A story of failure and triumph

On July 6, 1945, the United States, in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy, conducted the first ever test of an atomic weapon in the desert of New Mexico. US President G. Truman was shocked because he suddenly felt like the “Lord of the World.” After all, even as a senator and then vice president, he could not even imagine, did not know and had no idea that billions of dollars were secretly being spent on the creation of atomic weapons.

However, despite the strictest secrecy, the American atomic “Manhattan Project” (“US Army, Mailbox 1663"), was no secret to Soviet foreign intelligence, which back in 1941 received information from London about the attempts of a group of American scientists to create an “explosive” of enormous power, the so-called. “uranium bomb” (originally called an atomic weapon).

I. Stalin had long been aware of the work that was carried out in the USA and Great Britain to create nuclear weapons. And when the USSR exploded its own atomic bomb in August 1949, both the USA and Great Britain were shocked, because they believed that this could happen no earlier than 1955-1957. The American monopoly on nuclear weapons no longer existed!

How did the USSR, a country that had just suffered a terrible 4 years of war, a country that lay in ruins, with blown up enterprises and factories, destroyed cities, burned villages, a country that had lost more than 30 million people, a country of the Gulag, barracks, dugouts, post-war famine and rationed bread, was able not only to create an atomic bomb in the shortest possible time, but also to establish its military power throughout the world?

In the most difficult conditions of the post-war economy, nuclear weapons in the USSR were created by the incredible, heroic work of Soviet scientists and the entire people. And, of course, the merit of foreign intelligence is the clear and timely attraction of the attention of the country’s political leadership, and “personally Comrade Stalin” (who was often extremely skeptical about intelligence data) to the work ongoing in the West on the development of atomic weapons.

The leadership of foreign intelligence set clear tasks for all agents and employees - identifying countries conducting practical work on the creation of atomic weapons; urgently informing the Center about the content of these works and acquiring through agents the necessary scientific and technical information that can facilitate the creation similar weapons in USSR.

A special scientific and technical intelligence unit was also created and tasked with identifying all information related to the problem of creating a “uranium bomb.”

Let us note that scientists in Germany, England, the USA, France and other countries began to seriously study the problem of splitting the atomic nucleus and obtaining a new source of atomic energy since 1939. Similar work was carried out in the Soviet Union by nuclear scientists Ya. Zeldovich, Yu. Khariton and others. However, the outbreak of war and the evacuation of scientific institutes interrupted work on the creation of atomic weapons in our country.

Unfortunately, for a long time myself The task of obtaining atomic secrets did not stand out among foreign intelligence priorities , and the Soviet residency in the USA failed to achieve tangible results for a long time - it was very difficult to overcome the powerful wall of secrecy of the project, and only at the end of 1941 information was transmitted from New York that American professors Urey, Bragg and Fowler had left for London to work "over an explosive of enormous force."

The information from the London station also aroused the distrust of Lavrentiy Beria, who believed that the “enemies” were deliberately “planting disinformation” in order to force the USSR into war time go to enormous expenses and thereby weaken the country's defense capability.

In February 1942, front-line intelligence officers captured a German officer, in whose briefcase a notebook with incomprehensible notes was found. The notebook is sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense, and from there to the Commissioner for Science of the State Defense Committee. It was established that we are talking about the plans of Nazi Germany to create atomic (nuclear) weapons.

And only in March 1942 did scientific and technical intelligence inform I. Stalin about the reality of creating atomic weapons and proposed to form a scientific advisory council under the State Defense Committee to coordinate the work.

In November 1943, the Foreign Intelligence Center received a message that a number of leading British scientists had left for the United States, including Klaus Fuchs, a German emigrant and member of the German Communist Party.

K. Fuchs was recruited and cooperated out of a desire to neutralize the efforts of Nazi Germany to create nuclear weapons; he transferred to the Soviet side a number of calculations for nuclear fission and the creation atomic bomb.

In total, 7 valuable materials were received from K. Fuchs in 1941-1943, and in February 1944, in New York, he handed over copies of his theoretical works, which allowed the Soviet Union to reduce the time it took to create atomic weapons from three to ten years and to get ahead of the United States in creating hydrogen weapons.

In 1944-1945, Soviet intelligence managed to “establish” a “regular supply” of documentary information to the Center, and it was this that allowed Moscow to be aware of all the work that was carried out in the United States to create a “super bomb”.

Despite the fact that foreign intelligence is not attributed a leading role in the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR, nevertheless, its important role is recognized by scientists themselves. From 1943 until the 1945 test of the first American atomic bomb, intelligence received several thousand sheets of secret documentary information.

I.V. Kurchatov, to whom all the materials were sent, wrote that “...intelligence provided very rich and instructive material containing theoretically important instructions, and in it, along with the methods and schemes developed by Soviet scientists, opportunities were also indicated that were not considered...”.

So, the role of foreign intelligence in the development of the “atomic project” was not only in collecting valuable information and recruiting agents.

Perhaps the most important thing is that she managed to attract serious attention of the country's leadership and Stalin personally to the problem of creating atomic weapons in the West and thereby initiate similar work in the USSR.

It is believed that it was thanks to the timely information received by Academician I.V. Kurchatov and his group managed to avoid big mistakes and dead ends and create an atomic bomb in just three years, while the United States spent more than five years on it, spending five billion dollars.

But we note that intelligence materials give maximum effect only if they reach exactly those people who can understand, evaluate and use them correctly. And in the USSR, intelligence work was structured in such a way that the information received by intelligence services could be implemented into decisions only after passing “through the office” of Stalin, who kept absolutely all important decisions under personal control, and this was precisely the “basis of effectiveness” of his unlimited power .

