home Secrets of medicine Collaborationism in the occupied territory of Belarus briefly. Belarusian collaborationism in the Great Patriotic War

Collaborationism in the occupied territory of Belarus briefly. Belarusian collaborationism in the Great Patriotic War

Introduction

Collaborators after the liberation of Belarus

Conclusion

Literature

INTRODUCTION

COLLABORATIONISTS (from the French collaboration - cooperation), persons who collaborated with the occupation authorities in countries captured by Nazi Germany during the 2nd World War (especially in France in 1940-44).

Belarusian collaborationism- a designation adopted in Soviet and Russian historiography for political, economic and military cooperation with the occupying German authorities during the Second World War on the territory of Belarus.

The main reasons for Belarusian collaborationism are the dissatisfaction of part of the population with the Soviet regime (including mass repressions and forced Sovietization in Western Belarus, annexed to the USSR in 1939) and the activities primarily of the leaders of the Belarusian People's Republic, a group of supporters of the priest V. Godlevsky (himself and some of his followers later became disillusioned with the Germans and switched to an underground struggle against them), etc.

Collaborationism during the German occupation of Belarus

The training of Belarusian collaborators by the Third Reich began in the mid-to-late 1930s, when a Belarusian representative office was created under the German Ministry of Internal Affairs - first in Berlin and then in other German cities. It was engaged in identifying and recruiting persons willing to assist Germany in Belarusian issues. Thus, the third president of the BPR, Vasily Zakharka, wrote a detailed report on the political, economic and cultural situation of Belarus, and also addressed a memorandum to Hitler with assurances of support. In addition, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee was created, an organization that actively recruited members among Belarusians living in Germany. With the outbreak of World War II, the German command created bases in Warsaw and Biala Podlaska for the transfer of Belarusian patriotic agents to the territory of the USSR. In Berlin, in the Vustavu camp, courses for propagandists and translators were organized from among Belarusian patriots to work in Belarus after the change of occupation power.

collaborationist structures. The German leadership hoped for a quick victory in the war and was skeptical about the abilities of the Belarusian population for nation-state building due to the weakness of ethnic self-awareness. The activities of collaborators during this period were reduced mainly to the work of non-political structures, the largest of which was the Belarusian People's Self-Help, created on October 22, 1941, the purpose of which was declared to be concern for health care, issues of education and culture.

With the help of Belarusian collaborators, the German authorities tried to use the scientific personnel who ended up in the occupied territory for their own purposes.

In June 1942, they created the “Belarusian Scientific Partnership”. Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube became its honorary president. However, Belarusian scientists boycotted the work of the partnership, and it existed only on paper. In Cuba he ruled the general district "Belarus" from August 1941 to September 1943. During this time, Belarus became covered with a network of death camps. Near Minsk, in the village of Maly Trostenets, a real human extermination plant was smoking. With the direct participation of V. Kube, in the territory under his jurisdiction in the Minsk region, as he himself reported to his boss, Reichskommissar Ostland Lohse, the Jews were completely exterminated.

Other non-political collaborationist structures were also created (Women's League, trade unions, etc.). At the same time, attempts to create a Belarusian Free Self-Defense Corps were unsuccessful due to opposition from the military authorities and the SS. Its creation was proclaimed in June 1942 in the amount of 3 divisions. However, about 20 battalions were created, which they never decided to arm, and were disbanded in the spring of 1943. The attempt to create Belarusian autocephaly with the aim of separating Belarusian believers from the Moscow Patriarchate was also unsuccessful.

On the initiative of Cuba, on June 27, 1943, the creation of the Council of Confidence under the General Commissariat of Belarus was proclaimed. This body was an administrative commission, whose sole task was to process and present wishes and proposals from the population to the occupation authorities. On December 21, 1943, instead of the Rada of Trust, on the initiative of K. Gotberg (who became the General Commissioner after the murder of Cuba by partisans), the Belarusian Central Rada (BCR) was created, the head of the administration of the Minsk district, R. Ostrovsky (1887-1976), was appointed its president. The activities of the Rada were not effective, since the Rada did not have a real political power(only in matters of social care, culture and education did it have the right to relatively independent decisions), and its members held different views on the future of Belarus and often did not know local conditions. Therefore, she could not have authority in the eyes of the population. The Rada was indirectly connected with war crimes - in particular, with carrying out ethnic cleansing against the Polish population.

In occupied Belarus, many collaborationist newspapers and magazines were published: “Belorusskaya Gazeta”, “Pagonya” ( Chase), "Biełaruski hołas" ( Belarusian voice), "Novy Shliakh" ( New way) etc. These publications carried out anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet and pro-fascist propaganda. In a special article published on September 25, 1943 after the destruction of Kube in the Belorusskaya Gazeta, the editor of this newspaper, Vladislav Kozlovsky, wrote: “The heart is compressed by grief... He (that is, Kube - author) is no longer among us. General Commissioner Wilhelm Kube was one of the best, most heartfelt friends... who thought and spoke like every Belarusian nationalist...".

On February 23, 1944, K. Gottberg issued an order to create the Belarusian Regional Defense (BKO), a military collaborationist formation, whose leader was Franz Kuschel, and instructed the BCR to carry out mobilization. The 45 BKO battalions formed by the end of March were poorly armed. Their discipline gradually decreased and there were not enough officers. By the end of the occupation, the BKO was used to fight partisans, guard various objects and carry out economic work. The most important areas of activity of the BCR at the final stage of the war were the reorganization of units of the BKO and the replenishment of Belarusian military formations by recruiting new soldiers, the creation of auxiliary contingents for use in the German defense system, and the organization of the anti-Soviet partisan movement on the territory of Belarus. Initially, it was planned to reorganize the BKO into the Belarusian Legion. In preparation for this reorganization, in September 1944, the first personnel battalion of the BKO (422 people) was created in Berlin under the command of Captain Pyotr Kasatsky, which became a reserve and officer school for future units. At the same time, groups were selected from among those recruited by the “Union of Belarusian Youth” as “air defense assistants” (from 2.5 to 5 thousand people) for training at the anti-aircraft artillery school. After completing their studies, they were included in the air defense units of Berlin.

The last event of the BCR on the territory of Belarus was the holding of the Second All-Belarusian Congress in Minsk on June 27, 1944 (a week before the liberation of Minsk). The name of the congress was chosen to confirm continuity with the First All-Belarusian Congress, which took place in 1918, also under German occupation. Congress delegates announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia, proclaimed the BCR the sole representative of the Belarusian people and decided to send a statement of support to Hitler.

Members of Belarusian collaborationist organizations at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War began to be actively used by the relevant German services to organize espionage and sabotage warfare in the rear of the Soviet Army on the territory of the republic. For this purpose, the Dalvit reconnaissance and sabotage school was organized in East Prussia, and the SBM Malta school in Austria. After the defeat of Germany, many Belarusian collaborators became the focus of the US and UK intelligence agencies. They helped them escape from justice. So, in the USA, in the state of New Jersey, in the town of Saug River, in the center there is a tall monument on which the words are carved in English and Belarusian: “Glory to those who fought for the freedom and independence of Belarus.” Many of them are buried in the cemetery here those who served the Nazis during the last war, including R. Ostrovsky, on whose grave there is a monument and his portrait with the inscription “Here lies the president of the Belarusian Central Rada, created during the war, and the organizer of the Belarusian national armed forces.”

INTRODUCTION

1. Collaborationism during the German occupation of Belarus

Together with the advancing units of the German army, the main figures of the Belarusian nationalist movement from emigration arrived in Belarus: Fabian Akinchits, Vladislav Kozlovsky, activists of the Belarusian National Socialist Party, Ivan Ermachenko, Radoslav Ostrovsky and others. In the initial period of the war, the development of political and military collaboration occurred at a slow pace, which is explained by the successes of the Germans at the front and the lack of need for them to develop collaborationist structures. The German leadership hoped for a quick victory in the war and was skeptical about the abilities of the Belarusian population for nation-state building due to the weakness of ethnic self-awareness. The activities of collaborators during this period were reduced mainly to the work of non-political structures, the largest of which was the Belarusian People's Self-Help, created on October 22, 1941, the purpose of which was declared to be concern for health care, issues of education and culture.

With the help of Belarusian collaborators, the German authorities tried to use the scientific personnel who ended up in the occupied territory for their own purposes.

On the initiative of Cuba, on June 27, 1943, the creation of the Council of Confidence under the General Commissariat of Belarus was proclaimed. This body was an administrative commission, whose sole task was to process and present wishes and proposals from the population to the occupation authorities. On December 21, 1943, instead of the Rada of Trust, on the initiative of K. Gotberg (who became the General Commissioner after the murder of Cuba by partisans), the Belarusian Central Rada (BCR) was created, the head of the administration of the Minsk district, R. Ostrovsky (1887-1976), was appointed its president. The activities of the Rada were not effective, since the Rada did not have real political power (only in matters of social care, culture and education it had the right to relatively independent decisions), and its members held different views on the future of Belarus and often did not know local conditions. Therefore, she could not have authority in the eyes of the population. The Rada was indirectly connected with war crimes - in particular, with carrying out ethnic cleansing against the Polish population.

Belarusian collaborationism in the Great Patriotic War

Belarusian collaborationism is a designation adopted in Soviet and Russian historiography for political, economic and military cooperation with the occupying German authorities during the Second World War on the territory of Belarus. The main reasons for Belarusian collaborationism are the dissatisfaction of part of the population with the Soviet regime (including mass repressions and forced Sovietization in Western Belarus, annexed to the USSR in 1939) and the activities primarily of leaders of the Belarusian People's Republic, a group of supporters of priest V. Godlevsky (he himself and some of his followers later became disillusioned with the Germans and moved on to an underground struggle against them), etc.

The white-red-white flag is a symbol authorized for use by the German authorities and used by Belarusian collaborators

Preparation of the Belarusian collaboration before the start of the war The preparation of Belarusian collaborators by the Third Reich began in the mid-to-late 1930s, when a Belarusian representative office was created under the German Ministry of Internal Affairs - first in Berlin and then in other cities of Germany. It was engaged in identifying and recruiting persons willing to assist Germany in Belarusian issues. Thus, the third president of the BPR, Vasily Zakharka, wrote a detailed report on the political, economic and cultural situation of Belarus, and also addressed a memorandum to Hitler with assurances of support. In addition, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee was created, an organization that actively recruited members among Belarusians living in Germany. With the outbreak of World War II, the German command created bases in Warsaw and Biala Podlaska for the transfer of Belarusian patriotic agents to the territory of the USSR. In Berlin, in the Vustavu camp, courses for propagandists and translators were organized from among Belarusian patriots to work in Belarus after the change of occupation power.

Nazi demonstration on Freedom Square in Minsk. 1943

Collaborationism during the German occupation of Belarus
Together with the advancing units of the German army, the main figures of the Belarusian nationalist movement from emigration arrived in Belarus: Fabian Akinchits, Vladislav Kozlovsky, activists of the Belarusian National Socialist Party, Ivan Ermachenko, Radoslav Ostrovsky and others. In the initial period of the war, the development of political and military collaboration occurred at a slow pace, which is explained by the successes of the Germans at the front and the lack of need for them to develop collaborationist structures. The German leadership hoped for a quick victory in the war and was skeptical about the abilities of the Belarusian population for nation-state building due to the weakness of ethnic self-awareness. The activities of collaborators during this period were reduced mainly to the work of non-political structures, the largest of which was the Belarusian People's Self-Help, created on October 22, 1941, the purpose of which was declared to be concern for health care, issues of education and culture.
Nazi demonstration on Freedom Square in Minsk. 1943

symbols of traitor-policemen-collaborators.

With the help of Belarusian collaborators, the German authorities tried to use the scientific personnel who ended up in the occupied territory for their own purposes. In June 1942, they created the “Belarusian Scientific Partnership”. Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube became its honorary president. However, Belarusian scientists boycotted the work of the partnership, and it existed only on paper. Other non-political collaborationist structures were also created (Women's League, trade unions, etc.). At the same time, attempts to create a Belarusian Free Self-Defense Corps were unsuccessful due to opposition from the military authorities and the SS. Its creation was proclaimed in June 1942 in the amount of 3 divisions. However, about 20 battalions were created, which they never decided to arm, and were disbanded in the spring of 1943. The attempt to create Belarusian autocephaly with the aim of separating Belarusian believers from the Moscow Patriarchate was also unsuccessful. The situation that had developed by 1943 forced the German command to reconsider its attitude towards the collaborationist movement. To a large extent, this happened thanks to the efforts of the Minister of Eastern Occupied Territories A. Rosenberg, who was a supporter of the creation of collaborationist administrations. On June 22, 1943, the Union of Belarusian Youth (UBM) was formally created, which became an analogue of the Hitler Youth in Belarus (in fact, it existed since 1942). On the initiative of Cuba, on June 27, 1943, the creation of the Council of Confidence under the General Commissariat of Belarus was proclaimed. This body was an administrative commission, whose sole task was to process and present wishes and proposals from the population to the occupation authorities. On December 21, 1943, instead of the Rada of Trust, on the initiative of K. Gotberg (who became the General Commissioner after the murder of Cuba by partisans), the Belarusian Central Rada (BCR) was created, the head of the administration of the Minsk district, R. Ostrovsky (1887-1976), was appointed president. The activities of the Rada were not effective, since the Rada did not have real political power (only in matters of social care, culture and education it had the right to relatively independent decisions), and its members held different views on the future of Belarus and often did not know local conditions. Therefore, she could not have authority in the eyes of the population. The Rada was indirectly connected with war crimes - in particular, with carrying out ethnic cleansing against the Polish population.

Cover of the Belarusian police magazine “Belarus na vartse” (Belarus on guard) No. 6, 1944.

In occupied Belarus, many collaborationist newspapers and magazines were published: “Belorusskaya Gazeta”, “Pagonya” (Pahonia), “Biełaruski hołas” (Belarusian Voice), “Novy Shlyakh” (New Way), etc. These publications carried out anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet and pro-fascist propaganda. In a special article published on September 25, 1943 after the destruction of Kube in the Belorusskaya Gazeta, the editor of this newspaper, Vladislav Kozlovsky, wrote: “The heart is compressed by grief... He (that is, Kube - author) is no longer among us. General Commissioner Wilhelm Kube was one of the best, most heartfelt friends... who thought and spoke like every Belarusian nationalist...". On February 23, 1944, K. Gottberg issued an order on the creation of the Belarusian Regional Defense (BKO) - a military collaborationist formation, the leader of which Franz Kuschel was appointed and instructed the BCR to carry out mobilization. The 45 BKO battalions formed by the end of March were poorly armed. Their discipline gradually decreased and there were not enough officers. By the end of the occupation, the BKO was used to fight partisans, guard various objects and carry out economic work. The most important areas of activity of the BCR at the final stage of the war were the reorganization of units of the BKO and the replenishment of Belarusian military formations by recruiting new soldiers, the creation of auxiliary contingents for use in the German defense system, and the organization of the anti-Soviet partisan movement on the territory of Belarus. Initially, it was planned to reorganize the BKO into the Belarusian Legion. In preparation for this reorganization, in September 1944, the first personnel battalion of the BKO (422 people) was created in Berlin under the command of Captain Pyotr Kasatsky, which became a reserve and officer school for future units. At the same time, groups were selected from among those recruited by the “Union of Belarusian Youth” as “air defense assistants” (from 2.5 to 5 thousand people) for training at the anti-aircraft artillery school. After completing the course of study, they were included in the air defense units of Berlin. Demonstration in honor of the opening of the Second All-Belarusian Congress. The last event of the BCR on the territory of Belarus was the holding of the Second All-Belarusian Congress on June 27, 1944 (a week before the liberation of Minsk) in Minsk. The name of the congress was chosen to confirm continuity with the First All-Belarusian Congress, which took place in 1918, also under German occupation. Congress delegates announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia, proclaimed the BCR the sole representative of the Belarusian people and decided to send a statement of support to Hitler.

