German defense

The fighting during the Berlin operation took place in Western Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Brandenburg provinces and part of Saxony. The terrain in the offensive zone of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian fronts for the most part was convenient for the operation of all types of troops. On the other hand, natural and anthropogenic factors made it possible to create a strong defense. There were a large number of rivers, lakes, canals, large forests, large cities and settlements with strong stone structures, which provided ample opportunities for organizing defense in a short time. For the advancing fronts, this created additional difficulties for the deployment of troops and their maneuver.

The Soviet command had to take into account the factor of the need to force a significant number of water obstacles. The main part of the rivers in central Germany flows in a meridional direction from south to north. This gave the Germans additional opportunities to organize defensive positions on the western banks of the rivers. The most serious water obstacles were the rivers Oder and its branches (Eastern and Western Oder), Neisse, Spree, Havel and Elbe, as well as the Finow, Hohenzollern, Ruppiner, Oder-Spree and Teltow canals.

Back in January 1945, when the Red Army broke through the Vistula defensive line, the German command hastily began equipping defensive positions on the territory of the Reich. Fortification work especially began in February, when our troops reached the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Were under threat central areas Germany and the imperial capital. Engineering work was carried out not only by troops and paramilitary organizations, they mobilized the German population, attracted a large number of prisoners of war and foreign workers, significant amount who worked in Germany throughout the war.

Special attention focused on creating a strong defense on the western bank of the Oder and Neisse. The Germans here created a strong and deeply layered defense. The Oder-Neissen defensive line had three lines: the first (main), second and third (rear). In important directions between these strips, intermediate and cut-off strips were built. The depth of German defense at the Oder-Neissen line reached 20-40 kilometers. The total depth of German defense in the Berlin direction, including the Berlin fortified area, reached 100 kilometers.

The main line of enemy defense mainly ran along the western bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers. In addition, in the areas of Frankfurt an der Oder, Guben, Forst and Muskau, the Germans had small bridgeheads on the eastern bank. The first strip consisted of 2-3 positions, the total depth of which reached 5-10 km. The front edge was covered with barbed wire and minefields. All settlements in this zone were turned into strongholds. The dense network of defensive structures was a serious obstacle for our troops. The Germans, using the Oder lock system and numerous canals, prepared a number of areas for flooding, which was supposed to delay the advance of our troops.

The Germans created a particularly powerful defense in the possible directions of attack of the strike groups of the Soviet fronts: sections from Stettin to Schwedt (2nd Belorussian Front), from the mouth of the river. Alter Oder to Frankfurt (1st BF), from Guben (Gubin) to Priebus. The section from Stettin to Schwedt was especially difficult from a natural standpoint for the advancing troops. Here the Oder (Odra) River had two branches, which created two independent rivers: the Ost (Eastern) Oder and the West (Western) Oder. The main line of defense of the German troops ran along the western bank of the Western Oder. The river's floodplain and the interfluve were flooded and were under enemy fire. To attack the enemy, it was necessary to cross the Eastern and Western Oder under German fire.

The Germans created the most powerful defense in terms of engineering in the Küstrin-Berlin direction, on the front section from the river. Alter Oder to Frankfurt an der Oder. Here the enemy had 3-4 lines of full profile trenches. In the Frankfurt an der Oder - Priebus sector, nature also did not support the actions of large forces. The German defense passed through a forested lake area, so the enemy built 1-3 lines of intermittent trenches, covering the most accessible areas. On the offensive sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Guben - Priebus, the Germans had a dense defense with 2-3 lines of full-profile trenches.

German cities were prepared for all-round defense and street fighting. As a result, populated areas became strong defense centers. The approaches to them were covered by several lines of trenches. Particular attention was paid to the eastern and southern sectors of defense. The most powerful defense centers were Stettin, Schwedt, Frankfurt, Guben, Forst and Muskau. These cities, in connection with other strongholds, were the basis of the main defense line. A particularly powerful defense was created in Frankfurt an der Oder. The roads that passed through the forests were blocked by rubble and mined. Much attention was paid to anti-tank defense. To do this, they tried to use natural boundaries (rivers, canals), created rubble, and installed many minefields. In the most important directions, 1 km of front accounted for up to 2 thousand minutes. Ahead of the first trench, at road junctions, rifle cells were set up for soldiers armed with anti-tank grenade launchers (faustpatrons).

The front edge of the second defense line ran 10-20 km from the front edge of the main line. The second line of defense ran along the western bank of the river. Rand, the towns of Angermünde, Wriezen, Seelow, Katlow, Debern, Weiswasser and Görlitz. The most powerful defense was in the Berlin direction. There were 2-3 lines of trenches, all settlements and even individual estates, estates (farms) were prepared for all-round defense, turned into strong points. The most famous position in the second line of defense was the Seelow Heights in the Küstrin-Berlin direction. The city of Seelow and the Seelow Heights were one of the most important obstacles on the way of our troops to Berlin.

The Seelow Heights are the high bank of the old riverbed of the Oder and rise 40-50 meters above the area. The steepness of the coast reaches 30-40 degrees. From these heights it was good to adjust mortar and artillery fire. Fire weapons were located on the slopes of the heights. There are trenches and trenches on the slopes. There are anti-tank ditches in front of them. Tanks and self-propelled guns could only overcome the steep slopes of the Seelow Heights on roads. However, all the roads were mined and were under fire from all types. For our troops, the location of the German troops was difficult to identify due to the groves and gardens east of Seelow. The Germans called the Seelow Heights “the castle of Berlin.” Indeed, after the heights, a direct path to the German capital opened up. The Germans were preparing to fight to the death in this position.

Soviet attack on the Seelow Heights

The section of the second German defense line from Katlov to Weiswasser in front of the 1st Ukrainian Front (“Matilda Line”) consisted of one trench and settlements prepared for defense. The area was wooded, so the Germans made extensive use of tree debris here. The section from Müllrose to Katlov passed through wooded-lake terrain and consisted of an intermittent trench and individual strongholds. Positions for artillery and anti-tank grenade launchers were equipped along the roads.

The rear defense line was located 20-40 km from the front edge of the main line. It went from Torgelow, along the Uecker River, through Pasewalk, Prenzlau, Eberswalde, Batzlow, Müncheberg, Fürstenwalde, along the western bank of the Spree River to the lake in the Beskow area, through Ferow, again along the western bank of the Spree, Cottbus and Spremberg. The basis of the rear line of defense were cities, transformed into powerful strongholds and centers of resistance. They were surrounded by trenches. The most important strongholds were Torgelow, Prenzlau, Eberswalde, Batslow, Müncheberg, Fürstenwalde, Beskow, Cottbus and Spremberg.

The third line of defense was prepared most densely in the central (Berlin) direction, in the Eberswalde - Fürstenwalde section and in the Cottbus-Berlin direction, in the Cottbus - Spremberg section. For example, Cottbus had two defensive contours; strong artillery and armored caps were located in the most important directions. The trenches were covered with wire and anti-tank barriers. Sturdy stone buildings were turned into permanent defensive structures, and the streets were blocked off with barricades. Other cities were prepared for defense in approximately the same way. All the main forces of the field army defended the first and second defense lines, so sapper units, militias and the Hitler Youth were located on the rear line.

Simultaneously with the equipment of the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the Germans hastily prepared the Berlin region for defense. The Berlin defensive area consisted of three defensive rings (external, internal and urban). It was an entire fortified area, prepared for long battles. The German capital was surrounded on all sides by rivers, canals, lakes and forests, which helped in the creation of a defensive region. Rivers and canals divided Berlin into several parts, which also strengthened the defensive capabilities of the German garrison. The entire Berlin defensive region was divided into nine sectors. Sector No. 9 was located in the center, from which the other eight defense sectors diverged radially. Each sector in turn was divided into several subsectors.

The outer defensive contour of the Berlin region was located 25-40 km from the center of the capital along the Biesenthal line, Lake Stinitz See, Lake Seddin See, Mittenwalde, Rangsdorf, Tirow, Lake Schwilow See, Briselang, Velten and Lanke. Numerous rivers, lakes and canals strengthened the defense. Populated areas were turned into defense centers. On the outer defensive perimeter, the Wehrmacht planned to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to bleed him dry, in order to finally stop him on the inner defensive ring.

The internal defensive line (“green line”) was considered the main defensive line on which the enemy was going to be stopped. The Green Line ran along the outskirts of the Berlin suburbs - Malchow, Marzahn, Dahlwitz, Köpenick, Rudow, Lichtenrade, the Teltow Canal, Kladow, Falkenhagen, Tegel and Rosenthal. The internal defensive contour was based on strong buildings, converted into long-term structures. The internal circuit had 3-5 lines of trenches with a total depth of up to 6 kilometers. True, engineering work at this line was not completed before the start of the Soviet offensive. On this line, the German command planned to throw the main forces of the Berlin garrison into battle, and the troops received orders to hold this line at any cost. Even if Russian troops broke through the “green line” in some directions, all troops had to remain in their places, unless the reserve forces would restore the situation with counterattacks.