Information from agents came in the form of scientific reports and complex mathematical calculations, copies of research, and only highly qualified mathematicians, physicists and chemists could understand these materials. The reports lay unread in the NKVD safes for more than a year, and only in May-June 1942, Stalin received a brief oral report on the atomic bomb, presented by L. Beria.

Thus, only scientists high level could understand scientific materials and reports... And this happened...

L.P. Beria informed Stalin of the intelligence findings, and read a letter from physicists, “much more popular than the NKVD,” explaining what an atomic bomb was and why Germany or the United States might soon produce one. They say that Stalin, after walking around his office for a bit, thought and said: “We need to do it!”

Stalin and Kurchatov - “leader of the country” and “scientific manager”

Appointments to important state or party posts have always been the monopoly of Stalin, as the absolute leader of the state, and their registration as decisions of the Politburo, State Defense Committee or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was only a formality.

As already noted, research on the mastery of atomic energy was actively carried out by Soviet scientists back in the thirties, and even then they were considered a priority.

In 1933, the First All-Union Conference on Nuclear Physics was held with the invitation of foreign scientists, and in 1938, under the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a commission on the atomic nucleus was formed. However, after the outbreak of war, work on the uranium problem was suspended, and scientists were attracted to solving more pressing problems.

The organizational foundations of the USSR atomic project were laid by a series of Resolutions of the State Defense Committee (GKO) in 1942-1945, and on February 11, 1943, Stalin signed the decision “On the program of work for the creation of an atomic bomb.” General management of the problem was entrusted to V.M. Molotov and it is believed that it was Molotov who personally introduced Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov to Stalin, and it was Kurchatov's expert opinion on intelligence documents served as the beginning of the creation of an atomic bomb in the USSR.

The atomic bomb program required its own “scientific leader” and Stalin understood perfectly well that this had to be an authoritative and prominent scientist. Consultations about a possible leader were carried out, among other things, by L. Beria personally - the chosen “leader of scientists” had to familiarize himself with almost two thousand pages of exclusively scientific materials, consisting of formulas, diagrams, calculations and explanations in English. Therefore, any physicist who would be entrusted with managing the problem would have to work for the first months in the top-secret archives of the NKVD, and not in a quiet laboratory.

On March 10, 1943, Stalin appointed Igor Kurchatov to the post of scientific director of work on the use of atomic energy in the USSR, giving Kurchatov emergency powers to mobilize the human and material resources necessary to solve the problem. Throughout March 1943, without leaving his room for days, I.V. Kurchatov studied numerous intelligence documents in the NKVD, giving an expert opinion on 237 scientific works!

But... Neither I.V. Kurchatov, nor his colleagues admitted to intelligence secrets, had no right to disclose the sources of their knowledge, and as both historians and those who worked in this project say, although they were silent for a very long time, which supposedly both Kurchatov and his colleagues had to reveal data received from the NKVD intelligence department for ... own discoveries, which created for them a “halo of genius” and, paradoxical as it may sound, was generally beneficial to the cause! It was a clearly and subtly calculated psychological move - everyone dreamed and strived to work under the auspices of a brilliant scientist!

Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov assembles a team, using very limited financial resources, organizes the necessary theoretical and experimental research in a war-ravaged country, analyzes intelligence data and informs the government about the state of work and the blatant discrepancy between goals and means. At that time, 100 people were employed in the nuclear project in the USSR, and 50 thousand in the USA!

Kurchatov’s high authority in the government also helped; he knew how to defend the interests of the cause and its executors in the highest government spheres, and be tolerant of manifestations of incompetence of the “supervising party”, unless, of course, it greatly interfered with the research process. In addition, he could tell Stalin a lot... There is a legend that when the Americans detonated the atomic bomb, Stalin immediately called Beria and Kurchatov and asked: “Well, Comrade Kurchatov, did your scientists miss the bomb?” “It’s not too late..., Comrade Stalin,” Igor Vasilyevich boldly answered, “...we stood in lines!”

And Stalin, in a matter of days, made fundamental decisions that determined the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear industry and all science in Russia for many decades. But these decisions were prepared precisely by Kurchatov and his “team” and never in world history has power transferred the “reins of government” to such an extent into the hands of scientists. For 17 years I.V. Kurchatov turned Russia into a world superpower.

Kurchatov clearly and clearly saw the main path leading to the goal, and confidently walked along it, but, at the same time, he supported the breadth of his search, relying on the youth of Academician Ioffe’s school: A.P. Alexandrova, A.I. Alikhanova, L.A. Artsimovich, I.K. Kikoina. And the most important thing - Special attention devotes himself to the creation of an atomic bomb, and here his support is Yu.B. Khariton, Ya.B. Zeldovich, I.E. Tamm and A.D. Sakharov.

Possessing a broad scientific outlook and unique organizational skills, the strength of his convictions, I.V. Kurchatov was able to quickly reorient entire scientific teams to work in areas that were new to them. It was easier for him with industrial facilities - an order from above was enough. But scientists were involved precisely for creative work, which can be carried out when ordered, but it will not be effective.

On July 19, 1948, under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov started the launch of the nuclear reactor from zero and on June 22 its power reached its design value - 100 MW. Construction of the reactor took less than two years, and the development and design of the reactor took approximately the same amount of time. In less than 4 years, a nuclear reactor was developed and put into operation in the USSR...

And the first and successful test The first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out at a test site in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan on August 29, 1949...

I. Stalin, satisfied that there was no American monopoly in the field of the atomic bomb, allegedly remarked: “If we had been one to a year and a half late, we would probably have tried this charge on ourselves.”

What worked here - fear of the all-powerful Stalin and Beria? Yes and no... But, most likely, there was an opportunity to prove himself as a scientist, pride in the country, for the fact that he was given the right and opportunity to create an atomic bomb, thereby strengthening the country’s defense capability.

