Within a week, the heads of five regions resigned. Why they didn’t want to work and “who would hire the new guy” - political scientist Nikolai Petrov answers these questions for Fontanka.
Dmitry Korotaev/Kommersant
On Wednesday, February 15, the name of the next governor, who will not complete his term in office, became known. The head of Karelia, Alexander Khudilainen, asked to resign. The president immediately signed the petition and very quickly appointed a successor - the ex-head of the Federal Bailiff Service Artur Parfenchikov. A day earlier, the head of the Ryazan region Oleg Kovalev. On Monday, the head of the Novgorod region Sergei Mitin did the same.
Previous work week was marked by the resignations of the governor of the Perm region, Viktor Basargin, who will be the head of Rostransnadzor, and the head of Buryatia, Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn. What happened to the governor’s corps – explains the professor of the Department of Comparative Political Science High school economics, head of the Center for Political and Geographical Research Nikolai Petrov.
- Nikolai Vladimirovich, which governor is next to go?
– Ten heads of regions are expiring their terms of office, of which the Kremlin was going to change five or six, and reassign the rest. Among those who were called candidates for relegation, there was still Kuyvashev in the Sverdlovsk region.
- By what criteria are they selected for resignation?
– In the survival rating, which is last time published in December, all these governors received the lowest marks. For example, open and public conflicts occurred in their regions, and the governor was unable to consolidate the regional elite and control the situation. Like, for example, Basargin in Perm region. On the eve of the presidential elections, such a lack of control is dangerous. In addition, the Kremlin is changing generations. Governors born in the late 1940s and early 1950s are leaving and are being replaced by new governors born in the 1970s. And those who have already been replaced are among the ten governors whose powers expire this year. On the one hand, this is an element of rotation, on the other hand, it is a demonstration of a fundamentally new approach.
- The approach is not very new; rejuvenation began last year.
– Today these are young technocrats, emphatically civil, with experience in the federal government. And last time it was mainly the Federal Security Service and the military. Parfenchikov, appointed in Karelia, also cannot be called a man in uniform. He is first and foremost a lawyer. As we know, he is a classmate of Dmitry Medvedev.
Among the ten governors with expiring terms of office there is, for example, the head of Mordovia Volkov. In addition, he is 60 years old, these are two factors. But in the last elections in Mordovia there was a turnout of 83 percent, and 84 percent for United Russia. Or Belgorod: Governor Savchenko is 66 years old, but the turnout is 62 percent and the party in power has almost 55 percent. Are such merits taken into account?
- Yes, sure. Belgorod region is just good example that there are no clear criteria. If the governor has good control over the situation in the region, then the Kremlin prefers not to stir up anything and not take on the risk of destabilization on the eve of serious federal elections. In this sense, in Mordovia Volkov, who inherited almost cemetery calm and silence, has a good chance of being reassigned.
The governor of the Saratov region, Radaev, is only 55 years old, and he has excellent results in the Duma elections. But his region was among the record holders for officially registered complaints about election irregularities. What will outweigh?
– In this sense, Radaev has a certain weakness. But something else is important here. For example, the former Perm governor Basargin was considered Sobyanin’s man. He was replaced by a person from Sobyanin’s team, that is, the balance of power in the region was preserved. Radaev in Saratov is a member of Volodin’s team. And his fate is a question of how strong Volodin’s position is. Changes should not just mean some changes in the region, but also reflect and even provoke changes in the federal center. Therefore, experts are much less likely to call Radaev a candidate for relegation.
- This, therefore, is another factor: “whose will the governor be?”
– The conditional “federal roof” is the most important factor. And we're in Lately saw how three governors not only left, but sat down. They were united by the fact that they all did not have a serious federal roof.
- Are there still such unfortunate people left without a “roof”?
– The issue is not simply its absence. For example, the ex-governor of Karelia Khudilainen was associated with Naryshkin. While Naryshkin was the head of the administration and speaker of the State Duma, his influence on such things was significantly higher than it is today.
