Infantry tactics in defense

Opportunities can be used most fully in defense small arms, since fire, as a rule, is fired from prepared positions from stable positions. The opening lines of fire are outlined in advance and the ranges to landmarks and local objects are determined, amendments to the initial settings of sighting devices for firing conditions are calculated, areas of concentrated fire of units are targeted, lines and sectors of fire are specified on the ground and tasks for machine gunners, machine gunners, grenade launchers and all crew commanders other fire weapons. Strong points are equipped in engineering terms, main and temporary (spare) positions for firing are prepared; cartridge belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with the required types of bullets. All this makes it possible to reliably hit ground targets at maximum ranges of effective fire: from machine guns and concentrated fire from motorized rifle squads - up to 800 m, from machine guns - up to 500 m, and also to successfully combat air targets at low altitudes.

Before the start of the enemy's offensive, fire weapons on duty are assigned to the platoons, the personnel of which are in constant readiness to open fire. During the day, duty personnel occupy temporary or reserve positions. From them, individual enemy groups attempting to conduct reconnaissance or engineering work are hit by small arms fire. Snipers destroy enemy officers, observers, and snipers at their location.

At night, two-thirds of the personnel of each motorized rifle platoon squad are in position ready to open fire with night sights or at illuminated targets. For shooting at night, belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with ordinary and tracer bullets in a ratio of 4:1. In advance, before the enemy approaches, the opening lines of fire for each type of weapon are outlined, and areas of concentrated fire from units are prepared. The distances to them should not exceed the range of effective fire against the advancing enemy personnel. All unit personnel must know the 400 m line in front of the front line on the ground in their zones and firing sectors: frontal, flank and cross fire are prepared in the zone of this line.

When the enemy goes on the attack in armored vehicles without dismounting, his armored targets are destroyed by fire from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Small arms fire hits infantry and crews leaving damaged vehicles. If enemy armored vehicles approach at a distance of up to 200 m, small arms fire can be fired at their observation devices. When attacking the enemy on foot with fire from machine guns and machine guns, the enemy infantry is cut off from the tanks and destroyed together with the flamethrowers and other means assigned to the unit. From the line 400 m from the front line of defense from machine guns underbarrel grenade launchers at the commands of the squad commanders, they hit the advancing infantry with grenades. As the enemy approaches the front line, the fire of all types of weapons is brought to the highest intensity.

An enemy who breaks into a strong point is destroyed by point-blank fire, grenades and in hand-to-hand combat with a bayonet and butt, and pistol fire. At all stages of the battle, commanders control the fire of their units, setting fire missions, issuing commands and established signals for the concentration and transfer of fire. In this case, the most important thing is the soldier’s ability to independently choose the most important goals and open fire on them from a range that ensures their reliable defeat, and also skillfully adjust the fire. Unit commanders must use fire maneuvers in a timely manner, concentrating most of the firepower to defeat the enemy in the threatened area, or dispersing fire on several important targets. During air raids, some of the assets of motorized rifle platoons from less threatened areas can conduct concentrated fire on helicopters and airplanes at ranges of up to 500 m, and on helicopters in a hovering position up to 900 m. Note that for the successful use of small arms in defense, as in other types of combat, important has timely replenishment of ammunition, equipping belts for machine guns and magazines for machine guns and light machine guns with cartridges.

Infantry in modern armies is the backbone of the armed forces. Despite the rapid introduction of high technologies in military equipment, the increase in its firepower and mobility, the outcome of the war is still decided on the battlefield by the infantry in interaction with other branches of the military and branches of the armed forces. As combat experience shows, infantry singular gender troops, capable of acting completely independently in case of emergency. The history of wars knows cases when they tried to achieve the goals of war without involving infantry; even corresponding military theories appeared (“air war,” for example), but combat practice showed the inconsistency of such approaches.

Today, abroad, and even in Russia, among some “armchair” strategists, old theories are being revived under the new sauces of “high-precision weapons,” “high technology,” “excess firepower,” etc. Their essence is that precision, mainly aviation and rocket weapons of enormous destructive power can supposedly decide the outcome of the war without the involvement of large masses of infantry and tanks with reinforcements.

We must pay tribute to military specialists who have the right to make decisions about the direction of development of the armed forces - almost all of them are very distrustful of newfangled theories. Infantry in the armies of even the most developed countries continues to be the basis of the armed forces, its structure and weapons are being improved, and modern methods are being developed combat use.

Today, infantry has different organizational structures depending on the nature of combat missions. The infantry, operating on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, is consolidated into mechanized, motorized, motorized infantry and motorized rifle units, units, and formations. Infantry, operating on light vehicles and having additional equipment, is included in light infantry and mountain infantry formations. Infantry, adapted for airlift and landing, is part of the airborne troops, airborne assault, airmobile formations and units. Finally, the infantry intended for landing from the sea on the coast was called naval.

Thus, infantry today is multifaceted and multifunctional. Until recently, the battalion was considered the main infantry unit. However, now it is increasingly evolving towards a combined arms structure. It includes tanks, artillery, etc.

Nowadays, a company remains a relatively “pure” infantry unit, however, more and more heavy weapons are appearing in it. Apparently, over time, “heavy” infantry operating on armored combat vehicles will practically merge organizationally and technically with tank forces, direct fire support artillery, military air defense and other first-line weapons operating on the battlefield under direct fire from the enemy. There will also remain a “light” type of infantry, designed to solve specific tasks (landing from the air and sea, operations in mountainous and other terrain difficult to reach for equipment, participation in low-intensity conflicts).

The organizational structure of infantry units in the developed armies of the world is very similar. The primary organizational unit is a department (group) of seven to twelve people. The basis is shooters armed with a standard assault rifle (machine gun). In “heavy” infantry, crew members of combat vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers) on which the squad is transported are equipped with pistols, submachine guns or shortened versions of an assault rifle (machine gun). Typically, several people in the squad have under-barrel grenade launchers on their main weapons. Each squad must be equipped with at least one close combat anti-tank weapon. These can be rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades or grenade launchers. As a rule, the department has a light machine gun. In the Russian and some other armies there is a sniper in each squad. Almost all soldiers in the squad are equipped with hand grenades.