And after successful tests, the entire team received high government awards, large cash bonuses, cars, dachas, and apartments. Let me remind you that it was 1949, and half the country lay in ruins. So the government also made a “psychological move” - encouraging not only the best, and not only scientists, but practically everyone who took part in the work - from academics to workers.

I.V. Kurchatov was the initiator of the creation of secret scientific centers in Arzamas, Obninsk, Dubna, Dmitrovgrad, Snezhinsk, industrial and scientific nuclear centers in the Urals and Siberia, it was he who “stimulated the birth” of the Moscow Physico-Technical and Moscow Engineering Physics Institutes, the Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Physics MSU, was able to strengthen and reorient the physics department of MSU. And it was these centers, “closed cities,” that provided the opportunity to Soviet time albeit “supervised”, but also quite comfortable for its “inhabitants” to live, which also stimulated the development of industry and education - many sought to study in prestigious universities and then work on these “mailboxes”.

L.P. Is Beria an “effective manager”?

On August 20, 1945, Stalin signed Resolution No. 9887 “On the Special Committee,” which consisted of key figures party and state apparatus. L.P. was appointed Chairman of the Committee. Beria, and the Special Committee was entrusted with all management of the organization of the development and production of atomic bombs, all activities related to the use of atomic energy in the USSR: research work, exploration of uranium mining deposits and the creation of the nuclear industry.

On August 30, 1945, the First Main Directorate was created, which was entrusted with direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and enterprises for the use of atomic energy and the production of atomic bombs.

The most important part of the uranium problem was a clear, but incredibly difficult plan - to begin an intensified search for uranium deposits and organize its extraction. The First Main Geological Exploration Directorate was created, which was entrusted with the organization and management of special geological prospecting and exploration work on uranium on the territory of the USSR.

An important role in the organization of the country's nuclear industry belonged to the State Planning Committee of the USSR and ... the Gulag, or more precisely, the Main Directorate of Camps of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GULGMP), which was part of its “system”.

The NKVD, through its representatives authorized by the Council of Ministers, clearly and ruthlessly controlled the implementation of the resolutions of the Special Committee and the Government by the heads of enterprises and construction sites.

L.P. Beria, since 1944, has been supervising all work and research related to the creation of atomic weapons, demonstrating extraordinary organizational skills.

When it became clear that there was a catastrophic shortage of... physicists to carry out the tasks of the atomic project, Beria immediately ordered a search for “scientific heads” in the Gulag camps. Yesterday's prisoners, dying from exhaustion and overwork, were sent to specially created “sharashkas” - scientific prisons. And no matter what they say about them, it was they who saved the lives of many scientists, in particular the physics teacher A.S. Solzhenitsyn. Both A. Tupolev and S.P., who was dying in the Kolyma mines, passed “Sharashki”. Korolev and many other scientists.

But even after these emergency measures, there were still not enough scientists - the fate of each specialist was dealt with by the Technical Council of the Special Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers.

In general, several scientists studied the physics of the atomic nucleus, and L. Beria quickly drew conclusions - in 1945, a decision was made to create special departments in a number of universities, and then to create special universities. At the same time, the leaders responsible for the USSR higher education, to “correct deficiencies in the training of atomic nuclear physicists and engineers of related specialties” ... ten days were given.

However, Beria’s “management efficiency,” “according to rumors,” was also such. Arriving somewhere, he called the project managers or all the scientists and engineers in general and asked how long it would take to complete such and such a project. “Three months,” they answered him. “A month,” said Beria, and, flashing his pince-nez, silently left. The project was completed on time, or even in three weeks... No one wanted to “become camp dust”...

But everyone knew that L. Beria tried to delve into the work in detail, was extremely demanding of his subordinates and mercilessly parted with careless workers. The world-famous physicist Pyotr Kapitsa “for sabotage” (although he did it “in a scientifically sophisticated manner,” Beria did not need “empty theorizing,” but the result) was removed from the “atomic project” and deprived of the post of director of the Institute of Physical Problems.

A kind of “merit” of L.P. Beria, as an “effective government manager” in that for three and a half years “since clean slate"and "in an open field" in a war-torn country, a highly knowledge-intensive nuclear industry was created.

And here there was not only people’s fear of the possibility of ending up in the gold mines of Kolyma or the mines of Vorkuta. There was pride in one’s work, enthusiasm, personal responsibility for the security of the country, a desire to do everything as best as possible and “not out of fear, but out of conscience.”

And L. Beria understood perfectly well that he himself could have ended up in the “millstone of the Gulag” if he had failed the project - Stalin would not have forgiven him for this. Naturally L.P. Beria was able to demonstrate his “unique abilities as an organizer and manager” only by possessing incredible capabilities and power.

Although I.V. Kurchatov subsequently wrote that “...Beria supervised all the work and research related to the creation of atomic weapons, showing extraordinary organizational skills, and if not for him, Beria, there would have been no bomb...”. Whether this is true or not... But all the same, the “atomic project of the USSR” came at too high a price...

Modern nuclear energy in Russia

In November 2005, ex-Prime Minister and ex-plenipotentiary representative of the President in the Volga region Sergei Kiriyenko headed the Federal Atomic Energy Agency of Russia (Rosatom), since December 2007 - CEO state corporation "Rosatom".

As experts noted, the reshuffle of management in Rosatom is a factor indicating that the attention of the Russian Government to the development of the nuclear industry and energy has increased, and urgent, serious and operational reforms are needed.