The city defensive contour ran along the ring railway. Barricades were set up on all the streets that led to the center of Berlin. Firing positions were prepared in squares and street intersections. The German command ordered to fight for every street, every house and every meter of the capital. The defense planned to use well-developed underground communications, including the metro and sewer system. Underground communications allowed German units to move from one place to another without being subjected to air and artillery strikes and to deliver unexpected attacks on Soviet troops, including in the rear.

Volksturm militia parade in Berlin

Volkssturm soldiers erect anti-tank barriers, Berlin

Particular attention was paid to the central defense sector (sector No. 9). Various central state, party and military institutions were located here. Among them were the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellery. This was the “heart” of the Third Reich. Therefore, during the Battle of Berlin, the central sector became the site of especially fierce and furious fighting. It was here that the remnants of the Berlin garrison and selected SS units defended until the last. The leaders of the Reich settled here. Here the Victory Banner soared above the Reichstag dome.

Afterwards, Berlin itself was a huge city with about 600 thousand buildings. Taking such a city was extremely difficult, although Soviet troops had already gained extensive experience in urban battles during the assault on Budapest, Vienna, and Königsberg. Here every block, street and house had to be taken by storm, and a bloody price had to be paid for victory. For our soldiers, on the one hand, this was the last and main battle; they stormed the “lair of the beast.” On the other hand, everyone knew that Victory was near; dying and losing comrades was especially difficult.

The defense of Berlin was organized with the expectation of conducting brutal street fighting. Hitler and his entourage were going to fight to the last, they were not going to give up. The troops were given the order to defend the capital to the last man and last cartridge. The military-political leadership of the Third Reich, even in conditions of complete senselessness of resistance, refused to capitulate and made the final sacrifice - tens and hundreds of thousands of people still had to die for peace to finally come to Europe.

Thus, our troops at the end of the war needed to solve a difficult problem. Break through the Oder-Neissen defensive line (of three stripes) with a total depth of 20-40 kilometers, which ran along serious natural boundaries, had a well-prepared defense system and many cities and towns turned into centers of resistance. It was necessary to break the resistance of the million-strong Berlin group (the armies of Army Group Vistula and Center), in which the best divisions of the Third Reich were concentrated. It was necessary to crush such a tough nut as the Berlin fortified area.

Soviet soldiers during the storming of Berlin

To be continued…

The Tannenberg line is a complex of German defensive structures in Estonia on the Narva Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi. The name of the line, according to the propagandists of the Third Reich, was supposed to support the weakened morale of the German troops: in the Battle of Tannenberg during the East Prussian operation of 1914, two corps of the 2nd Army of Russia under the command of General Samsonov were surrounded and defeated.

Back in the summer of 1943, the Germans began to strengthen the defensive line along the Narova River, giving it the code name “Panther”. Retreating from Leningrad, the Germans occupied the Panther defense line, but rather quickly losing ground, on June 26, 1944 they occupied the Tannenberg line, the defense line of which included the Vaivara Blue Mountains. The wooded, swampy Narva Isthmus, in itself, was a serious obstacle to the advancement of troops and military equipment. Reinforced with military engineering structures and firepower, it became almost impregnable.

The line consisted of three defensive line stripes with a total length of 55 km and a depth of 25-30 km. The first line of this line ran from the village of Mummasaare, located on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, along the three heights of the Blue Mountains through the strongholds of Sirgala, Putki, Gorodenka and further along the Narova River to Lake Peipsi. The basis of the defense was the Blue Mountains, 3.4 km long, which consisted of three heights: Tower Mountain, 70 m high, Grenadier Mountain, 83 m high, and Park Mountain, 85 m high. All three mountains had a dominant position in the surrounding their localities.

The first military structures were built on three, then unnamed, heights under Peter I, during the Northern War with the Swedes. They were built to protect the rear of the army during the assault on Narva. At the beginning of the 20th century, the heights with the battery located there were included in the coastal defense system Russian Empire. Moves were cut inside the mountains to deliver ammunition and reserves. Firing points and strong points were connected by underground communications. German troops used a system of ready-made underground structures, adapting and rebuilding everything to suit their needs. Himmler personally checked the reliability of the Tannenberg line.

Taking into account the fact that on one side there were impenetrable swamp forests with Lake Peipus, and on the other, the Gulf of Finland, the Germans considered the defense line an insurmountable natural barrier for the Red Army units advancing from the east.

Along the defense line in populated areas, several parallel full-profile trenches were dug, lined with logs and poles. The trenches were reinforced with dugouts and bunkers, as well as open and semi-open firing points. In wetlands, instead of trenches, fortifications were built from logs on wooden decks. In front of the first line of trenches there were several rows of barbed wire, Bruno spirals and minefields. Behind the trenches in the depths of the defense, reinforced concrete and wood-earth shelters were placed to shelter troops. The defenses in the Blue Mountains were reinforced with artillery positions, armored Crab machine gun nests, and buried tanks. The deep caves on the heights that had existed since Peter the Great's time were turned by the Germans into bomb shelters and shelters for guns. The trenches climbed the slopes in winding labyrinths, connecting at the top with casemates that hid long-range artillery. The stone buildings of the children's colony that once existed here have been rebuilt into nests for firing points. The foundations of the buildings have been converted into massive pillboxes. Headquarters and reserves were located on the slopes of the heights, in bunkers. To the north and south of the heights were the main communications - the railway and the highway, which led deep into Estonia and allowed the Germans to maneuver their troops.

The second defensive line of the Tannenberg Line ran along the Sytka River from Sillamäe in the direction of Van - Sytke through Sirgala to the south. The third strip was located 25 kilometers from the main one and ran from the Gulf of Finland through the settlements of Kukkvhvrja, Suur-Konya, Moonaküla, Oru Yaam and further along the shore of Lake Peenjare.

On July 24, 1945, the troops of the left flank of the Leningrad Front, having launched the Narva offensive operation, liberating the city of Narva, ran into the Tannenberg defensive line and were forced from July 27 to begin a fierce assault on the fortifications until August 10, after which they went on the defensive. Against units 2 and 8 Soviet armies, with a total number of 57 thousand people, fought the 3rd German SS Armored Corps, with a total number of 50 thousand people. Estonians, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Dutch, Belgians, Flemings, Finns and representatives of other nations who volunteered to join the SS fought on the side of the Germans. Having failed to penetrate the defenses head-on for two weeks, the Soviet command, according to the plan of the Tallinn offensive operation, abandoned the assault on the Tannenberg line and, from September 3, secretly began transferring troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the southwestern coast of Lake Peipus, to the river line Emajõgi, to attack the line from the rear. The transfer of troops was promptly discovered by the enemy and on September 16, Hitler signed an order to withdraw troops from Estonia to Latvia. On the same day, the Germans, without announcing the order, began to evacuate their units. The Estonian units were informed of Hitler's order almost two days late. They were supposed to cover the general withdrawal of German units and leave the Blue Mountains on the morning of September 19, 1944. However, the Estonians were “ahead of schedule” and already left their positions on September 18th.

During the fighting, the losses of the German side amounted to about 10 thousand people, incl. 2.5 thousand Estonians. The Red Army lost a little less than 5 thousand people. The discrepancy between the losses of attackers and defenders in the current proportion is explained by the significant superiority of the Red Army in aviation and artillery. On average, per day of the offensive, from 1 to 3 thousand shells and mines of various calibers fell on the German positions. In two weeks, attack aircraft and bombers carried out about a thousand combat missions. According to eyewitnesses, the Blue Mountains were turned into a complete conflagration, plowed up by heavy shells to a depth of 2-3 meters. Only 10-15 years after the war the first sprouts of trees began to appear there. Therefore, German losses would have been many times greater if they had not been saved by countless caste caves, adapted for shelters and shelters.

The Tannenberg line was one of the smallest German defensive structures in terms of length in the entire history of World War II and the only one that the Red Army could not take, although it suffered very serious material and human losses. Thus, the Tannenberg defensive line is one of the few fortifications in Germany that has fully completed its task, and even with minimal capital investment.

Wehrmacht "invincible and legendary" [ Military art Reich] Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

In preparation for waging lightning wars, the Wehrmacht command first of all assumed that the German armed forces would have to at least temporarily go on the defensive in certain areas. Therefore, this type of combat operations was spelled out quite fully in the pre-war charters and manuals. However, the offensive campaigns of 1939 and 1940 did not provide practical experience of defense, as a result of which most German military leaders began to treat it superficially.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War cases of German troops switching to tactical defense became more frequent. Thus, already in border battles, the German command preferred to repulse frequent counterattacks and counterattacks of Soviet troops in a number of cases with attacks from the spot, for which their troops temporarily took up defensive positions. The peculiarities of this defense were that it was based on random lines and nodes of resistance that were not prepared in advance in engineering terms. The earlier advancing troops hastily occupied these lines, forming their battle formation in one echelon, and tried to inflict maximum defeat on the enemy on the approaches to the defense. Most of the artillery, as a rule, was deployed for direct fire. Often, defensive actions by ground forces were linked to air strikes or offensive actions in other directions. In the overwhelming majority, such defense was short-lived and was an integral part of a larger offensive operation.