- Which governors have a fairly reliable “roof” today?
– This situation is also not static. Probably Sobyanin’s “roof” is not bad. We saw this in the example of Basargin: not only was he replaced by another person from Sobyanin’s team, but also Basargin is so far the only one of those fired who received a federal post in return.
- Who, besides Sobyanin, is considered a reliable “roof”?
- There are quite a lot of them. Volodin is not just an influential federal politician, he is a politician who appointed governors. There are about twenty such regions where he was directly involved in this. Sobyanin’s governors are, naturally, the Tyumen region, where, when he left, he left his man, Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets District. Then there is the problem of corporate “roofs”: Chemezov with Rostec, Sechin with Rosneft. Here, the question of the governor’s belonging to one or another clan is a question of the region’s entry into the zone of interests of the corporation.
- Who, and most importantly – why, needs the current changes in the governor’s corps?
– Rotation occurs constantly, and partly it has objective reasons: the governor is aging, ceases to be, from the point of view of the federal center, effective, and he is replaced. This may be the result of competition between corporations. Finally, there is an underlying idea: if a person sits for too long at some corporation, and the Kremlin in this sense is also a corporation, he becomes too involved in some kind of internal corporate interests. Too rigid connections are built there, and it becomes more difficult to control the situation. In the last two or three years, we have seen intensive changes in leadership at the level of federal corporations, just as at the regional level. That is, the general idea is purely managerial: from time to time it is necessary to mix personnel. Including, so that people more actively demonstrate their effectiveness, so that they do not have the feeling that they have forever boarded their region or their own, say, railway.
- Is all this really for the benefit of voters?
– Well, in this case, the elites proceed from their own interests. But in some ways their interests may coincide with the interests of ordinary citizens. What happens when the head of the customs service sits in office for a long time? A strong chain of connections has been formed and consolidated, including corruption, and a significant part of the funds that the state would like to count on in a crisis situation goes somewhere within the corporation, to relatives, friends, acquaintances, and so on. It is important for the state to eliminate such corruption leaks.
- Why can’t this be done as planned? Just in required deadline re-elect governors?
– It’s no secret that the governor whom Putin appointed today will tomorrow...
- ... will be elected by the people.
- He will be elected by the people.
- Moreover, why these urgent changes?
– It’s easier for the Kremlin. It is easier than in conditions of competition, even relative ones, to bring a convenient person to power or to establish relations with the person who won the elections. But even with the current system, everything can be done more... More balanced. Looking for someone who has experience working in the region. Like, say, Reshetnikov in Perm. This was the first appointment in a series, and it gave hope that the Kremlin would be looking for loyal, but also good, effective people related to the region.
- Inspired – are you speaking in the past tense? No longer inspiring?
– We already see that this is not at all necessary. The next three appointments are people who are active and effective, but they do not have any connections with the regions where they were appointed. They never lived in these regions. And I don’t think they are going to live there in the future.
- Do you want to say that these are temporary workers?
- They are temporary workers. Their task is to extract the maximum from the region, from their post, in the 4–5 years that they are allotted. Therefore, they think for a very short term. In the longer term, this is dangerous, and primarily for the federal center.
- Does the center understand this?
- I think he understands there smart people sitting.
- So they do it deliberately?
– It’s just that they themselves have a very short planning horizon and, accordingly, decision-making. When appointing a governor, they are forced to choose between loyalty and efficiency every time. This is rarely combined in one person. When an outsider is appointed to a region, it is clear that he is loyal to those who appointed him.
- Is it possible to find someone in the region, appoint him, he will be grateful - but also tied to the place?
– When you look for someone in the region, he has his own internal connections, obligations, loyalties, and so on. Such a leader will not necessarily be loyal. He will contradict federal center, sometimes even publicly. An example is Shaimiev in Tatarstan, who was an effective head.
Instead of Khudilainen, the ex-head of the Bailiff Service, Parfyonchikov, was appointed to Karelia, and he is a native of Karelia. This is already the second case of communication with the region.