Depending on the tasks to be solved, the department may receive additional sets of weapons. For example, an under-barrel grenade launcher can be installed on every rifle (machine gun), an RPG can be issued to every soldier, etc. In addition, in war, infantry quickly adapts to the peculiarities of combat operations and adapts a standard set of weapons in relation to local conditions, not disdaining successful captured samples.

The next step up in infantry organization is considered to be a platoon. Usually the position of its commander is the primary position for the officer (although in some armies platoons are commanded by non-commissioned or non-commissioned officers). A typical group weapon appears in the platoon - a heavy machine gun. In many armies, the platoon has short-range ATGM crews.

The company is considered in the infantry to be the main link in training, combat coordination, and organization of the routine of army life. In combat conditions, it is capable of acting relatively independently, since it has in its structure units equipped with heavy weapons. As a rule, depending on the views of the national command on battle tactics, these are mortars, short- or medium-range ATGMs, automatic mounted grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, etc.

A battalion in foreign armies, unlike the Russian one, is already considered an independent unit (in our country this applies only to individual battalions). It has its own fire support units (mortar battery or company, fire support company), and closely cooperates with units of other branches of the military. In some armies, infantry battalions (no matter what they are called) organizationally include tanks, air defense units, reconnaissance units and others, reinforcing the tactical independence of the battalion. As mentioned above, the battalion today has become the organizational core around which modern battle tactics are developed. Unfortunately, in Russian army This process is far from complete; here, due to well-known difficulties, we are significantly behind the most developed countries.

The basis for defeating the enemy in combined arms combat is his destruction by fire of all types of weapons. Naturally, infantry mainly uses small arms fire, as it is the most widespread and quite effective in close combat. The following are the basics of the tactical use of infantry weapons in various types battle in accordance with the views prevailing in the Russian army.

In defense, the capabilities of small arms can be used most fully, since fire, as a rule, is conducted from prepared positions from stable positions. Lines of opening fire are outlined in advance and ranges to landmarks and local objects are determined, amendments to the initial settings of sighting devices for firing conditions are calculated, areas of concentrated fire of units are targeted, lines and sectors of fire are specified on the ground and tasks for machine gunners, machine gunners, grenade launchers and all crew commanders other fire weapons. Strong points are equipped in engineering terms, main and temporary (spare) positions for firing are prepared; cartridge belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with the required types of bullets. All this makes it possible to reliably hit ground targets at maximum ranges of effective fire: from machine guns and concentrated fire from motorized rifle squads - up to 800 m, from machine guns - up to 500 m, and also to successfully combat air targets at low altitudes.

Before the start of the enemy's offensive, fire weapons on duty are assigned to the platoons, the personnel of which are in constant readiness to open fire. During the day, duty personnel occupy temporary or reserve positions. From them, individual enemy groups attempting to conduct reconnaissance or engineering work are hit by small arms fire. Snipers destroy enemy officers, observers, and snipers at their location.

At night, two-thirds of the personnel of each motorized rifle platoon squad are in position ready to open fire with night sights or at illuminated targets. For shooting at night, belts and magazines are equipped with cartridges with ordinary and grade bullets in a ratio of 4:1. In advance, before the enemy approaches, the opening lines of fire for each type of weapon are outlined, and areas of concentrated fire from units are prepared. The distances to them should not exceed the range of effective fire against the advancing enemy personnel. All unit personnel must know the 400 m line in front of the front line on the ground in their zones and firing sectors: frontal, flank and cross fire are prepared in the zone of this line.

When the enemy goes on the attack in armored vehicles without dismounting, his armored targets are destroyed by fire from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Small arms fire hits infantry and crews leaving damaged vehicles. If enemy armored vehicles approach at a distance of up to 200 m, small arms fire can be fired at their observation devices. When attacking the enemy on foot with fire from machine guns and machine guns, the enemy infantry is cut off from the tanks and destroyed together with the flamethrowers and other means assigned to the unit. From a line of 400 m from the front line of the defense, from machine guns with under-barrel grenade launchers, at the commands of the squad commanders, they hit the advancing infantry with grenades. As the enemy approaches the front line, the fire of all types of weapons is brought to the highest intensity.

An enemy who breaks into a strong point is destroyed by point-blank fire, grenades and in hand-to-hand combat with a bayonet and butt, and pistol fire. At all stages of the battle, commanders control the fire of their units, setting fire missions, issuing commands and established signals for the concentration and transfer of fire. In this case, the most important thing is the soldier’s ability to independently select the most important targets and open fire on them from a range that ensures their reliable defeat, as well as skillfully adjust the fire. Unit commanders must use fire maneuvers in a timely manner, concentrating most of the firepower to defeat the enemy in the threatened area, or dispersing fire on several important targets. During air raids, some of the assets of motorized rifle platoons from less threatened areas can conduct concentrated fire on helicopters and airplanes at ranges of up to 500 m, and on helicopters in a hovering position up to 900 m. Note that for the successful use of small arms in defense, as in other types of combat, timely replenishment of ammunition, equipping belts for machine guns and magazines for machine guns and light machine guns with cartridges is important.

Let us give examples of the use of small arms in defensive combat. In July 1943, German troops launched an offensive on the Oryol-Kursk arc. On one of the sections of the front, a strong point at a height was defended by a rifle platoon. It was reinforced by two crews of heavy machine guns. The platoon commander assigned tasks to the squads and machine gun crews, indicated lines of fire and additional sectors of fire, areas of concentrated platoon fire, and lines of opening fire for machine guns and submachine gunners. He paid special attention to the interaction of machine gunners and submachine gunners in order to create the greatest density of fire at the line 400 m from the front edge of the defense.

With the beginning of the enemy’s offensive, his tanks fired at the platoon’s positions with cannons, and artillery opened fire on the strong point. The personnel, at the command of the platoon commander, ran across the trench that surrounded the height to its eastern side. This area was covered from fascist shells by the crest of a height. The platoon commander and observers remained on the ground. When the fascist infantry approached 400 m, the soldiers, at the commander’s signal, took up positions and opened fire: machine guns from the flanks, machine gunners from the front. Under crossfire, the attackers rolled back. Enemy artillery opened fire on the strong point again, and its tanks began to move around the heights from the flanks. Now the platoon commander did not withdraw the people behind the height, but ordered them to take cover in niches dug in the walls of trenches and communication passages.