In the summer of 1941, German troops also used defense to block encircled Soviet troops (internal encirclement front) and prevent their breakthrough or attack from the outside for the purpose of releasing the blockade (external encirclement front). And in this case, too, the main forces of the German troops were concentrated in the first echelon, which included tanks and artillery for direct fire. As a rule, engineering equipment for defensive lines was not carried out; defensive actions of ground troops were closely linked with air strikes. Such defense was considered temporary, and after solving a particular task, the troops undertaking it immediately went on the offensive and were used, after regrouping and replenishment, as reserves of armies or army groups.

For the first time, the German command began to think seriously about the problem of defense with the start of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow in early December 1941. By that time, the German troops operating in this direction had practically lost their offensive capabilities and ran into Soviet defenses. For some time, the parties stood in front of each other: Soviet troops did not dare to launch a counteroffensive until the reserves arrived, and German troops did not plan to defend themselves. But the fate of the latter was already predetermined by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army.

At the beginning of December 1941, the Soviet command managed to gather significant forces of its troops in the Moscow direction, which were distributed across three fronts: Kalinin, Western and Southwestern. It was planned to use simultaneous powerful strikes by the troops of the Western, left wing of the Kalinin and right wing of the Southwestern fronts to defeat the strike groups of German troops operating north and south of Moscow, and then with a rapid attack to the west to complete the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center.

The main forces went to the Western Front. By the beginning of the offensive, he outnumbered the enemy by approximately 1.5 times in personnel, by 1.3 times in guns and mortars, and by 1.5 times in tanks. One rifle or cavalry division accounted for more than 8 kilometers of front. On every kilometer of the front, from 10 to 12 guns and mortars and about 5 tanks could be used. It was difficult to advance with such superiority, but quite possible.

The German military command understood well that their troops would not be able to hold out in this position near Moscow for long, but Hitler’s Headquarters did not allow this to happen. Thus, General G. Guderian wrote in his book “Memoirs of a Soldier”: “The attack on Moscow failed... The High Command ground forces, being in East Prussia, far from the front, had no idea about the actual position of its troops...

Timely withdrawal of troops and occupation of defense at an advantageous and pre-prepared line would be the best and most effective means in order to restore the position and gain a foothold before the onset of spring. In the zone of action of the 2nd Tank Army, such a line could be the line of defense it occupied in October along the Zusha and Oka rivers. However, this is precisely what Hitler did not agree with.”

South of Moscow, at the 350-kilometer line along the line of Tula, Serebryanye Prudy, Mikhailov, Chernava, the troops of the 2nd Tank Army of General G. Guderian were stopped. The front line of the tank army's defense was occupied by the 24th Tank, 53rd Army and 47th Tank Corps, having divisions in one line with very insignificant reserves. All divisions were stretched along the front from 25 to 50 kilometers and had regiments, also lined up in one line, and regiments - one line of battalions. Thus, due to the single-echelon formation of the formations, the depth of the main defensive line of the German troops did not exceed 3–4 kilometers. Only two divisions were left in the reserve of the tank army - the 25th motorized and 112th infantry, which were located, respectively, in the areas of Venev and Stalinogorsk.

There was no continuous front line on the main line of German defense. The troops were garrisoned in populated areas, which were turned into strongholds and adapted for all-round defense. There were significant gaps between the strongholds that were not occupied by troops and were not equipped in engineering terms, but according to the command plan they should have been covered with artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire. Minefields were laid on the approaches to strongholds.

Schematic diagram of the Wehrmacht defense in December 1941

Typically, resistance nodes in large populated areas were defended by forces up to an infantry battalion, reinforced with tanks. Smaller villages housed infantry or tank companies. There were larger forces in the cities. Thus, a motorized infantry regiment was located in Serebryanye Prudy, and two motorized infantry and one artillery regiments were located in Mikhailov. In the operational depth of defense, defensive lines along the western banks of the Pronya and Don rivers were prepared from an engineering standpoint by the local population, but were not occupied by troops.

To attack Mikhailov, formations of the 10th Army were advanced (commanded by Lieutenant General I.F. Golikov), which, by decision of Headquarters, was transferred to the Western Front only on December 2. It consisted of eight rifle, three cavalry and one mixed air divisions. The army had 254 field guns, 81 anti-tank gun, 270 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber. In front of the army's offensive front there was one motorized division, reinforced with tanks.

The neighbor of the 10th Army on the right was the group of General P. A. Belov, consisting of a cavalry corps, one rifle division, a tank brigade and a separate tank battalion. Even further, in the Tula region, the 50th Army was located. To the south, the 61st Army was advancing from the Ryazhi area and preparing for the attack by the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front.

Thus, in the area east of Tula, the troops of General G. Guderian’s 2nd Tank Army were practically in a deep “cauldron”, the neck of which could be slammed shut by Soviet troops with counter attacks from Tula to the south and from Efremov to the north.

Under these conditions, General G. Guderian decides to withdraw his subordinate troops, covering the retreat with defense. In his memoirs, he writes: “In the face of a threat to my flanks and rear and given the onset of incredibly cold weather, as a result of which the troops lost mobility, on the night of December 6, for the first time since the beginning of this war, I decided to stop this isolated offensive and withdraw far forward parts on the line of the upper reaches of the river. Don, b. Shat, b. UPA, where to take up defense.”

Thus, the defense of German troops east of Tula should not be considered as well prepared defensive operation 2nd Tank Army, but as a tactical defense conducted with the aim of ensuring the exit from the battle and withdrawal of the main group of troops.

The offensive of the Soviet troops of the 10th Army began on December 6, and during the day, slowly, through deep snow, its formations approached the city of Mikhailov. At 24 hours on December 6, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the Soviet regiments again went on the attack. At 2 o'clock on December 7, they burst into the city and by 7 o'clock they completely liberated it. The Germans systematically withdrew their troops from Mikhailov to the west.

Information on how the battles for Mikhailov were conducted is contained in the textbook of the Department of History of Military Art of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze, “Preparation and conduct of an offensive with the advance of formations of the 10th Army from the depths in a counteroffensive near Moscow.” It says, in part: “By 2 o’clock on December 7, troops of the 330th Infantry Division broke into the city. Regimental artillery, being in infantry combat formations, destroyed enemy firing points with direct fire. Panic began among the enemy troops. To cut off the Germans' escape routes, the division commander ordered the commander of the 1111th Infantry Regiment to send one battalion to the road southwest of Mikhailov and block the enemy's retreat routes. But due to deep snow, the battalion did not complete its task. The remnants of the defeated enemy units managed to escape unhindered in a southwestern direction under cover of darkness.

In the battles for Mikhailov, the 330th Infantry Division captured about 50 people, captured 16 guns, 6 vehicles, one tank, 16 motorcycles, a large amount of ammunition, as well as documents of the 32nd, 63rd motorized infantry and 422nd motorized artillery regiments of the 10th th motorized division.

The tank battalion assigned to the 330th Infantry Division did not participate in the battle due to equipment failure. On the first day of the operation, the 28th Aviation Division carried out (in total. – Auth.) 11 sorties. Other army units acted less successfully on December 6.”

From this academic teaching aid One can draw reasoned conclusions that the offensive of the 10th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow was organized extremely poorly. Soviet troops attacked on a broad front after moving from the depths over a long distance. No preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy was carried out. There was no artillery or air preparation for the offensive. Tanks did not participate in the offensive. Nevertheless, the liberation of the city of Mikhailov by the morning of the next day of the offensive was presented as a great victory.

Thus, on time, none of the divisions operating in the first echelon of the 10th Army, despite the virtual absence of resistance from the enemy, was able to fully complete the task of the first day of the operation, which was to move from the concentration area to the front line of the enemy’s defense on 25–30 kilometers and mastering its tactical defense zone at a depth of 4–6 kilometers.

Subsequently, the offensive of the 10th Army troops continued at a slow pace. Not knowing the situation at the front and not having a specific task, the division commanders acted slowly, cautiously and without initiative. When intelligence reported to the commander of the 323rd Infantry Division that a column of German vehicles with troops was moving along the Mikhailovo highway towards Stalinogorsk, he did not take any measures to cut the highway and destroy the enemy. In general, the advance of the army troops on the second day of the operation, despite the lack of resistance from the enemy in front of all divisions, with the exception of one 322nd, was insignificant.

The 322nd Rifle Division was advancing on the city of Serebryanye Prudy, which also represented a center of resistance. On December 7, at 15:00, having covered 8 kilometers off-road, the division regiments reached the city. But it was not possible to take it on the move. The Soviet infantry attack was repelled by machine gun and artillery fire. The troops lay down and were forced to spend several hours in this position.