Demonstration in honor of the opening of the Second All-Belarusian Congress

Main collaborationist formations
In the German armed forces
* 1st Belarusian assault platoon
* Belarusian Railway Guard Battalion
* 13th Belarusian police battalion SD
* Novogrudok squadron
* 1st Personnel Battalion of the Belarusian Regional Defense
* Order Auxiliary Police Brigade "Siegling"
* 30th SS Grenadier Division (1st Belarusian)
* Grenadier brigade of SS troops (1st Belarusian)
* Belarusian Self-Defense Corps (BSA). Head Ivan Ermachenko.
* Belarusian Central Rada (BCR). President Radoslav Ostrovsky.
* Belarusian Regional Defense (BKA). Commander Franz Kuschel.
* Union of Belarusian Youth (UBY). Leaders: Nadezhda Abramova (1942-1943), Mikhail Ganko (since 1943).
* Belarusian People's Self-Help (BNS) is the occupation police. Head Yuri Sobolevsky.
* Belarusian glad of trust. Chairman Vaclav Ivanovsky.
* Battalion "Dahlwitz".
* 38th SS Grenadier Division "Nibelungen"
Schuma battalions
Shuma (German: Schuma) is a Belarusian auxiliary order police. Data are provided for battalions from 1942 to 1944.
Battalion No. ↓ Formed ↓ Deployment ↓ Subordination ↓ Strength 1943-1944 ↓
No. 45 (security) September 1943 Baranovichi Chief of the Belarusian Order Police -
No. 46 (security) summer 1943 Novogrudok Chief of the Belarusian Order Police -
No. 47 (security) summer 1943 Minsk Head of the Minsk security police -
No. 48 (front line) summer 1943 Slonim Chief of Police of the Order of “Belarus” 592-(615) 590
No. 49 (security) summer 1943 Minsk Head of the security police "Minsk" 327-314
No. 56 (artillery) 04.1943 Minsk Head of the security police "Minsk"?
No. 60 (front-line) 01.1944 Snov - Baranovchi Head of the Belarusian Order Police 562-526
No. 64 (front-line, and from May 1944 stored) 02.1944 Glubokoe Chief of the Belarusian Order Police ?-65
No. 65 (front-line) 02.1944 Novogrudok Chief of the police of the order of “Belarus”? — 477
No. 66 (front-line) 02.1944 Slutsk Chief of the Belarusian Order Police? — 172
No. 67 (security) 02-03.1944 Vileika Chief of the Belarusian order police? −23
No. 68 (front-line) 03/15/1944 Novogrudok Chief of the police of the order of “Belarus” 150 - 600
No. 69 (front) 03.1944 Mogilev Fuhrer of the SS and police "Minsk"
Collaborators after the liberation of Belarus
Immediately after the Second All-Belarusian Congress, the evacuation of the leadership and collaborationist formations began to Germany, where they continued their activities. In July-August 1944, the Abwehr training center in Dahlwitz (East Prussia) was transferred to the disposal of the BCR, which received large reinforcements from the evacuated BKO battalions. In early April 1945, an agreement was reached with representatives of the intelligence services of the Third Reich under the leadership of SS Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny on the deployment of a special battalion "Dahlwitz" numbering up to 700-800 people on the basis of this center. In addition, by order of SS Rechsführer Himmler, a new 30th SS division (Belorusskaya No. 1), also called the SS assault brigade “Belarus”, was created. Yazep Sazhich (who became the sixth “president” of the Belarusian People’s Republic in 1982) played an active part in the formation of these units, transferring cadets from the junior officer school he had trained to the SS brigade 101. On April 30, 1945, the division surrendered to American troops. After the end of the war, most of the leaders of the collaborationist movement moved to the United States (including Radoslav Ostrovsky), Western European countries and Australia, where they created Belarusian nationalist organizations or joined the ranks of existing ones used to fight the USSR . It is known about the collaboration of some representatives of the Belarusian movement with the CIA, which organized anti-Soviet sabotage detachments, in which some former collaborators, for example Mikhail Vitushka or Ivan Filistovich, also participated.

CONCLUSION. Collaborationism in Belarus did not play any significant role that could help strengthen the positions of the occupation authorities. The cooperation of some Belarusians with the occupiers for the supposed implementation of national goals was utopian. The Belarusian nationalists were completely dependent on the Nazis, never becoming an independent political force. Objectively, they played into the hands of the enemy. The majority of the population of the republic stood up to defend their Motherland. The partisan movement gained wide scope in Belarus, which began for the first time during the months of occupation and continued on an ever-increasing scale until its very last day. But in terms of its goals, the socio-demographic composition of the participants and the population supporting it, it was national.

Personalities and destinies
* Radoslav Ostrovsky - President of the BCR, emigrated.
* Nikolai Shkelenok - 1st vice-president of the BCR, executed.
* Vaclav Ivanovsky - burgomaster of Minsk (1942-1943), killed by partisans.
* Vitovt Tumash - burgomaster of Minsk (1941-1942), emigrated.
* Vaclav (Vladislav) Kozlovsky - editor of the Belorusskaya Gazeta, killed by partisans.
* Vasily Zakharka - president of the BPR in exile, died (died?) in Prague in 1943.
* Adam Demidovich-Demidetsky - Deputy Mayor of Minsk.
* Nikolai Abramchik - President of the BPR in exile after the death of V. Zakharka, lived in exile.
* Olekhnovich, Frantisek - playwright, killed by partisans.
* Konstantin Ezovitov - leader of armed forces, executed in the USSR.
* Franz Kuschel - head of the Belarusian Regional Defense, emigrated to the USA.
* Fabian Akinchits - journalist, killed by partisans.
* Vladimir Syabura - editor of the magazine “Novy Shlyakh”, emigrated to the USA.
* Ivan Ermachenko - emigrated.
* Mikhail Ganko - head of the SBM, emigrated to the West, perhaps later entered Belarus illegally and died.
* Nadezhda Abramova - former head of the SBM, emigrated, died in the late 1970s in West Germany.
* Yuri Sobolevsky - chief of police at the BCR, emigrated, died under unclear circumstances in Munich.
* Peter Kasatsky
* Jazep Sazhich - emigrated, headed the BPR government in exile.
* Stanislav Stankevich - burgomaster of Borisov, journalist, after the war - an active figure in the Belarusian emigration.
* Gelda, Ivan - commander of the Dahlwitz battalion, executed.

Was Belarus a “partisan republic”, or was it a territory where a civil war was raging? In his monograph, Doctor of Historical Sciences O.V. Romanko tried to answer this question by analyzing the problems of the history of Belarusian military collaboration during the Second World War. Based on extensive documentary material from the archives of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Germany and Poland, the author examined the military cooperation of Soviet citizens with Nazi Germany, highlighted its characteristic features, determined the reasons and conditions that contributed to the creation of Belarusian collaborationist formations. For the first time in Russian historiography, the Belarusian national movement and its role in the cooperation of the local population with the German military-political leadership have been studied. A special place in the book is occupied by an analysis of the characteristics of the organization, combat training and use of the Belarusian units of the Wehrmacht, police and SS troops. Finally, the author showed what contribution, in quantitative and qualitative terms, Belarusian collaborators made to the war effort of Nazi Germany.

A series: On the front line. The truth about war

* * *

by liters company.

Reasons for the creation of Belarusian collaborationist formations

Belarus in the geopolitical plans of the Nazi leadership

Changing the political status of the Soviet republics was the main goal of Germany's war against the USSR. None of the leaders of the Third Reich doubted that this status would be changed. However, in practice, the future structure of civil administration in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union caused the greatest amount of controversy among the Nazi military-political leadership. If military administration could only be temporary, and the SS apparatus, in principle, had no right to interfere in administrative issues, limiting itself to performing exclusively police functions, civil administration, on the contrary, was supposed to become a transitional form on the way to the future political structure of the entire “eastern space.” What will it be like after Germany's victory? This question had to be answered as quickly as possible and with as much political clarity as possible.

The structure of the future civil occupation administration directly depended on those concepts of national policy that were in circulation among various groups of the German military-political leadership. In fact, initially only the main Nazi theorist A. Rosenberg, who was considered a recognized expert on foreign policy and national issues, was allowed into this case. His main opponent, paradoxical as it may seem, was Hitler himself, who also had his own view of “Eastern” politics. The future Fuhrer of the German nation formulated its main theses back in the 1920s, when he wrote in Mein Kampf: “We, National Socialists, quite consciously put an end to all German foreign policy of the pre-war period. We want to return to the point where our old development was interrupted 600 years ago. We want to stop the eternal German drive to the south and west of Europe and definitely point the finger towards the territories located in the east... When we talk about the conquest of new lands in Europe, we, of course, can only mean primarily Russia and those border states who are subordinate to her." In general, this was only the general line. Although clearly formulated, it nevertheless suffered from one drawback: it was not clear how to follow it.

Rosenberg's views on the national question in the Soviet Union and the future political structure of its republics are well known. His ideal was a weak agrarian “Muscovy”, surrounded on all sides by a cordon sanitaire from states dependent on Germany - former republics of the USSR. Hitler's opinion on this matter is less known. Many researchers usually cite the above quote and write that the Fuhrer was a supporter of the complete subjugation of these territories and an opponent of any national political administration in them. This is partly fair. But it must be said that this opinion became so only just before the attack on the USSR and continued to remain unchanged throughout the war. After writing Mein Kampf and until the development of the Barbarossa plan, Hitler's views on Eastern policy underwent a significant evolution.

It should be said that, according to the American researcher A. Dallin, “the Fuhrer had little understanding of the nuances of the national concepts of his circle.” Therefore, it is difficult to say which of them he gave the greatest preference. This statement can be illustrated by the following example. In the summer of 1932, a conference was held at the headquarters of the Nazi Party in Munich on the ways and methods of future colonization of the “eastern territories.” The organizer of the conference was one of the Nazi theorists, W. Darre, who was responsible for agrarian policy in Hitler’s circle. In general, all the topics discussed at this conference did not go beyond the problems of agriculture and colonization. However, one of Darre's colleagues gave a very interesting report on the “spatial tasks of eastern territorial policy.” Thus, he believed that a union of states should emerge in Eastern Europe, the contours of which were outlined already during the First World War. In the center is a core consisting of Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Moravia. Then - a “wreath” of small and medium-sized non-independent state entities. Namely: the Baltic states, medium-sized Poland, larger Hungary, divided into component parts of Serbia and Croatia, reduced Romania, Ukraine, existing in the form of several independent parts, southern Russian and Caucasian states. In the northeast, this “federal state”, bound by a common military, economy, currency and foreign policy, was supposed to extend to the borders of Finland, in the southeast - Georgia.

Despite his radicalism, Hitler supported such principles of German Ostpolitik. Moreover, after coming to power, at the beginning of 1934, he stated at one of the meetings that the goal of German policy in the East should be “an alliance with Ukraine, the Volga region, Georgia, etc. But not an alliance of equal partners, but an alliance vassal states without a separate army, politics and economy."

The events of 1938–1940 showed that such a course of events was quite possible. It was during these years that the Protectorate of the Czech Republic and Moravia, the General Government in Poland and puppet governments in Slovakia and Norway were created. Therefore, when on July 22, 1940, at a meeting at the General Staff ground forces The issue of a future war against the USSR was discussed, Hitler set the following political tasks for his generals: “The Ukrainian state, the Federation of the Baltic States, Belarus...”

At first, this statement could be understood in any way, even to the point that Hitler was planning the creation of these independent states. However, a week later, on July 31, he made it clearer what he meant by “independence” for these regions. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, conveyed the words of the Fuhrer as follows: “Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states are ultimately for us...” That is, it was understood that after the victory these territories would be states dependent on Germany.

From the documents it is known that for the next four months Hitler did not touch upon the problem of organizing the “eastern territories” at all. And only on December 5 he returned to this topic again, defining future role western outskirts of the USSR. As if developing his July plans, the Fuhrer spoke in the sense that Ukraine, the Baltic states and Belarus should become “buffer states of Greater Germany.”

At the beginning of 1941, the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), General A. Jodl, submitted to Hitler for consideration a draft of the so-called “Instructions on Special Issues”, which were attached to Directive No. 21 (Barbarossa Plan). At the beginning of March, the Fuhrer returned this document to the OKW, providing it with the following additions and comments: “The upcoming campaign is something more than just an armed conflict. This is a clash of two different ideologies. Due to the scale of the territory involved in this war, it will not end simply with the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces. The whole territory should be divided into separate states, each with its own government, with which we can then make peace. The formation of these governments requires great political skill and must be based on well-thought-out principles... Today the socialist idea in Russia can no longer be exterminated. From the point of view of internal conditions, the formation of new states should proceed from this principle. The Bolshevik-Jewish intelligentsia must be destroyed, since to this day it is the “oppressor”... Our goal is to build as quickly as possible and using a minimum of military force socialist states that will depend on us. This task is so difficult that it cannot be entrusted to the army.”

These instructions from Hitler, which determined the competence of the Wehrmacht in the political sphere, formed the basis of the final “Instructions” for the Barbarossa plan, signed by the head of the OKW, Field Marshal W. Keitel on March 13, 1941. About the political structure of the occupied territories of the USSR, in particular, they said the following: “As soon as the combat zone reaches sufficient depth, the rear border will be established. The occupied territory in the rear of the combat zone will have its own political administration. It will be divided along ethnographic lines and in accordance with the demarcation lines of army groups. At first it will consist of “North” (Baltics), “Center” (Belarus), “South” (Ukraine). In these territories, political administration will be transferred to the Reich Commissioners, who will receive appropriate instructions from the Fuehrer."

It is known that this option did not yet completely satisfy Hitler. Therefore, after reading it on March 17, 1941, he again noted: “We must create republics free from communism. The intelligentsia planted by Stalin must be destroyed. The leadership apparatus of the Russian state must be broken.” It must be emphasized that here Hitler went the furthest in his planning for the future structure of the “eastern territories”. Subsequent events showed that he had significantly cooled down to the idea of a buffer alliance of vassal states - the former western republics of the USSR.

At the end of March 1941, the question of the future political structure of the Soviet Union was raised to a qualitatively different level. It should be said that in the half month that passed from the approval of the “Instructions” to Directive No. 21, Hitler’s point of view on the development of the “eastern territories” acquired a more radical connotation. He did not abandon the idea of administrative and political division of the “eastern space”. However, now the Fuhrer believed that these should not be vassals of Germany, but independent states (even if their independence was only a fiction). The entire occupied territory of the USSR should have been divided into administrative units, which would be directly and completely subordinate to Germany. That is, it was intended to create something like “ancient eastern satrapies, but in a new way.” According to A. Dallin, who owns the phrase in quotation marks, such an evolution in Hitler’s views occurred due to changes in the political and military situation that took place during this year. In 1939 and early 1940, he could speak quite sincerely about the creation of independent Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, in order to thus influence English, French and Soviet diplomacy, as well as have a counter-influence on the policies of the Polish émigré government. Now Hitler did not need such games: as you know, since the summer of 1940, Nazi Germany was the master of the entire European continent.

