gunners increased their fire. But at these moments the main role was given to the miners, who stood ready at their devices. Suddenly, near them, with a flash of short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on a dusty road. Something heavy separated from the fire and smoke and flew overboard. Senior Officer Paskin was pushed by the air into the casing near the rear chimney. Having recovered, he rushed to the scene of the explosion. The miners Abramov and Telegin lay dead near the apparatus, and all that remained of the mine conductor Bezdenezhnykh was his cap, thrown to the railing post. Lieutenant Paskin assigned miners Tsepelev, Bogoryadtsev and Ryadzievsky to the devices. The enemy was already approaching the beam. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander ordered to release the mine from apparatus No. 1. But it barely moved out and, touching the side with its tail, fell into the water like a log.

- She drowned, you vile one! – the sharp-eyed signalman Skorodumov screamed on the bridge and cursed loudly. The commander, who was closely monitoring the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and, either in response to him or to clarify for himself what had happened, muttered through his teeth: “The gunpowder did not ignite well - it was damp.” The second mine, fired in pursuit of the enemy, went correctly to the target. They were already waiting for an explosion, but she, having reached the surface of the sea almost to the very stern, suddenly turned to the side, thrown back by the seething currents from the propellers. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of “Loud.”
“Gromky” was lucky and the torpedo turned out to be serviceable. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set sail for the Yasukuni Shrine.

“The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his vehicles were secured in a marching manner.”

The destroyer Gromky launched a second torpedo at the second Japanese destroyer, but it managed to dodge and an artillery duel began. The excellent training of Kern's crew left him no chance. The Japanese destroyer received fatal damage, lost speed and sank after some time. The destroyer "Gromky" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel and safely reaching Vladivostok. 32nd and 33rd places are occupied by Japanese destroyers. A day earlier, the duel between the armored giants continued. The Oslyabya, Suvorov and Alexander III had already been lost (the last two were still afloat and were still firing). Later, the crew of the destroyer “Buiny” staged lynching, throwing Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky overboard with the wording “Missing in action.” The commander of the destroyer N.N. Kolomeytsev did not support the idea, but treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Heihachiro Togo stood on the upper navigation bridge along with his entire staff. A Russian 305mm fragmentation shell hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From everyone on the upper navigation bridge, including and Admiral Heihachiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to smack of mild hysteria, which usually happened to them as soon as something began to go against their plan.

The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately dropped so much that the battleship Borodino had enough of its remaining power and survivability to “drag” the battle until dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the pursuit. After the onset of silence, the battleship "Borodino", controlled only by sailors and having vehicles in full working order, without unnecessary complexes, increased its speed to the maximum possible 17-18 kts (it was of no use in battle anyway), heading N/O-23 °. The Eagle, which received the same amount, tried to keep up with him, but due to the armor plate on the bow at the waterline turned “against the grain,” the speed did not rise above 16.5 knots. The remaining ships with the flagship "Nicholas-I" trailed behind at a speed of about 14 knots. The cruiser "Emerald" walked with them in complete darkness without searchlights. The news of the death of Admiral Togo and his entire staff had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while Tokyo decided what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleships Borodino, Orel, Nikolai-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy " As a result, with the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji and Chin-Yen, six assorted cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly break through to Vladivostok, preserving such ships as “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Nikolai-I”, “Apraksin”, “Sevyanin”, “Izumrud” and “Gromky”. Purely in terms of the number of ships sunk and destroyed, this is, of course, still a loss, but not so shameful, which promised peace on more favorable terms with the preservation of the Kuril Islands for Russia. Both admirals, Russian and Japanese, die in this virtual reality. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep-seated crisis processes that at that time had already engulfed all of Tsarist Russia could count on something more, for example, the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. You might be lucky - once every 1000 years. The absurd death of S.O. Makarov showed that the war “didn’t work out” from the very beginning.

Lessons from war

Lesson #1. It is impossible to defeat the enemy with just the presence of even the most modern weapons. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and master all the techniques of its use perfectly. How are things going with combat training in our fleet today? I'd like to think it's better than 1904. Probably better.

Lesson #2. Military equipment is a very complex mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or at least limit its functionality. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, such “broken cogs” were over-moistened pyroxylin in the shells, low power of the OFS and overloading of ships beyond the norm with all sorts of nonsense. What is the technical condition of the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken cogs” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complex than even the most modern ships of the Borodino type and there are significantly more “cogs” in them.