As darkness fell, units of the 322nd Rifle Division again launched an attack on Serebryannye Prudy. Its parts covered the city from the north and south. German troops not only repelled attacks from the spot, but also tried to launch a counterattack. By 20 o'clock the city was captured by Soviet units, which took 50 prisoners, 6 artillery pieces and about 30 motorcycles.

In another direction, the 326th Rifle Division at 7 o'clock in the morning, without much resistance from the enemy, captured the village of Gryaznoye, after which its commander, Colonel V.S. Andreev, decided to temporarily stop the offensive and take a day's rest. The commander of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was advancing on the left flank of the 10th Army, brigade commander P. M. Davydov, on the second day of the operation, made no attempts at all to continue the offensive. The 28th Air Division flew only 24 sorties on the second day of the operation.

The offensive on the left flank of the army developed even more slowly. The 10th Army did not have an elbow connection with its neighbor on the left, which the German troops defending there immediately took advantage of. On December 8, Guderian ordered the forces of the 40th Signal Regiment to counterattack the flank of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was forced to stop the offensive and begin to retreat eastward. Only after the commander of the 10th Army sent the 41st and 57th Cavalry Division to reinforce it on December 9, the offensive was resumed and Soviet troops were able to occupy the village of Tabola by the end of December 10.

Thus, during the first four days of the operation, the German troops were practically pushed out of the Stalinogorsk pocket. By the end of December 10, the 330th Infantry Division reached the approaches to the Don in the area of ​​​​the village of Krutoye. The 328th Infantry Division captured Dubovo. And only the 324th Infantry Division completed the task of the first day of the operation and reached the Don. During the four days of the offensive, they covered 35–40 kilometers, advancing at an average pace of 8–10 kilometers per day. By that time, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with the 322nd Rifle Division of the 110th Army, had captured the city of Venev.

On December 10, General G. Guderian reported the situation to A. Hitler's chief adjutant, General Schmundt, and the chief of personnel of the main command of the ground forces, warning that if effective measures were not taken in this direction, then they should not have any illusions about those successful there actions of German troops.

On December 12, Soviet troops occupied Efremov, and on December 13, after a long battle, they captured the city of Epifan. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps advanced several kilometers south of Venev.

Thus, by the end of December 13, the 10th Army had only partially reached the milestone determined for it as part of the first offensive operation. The average rate of advance of its formations dropped to 4–5 kilometers per day. The opposing formations of the 2nd Tank Army were able to avoid encirclement, use rearguard defense to delay the advance of the Soviet troops and systematically retreat to a new rear line of defense.

In general, the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 achieved its goal. Having thrown the enemy strike force to the west and inflicted serious losses on it, the Red Army eliminated the danger looming over Moscow. The counteroffensive lasted 34 days. The total width of the combat front was 1000 kilometers, and the depth of advance of Soviet troops was 100–250 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance of rifle formations was 3–6 kilometers.

During this operation, the enemy’s plan to capture Moscow was thwarted, the troops of Army Group Center were defeated and the myth of the invincibility of German troops was dispelled.

The German command does not publish the exact number of losses during the Soviet offensive near Moscow. But, referring to the “War Diary” of F. Halder, it can be calculated that from December 10, 1941 to February 10, 1942, German ground forces lost 191 thousand people on the Eastern Front. A significant part of these forces was located near Moscow. It is known that during the operation, Soviet troops irretrievably lost 139.6 thousand people, 231.4 thousand were wounded and frostbitten.

Schematic diagram of the Wehrmacht defense in the fall of 1942

Almost a year has passed. Having exhausted offensive capabilities and not achieving the goals of the summer offensive of 1942, German troops were forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front, the total length of which reached 2,300 kilometers. The order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces dated October 14, 1942 stated: “We have to conduct a winter campaign. The task of the Eastern Front is... to hold the achieved lines at all costs, to repel any enemy attempts to break through them and thereby create the preconditions for our offensive in 1943.”

To carry out this order, the German command began to create a defense that ran along previously occupied lines. The main area of ​​this defense was Stalingrad, where the troops of the 6th field and 4th tank defended German armies, as well as the 3rd Army of Romania. Moreover, German troops operated directly in the Stalingrad area, and their flanks were covered by Romanian troops.

On the northern face of the Stalingrad salient, where Romanian troops were defending, the defense consisted of one main zone 5–8 kilometers deep, on which infantry divisions defended. In the operational depth of defense along the Krivaya and Chir rivers, separate resistance centers were created at the main directions and road junctions, which were not engaged by troops in advance. Even deeper in areas not equipped for defense were located units of the 1st Romanian Panzer Division, the 22nd and 14th Panzer Divisions of the Wehrmacht, which by that time had already lost more than half of their tanks and were in a state of reformation.

Consequently, almost all hope of defense rested on the main zone, defended by Romanian infantry divisions. It consisted of two positions, each of which was equipped with one or two trenches. In certain directions, mainly in the area of ​​roads, minefields and wire barriers were installed in front of the first trench. The second position was located at a depth of 5–8 kilometers from the front line of the defense, was equipped with one trench and was defended by regimental reserves with a strength of up to a battalion. But due to winter conditions, a significant part of the reserves were drawn to populated areas, which were officially called “foci of resistance,” but in fact were a collection of headquarters, rear services, non-combat units and served as the location of hospitals.

The troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Fronts, consisting of the 65th, 21st Field and 5th Tank Armies, were entrusted with breaking through the defenses of the Romanian troops and enveloping the main group of German troops located near Stalingrad from the north. From the southeast they were attacked by troops of the Stalingrad Front with the forces of the 57th and 51st field armies of the 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps. By that time, significant Red Army forces had been accumulated in the Stalingrad area as part of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts using reserves. In total, the fronts had ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies. These troops included 66 rifle divisions, 15 rifle brigades, three motorized rifle brigades, 4 tank corps, 14 separate tank brigades, 4 separate tank regiments, 3 cavalry corps. This group included more than one million personnel, 900 tanks, 13.5 thousand guns and mortars, including about 2.5 thousand of 76 mm caliber and above, and more than a thousand combat aircraft.

The law of military art states that in order to achieve a quick breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the attacking side must resort to a decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack, even at the cost of weakening other directions. By the end of autumn 1942, the Soviet command had already mastered this rule. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Tank Army, where Soviet troops outnumbered the Romanians in men and artillery by more than 2 times, in tanks by 2.5 times, in aviation by 1.5 times, the army commander concentrated on the direction of the main attack four rifle divisions out of six, two tank and one cavalry corps, a tank brigade, a tank battalion, sixteen artillery and mortar regiments of the RGK. This made it possible to achieve superiority in people by 2.7 times, in artillery - by 5 times, in tanks - absolute. The overwhelming majority of Soviet aviation also carried out strikes in the same direction. The ratio of forces and means in the zone of Romanian troops defending south of Stalingrad was approximately the same.

It is quite clear that the German command was unable to hold back the attacks of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad area with a defense that had such weak flanks. On November 19, 1942, shock groups of troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, going on the offensive, broke through the main lines of Romanian defense, brought tank corps into battle, which united on November 23 near the city of Kalach. The enemy's defenses were broken through in a 300-kilometer area; the depth of advance of Soviet troops in the first 12 days of the operation reached from 40 to 120 kilometers.

After Stalingrad, the German command still tried to attack (Kursk in the summer of 1943, Balaton in the spring of 1945, etc.), but from that time on, defense became the main type of military action of the Wehrmacht. A. Hitler on February 1, 1943 told his boss General Staff German ground forces to General K. Zeitzler: “I must say that the possibility of ending the war in the East by offensive no longer exists. We must understand this clearly."

So, the first place among the two main types of military operations is taken to defense, the art of preparation and conduct of which has been constantly improved in subsequent years.

The goals pursued by the Wehrmacht in this type of combat operations also changed. The defense in the winter of 1941/42 and 1942–1943 was carried out, as a rule, with the goal of disrupting the offensive of Soviet troops, holding captured lines (regions), and gaining time to prepare a new offensive (counteroffensive). In subsequent years, in strategic terms, it pursued a different goal: to exhaust and bleed the Soviet Armed Forces, prolong the war and thereby gain time in the hope of splitting the anti-Hitler coalition.

Given the enormous length of the Soviet-German front and the limited number of forces and means, the German command tried to solve the problem of the stability of strategic defense by concentrating its main efforts on holding the most important areas in military, economic and political terms (city boundaries as road junctions); the location of the overwhelming majority of forces and means in the first strategic echelon and directing the main efforts of army groups to hold the tactical defense zone of fortified cities.