Hitler expressed his new point of view on March 30, 1941 at a meeting of the German military-political leadership, during which the goals of the war against the USSR were finally determined. From a military point of view, they should have been to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, and from a political point of view, it should have been done so that “no organized force could resist the Germans on this side of the Urals.” At the conclusion of his speech, Hitler expressed himself more specifically: “Our tasks in relation to Russia are to defeat its armed forces and destroy the state.” To manage the captured Soviet territories, the Fuhrer proposed creating “protectorates”: in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus. The word “protectorate” is put in quotation marks here intentionally. Of course, these were not supposed to be protectorates like in Bohemia and Moravia. Rather, it was only about a political screen.

This March meeting is also significant in that at it all issues of future administrative and political planning in the “eastern territories” were transferred to Rosenberg’s department. Now only he and his subordinates could do this. Already on April 2, 1941, Rosenberg presented the first memorandum, in which he fully reflected his political views and the concept of resolving the national question in the USSR. In general, he proposed dividing it into seven regions:

Great Russia with its center in Moscow;

Belarus with Minsk or Smolensk as the capital;

"Baltenland" (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania);

Ukraine and Crimea with the center in Kyiv;

Don region with Rostov-on-Don as the capital;

Caucasus region;

Turkestan (Russian Central Asia).

According to the concept set out in this document, Russia (or, rather, what was left of it) was to be cut off from the rest of the world by a ring of non-Russian states. However, that was not all: according to Rosenberg’s plan, it also lost a number of territories with a Russian population. Thus, Kursk, Voronezh and Crimea went to Ukraine, and Rostov-on-Don and the Lower Volga - to the Don region. In the future Russia, “the Jewish-Bolshevik administration was completely destroyed,” and it itself “had to be subjected to intensive economic exploitation” by Germany. In addition, this territorial entity received a status much lower than even that of the surrounding “states”, in order to serve as a kind of “receiver” for all “undesirable elements from their territories.”

Rosenberg generally agreed with Hitler's previous plans to separate Belarus into an independent administrative unit. Nevertheless, it should be noted that he had a very low opinion regarding the national “ripeness” of the Belarusian people and therefore for a long time did not dare to form his final position on the Belarusian issue. Rosenberg noted in his memorandum that this Soviet republic “is very much behind in cultural and economic spheres“, in connection with which “the awakening of its national life and the creation of a full-fledged state mechanism may turn out to be very difficult.” However, its independent existence could be justified if only by the fact that it weakened Russia. For this purpose, it was planned to increase the territory of Belarus at the expense of Western Russian regions with the center in Smolensk.

This plan caused significant comments from Hitler, who believed that the division of the future occupied territory should not be so fractional, and the administrative units created should not be artificial. For example, the organization of a separate Don region was not, in his opinion, determined either politically, economically, or even from the point of view of national politics. The same applied to Belarus. The Fuhrer believed that it needed to be merged with the Baltic states - it would be more convenient from an administrative point of view. And such comments were made on almost all points of Rosenberg’s memorandum. However, it must be admitted that they almost did not affect his general line. Hitler had nothing against such passages that talked about “further differentiation among the population of the occupied territories,” “the Ukrainian people and their freedom,” “the liberation of the peoples of the Caucasus,” and “the salvation of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian nations.” As for “Russia or Russian territories, there could be no talk of any changes in their fate.”

Rosenberg worked on his new memo for more than two months. Judging by his rough sketches, only in May 1941 did he recognize the need to unite Belarus and the Baltic republics within one administrative unit. However, and Rosenberg himself admitted this, such a decision could only be a temporary measure that did not at all solve the problem of the political status of Belarus. There was no clear answer to the question about the post-war future of this republic. Either it was defined as a territory that, together with the Baltic states, was subject to Germanization and inclusion in the Third Reich, or as a territory that was not subject to any incorporation at all. There was an opinion to make Belarus a receiver for “undesirable elements” from the Baltic states and Poland, or even a nature reserve. At the same time, Rosenberg emphasized that one should not abandon the idea of providing Belarus with “a kind of autonomy” in the indefinite future.

On June 20, 1941, a meeting of the highest military-political leadership of Germany was held in Berlin, at which Rosenberg presented Hitler with a new plan for the future administrative and political structure of the “eastern territories.” According to this plan, it was planned to create five administrative units - Reichskommissariats ( Reichskomissariat):

"Muscovy" (central regions of Russia),

"Ostland" (Baltic states and Belarus),

"Ukraine" (most of Ukraine and Crimea),

"Caucasus" (North Caucasus, Transcaucasia and Kalmykia)

"Turkestan" (Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Volga region and Bashkiria).

These administrative units were planned to be created as the front line advanced to the East and after the military-political pacification of these regions.

In general, Hitler agreed with this solution to the problem and already on July 17, 1941, almost a month after the attack on the USSR, he signed an order introducing civilian administration in the occupied territories. This order created the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Regions ( Reichsministerium für die besetzen Ostgebiete) is the main governing body for the specified administrative units. The ministry was headed by A. Rosenberg. The failure of plans for a “blitzkrieg” against the Soviet Union led to the creation of only two Reichskommissariats – Ostland and Ukraine. Legally, they began to function on September 1, 1941. Their territories took shape in their final form only by December 1941.

This order regulated all plans for the “organization of the eastern space.” However, it should be noted that the future of Belarus, formulated by Rosenberg and his colleagues, was very vague. Therefore, when German troops entered the territory of this Soviet republic, none of the occupation authorities had any idea about its future political status.

Belarusian national movement: from its origins to the beginning of World War II

The Belarusian national movement was (and still is) one of the most undeveloped, both ideologically and organizationally. Even despite the support of certain external forces, Belarusian nationalists still have not managed to finally convince the “world community” and, more importantly, their own people that in an ethnic sense they are different from the Russian people. Nevertheless, they continue to assert that their claims to state independence have historical roots and foundations. In general, all the main milestones in the emergence and development of the Belarusian national idea can be reduced to the following points.

Thus, according to them, the Belarusian state was already the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (XIV - XVIII centuries), which lost its independence “only as a result of the imperialist policy of Moscow.” During this period, according to nationalists, the foundations of the Belarusian state and national idea were laid.

The emergence of Belarusian nationalism as such dates back to its ideologists during the Polish uprising of 1863. As you know, the Polish people did not accept the loss of their independence and fought for its restoration. At the same time, the Poles sought not only their own liberation, but also dreamed of restoring their state within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that is, they wanted to receive Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, which before the fall of Poland were, in essence, its colony. Therefore, the Polish struggle was reflected in the western part of Belarus, where the landowners, gentry, and partly the urban population were already Polish. The bulk of the population - peasants - were Belarusians.

What, among other things, is famous for the uprising of 1863? It is known that during this uprising, the Poles for the first time made an attempt to restore the Belarusian peasantry against the Russian authorities. This case was dealt with by the “dictator of Lithuania” K. Kalinovsky, who wrote and published several leaflets in the Belarusian language. Of course, these leaflets could not achieve any success, since the Belarusian peasant, who until recently was a serf, had no reason to support his recent masters. And Kalinovsky’s activities in connection with his leaflets would not deserve mention if not for the fact that Belarusian nationalists elevated him to the rank of a fighter for independence and the father of the Belarusian press, although there is no mention of the Belarusian question in Kalinovsky’s leaflets. By origin, a representative of the Catholic gentry, Kalinovsky was a pure nihilist, a sort of “demon” from Dostoevsky’s novel of the same name, as evidenced by his turbulent youth. While still a student at St. Petersburg University, he took an active part in the activities of revolutionary underground circles. And he was motivated by hatred for the existing regime, and not some kind of “love” for the Belarusian people.

As the emigre historian I. Korinkevich noted, “Belarusian nationalists in general often tried to appropriate and attribute to themselves what had nothing to do with them.” Just as they speak about Kalinovsky, they also write about I. Grinevitsky, the murderer of Emperor Alexander II. Many of them quite seriously consider the latter as a “conscious Belarusian” who acted on the basis of the Belarusian national idea. Whereas it is known that he was a convinced member of the “Narodnaya Volya”, for whom there were neither nations nor peoples, but only the oppressed and oppressors.

The next Polish attempts to sow confusion in the minds of the Belarusian population and restore them against the authorities occurred shortly before the first Russian revolution. In 1891, Polish revolutionary organizations published in Krakow (then the Austro-Hungarian Empire) a book of poems by F. Bogushevich entitled “Belarusian Pipes”, and in 1894 in Poznan (then the German Empire) - “The Belarusian Bow” by the same author. The “Polish trace” in this matter is evidenced by the fact that in 1903 both of these books were republished in London at the expense of the Polish Socialist Party, one of the leaders of which was J. Pilsudski, the future “chief of the Polish state.”

Studying the early stages of the history of Belarusian nationalism, one cannot help but note that it was initially supported by external forces. And the first such force was the Polish national liberation movement, whose leaders believed that such a political movement would be a lesser evil for them than Belarus belonging to a single Russian state. And besides, as was already the case with K. Kalinovsky, all means were good if they led to the weakening of Russia. It should be noted that at the same time similar actions were carried out in the “Ukrainian direction.” In fact, the start of two national ideas – Ukrainian and Belarusian – was given at the same time, and up to a certain point they developed in parallel.

All of the above is, of course, essential for understanding the history of the emergence and development of Belarusian nationalism. However, in fact, all these events can be considered nothing more than myths, without which no national movement can do. The origin of Belarusian nationalism in its modern form can only be attributed to the time of the first Russian revolution, before which the national question in the Russian Empire became more acute than ever before. In December 1902, at the Minsk congress of representatives of student and student organizations of Vilna, Minsk and St. Petersburg, the first Belarusian political party was created - the Belarusian Revolutionary Community, which was later renamed Belarusian Socialist Community (BSG). The immediate goal of the BSG was the overthrow of the “tsarist autocracy” and the establishment of democratic freedoms in a joint struggle with other peoples of the empire, after which the construction of socialism was planned. As for the national issue, the first party program provided for the creation of an independent Belarusian Democratic Republic, and the second (1906) - state autonomy for the region as part of a democratic federal Russia. At the same time, even nationalist historians do not deny that almost the entire first BSG program was copied from the program of the Polish Socialist Party.

At the same time, in 1905, the first newspaper in the Belarusian language, “Our Share,” was founded. Soon this printed organ adopted the new name “Nasha Niva” and existed in this form until the summer of 1915. The leading role in the newspaper was played by members of the BSG, brothers I. and A. Lutskevich, through whom funds for its publication also went. It should be noted that the second of the brothers, A. Lutskevich, also collaborated in the Polish and left-wing Russian press. In addition to them, V. Lastovsky, I. Lutsevich (Yanka Kupala), K. Mickiewicz (Yakub Kolos) and several other less significant employees took part in the work of the newspaper. “Nasha Niva” was published in Vilno, once a week, in two editions (Russian and Latin script) and, according to contemporaries, “had a deeply provincial character.” This newspaper and the group behind it had no influence either on the local intelligentsia or on the other population, who rightly saw in that case another Polish intrigue. And yet, “Nasha Niva” was the place where the most important figures of Belarusian nationalism received their treatment and where they came from.

If the first Russian revolution and the events preceding it awakened all kinds of national movements, then the First World War brought with it unprecedented opportunities for separatists of all stripes, who directed their activities towards the dismemberment of Russia. And Belarusian separatism was no exception in this case. It is clear that the greatest interest in it was shown by the Germans, who could use it to greater advantage than, for example, the Poles. Therefore, soon after the occupation of Vilna (1915), a representative of “German private circles”, Professor R. Abicht, appeared here and began close cooperation with A. Lutskevich and V. Lastovsky. The latter, having exchanged Polish patrons for German ones, created with their support the first Belarusian separatist organization in history - the Belarusian National Committee, later renamed the Belarusian Council ( Belarusian Rada). Council members took steps to create other Belarusian organizations, such as the Society for Relief to War Victims. In addition, some work has been done to develop a network of Belarusian schools. Anti-Russian propaganda also played an important role. So, for this and other purposes, the weekly newspaper “Homan” was published with German money. It should be noted that it was in this newspaper that Lastovsky “discovered” Kalinovsky as a Belarusian political figure, and also attributed a Belarusian character to the Polish uprising of 1863 (at least on the territory of Belarus).

The emergence of Belarusian nationalism on the international stage dates back to the same period. In 1916, Lastovsky travels from occupied Vilna to Sweden to attend a congress of representatives of non-Russian peoples of Russia organized by the Germans, where the League of these peoples was founded. Later he attended a similar conference in Lausanne (Switzerland). Lastovsky's associate A. Lutskevich also received a German foreign passport and made a number of trips in which he carried out a number of German assignments, mainly of a propaganda nature.

In general, all the efforts of Lastovsky and Lutskevich aimed at developing Belarusian nationalism under the conditions of German occupation were unsuccessful. Firstly, they did not have personnel, and secondly, their activities were in the nature of obvious high treason in relation to Russia, whose subjects they were, and therefore few people agreed to cooperate with them. On the other hand, and this cannot be ignored, they established certain contacts that were useful to Belarusian nationalists in the future.

February Revolution in the Russian Empire and the subsequent Bolshevik coup allowed Belarusian nationalism to take final shape and begin to develop in the Belarusian territories proper. It must be said that by February 1917, despite all the efforts of the nationalists, it was still in its infancy here. Thus, according to American historians M. Geller and A. Nekrich: “Belarusian peasants did not show a sense of ethnic independence in relation to the Russians,” and “political life in Belarus developed in Russian and Jewish political organizations.” Nevertheless, after the overthrow of the tsarist government, there was a revival of political life here too.

The already mentioned historian Korinkevich painted the following picture preceding the revolution and the Civil War on the territory of Belarus: “Various congresses took place throughout Russia at that time, national formations were formed, real and inflated governments and representative offices were formed. Everyone who had even the slightest reason to do so begins a rally struggle for their goals and ideals.”

At the beginning of April 1917, a congress of Belarusian national organizations that arose during the period from 1914 to 1917 was held in Minsk. At this congress it was decided to seek autonomy for Belarus within the framework of the future Russian Federation. For this purpose, the congress formed the Belarusian National Committee. However, the Provisional Government in Petrograd refused to recognize the Belarusians' right to autonomy. This soon led to the fact that all national forces began to focus on Germany, considering it possible to gain independence from the hands of the German imperial government.

In mid-July 1917, a congress of Belarusian national organizations and parties took place in Minsk. At it, deputies elected the Central Council ( Central Rada) Belarusian organizations, which was entrusted with the creation of a national bank, the formation of an army and the opening of a university. Renamed the Great Belarusian Council, this body convened the 1st All-Belarusian Congress in Minsk on December 18, 1917, which, according to the idea of its organizers, was supposed to unite all national political forces. 1872 delegates came to the congress, of which 716 were military. The entire group of Belarusian separatists from the zone of German occupation relatively easily managed to secure parliamentary powers and came to the congress in the amount of 70–80 people. This small group could not have any influence on the activities and decisions of the Congress. She did not dare to propose a resolution on declaring the independence of Belarus, since such a speech did not correspond to the realities of that time and would simply be laughed at. In general, the main struggle at the congress was between the Bolsheviks and the socialists, who advocated a federation with Russia. As a result, the first and only resolution adopted by the Congress was a resolution on the desirability of a federal structure of the Russian state. The adoption of just such a decision received the following “sorrowful explanation” from the nationalists: “The masses are still far from mature and not ripe to understand the idea of national independence. Therefore, we had to turn to the search for a compromise acceptable both to the nationalists and to the still unconscious masses. Such a compromise was found in the principle of federalism.”