Lesson #3. The ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and survivability with relatively compact sizes and forgave admirals and commanders such mistakes that no modern ship will ever forgive. In other words, with the same “command style” today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude even more terrible and fleeting than what took place in the Battle of Tsushima. In order not to be unfounded, you can look at the photographs that explain everything.

Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121.2m) after the Battle of Tsushima. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during an inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 are 305mm shells (386kg), 2 are 254mm shells (226.5kg), 9 are 203mm shells (113.4kg), 39 are 152mm shells (45.4kg) and 21 are 76mm (~6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is a hefty 5.3 tons. It contains explosives ranging from half a ton to a ton. The ship survived and retained about 10-15% of its original combat potential.

The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit by an AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missile weighing 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard and plastic boat completely burned out and sank. If the reader thinks that our Project 956E is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.

It is difficult to say how the construction of such ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor can be explained. They even have aluminum and magnesium body steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval warfare is no longer the determining factor.

The battleship "Eagle" in a creatively redesigned version, with closed dynamic protection armor "Relikt", with six AK-130 mounts instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm main battery gun barrels, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radar, with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35kt), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with nuclear warheads in new TA, with universal air defense systems and anti-aircraft defense systems it would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. These “Eagles” can be built in large numbers and in large numbers. At the same time, such a naval tank will be able to withstand a hit from 2-5 missiles of the P-700 complex, after which it will be restored at the factory. Expensive? How many Sheffields do you need to build so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save you from modern powerful anti-ship ammunition, but it gives the ship's hull the strength of a tank and prevents it from falling apart after being hit by just one missile. These are, perhaps, the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and sailors from that long-ago war.

Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the “big brothers”, but was 3-4 times smaller in displacement.
3. Given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of the new generation, which were first used in the Battle of Tsushima. High-explosive fragmentation shells of previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific Squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike carried out by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded on our side.
4. Data are given for “Suvorov”, “Eagle” and “Slava”. "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 323mm Krupp armor normal.
5. OFS – high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel “Tsushima” by A.S. Novikov-Priboy. Memories of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Among them, only one old Chinese “Chin-Yen” was an armadillo. The remaining three were light armored cruisers of the Matsushima type. Each of them carried one heavy and low-velocity 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not even withstand Russian cruisers of the 1st rank, not to mention battleships. However, in the battleship-less fishiness of the Japanese fleet, these were quite “lobsters” and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrapping. During the Battle of Tsushima, they were ordered to shoot at the shock Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Eagle armor, without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the “semi-heavy” cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis from the heavy artillery of the USSR Navy, as of June 22, 1941, there were only 36 305mm caliber guns (on the modernized Tsarist Marat-class battleships) and 40 B-1-P 180mm caliber guns (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and the modernized "Red Caucasus"). At the same time, the inclusion of formally light cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis in the list is a clear stretch “for the sake of numbers,” as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. That would not be completely embarrassing. As of June 22, 1941, the USSR Navy did not have any aircraft carriers.

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In 1868, the Meiji Ishin coup took place in Japan, as a result of which the power of the emperor was restored. The country emerged from the rule of feudal clans, the navy also became united. The Ministry of War (whose jurisdiction also initially included the Navy) received a strange set of ships that, with great stretch, could be called combat ships and which clearly did not represent the navy. It included ships of the bakufu - the feudal government, and ships inherited from its defeated opponents, primarily the powerful Satsuma clan. Among them was the only battleship purchased from the rebellious American Confederacy of the southern states, a wooden corvette and a gunboat, as well as several armed steamships and sailing ships. Japan was faced with a dilemma: either restore old ships or renew the fleet. The Japanese took the second path. In 1870, the most powerful fleet in the world, the British, was chosen as a landmark.