– He was born and worked in the region – and that’s great. Of course, his connections in Karelia are not what they were ten years ago. And ten years ago he was a representative not of the regional elite, but of the federal structure. Nevertheless, he will, of course, have a different feeling from the region than a “Varangian” would have.
Over the course of a year or two, the governor of St. Petersburg found himself at the center of several scandals, the latest connected with the transfer of the Russian Orthodox Church St. Isaac's Cathedral. How will this affect the fate of Georgy Poltavchenko?
– It’s difficult to predict. St. Petersburg is a special region; here the president does not need to read newspapers to understand what is happening. And Poltavchenko in this sense - special person. The Kremlin probably doesn’t see Poltavchenko’s replacement as good enough to quell the conflicts in St. Petersburg. Another thing that works for Poltavchenko is that he is semi-officially involved in relations with the church. And when Putin goes somewhere to the outback for work, he goes with Poltavchenko. That is, there are some connections here, in addition to those on the surface. But I think that this is up to a certain limit. When the Kremlin sees that a governor is not so much helping as demanding help himself, a decision is made to replace him.
In the Oryol region, Potomsky became a laughing stock because of the story about the journey of Ivan the Terrible to St. Petersburg. People in Vladimir really don’t like Governor Orlova. Do these kinds of stories influence the fate of the head of the region?
– It is important for the Kremlin that the scandal does not spill over into the public sphere and does not take drastic forms. When they start making fun of the governor, when he becomes “parsley,” the Kremlin does not need this. And when they simply don’t like it, then let them not like it. Thus he will be more loyal to the center. The Kremlin doesn't need the governor to be too loved, but it doesn't need to be hated too much either.
- How do you know what is “too much”?
– This is where opinion polls come to the rescue. But if the federal government, in spite of everything, gets the desired results, the governor remains. Take the example of Merkushkin in the Samara region: someone makes fun of him, someone really dislikes him, but in the elections Samara shows results like in Mordovia. And all the rumors that Merkushkin is about to be replaced turn out to be exaggerated. The Kremlin has something to do even without regions. By the way, this is why it is precisely those governors whose terms of office are ending who find themselves in a suspended and more problematic state.
- Is attention focused on them at this moment?
– The Kremlin has 85 regions. It’s impossible to deal with everyone’s problems. But when the time comes to replace the governor, when you still have to decide whether to keep him or replace him, it happens “ doomsday" And so the Kremlin has more important issues. And more important regions than the Oryol or Belgorod regions.
- How do they divide regions into “important” and “not important”?
– There are regions that play some kind of symbolic role. Moscow and St. Petersburg are capitals. Crimea is a focus of attention both within the country and abroad. Perm and Sverdlovsk are important because these are huge regions where there are many voters, and any political scandal takes on special significance. And there are regions, like Transbaikalia or the Amur region, which are so far from the focus of public interest that what happens there is simply not important. There is another factor - the availability of people who can replace the governor. If a region is important from a business point of view, if serious clans are fighting for it, this is one situation.
- Is there always a replacement at the ready?
- Yes. And there are regions like the Kursk region. The Kremlin may be unhappy with the governor. But the Kremlin also does not want to specifically look for a replacement for him and create a problem for itself when there are no two or three serious business groups proposing candidates.
- And without “sponsoring” business groups, the Kremlin itself cannot find candidates?
– Such business groups make it easier to manage the people put in charge of the regions. This is easier than solving the problem of each region individually.
“I thought that’s what plenipotentiaries were invented for.”
– Look at who is appointed as plenipotentiary representative, and you will understand what kind of tasks they must solve. There was a time when governors came to the posts of plenipotentiary representatives. From this it could be concluded that the Kremlin wanted to see people capable of understanding and solving complex problems in the regions, promoting economic development, eliminating conflicts, and so on. Once upon a time these were generals. It followed from this that they had to transmit orders from Moscow and control execution. Today we see retired and retired officials in the posts of plenipotentiary representatives. What they are needed for today is unknown.