Academician Evgeny Velikhov, President of the Russian Scientific Center “Kurchatov Institute” commented on the appointment of Sergei Kiriyenko: “There is nothing terrible in the fact that Kiriyenko is not a nuclear scientist. The main thing is that he is a manager and a person with a strategic vision of not only the industry, but also the economy as a whole. There is an energy crisis in the world, carbon prices are rising, and a golden age is dawning for nuclear energy, but nothing is developing in our country. I hope Kiriyenko will not miss this chance.” Alas, the academician was deeply mistaken...

With the arrival of S. Kiriyenko as head of Rosatom, it was expected that after four years of the failed leadership of Alexander Rumyantsev, the nuclear industry would face serious changes for the better. But, alas, Russian nuclear energy remains (in terms of the efficiency of using its capacities) at the 2003 level.

Sergei Kiriyenko and “his team” did not turn the situation around; ineffective management decisions led to serious financial losses in the industry and direct losses of budget investments, disrupted control over the work schedule in the nuclear industry.

The management of Rosatom has done practically nothing to restore the construction and installation complex of the nuclear power industry, the program for the construction and completion of nuclear power plants in Russia has actually been disrupted, the experimental base of the industry's research institutes has almost completely collapsed, work on the creation of new technologies and equipment for the nuclear fuel cycle has been frozen, there are no plans for reconstruction and construction of new research reactors. According to experts, possible losses associated with ineffective management and inept use of investment funds in Rosatom exceed $36 billion.

A leader, a manager who makes key decisions, must understand the essence of what is happening, and not only at the organizational level, but also all interrelated economic and technological issues and decisions made, and not only at the level of the central office, but also at the level of linear divisions. Otherwise, he becomes a hostage to his close circle, which is what happened in Rosatom.

The quality of management at Rosatom is of undoubted concern, since the corporation itself arose as a result of a “massive merger” of enterprises that have not yet been integrated into a single whole.

“Personnel decides everything!” - this phrase is attributed to Stalin. But in the leadership of the industry, institutes and enterprises, among the employees of the service of chief engineers, logistics workers responsible for the range and quality of supplied materials and equipment of the nuclear industry, one can find ... philosophers, teachers, pharmacists, supervised work on uranium mining (until 2012 ) ...veterinarian by training. What can we say? Ambiguous and incompetent decisions in strategically important areas of the nuclear industry are becoming simply inevitable, and the safety aspects of the operation of nuclear-hazardous facilities of the Rosatom system are especially vulnerable.

In addition, Rosatom management pursues a policy of information secrecy in the industry, enterprise managers are prohibited from making public comments in the media about the state of affairs not only in the industry, but also at their enterprise, and many negative trends are categorically closed to public discussion.

At one time, only an accident Chernobyl nuclear power plant forced to make the nuclear industry as open as possible, and in the current conditions it is necessary to ensure no less transparency. And this is not only about security issues and warning the population about a possible threat, but also about ineffective corporate governance of Rosatom, which, naturally, the management does not want to admit. Clear control is needed - from public examination to the introduction of the “institute of independent directors” in state companies industry, strict and constant control is required from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Rostekhnadzor and the Accounts Chamber.

The personnel problem remains one of the main ones for Russian nuclear workers; enterprise management has to face a situation where there is not enough qualified labor to fulfill orders.

The situation with personnel for the nuclear industry was affected by the “preferences” of university applicants recent years, when competition for natural sciences and engineering professions has sharply decreased, and for specialties such as “economics”, “management”, “law” - on the contrary, it has increased and students study not to gain knowledge, but to receive a diploma.

Only a few years ago did Russian nuclear scientists seriously take on solving this problem of personnel training. The TVEL Corporation, a nuclear fuel manufacturer, pays the best students of the Moscow Faculty of Engineering and Physics, who are studying in the corporation's core specialties, scholarships in the amount of 6 to 10 minimum wages... And that's all for now...

Incompetence of management in most sectors of industry, education, science, healthcare, social sphere in the Russian Federation, as if in a mirror, were reflected in Rosatom. But nuclear power plants and related enterprises are not factories that produce saucepans. Don't forget Chernobyl... April 25, 1986... Only a little more than 25 years have passed...

A.A. Kazdym
Candidate of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences
Academician of the International Academy of Sciences
Member of MOIP

The first test of a nuclear charge occurred on July 16, 1945 in the United States. The nuclear weapons program was codenamed Manhattan. The tests took place in the desert, in a state of complete secrecy. Even the correspondence of scientists with relatives was under the close attention of intelligence officers.

It is also interesting that Truman, while serving as vice president, knew nothing about the ongoing research. He learned about the existence of the American atomic nuclear project only after being elected president.

The Americans were the first to develop and test nuclear weapons, but similar work was carried out by other countries. The American scientist Robert Oppenheimer and his Soviet colleague Igor Kurchatov are considered the fathers of the new deadly weapon. It is worth considering that the creation nuclear bomb They weren't the only ones working. Scientists from many countries around the world worked on the development of new weapons.

German physicists were the first to solve this problem. Back in 1938, two famous scientists Fritz Strassmann and Otto Hahn for the first time in history performed an operation to split the atomic nucleus of uranium. A few months later, a team of scientists from the University of Hamburg sent a message to the government. It reported that the creation of a new “explosive” is theoretically possible. It was separately emphasized that the state that receives it first will have complete military superiority.

The Germans made serious progress, but were never able to bring their research to its logical conclusion. As a result, the Americans seized the initiative. The history of the Soviet atomic project is closely connected with the work of the intelligence services. It was thanks to them that the USSR was eventually able to develop and test nuclear weapons of its own production. We'll talk about this below.

The role of intelligence in the development of an atomic charge

The Soviet military leadership learned about the existence of the American Manhattan project back in 1941. Then our country's intelligence received a message from its agents that the US government had organized a group of scientists working on the creation of a new “explosive” with enormous power. What was meant was a “uranium bomb”. This is what nuclear weapons were originally called.