When the enemy stopped the fire raid and his infantry again launched an attack on the strong point, the platoon commander ordered to open fire on the infantry from light machine guns and machine guns. He ordered the heavy machine guns not to fire for now, since tanks could quickly suppress them with their fire. When two tanks were hit by the battalion's anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns, which had been silent until that time, opened fire on the enemy infantry. The enemy did not expect this, suffered heavy losses from their flanking fire and retreated again. The platoon's mission was accomplished thanks to the skillful use of small arms fire and, mainly, the power of heavy machine gun fire.

Captain I. N. Sukharev, a participant in the events, talks about the use of small arms in combat operations in Afghanistan. In 1986, he was the head of a guard outpost in one of the mountainous regions. The outpost, with fire from mortars, heavy machine guns of the NSV, PK machine guns and machine guns, covered the junction of mountain roads from the penetration of the Mujahideen. NSV machine guns were used as stationary fire weapons to destroy enemy groups on open sections of roads at a distance of about 1800 m. They were placed in strong shelters made of stones, the legs of the machine guns were half buried in the ground and strengthened in it for better stability. The assigned area was constantly monitored, and fire was immediately opened on the groups of dushmans found there. The sudden use of NSV machine guns, as a rule, achieved the goal. The mortar fire did not bring success - upon hearing the shots, the Mujahideen managed to hide.

PK machine guns were used at the outpost as a maneuverable fire weapon. Several positions were equipped for them in different firing directions. If necessary, crews quickly occupied designated positions in order to destroy the enemy in the threatened direction with concentrated fire.

For some time, the outpost was subjected to systematic shelling by snipers from the area of ​​the destroyed village. The range to it was about 800 m. However, it was not possible to detect the snipers. At the request of the head of the outpost, two sniper rifles were delivered to him. SVD rifles. Having checked their battle and shot one of them personally, Sukharev carefully examined the outskirts of the destroyed village with binoculars and made a diagram of the location of suspicious places where the shooters could hide. As the sun rose, the outskirts of the village were brightly illuminated, and through the optical sight of a sniper rifle, dark spots of breaks in the walls of houses and the blower were clearly visible. It was in them that Sukharev discovered the Mujahideen. Just a few shots and the enemy fled, carrying away the dead and wounded. As a result, the sniper fire on the outpost stopped.

Similar fire combing of suspicious places where enemy ambushes could be hiding was carried out using mortars, machine guns and under-barrel grenade launchers. So, before you send people drinking water to the source, located about 400 m from the outpost, the bushes located on the road to the source and near it and an invisible section of the bend of the path were fired upon. Only after this did the soldiers go for water. Such actions by the head of the outpost made it possible to avoid the death of personnel.

In an offensive, the peculiarities of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops, from armored vehicles or on foot. These conditions make it difficult to carry out combat missions and reduce the effectiveness of fire. Great importance here they acquire not only fire skills, but also the ability of personnel to board and disembark from vehicles, occupy and change positions in the shortest possible time, that is, to make full use of the maneuverable capabilities of weapons. When attacking, you often have to operate in unfamiliar terrain. This makes it difficult to navigate, especially when driving cars; The issues of fire control, observation of the battlefield and detection of targets, determination of distances to them, target designation and shooting adjustments become more complicated. Therefore, the independence of soldiers in finding and hitting targets, taking into account the position of neighboring units, is of particular importance, especially when fighting in the depths of enemy defenses.

Let us consider the issue of the combat use of small arms at the main stages of the actions of motorized rifle units in the offensive. In an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, motorized rifles are located in the first trench of the unit’s starting position, and combat vehicles- next to your squads or at a distance of up to 50 m from them. During fire preparation for an attack, when our artillery fire is transferred into depth, machine gun fire and machine gun fire hits the enemy’s fire weapons and manpower in the direction of the platoons’ advance. Unit commanders control the fire of their subordinates, issuing commands to destroy detected targets to individual fire weapons or concentrating the fire of a squad (platoon) on the most important target.

When advancing on the move, motorized rifles, during the period of fire preparation for the attack, advance to the line of transition to attack in columns on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). As they approach the line of attack, the platoons, at the command of the company commander, deploy into battle formation. From this moment on, small arms fire through loopholes and over hatches hits targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense.

When approaching the established dismounting line (when attacking on foot), infantry fighting vehicles catch up with the tanks, the personnel put their weapons on safety, remove them from the loopholes and prepare to dismount. After this, motorized rifle platoons are deployed in a chain and advance directly behind the battle line of tanks. Submachine gunners and machine gunners, operating in a chain, fire on the move and from short stops at the enemy in the trenches of the unit’s target of attack.

For ease of firing and better adaptation to the terrain, soldiers in the chain can move slightly forward or to the side without disturbing the general direction of the unit’s advance. When overcoming a barrier in front of the enemy's front line of defense, the personnel of motorized rifle units, at the commands of platoon commanders, put their weapons on safety and in columns of two (three) following the tanks along their ruts, they run along the passages in the mine-explosive barriers.

Having overcome them, the motorized riflemen deploy in a chain, open massive fire from their weapons and quickly attack the enemy. Soldiers fire, as a rule, independently choosing a target in the area of ​​the enemy stronghold indicated by the commander before the attack. Having approached the enemy trench to 25–40 meters, the personnel throw grenades at him, destroy him with point-blank fire from machine guns, machine guns, pistols and continue the attack non-stop in the indicated direction.

When attacking with infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), their battle line operates behind the tanks at a distance of 100–200 m. Machine gunners and machine gunners fire through loopholes (over hatches) at targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense in the gap between their tanks. The effective range of small arms fire from short stops is 400 m, and on the move 200 m.

For shooting, cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets are used (in a ratio of three to one), especially to engage fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones. Following the tanks, combat vehicles rush into the front line of the enemy’s defense and, using the results of fire damage, quickly advance into the depths.

When fighting in the depths of enemy defenses, the advancement of units occurs unevenly, so small arms fire usually has to be fired into the gaps and from behind the flanks of friendly units. At the same time, it is necessary to comply with shooting rules that ensure the safety of your troops. Thus, the mandatory rule for firing from behind the flanks is two conditions.