The congress did not have time to adopt any other resolutions or decrees, since it was dispersed by the Bolsheviks, who insisted on establishing Soviet power. After these events, 71 congress participants (mostly from nationalist groups) gathered in their circle and proclaimed the illegal nature of the usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks. Then they decided that they would “single out” the so-called Belarusian Council from their composition (Belarusian Rada), which was supposed to represent the will of the dispersed Congress. Subsequently, a myth was created around this congress, which formed the basis for all other nationalist constructions. The Congress began to be presented as something similar to the Belarusian Constituent Assembly, which sought to proclaim the independence of Belarus, but did not have time to do this, being dispersed by the Bolsheviks.

Until the end of February 1918, the Belarusian Council created by the nationalists was underground and did not declare its existence in any way. However, the breakdown of peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and the occupation of the territory of Belarus by German troops created a new state of affairs. The expulsion of the Bolsheviks again made it possible for nationalist forces to seek the independence of Belarus. Soon concrete steps were taken in this direction. Thus, already on March 9, 1918, the creation of Belarusian People's Republic (BPR). Soon after this, namely on March 25, 1918, the council, with the permission of the German authorities, proclaimed the independence of Belarus. At the same time, the council performs a second act, perhaps of no less historical importance - it sends a loyal telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II on behalf of the Belarusian people and asks him to accept Belarus under his protection.

After this, the Belarusian Council was constituted into the Council of the Belarusian People's Republic ( BNR Rada). At the same time, a cabinet of ministers (people's secretariat) was created, headed by President P. Krechevsky, who at the same time headed the Council of the BPR. But the Belarusian government did not have to lead. Despite all the declarations, the German command considered Belarus as an occupied part of Russia. The activities of the BPR Council, as well as the provisional government of Belarus - the People's Secretariat - were not exactly prohibited, but also not very welcomed. Only three months later, in May 1918, the commander of the German occupation forces, Infantry General E. von Falkenhayn, received representatives of the BPR Council and gave his consent to the creation of an institute of advisers under the local occupation structures. As a result, under the German occupation, the BPR existed only on paper, and all the real activities of its Council were reduced to cultural and educational events. This situation continued until the collapse of Germany in November 1918, when, due to the approach of the Bolsheviks, the Belarusian ministers were forced to flee along with the retreating German troops and ended up in Poland, Lithuania, Germany or Czechoslovakia. For example, President Krechevsky remained on the territory of this republic.

As a result of the collapse of the German Eastern Front and the formation of a political and military vacuum on the territory of Belarus, its territory was captured by Soviet Russia for the second time. Thus ended the first attempt of Belarusian nationalists to achieve independence with the help of the Germans. Belarus, for two whole years (from 1919 to 1920), became a theater of military operations between the Bolsheviks and Poles. The latter, by the way, were also considered by Belarusian nationalists as allies. However, the revived Polish state was not very interested in real creation such an alliance. The most that the “chief of Poland” J. Pilsudski could promise the nationalists was very reduced autonomy, and even then only after the end of the war. It is now clear that these statements contained more propaganda than truth, since even at the beginning of the 20th century the Poles could not abandon the idea of a “Greater Poland from sea to sea” with Ukraine and Belarus as colonies. As a result, all attempts by nationalists to create their own self-government and armed forces in Polish-occupied Belarus were blocked. These events led to the first serious split in their ranks. The Belarusian socialist revolutionaries moved away from them, who now began to believe that an alliance with the Bolsheviks was quite possible provided they recognized the autonomy of Belarus.

Here we should stop and say a few words about another key and extremely popular myth of Belarusian nationalists. We are talking about the so-called Slutsk uprising - an event that took place at the final stage of the Soviet-Polish war. It has already been said several times above that the first main myth - the myth of the All-Belarusian Congress - is primarily of a political nature. With its help, nationalists tried and are trying to prove that it was then that “independent Belarus” was proclaimed. The second myth is associated with “the conscious armed struggle of the Belarusian people for this independence.” Here’s how, for example, the story of the Slutsk uprising looks like as presented by the authors of the Belarusian emigrant weekly “Batskaushchyna”: “...When the Council of the Belarusian People's Republic declared Belarus a free and independent state on March 25, 1918 in Minsk, executive bodies of the BPR immediately began to be created in Slutsk region, which became local authorities, subordinate to the central supreme authorities in Minsk. The Belarusian National Committee (BNC) headed by P. Zhavrid emerges in Slutsk, which begins extensive administrative activities. The Bolsheviks, who were moving west at that time (November 1918), disperse the BNK, and its chairman Zhavrid is arrested. Two years later, in connection with the Polish-Soviet war and the advance of the Poles to the east, Sluchchina came under Polish occupation. Just before the Bolshevik retreat, Zhavrid manages to escape from prison, and the BNK resumes its activities... At the end of November 1920, the Bolsheviks, without any warning, again broke into Sluchina. The main Belarusian command ordered the already formed Belarusian military units and police to leave Slutsk and gather in the town of Semezhevo, where up to 10 thousand rebels gathered. The formed 1st Belarusian division on November 27 went into a bloody battle for their native Belarus... The glorious Slutsk front of the BPR held back the advance of the Russian-Mongol horde for a month.” And so on, in the same spirit, with the emphasis that such “mass struggle of the Belarusian people can be explained only by their national maturity, their hostile attitude towards Russian imperialism, their hatred of the Russian occupier, their absolutely correct identification of Bolshevism with dissentism.” .

What can I say? Of course, in the above excerpts the truth is very much mixed with lies. For example, neither the Main Belarusian Command nor the 10,000-strong 1st Belarusian Division, which held a 100 km front for more than a month, existed at all in nature. And there was no Zhavrid. Or rather, he was, but not there. Judging by the documents, after the end of the Civil War, a refugee from Slutsk, a certain P. Zhavrod, actually lived in Vilnius, who returned to the BSSR with his family in 1923.

But what really happened? As you know, on the basis of the armistice agreement, Polish troops were supposed to retreat beyond the demarcation line, and the Red Army was supposed to enter Slutsk district. However, on November 15-16, 1920, in Slutsk, which was still occupied by Polish troops, on the initiative of Judge Prokulevich, a congress of representatives of local authorities of the district was convened, to which 127 people arrived. The congress elected the Slutsk Belarusian Council consisting of 17 people and instructed it to organize a national army. In addition, Slutsk representatives protested against the entry of the Red Army into the borders of the district and called on everyone to fight for “independent Belarus within its ethnographic borders.” Then, within three days, a brigade was formed from among those liable for military service, consisting of two regiments (Slutsky and Grozovsky), in which about 4 thousand people were enrolled. Captain P. Chaika was appointed commander of this unit. When, on November 22, 1920, the Red Army, according to the terms of the armistice agreement, began to approach Slutsk, the brigade command decided to retreat to the west, following the Polish troops. At this moment, their commander, Captain Chaika, left the “Slutsk rebels”. The new brigade commander, Staff Captain A. Sokol-Kutylovsky, was able to calm the people entrusted to him and took them across the Moroch River so as not to collide with the advancing Red Army. On the right bank of this river there was already Polish territory. Here the brigade laid down its arms and was interned. This view of this history is the official version of modern Belarusian historiography. It looks, of course, more believable than nationalist fairy tales, although their influence on this version also cannot be ignored.

After the Peace of Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia (March 1921), most of Belarus remained part of the USSR, where the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) was created with its capital in Minsk. Its western part with the cities of Grodno, Baranovichi, Bialystok, Brest and Pinsk went to Poland. In addition, a small part of the Belarusian lands was annexed to the newly formed Lithuanian and Latvian republics. Subsequently, this territorial (and, no less important, religious) split played a fatal role in the development of Belarusian nationalism during the Second World War. In addition, the post-revolutionary Belarusian diaspora settled in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it was not as significant in size as, for example, Russian or Ukrainian (there were even fewer “conscious Belarusians” there), its role in the further development of Belarusian nationalism is also important. By the way, almost the entire government of the BPR was in exile (in Czechoslovakia). Another significant place of residence of the Belarusian diaspora was Germany.

Naturally, real Belarusian political life developed only on Belarusian lands. It was less active in Lithuania and Latvia, although the former “Minister of War” of the BPR and famous publicist K. Ezovitov ended up on the territory of the latter. This life acquired its most active character in the USSR and Poland. It developed here in completely opposite directions, but, paradoxically, it came to a common denominator - the strengthening of Belarusian nationalism.

Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks proclaimed their goal to be the leveling of all nations, in the words of historian I. Korinkevich, “their role in breeding and planting various nationalisms is well known.” In the 1920s, this activity was expressed in the policy of so-called “indigenization.” What was it? First of all, in the training of national personnel devoted to the ideas of communism and in the introduction of the language of a particular people into all spheres of social and cultural life of a given national republic. As soon as possible and forcibly, the Belarusian language was introduced in all party and Soviet institutions, and even in army units stationed on the territory of the republic. Both Soviet historians and even nationalists admit that Belarus lacked literate personnel who could speak the Belarusian language. Almost the entire Belarusian intelligentsia of that time spoke Russian and did not want to switch to the Belarusian language. And the lack of specialists in the Belarusian language was filled from where it was least expected. After the announcement of the amnesty and the proclamation of the “Belarusization” policy, many former BPR figures returned to the BSSR and almost immediately became involved in the implementation of this policy. Thus, the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, created after the end of the Civil War, almost completely fell into their hands. It was these figures who determined the Soviet version of the history of Belarus, the main tendency of which was to highlight and emphasize the most insignificant manifestations of separatism in pre-revolutionary times. In a slightly modified form, this version existed until 1991 and, in fact, even now is the basis for all further scientific (and non-scientific) research in the field of the history of Belarus.

At the end of the 1920s, after the collapse of the NEP and all the accompanying experiments in the political and spiritual spheres, “indigenization” came to an end. Most of the returning Belarusian nationalists and the new Belarusian intelligentsia they raised shared the tragic fate of the intelligentsia of other peoples of the USSR. However, the seeds of the Belarusian national idea and separatism they sowed still sprouted. And this happened during the Second World War.

If the policy of the communists in resolving the Belarusian issue was initially loyal to the nationalists, then in Poland everything was the opposite. Official Warsaw did not consider Belarusians to be a separate people, but only a national minority that needed to be assimilated. The same policy was carried out in relation to Western Ukrainians, which resulted in the strengthening of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). As a result, the entire history of Western Belarus in the 1920s and 1930s was filled with the struggle for its national survival. It is not surprising that many of them looked with hope at the USSR, where, as it seemed to them, the Belarusian nation was actively developing and building its own national state in the form of the BSSR.

It should be said that the Polish authorities did not formally ban Belarusian political parties and organizations. However, they did everything to destroy them. It is now customary to argue that Polish parliamentarism and the “sanation” regime were more liberal than the Stalinist regime: it allowed the existence of Belarusian political parties, etc. But, paradoxical as it may seem, Belarusians fled from Poland to the USSR, and not vice versa (although many later and regretted it). In general, Poland’s policy towards the Belarusian national movement led to the fact that on the eve of World War II it was split into several movements. Of these, the most significant were the following.

The so-called “Nezalezhnitskoe” trend. It was a rather motley political direction, in which, on the basis of Belarusian independence, organizations from the party coexisted Christian Democrats to the National Socialists. Historian I. Korinkevich noted that “the Christian Democrats can be considered the only Belarusian party in the real sense of the word for the entire existence of Belarusian separatism.” Its members, mostly Belarusian Catholics, were led by priest A. Stankevich, who, according to contemporaries, was a decent man, capable and loyal to dissidents. A number of Belarusian priests grouped around him, the most prominent of whom was V. Godlevsky, abbot in the village of Zhodishki. The Belarusian Catholic clergy certainly influenced their parishioners, which, of course, did not please the Polish authorities. Therefore, reprisals soon followed. In 1925, Father Godlewski was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison for anti-government activities. After this, the Catholic spiritual authorities gradually transferred the majority of Belarusian priests to parishes in internal Poland, as a result of which the activities of the Christian Democrats died out by themselves (although the party formally continued to exist until 1940). Over time, several other organizations grew out of this party, the most significant of which was the “Belarusian Front”, which by this time had emerged from the imprisonment of V. Godlevsky. This organization was created in 1936, but, despite such a late emergence, it played probably the most significant role in the history of Belarusian nationalism. Its supporters opposed communism, polonization, and German Nazism. Their goal was the revival of the Belarusian people and their spirit based on historical traditions.

On the right flank of the Belarusian “Nezalezhniki” trend was Belarusian National Socialist Party (BNSP) F. Akinchitsa. This organization was created at the end of 1933 in the wake of a pan-European fascination with the ideas of fascism. Akinchits and his supporters believed that all national and social problems of the Belarusian people could be solved only by completely abandoning the illusions of a democratic system. And the reunification of the Belarusian lands torn apart by the Treaty of Riga is possible only as a result of war. There is no need to say that in the last point of its program the party was guided by possible support from the Nazis who had recently come to power in Germany.

Another current consisted of members of the illegal Communist Party Western Belarus and their non-partisan supporters. Naturally, this group had an extremely negative attitude towards the first movement and fought against it in every possible way, since it believed that the idea of independence of Belarus would only “disorient the masses.” There are facts that in their struggle against the Belarusian nationalists, the communists quite consciously cooperated with the Polish political police. Probably, Stalin also knew about this, since after the annexation of Western Belarus to the BSSR, all local communists were either destroyed or expelled to Siberia.

Ideologically aligned with the communists Belarusian peasant-worker community, which was headed by B. Tarashkevich, S. Rak-Mikhailovsky, I. Dvorchanin and others. It is interesting that the Hromada for some time included the mentioned National Socialist F. Akinchits, and the communist R. Ostrovsky, who during the war became one of the leaders Belarusian collaborators. This organization channeled all the discontent of the Belarusian society, which had accumulated as a result of social disorder and national oppression. In 1926, the Gromada movement, which included open and secret communists, took on the character of an avalanche. IN short term its activists created hundreds of village committees - the so-called “gurtki”. But in the end, the Polish authorities came to their senses, and at the beginning of 1927 Hromada was dealt a crushing blow. The most active leaders and members of the movement were arrested, and the organization itself was dissolved and declared prohibited.

Later, many of those convicted in the Hromada case were sent at their request to the USSR in exchange for Poles arrested by the Soviet authorities. Almost all of the leaders of the Community who left for the USSR were repressed here in the fabricated case of the so-called Belarusian National Center (1933). For example, such a fate befell S. Rak-Mikhailovsky and I. Dvorchanin. And a little later B. Tarashkevich was also repressed. Despite the fact that this organization ceased to exist quite quickly, its ideas sprouted. For example, during the years of the German occupation of Belarus, its members will try to organize an alternative partisan movement to the communists.

Finally, the third movement, very small and uninfluential, consisted of the so-called polonophiles, who tried to resolve the Belarusian issue by cooperating with the Polish authorities. However, it was not as influential as the first two. The most significant representative of this trend was R. Ostrovsky. In January 1927, he was arrested and charged in the Hromada case. In prison, this figure changed his political views and became an active organizer and promoter of cooperation with the Polish authorities. However, the bulk of the Belarusian population did not trust either him or his supporters. And there was every reason for this. As one of the Belarusian nationalists, J. Maletsky, recalled, “the Polish government cynically prophesied that in 50 years there would be no trace of Belarusians on the territory of the Polish Republic.”