The story of the Potsdam Conference, at which Stalin was informed of the successful American test of an atomic bomb, deserves special attention. The reaction of the Soviet leader was quite restrained. In his usual calm tone, he thanked for the information provided, but did not comment on it in any way. Churchill and Truman decided that Soviet leader does not fully understand what exactly was reported to him.

However, the Soviet leader was well informed. The Foreign Intelligence Service constantly informed him that the Allies were developing a bomb of enormous power. After talking with Truman and Churchill, he contacted the physicist Kurchatov, who headed the Soviet atomic project, and ordered the development of nuclear weapons to be accelerated.

Of course, the information provided by intelligence contributed to the speedy development by the Soviet Union new technology. However, to say that it was decisive is extremely incorrect. At the same time, leading Soviet scientists have repeatedly stated the importance of information obtained through intelligence.

Throughout the development of nuclear weapons, Kurchatov has repeatedly given the information received high marks. The Foreign Intelligence Service provided him with more than a thousand sheets of valuable data, which certainly helped speed up the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb.

The creation of the bomb in the USSR

The USSR began conducting research necessary for the production of nuclear weapons in 1942. It was then that Kurchatov gathered big number specialists to conduct research in this area. Initially, the atomic project was supervised by Molotov. But after the explosions in Japanese cities, a Special Committee was established. Beria became its head. It was this structure that began to oversee the development of the atomic charge.

The domestic nuclear bomb was named RDS-1. The weapon was developed in two types. The first was designed to use plutonium, and the other uranium-235. The development of the Soviet atomic charge was carried out on the basis of available information about the plutonium bomb created in the United States. Most of the information was received by foreign intelligence from the German scientist Fuchs. As mentioned above, this information significantly accelerated the progress of research. More detailed information you will find it at biblioatom.ru.

Testing of the first atomic charge in the USSR

The Soviet atomic charge was first tested on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site in the Kazakh SSR. Physicist Kurchatov officially ordered the tests to be carried out at eight in the morning. A charge and special neutron fuses were brought to the test site in advance. At midnight the RDS-1 assembly was completed. The procedure was completed only at three o'clock in the morning.

Then at six in the morning the finished device was lifted onto a special testing tower. As a result of deterioration weather conditions management decided to postpone the explosion one hour earlier than the originally scheduled date.

At seven o'clock in the morning the test took place. Twenty minutes later, two tanks equipped with protective plates were sent to the test site. Their task was to conduct reconnaissance. The data obtained indicated that all existing buildings were destroyed. The soil is contaminated and has turned into a solid crust. The charge power was twenty-two kilotons.

Conclusion

The successful test of a Soviet nuclear weapon marked the beginning of a new era. The USSR was able to overcome the US monopoly on the production of new weapons. As a result, the Soviet Union became second in the world nuclear state. This contributed to strengthening the country's defense capability. The development of the atomic charge made it possible to create a new balance of power in the world. Contribution Soviet Union in the development of nuclear physics as a science is difficult to overestimate. It was in the USSR that technologies were developed that later began to be used throughout the world.

The first Soviet charge for an atomic bomb was successfully tested at the Semipalatinsk test site (Kazakhstan).

This event was preceded by long and difficult work by physicists. The beginning of work on nuclear fission in the USSR can be considered the 1920s. Since the 1930s, nuclear physics has become one of the main directions of domestic physical science, and in October 1940, for the first time in the USSR, a group of Soviet scientists made a proposal to use atomic energy for weapons purposes, submitting an application to the Invention Department of the Red Army "On the use of uranium as a explosive and toxic substances."

The war that began in June 1941 and the evacuation of scientific institutes dealing with problems of nuclear physics interrupted work on the creation of atomic weapons in the country. But already in the autumn of 1941, the USSR began to receive intelligence information about secret intensive research work being carried out in Great Britain and the USA aimed at developing methods for using atomic energy for military purposes and creating explosives of enormous destructive power.

This information forced, despite the war, to resume work on uranium in the USSR. On September 28, 1942, a secret decree was signed State Committee Defense No. 2352ss "On the organization of work on uranium", according to which research on the use of atomic energy was resumed.

In February 1943, Igor Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of work on the atomic problem. In Moscow, headed by Kurchatov, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created (now the National Research Center Kurchatov Institute), which began to study atomic energy.

Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the US atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee, headed by Lavrentiy Beria. He became the curator of the Soviet atomic project.

At the same time, the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (later the Ministry of Medium Engineering of the USSR, now the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom) was created for the direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and industrial enterprises involved in the Soviet nuclear project. Boris Vannikov, who had previously been the People's Commissar of Ammunition, became the head of the PSU.

In April 1946, the design bureau KB-11 (now the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - VNIIEF) was created at Laboratory No. 2 - one of the most secret enterprises for the development of domestic nuclear weapons, the chief designer of which was Yuli Khariton. Plant No. 550 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, which produced artillery shell casings, was chosen as the base for the deployment of KB-11.

The top-secret facility was located 75 kilometers from the city of Arzamas (Gorky region, now Nizhny Novgorod region) on the territory of the former Sarov Monastery.

KB-11 was tasked with creating an atomic bomb in two versions. In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium, in the second - uranium-235. In mid-1948, work on the uranium option was stopped due to its relatively low efficiency compared to the cost of nuclear materials.

The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself,” “The Motherland gives it to Stalin,” etc. But in the official decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946, it was encrypted as “Special jet engine (“S”).

The creation of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was Klaus Fuchs, a German physicist who participated in the work on nuclear programs USA and UK.