Firstly, the smallest angle between the direction of the target and the nearest flank of friendly troops should be 50 thousandths, in order to exclude direct hits of bullets on friendly troops due to errors in aiming and lateral dispersion. Secondly, when moving your troops ahead of those shooting up to 200 m, the target must be chosen at a distance of at least 500 m. This is necessary to prevent bullets from hitting your troops in the event of possible ricochets. Shooting from behind the flanks is only allowed from a standing position.

In an offensive in hard-to-reach areas of terrain, where motorized rifles operate in front of tanks, small arms should first of all hit anti-tank grenade launchers, recoilless rifles and other close-combat anti-tank weapons. Directed fire from machine guns and machine guns should be fired at bushes and various masks behind which one can assume the presence of fire weapons.

During an enemy counterattack, small arms fire is conducted in conjunction with the fire of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Submachine gunners and machine gunners destroy groups of infantry and fire crews, starting from a range of 800 m (with concentrated fire from squads). Snipers hit officers, ATGM crews and other important targets. Then the defeat of the enemy ends with an attack. At the same time, small arms fire is conducted on the move at its lying down and retreating groups.

When pursuing, motorized riflemen usually take seats in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and fire their weapons through loopholes (on top of hatches) at groups of infantry and anti-tank weapons on the move and from short stops.

When motorized rifle units operate as part of tactical airborne assault forces, small arms can be used in flight, for example, from helicopters against ground targets. As the landing force approaches the landing site, the enemy on it is destroyed by airborne weapon fire, and from a range of 400–500 m by small arms fire through observation windows and entrance doors helicopter.

Various tasks had to be solved with small arms during the offensive of our troops during the Great Patriotic War. For example, in January 1944, a rifle company of the 155th Guards rifle regiment The 52nd Guards Rifle Division was given the task of capturing the enemy's fortified heights. It was planned to support the company's attack with a 15-minute artillery raid, and support the offensive with a sufficient number of artillery units. For the purpose of better camouflage in winter conditions, the personnel were dressed in white camouflage robes, the weapons were wrapped in white cloth, and the heavy machine guns were painted in White color and installed on skis. At dawn, our artillery began a fire attack; 45-mm guns fired directly at targets on the front line. Rifle units and machine gun crews began moving from the starting line to the attack line. After a salvo from the rocket battalion, the artillery moved its fire into the depths, and rifle platoons began to overcome the obstacles along the passages.

After this, turning into a chain, firing on the move and from short stops at the first trench of the strong point, the riflemen attacked the enemy. Heavy machine guns, operating on the flanks of the platoons, fired from stops at detected fire weapons in the strong point. Unexpectedly, a machine gun from the enemy bunker opened fire on the attackers. The platoon operating in this direction suffered losses and lay down. The platoon commander set the task for the crew of the heavy machine gun, using tracer bullets, to fire at the embrasure of the bunker and in front of it, so that snow dust from bullets falling into the snow would interfere with enemy observation.

Indeed, after this the machine gun fire became less effective and the platoon commander raised the lying squads to attack. In dashes, they approached the bunker at 150–200 m and also opened fire from light machine guns and submachine guns at its embrasure. Under cover of fire, sappers crawled to the bunker and blew it up. At this time, other platoons of the company fought in trenches and communication passages, successfully using point-blank fire from submachine guns to defeat the enemy. Thus, with the combined efforts of artillerymen, machine gunners, submachine gunners and sappers, the company captured the enemy stronghold.

On the march, in anticipation of entering into battle, motorized rifle units move in columns with distances between vehicles of 25–50 m, and if necessary, they can move on foot or on skis. At the same time, personnel and weapons must be in constant readiness to repel enemy airborne forces, airborne and sabotage and reconnaissance groups with fire.

An enemy air attack is repelled by air defense systems and small arms fire. Submachine gunners and machine gunners assigned to fire at low-flying aircraft, helicopters and other air targets are prepared to fire through the hatches of combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) upon a warning signal. Fire is conducted at the commands of the squad commanders at targets on a collision course from machine guns and machine guns with continuous fire for 3–4 seconds (the time the target is in the affected area).

When moving on foot during an enemy air raid, a motorized rifle unit, at the commands of its commanders, takes the nearest shelter and opens fire on low-flying aircraft and helicopters.

At rest stops, machine gunners (gunners) on duty remain in the vehicles, and fire weapons are assigned to repel enemy air, including small arms.

Motorized rifle units assigned to march guard duty use small arms in conjunction with the armament of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). When meeting with an enemy of superior strength, they use fire to ensure that the guarded column maintains its position, deploys and enters the battle.

When starting and conducting an oncoming battle, small arms are used together with all other fire weapons to create fire superiority over the enemy. At the same time, small arms, as the most maneuverable, allow you to open fire on the enemy in as soon as possible, destroy his advanced infantry groups, foot reconnaissance groups and other targets with fire on the move from loopholes.

When meeting with an enemy of superior strength, the head marching outpost occupies an advantageous position and, with fire from all means, ensures the deployment of the main forces of the vanguard (advanced detachment). Small arms fire at infantry groups advancing behind sneakers, fire crews, and infantry in vehicles.

As the main forces go on the attack, motorized rifle subunits use fire on the move from infantry fighting vehicles and small arms to destroy the enemy's marching guards.

In the event that the enemy, with superior forces, has forestalled our lead marching outpost in deployment and is conducting an offensive, motorized rifle subunits dismount and defeat the enemy with fire from the spot, together with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that occupy positions behind the nearest shelters.

During air raids, submachine gunners and machine gunners, appointed by commanders to fire at low-flying aircraft and helicopters, take part in repelling them.

In general, small arms remain the most important weapon of fire in modern combined arms combat. Its role is especially great when operating in special conditions, when the capabilities of other fire weapons are limited. For example, in the city, in the forest, in the mountains, etc.

No less important is the importance of small arms in “low-intensity conflicts,” which are understood as local wars, counterinsurgency operations, the fight against terrorists and other types of armed conflicts in which heavy weapons are little used due to their ineffectiveness or limited quantities among the warring parties. In the future, the important role of infantry weapons will continue.