If informal “roofs” are still needed, why not make them official? Why not return the institution of plenipotentiary mission to its former meaning?
- Plenipotentiary representatives are overseers. But they do not have financial resources. It is important. If you divided the country into seven pieces and gave a budget to each plenipotentiary, he would become a small viceroy of the king. You look - and you yourself would like to become a king. As it is, they don’t have financial resources, their task is to monitor, control, whisper, give their own conclusions, but nothing more.
What is the secret of the unsinkability of the Pskov governor Turchak? It would seem that the scale of the scandal was, even with a criminal odor...
– This is partly being discussed in the press; the very rumor that the center is removing this or that official can almost serve as protection for him. In the sense that the Kremlin does not want to make decisions that will look forced.
- Well, time has already passed; no one will suspect the Kremlin of succumbing to pressure with Turchak.
- I would see it here possible reason Another thing is that the Pskov region is of little interest to anyone from the point of view of business attractiveness. And the fact that Turchak Sr. and this whole system of informal connections and institutions is quite strong. In this sense, Andrei Turchak was safe. We see scandals involving several children of the Kremlin elite. But so far I have not seen any serious organizational measures. There is a rational explanation for this. In particular, there is a certain hostage mechanism in this: if your son works in a high position, you will think about whether to make strong statements and whether to take radical steps.
What is the secret of Aman Tuleyev’s survival in Kemerovo? He has been in office for 19 years, with another 4 years left until the end of his term of office, which will already be longer than Putin’s presidency.
– Tuleyev has built a powerful political machine; he completely controls the situation in the region at all levels. The region itself is located quite far from Moscow, but it can be considered explosive. Several years ago there was a major accident there, and Tuleyev, as a representative of an almost extinct generation of public politicians, came out to the people and managed to take control of the situation. Any, even the most effective, official in his place could not behave like that. It’s like in economics: you always have to weigh costs and benefits.
So you say all this - and it seems that if in the region no one makes noise, does not make a fuss, does not die in accidents, and so on, it is as if no one lives there. Are residents of the regions even of interest to anyone in the Kremlin?
– There is no feedback between the regions and the Kremlin. It exists either in the form of scandals that attract increased attention to the region, or through serious lobbyists who are able to convey to the Kremlin people’s aspirations that coincide with their interests, the lobbyists. If neither one nor the other happens, if the region is not attractive enough for business groups and if it does not create problems for the Kremlin, this is a whirlpool. Such a region is the safest for the governor, who will sit without sticking his head out.
Interviewed by Irina Tumakova, Fontanka.ru
Political scientists from the Minchenko Consulting holding named governors who may soon lose the post of head of the region. This became known from the expert report “Politburo 2.0 and the Governor’s Corps.”
The governors were assessed according to nine criteria: for each of them one could receive from three to 10 points. At the same time, three criteria were “penalty” - they took away points from officials.
Experts came to the conclusion that the next heads of regions to be included in the “removal” list will be the heads of Kalmykia, North Ossetia, Altai, Novosibirsk, Murmansk, Omsk, Vladimir, Ivanovo and Voronezh regions, as well as the heads of the Altai and Primorsky territories.
The study took into account the activities of the heads of the constituent entities of the Federation from January to August 2017. Therefore, the “hit lists” included regional heads Nikolai Merkushkin (Samara Region), Ramazan Abdulatipov (Dagestan), Valery Shantsev (Nizhny Novgorod Region), Viktor Tolokonsky (Krasnoyarsk Territory) and Igor Koshin (Nenets Autonomous Okrug), who had already been removed by the time the document appeared.
All candidates received low marks - from four to nine points. At the same time, the head of Kalmykia, Alexey Orlov, received the lowest score - experts rated him four points. The head of the Novosibirsk region, Vladimir Gorodetsky, received five points. No less low performance from the head of the Murmansk region Marina Kovtun, governor Altai Territory Alexander Karlin and the head of the Omsk region Viktor Nazarov - they received six points each.