Several English instructors arrived in the country, which was until recently completely closed from the rest of the world, and began training sailors and transferring modern technologies. However, the Japanese were very cautious, and the British operated within many restrictions. But in the years allotted to them, the British managed to do a lot of useful things. In addition to organizing the fleet and training personnel, they established the purchase of warships.

corvette Tsukuba

True, for him the beginning did not look inspiring; among his first acquisitions was, for example, the corvette “Tsukuba” with a displacement of about 1900 tons, built almost 20 years ago in the British colony of Burma and then modernized in the metropolis “Old Man” (which one cannot dare to call a cruiser ) developed in pairs no more than 10 knots. However, the Japanese treated this antiquity, as they did all their warships, with great care and love. The artillery on it was changed twice and, according to some information, in 1892 the Tsukuba even received four 152-mm rapid-fire guns. The veteran finally retired after the Russo-Japanese War. The 1,400-ton corvette Asama, purchased in France, did not shine with its merits either.

corvette "Asama"

However, British specialists did not limit themselves to these obsolete ships. At the shipyards of England, completely modern armored units were created: the frigate Fuso (essentially a small battleship) and the corvettes Hiei and Kongo. The design of the latter was developed by Edward Reed himself, the chief designer of the Admiralty. With a displacement of 2200 tons, they could develop 14 knots and had an iron belt up to 114 mm thick. The Hiei still managed to actively participate in the Sino-Japanese War and received its share of enemy shells in the battle at the mouth of the Yalu River.

frigate "Fuso"

Deciding quite sensibly “not to put all your eggs in one basket,” the War Department abruptly changed the main supplier of ideas and ships. The choice fell on Britain’s main rival. By the early 1880s, French metallurgists and engineers began to arrive in the Far East. They managed to complete the work of their predecessors and organize the construction of cruisers in Japanese shipyards. It is quite natural that at first everything did not go very smoothly. The wooden corvettes “Kaimon” and “Tenryu” with a displacement of only about 1500 tons took a painfully long time to build, about seven years each, entering service only in 1885 - 1886. However, they turned out to be quite successful and served until the Russo-Japanese War, during which in July 1904, the Kaimon hit a mine in Talienwan Bay and died, and the Tenryu, which successfully survived it, was removed from the lists soon after the end of hostilities.

corvette "Kasuga"

The successful project was modernized, and the following corvettes, Musashi and Katsuragi, were laid down on the vacated stocks in Yokosuka. Another corvette of the same type, Yamato, was built at the second state shipyard in Kobe. The ships had a composite frame with steel frames and wooden plating and carried a full sail rig, removed at the turn of the century, in 1900. Construction also accelerated, although the five-year deadline for fairly simple units still remained insurmountable.

Practical “pieces of wood” were quite suitable for study, but for a serious war larger ships with powerful weapons were required. The Japanese wanted to get the most powerful and at the same time cheap modern cruiser, and the French engineers, who were usually very vigilant about such a characteristic as stability, gave up the slack. Built in Le Havre, the Wenby had all the external features of typical French ships, such as the Sfax, Cecil or Taj, and had a fairly thick armored deck and good speed. However, in an effort to satisfy the customer as much as possible, the designers went too far with the artillery, which consisted of four heavy 240-mm Krupp guns, not counting 150-mm guns and other “trifles.” As a result, the overloaded cruiser, under full sail, heeled dangerously and did not want to return to an even keel. In this state he left Le Havre on a long journey to the Far East. But he never arrived there, disappearing without a trace somewhere between Singapore and Taiwan in October 1887.

The first loud “puncture” was followed by further ones, albeit not so serious and of a completely different nature. The reorientation towards France brought to Japan the ideas of the “young school”, which turned out to be quite consistent with the fighting spirit of the samurai. Small ships attacking armored giants, in addition to being a good opportunity to show the valor of warriors, were also inexpensive, just within the means of a rapidly developing power that had too many wants and needs.

Corvette "Matsushima"

To implement new ideas, “heavy artillery” arrived from Europe; the famous French shipbuilder Emile Bertin signed a three-year contract to stay in Japan. He proposed a super-original project for a trio of cruisers, armed with the heaviest guns and designed as a response to fight even large battleships - ordered for the most powerful Northern squadron of the Chinese fleet, the Matsushima, Hashidate and Itsukushima received the designation "san-keikan" ” - “landscape ships”, since each unit bore the name of one of the three most famous species in Japan - Matsushima Bay in Miyagi Prefecture, Amano Hashidate Sandbank in Miyazu Bay in Kyoto Prefecture, and Ikutsushima Island in Hiroshima Bay.