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In an offensive, the peculiarities of firing from small arms are shooting on the move and from short stops

In an offensive, the peculiarities of firing from small arms are firing on the move and from short stops, from armored vehicles or on foot. These conditions make it difficult to carry out combat missions and reduce the effectiveness of fire. Not only fire skills are of great importance here, but also the ability of personnel to board and disembark vehicles, occupy and change positions in the shortest possible time, that is, make full use of the maneuverable capabilities of weapons. When attacking, you often have to operate in unfamiliar terrain. This makes it difficult to navigate, especially when driving cars; The issues of fire control, observation of the battlefield and detection of targets, determination of distances to them, target designation and shooting adjustments become more complicated. Therefore, the independence of soldiers in finding and hitting targets, taking into account the position of neighboring units, is of particular importance, especially when fighting in the depths of enemy defenses.

Let us consider the issue of the combat use of small arms at the main stages of the actions of motorized rifle units in the offensive. In an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy, motorized rifles are located in the first trench of the unit’s starting position, and combat vehicles are located next to their squads or at a distance of up to 50 m from them. During fire preparation for an attack, when the fire of our artillery is transferred into depth, machine gun fire and machine guns hit enemy fire weapons and manpower in the direction of the platoons' advance. Unit commanders control the fire of their subordinates, issuing commands to destroy detected targets to individual fire weapons or concentrating the fire of a squad (platoon) on the most important target.

When advancing on the move, motorized rifles, during the period of fire preparation for the attack, advance to the line of transition to attack in columns on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). As they approach the line of attack, the platoons, at the command of the company commander, deploy into battle formation. From this moment on, small arms fire through loopholes and over hatches hits targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense. When approaching the established dismounting line (when attacking on foot), infantry fighting vehicles catch up with the tanks, the personnel put their weapons on safety, remove them from the loopholes and prepare to dismount. After this, motorized rifle platoons are deployed in a chain and advance directly behind the battle line of tanks. Submachine gunners and machine gunners, operating in a chain, fire on the move and from short stops at the enemy in the trenches of the unit’s target of attack.

For ease of firing and better adaptation to the terrain, soldiers in the chain can move slightly forward or to the side without disturbing the general direction of the unit’s advance. When overcoming a barrier in front of the enemy's front line of defense, the personnel of motorized rifle units, at the commands of platoon commanders, put their weapons on safety and in columns of two (three) following the tanks along their ruts, they run along the passages in the mine-explosive barriers.

Having overcome them, the motorized riflemen deploy in a chain, open massive fire from their weapons and quickly attack the enemy. Soldiers fire, as a rule, independently choosing a target in the area of ​​the enemy stronghold indicated by the commander before the attack. Having approached the enemy trench to 25-40 meters, the personnel throw grenades at him, destroy him with point-blank fire from machine guns, machine guns, pistols and continuously continue the attack in the indicated direction.

When attacking with infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), their battle line operates behind the tanks at a distance of 100-200 m. Machine gunners and machine gunners fire through loopholes (over hatches) at targets on the front line of the enemy’s defense in the gap between their tanks. The effective range of small arms fire from short stops is 400 m, on the move 200 m. For firing, cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets are used (in a ratio of three to one), especially to engage fire weapons, primarily anti-tank ones. Following the tanks, combat vehicles rush into the front line of the enemy’s defense and, using the results of fire damage, quickly advance into the depths.

When fighting in the depths of enemy defenses, the advancement of units occurs unevenly, so small arms fire usually has to be fired into the gaps and from behind the flanks of friendly units. At the same time, it is necessary to comply with shooting rules that ensure the safety of your troops. Thus, the mandatory rule for firing from behind the flanks is two conditions.

Firstly, the smallest angle between the direction of the target and the nearest flank of friendly troops should be 50 thousandths, in order to exclude direct hits of bullets on friendly troops due to errors in aiming and lateral dispersion. Secondly, when moving your troops ahead of those shooting up to 200 m, the target must be chosen at a distance of at least 500 m. This is necessary to prevent bullets from hitting your troops in the event of possible ricochets. Shooting from behind the flanks is only allowed from a standing position.

In an offensive in hard-to-reach areas of terrain, where motorized rifles operate in front of tanks, small arms should first of all hit anti-tank grenade launchers, recoilless rifles and other close-combat anti-tank weapons. Directed fire from machine guns and machine guns should be fired at bushes and various masks behind which one can assume the presence of fire weapons.

During an enemy counterattack, small arms fire is conducted in conjunction with the fire of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Submachine gunners and machine gunners destroy groups of infantry and fire crews, starting from a range of 800 m (with concentrated fire from squads). Snipers hit officers, ATGM crews and other important targets. Then the defeat of the enemy ends with an attack. At the same time, small arms fire is conducted on the move at its lying down and retreating groups.

When pursuing, motorized riflemen usually take seats in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and fire their weapons through loopholes (on top of hatches) at groups of infantry and anti-tank weapons on the move and from short stops.

When motorized rifle units operate as part of tactical airborne assault forces, small arms can be used in flight, for example, from helicopters against ground targets. As the landing force approaches the landing site, the enemy on it is destroyed by airborne weapon fire, and from a range of 400-500 m, by small arms fire through the observation windows and entrance doors of the helicopter.

Infantry organization and tactics

The coastal forces of the Russian Navy include:

  • coastal missile and artillery troops (BRAV),
  • Marine Corps (MP),
  • Coastal Defense Troops (CD).
The main tactical properties of coastal troops:
  • versatility, high combat readiness, ability to conduct independent and joint actions in coastal areas;
  • high combat stability, firepower;
  • mobility;
  • low dependence on GMU.
TO negative combat properties The need for combat support, especially reconnaissance and target designation, can be attributed.

Purpose BRAV:

  • destruction of ships, CON, DesO;
  • fire cover of bases, coastal fleet facilities, coastal sea communications and groupings of troops operating in coastal areas from enemy surface forces;
  • destruction of enemy bases and ports;
  • destruction and suppression of enemy personnel and firepower on the shore.
Marines capable of landing in an independent amphibious assault or as part of the amphibious landing forces of the ground forces.

Goals Marine Corps in amphibious assault:

  • creation of a landing site;
  • assistance ground forces, advancing on the coastal flank;
  • improving the conditions for basing fleet forces, etc.
Tasks Marine Corps:
  • capture landing points, create and hold landing bridgeheads, defend the landing base;
  • capture important objects and positions on the coast, hold them until your forces arrive; capture ports and bases of enemy fleet forces; destroy elements of the enemy’s control system and high-precision weapons located on the coast (islands), air defense, missile defense facilities, coastal airfields, etc.
Tactical formations MP - division, brigade. Tactical units of the MP - regiment, battalion.