Intelligence materials on the American plutonium charge for an atomic bomb made it possible to reduce the time needed to create the first Soviet charge, although many of the technical solutions of the American prototype were not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual components. Therefore, the first atomic bomb charge tested by the USSR was more primitive and less effective than the original version of the charge proposed by Soviet scientists in early 1949. But in order to reliably and quickly demonstrate that the USSR also possesses atomic weapons, it was decided to use a charge created according to the American design in the first test.

The charge for the RDS-1 atomic bomb was a multilayer structure in which the active substance, plutonium, was transferred to a supercritical state by compressing it through a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.

RDS-1 was an aircraft atomic bomb weighing 4.7 tons, with a diameter of 1.5 meters and a length of 3.3 meters. It was developed in relation to the Tu-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a “product” with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters. Plutonium was used as fissile material in the bomb.

To produce an atomic bomb charge in the city of Chelyabinsk-40 at Southern Urals a plant was built under the conditional number 817 (now the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Mayak Production Association). The plant consisted of the first Soviet industrial reactor for producing plutonium, a radiochemical plant for separating plutonium from uranium irradiated in the reactor, and a plant for producing products from metallic plutonium.

The reactor at Plant 817 was brought to its design capacity in June 1948, and a year later the plant received the required amount of plutonium to make the first charge for an atomic bomb.

The site for the test site where it was planned to test the charge was chosen in the Irtysh steppe, approximately 170 kilometers west of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. A plain with a diameter of approximately 20 kilometers, surrounded from the south, west and north by low mountains, was allocated for the test site. In the east of this space there were small hills.

Construction of the training ground, called training ground No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Armed Forces (later the USSR Ministry of Defense), began in 1947, and was largely completed by July 1949.

For testing at the test site, an experimental site with a diameter of 10 kilometers was prepared, divided into sectors. It was equipped with special facilities to ensure testing, observation and registration physical research. In the center of the experimental field, a metal lattice tower 37.5 meters high was mounted, designed to install the RDS-1 charge. At a distance of one kilometer from the center, an underground building was built for equipment recording light, neutron and gamma fluxes nuclear explosion. To study the impact of a nuclear explosion, sections of metro tunnels, fragments of airfield runways, and samples of aircraft, tanks, and artillery were placed on the experimental field. rocket launchers, ship superstructures of various types. To ensure the operation of the physical sector, 44 structures were built at the test site and a cable network with a length of 560 kilometers was laid.

In June-July 1949, two groups of KB-11 workers with auxiliary equipment and household supplies were sent to the test site, and on July 24 a group of specialists arrived there, which was supposed to be directly involved in preparing the atomic bomb for testing.

On August 5, 1949, the government commission for testing the RDS-1 gave a conclusion on full readiness polygon.

On August 21, a plutonium charge and four neutron fuses were delivered to the test site by a special train, one of which was to be used to detonate a warhead.

On August 24, 1949, Kurchatov arrived at the training ground. By August 26, all preparatory work at the site was completed. The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29 at eight o'clock in the morning local time and to carry out preparatory operations starting at eight o'clock in the morning on August 27.

On the morning of August 27, assembly of the combat product began near the central tower. On the afternoon of August 28, demolition workers carried out a final full inspection of the tower, prepared the automation for detonation and checked the demolition cable line.

At four o'clock in the afternoon on August 28, a plutonium charge and neutron fuses for it were delivered to the workshop near the tower. The final installation of the charge was completed by three o'clock in the morning on August 29. At four o'clock in the morning, installers rolled the product out of the assembly shop along a rail track and installed it in the tower's freight elevator cage, and then lifted the charge to the top of the tower. By six o'clock the charge was equipped with fuses and connected to the blasting circuit. Then the evacuation of all people from the test field began.

Due to the worsening weather, Kurchatov decided to postpone the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00.

At 6.35, the operators turned on the power to the automation system. 12 minutes before the explosion the field machine was turned on. 20 seconds before the explosion, the operator turned on the main connector (switch) connecting the product to the automatic control system. From that moment on, all operations were performed by an automatic device. Six seconds before the explosion, the main mechanism of the machine turned on the power of the product and some of the field instruments, and one second turned on all the other instruments and issued an explosion signal.

At exactly seven o'clock on August 29, 1949, the entire area was illuminated with a blinding light, which signaled that the USSR had successfully completed the development and testing of its first atomic bomb charge.

The charge power was 22 kilotons of TNT.

20 minutes after the explosion, two tanks equipped with lead protection were sent to the center of the field to conduct radiation reconnaissance and inspect the center of the field. Reconnaissance determined that all structures in the center of the field had been demolished. At the site of the tower, a crater gaped; the soil in the center of the field melted, and a continuous crust of slag formed. Civil buildings and industrial structures were completely or partially destroyed.

The equipment used in the experiment made it possible to carry out optical observations and measurements of heat flow, shock wave parameters, characteristics of neutron and gamma radiation, determine the level of radioactive contamination of the area in the area of ​​the explosion and along the trail of the explosion cloud, and study the impact damaging factors nuclear explosion on biological objects.

For the successful development and testing of a charge for an atomic bomb, several closed decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated October 29, 1949 awarded orders and medals of the USSR to a large group of leading researchers, designers, and technologists; many were awarded the title of Stalin Prize laureates, and more than 30 people received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

As a result of the successful test of the RDS-1, the USSR abolished the American monopoly on the possession of atomic weapons, becoming the second nuclear power peace.

Nuclear combat unit 533 mm torpedoes
Entered service in 1967
Withdrawn from service in 1980
Weight 550 kilograms
Developed by the All-Russian Research Institute of Automation named after N.L. Dukhov (Moscow), chief designer A.A. Brish.

It was used as part of steam-gas torpedoes, homing acoustic electric torpedoes (SAET-60), long-range electric homing torpedoes (DEST-2) from Project 671RTM "Pike" submarines.