This was the general picture of the development of Belarusian nationalism in the period between the two world wars. Neither Poland nor the USSR were interested in creating an independent Belarusian state, and Western democracies did not show any interest in the Belarusian issue, primarily due to the weakness of the national movement. Therefore, one cannot but agree with the opinion of a number of researchers that by the end of the 1930s, Belarusian nationalism and separatism as such would have disappeared altogether if not for the rise to power of the Nazis and the Second World War they unleashed.

Hitler’s declarations about the redivision of the world and the “New Europe”, in which all disadvantaged peoples would find their place, instilled in the leaders of Belarusian nationalists hopes for a quick solution to the Belarusian issue. Of course, the majority of Belarusian politicians who considered themselves democrats were at first very critical of Hitler’s statements and the propaganda of fascism. However, when at the end of the 1930s it became clear that Germany had taken an open course towards redividing the world and war could not be avoided, even the organ of the Polish Belarusian Christian Democratic Party “Khrystsiyanskaya Duma” wrote in the article “German intentions and Belarusians”: “Recently Germany is very interested Eastern Europe– The USSR, where Ukraine and Belarus are located... Not because he wants to help Ukrainians and Belarusians build their own state, but because he hopes to destroy the USSR, open a large sales market for his industry and get to the grain wealth of Ukraine and the forest wealth of Belarus... This however, this does not mean that Belarusians should now be afraid of German plans and even now fight them. No! You just need to know that there will be no disinterested help for anyone and that the most useful thing is only your own strength...”

The same applies to the newspaper “Belarusian Front”, a periodical published by the organization of the same name of Father Godlevsky. If in its first issues (1937 - 1938) journalists considered both communism and Nazism to be enemies of Belarus, then starting from the end of 1938, the newspaper clearly shows a tendency to focus on Germany not only as a guarantor of the redistribution of the world, but also as a model state new order.

As for Germany’s interests in relation to Belarus, in a future war its leadership as a whole did not count on using the Belarusian factor, since, as shown above, the Belarusian nationalist forces were extremely weak. As such, only certain party authorities and military intelligence were interested in the Belarusian issue in Poland and the USSR. They established contact with Belarusian nationalist organizations (primarily in Poland). Priority in this matter belonged to the Foreign Bureau of the Nazi Party ( Aussenpolitisches Amt NSDAP; APA) and its leader, Reichsleiter A. Rosenberg, who in this post, among other things, was involved in cooperation with “fraternal” movements abroad. The bureau's relations with Belarusian organizations did not become widespread, but they had a noticeable influence on the German attitude towards the Belarusian problem. Back in the summer of 1933, the APA established contact with F. Akinchits, an ideologist and leader of a small group of Belarusian National Socialists. In November 1933, this group, with the support and money of the APA, began publishing the newspaper “Novy Shlyakh” in Vilnius. Almost simultaneously, thanks to the efforts of Akinchits, the Union of Belarusian Students was created in Berlin. However, these efforts did not bring the desired result. The Students' Union remained a small organization, and the newspaper “Novy Shlyakh” was not popular among the population. In addition, this printed organ had a very pathetic appearance: it was published no more than once every two months, in a small format of eight pages, and its one-time circulation did not exceed 500 copies. The last fact is further evidence that the Germans did not particularly support the Belarusian ideological allies. Most likely, their support was more moral.

Akinchitsa’s attempts to gain popularity for his party, the BNSP, also failed. This happened for several reasons. Firstly, to create such an organization in the Western Belarusian lands there was no necessary social base, passionate about the ideas of Nazism. Secondly, the creation of such a party was greeted by the Polish authorities without much enthusiasm: they, quite rightly, believed that it would not be a political party defending the rights of the Belarusian population, but an ordinary organization of Hitler’s agents. As a result, in October 1936, almost immediately after the creation of the BNSP, Akinchits did not receive permission from the Polish authorities to hold a party congress, and already in the fall of the following year its activities were actually prohibited. At the same time, the newspaper “Novy Shlyakh” was also banned by the Polish authorities. Due to political persecution, its editorial office was moved from Vilna to Lida, where the last issue of the newspaper was published on November 25, 1937. Some party members left for Germany. Some, led by the editor-in-chief of the party organ V. Kozlovsky, remained in Vilna and continued to work illegally, until they arrived there Soviet troops(1940). Akinchits himself declared himself ill, returned to his native village of Akinchitsy (Minsk region) and “began to wait for the explosion, which was supposed to destroy the political situation in Europe created in Versailles and Riga.” In general, the activities of this party are not of particular interest, since they did not lead to any serious consequences. The only positive aspect of Rosenberg’s work with the Akinchits group was the acquisition by him (and German authorities in general) of valuable experience in cooperation with Belarusian nationalists.

Before the start of World War II, the German authorities had no problems with Belarusian emigration. However, as a result of the Polish campaign (September 1939), about 70 thousand Belarusians - prisoners of war of the Polish army - ended up on the territory of the Third Reich. In addition, in the German-occupied territories, mainly in Warsaw, Lodz and Prague, there was a significant Belarusian diaspora since the 1920s. By the end of the autumn of 1939, it became clear that this entire mass of people needed to be somehow organized and, if possible, used. Therefore, in November, to unite emigrants and prisoners of war, establish guardianship over them and help them find work in Berlin, the Ministry of the Interior was created Belarusian representative office(Weissruthenische Vertrauenstelle). This organization had its branches in other cities (Vienna, Munich, Lodz, Poznan, Gdansk). Akinchits was appointed head of the representative office. During the organization, a printed organ was created - the newspaper “Ranitsa”. Its first issue was published on December 3, 1939. The representative office carried out a lot of organizational work, provided material and legal assistance to Belarusians who found themselves outside their homeland (former Western Belarus). In total, about 120 thousand people were registered with this organization. However, the representative office could not satisfy the national needs of the Belarusians, since its main and only responsibility was to work with prisoners of war.

In the summer of 1940, the leaders of the Belarusian diaspora in Berlin received permission from the German authorities to create Belarusian Self-Help Committee- formally an independent structure, but in reality it was under the complete control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The chairman of the committee was the former consul of the BPR in Berlin A. Borovsky. Almost simultaneously, branches of this organization were opened in Poznan, Lodz, Torun (Poland), and a little later in Munich, Leipzig (Germany) and Prague (Czech Republic). In total, 18 branches were created, which included about 8 thousand members. At these local institutions there were numerous folk art circles.

In December 1939 - January 1940, independent of the Berlin Committee, the Belarusian Committee in the General Government (Poland). Its headquarters were located in Warsaw, and two branches were in Biała Podlaska and Krakow. According to the charters of these organizations, of which more than a dozen were eventually created, their members had the right to engage only in social, cultural and educational activities. For example, they took care of opening public canteens for the Belarusian population and creating libraries for them.

All these committees had the status of public and auxiliary organizations, so they were prohibited from engaging in politics. Nevertheless, on their basis, several political groups of nationalists arose, each of which saw itself as the only exponent of the will of the Belarusian people. In general, they all sought to achieve the independence of Belarus. The only thing that distinguished them was the angle from which they looked at cooperation with the Germans, and what German authorities they relied on: the party, the government, the SS or the army. To achieve its main strategic goal, each of these groups set itself a number of tactical tasks. Each of them had different ones. However, one thing was common - gaining political influence in Belarus after its occupation by German troops. Therefore, almost immediately, intense competition for German favor developed between these groups.

The first to get down to business was I. Ermachenko, a former officer of the White Army and one of the leaders of the Belarusian diaspora in Prague. In order to give his mission the character of historical and political legitimacy, he enlisted the support of V. Zakharko, the chairman of the BPR Council in exile. Almost immediately after the occupation of the Czech Republic by the Germans, on April 20, 1939, Ermachenko prepared a memorandum addressed to Hitler, the leitmotif of which was a request to resolve the Belarusian issue by dismembering the USSR. It is known that this memorandum did not go unnoticed, as evidenced by the invitation of Ermachenko and Zakharko (who only signed this document) to a conference at the German Foreign Ministry (Berlin, August 3, 1939). During this conference, both leaders of the Belarusian emigration received encouraging assurances that Germany “opposes the concept of a united and indivisible Russia.” Subsequently, these contacts greatly influenced Ermachenko’s career in the German occupation administration in Belarus.

F. Akinchits, on the contrary, relied on Rosenberg’s department, since he believed that long-term relations with this politician gave him reason to hope for obtaining a leadership role among the Belarusian emigrant organizations of Germany and the territories it occupied. However, Akinchits' chances gradually decreased. The unsuccessful attempt to create the BNSP served him badly. In certain German circles he began to be considered an adventurer, with all the ensuing consequences. This opinion was also influenced by the fact that, despite all the statements, Akinchits had very few supporters. Ultimately, this led to his removal from the post of chairman of the Berlin Belarusian representative office almost immediately after his appointment. He was replaced in this post by A. Shkutka. Moreover, when at the beginning of 1940 Akinchits went to Warsaw in order, under the guise of the Belarusian Self-Help Committee, to create there a legal support for the resumption of the activities of his Nazi party, he found there a ready-made committee created by his ideological opponents. A struggle for power began, which Akinchits, despite initial success, still lost and in the second half of 1940 was forced to return to Berlin. Or rather, he was simply sent there. The fact is that the Warsaw activists were supported by the SD, so Akinczyc had no chance, even with Rosenberg’s favorable attitude.

The end of 1940 found Akinchits in Berlin, where he continued the struggle for leadership in the Belarusian emigration. His memoranda to Rosenberg date back to the same time (November 1, 1940 and January 10, 1941), in which he proposed a detailed project for joint activities of the Belarusian National Socialists and the German leadership. In general, this project included the following activities:

Organization of courses for the purpose of training political, administrative and economic figures for the future occupation administration in Belarus;

Military retraining of Belarusian prisoners of war;

Organization of courses for the purpose of training reconnaissance and sabotage personnel for their future deployment to the territory of the USSR;

Training of propagandists from among prisoners of war of Belarusian nationality.

However, that was not all. According to Akinchits, such political tasks could only be accomplished by his like-minded people (that is, the Belarusian Nazis), and therefore they should be given a leadership role. “The other political group,” he wrote, “is democratic. Her attitude towards the communists is beyond doubt; they secretly sympathize with Jews, are inclined towards pan-Slavism and treat Germany with hidden distrust. This group does not believe in the victory of Germany and, judging by its political position, strives not to compromise itself either before the Poles or the communists or believes that after the defeat of Germany the communists, and with them the Poles and Jews, will dominate Europe. This group is very hostile to our organization, constantly trying to destroy it and in no case allow German institutions to take its views into account.” After such a characterization of groups independent of Akinchits, there were his denunciations against their leaders - real and imaginary competitors of the Belarusian nationalists. Mainly, these were all those who deprived him of power in the committees of Berlin, Warsaw and Lodz - all of them had to be replaced by his like-minded people. Ermachenko’s group in Prague also suffered. The author of the denunciation memorandums considered its members to be democratically minded and with left-wing views.

However, this time Akinchits was defeated. The fact is that in Germany there was a strict ban on the activities of any political parties other than the Nazi one. This ban applied to both the Third Reich and the territories it occupied. Therefore, all projects for the legal registration of the Belarusian Nazi party remained projects, and its possible members had to carry out instructions from various German authorities only on an individual basis. For example, many of them joined the reconnaissance and sabotage groups that the Germans dropped into the territory of the USSR from December 1940 to June 1941.

Akinchits was not allowed to participate in official propaganda activities. Probably, this decision of the German authorities was influenced by his uncompromising anti-communist position, which in the light of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was too provocative. For this reason, Akinchits left the editorial office of Ranitsa, but he did not stop his propaganda activity. So, in the first half of 1941, his supporters published two brochures in Berlin - “How to create our strength” and “The road of Belarus’s struggle with Moscow.” The brochures were printed using rotary technology and looked like illegal publications.

Akinchits' period of forced inactivity ended in September 1941. This month he was appointed head of a school of propagandists (or "ideological leaders"), which was located in the town of Wustrau near Berlin. As the head of the school, Akinchits was endowed with very broad powers, including the ability to recruit the people he needed among prisoners of war and workers. This was a serious victory for Akinchits: over time, these young people were to enter the future German occupation administration of Belarus and thus become conductors of his influence.

The leader of the third group of Belarusian nationalists was the young doctor N. Shchors, an active figure in the Vilna Belarusian Student Union, which was ideologically associated with the Belarusian Front of the priest V. Godlevsky. Unlike the previous two, this was a very influential and extensive group, which had representatives in Warsaw, Lodz and Berlin. Over time, members of this group managed to occupy all the key positions in the Belarusian public organizations mentioned above, and even pushed Akinchits’ people out of the leadership of the editorial policy of the newspaper “Ranitsa”. By the way, he mainly considered them his main opponents. It was Shchors and his supporters who were listed in Akinchits’ memoranda as “secret enemies of Germany and friends of communists, Poles and Jews.”

It was representatives of this group who came up with the initiative to create a single coordination center that would lead all disparate groups of Belarusian emigration. On June 19, 1941, on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, supporters of V. Godlevsky held a meeting in Berlin, during which they tried to create such a body. This event was attended by:

From Germany - N. Szkelenok and V. Tumash (chairmen of the Belarusian Self-Help Committee in Berlin and its Lodz branch, respectively); A. Shkutka (Head of the Belarusian Representative Office in Berlin);

From the General Government - W. Godlewski (representative of the Warsaw Belarusian Committee and its branches in Krakow and Biała Podlaska).

The meeting decided to create Belarusian National Center, which formally could lay claim to the role of an organization involved in the management, planning and coordination of the activities of the Belarusian emigration in Germany and the General Government. Shchors became the chairman of the center, and its members were: V. Godlevsky, N. Shkelenok, Ch. Khanyavka, A. Shkutka, V. Tumash and others. Further, Shchors, with the assistance of Tumash, prepared a memorandum addressed to Hitler. On July 13, 1941, this document was handed over to representatives of the German military command in Warsaw. Two days later, committee members received a response stating that the wishes expressed in the memorandum would be taken into account.

It should be noted that the very fact of the creation of the center three days before the attack on the USSR indicated that the goal of its creators was not to work among the emigration. First of all, he had to coordinate all the efforts of the nationalists during the German occupation of Belarus. In the future, under favorable circumstances, this body could proclaim itself a provisional Belarusian government.

Unlike Ermachenko and Akinchits, the Shchors group was oriented towards military circles (mainly the Abwehr) and the SD. Their cooperation with these organizations began in the second half of 1940 and was aimed at recruiting and training agents for the purpose of their further dispatch to the USSR. The center of such training was the Abwehr school in the town of Lamsdorf (Germany). And the main recruiting office is the branch of the Warsaw Belarusian Committee in Biała Podlaska. No later than the spring of 1941, Shchors’ group began recruiting volunteers for Abwehr sabotage units among Belarusian prisoners of war of the former Polish Army. This will be discussed in more detail below.

It should be noted that another famous Belarusian figure, R. Ostrovsky, stood apart during this period and did not officially support any of the above groups. In this sense, he was much more cautious than other contenders for power in Belarus, whose initiatives, as it later turned out, were not backed by any real guarantees and obligations from the German side. Finally, Ostrovsky had other reasons for not participating in the events of the Belarusian national movement before the German attack on the USSR. Most of his supporters remained on the territory of Belarus, and in exile he had an irreconcilable enemy - V. Godlevsky, who could not forgive him for collaborating with the communists, and then with the Polish authorities. In such a situation, Ostrovsky decided to take a wait-and-see approach. The outbreak of the Soviet-German war found him in the insignificant position of head of the Lodz branch of the Belarusian Self-Help Committee.