They didn’t forget about the Governor of St. Petersburg Georgy Poltavchenko - political scientists rated him eight points.
The criteria for evaluating the work of regional heads were divided into “bonuses” and “fines.” To the first, political scientists attributed the presence of large projects in the subject, a recognizable image of the governor and his support by forces close to the Kremlin. The “penalty” criterion included federal and regional conflicts, as well as criminal cases and arrests of relatives of regional heads.
Political scientists recognized Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, the head of the Tula region Alexei Dyumin and the head of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Dmitry Kobylkin as the most persistent leaders - they all scored 19 points.
Last week was marked by the appearance in the media of information about the possible resignations of several heads of Russian regions at once. The governors of the Nizhny Novgorod, Samara regions, Krasnoyarsk Territory. « Total number subjects who are named as candidates for a change of power are approaching ten,” Gazeta.Ru sources said.
The forecasts began to come true on September 25: then, by presidential decree, Nikolai Merkushkin, the governor of the Samara region, lost the position of head of the region. When leaving, he said that several more regional heads would lose their posts in the near future. “There is a reason for such a decision to be made... Probably, decisions will follow regarding other governors, I believe, according to a certain list,” the politician said at a press conference.
The next governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region, Valery Shantsev, who headed the region for 12 years, was relieved of his post. In his place was appointed 40-year-old Gleb Nikitin, who previously held the post of First Deputy Minister of Industry of Russia. Later, the head of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Viktor Tolokonsky, also left - he was removed from his post on September 27.
The head of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, also announced his resignation on September 28. The main candidate for his position is now First Deputy Director of the Russian Guard Sergei Melikov. On the same day, the governor of Nenets decided to leave the post of head of the subject of the Russian Federation Autonomous Okrug(NAO) Igor Koshin.
The head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Koshin left his post ahead of schedule and at will- in connection with the transition to a new place of work. President Vladimir Putin has already signed a corresponding decree. Deputy Minister was appointed to replace Igor Koshin economic development RF Alexander Tsybulsky - he became the acting head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
Koshin, 43, was one of the youngest regional leaders in the country: he was appointed governor in September 2014. Before that, for two years he was a representative from the Assembly of Deputies of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the Federation Council. After resigning, he addressed residents of the region through social networks.
“It's time to move on. During these three years there were different things - both good and bad. 2016 turned out to be especially difficult, when we lost a third of our income. I know it hasn't been easy for all of you. Believe me, me too. Responsibility is a heavy burden,” Koshin wrote.
He also noted that all the unpopular and painful decisions that he made during his tenure as head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug were aimed at making the district’s economy more resistant to fluctuations in oil prices, and thereby protecting the region’s residents.
Experts are convinced that there is now a trend in the country towards “greening the workforce”,
that is, the appointment of young people with experience of service in federal bodies to the positions of heads of regions. In particular, Dmitry Gusev, head of the consulting agency Backster-group, told Gazeta.Ru about this.
He is convinced that Putin continues his policy of updating the country's political team. “Several young technocratic governors were appointed. Now people with experience working in federal bodies are being appointed to similar positions. This is the current policy of the president,” Gusev explained the situation.
© krskstate.ru. Victor Tolokonsky (with flowers)
25 Sep 2017, 14:00Hopes dissipate, euphoria wears off. And since the governor is not local, the elites’ opposition and confrontation with the legislative assembly begins (in the case of Novosibirsk, don’t go to the fortune teller). And from the point of view of the presidential administration, they changed the awl to soap. Therefore, if we are to take such a radical step, then “ Honeymoon“should fall exactly on the presidential elections.
In the media and on the Internet, discussions about the upcoming (or even supposedly already occurred) resignations of governors have intensified. The governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Viktor Tolokonsky, who allegedly already flew “on the carpet” to the Kremlin (the regional administration denies it), is being sent into resignation with the greatest insistence. And there was even a rumor that he wrote “on his own.” The rumor lasted for four hours, after which the regional administration denied it.