Performance characteristics of the SAET-60 torpedo
Caliber............533.4 mm
Length............7.8 m
Weight............2000 kg
Range....13 km
Travel depth......14 m

Nuclear bomb
Entered service in 1971.
Removed from service in 1984.
Developed at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - VNIITF (Snezhinsk).
Serial production - instrument-making plant (Trekhgorny).
Weight 430 kilograms.
Intended for use with anti-submarine aircraft Be-12 (amphibious aircraft), Il-38, Tu-142, and Ka-25 helicopter.

Nuclear warhead of an anti-ship cruise missile
Entered service in 1977.
Removed from service in 1991.
Weight 560 kilograms.
Developed by the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automation named after N. L. Dukhov (Moscow), chief designer A. A. Brish.
Serial production - instrument-making plant (Trekhgorny).
It was used as part of the P-35 anti-ship cruise missile and the Progress missile.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the P-35 anti-ship missile
Length - 9.8 m
Case diameter - 1 m
Starting weight - 5300 kg
Weight without starting engine - 4500 kg
Warhead weight - 560 kg
range - 300 km
Flight altitude - 100-700 0m

152mm nuclear artillery shell

Adopted into service in 1981.
Removed from service in 1991.
Developed at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (RFNC - VNIITF, Snezhinsk) in 1971-1981. Scientific director of the development, Academician E. I. Zababakhin, chief designer of the nuclear charge, Academician B. V. Litvinov, chief designers of the development of nuclear weapons: L. F. Klopov, O. N. Tikhane, V. A. Vernikovsky.
Serial production - instrument-making plant (Trekhgorny).
The smallest nuclear weapon. Withstands the overload of an artillery shot without destruction or loss of characteristics. Designed to resemble the contours of a standard high-explosive fragmentation projectile for a self-propelled gun.
Designed for use as part of an artillery shot from cannons and howitzers of various designs: D-20 howitzer cannon, ML-20 howitzer cannon, 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzer, 2A36 Giatsint-B cannon (towed), 2S5 Giatsint cannon -S" (self-propelled).

Performance characteristics
Weight - 53 kg
Diameter - 152.4 mm
Length - 774 mm
Firing range - 15-18 km

Nuclear artillery shell of 203 mm caliber
adopted for service in 1970.
Removed from service in 1997. Developed at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (RFNC - VNIITF, Snezhinsk).
Serial production - instrument-making plant (Trekhgorny).
Intended for use with the B-4M towed howitzer and the 2S7 "Pion" self-propelled artillery gun.

Information from the stand
History of the creation of nuclear artillery shells
the creation of tactical nuclear weapons, including for artillery systems, has become an urgent problem since the appearance of the first atomic bombs. In the USSR, the task of creating an artillery shell with a nuclear “filling” was set in the first half of 1952. In 1956, a successful test of the RDS-41 charge for a 406 mm caliber projectile was carried out at the Semipalatinsk test site under the leadership of E. A. Negin.
At NII-1011 (RFNC - VNIITF), research work to find the possibility of creating a small-sized nuclear charge that was operational under the conditions of an artillery round was started in 1959 on the initiative of K. I. Shchelkin.
Full-scale work to create nuclear equipment for artillery ammunition for artillery and mortar systems in service ground forces Soviet army, which ensured parity between the USSR and the USA in this type of weapons, was started at NII-1011 (RFNC - VNIITF) in the mid-1960s.
In the early 1970s, nuclear warheads for 240 and 203 millimeter caliber ammunition were created in Snezhinsk, which were equipped with: the B-4M towed howitzer (1971); the M-240 heavy towed mortar and the 2S4 “Tulpan” self-propelled mortar (1973); self-propelled artillery piece 2S7 "Peony" (1975).
Creating a nuclear charge for artillery shells smaller than 203 millimeters in caliber was an extremely difficult and time-consuming task. It was necessary to ensure the survivability of systems under conditions of ultra-high overloads characteristic of an artillery shot. At the same time, it was necessary to ensure nuclear safety and eliminate the possibility of unauthorized detonation.
The development of 152.4 mm nuclear shells is one of the most striking pages in the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR. Very limited volume 152.4 mm projectile, a unique small-sized nuclear charge and automatic detonation were created, operational under conditions of artillery fire.
From 1966 to 1992 in the USSR, all large-caliber artillery systems in service with the ground forces were equipped with nuclear weapons. The complex of works on the creation of small-sized, high-strength, safe to handle and reliable in operation nuclear charges and nuclear ammunition based on them for artillery and mortar systems was awarded three State Prizes of the USSR (1973, 1974, 1984) and one Lenin Prize (1984).

Head part ballistic missile submarines R-29

Removed from service in 1986.

Serial production - instrument-making plant (Trekhgorny).
A monoblock warhead with a megaton-class thermonuclear charge was developed for the ballistic missile of the R-29 submarine of the RO D-9 complex. First intercontinental missile[with underwater launch].
The decommissioned and modified warheads (Volan salvage vehicle) were used to conduct scientific and technological experiments in conditions of short-term weightlessness during suborbital and orbital flights.

"Shuttlecock"

Peaceful atom - into your home!
Industrial nuclear explosive device
Created in 1968.
Developed at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (RFNC - VNIITF, Snezhinsk). Chief designer B.V. Litvinov; Theoretical physicists: E. N. Avrorin, E. I. Zababakhin, L. P. Feoktistov, A. K. Zlebnikov.
Diameter 250 millimeters.
Length 2500 millimeters.
Weight 300 kilograms.
Designed to carry out “clean” residual tritium camouflage (underground) nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes: seismic sounding of the earth’s crust, liquidation of oil and gas gushers.