German “new order” on the territory of Belarus: organization and functions

The division of occupied Belarus was completed by mid-autumn 1941. Its territory along the line Polotsk - Borisov in the east, Starye Dorogi - Lake Chervonnaye in the south, along the Zelvyanka River and the eastern edge of Belovezhskaya Pushcha in the west was allocated to the general district "Belarus" ( Generalbezirk Weißruthenien). The area of the district was only 1/4 of the BSSR and was equal to 53,660 km 2 with a population of 2,411,333 people (as of December 4, 1941). The General District "Belarus" was an integral part of the Reichskommissariat "Ostland" ( Reichskomissariat Ostland). In addition to him, this Reichskommissariat also included the general districts of “Lithuania”, “Latvia” and “Estonia”. SA-Obergruppenführer G. Lohse was placed at the head of the Reichskommissariat Ostland. His residence was in Riga (Latvia). The southern regions of Belarus, as well as part of the Brest region, became part of the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”. The Bialystok region was separated into a separate administrative unit and annexed to East Prussia. And finally, some northwestern regions of the republic were annexed to the general district “Lithuania”.

The apparatus of the civil occupation administration consisted of three levels. The highest authority in the general district "Belarus" was the General Commissariat. The commissariat was headed by SS-Gruppenführer W. Kube. And after his murder by Soviet underground fighters (September 23, 1943), the acting general commissar was the Fuhrer of the SS and police “Russia-Center and Belarus,” SS-Gruppenfuhrer K. von Gottberg.

The structure of the central apparatus of the General Commissariat was as follows. Directly subordinate to the General Commissioner were his deputy, assistant, adjutant, head of the information service and head of the personal office. Seconded to the apparatus were the Fuhrer of the SS and the police, a liaison officer with the Wehrmacht command (these branches of the occupation administration will be discussed below), and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Posts and Railways. The organization of the Office of the General Commissioner generally repeated the structure of the Reichskommissariat Ostland and the Rosenberg Ministry and consisted of four main departments - central, political, economic and technical:

The central department consisted of 9 departments (personnel, economic, accounting, procurement and supply, archives, accounting, housing, food, main bureau) and was responsible for administrative work in the General Commissariat.

The political department included 14 departments: general, settlement policy, culture, economic, labor and social policy, youth, women's, general propaganda, labor, medical, veterinary, legal, financial, science and art, general management. This department was responsible for implementing political principles and directives for administration.

The economic and technical departments resolved issues of ensuring, organizing the production and use of industrial and agricultural products in the general district and had an equally ramified structure.

The vast majority of departments of the main directorates included numerous subdivisions. For example:

Department of Food and Agriculture: land legal and land policy, state estates, market and agricultural settlements;

Department of Science and Art: School, high school, book, stage and fine arts;

Department of general propaganda: propaganda, radio, press, cinema, international relations, economic recruitment, exhibition, military service.

The middle level of civil administration was represented by the main districts ( Hauptbezirk) in Minsk and Baranovichi. At the head of this administrative unit was the chief commissioner, who was supposed to lead several districts ( Gebiet) – the next level of occupation power. Over time, it became clear that the main districts could not fully play the role assigned to them, so in March 1943 they were abolished. The territory of the general district was divided into 10 districts, in each of which a district commissariat was created. The centers of district commissariats were located in the following cities: Baranovichi, Borisov, Vileika, Gantsevichi, Glubokoe, Lida, Minsk, Novogrudok, Slonim and Slutsk. These districts, as well as the city commissariat in Minsk ( Stadtkomissariat) were the third level of civil occupation administration. The heads of the districts were the following persons:

Baranovichi - R. Werner;

Borisov - Bauer (then Buchman and Dr. H. Kaiser);

Vileika – Schmidt (then G. Magass);

Gantsevichi - W. Muller (then W. Herdt);

Glubokoe – P. Gahmann;

Lida - von Hanweg (then A. Hennig);

Minsk-city - V. Janetzke (then J. Becker);

Minsk-okrug – Dr. H. Kaiser (then Dr. L. Ehrenleiter and W. Schollmann);

Novogrudok - V. Traub (then Dr. A. Gille);

Slonim - G. Erren;

Slutsk - G. Karl.

The structure of district and city commissariats included in its administrative apparatus departments of the same name as the general commissariat.

All these administrative units were subordinate to each other directly from the bottom up. However, there were also some nuances. They mainly concerned personnel appointments to management positions. Thus, Reichskommissars and general commissars were appointed and replaced exclusively by Hitler, and district and city commissioners - by Rosenberg.

The territorial and administrative structure of the general district "Belarus" remained unchanged until the late autumn of 1943. The situation on the Eastern Front put a number of reforms on the agenda. In general, there were two reasons for this. Firstly, the rear area of Army Group Center was significantly reduced. Secondly, by this time the Germans had already lost almost the entire Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”. All that remained of it were the southwestern Belarusian territories, which had previously been its integral part - the Brest, Pinsk and Kobrin districts. Therefore, the new Commissar General von Gottberg was transferred to civil power in the eastern regions of Belarus, where it still formally belonged to the Wehrmacht. And on February 25, 1944, with Hitler’s consent, he temporarily took over the three Belarusian districts remaining from the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine” under his control. Somewhat later, part of the general district “Lithuania” was included here, along with the city of Vilnius. Finally, on April 1, 1944, Hitler issued a special order, according to which the general district “Belarus” was separated from the Reichskommissariat “Ostland” into an independent commissariat. Now von Gottberg reported exclusively to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions.

In general, the General District "Belarus" had the following quantitative indicators for individual districts:

Notes:

* Only the Plischanitsa district, the rest of the district was under the control of the military administration.

Unlike the western and central regions, the eastern part of Belarus throughout the entire period of the war was the rear area of Army Group Center. Eastern Belarus included: Vitebsk and Mogilev regions, eastern regions Minsk region, Gomel region and northern regions of Polesie region. In addition, the area of responsibility of the military administration included most of the Borisov district of the General Commissariat "Belarus" (with the exception of the Plischanitsa area). Here the organization of the occupation apparatus was somewhat different in form from the areas where the civil administration operated.

The structure of the sphere of military occupation was established on April 3, 1941 by “Special Instructions for Support, Part “C””. In accordance with them, all Soviet regions, which were under the control of the military administration and designated as the operational area of the ground forces, were divided into three zones:

The immediate area of combat operations, where the commanders of divisions and corps and the troops subordinate to them were actually themselves the executive authority in relation to the civilian population;

Behind it, at a depth of approximately 20 to 50 km, was the rear army area, in which a special commandant was appointed for each army ( Kommandeur der Rückwartigen Armeegebiet);

The rear area of army groups, the head of which was appointed one of the corps commanders ( Befehlshaber der Rückwartigen Heeresgebiet).

Head of the military administration apparatus on the territory of eastern Belarus (as well as western Russia) was the commander of the rear area and security troops of Army Group Center ( Befehlshaber der Rückwartigen Heeresgebiet Mitte), who was simultaneously subordinate to the commander of Army Group Center and the chief of logistics of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH). According to German nomenclature, this rear area had the 102nd serial number. From June 1941 to July 1944, this position was held by the following persons:

In order to exercise all the necessary powers under the post of commander of the rear area, a headquarters was created. Organizationally, this headquarters consisted of several departments, the main ones in this case were operational (I), intelligence (II) and administrative (VII). The first department controlled the security forces of this rear area. Through the second - by units of the Abwehr - German military intelligence.

The head of the seventh department supervised the military administrative bodies, which consisted of field ( Feldkommandantur; FK) and local commandant's offices ( Ortskommandantur; OK), endowed with full power in their area of action. Field commandant's offices were usually created within the region. Local commandant's offices were subordinate to them , created in cities, regional centers, large railway and highway junctions and military garrison locations. All commandant's offices had to perform two tasks: security and management. The first included “ensuring peace” in the occupied areas and protecting the rear of the active army. The second includes the creation, management and control of local governments, as well as the “mobilization of reserves” for waging war. In general, this boiled down to the following main functions: (a) fighting partisans; (b) protection of communications, military facilities and prisoner of war camps; (c) intelligence and counterintelligence activities; (d) conducting propaganda. In total, during the period from 1941 to 1944, 11 field and 23 local commandant’s offices functioned on the territory of eastern Belarus (in general, throughout the entire territory of Belarus this ratio was 18:48).

To perform these functions, units of the army order service were assigned to each type of commandant's office. In the rear area of Army Group Center, they were represented by the secret field police and the field gendarmerie, who carried out investigative and punitive measures, respectively, in the area of jurisdiction of the military administration.

After the transfer of most of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic republics to civilian administration, the military administration bodies, as being of a temporary nature, were gradually phased out. However, this did not happen completely. According to the directive of the head of the OKW, Field Marshal W. Keitel, dated March 13, 1941, the influence of Wehrmacht structures was to extend to areas under the jurisdiction of the civilian occupation administration. For these purposes, the positions of commanders of Wehrmacht troops with corresponding troop contingents and far-reaching powers were introduced in both Reichskommissariats. Thus, in the Reichskommissariat Ostland such a position was established on June 24, 1941. On this day, the commander of the Wehrmacht troops on the territory of this administrative unit ( Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ostland) was appointed Lieutenant General (from September 1, 1942 - General of Cavalry) V. Bramer. It should be said that initially he did not have any troops at his disposal. From his headquarters in Riga, Bramer directed the activities of only three main field commandant's offices ( Oberfeldkommandantur; OFK):

No. 392 (Minsk) or “protected area of Belarus”;

No. 394 (Riga) or “protected area Latvia”;

No. 396 (Kaunas) or “protected area Lithuania”.

The commander of the Wehrmacht troops reported directly to the OKW and had the right to give orders on all issues that he considered necessary to ensure the occupation regime. Often these issues were resolved without taking into account the opinion of the Commissioner General. However, they were by no means limited to solving only military problems. The aforementioned instructions from Keitel, on the contrary, urgently demanded:

1. Close cooperation with the Reich Commissioners to assist them in carrying out political tasks.

2. Using the occupied territory for military purposes and providing it with economic resources for the needs of the German economy.

3. Exploitation of the occupied territory to supply the German armed forces in accordance with the requirements of the OKW.

It was already mentioned above that, in fact, since February 1944, the general district “Belarus” became independent administrative unit in the system of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions. In this regard, on its territory it was decided to establish an independent structure for the commander of the Wehrmacht troops, who was supposed to be vertically subordinate to Cavalry General Bramer. As a result, the commander of the Wehrmacht troops in Belarus ( Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Weißruthenien) General of the Cavalry E. von Rothkirch-und-Trach was appointed. This happened on April 19, 1944, two weeks after Belarus (already legally) became an independent district in the system of civil occupation administration. At the same time, this general was the commander of the rear area of Army Group Center and the commandant of the main field commandant's office No. 392 ( Oberfeldkommandantur 392), which was located in Minsk. Vertically, field commandant's offices in Minsk were subordinate to him ( FK 812) and Baranovichi ( FK 400) and local commandant's offices in Minsk ( OK 650), Molodechno ( OK 812), Slutsk ( OK 343), Glubokoye ( OK 339), Baranovichi ( OK 264), Lida ( OK 355) and Gantsevich ( OK 352), who controlled the territories of all district commissariats.

On July 1, 1944, after the territory of Belarus had already been cleared of the Germans, the headquarters of the commander of the Wehrmacht troops was transferred to Poland, where on its basis the Main Command "Rotkirch" was created ( Generalkommando Rothkirch). This unit was first subordinate to the command of Army Group Center, and from July 11 it was reassigned to the command of the 3rd Tank Army. The team was disbanded on November 12, 1944.

Finally, according to Hitler’s order of July 17, 1941, Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police G. Himmler was entrusted with “police support for the eastern territories.” The latter appointed the chief Fuehrers of the SS and police (Höhere SS– und Polizeiführer; HSSPf), who were the highest police officials in the Reichskommissariats or, in agreement with the military administration, in the rear areas of army groups. Although the SS and police Fuehrers were formally subordinate to the Reichskommissars or were operationally subordinate to the commanders of the rear areas of the army groups, only Himmler had real power over them. This last fact meant that the police structures acted in parallel, and on equal terms, with the civil and military administration.

From June 29 (actually from September) 1941, the chief Fuhrer of the SS and police in the territory of the Reichskommissariat Ostland and in the rear area of Army Group North (HSSPf Russland-Nord) was SS-Gruppenführer and Police General H.-A. Prützmann, who was already replaced on November 1 by SS-Obergruppenführer and Police General F. Jeckeln. In the general districts that were part of the Reichskommissariat, local SS and police Fuhrers were subordinate to him. Thus, in the general district “Belarus” this position, with headquarters in Minsk, was occupied by SS-Gruppenführer J. Sporrenberg, who performed his duties from July 21 to August 14, 1941. As you know, Belarus was a very troubled area in terms of maintaining public order. Therefore, the main police officials on its territory changed quite often. In general, their list after Sporrenberg looked like this:

The apparatus of each SS Fuhrer and the police as a whole copied the police structures of Germany. In this case, the apparatus of the SS Fuhrer and the police of the general district “Belarus” was no exception ( SSPf Weißruthenien). Organizationally, he was subordinate to:

Head of the Security Police and SD of the General District "Belarus" ( Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und SD Weißruthenien). This official , in turn, the local chiefs of the Gestapo, SD and criminal police were subordinate;

Chief of the Order Police of the General District "Belarus" ( Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei Weißruthenien). Subordinate to him, in turn, were the local chiefs of the security police, the gendarmerie, the railway guard, and later the “auxiliary order police” recruited from local volunteers.

In the districts and districts of the general district "Belarus" there were structural units of the SS Fuhrer's apparatus and the police, which were headed, respectively, by district and district Fuhrers. There were six police districts in total, which were slightly larger than the civil administration districts: Baranovichi - Gantsevichi, Vileika, Glubokoe, Lida - Novogrudok, Minsk - Slutsk and Slonim. The security police and order police departments were represented in these districts by the corresponding main and regular departments.

It should be said that each of the two police departments of the general district "Belarus" had dual subordination. On the one hand, he was led by his SS and police Fuhrer, and through him by the chief SS and police Fuhrer of the Ostland. On the other hand, it was subordinate to the corresponding headquarters in Berlin. However, in this case this did not play a significant role, since the only head of all SS departments was Himmler. Another feature of the police apparatus in occupied Soviet territory was that it was not as structured as in Germany. There was a shortage of professional personnel. In this regard, the occupiers were forced to create combined police forces. That is, security police and SD officers simultaneously performed the functions of both the Gestapo and the criminal police. The situation was similar in the sphere of competence of the order police.

As mentioned above, in addition to the territory of the general district of Belarus, there was also an extensive police apparatus, which was also subordinate to Himmler, in the rear area of Army Group Center. By agreement with the OKW, its employees were to perform the same functions as in the territory of civil jurisdiction.

So, in June (actually May 1), 1941, for the purpose of “police support” of the specified rear area, a special post of the chief Fuhrer of the SS and police “Russia-Center” was established ( HSSPf Russland-Mitte). Until June 21, 1944, it was occupied by SS-Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of Police E. von dem Bach-Zelewski. The headquarters of the Chief Fuhrer of the SS and the Russia-Center police was located in Mogilev (since 1943 - in Minsk) and generally copied the apparatus of the Chief Fuhrer of the SS and the Russia-North police. Thus, the local (garrison) Fuhrers of the SS and police were subordinate to him ( SS– und Polizei Standartführer) in the following settlements: Baranovichi, Smolensk, Mogilev, Vitebsk and in the so-called “Pripyat” region - the southern regions of Belarus, centered in Pinsk, which were transferred to the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”.

On April 1, 1943, the police apparatus in Belarus, the western regions of Russia and in general in the Reichskommissariat Ostland underwent a significant and multi-stage reorganization. On this day, the Fuhrer of the SS and police of the general district "Belarus" was removed from the subordination of the chief Fuhrer of the SS and police of the region "Russia-North" and was reassigned to E. von dem Bach-Zelewski. In turn, his position was now called Chief Fuhrer of the SS and Police "Russia-Center and Belarus" ( HSSPf Russland-Mitte und Weißruthenien). This happened for several reasons. Firstly, to subordinate the entire territory of Belarus, which by that time had already become the near rear of Army Group Center, under a single police command. And secondly, this was one of the signs that Belarus would soon become an independent general district. Finally, on June 21, 1944, the joint position was occupied by SS-Gruppenführer and Police Lieutenant General K. von Gottberg. Thus, this official concentrated in his hands the entirety of police and civil power on the territory of Belarus, receiving virtually dictatorial powers.

Over time, each of the branches of the German occupation administration began to involve the population of occupied Belarus in one way or another. In the civil sphere, this was initially expressed in the creation and functioning of so-called local self-government bodies - rural, district and city administrations. They were, accordingly, headed by: elders, heads of district and city departments. These bodies were created immediately after the establishment of German military or civil administration in a given territory. Politically, self-government was absolutely passive and powerless, and its leaders were completely subordinate to the corresponding German officials (district or city commissioners). If such self-government bodies were created in the area of military administration, then their leaders were subordinate to the chiefs of field or local commandant’s offices.

The general management of the district was in the hands of the head of the district administration. He was personally responsible for all institutions and farms subordinate to him, had to ensure “peace and order” in the territory under his jurisdiction, combat manifestations of sabotage, sabotage, disobedience to the occupation authorities, organize the “seizure” of products for the needs of Germany and meet the needs of Wehrmacht units that were stationed in his area. The head of the district was appointed and dismissed from office at the proposal of the field commandant's office, the commander of the rear area of the army or army group, and in the general commissariat - the commandant of the local commandant's office or the district commissar. The structure of the district administration included the following main departments: general management, "auxiliary police of order", schools and cultural institutions, health, veterinary, financial, construction, industry, supply and labor. Over time, another department appeared - propaganda. Their leaders were usually appointed by the head of the district administration in agreement with the local military or civilian German commander.

The next most important figure in local government was the burgomaster. In this case, this term had two meanings: the head of the community administration (usually the former Soviet village council, consisting of several villages) or the head of the city administration, who reported to the head of the corresponding district administration.

For his territory, the burgomaster’s tasks were absolutely the same as those of the head of the district administration for the region. The procedure for appointment and dismissal from a position was the same. The burgomaster's apparatus consisted of the same departments as the district administration.

The lowest authority of local government was the rural administration, headed by the headman. The latter, as a rule, was appointed by the burgomaster of the community. The practical work of rural administrations sometimes boiled down to the usual accounting routine. However, in most cases, and this is typical for Belarus, due to difficulties with communication, the extent of the territory and, most importantly, the active resistance of the population to the occupation policy, work in villages often went beyond the scope of their duties. The affairs of rural administration often required such efforts that in most areas the Germans had to pay the village elders a salary. At first they worked on a voluntary basis. The headman, with his assistant, accountant and subordinate police officers, had to carry out all orders of the German administration, the burgomaster and the head of the district administration. For example, their tasks included: registering arrivals, keeping records of the local population, collecting taxes, providing supplies for Wehrmacht units, providing labor, horse-drawn transport, apartments for military units, etc.

As a rule, people who had already proven themselves to be “politically reliable” and active collaborators of the occupiers were appointed to the positions of heads of local government at all levels. When appointed to a position, they had to undergo verification by the SD (in the civilian zone) or the secret field police (in the military zone). However, in the future, all these people continued to be under the supervision of one or another German authorities. As for staffing the executive apparatus of departments (departments), the Germans tried to recruit employees who were already familiar with the work of such bodies. Therefore, it is not surprising that many former Soviet employees remained to work in these departments, who continued to sympathize with the previous government (and sometimes even from the NKVD apparatus).

Another feature of the personnel policy when staffing local self-government was that representatives of various Belarusian nationalist organizations very actively tried to get into these positions. Their main goal was to “Belarusify” these bodies and thereby force them to work not for the Germans, but for the Belarusian national idea. In a number of cases this was not so easy to do. Firstly, the Germans at first did not really favor manifestations of any kind of nationalism. Secondly, Belarusian activists had competitors who also fought for seats in local government with the same goals. In Western Belarus these were Poles, and in Eastern Belarus they were Russians. Often things got to the point where they wrote denunciations against each other, accusing their opponents of hidden communism. And the Germans often believed such denunciations. Sometimes denunciations against nationalists were written by hidden supporters of the Soviet regime or by those who worked in self-government on instructions from the Soviet secret services or partisans, thus removing them with German hands. Naturally, all this did not contribute to fruitful work.

Security forces of the occupation regime

The armed support of the regime created by the Nazis on the territory of Belarus were the forces for maintaining public order. This general name refers to the security forces that were subordinate to each of the specified forms of occupation administration. These are primarily army units stationed in the military administration zone, and police units operating in both the civilian and military zones.

The occupation units of the Wehrmacht, subordinate to the commander of the rear area and security forces of Army Group Center, consisted of the following structures:

The actual units and formations of the Wehrmacht (security divisions and other, smaller formations);

Military intelligence units - Abwehr;

Secret field police units;

Field gendarmerie units.

Wehrmacht security divisions ( Sicherungs Division) represented the main force for maintaining public order in the area of responsibility of the military administration. The creation of these divisions began in January 1941, and their existence as special Wehrmacht formations was legitimized by the order of the commander of the Reserve Army, Colonel General F. Fromm, dated March 3, 1941. Based on this order, 3 infantry divisions were disbanded, the officers and non-commissioned officers of which went to staff 9 security divisions. After this, each of the rear areas of the army groups received three of them. Army Group Center fell to the 221st, 286th and 403rd.

The new divisions were significantly different from the usual Wehrmacht infantry division: they were inferior to it both in organization and in armament. For example, the 286th Security Division (commander - Lieutenant General K. Müller) had the following structure:

354th Infantry Regiment ( Infanterie Regiment Nr.354) – consisted of three infantry battalions;

61st Security Regiment ( Landesschützen Regiment Nr.61);

213th Artillery Regiment ( Artillerie Regiment Nr.213) - in fact, only his 2nd division, consisting of three batteries;

704th Security (Guard) Battalion ( Wach Bataillon Nr.704);

354th Engineer Company ( Pionier Kompanie Nr.354).

The remaining security divisions were in the same situation. Naturally, such forces were clearly not enough to maintain order in such a vast territory. Therefore, the number of security divisions soon had to be increased. In total, during the war, 15 such formations operated in the occupied Soviet regions. By December 1941, there were four of them on the territory of Belarus proper:

201st (headquarters in Lepel);

203rd (headquarters in Bobruisk);

221st (headquarters in Gomel);

286th (headquarters in Vitebsk).

In addition to the security divisions, 229 separate infantry companies, 12 anti-tank companies, 9 heavy weapons companies and 11 artillery batteries, as well as some Slovak units and the so-called regimental-type Legion of French Volunteers, served to maintain order in the rear area of Army Group Center.

It was already said above that on April 19, 1944, the territory of the general district “Belarus” was allocated to a special rear area with its own system for managing the security units located here. The following formations were subordinate to its chief, General of the Cavalry E. von Rotkirch-und-Trach:

On April 15, 1944 - the 221st Security Division and the 8th Hungarian Army Corps as part of the 24th Mixed and 23rd Reserve Divisions;

On May 15, 1944 - 52nd Special Purpose Security Division, 221st Security and 391st Infantry Divisions;

Another structure of the Wehrmacht was military intelligence - the Abwehr ( Abwehr). On the territory of the general district “Belarus” it was represented by a special residency operating in Minsk from March 1942 to June 1944. Until mid-1942, this body was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Krebitz, later, until mid-1943, by Major Kessner, who was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Euler. The main task of the residency was to organize the fight against Red Army intelligence, paratroopers, radio operators and underground fighters in cities and other populated areas. For this purpose, it had three special local representations ( aussenstelle). These bodies were located at local commandant's offices in Glubokoe, Molodechno and Vilnius and had generally the same tasks.

In the spring of 1941, almost before the attack on the USSR, each Wehrmacht army group was assigned Abwehrkommandos ( Abwehrkommando), and the armies - Abwehrgruppen subordinate to these commands ( Abwehrgroup). According to its functional responsibilities, each of the Abwehrkommandos (and Abwehrgruppen) had to engage in reconnaissance, sabotage or counterintelligence activities. Therefore, in their nomenclature they had, respectively, the number “1”, “2” or “3”, which indicated the number of the department in the Main Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Abwehr). It was these units and the special schools subordinate to them that were the main intelligence and counterintelligence agencies throughout the Eastern Front.

Of these, the following operated on the territory of eastern Belarus from 1941 to 1944:

At the disposal of the headquarters of Army Group Center are the 103rd, 203rd and 303rd Abwehrkommandos;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 2nd Field Army are the 105th, 205th and 207th Abwehrgruppen;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 4th Field Army are the 108th, 208th, 308th and 316th Abwehrgruppen;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 9th Field Army are the 209th, 307th and 309th Abwehrgruppen;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Group (then the army) are the 107th (soon transferred to the 9th Field Army) and the 109th Abwehrgruppe;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Group (then the army) are the 101st, 113th, 210th, 310th and 318th Abwehrgruppen;

At the disposal of various commandant's offices - 215, 315, 325th and the so-called Luftgruppe ( Luftgruppe).

In addition to these units, since March 1942, the so-called Special Headquarters “Russia” operated throughout Belarus ( Sonderstab-R) under the leadership of the white emigrant Major B. Holmston-Smyslovsky. The main goal of this organization was to fight the Soviet partisan movement, as well as train personnel for the insurgent movement in the rear of the Red Army. At the end of 1943, this headquarters was disbanded. A short time later, at the beginning of 1944, a new intelligence agency was created with the same tasks - the Ingvar headquarters ( Ingvar). Its leader was a former employee of Holmston, Russian emigrant I. Jung. The headquarters was located in Minsk, and its residencies were in Baranovichi and Borisov. In June 1944, most of the Ingvar employees left along with the retreating German troops.

A special role in the system of the occupation apparatus of eastern Belarus was played by the secret field police ( Geheime Feldpolizei; GFP). Being an integral part of the Wehrmacht, it carried out military and police functions. In essence, the secret field police performed the same functions in the military administration zone as the security police and SD in the civil administration territory. Its tasks included: (a) organizing counterintelligence activities to protect headquarters and personal protection of senior command personnel; (b) monitoring military correspondence, monitoring postal, telegraph and telephone communications of the civilian population; (c) assistance in the protection of postal messages; (d) search for military personnel of the enemy armies remaining in the occupied territory; (e) conducting inquiries and supervising suspicious persons in a war zone.

Secret field police units were represented by groups ( Group) at the headquarters of army groups, armies and field commandant's offices and commissariats ( Commissariat) - at the headquarters of corps, divisions and some local commandant's offices. The groups and commissariats were subordinate to the chief of the secret field police of the corresponding army group and the Abwehr officer of the corresponding headquarters and/or commandant's offices. Groups and teams of secret field police assigned to field and local commandant's offices were their executive bodies. Each group consisted of two to five commissariats, which, in turn, were divided into external teams ( Aussenkommando). The number of groups varied. If in 1939 - 1940 it consisted of 50 people (manager, 32 mid-level employees and 17 support staff - drivers, stenographers, security), then during the war against the USSR their number increased to 95 people (manager, 54 middle-level employees and 40 support staff). In addition, the units of this police had groups of full-time agents and small military units for punitive operations against partisans, conducting raids, guarding and escorting those arrested. All groups were fully motorized. The main governing body for all parts of the secret field police was a special group of the military administration department of the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Until the very end of the war, it was headed by SS-Oberführer and Security Police Colonel W. Kirchbaum.

From 1941 to 1943, secret field police groups were located in the following settlements in eastern Belarus: Bobruisk, Borisov, Vitebsk, Lepel, Mogilev, Orsha, Starye Dorogi and Polotsk. In this case governing bodies for them there were headquarters of the following military formations:

9th Field Army - 580th Group;

3rd Tank Group - 703rd Group;

2nd Tank Group - 639th and 612th Groups;

4th Field Army - 570th Group.

Field gendarmerie units also operated throughout the occupied territory of eastern Belarus ( Feldgendarmerie), which carried out the functions of order police in the troops and in the area of responsibility of the military administration. Usually its tasks included: (a) fighting partisans in the area of deployment; (b) regulation of the movement of troops on the march; (c) setting up checkpoints, checking documents, escorting prisoners of war; (d) security of ports and airfields; (e) enforcement of sentences of military courts. In addition, moving directly behind the regular troops, the field gendarmerie supervised the creation of local authorities in the occupied territories, searched for deserters, collected refugees and prisoners of war, protected trophies from looting and controlled the surrender of weapons by the local population.

At army groups and armies there were gendarmerie battalions, subordinate to the commander of the corresponding rear area, and at the headquarters of corps and divisions - detachments ( Troupe). Each battalion consisted organizationally of three companies. The company was divided into three platoons, each of which had 4 officers, 90 non-commissioned officers and 22 privates. All field gendarmerie units were fully motorized. The senior officer of the entire gendarmerie was subordinate to the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Ground Forces.

On the territory of eastern Belarus, the field gendarmerie operated under the corresponding military formations and administrative structures: gendarmerie departments functioned in regional centers, gendarmerie posts in regional centers, and in rural areas employees of strongholds kept order. For example, in 1941 - 1943 there were the following field gendarmerie battalions:

At the disposal of the headquarters of Army Group Center is the 690th battalion;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 9th Field Army is the 531st battalion;

The headquarters of the 3rd Tank Group has at its disposal the 551st, 694th and 695th battalions;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 2nd tank group is the 591st battalion;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 2nd Field Army is the 581st Battalion;

At the disposal of the headquarters of the 4th Field Army are the 695th, 696th and 697th battalions.

The civil and police occupation administration also had their own armed forces, which consisted of the following structures:

Units and subunits of the SS troops;

Units and units of the German paramilitary police;

Units of the so-called SD operational groups.

The basis for the grouping of SS troops in the rear area of Army Group Center were units and subunits under the so-called Reichsführer-SS Command Headquarters ( Kommandostab Raichsführer-SS). This body was created in April 1941 as part of the personal headquarters of the Reichsführer-SS. In essence, it was Himmler's field headquarters, whose responsibilities included the general leadership of the SS troops, as well as coordinating their activities with the efforts of the police and the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories. However, in addition to purely administrative structures, this headquarters also had at its disposal a number of units of the SS troops, which on June 27, 1941 were transferred to the disposal of the Chief Fuhrer of the SS and the Russia-Center police, SS-Gruppenfuhrer E. von dem Bach-Zelewski. This:

1st SS Infantry (Motorized) Brigade ( 1. SS-Infanterie-Brigade(mot.);

2nd SS Infantry (Motorized) Brigade ( 1. SS-Infanterie-Brigade(mot.

1st and 2nd SS Cavalry Regiments ( SS-Kavallerie-Regiment Nr. 1 and 2) - in August 1941, both regiments were consolidated into the 1st SS Cavalry Brigade ( 1. SS-Kavallerie-Brigade);

Volunteer standard of the SS "Hamburg" ( SS-Freiwilligen-Standarte Hamburg) - transferred to the disposal of the Chief Fuhrer of the SS and the Russia-North police;

Escort battalion Reichsfuehrer SS(SS-Begleit-Bataillon Raichsführer-SS);

1st Air Defense Battalion of the Reichsführer-SS Command Headquarters ( SS-Flak-Bataillon Kommandostab Raichsführer-SS I) – formed in 1942;

2nd Air Defense Battalion of the Reichsführer-SS Command Headquarters ( SS-Flak-Bataillon Kommandostab Raichsführer-SS II) – formed in 1943;

SS Air Defense Division "Vostok" ( SS-Flak-Abteilung Ost);

SS Special Forces Battalion ( Bataillon der Waffen-SS z.b.V.);

10th Police Signal Company ( Polizei-Nachrichten-Kompanie Nr. 10);

SS Special Team "Dirlewanger" ( SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger) - arrived on the territory of Belarus in January 1942.

On April 28, 1941, the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Major General E. Wagner, signed an agreement with Reichsführer SS Himmler regarding the additional use of police and SS troops in the rear areas of all three army groups. In accordance with this agreement, each rear area received a motorized police regiment, and each security division received a motorized police battalion ( Polizei-Bataillon). According to the same agreement, all these units were to be operationally subordinate to the respective commanders of the ground forces. For example, in the rear area of Army Group Center they were distributed as follows:

213th Security Division - 91st Police Battalion;

286th Security Division - 134th Police Battalion;

403rd Security Division - 111th Police Battalion.

In addition to these battalions, a number of SS and police formations operated in the front-line zone, which were the security forces of the apparatus of the Chief Fuehrer of the SS and the police of the corresponding rear area. In this case, we are talking about the chief Fuhrer of the SS and the Russia-Center police, who had full police power in his area of responsibility (army commanders could give orders to his units only in case of “urgent need for combat use”, but usually he obeyed only Himmler ). In July 1941, he had at his disposal:

Police regiment "Center" ( Polizei-Regiment Mitte);

32, 131, 307, 308, 309, 316, 317, 322 and 323rd police battalions;

31st Police Signal Company ( Polizei-Nachrichten-Kompanie Nr. 31).

In April–May 1943, due to the strengthening of the partisan movement, police forces in eastern Belarus were significantly increased. Now their grouping looked like this:

Police regiment "Center" ( Polizei-Regiment Mitte);

2, 8, 13, 14, 22, 24, 26, 31 and 36th police regiments;

6, 11, 32, 51, 85, 91, 111, 122, 131, 134, 301, 307, 308, 313 and 316th police battalions.

On March 13, 1941, a meeting was held between the head of the Main Directorate of Reich Security (RSHA), SS-Gruppenführer R. Heydrich, and Major General E. Wagner. The result of these negotiations was the creation of so-called task forces ( Einsatzgruppe) Security Services (SD), which were supposed to operate in the rear areas of army groups and perform the following functions: (a) ensure the safety of documents, archives, files of suspicious persons, organizations and groups; (b) detain emigration leaders, saboteurs, terrorists; (c) detect and destroy hostile elements (usually Jews, communists, gypsies, etc. fell under this definition) and prevent hostile activities on the part of the local population; (d) inform the army command about the political situation in the occupied territory.

A total of four operational groups were created: “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”, each of which was assigned to a corresponding army group. In the rear area of Army Group Center, Operational Group B operated ( Einsatzgruppe B), whose headquarters were located first in Bialystok, then in Minsk and Smolensk, and from August 1943 - again in Minsk. The main area of activity of this group was the areas of Minsk and Smolensk. Its first chief was SS-Brigadeführer and Major General of Police A. Nebe, who held this position from June 1 to November 16, 1941.

Typically, the composition of the task force consisted of from 550 to 1200 people, which included SD, Gestapo, criminal police, order police, SS troops and support personnel (radio operators, motorcyclists, etc.). Since August 1941, local volunteers also began to be accepted into such groups (as translators and performers of “dirty work”).

Each of the operational groups consisted of several units. For example, Task Force "B" included:

Operational commands ( Einsatzkommando) 8 and 9;

Special teams ( Sonderkommando) 7-a and 7-b;

Advanced team "Moscow" ( Vorkommando Moscow), from January 1942 - special team 7-ts ( Sonderkommando 7c).

Each of these divisions acted completely independently, as they were even subordinate to different authorities. For example, operational teams 8 and 9 and special teams 7-b and 7-c were operationally subordinate to the chief of the security police and SD of the military zone of occupation, and operational team 7-a was at the disposal of the same official, but in the general district "Belarus" . The result of the activities of Task Force “B” on the territory of Belarus and western Russia was the destruction of more than 134 thousand civilians. After the liberation of the territory of Belarus, there was no longer a need to use this group, and on August 29, 1944 it was disbanded.

Speaking about the activities of the operational groups of the Security Police and SD, one cannot ignore one more responsibility assigned to their commanders. By agreement with the civil and military administration, they were engaged in the formation of security police and SD bodies in the occupied territories, providing them with their organizational structures and human resources. Thus, the units of the operational group A. Nebe (headquarters, special teams 7-b and 7-a) over time, respectively, became the headquarters of the chief chief of the security police and SD "Russia-Center", the office of the chief chief of the security police and SD "Russia-Center" and the office of the chief of the security police and SD "Belarus".

The power structures of the SS Fuhrer and the police in the civil administration zone began to be created somewhat later - in September 1941. In contrast to the police apparatus of the Fuhrer of the military zone, they were initially insignificant and consisted mainly of gendarmerie units, which were at the disposal of the head of the order police department in Belarus. So, in April 1943, the following units were subordinate to him:

6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 49, 50th motorized gendarmerie platoons;

Commandant's company at the headquarters of the Chief of the Order Police.

It should be emphasized that the development of forces to maintain order in the territory of the general district “Belarus” proceeded somewhat differently than in the zone of military administration. Here the Germans relied on the use of local and foreign collaborationist formations. Local collaborationist formations began to be created almost immediately after the first days of the occupation. But their history, organization, structure, and combat use will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. Here it would be more appropriate to say a few words about those “eastern” units and divisions that, due to various circumstances, ended up on the territory of Belarus.

Due to the fact that Belarus occupied a key position for the rear of the entire Eastern Front, the Germans attached paramount importance to its pacification. However, as was shown above, own strength They didn't have it for that. Therefore, to protect communications and territory, the German military command and police leadership began to attract volunteer formations from various peoples of the USSR, which they began to create in August 1941. Over time, these and local volunteer formations became virtually the backbone of all public order protection. From August 1941 to July 1944, there were a significant number of them on the territory of Belarus, which can be conditionally classified according to the following indicators: (a) nationality; (b) the type of occupation administration under whose jurisdiction they operated, and, accordingly, to which authority they were subject; (c) whether they were formed on the territory of Belarus, arrived here as a reinforcement of the local police apparatus, or retreated along with German troops.

The national characteristic is the most significant and covers both subsequent indicators. According to it, the following units and formations of “eastern” volunteers can be distinguished (this list contains all volunteer formations, with the exception of Belarusian ones):

The “eastern” volunteer formations also include the so-called Special SS Command “Dirlewanger”. Initially, this unit was exclusively German, but after several months of anti-partisan war on the territory of Belarus, it included a number of units staffed exclusively by “Eastern” volunteers (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.).

Volunteer formations protected public order throughout the territory of Belarus, being at the disposal of all branches of the occupation administration. In general it looked like this (although there were exceptions):

Mainly all Russian formations, eastern battalions, Cossack units and units of the Eastern Legions operated under the command of the rear area and security forces of Army Group Center;

All battalions Schuma were distributed between the corresponding structures of the Chief Fuhrer of the SS and the police “Russia-Center” and the Fuhrer of the SS and the police of the general district “Belarus” (the 1st East Muslim SS Regiment was also subordinate to the latter).

Having analyzed the system for maintaining public order and its armed forces on the territory of Belarus, we can say that during the entire period of occupation there was a steady growth. So, if in 1941–1942 their number was approximately 160 thousand, then by the spring of 1944 it increased to 250 thousand people.

To summarize what has been said, it should be emphasized that Belarusian military collaboration did not arise spontaneously, but was generated by a whole complex of reasons, both internal and external. Nevertheless, among the most significant points that had a significant impact on its appearance, it is necessary to highlight the following.

The first aspect is the history of the emergence of the Belarusian nationalist movement. As can be noted, in fact, the main milestones of its development are no different from the mythology of a number of similar movements that appeared in large numbers in the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century. However, Belarusian separatism had a number of features that cannot be ignored. Firstly, its ideological and historical justification is based exclusively on myths, even in comparison with Ukrainian nationalism. Secondly, these myths were so unconvincing that even the Belarusian population itself did not believe them. That is why the emergence of Belarusian separatism in the political arena (1917 – 1921) ended in such a failure. Thirdly, all the separatist movements that arose in the Russian Empire before the First World War used outside help in one way or another. But only in the case of the Belarusian national movement did this help take on a total character, since without the help of, for example, Germany or Poland, this movement would never have gone beyond the framework of marginal cultural and educational circles. All this ultimately led the Belarusian Nazis to an alliance with Hitler’s Germany.

Further. Studying the plans of the Nazi military-political leadership regarding the future political organization of the “eastern territories” in general and Belarus in particular, one cannot help but note that there was a model for such an organization. And as is clear from the sources, its main bearers were Rosenberg and some circles of the military command. Another thing is that the military was almost immediately removed from the analysis of this problem by Hitler, who preferred to work with Rosenberg. But the latter’s point of view was not final. Beginning in the mid-1930s, he was forced to reconcile it with Hitler's views, which, as we have seen, were rather chaotic and unstable. As a result, a unified concept for the reorganization of the “eastern territories” was never actually developed. It would be a mistake to assume that Hitler’s point of view remained the only one and was accepted by everyone. Formally, the entire administrative and political structure of the occupied Soviet territories was organized according to his views. However, since they were of an extremely general nature, the German authorities responsible for carrying out the “Eastern Policy” entered the war with completely different settings. This is the second aspect.

Finally, the third aspect was as follows. One of the reasons for such an attitude towards the Belarusian issue was the lack of faith of the German military-political leadership in the strength and capabilities of Belarusian nationalism. This naturally affected the relationship between German authorities and the Belarusian emigration. Neither political nor military authorities considered her a serious partner. The only positive aspect of these pre-war contacts can only be considered that the leaders of the national movement managed to put the Belarusian issue on the agenda.

Subsequently, these moments had a significant impact on German occupation policy, playing a very controversial role in attracting the local population to cooperation.

* * *

The given introductory fragment of the book Belarusian Collaborators. Cooperation with occupiers on the territory of Belarus. 1941–1945 (O. V. Romanko, 2013) provided by our book partner -

Preparation of the Belarusian collaboration before the start of the war
The training of Belarusian collaborators by the Third Reich began in the mid-to-late 1930s, when a Belarusian representative office was created under the German Ministry of Internal Affairs - first in Berlin and then in other German cities. It was engaged in identifying and recruiting persons willing to assist Germany in Belarusian issues. Thus, the third president of the BPR, Vasily Zakharka, wrote a detailed report on the political, economic and cultural situation of Belarus, and also addressed a memorandum to Hitler with assurances of support. In addition, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee was created, an organization that actively recruited members among Belarusians living in Germany. With the outbreak of World War II, the German command created bases in Warsaw and Biala Podlaska for the transfer of Belarusian patriotic agents to the territory of the USSR. In Berlin, in the Vustavu camp, courses for propagandists and translators were organized from among Belarusian patriots to work in Belarus after the change of occupation power.

The situation that had developed by 1943 forced the German command to reconsider its attitude towards the collaborationist movement. To a large extent, this happened thanks to the efforts of the Minister of Eastern Occupied Territories A. Rosenberg, who was a supporter of the creation of collaborationist administrations. On June 22, 1943, the Union of Belarusian Youth (UBM) was formally created, which became an analogue of the Hitler Youth in Belarus (in fact, it existed since 1942). On the initiative of Cuba, on June 27, 1943, the creation of the Council of Confidence under the General Commissariat of Belarus was proclaimed. This body was an administrative commission, whose sole task was to process and present wishes and proposals from the population to the occupation authorities. On December 21, 1943, instead of the Rada of Trust, on the initiative of K. Gotberg (who became the General Commissioner after the murder of Cuba by partisans), the Belarusian Central Rada (BCR) was created, the head of the administration of the Minsk district, R. Ostrovsky (1887-1976), was appointed its president. The activities of the Rada were not effective, since the Rada did not have real political power (only in matters of social care, culture and education it had the right to relatively independent decisions), and its members held different views on the future of Belarus and often did not know local conditions. In occupied Belarus, many collaborationist newspapers and magazines were published: “Belorusskaya Gazeta”, “Pagonya” (Pahonia), “Biełaruski hołas” (Belarusian Voice), “Novy Shlyakh” (New Way), etc. These publications carried out anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet and pro-fascist propaganda. In a special article published on September 25, 1943 after the destruction of Kube in the Belorusskaya Gazeta, the editor of this newspaper, Vladislav Kozlovsky, wrote: “The heart is compressed by grief... He (that is, Kube - author) is no longer among us. General Commissioner Wilhelm Kube was one of the best, most heartfelt friends... who thought and spoke like every Belarusian nationalist...".

February 23, 1944 In 1999, K. Gottberg issued an order to create the Belarusian Regional Defense (BKO), a military collaborationist formation, whose leader was Franz Kuschel, and instructed the BCR to carry out mobilization. The 45 BKO battalions formed by the end of March were poorly armed. Their discipline gradually decreased and there were not enough officers. By the end of the occupation, the BKO was used to fight partisans, guard various objects and carry out economic work.

Main collaborationist formations in the German armed forces
* 1st Belarusian assault platoon
* Belarusian Railway Guard Battalion
* 13th Belarusian police battalion SD
* Novogrudok squadron
* 1st Personnel Battalion of the Belarusian Regional Defense
* Order Auxiliary Police Brigade "Siegling"
* 30th SS Grenadier Division (1st Belarusian)
* Grenadier brigade of SS troops (1st Belarusian)
* Belarusian Self-Defense Corps (BSA). Head Ivan Ermachenko.
* Belarusian Central Rada (BCR). President Radoslav Ostrovsky.
* Belarusian Regional Defense (BKA). Commander Franz Kuschel.
* Union of Belarusian Youth (UBY). Leaders - Nadezhda Abramova (1942-1943), Mikhail Ganko (since 1943).
* Belarusian People's Self-Help (BNS) - occupation police. Head Yuri Sobolevsky.
* Belarusian glad of trust. Chairman Vaclav Ivanovsky.
* Battalion "Dahlwitz".
* 38th SS Grenadier Division "Nibelungen"

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

Collaborationism in the occupied territory of Belarus briefly. Belarusian collaborationism in the Great Patriotic War

* * *

* * *