The main organizational structure of BRAV is the coastal missile regiment, capable of solving problems independently in a range of up to 300 km along the front and in depth.

A missile regiment consists of: headquarters and control units, combat units, support and service units. Depending on the weapons, a coastal missile regiment can be mobile or stationary, long-range or short-range.

The basis of the organizational structure of coastal artillery is a separate coastal artillery battalion: control units, 2-4 artillery batteries, support and maintenance units.

BRAV combat operations are a set of actions involving the movement of units, their placement in firing positions and the delivery of strikes.

The purpose and objective of the action are indicated in the combat order. Based on the order, the commander makes a decision, manages preparations for combat, exercises control during combat, and organizes support for combat operations.

Having received a fire mission, the commander carries out the tactical deployment of the formation (advancement to the designated area, deployment to the combat formation and transfer to the designated level of combat readiness), takes measures to detect and identify the target, generates firing data, and carries out a missile strike at the appointed time.

After the strike, the units are withdrawn from the enemy's retaliatory strike and their combat effectiveness is restored.

In order of battle A regiment is the relative location on the ground of units deployed in a designated area for battle, oriented relative to the enemy and each other along the main directions of fire, ensuring the use of weapons, camouflage, self-defense, etc.

Includes: command post, battle formations of combat and support units.

The regiment is located in the area, the starting division is at the starting position, the technical division is at the technical position, and the artillery battery is at the artillery position.

Marine Division includes: combat units, combat support units and units; service units and units; headquarters and control units.

Combat units: These are regiments of marines, reinforced by tank and artillery regiments, and sometimes an anti-aircraft missile regiment.

The main combat units of the Marine Corps regiment are:

  • a battalion of marines with armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles with an artillery battery of self-propelled guns;
  • air assault battalion;
  • tank battalion;
  • reactive battery;
  • anti-tank guided missile battery, anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery.
Marine units are designed to conduct combat operations in an operational (operational-tactical) amphibious assault independently and in cooperation with units of ground forces.

In a tactical landing, a Marine battalion is capable of independently destroying enemy personnel, tanks and armored personnel carriers, artillery and anti-tank weapons, chemical attack weapons, helicopters and aircraft, in order to capture and hold enemy positions until the main forces arrive.

Tactical amphibious assault it is applied for:

  • breaking through enemy defenses on the sea coast and assisting units advancing in the coastal direction, encircling and defeating the enemy on the coast;
  • capturing and holding ports, airfields, coastal islands and other important coastal objects until the main forces arrive; disruption of enemy command and control and rear operations.
Upon receiving the task for operations in the amphibious assault, the battalion commander understands:
  • the task of the amphibious assault and its battalion, the procedure for ensuring the landing;
  • evaluates the nature of the enemy's anti-landing defense and the terrain in the area of ​​the landing point and the battalion's upcoming actions, the system of its obstacles in the water and on the shore;
  • specifies the location, order of landing (loading) of the battalion, methods of fighting for the landing point and the order of landing;
  • studies conditions during the sea crossing and at the disembarkation point.
When preparing for an amphibious landing, the battalion commander additionally determines:
  • tasks for units to destroy the enemy at the landing point and in the specified area on the shore;
  • distribution of staff units and reinforcements among landing vehicles;
  • the order of boarding (loading) and disembarking (unloading) of units.
When organizing interaction, the battalion commander additionally agrees:
  • actions of units to capture a landing point, during landing and overcoming anti-landing barriers;
  • interaction of units with naval artillery fire, air strikes and airborne assault operations (if used).
The departments create increased inventories of material resources. The battalion's medical center is being reinforced with medical personnel and medical aid.

Before landing (loading), the battalion unit occupies a holding area and completes preparations for landing.

To board (load) the battalion onto landing vehicles, a boarding (loading) point is designated.

Advancement to the landing (loading) point is carried out in columns of units, taking into account the order of approach of landing ships according to signals from commanders.

Loading of weapons, equipment, missiles, ammunition, fuel and other materiel onto the ship is carried out taking into account ensuring their fastest unloading and combat on shore. The sequence of loading weapons and equipment must be in the order reverse order unloading them.

Personnel are boarded after loading weapons, equipment and supplies.

From the moment the order is received to board units on landing vehicles and until the end of the landing, the battalion commander becomes subordinate to the commander of the detachment of ships on which the battalion is making the transition by sea.

Amphibious tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), as a rule, launch into the water before the landing ships approach the landing point and proceed to the shore under their own power. Behind them, landing ships approach the landing point, landing units directly on the shore.

Subunits of the battalion, under the cover of air strikes and naval artillery fire, their own assets and the actions of the air assault group, move to the shore in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), high-speed landing craft. The battalion lands on the shore and deploys its battle formation on the move. When going on the attack, it destroys the enemy and captures the landing point to a depth that ensures the landing of the main landing forces. Subsequently, the battalion, in cooperation with units of the first echelon of the landing force, expands the captured area and continues to carry out the task on the shore.

Units advancing in the direction of the airborne assault area quickly connect with it and continue to carry out the combat mission together.

THE MAIN TACTICAL PROPERTIES OF COASTAL FORCES ARE HIGH COMBAT READINESS AND COMBAT STABILITY.

The doctrine of fighting tanks among most armies of the world before the war was a speculative construction that did not have any experience behind it. Pre-war conflicts in which tanks were used (the Spanish War, Italian expansion in Ethiopia) provided little information for analysis when only light tanks were used, and in relatively small quantities. There were also too few anti-tank weapons to evaluate their effectiveness. The results of the maneuvers turned out to be uninformative, since it is very difficult to accurately simulate the actions of enemy tanks. Obviously, real experience in the massive use of tanks was required.

There were two schools that viewed the use of the tank differently. Some specialists insisted on carrying out massive breakthroughs of the enemy’s defenses, followed by a quick and deep wedge into enemy territory. Other specialists They saw the tank as just a means of supporting infantry. Practice has shown that both schools were right. However, a tank is an expensive weapon, so in all armies there was a tendency to save tanks. Even in the German army, where the first school had absolute predominance, tanks were supposed to be kept 100 meters behind the infantry chain, from where they should support the infantry’s actions with fire from machine guns and cannons.