A characteristic feature of the organization of enemy defense in 1941 was the creation of strongholds (“hedgehogs”) adapted for all-round defense. They were in fire interaction with each other and blocked the path of the advancing troops in the main directions. In connection with this reception of the enemy in the tactics of the offensive battle of the Soviet troops, a desire arose to bypass enemy strongholds at intervals and to act against them from the flanks.

In 1942, Wehrmacht troops in some sectors of the front began to gradually create a deeper and more advanced defense in engineering terms. Individual strong points began to be connected with each other by trenches, resulting in a continuous position. Strongholds and defense areas appeared in the depths. This immediately increased the requirements for the methods of organizing offensive combat by Soviet troops. Already in the spring and summer of 1942, they began to use strike groups to a much greater extent than before, massing equipment in the directions of the main attacks.

Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht began to pay great attention to the use of lines, stripes, and natural defensive lines prepared in the depths to stabilize the defense, which were large rivers– Dnieper, Danube, Vistula, Oder. It is noted that they are used to strengthen the defense of large settlements, such as Mozhaisk, Velikiye Luki, Orel, Belgorod, Vyazma, Smolensk, Odessa, Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius, Brest, Kaunas, Riga and others. It is noted that the lack of reserves was the weakest link in the strategic defense of the Wehrmacht. They were created mainly at the expense of formations and units withdrawn to the rear for replenishment after losses suffered, and were intended mainly to restore the damaged defense front by launching counterattacks and occupying important defensive lines in depth. In some cases they were used to launch a counteroffensive.

Significant changes occurred in the structure of the Wehrmacht's defense in the summer of 1943, after the failure of the offensive near Kursk. Its tactical zone, up to 8–15 kilometers deep, included the main defense line (“main battlefield”) and the second defense line (“corps reserve positions”). The defense of the tactical zone was entrusted to the army corps of the first echelon of the field army.

The main line of defense consisted of three positions. It was occupied by first echelon divisions. The basis of the first position were company strongholds, forming battalion defense areas. They were equipped with two or three lines of continuous trenches. The first position was usually occupied by battalions of the first echelons of regiments. The second position was also equipped with trenches, sometimes with separate strongholds. Regimental reserves and artillery firing positions were located within its boundaries. The third position was a system of strong points in which divisional reserves were located.

At a distance of 10–15 kilometers from the front edge of the main defense line, a second line was built. It could house the army corps commander's reserve. The depth of the position of the corps reserves reached 2–5 kilometers.

The improvement of the construction of defense zones of the German troops proceeded through the development of engineering structures, the creation of intermediate and cut-off positions, a system of pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, and reinforced concrete caps. Within the main line of defense, all three positions began to be equipped with lines of continuous trenches.

Thus, the main line of defense of the German troops in the Korsun-Shevchenko salient (January 1944) had a depth of 6–8 kilometers and was built on holding individual strong points and resistance centers, which were covered by minefields and barbed wire barriers. Many of the strong points were interconnected by fire, and only a few of them were connected by trenches, which were more suitable for maneuvering forces and means in battle than for conducting the battle itself.

In the summer of 1944, German troops, during the transition to defense in Belarus, concentrated a group there consisting of 63 infantry divisions and 3 infantry brigades. But, being confident that the Soviet command was preparing the main blow in Ukraine, the main formations of tank and motorized forces were sent in this direction.

It must be remembered that at that time the territory of Belarus, which was characterized by the presence of large forests, rivers, swamps with a poorly developed road network, did little to facilitate large-scale military operations. In addition, numerous partisan detachments and groups operated in Belarus, which controlled a significant part of its territory. Therefore, the forces at the disposal of the German command in Belarus were concentrated in the areas of the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, which were considered the most important operationally.

In order to maintain a wide front of defense in the absence of sufficient forces and means, the command of Army Group Center was forced to deploy its troops in one echelon, concentrating the main efforts on holding a well-prepared tactical defense zone with a depth of 8 to 12 kilometers, which was occupied by infantry divisions. In addition, in the depths along the western banks of numerous rivers with wide swampy floodplains, the forces of the local population also prepared defensive lines that could be occupied by troops in the event of a retreat. The total depth of defense, according to Soviet sources, reached 250–270 kilometers.

But the defense built by the German command in this way did not fulfill its task. There were several reasons for this. The main thing is that the Soviet command by that time already had experience in preparing and conducting major offensive operations with decisive goals. Secondly, at the beginning of the operation, the superiority of Soviet troops in Belarus was 2 times in personnel, 3.6 times in artillery, 3.9 times in aviation, 5.8 times in tanks and self-propelled guns. Thirdly, the operational and even tactical rear of the German troops were pinned down by Soviet partisans, whose total number reached 143 thousand people.

Under these conditions, the Soviet command decided to carry out an operation to encircle several enemy groups dispersed along the front and in depth with the goal of dismembering and defeating the main forces of Army Group Center. The encirclement and defeat of the Vitebsk group was planned by the forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The encirclement and defeat of the Bobruisk group was entrusted to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the Dnieper River Flotilla. Taking into account the concentration of efforts on narrow sections of the front, the superiority of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks increased several times more.

To prevent German troops from maneuvering along the front between the indicated fronts, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to advance, which, together with other fronts, were to encircle and defeat the retreating enemy troops in the Minsk region.

The defeat of German troops as a result of the Belarusian operation was very significant. According to Soviet sources, in the Vitebsk region during the first five days, as a result of the breakthrough and encirclement, they lost 20 thousand people killed and 10 thousand prisoners. In the Bobruisk region, their losses in killed and captured reached 74 thousand people. In the Minsk region – 105 thousand people.

In total, during the Belarusian operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people. Hitler's entourage regarded this defeat as a catastrophe equal to that which the Wehrmacht suffered at Stalingrad.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the victory in the Belarusian operation came at a high cost to the Red Army. The irretrievable losses of the front troops alone amounted to 178 thousand people, to which more than half a million wounded must be added.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in 1943-1945.

Failures in the Belarusian region forced the German command to pay even more serious attention to defense. But the strength of the Wehrmacht was dwindling every day, and it became increasingly difficult to replenish them. There were very little hope for the allies.

The Iasi-Kishinev operation, carried out by the Soviet command in August 1944 against the army group, put a big end to German-Romanian relations. Southern Ukraine", consisting of German and Romanian associations.

In the Iasi-Chisinau direction, by August 1944, the defense of German and Romanian troops had been prepared for four months, was echeloned in depth and well developed in engineering terms. In front of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, where the 6th German and 4th Romanian armies were defending, it consisted of three stripes 25–25 kilometers deep. Several lines and cut-off positions were established in the operational depth, and fortified areas were erected at Tirgu-Frumos and Iasi. In front of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the enemy also prepared three defense lines with a total depth of 40–50 kilometers.

However, this defense also did not fulfill the tasks assigned to it. The main reasons are the significant numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the extremely low combat effectiveness of the Romanian troops, in the zones of which the Soviet command delivered its main attacks. In addition, we must remember that the Iasi-Kishinev operation was launched on August 20, and on August 23, forces opposing Berlin rose up in Bucharest. The pro-fascist government of Antonescu was overthrown on the same day, and the new government immediately declared war on Germany. What kind of staunch defense of the Romanian troops, mainly consisting of peasants and industrial workers, at the front in such conditions could we talk about?

Then the Bulgarians did the same, starting a “popular uprising” in Sofia when Soviet troops approached. On September 8, Soviet troops crossed the Romanian-Bulgarian border without firing a shot, and on September 9, the new Bulgarian “government” declared war on Germany.

In such conditions, the German leadership had no choice but to defend the territories of the remaining allied Hungary and the territory of its own state. Nevertheless, in 1944 and 1945, the defense of the German troops received its further development, primarily due to the development of its operational depth. The operational defense zone at this time included the third army defense zone (“army reserve positions”) and the rear defensive zone (“army group reserve positions”). Its total depth reached 50–60 kilometers or more. It was characterized by the careful selection of terrain for the construction of defensive lines and their skillful engineering equipment.

With the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Poland and Germany, the army group’s defense system began to include pre-equipped intermediate lines and fortified areas, its depth increased to 120–150 kilometers. The system of “fortress cities” became very rich. Operational densities in the main directions ranged from 3 to 12 kilometers per division. Artillery density ranged from 15–20 to 50 guns and mortars per kilometer.

Defense activity on an operational scale was manifested in counterattacks, which were carried out primarily by mobile formations. The operational density during the counterattack was one division per 3.5–4 kilometers of front. Counterstrikes were most often delivered under the base of the wedged enemy group from one or more directions. This is how counterattacks were launched when Soviet troops penetrated the German defenses north of Orel in July and south of Belgorod in August 1943, in Eastern Pomerania in 1945 and in a number of other operations. Sometimes counterattacks were carried out in the form of a frontal attack. To create counterattack groups, the German command, in a limited time, carried out regroupings of large forces from various directions, and primarily from unattacked sectors of the front.