They were conceived to operate as a single detachment, forming, as it were, one “composite battleship”, in which “Hashidate” and “Itsukushima” were the “bow towers”, and “Matsushima” was the “stern”. Accordingly, the main gun, one of the most powerful 320-mm Kane guns in the world at that time, was located on the first pair in the bow, and on the “last” one in the stern. In addition to the monster gun located in a lightly armored barbette, each of the cruisers carried a substantial battery of 120-mm rapid-fire guns, which had just been “introduced into use.” The rapid fire guns were located in a large battery in the center of the hull, firing through ports on both sides in the manner of ancient frigates. They were in fact the main weapon of the Sankeikan. But the small size of the ship did not allow them to be protected, and therefore they were very vulnerable.

Therefore, neither Bertin’s strange idea nor its implementation can be called successful. The Matsushima failed to develop the already non-sprinting 16.5-knot design speed; their boilers constantly leaked and failed. However, the main drawback was their monstrous 320mm frames, for the installation of which they had to sacrifice too much. The huge guns themselves on such small ships turned out to be practically useless; the 65-ton long barrel, when aimed directly at the side, noticeably tilted the hull, creating additional difficulties for firing, not only its own, but also much more effective rapid fire guns. As a result, even in calm sea conditions, no more than four shots per hour could be fired from the “monster.”

All the shortcomings of the project were fully revealed in battle. Serious troubles awaited the Sankeikan type in the battle with the Chinese at the mouth of the Yalu River. There, in four hours of battle, 320-millimeter fired 14 rounds for the entire trio, but unlike later battles, when the Matsushimas wisely stayed outside the range of effective return fire, they had to experience the effects of enemy shells. And then all the shortcomings of the cramped and unprotected 120-mm battery appeared. One of the few shells that hit from the Chinese battleships exploded among the ammunition on the Matsushima, causing a strong fire in which almost 100 people were injured - about a third of the crew, and half of them died .

Without a doubt, this hit was the most successful in the entire war and showed the extreme vulnerability of the “pseudo-battleship”. During the Russo-Japanese War, the “landscape trinity” participated in both main battles, but neither in the Yellow Sea nor at Tsushima achieved a single hit, firing less than two dozen shells at all. In general, the main benefit from the “landscapes”, perhaps, was the process of “assembling” the “Hashidate” at the shipyard in Yokosuka (the other two units were built in France). Namely “assemblies”, since almost all the mechanisms, equipment, materials and drawings came to Japan from Europe, and the work was supervised by French engineers. Equipment and skills were still clearly insufficient, and the construction of the Hashidate took twice as long. It entered service three years later than its “sisters.” Nevertheless, the experience in creating a modern combat vessel turned out to be very useful.

"Hashidate"

The failure to implement Bertin's extravagant ideas did not go unnoticed by attentive Japanese three years before the Matsushima disaster. In 1892, it was decided not to use the services of the French anymore. The Mikado ministers quickly turned their attention back to their main competitors, the British. And very fortunately, just in the 1890s, the rapid ascent of Armstrong’s company and its designers began along the pyramid of fame. In fact, it was they who largely created the modern Japanese fleet. We have already talked about the Elsvik "Esino", armed exclusively with rapid fire and developing 23 knots, which did so much to defeat the Chinese at Yalu. Under the flag of Admiral Tsuboi, he led a “flying squadron”, consisting of the fastest cruisers, which attacked the enemy from the flank and completely destroyed his formation.

"Akitsushima"

The “flying squadron” included the fastest and most modern cruisers, in addition to the Yoshino, the Elsvik Naniwa and Takachiho, as well as the first modern Japanese-built product, the Akitsushima. It strongly resembled a smaller version of the American "Elswick" - "Baltimore" (which is not surprising, since both projects were compiled by Armstrong's chief designer William White) and was built from materials brought from Britain.
The first fully Japanese-built cruisers were the Suma and Akashi pair.
Finally, almost everything was domestic, from the design to the materials, mechanisms and equipment. The exception was artillery, so as not to produce unnecessary types of guns and shells, they were left English, produced by the same Armstrong.