The evolution of anti-tank tactics

1939-42

Infantry anti-tank tactics developed in different ways in different armies, which was determined by local specifics. In general, two approaches to this issue can be distinguished.

Passive protection. Includes patrols and outposts designed to warn of the appearance of tanks, anti-tank barriers and minefields, the use of artificial barriers to natural barriers, the use of other factors that can delay the movement of tanks, strengthen anti-tank protection, and camouflage.

Active defense. Selecting successful positions for anti-tank weapons, determining sectors of fire, using anti-tank weapons, forming infantry detachments of tank destroyers, using reserves for a counterattack.

Since mobility is an integral property of a tank, and infantry anti-tank defense is usually static in nature, the initiative always belongs to tanks. According to J.F.K. Fuller: " Tanks conquer, infantry hold"As a rule, this principle is correct, but anti-tank defense does have a certain offensive potential. Even the very first primitive self-propelled anti-tank guns mounted on the chassis of trucks or obsolete tanks could, to some extent, conduct offensive operations.


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Regardless of the country, the infantry company built its defensive positions according to the same pattern.

Regardless of the country, the infantry company built its defensive positions according to the same pattern. The differences were caused only by what anti-tank weapons were available and in what quantities. Usually two platoons of the company moved forward, and the third was in reserve. However, the formation could change depending on the tactical situation.

The outpost (1) is moved far forward in order to notice the approaching enemy in advance and prevent him from conducting reconnaissance. The forward posts of the battalion, regiment and division were moved even further forward. Most anti-tank weapons (2) cover tank-dangerous areas, and machine guns (3) keep an eye on terrain impassable for tanks, where enemy infantry may appear. Anti-tank barriers (4) are presented here in the form of gouges. These barriers are installed when time permits and applied to natural barriers (5). The bridge over the river has been blown up (6), a minefield has been created at a key point (7), the road is blocked by a rubble (8) of fallen trees. Infantry anti-tank weapons - anti-tank rifles, bazookas or PIATs - are available one for each platoon, but the company commander can concentrate them in one place. The company's defensive positions can be reinforced with one or more anti-tank guns (9), especially if there is a tank-dangerous direction. This area is additionally targeted with field artillery and mortars, the fire of which helps to cut off the infantry from the tanks. Anti-tank defense is layered in depth. To do this, some infantry anti-tank weapons are left in the rear or on the flank. One or more armor-piercing teams (10) are preparing to intercept tanks that managed to break through the forward positions of the company. Sometimes anti-tank mines cover the nearest approaches and flanks (11).


Spoiler: Company anti-tank defense

Infantry mobility is limited, especially when repelling a tank attack. Motorized infantry differs little from regular infantry, as trucks or armored personnel carriers are too vulnerable to tank fire, and also have limited maneuverability compared to tanks. The armament of motorized infantry differs little from that of ordinary infantry. Infantry squads of tank destroyers can move only within limited limits, their actions are exclusively defensive in nature.

Anti-tank defensive measures were carried out during the organization of any defense. The determining factors were the extent of enemy tank operations, known enemy tank tactics, the number and type of anti-tank weapons available, and terrain conditions. Infantry Regiment(in the English army, an infantry brigade), as a rule, took up defensive positions, having two battalions in the first line and one battalion in reserve. Each battalion had two rifle companies on the front line and one company in reserve. The same formation scheme was used at the company-platoon level. That is, approximately a third of the available forces were in reserve. This ensured adequate defensive depth. The effectiveness of anti-tank weapons depended largely on infantry support. This required a high degree of coordination.

German Panzerkampfgruppe in ambush (1944-45):

Click on the diagram to enlarge

Towards the end of the Second World War, the German army found itself in a difficult situation. The Germans increasingly had to resort to infantry tactics to combat Allied tanks. The situation was somewhat saved by the fact that the German infantry now had very effective anti-tank weapons at its disposal. This diagram shows the positions of a battle group (vorgeschobene Stellung) covering one of the approaches to an anti-tank defense stronghold (Panzerabwehrgeschutz), located in a village outside the diagram. Typically, such groups were tasked with holding out until they received orders to withdraw or until a predetermined time. This tactic often baffled the Allies., as the fierce battle suddenly stopped and the enemy disappeared. As a rule, the abandoned positions were immediately covered by German artillery. In order to hold back the advance of British tanks (1), the Germans laid minefields (2), where anti-tank mines are used along with anti-personnel mines.

Anti-personnel mines not only made it difficult for sappers to work, but also interfered with the evacuation of exploded tanks and prevented infantrymen from using tank hulls as cover. The few available anti-tank guns, in this case the 5 cm Pak 38 (3), are used singly rather than in concentration. The flank was covered with 20 mm anti-aircraft gun(4). A squad with six 8.8 cm RP 54 Panzerschreck is located in the center (5). Each crew dug a V-shaped cell for itself, with both ends directed forward. The trench was usually dug around trees. If it was necessary to dig a trench in an open field, it was additionally camouflaged. This form of trenches allowed the crew to fire at tanks regardless of the direction of their approach. If the first number of the crew occupied one shoulder of the trench, then the second took refuge in the second shoulder. In a few buildings, snipers take a position (6). The buildings attracted allied fire. Pairs of panzergrenadiers armed with panzerfausts (7) were scattered throughout the depth of the defense. Their task is to intercept tanks that managed to break into the depths of the position. The shortage in manpower was partially compensated by the rapid-firing MG 34 or MG 42 (8) machine guns, capable of maintaining unusually dense fire along the front. Machine guns cut off infantry from tanks. English tank crews joked that as soon as machine-gun bullets clicked on the armor, the infantrymen hid in holes like rabbits.

For support, the German infantry was often given other types of weapons. For example, the forefield of the German defense is targeted with 80-mm and 120-mm mortars, which will cover the enemy with fire as soon as they approach the positions (9). In the rear, assault guns (10) are in position, dug in and awaiting the order to engage in battle in the event of a deep enemy breakthrough. According to American estimates, permanent fortifications like the Siegfried Line strengthened the German defenses by only 15% relative to their usual field fortifications. Digging in German tanks and self-propelled guns increased their effectiveness by 40%; they represented a more difficult target than a pillbox.