The constantly improving tactics of the enemy's defensive battle underwent significant changes. At the beginning, there were usually only a small number of forces and assets on duty at the forefront. The rest of the personnel were located in shelters at a depth of up to 1500 meters, in such a way as to occupy their areas within 15–20 minutes. But then, as the defense front was reduced, continuous trenches and a second position were created, the units no longer left their areas for rest, but were located here, in dugouts and shelters. The activity of the defense increased as a result of the participation in counterattacks of not only divisional but also regimental reserves, as well as due to the maneuver of forces and means on the scale of strong points of the first echelon companies. As a result, the struggle for every defensive line and stronghold became more fierce. When the defense was penetrated, the battle was transferred to the communication passages. It was combined with decisive and daring counterattacks even with small forces (before separation).

During the war, the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command sought to make maximum use of the experience gained. She developed special “Instructions for combat training of infantry based on the experience of battles on the Eastern Front,” which were essential for the further development of defensive battle tactics. Exceptional attention was paid to the role of fire in battle, especially against attacking tanks and self-propelled guns. It was necessary to quickly concentrate the fire of various types of weapons using flat and mounted fire. “By concentrating the fire of all available types of weapons in place and time,” this document emphasized, “the fastest and most effective impact is achieved; all types of weapons must be able to maneuver and operate simultaneously in the zones indicated by them.” Short-range fire, especially against attacking tanks, was considered more effective than long-range fire. It should be emphasized that in the third period of the war, during the Soviet troops’ artillery preparation for the attack, the enemy began to practice withdrawing the main forces from the forward platoon strongholds to the second and even third trenches. He also used other elements of military cunning.

The art of building defenses and the tactics of defensive combat of the Wehrmacht were also constantly improved. TO strengths The enemy's defense can rightfully be classified as a developed network of engineering barriers, long-term and wood-earth structures. A major step aimed at increasing the stability and activity of the defense was the creation of cut-off trenches and positions adapted for occupation by reserves and equipped taking into account the formation of flank fire lines and fire “bags”, as well as the presence of mobile reserves in the depths of the defense. Various engineering barriers, as well as protective and other terrain conditions, were skillfully used. It should be noted that the enemy’s defense also had weak sides. This is a relatively low density of anti-tank weapons, a significant distance from the front edge of firing positions, and a low degree of massing of artillery fire. The attempt to counterattack within the first position with relatively weak reserves (the strength of an infantry platoon) often did not give positive results. Therefore, starting from 1943, a completely new phenomenon came to the fore in the actions of German troops, associated with the art of timely withdrawal from battle and a systematic retreat to the rear defensive lines.

From the book Eastern Front. Cherkasy. Ternopil. Crimea. Vitebsk. Bobruisk. Brody. Iasi. Kishinev. 1944 by Alex Bukhner

From Wehrmacht reports on February 18, “...In the area west of Cherkassy, ​​after repelling a fierce enemy counterattack, contact was restored with a strong German strike group that had been cut off for several weeks and made its way through the encirclement to meet the tank

From the book Soldiers and the Convention [How to fight according to the rules (litres)] author Veremeev Yuri Georgievich

From the Wehrmacht reports on April 17, “...Near Ternopil, our troops, with strikes from the west, advanced to the enemy’s artillery positions and have already accepted into their composition a part of the fighting to the west in accordance with the order of the garrison...” April 18, “...Near Ternopil remaining parts

From the book Wehrmacht Artillery author Kharuk Andrey Ivanovich

From Wehrmacht reports: June 23 “...On the central sector of the front, the Bolsheviks began the expected offensive. All enemy attacks, launched on a wide front with the support of tanks and attack aircraft, were repulsed in fierce battles, individual breakthroughs of his forces were eliminated

From the book Sniper Survival Manual [“Shoot rarely, but accurately!”] author Fedoseev Semyon Leonidovich

From Wehrmacht reports on July 15 “...On the southern sector of the Eastern Front, Soviet troops from the Ternopol and Lutsk area launched the expected offensive. Yesterday, all their attacks were repulsed in heavy battles, many tanks were destroyed, and individual breakthroughs were eliminated...”16

From the book Sniper War author Ardashev Alexey Nikolaevich

From Wehrmacht reports on August 26 “...On the Romanian sector of the Eastern Front, our divisions, having repelled numerous enemy attacks, in accordance with the orders given to them, retreated to new lines...” August 27 “... In Romania, motorized units and large tank forces enemy

From book Battle of Kursk. Offensive. Operation Kutuzov. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev". July-August 1943 author Bukeikhanov Petr Evgenievich

Nutrition of Wehrmacht soldiers Unfortunately, the author was unable to find regulatory German documents regarding nutrition German soldiers. The data provided is taken from secondary sources, so they cannot claim absolute accuracy and completeness. How much is this

From the book SS Troops. Blood trail by Warwall Nick

Wehrmacht artillery Artillery was one of the main elements of the Nazi war machine, however, it often remains out of sight of modern researchers, who focus their attention on the Panzerwaffe - the armored fist of the Wehrmacht, and the Luftwaffe - its

From the book The Largest tank battle Great Patriotic War. Battle for Eagle author Shchekotikhin Egor

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From the book How SMERSH Saved Moscow. Heroes of the Secret War author Tereshchenko Anatoly Stepanovich

From the author's book

Wehrmacht shooters Oddly enough, very little is known about the opponents of the Soviet snipers - the “super sharp shooters” of the German army. Despite the fact that during the First World War the Germans were the first to take the initiative in using specially trained soldiers and rifles

From the author's book

1.1. Defense of German troops on the southern front of the Kursk salient and the German command’s assessment of the operational situation that had developed on the front of Army Group South of the Wehrmacht in early August 1943. By early August 1943, the group of German troops assembled in the northern

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“LAW ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WEHRMACHT” § 1. Service in the armed forces takes place on the basis of universal conscription. § 2. The peacetime army (together with police forces) consists of 12 corps and 36 divisions. § 3. The Minister of the Reichswehr shall suspend additional

From the author's book

WEHRMACHT TROOPS At the beginning of July 1943, the largest group of German troops on the entire Soviet-German front was located on the Oryol bridgehead. It was formed gradually over twenty months. In front of the left wing of the Western and in general in front of Bryansk and

From the author's book

“Parade” of the Wehrmacht in Moscow How the Fuhrer wanted to organize a victory parade in Moscow, but for some reason he did not read Jomini’s remarks regarding Napoleon’s invasion: “Russia is a country that is easy to penetrate, but from which it is difficult to return.” In the first weeks of the invasion

Machine gun nests are built directly from the main trench and in some cases are pushed forward 2-3 meters; each machine gun nest is designed for two people. Closed machine gun nests are rarely constructed, in this case having an overlap of 1-2 rolls of logs and a layer of earth, with a total height of up to 80 centimeters. Niches are dug in the nest for storing ammunition. In the presence of camouflage nets or improvised materials, the trenches are camouflaged from aerial surveillance. To the side of the enemy, dugouts are set up for soldiers to rest, to which communication passages 1-2 meters deep lead.
Dugouts are dug into the ground, having a hard layer of up to 60-80 centimeters. The walls and ceiling have wooden formwork. 1-2 rows of logs are laid on top and covered with open soil. The bunks in the dugouts are arranged in two floors for 5 people each, niches are also created there for the personal belongings of soldiers, and, if possible, a table and benches are equipped.
During a long-term defense from communication passages leading to the dugouts, more adits, 3-4 meters deep, are torn to the side, serving as shelters during heavy shelling and air raids, each designed for separation.
Platoon commanders usually have separate dugouts, sometimes located 20-60 meters behind the main trench. The company command post is usually located 100 meters deep from the trench line, consisting of 4 dugouts. One accommodates the company commander, his clerk - a non-commissioned officer or sergeant major, a radio operator and a messenger. In the second dugout there are medical non-commissioned officers, a gunsmith, a radio operator and a messenger. Then, two dugouts for the reserve squad and the squad armed with anti-tank weapons - offenror and faustpatrons.

Anti-tank ops are located 200-400 meters from the trench line; they are a round depression 60 cm deep, with a diameter of 2 meters. On the right and left in the ground there are shelters for 4 servants with niches for storing ammunition.
Mortar OPs are most often set up on the reverse slopes of hills or in gullies. Square or round holes are dug for them, measuring 1.5x1.5-1.5. Near the strong points, 10-12 meters away, dugouts for servants are erected. Ammunition is stored in pits 2-3 meters from the OP, connected by communication passages.
Strongholds of field 7.5 cm guns are located at a distance of up to 1000 meters from the trench line, depending on the terrain; they are also equipped, if possible, on the reverse slope of the hills. According to the state, a 7.5 cm field gun is served by a crew of 7 people, but since 1943, usually, the servants have been reduced to 4-5 people.