British influence, albeit indirect, remained very strong. Both ships were in many ways similar to the Akitsushima in layout and characteristics. Some step forward was the introduction of triple expansion steam engines with vertical cylinders, but the boilers clearly “pulled back”; the locomotive type had by that time almost completely disappeared from all more or less large warships. They became a real headache for the mechanics and did not allow them to develop the contract speed, which was already quite modest compared to the high-speed Elswicks. Not everything was immediately successful with such qualities as seaworthiness. The Suma, which was the first to enter service, turned out to be insufficiently stable and was heavily flooded by waves, so the completion of the Akashi was delayed, changing the design of the hull, which became smooth-deck. Subsequently, archaic locomotive boilers were replaced on both cruisers with modern water-tube boilers, but during the Russo-Japanese War these ships had to suffer a lot on campaigns, trying to maintain something resembling full speed.

"Takasago"

The construction of domestic cruisers is still too long, from four to five years. At this rate, with only two shipyards capable of producing relatively large ships, the Japanese fleet would be hopelessly behind its ambitious plans. Therefore, the search abroad continued. And not without success, in 1898 Armstrong delivered another beautiful cruiser. With a displacement of just under 4,200 tons, the Takasago had very powerful armament, including a pair of 203 mm, ten 120 mm and twelve 76 mm rapid-fire guns. At the same time, the ship had excellent protection, which, according to its creators, could withstand even 8-inch shells. Thus, the thickness of the deck bevel in the central part reached 114 mm. In addition, the hull had a large number of waterproof compartments, the number of which exceeded a hundred. A couple more almost completely similar units were ordered in the United States of America from Crump and Union Iron Works.

Since at that time overseas technology still lagged behind the capabilities of the Elsvik “magicians”, “Kasagi” and “Chitose” had slightly larger sizes and displacement with the same weapons and protection. It should be noted that the “English” turned out to be faster, reaching the design 23.5 knots, while the “Americans” had to limit themselves to 22.5. The main disadvantage of these very powerful combat units for their size was caused by their strength. Two and a half dozen guns, protected only by small shields, were placed so closely on the deck that any shell exploding there could cause complete devastation among the crews. There were understandable problems with eight-inch cameras.

It would be difficult for even a hefty grenadier to hold a heavy 113-kilogram projectile on a not-at-all wide swinging deck, and even more so for Japanese sailors who were not at all of a heroic build. Therefore, the designers tried to help the servants as much as possible by equipping the installation and feeding with electric motors. The shells delivered by the elevator from the ammunition magazines were laid out on a special cart, which ran on rails laid on the deck behind the gun. It was, of course, much easier to push a projectile from such a cart into the breech of the gun, but all this “railway equipment” remained highly vulnerable to enemy hits, including fragmentation.

It is clear that such heavily loaded ships had very moderate seaworthiness.

Nevertheless, this trio, together with the proven and equally fast Yoshino, formed the 3rd detachment of cruisers during the Russo-Japanese War, which was very actively used for reconnaissance and targeting its main forces at the enemy. They caused a lot of unpleasant moments for our sailors, who nicknamed them “dogs” for their persistence. However, one of the “mongrels” did not live to see Tsushima, “Takasago” was blown up by a mine in December 1904.

It should be noted that these powerful ships were built surprisingly quickly. Takasago entered service exactly two years after its keel, and its American “cousins” were even faster.

But the Japanese did not stand still. The next pair of domestic cruisers, Tsushima and Niitaka, became much more successful than the long-suffering Suma and Akashi. By increasing the displacement by approximately 700 tons, they received a single armament of six 6-inch guns, supplemented by a dozen 76-mm guns. The ships turned out to be quite seaworthy and had enviable stability. Of course, their 20-knot speed was somewhat lost against the background of foreign records, but it was possible to develop it without special problems. The construction time of the country's main shipyard in Ekosuka also decreased, and the Niitaka was put into operation two years and 20 days after its laying, almost catching up with the leading firms of the main maritime powers. It is interesting that both had capricious boilers of the notorious Niklos type, usually much reviled by our specialists and historians (mainly using the example of the Varyag), but throughout their careers, Japanese sailors did not experience any special problems with them.

But the next domestically built cruiser, Otova, became the first to also have boilers of a domestic brand. Unsurprisingly called “Kanpon” (that is, “naval” or “naval”), they had higher steam parameters than the vast majority of Western models (including the same Niklos products) and turned out to be very unpretentious and reliable in operation. The somewhat smaller size of the ships compared to their predecessors forced a return to a mixed armament of 6- and 4.7-inch Akashi-type guns, but the speed was increased to 21 knots.