When the division organized defensive positions, the division's reconnaissance units, as well as units allocated from the reserve, provided cover. Units pushed forward prevent enemy patrols from moving forward, monitor enemy activity, prevent a surprise attack, warn of the start of an attack, and are also the first to engage the enemy. This combat guard can use anti-tank weapons allocated from regimental and divisional reserves. After the main line of defense is equipped, part of the combat guard moves back, but the cover is not completely removed. Each regiment and battalion also provides itself with additional cover by establishing forward posts, observation and listening posts, and sending out patrols. Anti-tank guns can be moved forward if there is a very high risk of enemy tanks being used. However at the beginning of the Second World War, anti-tank weapons were in too great a supply, to put them at risk by pushing them forward.

Ideally anti-tank obstacles should be located in front of the main front of the defenders. These could be minefields, anti-tank ditches, natural barriers (rivers, swamps, ravines). It is also possible to create simplified obstacles: rubble, individual mines installed at key points, blown up bridges. Lack of time often prevents the organization of serious anti-tank obstacles.

The infantry battalion had two to six anti-tank guns. These guns were assigned to rifle companies and installed in tank-hazardous areas. The reliability of the defense depended on its depth. Several enemy tanks could easily break through, so a reserve was needed. Anti-tank rifles located in battalions and companies were usually located together with rifle platoons. The effectiveness of anti-tank guns could be increased by concentrating fire from several guns on one tank. The infantry also prepared anti-tank hand and rifle grenades, anti-tank hand mines and improvised anti-tank weapons for battle.

Actions of English armor-piercing soldiers (1943-44),
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Mountainous terrain of Italy

The mountainous terrain of Italy was not conducive to the use of tanks. The settlements here are located on mountain ridges; they are usually reached by a single road, easily blocked by mines and rubble. However, blockages were rarely used, as they warned the enemy of an impending ambush. Instead, the infantrymen hiding in an ambush disabled the lead vehicle of the column. As a result, the entire column lost momentum and became a target for an artillery attack. In this illustration, the 7.5 cm StuG III assault gun and the SdKfz 251/1 armored personnel carrier will be ambushed.

There was no way to dig in in the rocky ground. Therefore, soldiers use available shelters: rocks, the remains of a stone wall, as well as stones collected in a heap. The last shelter of the British was called "sangar". Outwardly, the sangar looked like a simple pile of stones. In mid-1943, the British army adopted the PIAT (1) grenade launcher, which replaced the Boys anti-tank rifles and rifle grenades No. 68. Before the first shot, the 90-kg spring had to be cocked, then the grenade should be placed in a semi-cylindrical tray. When fired, the spring pushed the rocket out and punctured the primer of the rocket engine. The recoil of the rocket engine again cocked the spring into the firing position, but sometimes this did not happen. Then the soldier had to manually cock the spring. It was almost impossible to do this under fire, since you had to lean on your entire body weight. The 3.5-inch Mk 1A missile with a cumulative warhead (2) weighed 1.2 kg and penetrated armor up to 100 mm thick. However, the design of the rocket was imperfect.

The Hawkins No. 75 (3) anti-tank grenade was actually a small mine that was buried in the ground or thrown like a grenade. Five or six of these grenades are tied to a rope stretched across the road. Heavier anti-tank mines could be used in a similar way. One infantryman holds a No. 77 phosphorus smoke grenade (4) and a No. 73 anti-tank grenade (5) at the ready. Grenade No. 73 was a one and a half kilogram charge of ammonal or nitrogelatin. This grenade penetrated armor up to 50 mm thick, but was especially effective against tank tracks. With a total mass of 2 kg and dimensions of 30x8 cm, this grenade could be thrown only 10-15 meters. The grenade was equipped with a percussion fuse of the "Allways" system. During the flight, the fixing tape unwound from the fuse, after which the pin fell out. The group's actions are covered by the crew of the Bren light machine gun (6), who took aim at the armored personnel carrier.


Slider: Description of the actions of English armor-piercing soldiers

If a defensive position passed through a forest, it was organized in the depths of the forest, and not along the edge. As a result, the enemy lost the opportunity to conduct direct fire. The forest limited the mobility of tanks, and also provided shelters that facilitated the actions of infantry squads of tank destroyers and camouflage anti-tank weapons. The infantry dug into the ground as deep as possible. A trench or rifle cell allowed a soldier to lie down with at least half a meter of height above him. Separate firing positions were connected to each other by trenches, allowing infantry to safely move between positions depending on the tactical situation. For sustainable defense it was important so that the infantrymen know vulnerable points tank, had confidence that tanks could be fought. Otherwise, the infantry will simply scatter when the tanks appear. Infantrymen must be able to pass the tank above them, lying between the tracks on the ground or at the bottom of the trench. Infantrymen should be aware that the closer a tank is, the less dangerous it is to humans and the more vulnerable it becomes to hand-held anti-tank weapons. In the immediate vicinity of the tank there is a dead zone that is not covered by tank machine guns. Depending on the situation, the infantryman can either let the tank pass by him or attack it with hand grenades. In any case, the task of the defending infantry is to fight the enemy infantry accompanying the tanks.

Infantry anti-tank guns are sometimes deployed to the front line, but more often they are kept in the depths of the defense: in a tank-hazardous direction or where it would be more convenient to advance in one direction or another. Early defensive doctrines generally dictated that enemy tanks should be engaged at the greatest possible range. However, the experience of the first battles showed that it is much more efficient to wait until the tanks approach a minimum distance, maybe up to several hundred meters. Fire at short distances is highly accurate. This principle turned out to be effective even for the flat North African desert. Machine guns and mortars must concentrate their fire on the infantry, cutting them off from the tanks.

Anti-tank guns are located in the depths of the defense, taking on tanks that have broken through the front line of defense. If necessary, regimental reserves should be brought into battle. If the battle is fought in a closed area, it is convenient for infantry to fight tanks with the help of hand-held anti-tank weapons. A divisional tank destroyer battalion is usually held in reserve, although individual guns can be used to reinforce rifle units. If a division is reinforced with tanks, they are kept in reserve in case of a possible counterattack. During the offensive, anti-tank crews accompany the infantry, staying slightly behind. If enemy tanks are encountered, anti-tank guns roll forward and engage in battle. Anti-tank guns can also be used to combat enemy pillboxes and bunkers, as well as to cover the flanks.