The battalion command post is located on average at a distance of 200-500 meters from the front line of the trenches. The battalion commander's dugout is covered with a row of boards, three rows of logs and a layer of earth with a total height of 1.6-1.8 meters. Near the battalion commander's dugout there are another 4-5 dugouts for telephone operators and a switchboard, one for 5-8 people. Radio operators and walkie-talkies - one for 5-7 people. For a doctor and orderlies - one dugout for 5-6 people. and for the reserve platoon - 2 dugouts. Communication passages leading from the trench line to company and battalion lines command posts have a depth of 1.2-1.6 meters. The company command post has direct communication with the platoon and battalion command posts and, through a switchboard, with other companies.

Radio communication is maintained between companies and battalions, between battalions and regiments. The battalions are connected to each other only by telephone; they have no radio communications. The distance between the battalion CP and the company is on average 300-600 meters; if the ground is soft, then the communication passages from the battalion CP are torn off by each of the companies, otherwise a general communication passage with a depth of up to 1.5 meters opens. In front of the trench line, at a distance of 20-40 meters, there are wire barriers: a Bruno spiral in one row and, in some cases, a Flemish fence. Close to the wire in the direction of the trenches, holes were dug for listening posts for two people each; duty began at nightfall and continued until dawn. As the enemy approaches, the platoon commanders or one of the duty officers are warned personally, or sometimes using a cord connected to some kind of sound signal, for example, tin cans; after the signal, both duty officers retreat to the trenches. In the trenches during the day, one observer with binoculars is on duty from each squad. Anti-personnel mines are laid in front of the wire fences, and anti-tank mines in 2-3 rows in tank-hazardous directions.

Excavated German dugout

The SECOND option for constructing a forward defense line - instead of trenches, strong points in the form of dugouts, designed for one squad each. There are only two platoons in the company’s defense sector, from which all-round defense can be carried out. Behind them, 60 meters away, there is a general communication passage 0.8 meters wide, 1.8 meters deep, to which connecting passages from the dugouts approach. Whenever possible, communication passages are camouflaged from aerial surveillance. The dugouts are surrounded by wire fences, in addition, in front of them at a distance of 10-15 meters there is also a Flanders fence, and between them a minefield with anti-tank mines. The company's third platoon is a reserve for a counterattack and is located near the company command post. Behind the front line, 600 meters from the general communication route, there is a PT ditch. Cut-off positions are located approximately 1 km behind the strong points. This is the initial area for the reserve in case of a counterattack, and a refuge for the battalion commander's reserve is also located there.

The battalion command post is being supplied with ammunition for the reserve approach, 1.8 meters deep and 1.5 meters wide. At a distance of 150-200 meters from the general route of communication, heavy machine gun bases are located, firing in the gap between strong points and over the heads of their troops. The servants of heavy machine guns have dugouts also surrounded by barbed wire, in which they take shelter from artillery shelling and air raids. Connecting passages extend from these dugouts to a communication passage leading into the depths. Mortar positions are located 400-600 meters from the general communication route, designed for 4 81.4mm mortars, the servants of which also have appropriate shelter.

German dugout flooded with water

German fortification system
near Leningrad

Military Thought 1944, No. 7, p. 83–89
From the collections of the Russian National Library (St. Petersburg)

Having failed in their repeated attempts to take Leningrad by storm, fascist German troops were forced in the fall of 1941 to go on the defensive on the outskirts of it, hoping to starve out the blockaded city. Fearing counterattacks from our troops, the Germans surrounded the Leningrad area with heavily fortified and deeply echeloned positions. The enemy had high hopes for the strength and inaccessibility of their positions, not allowing the idea that Soviet troops would be able to overcome them. Events that unfolded in January 1944 showed that the Germans had exaggerated the strength of the fortifications and the resistance of their troops. The Red Army broke through the “impregnable” defense to its entire depth and threw the enemy far from Leningrad.

The successful offensive of our troops, which cleared a heavily fortified bridgehead of the enemy, made it possible to study in detail the German defense system and the structure of various fortifications. In this article we will provide brief description organization, fortification principles and some features of the German defense near Leningrad.

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The German defense near Leningrad consisted of a main line, intermediate positions and a rear defense line. The main defense line with a front line with a total length of up to 170 km and a depth of two or more kilometers consisted of well-equipped strong points united into defense nodes, which were located in the areas: Sinyavinsky Heights, Pushkin, Bol. Vittolovo, Finnskoe Koirovo, Uritsk, etc. (diagram 1). The gaps between defense centers and strongholds were filled with trenches. The system of fire in the gaps supplemented the fire of neighboring strong points or defense centers, which, as a rule, were in fire cooperation. This line of defense was most fully equipped with military and special fortifications and was saturated with a dense system of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles.

The trenches in the main defensive line were located in lines 2–3 and 4. The first line, and sometimes the second, stretched continuously along the entire front line of defense and were most fully equipped with open “universal” platforms (every 25–50 m) for machine guns, machine guns, anti-tank rifles and mortars. The second trench was located 150–200 m behind the first, while subsequent trenches (the third and sometimes the fourth in important directions) were located 300–800 m away. In most cases, the third and fourth trenches were not continuous and were located in the most dangerous directions for defense . In areas with high level soil-[p. 84] instead of trenches, embankments were erected or fences made of logs were built, reinforced with earth on the front side.

The presence of a mass of rifle, machine-gun and mortar platforms in the first and second trenches ensured the placement of a large number of fire weapons, their maneuver and the creation of multi-layered machine-gun and mortar fire in front of the front edge. The latter was supplemented by fire from casemate-type structures located in the depths.

Giving great importance To monitor the battlefield, the Germans erected many observation posts with all-round visibility in the main defense line.

They paid special attention to tank-dangerous areas of defense. Artillery was concentrated here, anti-tank barriers were the densest, and anti-tank slots with corrugated iron fastenings were arranged in the trenches.

Behind the main defense line 10–15 km, on the Mga - village line. Ulyanovka - Slutsk - Krasnoe Selo - Ropsha - Dyatlitsy - Koporye there was an intermediate position. It consisted of separate defense areas and strongholds, highly developed in engineering terms. Powerful fortifications, including reinforced concrete ones, were equipped here.

The rear defense line was located 20–40 km from the front edge of the main line and was a system of strongholds and defense nodes covering the most important directions. Such fortifications existed in the areas of Tosno, Susanino, and the village. Vyritsa south of Semrino, Krasnogvardeisk, Volosovo, Opole, Novoselki (southwest of Krasnogvardeisk) and served as the backbone of the rear defense line.

In general, the German defense was a positional defense with a widely developed system of strongholds that made up rotation nodes. The main element of the fortification equipment of strongholds, defense units and the spaces between them were trenches and communication passages with open areas for infantry weapons, wood-earth structures (mainly anti-fragmentation type), reinforced concrete firing points ("universal" type) [p. 85] with an open area and a shelter for calculation. In the main directions, reinforced concrete structures formed the backbone of strongholds and defense centers. “Universal” structures of reinforced and sometimes heavy types were located mainly in the depths of the defense, 800–3000 m from the front edge.

In a number of cases, the Germans adapted residential buildings and other buildings for defense, but the main firing positions were set up outside buildings, on the streets or even outside the populated area. Strongholds, as a rule, were surrounded by wire fences in one or several rows. The most typical for most areas (Pulkovo region) was the following order of setting up wire fences: the first row - slingshots, the second - a wire network on low stakes, the third - a Bruno spiral, the fourth - a reinforced fence or slingshots, the fifth - a wire network on low stakes. The depth of the wire fences in the most critical areas reached 100 m, and the spaces between the rows were mined.

The size and extent of equipment, fortification forms and structural elements of strong points and defense centers were very diverse and depended on the importance of the direction they covered and the significance of each of these objects in common system defense To illustrate, consider some of the defense units.

Diagram 2 shows a defense center located in the Bol area. Vittolovo, Hamalaine, consisting of separate strong points. This node was advantageously located on the ground and covered the approaches to the city of Pushkin from its northwestern side. Each strong point was a system of firing positions and fortifications. The backbone of the strong points were “universal” structures that made it possible to conduct all-round shelling. In addition to reinforced concrete, there were also wood-earth structures of anti-fragmentation type. All pillboxes and bunkers in strong points were connected by a continuous trench. A strong fire connection was established between the strong points.

The most developed trench system (in 2-3 lines) had strong point “a”, located on the highway in the city of Pushkin. It should be noted that the trenches and communication passages of the right-flank strong points were developed mainly along the front and on the flanks; those located on the left flank (“b”, “c”) had a ring trench. In the trenches there were prepared rifle cells and platforms for machine guns, from which fire and mortars were fired. Many of the sites were built as reserve sites. This was done in order to be able to maneuver fire weapons and create a greater density of fire in various directions depending on the situation. As anti-personnel obstacles here [p. 86] a reinforced fence was used in two rows with an interval of 30–60 m (strong point “a”), slingshots and a Bruno spiral were placed in places. Anti-tank obstacles were installed in front of the first trench at 25–30 m (sometimes closer or further, depending on the terrain and the ability to observe obstacles). The front edge of the strong point was reinforced with anti-personnel minefields placed between the wire fences and the trench. To the right and left of strong point “a” in front of the wire fence there were anti-personnel minefields. The entire defense center was equipped with anti-tank capabilities. In the rear of strong point “a” the Germans dug an intermittent anti-tank ditch. In areas where the ditch was interrupted, as well as behind ditch “g,” anti-tank mines were installed. Each strong point had anti-tank artillery.