Similar stories are in Barnaul and Omsk.
What does all this mean? Why did the wave of rumors (which even included respected federal publications) arise right now?
Many years of working at Taiga.info have taught me to react very restrainedly to rumors about the governor’s resignation, no matter what source they come from. For 10 years such rumors circulated about Tolokonsky, when he was the governor of the Novosibirsk region. And yes, in the end they were confirmed. For three years similar rumors circulated about Vasily Yurchenko. And he also ended up resigning (and due to lack of trust). Vladimir Gorodetsky was also “removed” almost from the moment of his election, but to no avail.
Sooner or later, rumors about the governor's resignation are confirmed - except for the case when he lost the election. And such a case has happened only once in the whole of Russia over the past ten years. But from a practical point of view, these rumors are “white noise” that carries no information. However, as well as refutations - we remember many cases when an official denies a rumor about his resignation in the morning, and in the evening writes a statement “on his own.”
However, the current rumors did not just appear out of nowhere. Our politics, oddly enough for developed authoritarianism, is subject to electoral cycles. And we are, of course, not talking about gubernatorial elections, but about the main and only ones that matter in Russia. Formally, they are called “elections of the President of the Russian Federation,” but in fact it is a referendum on confidence in Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
The referendum must be fair (in the sense of counting votes) and legitimate (the same sources called the bar at 70% turnout and 70% “for” Vladimir Putin).
As you know, everything good in our state comes from Vladimir Putin, and everything bad comes from bad boyars (that is, governors and mayors). But if the governor is too bad, then his anti-rating can tarnish the sun of our political system, and this is completely unacceptable. Sometimes the problems of a governor's anti-rating are solved simply by removing him from the campaign - some regional headquarters is appointed, a respected athlete (doctor, teacher, actor, academician) is put in charge and campaigning is carried out on his behalf.
Compared to his former boring boss, the governor looks fresh, meets with the public, hugs deputies and criticizes officials. The people and the elite are full of hope and fall into euphoria
But if the regional agenda is too hot, then people with this agenda will first trample to the regional headquarters, and then begin to break through to pre-election events.
And then the governor’s resignation may be the cure. And now is the time for such “pre-election” resignations. I'll explain why.
When a region is assigned new governor, the first time can be attributed to the “honeymoon”. Compared to his old boring boss, he looks fresh, meets with the public, hugs deputies and criticizes officials of the previous administration. The people and the regional elite are full of hope and euphoria.
But then, but then...
Then the elite discovers that the new boss is not very smart (and where do they get smart in a system where the main thing is to keep them and not let them go?). And that he is not relying on local promising personnel (and the locals have an exaggerated idea of their prospects), but dragging some kind of crook (in fact, the same as the locals) from their previous job.
The people suddenly discover that old problems are not being solved, and old and well-known corruption schemes continue to exist under the new governor. The people naively thought that a new governor was installed to stop these schemes, not understanding simple fact, that he was appointed from the very place where they grow.
Hopes dissipate, euphoria wears off. And since the governor is not local, the elites’ opposition and confrontation with the legislative assembly begins (in the case of Novosibirsk, don’t go to the fortune teller). And from the point of view of the presidential administration, they changed the awl to soap.
Therefore, if we are to take such a radical step as changing the governor in difficult regions (why change in simple ones?), then the “honeymoon” should fall exactly on the presidential elections. Well, governors must also go to the polls. And if they coincide with the presidential ones, this will increase turnout. And given the lackluster nature of the presidential elections, turnout is the main problem. And here's a surprise - it is in problem regions that it is the lowest. So all the dice fall in October or November.
The most fascinating thing in all this is that the fate of the governors is decided by some sociological calculations and calculations. Nothing personal, just technology.
Alexey Mazur
The resignations of governors will continue, this is how we can interpret the answer of the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov to the TASS agency’s question about whether the rotation of governors will continue next week. “The President continues to deal with regional issues,” he said. The key word here is “continues” - the process that was started on Monday, September 25, by the resignation of the Governor of the Samara Region, Nikolai Merkushkin.
After this, the heads of the Nizhny Novgorod region Valery Shantsev and the Krasnoyarsk region Viktor Tolokonsky announced their resignation. All three, together with Mr. Merkushkin, are already quite old figures. So, the head of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, who also announced his resignation, accurately called what was happening a trend towards “greening” the governor’s corps.
But then there was the resignation of the head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the still quite “green” 43-year-old Igor Koshin. True, he is the only one who himself explained this by moving to another job. According to some reports, the issue is the unsuccessful results of interaction between influence groups in the oil region for the former governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
Social work has been strengthened in some places
All resignations were predicted by the Kommersant newspaper, which cited its sources in the presidential administration. But not all predicted changes of governors took place.
The newspaper's list also includes Ivanovo, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, Omsk regions and the Altai Territory. In addition, the prophetic article spoke about “one or two subjects in the North Caucasus.” The yet unnamed “number two” did not come true. However, Kommersant itself writes that in such leaks there is always extra information. Some are named only as a warning, while others even manage, upon arriving in Moscow, to agree to retain their post, apparently promising to “strengthen work” on the most problematic positions. But in this moment the list is only half completed, and judging by Peskov’s words, 2-3 more resignations are quite possible.
The governor of the Murmansk region denied her probable resignation; this happened on September 25, and on the 26th a message appeared that “the Ministry of Social Development of the Murmansk Region provided funds in the amount of about 32 million rubles to subordinate institutions - centers for social support of the population. for social security and other payments to the population of the region. This work is being carried out in accordance with the instructions given by the Governor of the Murmansk Region Marina Kovtun.” More information from the region has not yet been received (as of Friday evening).
Remains and exceptions
The change of governors occurred mainly to people who were clearly appointed acting for a long time, with an eye to next year’s elections. This is the former first deputy head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Gleb Nikitin, appointed, in accordance with his previous duties, to the Nizhny Novgorod region, which is saturated with military-industrial complex enterprises. Dmitry Azarov came to the Samara region, a man, as they say, from Samara to the core, who was a senator from this region. The Nenets Autonomous Okrug will be headed by Alexander Tsybulsky, who until recently worked as deputy head of the Ministry of Economic Development.
These are all quite young people. The exception is an old-timer in Krasnoyarsk politics, Alexander Uss, who has seen many heads of the region, but now he himself is the acting governor, and at the same time remains in his usual position of chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the region. This appointment appears to be temporary. And there is no new figure at all for the post of head of Dagestan.
Crises are not expected
For some reason, resignations as a “package” turned out to be more important for the Kremlin than appointments. Perhaps this is explained by the struggle that is going on for the vacant posts, and which cannot be transferred to the necessary (more or less open) phase without first removing the current head of the region. In general, there is nothing surprising here, since such appointments, in a certain sense, are also elections. And holding elections, even purely instrumental ones, in a completely closed mode is only possible in either completely problem-free or completely unambiguous situations. Dagestan has never been problem-free, and the Krasnoyarsk Territory is also difficult.
Much has already been said about the rise of young technocrats to power, and this batch of resignations clearly confirms this thesis. The era of regional security officials, even if one is expected to lead Dagestan, has generally passed. This means, by the way, that political forecasting at the level of the highest echelons of power does not imply crisis situations of a socio-economic nature with political development in the coming years. Such situations would require experienced personnel. Or the same security forces, which does not mean forceful suppression of hypothetical protests, but means the ability to manage poorly managed processes. Or the same experienced regionals, albeit not the same ones who were in their posts, but from the old clip.
That is, according to official expectations, the economy does not give rise to serious concerns. Moreover, at the end of last week the regions received a deferment on debt payments, which were a very serious burden for a number of them. As for politics, until now (after 1996) presidential elections have turned out to be periods of consolidation that can also dampen serious destabilization, as was the case in 2012. So from this side, too, apparently, it’s time to test out young personnel.
Gigabytes will arrive from orbit
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In addition to the eight federal districts, Russia will now have twelve macro-regions. Agglomerations are recognized as the most progressive form of settlement. And each subject of the federation is assigned a promising specialization. The "expert" tried to find grains common sense in the recently approved Spatial Development Strategy
The series of replacements of heads of Russian regions will be completed by October 10; in total, the president will nominate from eight to 11 new candidates, RIA Novosti reports, citing a source close to the presidential administration.
In just the last 10 days, resignations have affected the head of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Viktor Tolokonsky, Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov, Nizhny Novgorod Region Valery Shantsev, Samara Region Nikolai Merkushkin and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Igor Koshin.
Several heirs of retired regional heads are already known. Thus, 40-year-old Gleb Nikitin, who previously held the post of First Deputy Minister of Industry of Russia, was appointed to replace Shantsev. The Samara region was headed by the former mayor of the regional capital Dmitry Azarov.
The first deputy director of the Russian Guard, Sergei Melikov, is being considered as the main candidate for the post of head of Dagestan. Koshin will be replaced by 38-year-old Alexander Tsybulsky, who has worked as deputy head of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development since November 2014.
Next in line, according to an informed interlocutor, is the resignation of Omsk Governor Viktor Nazarov.
“This will be completed by the 10th (October 10), based on the results, from 8 to 11 replacements of new gubernatorial candidates will be proposed, taking into account those that have already been announced. The number of resignations depends entirely on the president’s decision,” explained a person close to the Kremlin.
According to him, replacing the head of the Omsk region is long overdue.
“Yes, changes are required in the Omsk region to improve controllability in the region,” the interlocutor indicated.
Earlier, the press secretary of the head of the region called information about the planned resignation “an artificially created wave of rumors” and said that Nazarov’s schedule was scheduled for several weeks in advance.
Political scientists from the Minchenko Consulting holding have compiled their list of governors who may soon lose their post as head of the region. This became known from the expert report “Politburo 2.0 and the Governor’s Corps.”
The governors were assessed according to nine criteria: for each of them one could receive from three to 10 points. The criteria for evaluating the work of regional heads were divided into “bonuses” and “fines.”
To the first, political scientists attributed the presence of large projects in the subject, a recognizable image of the governor and his support by forces close to the Kremlin. The “penalty” criterion included federal and regional conflicts, as well as criminal cases and arrests of relatives of regional heads.
Experts came to the conclusion that the next heads of regions to be included in the “removal” list will be the heads of Kalmykia, North Ossetia, Altai, Novosibirsk, Murmansk, Omsk, Vladimir, Ivanovo and Voronezh regions, as well as the heads of the Altai and Primorsky territories.
All candidates received low marks - from four to nine points. At the same time, the head of Kalmykia, Alexey Orlov, received the lowest score - experts rated him four points. The head of the Novosibirsk region, Vladimir Gorodetsky, received five points. The head of the Murmansk region Marina Kovtun, the governor of the Altai region Alexander Karlin and the head of the Omsk region Viktor Nazarov had no less low results - they received six points each.
Political scientists recognized Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, the head of the Tula region Alexei Dyumin and the head of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Dmitry Kobylkin as the most persistent leaders - they all scored 19 points.
Member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva told Gazeta.Ru that the governor’s imminent resignation is not ruled out Kemerovo region Aman Tuleyeva, first of all, in terms of age. According to her, the reason for the change of most regional heads is the policy of rejuvenating personnel. As for the timing of resignations, we must assume that the current President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, will serve another term next year.
“By this time, it is necessary that the newly appointed heads of regions gain confidence in their posts, get their bearings, and take the levers of control. They need to be given time to prove themselves. Change the heads of such large regions immediately before presidential elections undesirable,” the political scientist said.