All Japanese armored cruisers, both high-speed “dogs” and slower units that came off the slipways in Kure and Yokosuka, were actively used in the Russo-Japanese War. They turned out to be literally servants of all trades, carrying out patrols at Port Arthur and carrying out tactical reconnaissance and search in battles. It must be said that the command was afraid of the larger and superior in armament (all but the “dogs”) Russian “6-thousanders” and preferred to keep their light cruisers at a considerable distance from them, and even more so from our battleships. However, the “trifle” took a very active part in searching for and finishing off the defeated 2nd Pacific Squadron, taking advantage of its numerical superiority.

Thus, “Otova” and “Niitaka” easily caught up with the damaged “Svetlana” and sank her after an hour and a half battle. But this immediate military success was rather an exception. The same pair plus Admiral Uriu’s detachment (“Naniwa”, “Takachiho”, “Akashi” and “Tsushima”), six of them, could not cope with the old armored cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, although they seriously damaged it. The speed was not always enough, since the active service thoroughly “planted” the engines and boilers of almost all units, few of which could develop more than 18 knots by the Battle of Tsushima. Thus, Chitose and Akitsushima were unable to catch up with the Emerald, which broke through the enemy ring when the remnants of the squadron surrendered. Nevertheless, the activities of Japanese small cruisers should be recognized as both useful and successful.

Evidence of this is the fact that only four Russian light ships reached Vladivostok.

After the end of the war with Russia, the already very diverse Japanese cruiser fleet was enriched with trophies. As a result, by 1907 a unique situation had arisen. The Mikado fleet now had cruisers produced by literally all the major maritime countries of England, France, the USA, Germany, Russia and Italy. An unimaginable mixture of systems of mechanisms and weapons, various shipbuilding principles and techniques. However, it was the experience of their operation that opened up for Japanese designers the opportunity, inaccessible to engineers of other powers, to choose the best. And this experience was soon embodied in original and powerful ships.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the basis of any fleet was made up of battleships - large ships with strong artillery and powerful armor protection. Let's remember three Russian ships of this class - participants in the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

The battleship Sevastopol was commissioned in 1900. The ship carried four 305 mm main caliber guns. Eight 152 mm cannons were located in pairs in four turrets, and another four six-inch guns were located on the battery.

By the time the Russo-Japanese War began, the Sevastopol, along with the similar Poltava and Petropavlovsk, was far from a new ship, but destroying it in an artillery battle was very problematic.

"Sevastopol" took part in the battle on January 27, 1904, supporting the actions of ground forces at Port Arthur and the naval battle in the Yellow Sea. Several times the battleship was damaged by Japanese mines, but, unlike the Petropavlovsk, it happily escaped destruction. In October 1904, Japanese troops began methodically shooting down the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. Only when most of the squadron was killed under the fire of Japanese siege artillery, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Essen, on his own initiative, managed to obtain permission to take the battleship to the outer roadstead of the fortress in White Wolf Bay, where the crew began preparing to independently break the blockade.

However, the lack of people in the team and the lack of part of the artillery transferred to the shore forced them to postpone the breakthrough. Meanwhile, the Japanese command, having discovered the Sevastopol in the outer roadstead, decided to destroy the Russian battleship with destroyer attacks. Over the course of several nights, Sevastopol, protected by coastal batteries, the gunboat Groziashchiy and several destroyers, was subjected to numerous mine attacks.

Having fired up to 80 torpedoes at the Russian ship, the Japanese achieved one hit and two close explosions of torpedoes. On the Sevastopol, a number of compartments were flooded and the battleship suffered a significant list. True, this success cost the Japanese very dearly. Destroyer No. 53 and its entire crew were killed on a Russian barrage mine, and destroyer No. 42, damaged by the fire of Sevastopol, was finished off by a torpedo from the destroyer Angry.

Another two dozen Japanese fighters and destroyers were damaged, and some, apparently, were no longer put into service until the end of the war. The damage received by the Russian ship already excluded the possibility of a breakthrough, and the Sevastopol crew switched to the fight against Japanese batteries, which continued until the very last day of the defense of Port Arthur. In connection with the surrender of the fortress, the battleship was towed from the shore and scuttled at a depth of more than 100 meters. Thus, Sevastopol became the only Russian battleship sunk in Port Arthur that was not raised by the Japanese and did not fall into enemy hands.

Squadron battleship "Eustathius"

The squadron battleship "Eustathius" was a further development of the project of the battleship "Prince Potemkin Tauride". Unlike its prototype, the Eustathia has 152 mm. the guns at the extremities were replaced with 203 mm guns. However, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War forced us to reconsider the ship's design. As a result, the already lengthy construction was delayed.

In 1907, all battleships of the Russian Navy were reclassified as battleships. With the advent of the battleship Dreadnought in England, all the world's battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, including the Eustathius, instantly became obsolete. Despite this, both the “Eustathius” and the “John Chrysostom” of the same type represented an impressive force on the Black Sea and the Ottoman Empire, as the main potential enemy, in principle could not oppose anything serious to the Russian battleships.

To strengthen the Turkish fleet, the German command transferred the newest battle cruiser Goeben and the light Breislau, which Russia's Entente allies so helpfully allowed into the Black Sea.

The first collision with the Goeben took place at Cape Sarych on November 5, 1914. The battle, in essence, came down to a duel between the flagship Eustathius and the German cruiser. The remaining Russian ships, due to fog and errors in determining the distance, fired over long distances or did not open fire at all.

From the first salvo, the Eustathius gunners managed to cover the Goeben, which in 14 minutes of battle received, according to various sources, from three to fourteen direct hits. As a result, the German cruiser left the battle and then underwent two weeks of repairs. The Eustathius was hit by five German shells, which did not cause fatal damage.

The second collision between the Eustathius and the Goeben took place on April 27, 1915, near the Bosporus, when a German raider attempted to destroy the core of the Black Sea Fleet piece by piece. However, faced with three dreadnought battleships, the Germans did not tempt fate and hastened to withdraw from the battle after a short firefight. The fate of "Eustathius", which successfully operated in the First World War, turned out to be sad. In 1918, it fell into the hands of the German command, and then into the hands of the former Entente allies. Leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the Eustathia vehicles. Successful restoration of the battleship, which required skilled workers and a powerful industrial base, immediately after the end of the Civil War proved impossible, and in 1922 the ship was cut into metal.

Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were built to protect the Baltic coast. Each of them carried four 254 mm guns (Apraksin three), four 120 mm guns and small-caliber artillery. Having a relatively small displacement (just over 4,000 tons), the ships were distinguished by powerful weapons.

After the fall of Port Arthur, the formation of the 3rd Pacific Squadron began, into which, along with the Apraksin and Senyavin, the Admiral Ushakov was included. The value of these ships lay, first of all, in their well-trained crews, who, as part of the artillery training detachment, were engaged in training fleet gunners. However, before the ships were sent, the crews were replaced, and the battleships were sent to the Far East without replacing the main caliber guns, which subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the Admiral Ushakov.

In the Battle of Tsushima, “Admiral Ushakov was part of the 3rd combat detachment, closing the column of the squadron’s main forces. In a daytime battle on May 14, 1905, the ship, at about 3 p.m., during a firefight with the armored cruisers of Admiral Kamimura, received two large holes in the bow and fell behind the squadron. The speed of the battleship dropped to 10 knots.

At night, sailing without lighting, the Admiral Ushakov managed to avoid attacks from Japanese destroyers, but the next day it was overtaken by the armored cruisers Yakumo and Iwate. At the Japanese offer to surrender, the Russian ship opened fire. Each of the Japanese cruisers carried four 203 mm and fourteen 152 mm guns, significantly surpassing the Russian battleship in speed. And if the first salvoes of the Ushakov covered the Iwate, causing a fire on the Japanese cruiser, then later the Japanese ships stayed out of the reach of the battleship’s guns at a favorable combat distance. After a 40-minute battle, the Admiral Ushakov, when further resistance became pointless, was scuttled by the crew. Among the 94 dead officers and sailors of the Ushakov was the commander of the battleship, Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukha (brother of the famous Oceania explorer N. N. Miklouho-Maclay). According to one version, he was mortally wounded by a shrapnel, and according to another, he himself refused to be saved, pointing out to the Japanese a sailor drowning nearby.