Let's consider another defense center created in the settlement of Finskoye Koirovo (Diagram 3), which also covered the approaches to the city of Pushkin from the north-west. Unlike the defense center described above, here the trenches and communication passages were developed to a depth of 3 km and had prepared firing positions, wood-earth (anti-fragmentation and reinforced types) and reinforced concrete fortifications with all-round firing. All structures were connected to each other by trenches and communication passages. On the right flank, in the immediate vicinity of the first line of trenches, anti-personnel obstacles were installed in two rows: the first - a reinforced wire fence and the second - a Bruno spiral. On the right flank of the defense center, anti-tank mines were installed in a strip up to 1.8 km deep. An anti-tank ditch was dug approximately 2 km from the front edge. The enemy paid great attention [p. 87] equipment of mortar positions (caliber 81 mm and above). They were located in the depths behind the reverse slopes and no closer than 1.5–2 km from the front edge.

The principles of constructing a strong point for German defense were most fully expressed in the organization of a strong point at height 112.0 (Diagram 4), northwest of Krasnoe Selo, which is characteristic of the defense near Leningrad. This strong point is located at a height dominating the surrounding terrain, which made it possible to view and shoot through it at a distance of up to 2 km.

At this strong point, as can be seen from the diagram, the circular defense system with a well-developed network of trenches is most clearly expressed. The entire height is surrounded by a continuous trench equipped with machine gun platforms, rifle cells, shelters, fire fortifications and observation posts. The second trench (where there were mainly dugouts and dugouts for the personnel of the garrison of the strong point) ran right next to the topographic ridge. All heavy-type structures were well adjusted to the terrain and camouflaged. On the southwestern side, the Germans dug an anti-tank ditch, covering the approaches to the height and the road from Nagornoye.

Diagram 5 shows a defense center near the mouth of the Tosno River. It covered the Leningrad - Mga - Volkhov railway, the route to Tosno from the north and was a system of well-fortified firing positions and fortifications, advantageously located on the ground. This node reinforced the significance of the natural obstacle present here - the river with its steep banks (on the right flank).

The front edge of the central section and the left flank ran along the embankment railway. On the right flank, the Germans built a series of wood and earthen fire structures for shelling the approaches to the river. To flank the shore, trees were specially built [p. 88] earthen structures dug deep (by mines) into steep banks. At the front line, the enemy made extensive use of the railway embankment to install artillery and machine-gun fire installations in it. On the left flank of the defense center and along the Tosna River (right bank), wood-earth firing structures were built to a depth of up to 1.5 km, and on the front edge of the left flank, artillery and machine gun firing structures were built of brick, since there are brick ones in this area factories. All fire installations were connected to each other by a continuous trench stretching along the shore (right flank), along the railway embankment (in the central section and on the left flank) and deep into the defense center. It should be noted that the line of trenches and communication passages was developed throughout the entire depth of the defense, especially on its left flank and along the right bank of the river. Tosna.

In general, this defense unit was adapted to all-round defense. In its depth, 1.5 km from the front edge, there was a group of artillery bunkers for 75-mm guns. There were also equipped mortar positions in the depths of the defense (in clay quarries).

Anti-personnel obstacles were well developed only on the left flank, since in this direction the terrain was completely open, flat and partially swampy. The obstacles consisted of four rows: the first row - slingshots, the second - Bruno's spiral, the third and fourth - slingshots. The obstacles were reinforced by anti-personnel mines.

Diagram 6 shows a defense center located in the city of Uritsk. It should be noted that although Uritsk is a large settlement and has solid stone houses, the Germans built firing positions, shelters and dugouts outside the buildings. This defense unit, which was part of the fortification system of the main defense line, was of exceptionally great importance for the enemy, covering the main highways to Petrodvorets (formerly Peterhof) and Krasnoye Selo.

This defense center had a highly developed trench system. Here the enemy equipped up to seven continuous full-profile trenches, interconnected by communication passages every 50–200 m; the trenches were well equipped with universal platforms and cells for riflemen. The backbone of the defense was machine-gun bunkers and pillboxes, interconnected by trenches and communication passages. The embrasures of machine gun bunkers were covered with wire mesh, which protected against grenades being thrown into them and was used for camouflage. Reinforced concrete structures were located in the depths of the defense no closer than 800–1000 m from the front edge. The depth of the defense center reached 1.5 km. He was prepared to conduct a perimeter defense.

Anti-personnel obstacles were located not only in front of the front line, but also in the depths of the defense in front of the line of reinforced concrete structures. The depth of the anti-personnel obstacles reached 100 m. In front of the rows of wire obstacles and between them there were anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. Particular attention was paid to the creation of anti-tank defense. All streets were mined with anti-tank mines, open areas and shelters for equipment and crew were equipped for anti-tank guns. In addition, there were three [p. 89] underground shelters for personnel with a capacity of 50 people each.

As already noted, the enemy connected defense nodes and strong points with trenches, creating a fairly strong fire system in them. The most typical section of such defense is shown in Diagram 7. Two continuous trenches run along the front edge here. The second trench is 150–300 m away from the first. The first trench is most fully equipped with open machine-gun platforms and cells for riflemen. It is connected to the second communication passage. At the firing positions in the first trench there are dugouts and dugouts for the riflemen. The mortar positions are located 300–400 m from the front edge and are connected to the second trench. In the main direction (on the field road leading to the highway), the enemy created two strong points in the depths, in which there were reinforced concrete structures. In a strong point located in the depths (a fork in the road), a “universal” reinforced concrete firing point and three 75 mm anti-tank guns were located.

In front of the front edge of the strong point were two reinforced wire fences. Wire obstacles were built in three to four rows to a depth of 100–150 m and were reinforced with anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. The roads were mined to great depths.

Such defense areas had a depth of 300–400 m and were located mainly in open and flat areas between individual heights and populated areas.

The Germans paid great attention to the creation of anti-tank lines. For this purpose, they primarily used ravines and water obstacles. Anti-tank lines were not only a means of blocking the path of tanks; they were also adapted for anti-personnel defense. As an example, consider a section of the anti-tank line in the Novo-Panovo area (Diagram 8).

The described site was located on the main direction to Krasnoe Selo and covered two highways on the north-eastern side of the city. Anti-tank minefields were laid in front of the anti-tank ditch. In addition, in the central area they were installed behind the ditch. Anti-tank artillery was installed along the front every 300–500 m and in depth (from the front edge) also at 300–500 m.

Along the entire front edge of the anti-tank line there was a continuous trench with open areas for machine gunners, riflemen, submachine gunners and mortar men.

There were three lines of trenches on the right flank; in the central part there was only one, and on the left flank the trench system was completely undeveloped. The left flank of the site covered the main highway (asphalted) road to Krasnoe Selo. Here, mainly reinforced concrete structures were built - monolithic and prefabricated reinforced concrete structures. Slingshots were installed behind the anti-tank ditch (in one row), and in front of it - slingshots in combination with a Bruno spiral (the Bruno spiral is put on slingshots). 200–300 m from the front edge there were dugouts and dugouts for manpower.

By placing artillery positions primarily in areas inaccessible to tanks, the Germans sought not only to increase their resistance from aviation fire, artillery and tank attacks, but also took measures to self-defense artillery positions from infantry attacks.

The organization of self-defense of artillery positions can be seen in Diagram 9. They were located, as we see, on a swampy plain overgrown with small forests and bushes. In front of the artillery positions ran the main road of this area, in front of which the enemy had built a tree-earthen rampart with three-embrasure bunkers of light and reinforced types built into it. In addition, many open machine-gun platforms were equipped, allowing for frontal and flanking fire in front of the rampart, as well as cut-off fire from its rear side. 500 m from the road there was an artillery position with four 122 mm guns, surrounded by a reinforced wire fence and equipped for self-defense. Here the enemy built 4 light three-embrasure bunkers and 2 machine gun platforms. It can be concluded that the artillery positions in this area had all-round defense and were provided with both anti-personnel and anti-tank protection.

Summarizing all that has been said, we can conclude that the German defensive line near Leningrad consisted of several fortified positions echeloned in depth with widely developed fortification equipment of strong points and defense nodes, connected by a system of trenches. The defense was built as anti-aircraft, anti-artillery, anti-tank and, to a large extent, anti-personnel. In general, it was a modern, heavily fortified defense, which our troops encountered and, undoubtedly, will encounter in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel P. KISELEV.
Engineer Major S. ZHARKOV.
Engineer Major 3. BRAUDE.