Small-sized warhead of the multiple warhead of the dispersive type SLBM R-27U

The head of the R-27U submarine-launched ballistic missile
Entered service in 1974.
Removed from service in 1990.
Developed at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (RFNC - VNIITF, Snezhinsk).
Serial production - instrument-making plant (Trekhgorny).
Monoblock warhead with a megaton-class thermonuclear charge with increased power. Designed for the R-27U submarine-launched ballistic missile complex

RO D-5U. It was also used to replace the combat equipment of the ballistic missile for submarines R-21 of the RO D-4M complex.
The decommissioned warheads, after modification, were used in the Sprint and Ether research rescue vehicles.

Frontal drummer
Instrument-making plant, Trekhgorny
Used in products to trigger when meeting an obstacle

- the original name of an aircraft nuclear bomb, the action of which is based on an explosive chain nuclear fission reaction. With the advent of the so-called hydrogen bomb, based on the thermonuclear fusion reaction, a common term for them was established - nuclear bomb.

The development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 (“product 501”, atomic charge “1-200”) began at KB-11 of the Ministry of Medium Engineering (now the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC-VNIIEF), city ​​of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region) July 1, 1946 under the leadership of academician Yuli Khariton. The USSR Academy of Sciences, many research institutes, design bureaus, and defense factories participated in the development.

To implement the Soviet nuclear project, it was decided to move closer to the American prototypes, the performance of which had already been proven in practice. In addition, scientific and technical information about American atomic bombs was obtained through reconnaissance.

At the same time, it was clear from the very beginning that many of the technical solutions of the American prototype were not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual components. But the requirement of the country’s leadership was to guarantee and with the least risk a working bomb by the time of its first test.

Presumably the design of the RDS-1 was largely based on the American "Fat Man". Although some systems, such as the ballistic body and electronic filling, were of Soviet design. Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes when creating the bomb by Soviet scientists and designers, significantly shorten its development time, and reduce costs.

The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself,” “The Motherland gives it to Stalin,” etc. But to ensure secrecy, in the official decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946, it was called “Special Jet Engine” (“S” ).

Initially, the atomic bomb was developed in two versions: using “heavy fuel” (plutonium, RDS-1) and using “light fuel” (uranium-235, RDS-2). In 1948, work on RDS-2 was curtailed due to relatively low efficiency.

Structurally, RDS-1 consisted of the following fundamental components: a nuclear charge; explosive device and automatic charge detonation system with safety systems; the ballistic body of the aerial bomb, which housed the nuclear charge and automatic detonation.

Inside the case there was a nuclear charge (made of high-purity plutonium) with a capacity of 20 kilotons and automation system blocks. The RDS-1 bomb charge was a multilayer structure in which the transfer of the active substance (plutonium to a supercritical state) was carried out by compressing it through a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive. Plutonium was placed in the center of the nuclear charge and structurally consisted of two spherical half-parts. A neutron initiator (detonator) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core. On top of the plutonium were two layers of explosive (an alloy of TNT and hexagen). The inner layer was formed from two hemispherical bases, the outer layer was assembled from individual elements. The outer layer (focusing system) was designed to create a spherical detonation wave. The bomb's automatic system ensured the implementation of a nuclear explosion at the desired point in the bomb's trajectory. To increase the reliability of the product's operation, the main elements of the automatic detonation were made according to a duplicate scheme. In case of failure of the high-altitude fuse, an impact fuse is installed to carry out a nuclear explosion when the bomb hits the ground.

During the tests, the operability of the systems and mechanisms of the bomb was first checked when dropped from an aircraft without a plutonium charge. Testing of the ballistics of the bomb was completed by 1949.

To test a nuclear charge in 1949, a test site was built near the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR, in the waterless steppe. The experimental field contained numerous structures with measuring equipment, military, civil and industrial facilities to study the effects of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. In the center of the experimental field there was a metal tower 37.5 meters high for the installation of RDS-1.

On August 29, 1949, at the Semipalatinsk test site, an atomic charge with automation was placed on a tower, without a bomb body. The power of the explosion was 20 kilotons of TNT.

The technology for creating domestic nuclear weapons had been created, and the country had to launch its mass production.

Even before the testing of the atomic charge in March 1949, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the construction of the first plant in the USSR for industrial production atomic bombs in the closed area of ​​facility No. 550, as part of KB-11, with a production capacity of 20 RDS units per year.

The development of a serial technological process for assembling an atomic charge required no less effort than the creation of the first prototype. To do this, it was necessary to develop and put into operation technological equipment, additional operations, and the latest technologies at that time.

On December 1, 1951, in the closed city of Arzamas-16 (since 1995 Sarov), serial production of the first model of the Soviet atomic bomb called the “RDS-1 product” began, and by the end of the year the first three serial atomic bombs of the RDS-1 type “came out” from the factory.

The first serial enterprise for the production of atomic weapons had a number of conventional names. Until 1957, the plant was part of KB-11 and after, when it became independent, until December 1966, it was called “Union Plant No. 551”. It was a closed name, used exclusively in secret correspondence. For internal use, in parallel with this closed name, another one was used - plant no.

3. Starting from December 1966, the enterprise received an open name - Electromechanical Plant "Avangard". Since July 2003, it has been a structural unit within the RFNC-VNIIEF.

The first atomic bomb, RDS-1, tested in 1949, automatically deprived the Americans of their monopoly on nuclear weapons. But only when the production of the first serial atomic bombs began in 1951, it was possible to say with confidence that the peaceful life of the people would be guaranteed and the creation of a reliable " nuclear shield" countries.

Currently, the prototype of the RDS-1 charge, the remote control, the signal from which this charge was detonated, and the housing aerial bomb, made for him, is exhibited in the nuclear weapons museum in the city of Sarov.

On combat duty, the first atomic bomb RDS-1 was replaced by many times improved "descendants".

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources