Introduction. 3

The emergence of the concept and theory of political elites. 4

The main directions of modern elite theory. 6

Typology of elites. 14

Functions of the political elite. 16

Political elite in Russia. Types of political elite. 16

Features of the political elite in Russia. 18

The structure of the political elite in Russia. 20

Conclusion. 22

Bibliography. 24

Introduction.

Politics, which is one of the spheres of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called the political class, for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it is engaged in governance and manages the resources of power. Its main difference is its institutionalization, which consists in the system of government positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain government structures.

The political class forms the elite and at the same time is the source of its replenishment. The elite not only rules society, but also controls the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. The political elite is a relatively small layer of people occupying leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, public organizations, etc. and influencing the development and implementation of policies in the country. This is an organized minority, a controlling group that has real political power, the ability to influence all functions and political actions of society without exception.

The emergence of the concept and theory of elites.

The political elite is a relatively small social group that concentrates in its hands a significant amount of political power, ensures integration, subordination and reflection of the interests of various sectors of society in political attitudes and creates a mechanism for the implementation of political plans. In other words, the elite is the highest part of a social group, class, political social organization.

The word "elite" translated from French means "best", "selected", "chosen". IN everyday language it has two meanings. The first of them reflects the possession of some intense, clearly and maximally expressed features, the highest on a particular scale of measurements. In this meaning, the term “elite” is used in such phrases as “elite grain”, “elite horses”, “sports elite”, “elite troops”. In the second meaning, the word “elite” refers to the best, most valuable group for society, standing above the masses and called upon, due to the possession of special qualities, to control them. This understanding of the word reflected the reality of a slave-owning and feudal society, the elite of which was the aristocracy. (The term “aristos” means “the best”; aristocracy means “the power of the best.”) In political science, the term “elite” is used only in the first, ethically neutral meaning. Defined in the most general form, this concept characterizes the bearers of the most pronounced political and managerial qualities and functions. The theory of elites seeks to eliminate leveling, averaging in assessing the influence of people on power, reflects the unevenness of its distribution in society, competitiveness and competition in the field political life, its hierarchy and dynamism. The scientific use of the category “political elite” is based on well-defined general ideas about the place and role of politics and its direct bearers in society. The theory of the political elite proceeds from the equality and equivalence or even priority of politics in relation to the economy and social structure of society. Therefore, this concept is incompatible with the ideas of economic and social determinism, represented, in particular, by Marxism, which treats politics merely as a superstructure over the economic base, as a concentrated expression of the economy and class interests. Because of this, and also due to the reluctance of the ruling nomenklatura elite to be the object of scientific research, the concept of the political elite in Soviet social science was viewed as pseudoscientific and bourgeois-tendentious and was not used in a positive sense.

Initially, in political science, the French term “elite” became widespread at the beginning of the 20th century. thanks to the works of Sorel and Pareto, although the ideas of political elitism arose outside of France in ancient times. Even during the time of the disintegration of the tribal system, views appeared that divided society into higher and lower, noble and rabble, aristocracy and common people. These ideas received the most consistent justification and expression from Confucius, Plato, Machiavelli, Carly, and Nietzsche. However, this kind of elitist theories have not yet received any serious sociological justification. The first modern, classical concepts of elites arose at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. They are associated with the names of Gaetano Moschi, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels.

The characteristic features of the political elite are the following:

• this is a small, fairly independent social group;
• high social status;
• a significant amount of state and information power;
• direct participation in the exercise of power;
• organizational skills and talent.

The political elite is the reality of the current stage of development of society and is determined by the action of the following main factors:

· Psychological and social inequality of people, their unequal abilities, opportunities and desires to participate in politics.

· The law of division of labor requires professional management.

· High importance of managerial work and its corresponding stimulation.

· Wide possibilities for using management activities to obtain various kinds of social privileges.

· The practical impossibility of exercising comprehensive control over political leaders.

· Political passivity of the broad masses of the population.

The main directions of modern elite theory.

Machiavellian school.

The concepts of the elites of Mosca, Pareto and Michels gave impetus to broad theoretical and subsequently (mainly after the Second World War) empirical studies of groups that lead the state or pretend to do so. Modern theories of elites are varied. Historically, the first group of theories that have not lost modern significance are the concepts of the Machiavellian school. They are united by the following ideas:

1. Special qualities of the elite, associated with natural talents and upbringing and manifested in its ability to govern or at least to fight for power.

2. Group cohesion of the elite. This is the cohesion of a group, united not only by a common professional status, social status and interests, but also by an elite self-awareness, the perception of itself as a special layer called upon to lead society.

3. Recognition of the elitism of any society, its inevitable division into a privileged ruling creative minority and a passive, uncreative majority. This division naturally follows from the natural nature of man and society. Although the personal composition of the elite changes, its dominant relationship to the masses is fundamentally unchanged. So, for example, in the course of history, tribal leaders, monarchs, boyars and nobles, people's commissars and party secretaries, ministers and presidents were replaced, but the relations of dominance and subordination between them and the common people always remained.

4. Formation and change of elites during the struggle for power. Many people with high psychological and social qualities strive to occupy a dominant privileged position. However, no one wants to voluntarily give up their posts and positions to them. Therefore, a hidden or overt struggle for a place in the sun is inevitable.

5. In general, the constructive, leading and dominant role of the elite in society. It performs the management function necessary for a social system, although not always effectively. In an effort to preserve and pass on their privileged position, the elite tends to degenerate and lose its outstanding qualities.

Machiavellian theories of elites are criticized for exaggerating the importance of psychological factors, anti-democracy and underestimation of the abilities and activity of the masses, insufficient consideration of the evolution of society and the modern realities of welfare states, and a cynical attitude towards the struggle for power. Such criticism is largely not without foundation.

Value theories.

The value theories of the elite are trying to overcome the weaknesses of the Machiavellians. They, like Machiavellian concepts, consider the elite the main constructive force of society, however, they soften their position in relation to democracy and strive to adapt the elite theory to real life modern states. The diverse value concepts of the elites differ significantly in the degree of protection of aristocracy, attitude towards the masses, democracy, etc. However, they also have a number of the following common settings:

1. Belonging to the elite is determined by the possession of high abilities and performance in the most important areas of activity for the entire society. The elite is the most valuable element of the social system, focused on satisfying its most important needs. In the course of development, many old needs, functions and value orientations die out in society and new needs, functions and value orientations arise. This leads to the gradual displacement of the bearers of the most important qualities for their time by new people who meet modern requirements.

2. The elite is relatively united in healthy basis the leadership functions she performs. This is not an association of people seeking to realize their selfish group interests, but cooperation of individuals who care, first of all, about the common good.

3. The relationship between the elite and the masses is not so much in the nature of political or social domination, but rather of leadership, implying managerial influence based on the consent and voluntary obedience of the governed and the authority of those in power. The leading role of the elite is likened to the leadership of the elders, who are more knowledgeable and competent in relation to the younger ones, who are less knowledgeable and experienced. It meets the interests of all citizens.

4. The formation of an elite is not so much the result of a fierce struggle for power, but rather a consequence of the natural selection by society of the most valuable representatives. Therefore, society should strive to improve the mechanisms of such selection, to search for a rational, most effective elite in all social strata.

5. Elitism is a condition for the effective functioning of any society. It is based on the natural division of managerial and executive labor, naturally follows from equality of opportunity and does not contradict democracy. Social equality should be understood as equality of life chances, and not equality of results and social status. Since people are not equal physically, intellectually, in their vital energy and activity, it is important for a democratic state to provide them with approximately the same starting conditions. They will reach the finish line at different times and with different results. Social “champions” and underdogs will inevitably emerge.

Value ideas about the role of the elite in society prevail among modern neoconservatives, who argue that elitism is necessary for democracy. But the elite itself must serve moral example for other citizens and to inspire respect, confirmed in free elections.

Theories of democratic elitism

The main provisions of the value theory of elites underlie the concepts of democratic elitism (elite democracy), which have become widespread in modern world. They proceed from Joseph Schumpeter's understanding of democracy as competition between potential leaders for the trust of voters. Proponents of democratic elitism, citing the results of empirical research, argue that real democracy needs both elites and mass political apathy, since too much political participation threatens the stability of democracy. Elites are needed primarily as a guarantor of a high-quality composition of leaders elected by the population. The very social value of democracy depends decisively on the quality of the elite. The leadership stratum not only possesses the necessary qualities for governance, but serves as a defender of democratic values ​​and is able to restrain the political and ideological irrationalism, emotional imbalance and radicalism often inherent in the masses.

In the 60s and 70s. claims about the comparative democracy of the elite and the authoritarianism of the masses have been largely refuted by concrete research. It turned out that although representatives of the elites usually surpass the lower strata of society in accepting liberal democratic values ​​(freedom of personality, speech, competition, etc.), in political tolerance, tolerance of other people’s opinions, in condemning dictatorship, etc., but they are more conservative in recognizing the socio-economic rights of citizens: to work, to strike, to organize in a trade union, to social security, etc. In addition, some scientists (P. Bachrach, F. Naschold) have shown the possibility of increasing the stability and efficiency of the political system by expanding mass political participation.

Concepts of Elite Pluralism

The principles of the value theory about the value-rational nature of the selection of elites in a modern democratic society develop the concepts of plurality and pluralism of elites, which are perhaps the most common in today's elite thought. They are often called elite functional theories. They do not deny the elitist theory as a whole, although they require a radical revision of a number of its fundamental, classical principles. The pluralistic concept of the elite is based on the following postulates:

1. Interpretation of political elites as functional elites. Qualification to perform the functions of managing specific social processes is the most important quality that determines belonging to the elite. “Functional elites are individuals or groups with special qualifications necessary to occupy certain leadership positions in society. Their superiority in relation to other members of society is manifested in managing or influencing important political and social processes."

2. Denial of the elite as a single privileged relatively cohesive group. In a modern democratic society, power is dispersed among various groups and institutions, which, through direct participation, pressure, the use of blocs and alliances, can veto undesirable decisions, defend their interests, and find compromises. The pluralism of elites is determined by the complex social division of labor and the diversity of the social structure. Each of the many basic, “mother” groups - professional, regional, religious, demographic and others - identifies its own elite that defends its values ​​and interests.

3. The division of society into the elite and the masses is relative, conditional and often blurred. Between them there is a relationship of representation rather than dominance or permanent leadership. Elites are controlled by mother groups. Through a variety of democratic mechanisms - elections, referendums, polls, the press, pressure groups, etc. This is facilitated by elite competition, reflecting economic and social competition in modern society. It prevents the formation of a single dominant leadership group and makes it possible for the elites to be accountable to the masses.

4. In modern democracies, elites are formed from the most competent and interested citizens, who can very freely join the elite and participate in decision-making. The main subject of political life is not the elite, but interest groups. The differences between the elite and the masses are based mainly on unequal interests in decision-making. Access to the leadership stratum is opened not only by wealth and high social status, but, above all, by personal abilities, knowledge, activity, etc.

5. In democracies, elites perform important public functions related to governance. It is unlawful to talk about their social dominance.

Concepts of elite pluralism are widely used to theorize modern Western democracies. However, these theories largely idealize reality. Numerous empirical studies indicate a clear uneven influence of different social strata on politics, the predominance of the influence of capital, representatives of the military-industrial complex and some other groups. Given this, some proponents of pluralist elitism propose to identify the most influential “strategic” elites, whose “judgments, decisions and actions have important predetermining consequences for many members of society.”

Left-liberal concepts

A kind of ideological antipode to pluralistic elitism are left-liberal theories of the elite. The most important representative of this trend was Charles Wright Mills back in the 50s. tried to prove that the United States is governed not by many, but by one ruling elite. Left-liberal elitism, while sharing some provisions of the Machiavellian school, also has specific distinctive features:

1. The main elite-forming characteristic is not outstanding individual qualities, but the possession of command positions and leadership positions. It is the occupation of key positions in the economy, politics, military and other institutions that provides power and thereby constitutes the elite. This understanding of the elite distinguishes left-liberal concepts from Machiavellian and other theories that derive elitism from the special qualities of people.

2. Group cohesion and diversity in the composition of the ruling elite, which is not limited to the political elite directly making government decisions, but also includes corporate leaders, politicians, senior civil servants and senior officers. They are supported by intellectuals who are well ensconced within the existing system.

The rallying factor of the ruling elite is not only the common interest of its constituent groups in maintaining their privileged position and the social system that ensures it, but also the proximity of social status, educational and cultural level, range of interests and spiritual values, lifestyle, as well as personal and family ties.

There are complex hierarchical relationships within the ruling elite. Although Mills sharply criticizes the ruling elite of the United States and reveals the connection between politicians and large owners, he is still not a supporter of the Marxist class approach, which considers the political elite only as representatives of the interests of monopoly capital.

3. The deep difference between the elite and the masses. People who come from the people can enter the elite only by occupying high positions in the social hierarchy. However, they have little real chance of doing so. The ability of the masses to influence the elite through elections and other democratic institutions is very limited. With the help of money, knowledge, and a proven mechanism for manipulating consciousness, the ruling elite controls the masses virtually uncontrollably.

4. Recruitment of the elite is carried out mainly from its own environment on the basis of the acceptance of its socio-political values. The most important selection criteria are the possession of resources of influence, as well as business qualities and a conformist social position.

5. The primary function of the ruling elite in society is to ensure its own dominance. It is this function that is responsible for solving management problems. Mills denies the inevitability of elitism in society and criticizes it from a consistently democratic position.

Proponents of the left-liberal theory of the elite usually deny the direct connection of the economic elite with political leaders, whose actions, as, for example, Ralph Miliband believes, are not determined by large owners. However, political leaders of developed capitalist countries agree with the basic principles of the market system and see in it the optimal form of social organization for modern society. Therefore, in their activities they strive to guarantee the stability of the social order based on private property and pluralistic democracy.

In Western political science, the main provisions of the left-liberal concept of the elite are subject to sharp criticism, especially statements about the closedness of the ruling elite, the direct entry of big business into it, etc. In Marxist literature, on the contrary, this direction, due to its critical orientation, was assessed very positively.

Typology elite.

Points of view on the content of the category “elite” differ from each other mainly in their attitude to the ideal principles of elite recruitment and the corresponding axiological guidelines:

Some researchers believe that the true elite must be distinguished by the nobility of its origin;

Others include in this category exclusively the richest people in the country;

Still others, who consider elitism a function of personal merit and merit,

The most gifted representatives of society.

It is obvious that the upper layer of any modern society includes various political elite groups: economic, intellectual, professional.

The inevitable difference in the abilities and aspirations of people, the need for professionalization and institutionalization of administrative work, the high importance of the latter for society and a number of other factors inevitably lead to the formation of a managerial layer. It, accordingly, should be considered not only as a “caste” or clan of people engaged in “dirty work”, but also as a recruited stratum called by society, possessing undoubted privileges and endowed with great responsibility. The basic parameters for classifying elites can be all the characteristics listed at the beginning of the previous section. Here are several types of elite classification:

The classification of the ruling layer into elite and counter-elite is generally accepted.

The ways of replenishing the elite, the functional features of the society to which a given elite stratum belongs, allow us to talk about open and closed elites.

According to the source of influence (origin, on the one hand, or status, functions, merits, on the other), hereditary and value elites differ.

The different combinations of the most important stratification factors (income, status, education, professional prestige) among representatives of the upper and middle strata (income, status, education, professional prestige) allow us to speak of a top elite, directly making political decisions, and a middle elite, the upper part of the middle class.

Despite the fact that Western elites, as a rule, are oligarchic groups of owners, the replenishment of the elite in the United States and Western European countries comes precisely from the upper part of the middle class, mainly from liberal professions with diplomas and degrees from prestigious universities.

Functions of the political elite.

It is necessary to highlight the following most essential functions of the political elite:

strategic - defining a political program of action by generating new ideas that reflect the interests of society, developing a concept for reforming the country;

organizational - implementation of the developed course in practice, implementation of political decisions;

communicative - effective representation, expression and reflection in political programs of the interests and needs of various social strata and groups of the population, which also involves the protection of social goals, ideals and values ​​characteristic of society;

integrative - strengthening the stability and unity of society, the sustainability of its political and economic systems, preventing and resolving conflict situations, ensuring consensus on fundamental principles life of the state.

Political elite in Russia. Types of political elite.

The personal composition of the political elite is changing, but its official structure remains virtually unchanged. The political elite of Russia is represented by the President, Prime Minister, members of the government, deputies of the Federal Assembly, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, Supreme Arbitration Court, the staff of the presidential administration, members of the Security Council, presidential plenipotentiaries in the federal districts, heads of government structures in the constituent entities of the federation, the highest diplomatic and military corps, some other government positions, the leadership of political parties and large public associations, and other influential persons.

The highest political elite includes leading political leaders and those who hold high positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (immediate circle of the president, prime minister, speakers of parliament, heads of government bodies, leading political parties, factions in parliament). Numerically, this is a fairly limited circle of people who make the most significant political decisions for the entire society, concerning the fate of millions of people who are significant for the entire state. Belonging to the top elite is determined by reputation, finances (the so-called "oligarchs"), or position in the power structure.

The average political elite is formed from a huge number of elected officials: deputies of the State Duma, members of the Federation Council, heads of administrations and deputies of legislative assemblies of the constituent entities of the federation, mayors of large cities, leaders of various political parties and socio-political movements, heads of electoral districts. The middle elite includes approximately 5% of the population, who simultaneously have three fairly high indicators: income, professional status and education. People whose educational level is higher than their income are more critical of existing social relations and gravitate toward left-wing radicalism or centrism. Representatives of the middle elite, whose income is higher than their level of education, are more likely to show dissatisfaction with their prestige, social status and gravitate toward right-wing political positions. IN modern conditions there is a tendency for the role of the middle elite to increase: civil servants, managers, scientists, administrators - in the formation of public opinion, preparation, adoption and implementation of political decisions. This “subelite” usually surpasses the higher elite in awareness and ability to act in solidarity. However, the development of this trend, as a rule, is restrained by authoritarian political regimes, striving by all means to keep the “subelite” in line with their policies. Therefore, the process of forming a stable democratic elite is very complex. But only this type of political elite is able to have a close connection with the people, the highest level of interaction with all layers of society, perceive political opponents and find the most acceptable compromise solutions.

The administrative functional elite (bureaucratic) is upper layer civil servants (bureaucrats) occupying senior positions in ministries, departments and other government bodies. Their role is reduced to preparing general political decisions and organizing their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise. The political weapon of this group can be sabotage on the part of the administrative apparatus.

Features of political elites in Russia.

Speaking about the Russian ruling political elite, first of all, one cannot help but notice that the burden of historical traditions of political culture in many, if not all, ways determines the methods political activity, political consciousness and behavior of the new wave of “Russian reformers”. By their nature and essence, they do not perceive other methods of action other than those that were successfully used by both themselves and their predecessors. An undeniable fact, historically proven many times, is that political culture takes centuries to develop and it is impossible to change it in a short time. That is why the political development of today's Russia has taken on such a familiar character to all of us, with only slight nuances liberal democracy, while at the moment there is a pronounced need for a new way of developing political relations. At the moment in Russia, state power is characterized by three main features:

1). Power is indivisible and irreplaceable (in fact, one can say hereditary);

2). Power is completely autonomous and also completely uncontrollable by society;

3). The traditional connection of Russian power with the possession and disposal of property.

It is precisely these essential characteristics of the Russian government that the principles of liberal democracy are adjusted to, which turns into its complete opposite. At the moment, the central problem of the Russian political system is the implementation of power (primarily its divisibility and displacement). The historical experience of Russian parliamentarism and its development confirms one interesting feature: confrontation, and sometimes violent conflict, between the executive power, as the leading one, and the marginal legislative power. The suppression or even destruction of one branch of government actually consolidates the omnipotence of another, which, however, based on world experience, leads to the defeat of the current regime. There cannot be complete harmony between these branches of government, but their clear separation ensures public control over state power.

The structure of political elites in Russia.

Political power elite Russian Federation consists of a number of groups. Moreover, what is characteristic is that the ideological foundations of these groups do not play a special role; in reality, they act only as an ideological flair in political discussions. The ideas of justice, public order, and the effectiveness of power are shared by all parties, which makes them look the same and hardly distinguishable from each other. At the same time, the socio-economic structuring on the ground, which took place several years ago, has been replaced by socio-political and even ethnic factors , which indicates the growing politicization of public sentiment.

The modern ruling political elites of Russia consist mainly of the following socio-political groups:

• former party nomenclature (CPSU);
• former democratic opposition (Democratic Russia);
• former economic managers of lower and middle management;
• former Komsomol workers;
• employees of various self-government bodies (district councils, city councils).

In addition, one can take into account a small percentage of the intellectual elite - the intelligentsia. The above groups, as part of the ruling elite, have a number of characteristics characteristic of it:

• activities based on the principle of management teams strictly subordinate to the head of the executive branch;
• the obligatory existence of personal devotion to the head, the first person at any level;
• the presence at each level of appropriate leaders with a personal dedicated team;
• carefully disguised involvement in the division and appropriation of state property (privatization);
• connection with organized crime and direct lobbying of its interests is common.

This gradation, as already mentioned, is based on research in the provinces, but, again, it is quite representative of the entire political elite of the Russian Federation. In general, in the political structure of Russia two main blocks can be distinguished, mostly constantly colliding and occasionally cooperating with each other - these are the political elites and the electorate of capital cities and provinces. In the province, at the level of regions, autonomies, in Lately the ethnic factor comes to the fore due to direct national demarcation. This is precisely where the above-mentioned grouping of public opinion and political elites around national-patriotic parties, movements and blocs occurs.

Conclusion.

There is still no complete, well-functioning system for replenishing the elite, and this suggests that, in general, the political system of Russia has not yet been formed.

The development of the political elite goes from disunited to consensus, i.e. inclined to come to a common opinion on the basis of compromises. This does not mean that elite groups strive for unity (although there are such trends), they are not ready for this. However, what the country needs is not the unity of the political elite, but its ability to solve state problems.

However, in Russia, strengthening the state does not mean strengthening the entire political elite, but only the ruling one. This specificity is a consequence of the authoritarian social system. And if the taken course is not changed, then we should expect an even greater strengthening of the elite in power.

This process has positive sides. Strengthening the state and the political elite will lead to increased efficiency of the legal system. And in this regard, one can challenge another false thesis about Russia: that strengthening the role of the state increases the power of officials.

The power of civil servants increases precisely during periods of weakening of the state, when control over officials by the political elite disappears, and they are guided not by laws, but by their own interests, which inevitably leads to increased corruption and the criminalization of power.

The question arises: how much time does the political elite have to solve such problems as improving its qualitative composition, increasing the efficiency of government, improving the socio-economic situation in the country and some others?

With V. Putin coming to power, the ruling elite took many steps to transform both the political system and the country’s political elite into an authoritarian-democratic one. The new head of state put the Federal Assembly, the main political parties, the business elite, the majority of regional leaders, and the main electronic media under his control.

Whatever the prospects for the development of the situation in Russia, they completely depend on the policies of the ruling elite, etc. first of all, its head - the President of the country.

Bibliography:

1. N.A.Baranov, G.A.Pikalov. Theory of Politics:

Textbook in 3 parts. St. Petersburg: BSTU Publishing House, 2003.

2. Baranov N.A. Textbook: “Political relations and the political process in modern Russia: A course of lectures.”

St. Petersburg: BSTU, 2004.

3. V.P. Pugachev, A.I. Soloviev. Textbook "Introduction to Political Science."

M.: Aspect-Press, 2000.

4. The website www.33333.ru is only about politics.

6.1. About the concepts of ruling and political elite

Politics, which is one of the spheres of society, is carried out by people who have power resources or political capital. These people are called political class, for whom politics becomes a profession. The political class is the ruling class, since it is engaged in governance and manages the resources of power. It is heterogeneous due to differences in the possession of power, the nature of activities, methods of recruitment, etc. Its main difference lies in institutionalization, which consists in the system of government positions occupied by its representatives. The formation of a political class is carried out in two ways: appointment to public office (such representatives of the political class are called bureaucracy) and through elections to certain government structures.

In addition to the political class, politics can be influenced by individuals and groups with either official powers or informal opportunities. T.I. Zaslavskaya calls such a set of individuals and groups ruling elite, to which she includes politicians holding senior government positions, the top echelon of the bureaucracy and the business elite. Since the most significant resource of the ruling elite is political capital, or power that gives the legitimate right to manage the property and finances of the state, there is a direct or latent connection between all groups of the ruling elite and state structures.

O. Kryshtanovskaya gives this definition elite: “this is the ruling group of society, which is the upper stratum of the political class. The elite stands at the top of the state pyramid, controlling the main, strategic resources of power, making decisions at the national level. The elite not only rules society, but also controls the political class, and also creates such forms of state organization in which its positions are exclusive. The political class forms the elite and at the same time is a source of its replenishment.” From her point of view, any elite is ruling, i.e. if the elite does not rule, then it is not the elite. The remaining members of the political class - professional managers who do not belong to the ruling elite - constitute the political-administrative elite, whose role is reduced to preparing general political decisions and organizing their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise.

The elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. Various parts of a single ruling elite are called sub-elites, which can be sectoral (political, economic), functional (administrators, ideologists, security officials), hierarchical (subelite layers), recruitment (appointees, elected officials). According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, “the elite cannot but be political.” At the same time, it is possible to use this term to designate a sub-elite group whose functions include direct management of the political process.

In this context we can characterize political elite as a relatively small layer of people occupying leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, public organizations and influencing the development and implementation of policy in the country.

The political elite includes high-ranking professional politicians endowed with power functions and powers, senior government officials involved in the development and implementation of political programs and social development strategies. It can be divided into groups corresponding to the branches of government - legislative, executive, judicial, and also by its location - federal and regional.

The authority of the elite is the most important condition for its staying in power and maintaining power; the ruling elite must be legitimate. When a political or state community ceases to sanction the power of a given political elite, it loses the social basis of its existence and ultimately loses power.

Political elites can come to power as a result of elections, winning the political struggle against other organized minorities that aspire to the role of a political controlling group. In this case, the interaction between the elite and the masses is legal and legitimate. However, the political elite can come to power through revolutionary means or through a coup d'etat. In such a situation, the new political elite seeks to gain the necessary legitimacy through informal recognition from the unorganized majority. In any case, the relationship between the elite and the masses is based on the principles of leadership and authoritative guidance, and not on blind submission. The legitimation of the political power of the elite distinguishes it from an oligarchy.

In countries with the legitimate existence of power, the content and boundaries of the functions performed by the political elite are determined by the constitution of the country. However, in real life there are frequent cases of discrepancies between constitutions and real power. This is possible in the event of a sharp change in the political situation, when the changes are not yet reflected in the constitution, as well as in the event of a deviation from the norms of the constitution. For example, the Constitution of the USSR declared that power at all levels belonged to the Soviets, but the real political picture did not confirm this.

6.2. Characteristics and functions of the ruling Russian elite

The elite is not uniform. Within the ruling elite there is a small, close-knit group standing at the very top of the power pyramid. T. Zaslavskaya calls it the “upper (sub-elite) layer”, O. Kryshtanovskaya - “top elite”, L. Shevtsova - “super elite”. This group consists, as a rule, of 20-30 people and is the most closed, united and difficult to access for research.

To the most important characteristics of the elite researchers include cohesion, awareness of one's group interests, a developed network of informal communications, the presence of esoteric norms of behavior and coded language, hidden from outside observers and transparent to initiates, and the absence of a clear line separating official activities and private life.

For Russia, as for other post-communist states, the following are characteristic: common features, defining the features of the ruling elite: strengthening the role of the executive branch, increasing the importance of informal connections and procedures, accelerating the circulation of elites, intensifying intra-elite rivalry and increasing mobility.

Under elite mobility understand entry into the elite, movement of personnel within the political system and exit from the elite. Thus, mobility can be divided into upward, horizontal and downward. Elite mobility in Russia has significant differences from the mobility of other social groups, which, according to O. Kryshtanovskaya, is associated with a number of factors:

1. Higher competition between candidates for positions than other groups, which occurs at all levels of the political hierarchy.

2. Uncertainty of requirements for candidates who must satisfy conditions that are not disclosed anywhere.

3. Elite mobility is subject to much more regulation and planning than other professional mobility, since there is an institutionalized personnel reserve to fill vacant positions.

4. The mobility of the elite is regulated not so much by labor legislation as by intra-group norms.

5.Unlike all other professions, joining the elite is the endowment of an individual with primary political capital, which he can develop or leave unchanged.

Some researchers have noted changes in the type of organization of the power elite. Thus, O.V. Gaman-Golutvina distinguishes two types: bureaucratic and feudal (oligarchic). Bureaucratic is based on the separation of the functions of economic and political management, oligarchic is based on their fusion. Historical basis Russian state was the universality of responsibilities to the state, which presupposed the service principle of recruiting elites, which ensured the priority of the political elite over the economic one. As a result of the reforms carried out, the service principle began to be replaced by the oligarchic principle. As a result, the model of elite education characteristic of the feudal, rather than the modern West, was reproduced. One of the most characteristic features of the modern ruling elite of Russia is the shadow merging of state power with business. This process covered all levels of government. Place and connections in the political system became the main factor in the increase of property, and property became a powerful source of political influence.

The content of political functions is greatly influenced by the political regime. T.I. Zaslavskaya considers the development, legitimization and implementation of a general strategy for reforming society to be the main functions of the elite in the transformation process. A.V.Malko inhighlights the following most significant functions of the political elite:

strategic - defining a political program of action by generating new ideas that reflect the interests of society, developing a concept for reforming the country;

organizational- implementation of the developed course in practice, implementation of political decisions;

integrative - strengthening the stability and unity of society, the sustainability of its political and economic systems, preventing and resolving conflict situations, ensuring consensus on the fundamental principles of the life of the state.

To these functions we should also add the communicative function - the effective representation, expression and reflection in political programs of the interests and needs of various social strata and groups of the population, which also involves the protection of social goals, ideals and values ​​characteristic of society.

In order to effectively implement these functions, the elite must be characterized by such qualities as a modern mentality, a state type of thinking, a readiness to protect national interests, etc.

6.3. Formation of the federal elite

In the political history of Russia XX - early XXI centuries The ruling elite has repeatedly undergone significant transformations. The first significant “revolutionary political transformation,” as S.A. Granovsky put it, occurred in October 1917, when a party of professional revolutionaries came to power. The Bolsheviks monopolized power and established the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the death of V.I. Lenin, a struggle broke out in the ruling elite for the possession of Lenin’s legacy, the winner of which was J.V. Stalin. Even under Lenin, a special ruling class was created - nomenclature(list of leadership positions, the appointment of which was approved by party bodies). However, it was Stalin who perfected the process of reproduction of the Soviet elite. The nomenclature was built on a strictly hierarchical principle with a high degree of integration based on a common ideology, with a low level of competition and a low degree of conflict between intra-elite groups. In the mid-1980s. processes of structural disintegration intensified in the ruling elite, which led to an intra-elite conflict of values ​​and personnel associated with changes in the political course. By the end of the 1980s. The process of rapid formation of a counter-elite begins, which includes leaders and activists of various democratic movements, representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. At the same time, there is a change in the mechanism for recruiting the elite. Instead of the nomenklatura principle, the democratic principle of election is affirmed.

The German scientist E. Schneider, who studies the political system of modern Russia, believes that the new Russian political elite was formed in the depths of the old Soviet system as a type of counter-elite in various groups at the federal level. The beginning was made on May 29, 1990, when Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, who also took on the functions of head of state. The second step followed after the election of B. Yeltsin as President of Russia on June 12, 1991. B. Yeltsin created his own administration, numbering 1.5 thousand people, and approaching in size the apparatus of the former Central Committee of the CPSU. The third step towards the formation of the central Russian political elite is the election of deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council on December 12, 1993. The fourth stage has been reached parliamentary elections 1995 and the presidential elections of 1996. That is, E. Schneider connects the process of formation of a new Russian political elite with the electoral process, which has become characteristic of post-Soviet Russia.

An important factor that had far-reaching consequences for the ruling elite was the ban on the CPSU in 1991, which caused the liquidation of the traditional institutions of Soviet power, the liquidation of the institution of the nomenklatura, and the transfer of powers from the Union authorities to the Russian ones.

Researchers distinguish two stages in the formation of the post-Soviet elite: “Yeltsin” and “Putin”. Thus, O. Kryshtanovskaya is the author of the book “Anatomy Russian elite“- notes that during the nine years of his rule (1991-1999), Boris Yeltsin was never able to integrate the supreme power. At the same time, no single state structure became dominant. In conditions of a power vacuum, informal groups and clans took over government functions, competing with each other for the right to speak on behalf of the president. According to the scientist, “during the Yeltsin period there was a collapse of the supreme power. The diffusion of power did not lead to a democratic separation of powers, but to managerial chaos.”

The “Putin” stage is characterized by the elimination of the reasons that led to the destruction of the management vertical under Boris Yeltsin. The new president returned a significant amount of power over the regions to the federal center, expanded the center's local support base, and outlined ways to restore territorial governance mechanisms without formally violating democratic principles. A controlled, orderly system of executive power was created. If under B. Yeltsin power was dispersed, moving from the center to the regions, then under V. Putin power again began to return to the center, centrifugal tendencies gave way to centripetal ones.

Researchers note that the modern ruling elite of Russia differs from the Soviet elite in many important qualities: genesis, recruitment models, socio-professional composition, internal organization, political mentality, the nature of relations with society, the level of reform potential.

The personal composition of the political elite is changing, but its official structure remains virtually unchanged. The political elite of Russia is represented by the President, Prime Minister, members of the government, deputies of the Federal Assembly, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Arbitration Courts, the presidential administration, members of the Security Council, presidential plenipotentiaries in federal districts, heads of power structures in the constituent entities of the federation, the highest diplomatic and the military corps, some other government positions, the leadership of political parties and large public associations, and other influential persons.

Higher political elite includes leading political leaders and those who occupy high positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (immediate circle of the president, prime minister, speakers of parliament, heads of government bodies, leading political parties, factions in parliament) . Numerically, this is a fairly limited circle of people who make the most significant political decisions for the entire society, concerning the fate of millions of people who are significant for the entire state. Belonging to the highest elite is determined by reputation (advisers, consultants to the president) or position in the power structure. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, the top leadership should include members of the Security Council, which in modern Russia is the prototype of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

The size of the ruling elite is not constant. Thus, the nomenclature of the CPSU Central Committee (in 1981) included approximately 400 thousand people. The highest nomenklatura (nomenklatura of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) included approximately 900 people. The nomenclature of the secretariat of the Central Committee consisted of 14-16 thousand people. The accounting and control nomenclature (nomenclature of departments of the CPSU Central Committee) included 250 thousand people. The rest was made up of the nomenklatura of lower party committees. Thus, the political class during Soviet times constituted approximately 0.1% of the country's total population.

In 2000, the size of the political class (the number of civil servants) increased 3 times (while the country's population decreased by half) and began to amount to 1 million 200 thousand people. or 0.8% of the total population. The number of the ruling elite increased from 900 to 1060 people.

According to the same studies, the main suppliers to the ruling elite in 1991 were the intelligentsia (53.5%) and economic managers (about 13%). During the transition period of Yeltsin's rule (1991-1993), the role of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, economic managers, and employees of ministries and departments declined. The importance of others, on the contrary, increased: regional administrations, employees of security and law enforcement agencies and, especially, businessmen.

Gradually, parliamentary and government careers became two different paths to the top, which was not typical for the Soviet elite, for which a parliamentary mandate was a corresponding attribute of nomenklatura status. Now a new professional group has emerged within the elite - elected officials.

In the absence state support weak social groups - workers, peasants - were almost completely forced out of the political field, the share of women and youth, whose high percentage of participation in power had previously been artificially supported by the CPSU, fell sharply.

For parliamentarians, there remains a fairly high percentage of those who entered the elite back in Soviet times. In the State Duma of the first convocation (1993) there were 37.1% of them, in the third convocation (1999) - 32%; in the Federation Council in 1993 - 60.1%, in 2002 - 39.9%.

Researchers notice another feature: if in the early 1990s. the share of party and Komsomol functionaries fell, then their share among the deputies of both chambers increased to almost 40%. After 10 years of the post-Soviet period, involvement in the nomenklatura ceased to be a stain on a political career. A number of studies (S.A. Granovsky, E. Schneider) show that the foundation of the new Russian ruling elite is mainly made up of representatives of the second and third echelons of the old Soviet nomenklatura, transferring to the new political elite the special knowledge and experience that it needs.

The composition of the new political elite of Russia has undergone significant changes in educational, age and professional terms.

Thus, the government and elite in the regions have become almost ten years younger. At the same time, parliament has aged a little, which is explained by its artificial rejuvenation during the Brezhnev period. The end of age quotas freed the country's highest legislative power, both from Komsomol members and from young workers and collective farmers subject to quotas.

Boris Yeltsin brought young scientists, brilliantly educated city politicians, economists, and lawyers closer to him. The share of rural residents in his surroundings fell sharply. Despite the fact that the elite has always been one of the most educated groups of society, nevertheless, in the 1990s. there was a sharp jump in the educational qualifications of the elite. Thus, B. Yeltsin’s inner circle includes famous scientists and public figures. More than half of B.N. Yeltsin’s presidential team consisted of doctors of science. There was also a high percentage of those with academic degree in the government and among party leaders.

The changes affected not only the level of education of the elite, but also the nature of education. The Brezhnev elite was technocratic. The overwhelming majority of party and state leaders in the 1980s. had an engineering, military or agricultural education. Under M. Gorbachev, the percentage of technocrats decreased, but not due to an increase in the number of humanities students, but due to an increase in the proportion of party workers who received a higher party education. And finally, a sharp decrease in the proportion of people who received a technical education (almost 1.5 times) occurred under Boris Yeltsin. Moreover, this is happening against the background of the same educational system in Russia, where the majority of universities still have a technical profile.

Under V. Putin, the proportion of people in uniform in the ruling elite increased significantly: every fourth representative of the elite became a military man (under B. Yeltsin, the share of military men in the elite was 11.2%, under V. Putin - 25.1%). This trend coincided with the expectations of society, since the reputation of the military as honest, responsible, politically unbiased professionals distinguished them favorably from other elite groups, whose image was associated with theft, corruption, and demagoguery. The massive recruitment of military personnel into public service was also caused by the lack of a personnel reserve. The main distinguishing features of the Putin elite were a decrease in the proportion of “intellectuals” with an academic degree (under B. Yeltsin - 52.5%, under V. Putin - 20.9%), a decrease in the already extremely low representation of women in the elite (from 2 .9% to 1.7%), “provincialization” of the elite and a sharp increase in the number of military personnel, who began to be called “siloviki” (representatives of the armed forces, the federal security service, border troops, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.).

The latest wave of the ruling elite is also characterized by an increase in the share of fellow countrymen of the head of state (from 13.2% under B. Yeltsin to 21.3% under V. Putin) and an increase in the share of businessmen (from 1.6% under B. Yeltsin to 11.3 % under V. Putin).

6.4. Regional political elite

At the regional level, a new political elite was formed in different subjects at different times. This process was associated with the transition to an electoral system for the formation of a regional elite. The heads of the executive branch in Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the president of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, were elected on June 12, 1991. After the failure of the putsch on August 21, 1991, by resolution of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the position of the head of administration was introduced in the territories, regions and districts as the head of the executive branch. The presidential decree of November 25, 1991 determined the procedure for appointing heads of administrations. By January 1992, a new government had been established in almost all territories, regions and autonomous okrugs. True, it was only partially new. Half of the heads of administration were appointed from among the former heads of executive or representative authorities, about a fifth consisted of lower-level employees of the Soviet apparatus, and only a third consisted of new appointees - directors of enterprises, employees of scientific institutions and other representatives of the non-political sphere.

IN autonomous republics The head was the president, elected in popular elections, which contributed to the transformation of the Soviet model into a democratic one. By the end of 1994, most of the leaders of the autonomous republics were elected by popular vote.

In 1992-1993 There was a struggle between the President and the Supreme Council for influence on the formation of heads of regional administrations. This struggle ended after the dissolution of the representative body of power with the adoption of the presidential decree “On the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of heads of administrations of territories, regions, autonomous districts, cities of federal significance,” issued on October 7, 1993. The decree stated that heads of administrations are appointed and dismissed from positions of the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation.

However, electoral trends were gaining momentum. Therefore, in a number of regions, as an exception, back in 1992-1993. The supreme power allowed the holding of elections of heads of administration. This process continued to develop and ended with the adoption of a presidential decree on September 17, 1995, which determined the date for the election of heads of administrations of the constituent entities of the federation appointed by the president - December 1996. Thus, the transition to an elective system of heads of executive power of the constituent entities of the federation was carried out. The last appointment of the head of administration took place in July 1997 in the Kemerovo region.

The formation of the regional elite was continued by the elections of people's representatives, which, after the dissolution of councils at all levels at the end of 1993, became full-fledged legislative bodies of power.

The elections were one of the most significant achievements of democracy in Russia, leading to profound changes in the entire political system. The consequences of this transition were both positive and negative. On the one hand, a basis was created for the separation of powers, the formation of civil society, and the creation of equal subjects of the federation. On the other hand, the election of heads of subjects destabilized the political situation, allowing governors to become independent from the center. There was a danger of a new wave of “parade of sovereignties”, which could end in the collapse of the country. The federal government has virtually no leverage left over the regional elite.

In December 1995, the principle of forming the Federation Council changed. In accordance with the new provision, the upper house of the Russian parliament began to be formed by delegating two leaders of the subject of the federation - the heads of the executive and legislative branches. In the Federation Council, interregional associations began to be formed on territorial and economic principles, which threatened the center with the loss of political and financial control.

To prevent negative trends, the new President V.V. Putin initiated political reforms with the aim of strengthening the power vertical. In 2000, the procedure for forming the Federation Council changed: one representative each from the executive and legislative branches of the constituent entity of the federation began to be delegated to the upper house of parliament, but not top officials, as was previously the case. At the end of 2004, a federal law was adopted that changed the procedure for electing heads of federal subjects: they began to be elected by the relevant legislative assemblies on the proposal of the president of the country. The last popular election of the head of the administration took place in March 2005 in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

As a result, the power of the federal center was restored, and the heads of the regions became completely dependent on the president. The danger of the country's collapse was overcome by abandoning the democratic procedure of popular elections.

An analysis of regional leaders indicates that the overwhelming number of governors entered the elite long before their appointment to the post of head of the region. Thus, according to the data provided in the study by O. Kryshtanovskaya, in 2002, the average number of years spent in the elite of regional leaders before their appointment (election) as head of the region was 15 years, and the average number of years spent as the head of a federal subject was 6 years.

The average age of a regional leader under L. Brezhnev was 59 years old, under M. Gorbachev - 52 years old, under B. Yeltsin - 49 years old, under V. Putin - 54 years old.

The weight of the Soviet nomenclature still remains very high. In 2002, 65.9% of the heads of the federal subjects were previously members of the Soviet nomenklatura (in 1992 - 78.2%, in 1997 - 72.7%).

As O. Kryshtanovskaya notes, “the paradox is that it was not elections, but appointments that brought new people to the top.”

Describing professional qualities regional political elite, many researchers note its redistributive (rental) relationship to economic activity. At the same time, it should be noted such a trend as the promotion of an influential layer of intellectual, political, cultural, professional, highly educated leaders who form the core of the regional political elite. As S.A. Granovsky notes, “the nomenklatura origins of the current government, which are not easy to get rid of, represent a brake on reforms, preventing the true democratization of society, the transformation of not only political, but also all other spheres of our life. Russia has not yet formed an elite that would correspond to the new statehood that has already manifested itself.”

An important characteristic of the elite is its mentality. Practical orientations and their actual implementation in the affairs of regional political and administrative elites are reflected both in their own worldview and in the assessments of the population. Characterizing the mental characteristics of regional administrative and political elites, it should be noted their federalist thinking, the main parameters of which are the preservation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, the problems of equality of all subjects, the priority of federal laws over republican ones.

One can state a significant weakening of centro-paternalistic hopes among the regional political elite. In the minds of the elites, hopes for the capabilities of the center and own strength in the development of the economy and economic relations have almost leveled off. In many regions, the mood of “reliance on one’s own strength” already prevails. Thus, ethno-federalist, economic-federalist and political-federalist factors are combined into one complex and now act in one direction, contributing to the more rapid formation of a federalist paradigm of thinking.

On the other hand, as the most important characteristics of the political mentality of the ruling elite, many researchers emphasize its unprincipledness and “servility.” Thus, O. Gaman-Golutvina notes that “admiration for power remains the dominant attitude of behavior, both central and regional authorities, and the population." This leads to unconditional devotion to the President, on the one hand, and a stable priority of clan interests over national ones, on the other.

6.5. Circulation and reproduction of the elite

Two waves of renewal of the upper strata can be distinguished. The first of them was associated with the invasion of reformers. The second marked the arrival of counter-reformers, whose actions should be considered as the normal completion of the reform cycle. In classical images it looks like this: “young lions” are replaced by “old foxes”.

Models circulation And reproduction elite groups should be supplemented with a third element - expansion of the elite composition. Increase in the elite ranks in the first half of the 1990s. happened more than twice. There has been a significant increase in the number of positions considered “elite.” This is caused by the growth in the number of new economic structures, the leaders of which can be classified as a new economic elite. But this is no less true and is due to the growth of political and administrative structures.

The acceleration of the circulation of Russian elites is an obvious fact. It began during the reign of M. Gorbachev due to the promotion to the top of numerous representatives of the so-called pre-nomenklatura groups from various public sectors (mostly we are talking about former middle managers - heads of departments, divisions, services).

In the 1990s. quickened pace elite traffic(movement of the elite - a term coined by O. Kryshtanovskaya) required a change in approaches to working with personnel. Under Boris Yeltsin, there were frequent resignations and reshuffles of high-ranking officials, whom he first brought closer to himself, then became disappointed and exchanged them for others. The rapidity of personnel changes led to the destruction of the personnel reserve that helped maintain continuity. There was a need to create some kind of reservations for high-ranking officials who had fallen out of power. As a result, structures such as “state business” were created - commercial organizations based on state resources and having multiple privileges compared to private business, as well as foundations, associations, socio-political organizations, the leadership of which was assumed by retirees. In recent years, parliamentary activity has acted as a kind of reservation, which provides the necessary honor to all former officials.

With the widespread use of alternative elections, the ruling elite no longer had complete control over the removal of undesirable individuals from the elite. Officials who lost their positions in the executive branch could be elected to the federal or regional parliament, go into big business and influence the political situation with the help of economic resources, or create a political party and actively participate in political life.

If in Soviet times resignation meant “political death,” then in post-Soviet times returns to power began to occur. Thus, among the government elite of 1992, the share of returns was 12.1%, for the government of 1999 - 8%.

Under V. Putin, the personnel situation begins to gradually change. The personnel reserve is being restored and strengthened civil service, and loyalty to the regime becomes a guarantee of status stability. Administrative reform, launched in 2004 and designed to reduce the number of bureaucrats, only restructured departments and significantly increased the salaries of civil servants. In the 2000s. It is not vertical, but horizontal mobility among the elite that is increasing. Thus, former governors become members of the Federation Council, former ministers become deputies, former officials of the presidential administration go into state business.

As studies show, according to most indicators, the nature of appointments and resignations under V. Putin has undergone minor changes: the age of entry and exit, the average number of years in office, the proportion of people of retirement age among retirees are approximately the same as under the previous president. But the main thing is that the atmosphere has changed: the growing self-confidence of the political elite, the basis of which is the high level of public trust in the president.

Changing the norms and rules of power interactions largely stems from the process elite reconversion(i.e. transfer of capital from one form to another). The decisive element of this process was the “capitalization” of elite groups. It manifested itself primarily in two phenomena. Firstly, part of the political elite converted their political influence into economic capital. Representatives of the political nomenklatura themselves entered the new business elite or protected close relatives in the economic sphere. Secondly, “capitalization” affected the political elite itself - through the expansion of corruption. Corruption has always existed, but it is in modern Russia that it has become more widespread and open than ever.

As a result, politics became associated with the most profitable business. On the one hand, large entrepreneurs seek the protection of the state and try to obtain property and privileges from the state. On the other hand, politicians are no longer satisfied with the usual attributes of power and fame. Their status positions must be supported by income into private bank accounts. As a result, large businessmen become politically influential persons, and politicians turn into very wealthy people.

The next process, which deserves special attention, is related to the mutual relations of various elite groups. Here two opposing trends usually collide - fragmentation and consolidation of elites. The fragmentation hypothesis states that there is a process of pluralization of elites and the emergence of numerous pressure groups and interests.

Confrontation between the legislative branch, presidential structures and government, federal and regional bodies state administration, party groups of the left and right, political, military and economic elites, industry lobbies representing various economic complexes - all this contributes to the situation of power pluralism. Such a situation can be seen as a manifestation of the democratization of society, but more often it is seen as evidence of a power vacuum and a lack of effective management.

The struggle for power between the “old” and “new” elite also leads to fragmentation. The goal of the first is to retain power, the second is to seize key positions in the state and oust their opponents from their posts.

Opposite assessments are expressed within the framework of the hypothesis of elite consolidation. It is argued here that the dividing lines between various elite groups are increasingly blurred, and power is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of subjects. Legislatures have no special power; federal bodies retained enough administrative and financial influence over the regions to determine policy at the regional level; the military elite is still loyal and subordinate to political forces; "left" and "right" party groupsdrifting towards the political “center”.

The confrontation between the political and economic elites should also not be exaggerated. On the contrary, the stage of transformation of the Russian elite is characterized by the integration of the political and economic elite. The reason for this rapprochement is mutual benefit: the economic elite is interested in the appropriate distribution of budget funds and federal investments, certain personnel policies, making political decisions beneficial to themselves, and the political elite wants to benefit from the transformation of the economy.

Thus, despite visible confrontations, consolidation of elite groups occurs.

6.6. Political corporatism

In the Western political elitethe priority is social origin, which determines the starting opportunities, conditions and guidelines for primary and secondary socialization, in contrast to Russian, where the place of this factor is taken by the previous connection with the nomenklatura elite and commitment to the leader - the manager. In other words, corporate origin.

American political scientist F. Schmitter considers corporatism“as one of the possible mechanisms that allow associations of interests to mediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, local communities, groups) and various counterparties (primarily state and government bodies).” Corporatism fits organically into the democratic legal order, as evidenced by the spread of this phenomenon in countries with developed democratic institutions, and with significant relapses in countries of unconsolidated democracy. It manifests itself especially negatively in the political sphere.

Political corporatism means the dominance in the political system of a set of persons united to achieve, implement and retain state power. The interaction of political corporations allows them to divide the market of power, not allowing representatives of the wider population to enter it. There is a mechanism of “linking” and coordination of interests between corporations. Corporations can be built according to social class, professional, family and other characteristics, but they are always based on unity of interests. The political system of modern Russia is an example of corporations interacting with each other.

Political corporations, in order to be effective, must have a certain degree of monopoly on the representation of interests. This is necessary from the point of view of influence on political decisions made, since state power, when forming the goals and objectives of its activities (especially in the transition period, when the leading groups are formed from a plurality of interests), inevitably takes into account only those groups interests and corporations that have the appropriate resources, i.e. able to mobilize and control large groups of the population. Thus, certain corporatist representations take shape, and the state becomes a “corporatist state.” The basis of his policy in this case is not “public interest,” but the interest of the political corporation whose representatives are currently at the helm of state power or have the greatest influence on it.

The most powerful corporations in modern Russia are those that are based on the foundation of financial-industrial groups, possessing enormous financial resources, controlling the most important enterprises and productions, gradually monopolizing the media market and thereby being able to influence the decision-making process on government and parliamentary channels.

Features of the corporatist system in Russiais that it is built on the basis of the interdependence of the most influential interest groups and the state and is of a contractual nature. For example, the former government of V. Chernomyrdin, patronizing the Gazprom corporation, received in return the opportunity with its help to solve problems in social policy. State power in Russia, driven by the need to overcome the crisis, provided opportunities for such a monopolization of interests in exchange for political and financial support. Therefore, corporations should be considered as the main support of the political regime in Russia in the 1990s.

T.I. Zaslavskaya notes that “as a result of the “market” reform of basic institutions, the state dissolved into private political and financial corporations... Behind each group of ministries, regions, and industrial complexes of Russia there is a certain ruling clan.”

As a result of the activities of political corporations, state power may find itself hostage to a group of political and economic monopolists and be subject to targeted pressure from representatives of private interests, which can lead to the oligarchization of the political regime and increased social tension in the country.

In the 2000s. a new corporatist structure emerged, associated with belonging to the intelligence services. In this structure, there is a corporate spirit of unity inherent in security employees. The statement of President V. Putin: “there are no former security officers” is a confirmation of the corporate spirit of the special services, which cements power. In such an elite, solidarity prevails. According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, despite the fact that “the whole country is becoming an arena of operational work,” ... “such power is doubly stable, especially since it is cemented by the ideology of patriotism, diluted, however, with liberal economic ideas.”

Russian scientist S.P. Peregudov, summarizing F. Schmitter’s reasoning about corporatism, identified several main positions that could make corporatism “new”, not undermining, but strengthening democracy and social peace. “Firstly, this is the presence of independent interest groups independent of the state and their focus on interacting with it for the sake of strengthening social partnership and increasing economic efficiency. Secondly, this is one or another degree of institutionalization of this interaction and the ability of the state to “impose” during the negotiation process priorities dictated by the general public. national interests. And finally, thirdly, this is compliance by all parties with their obligations and an appropriate system of monitoring their implementation.” These principles, transferred to the political sphere, could prevent or weaken the negative consequences of political corporatism.

6.7. Privileges as a sign of the political elite

Privilege- these are legal benefits, first of all, for government structures and officials, which they need to fully fulfill their powers.

Privileges are one of the most important characteristics of the political elite. Exclusive rights and special opportunities are closely associated with the elite because it includes groups of people with natural talent, bright talents, special ideological, social and political qualities that determine the special role of people performing the most important functions of managing society. The political elite, actively participating in the exercise of state power or in directly influencing it, spends a lot of energy, strength, and resources. To manage more effectively, the elite needs appropriate sources of replenishment of this energy. Therefore, the position of the elite is supported by its prestige, privileges, benefits, and therefore it enjoys significant material and spiritual benefits.

Consequently, the formation of a political elite is stimulated by the fact that the high status of managerial activity is associated with the possibility of receiving various kinds of material and moral privileges, advantages, honor, and fame.

As R. Mills writes, the power elite “consists of people who occupy positions that give them the opportunity to rise above the environment of ordinary people and make decisions that have major consequences... This is due to the fact that they command the most important hierarchical institutions and organizations of modern society... They occupy strategic command posts in the social system, in which effective means are concentrated to ensure the power, wealth and fame that they enjoy.”

However, due to the limited resources of power (material and spiritual goods, values), representatives of the elite voluntarily, as a rule, do not give up privileges. In order to win this war, the elites are forced to unite and group. The very high position of the political elite in society determines the need for its cohesion and group interest in maintaining its privileged status. “For the elitist paradigm,” emphasizes G.K. Ashin, - a typical statement is that society cannot function normally without the elite, that it has the right to a privileged position, moreover, it must vigilantly guard its privileges from “encroachments” by the masses.”

A.V. Malko notes another factor, which determines the close connection of the elite with privileges. It consists in the fact that this group of people personifies power, which (due to the fact that it is associated with the distribution of values ​​and resources) opens up wide opportunities for the realization of the individual interests of the elite and its entourage. Consequently, the struggle for privileges is in many ways a struggle for power, opportunities, resources, influence.

After the February and October revolutions In 1917, there was a massive abolition of feudal, unjust, largely outdated privileges, and a change of political elites took place. In addition, legal advantages and exclusive rights for bodies and officials of the Soviet state began to be designated in legislation to a greater extent through the concept of “benefits”. The unfolding struggle against class and estate privileges, incompatible with the ideals of equality and justice, with the principles of socialist construction, led to the fact that the term “privilege” began to be perceived as purely reflecting unlawful advantages. In connection with this, it was practically erased from law-making circulation.

However, contrary to Marxist teaching, in Soviet society from the very beginning there was a stratification of the population into classes occupying different positions in the social structure and, accordingly, having different opportunities in the distribution of life's goods. Inequality in this regard was not some kind of deviation from certain correct norms prescribed by the classics of Marxism, but a manifestation of the objective laws of social existence. By the end of the Brezhnev period, the class stratification of Soviet society had reached a high level. A tendency towards a decrease in the vertical dynamics of the population has become obvious, i.e. the possibilities of transition from one layers to layers of a higher level were reduced. Representatives of the highest echelons of power rarely descended to the lower ones, as they had various privileges and opportunities to acquire the benefits of life thanks to their position in society.

Such privileges, received primarily by the nomenklatura, were not enshrined in the law or were established in closed decisions. These advantages included the following: distribution of housing, summer cottages, vouchers to sanatoriums and prestigious holiday homes, scarce goods, etc.

The new political elite, headed by B.N. Yeltsin, despite the fact that it came to power in the wake of the fight against privileges, not only did not abandon the existing privileges, but also increased them.

Privilege system, as S.V. writes Polenin, unfortunately, became widespread not only during the years of stagnation and deformation of socialism, but also to an even greater extent in the current democratic period. We are talking about benefits with the help of which conditions for increased living comfort are created for a selected circle of “most responsible” persons, identified on the basis of their affiliation or proximity to those in power. In this case, benefits are not based on objective grounds and turn into ordinary privileges, the existence of which contradicts the idea of ​​​​forming a rule of law state and undermines both the principle of equal rights of citizens and the principle of social justice, under the slogan of which they are usually established.”

A significant part of the ruling modern Russian elite, not possessing high managerial and moral qualities, having received enormous privileges as a result of the nomenklatura privatization of a significant part of state property, turned out to be unable to adequately govern the country and are largely to blame for the crisis that engulfed society in the 1990s. .

In a truly democratic country, illegal and excessive privileges must be abolished.It is necessary to incorporate regulations on benefits for senior officials, including the President of the Russian Federation, on a thematic basis, and then publish them for public information and control over their compliance. In addition, the question increasingly arises of careful control over the existing and emerging political elite (through the institution of elections, referendums, reports of deputies to voters, the media, public opinion polls, etc.) so that it does not turn into a closed the dominant privileged caste, but worked for the benefit of society, the majority of Russian citizens.

A political system can be considered truly democratic if it implements the supremacy of the people, whose influence on politics is decisive, while the influence of the elite is limited, limited by law, a political system in which the elite is controlled by the people. Consequently, if we cannot ignore the thesis that the presence of an elite is a real or potential threat to democracy, then the way out, the condition for preserving democracy, is in the constant control of the people over the elite, limiting the privileges of the elite only to those that are functionally necessary for exercise of its powers, maximum openness, the possibility of unlimited criticism of the elite, separation of powers and relative autonomy of political, economic, cultural and other elites, the presence of opposition, struggle and competition of elites, the arbiter of which (and not only during elections) is spoken by the people, in other words, everything that in its totality constitutes the modern democratic process.”

It is important for Russia to form public opinion in such a way that the political elite itself begins to limit itself to a number of privileges, which, from a moral point of view, look clearly disproportionate against the backdrop of the poor majority of the population.

For the modern Russian state, the problem of developing a qualified, highly professional political elite that the population can trust is becoming increasingly acute. Russian society needs to create such an elite, making significant efforts to, with the help of democratic and legal norms and mechanisms, including through legal and justified privileges, carry out a kind of “selection” of new politicians who have state thinking and are capable of taking personal responsibility for transformations in the country.

Basic concepts: reproduction of the elite, the highest political elite, consolidation of the elite, corporatism, mobility of the elite, nomenclature, political corporatism, political elite, political class, ruling elite, privileges, regional elite, elite reconversion, subelite, federal elite, functions of the political elite, elite fragmentation, elite characteristics, elite circulation, elite, elite traffic.

Questions for self-control:

1.What is the main difference between the political class?

2.What is the relationship between the political class and the ruling elite?

3.What are the different parts of the single ruling elite called?

4. Define the political elite.

5.Name the most important characteristics of the elite.

6. Describe the mobility of the elite.

7.List the functions of the political elite.

8.What is the difference between the “Yeltsin” and “Putin” stages of the formation of the political elite?

9. Who belongs to the political elite in Russia?

10. What changes have occurred in the composition of the new political elite of Russia?

11. What are the main features of the ruling elite formed under V. Putin?

12. Name the main stages in the formation of the modern regional elite of Russia.

13. What reforms did V. Putin initiate with the aim of strengthening the power vertical?

14. Describe the regional political elite of Russia?

15. What is elite reconversion?

16. Explain the relationship between elite fragmentation and consolidation.

17. What is the essence of political corporatism?

18. What are the reasons for the privileges of the elite?

19. What are the necessary conditions for the democratic exercise of elite group privilege?

Literature:

Ashin G.K.Change of elites // Social sciences and modernity. 1995. No. 1.

Ashin G.K.Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological studies. 1998. No. 1.

Gaman-Golutvina O.V. Bureaucracy or oligarchy? // Where is Russia going?.. Power, society, personality. M., 2000.

Granovsky S.A.Applied political science: Textbook. M., 2004.

Zaslavskaya T.I.Modern Russian society: Social mechanism of transformation: Textbook. M., 2004.

Kretov B.I., Peregudov S.P. New Russian corporatism: democratic or bureaucratic? // Policy. 1997. No. 2. P.24.

Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological studies. 1998. No. 1. P.11.

Polenina S.V. Law as a means of implementing the tasks of forming a rule of law // Theory of Law: New Ideas. M., 1993. Issue 3. P.16.

Ashin G.K. Elitology in the mirror of political philosophy and political sociology // Elitological studies. 1998. No. 1. P.13-14.

The elite of society in any period of the history of human civilization has played and is playing a primary role in the formation and functioning of the institutions of a particular human society.

Roughly speaking, the state elite, as the dominant social stratum (class) of society, is called upon to have a direct impact on the essence, character, capabilities and guidelines of society as a whole.

Where does the “elite of society” in the classical sense begin?

First of all, this is a certain group located at the top of the conventional pyramid of social classes and strata.

Secondly, the elite must have clearly defined and defined guidelines. A specific and general Idea, Goal, Task - this is what unites the elite, makes it the very “elite of society”, which receives a universal and complex tool in the form of that very society for solving and achieving specific tasks and goals (I would like to immediately note that the ideology of fascism , which has a similar model of building public institutions with the formation of a social elite, is not meant here).

The elite of society is a designer, a foreman, a supplier, and a foreman at a construction site. What ultimately comes out depends on her competent actions during construction. Tower of Babel or the Taj Mahal.

The elite should not make vital social processes chaotic. The elite is a shepherd, the elite is a guiding star, the elite is a bearer of spiritual, moral potential. And it should not dissipate its original essence.

In reality, there must be obvious and hidden mechanisms for the formation of such an elite. What is the elite of the modern Russian Federation like?

Firstly, like any other elite, it is divided into two main groups: the power (political) elite, which exercises direct control over state institutions, as well as over political and social processes; the secular elite, which is a potential bearer of spiritual and moral guidelines, setting the main directions of spiritual development for the rest of society. What is the character and essence of each of these elites?

The political elite is a special social group, just like any other professional group, which has its own corporate interests and its own corporate consciousness. However, there are no special reasons to consider it a separate class. The political elite is formed from representatives of not all social strata and classes, but only those of them that can be classified as the highest politicized stratum of society.

In the modern Russian Federation, such a layer of society is a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus with a well-functioning bureaucratic machine. A modern official is one of the most permanent, “reliable” and sought-after “recruits” in the system of forming the power elite. In addition to “His Majesty the official,” the modern large industrial and raw materials bourgeoisie, large owners of natural monopolies, and a small part of the secular intelligentsia take part in the formation of the power elite. But the determining role is still played by bureaucratic officials. There is nothing surprising in this fact. Rather, this is a familiar picture of the structure of any state.

What are the priorities of the power elite of the Russian Federation in concrete actions in practice?

Of course, these are the modern world generally accepted economic “market values”. Russia has long been integrated into the circulatory dollar system of the world economy and has taken a not particularly honorable place there. Based on this fact, the real actions of the Russian power elite are built.

In simplified terms, the main problems that the power elite seeks to solve are maintaining power in the state by any means and harmonious coexistence in the economic sphere with the world system. The remaining issues are of secondary importance. Thus, it becomes obvious that such an elite lacks clear moral guidelines in the formation of society, the absence of a clear Goal and Idea at the state-national level (this is despite the prevailing rhetoric of “patriots” in the last few years, which is designed to create the illusion of the emergence of such Goals and Ideas), which was mentioned above, in the construction of institutions of such a society, vagueness of criteria and assessments of their activities, lack of awareness of their pastoral mission. That is, the rest of the social processes that do not relate to the two above-mentioned problems are, by and large, left to chance. Those problems that arise from such gravity are solved by the power elite not as the reason for their appearance, but as a consequence. And he solves it using a predominantly wide range of violent actions. Therefore, the structure of state institutions is built on the same principle. This is how we can briefly characterize the power elite of the modern Russian Federation.

The main problems of such a society are the absence of the role of society in direct control over the formation of the power elite, the absence of a conventional institution of “orderlies” who will be able to separate and isolate the “black sheep” and, finally, the absence of real common goals and objectives of the power elite with society. Unfortunately, the created and artificially cultivated consumer society has nothing to do with the national interests of Russia and its future generations.

The secular elite of the modern Russian Federation is also imbued with the spirit of corporatism and opportunism. She is absolutely divorced, “stewing” in her own juice, from the real life of society. However, in general, she tends to talk about her “invaluable influence” on various processes, taking place in society, it is pathetic to place oneself in the vanguard of control over such processes, to flaunt one’s “missionary” pseudo-idea.

The secular elite, consisting of the creative intelligentsia and public figures, is, at first glance, a very politically amorphous environment. In fact, the power elite actually imposes such amorphousness on the secular elite. This is all done for the same precise control over the two above-mentioned problems. After all, if the secular elite takes steps aimed at actively participating in the internal political life of the country, it will certainly attract serious attention and cause all the main social strata of society to awaken from hibernation. And this already calls into question the retention of power by the modern power elite and peaceful coexistence with the global economic system. So it is obvious that the power elite tried to forever deprive the secular elite of its original essence, the essence of the “salt of the Russian soil,” an intercessor for the common people (this is what it really was in the 19th and 20th centuries).

Otherwise, the secular elite, which does not get involved in solving internal political and economic problems, is given a wide range of freedoms, a whole system of pretentious and lulling incentives, honors, attention, etc. The secular elite, like a river that suddenly changed its usual course, created a whole distorted world of abstract reality, “universal human values ​​of a civilized community,” slutty glamor, reeking of expensive champagne and show business cocaine. All this is presented to the rest of society as a real revelation of new theologians, the ultimate truth.

Thus, in the modern Russian Federation, the root cause of all problems and social disorders is the absence of a real national state-forming elite of society. No, of course, today’s elite is also a completely real elite - it manages, manages, and solves problems that are important to it. But this elite has nothing to do with the real interests of Russia, its future generations. But this is the first indicator of the quality and capacity of the elite of society during critical episodes of human history. It’s just that such truly critical moments have not yet arisen before the modern elite of the Russian Federation. I am sure that as soon as such problems appear, such an elite will not be able to solve them.

Ideally, such problems in the future, as I think, should be solved by a group of desperate brave “extremists”, “intellectual scumbags” led by a Teacher or Leader, through the accompanying events of a dramatically changing reality and the very crisis situation that will be proclaimed in words and words. matter: “I tell you the truth: it must be so!”

One thing must be remembered - the elite, in its original essence, represents the skeleton of any society. Therefore, it should be formed neither according to clan, nor according to matchmaker-friendly, nor according to any other principles, except the principle of usefulness and devotion to a common Idea, a common Goal, for the sake of which it will not be a pity to sacrifice one’s own life.

Regarding the term "elite" there are many different views. For quite a long time, a person’s membership in the elite was ensured by his noble origin. Subsequently, the richest and most influential people began to be counted among the elite. Moreover, among the elite, groups of elites began to be distinguished, united by a common characteristic, for example: intellectual, literary, musical and other elites. But no matter how this term evolves, one thing is beyond doubt - the elite has played, is playing and will play a leading role in the development of the state and society. In interviews, experts from different countries spoke about the elites.

: How can you characterize the modern political and managerial “elite” in the country of your residence?

Vladimir Korobov -Director of the Center for Research of the Southern Ukrainian Borderland, Candidate of Sociological Sciences (Kherson, Ukraine):

The most important thing is that the Ukrainian elite does not reflect the interests and structure of the entire society. I get the impression that the condition for entering the Ukrainian elite is origin and ideological commitment. To get into the elite you need to have your last name ending with “chuk” or “ko”.

You need to be a supporter of the so-called “Ukrainian national idea.” There are fewer and fewer Russians and Russian-speaking people in the elite, and more and more people from Western Ukraine and ethnic Ukrainians.

Taking into account the socio-demographic structure of society, we can say that the elite of Ukraine is recruited not from the whole society, but from individual regions and supporters of a certain nationalist ideology. There are practically no supporters of reunification with Russia and Russian speakers defending the rights of Russians and Russian speakers in the Ukrainian elite. Even those who were considered as such are subject to party discipline of the Party of Regions and adapt to the new Ukrainian ideology (Kolesnichenko, etc.).

In a country where half the population is Russian-speaking, this looks like some kind of occupation. I ask myself a question: who from the Ukrainian elite reflects my interests and the interests of my family? Nobody. I ask my friends about this - no one. We do not have our representatives among the Ukrainian elite. We don’t have our ministers, we don’t have our deputies, we don’t have our own party, we don’t have our own speakers on television.

Sometimes they show us guests from Russia, as if emphasizing that such views are the lot of foreigners, not Ukrainians. But this is a lie and fraud! How can we relate to this country and this elite? The Ukrainian elite is the elite of only a small part of the country and society; its composition does not reflect the entire diversity of our society. It was artificially recruited from limited marginal layers.

This is the weakness of Ukraine as a state and the inferiority of Ukrainian society. It will not be able to achieve any success in this state. Half of the country does not have its own elite and is forced to look with hope to Putin and the elite of the neighboring country.

The nationalists are experiencing a personnel shortage and are forced to recruit all sorts of nonentities even for large positions. One after another, there are scandals surrounding high-ranking figures who presented fake higher education diplomas.

The Ukrainian “elite” is characterized by moral corruption, drug addiction, debauchery, hooliganism, corruption, and various forms of deviant behavior. Children of high-ranking Ukrainian officials behave especially defiantly, around whom scandals constantly arise. The Ukrainian “elite” both in the country and abroad has become the talk of the town, a model of decay and moral decline. The disintegration of the Ukrainian elite and its impunity reflect the sad prospects of the entire Ukrainian society, standing on the edge of an abyss and on the verge of destruction.

Alexander Pelin -philosopher and sociologist, candidate of philosophical sciences (Uzhgorod, Ukraine):

We are replacing the concept of the managerial elite with the concept of the establishment. The elite is recognized but not appointed.

Pavel Krupkin -scientific director of the Center for the Study of Modernity, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences (Paris, France):

The modern Russian elite for the most part is affected by a certain “ethical disease.” This system of personal attitudes is the dominant ethos of the Russian elite strata, and is characterized by: (a) the adoption of the cult of money in a very interesting form - in the form of worship of a certain magical substance - “dough”; (b) irrationalization and biologization of the worldview, “bewitching” the world; (d) extreme elitism up to racism in terms of social vision. The “flight from rationality” of the Russian elite results in its lack of strategic understanding, its rejection of even the idea of ​​the possibility of some kind of “common good”, and overwhelming egoism, including economic selfishness. All this is compounded by a lack of confidence in the legitimacy of one’s rule and the associated social order, and a lack of vision of one’s future in “this country.” As a result, the label “temporary compradors” turns out to be adequate for the dominant aspect of the identity of the Russian elite - both political and economic.

In a slightly different aspect, this ethos is close to the ethos of the medieval nobility, which determines both the “extraction of rent from one’s social position” as the dominant economic and power motive, and the current archaization of the social consciousness of Russia.

Along with the dominant ethos of the neo-feudal temporary worker, at the very top of the elite there is a group that would like to return the country to Modernity/Modernity (where the term “modernization” comes from). This group, due to its political influence, “induces” the ethos of modernization on the elite strata - after all, not a single archaic comprador wants to be publicly considered as such.

And the interaction of many variants of these ethos in the elite strata provides all the richness of Russian politics.

Yuri Yuriev - political constructor (Odessa, Ukraine):

The elite of Ukraine is like Lazarenko - they risk being left without the protection of the people and appearing as cash sheep on foreign territory.

Daniel Steisslinger- journalist and translator (Lod, Israel):

As cut off from the life of ordinary people. They care about well-being in the field of macroeconomics and the investment climate, forgetting that the economy is for people, not people for the economy. And too good an investment climate is actually no good: it attracts speculative capital, which does not create any jobs, but makes money on various shady games.

David Eidelman - political scientist and political strategist (Jerusalem, Israel):

Unlike Russian usage, in Israel the word “elite” is usually pronounced in the plural. Because the elite is not alone. There are several of them, they are different. There is a political elite, there is a military elite close to it, there is a religious, legal, and financial elite.

Due to the fact that the state is young, many elites are open to new people, “fresh blood”.

“Fighting the elites” has been a constant trend of right-wing parties for thirty years, although since 1977 they have been in power and, in theory, should have become elites, and not shouted against them. But during the 1999 election campaign, the Likud leader, then and current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his election rhetoric he repeatedly repeated “Ani asafsuf gaye” (“I was proud”), opposing himself to the “elites.” Although Netanyahu himself comes from a very decent family. And he occupied the chair of prime minister - the main position in the country.

Michael Dorfman - publicist, editor, publisher (New York, USA):

In the USA, it is more correct to talk about one elite, since here there is a very easy transition between the authorities, big business and the academy, which trains personnel and develops concepts. The Academy, represented by leading universities, plays in our country the same role that the Catholic Church played in the medieval world.

Alexander Khokhulin - blogger, owner and moderator of the site "Mankurty" (Lvov, Ukraine):

Just like in the question - in quotation marks.

Victor Gleba - architect, member of the Presidential Council of the National Union of Architects (Kyiv, Ukraine):

“Rednecks” - “Boys” - “Intellectuals” (this is a quote from one of the protesters under the walls of the Supreme Council of Ukraine) ...11/20/10.

Larisa Belzer-Lisyutkina - cultural scientist, lecturer at the Free University (Berlin, Germany):

These are professional politicians who have made a career within their parties and trade unions.

Vladimir Bukarsky - political scientist (Bendery, PMR):

In Moldova there is practically no “elite” as such. But there is only a group of clans with certain resources of influence, which, depending on the external or internal situation, fill themselves with a certain ideological content. These clans are intertwined with a complex system of kinship, commercial and other ties, revolve in their own field and are practically not subject to control by the bulk of the population.

Vladimir Belyanov- political scientist (Kharkov, Ukraine):

The concept of the elite as the best representatives of the nation, its lights and iconic personalities who really play a role, and not farcical divertissements, is very small today; more precisely, this part of society is actually not public. Availability higher education for a person today, alas, is not the key to his successful future. This upsets me and neutralizes the very concept of “political and managerial elite, which consists mostly of those who found themselves at the right moment in the right place, closer to power and the once common assets. They also “pull up” their own people, their own kind.

Vadim Bulatov- journalist, publicist, blogger (Nizhny Tagil, Russia):

There are probably some special sociological terms that describe the type of Russian elite: comprador, clannish, closed, bureaucratic, disunited. But it seems to me that the key term here will be one that describes the internal self-awareness of the Russian elite. It is the elite under suspicion. Our elite constantly feels a lack of legitimacy. This feeling gives rise to a powerful unconscious desire to humiliate and trample the non-elite, the people, into the dirt. And only then, against the backdrop of the downtrodden, downtrodden and illiterate, appear as bright princes. This suspicion also extends to relations within the elite, which gives rise to its disunity.

Representatives of the elite are forced to constantly prove to each other that they are the elite. Usually used for this various shapes humiliation of the people. I know for sure that aerobatics Among the elite, it is considered that relatives are excused from criminal punishment. If, for example, the son of an elitist crushed someone and was not punished, then this, in fact, is a gold card in the elite club.

Naturally, self-doubt gives rise to a primary desire among the Russian elite to create a reserve airfield outside of Russia. Children go to study abroad to make connections. So that they become their own in the West. If the child of an elitist studies in Russia, then this calls into question his status in the eyes of other elitists. Among the Russian elite, worldviews dominate to one degree or another, justifying social Darwinism and going directly back to the subculture of thieves in law. Anything that indicates that the people are suckers and sufferers is accepted. Anything that indicates otherwise is rejected. Liberal ideology speaks of Russians as an eternally backward people - subject to destruction.

The Orthodox state ideology is accepted by the elite in an amazing way. Orthodoxy is understood as the religion of the chosen, the religion of the elite, which the Russian cattle rejected in 1917 and still remains in the darkness of paganism. The murders of priests and the destruction of churches at the beginning of Soviet rule are interpreted by Orthodox elitists as a rebellion of the poor who came out of the stables, where they were not flogged diligently enough. The people have not yet corrected themselves, having turned into genetic waste thanks to the negative selection carried out by the red-bellied ones.

There is no hope for correction - the people have surrendered body and soul to the devil.

Some priests and hierarchs are very willing to support this worldview, because it gives material bonuses and, to some extent, classifies them as elite.

: What has a greater influence on government decision-making: public opinion or the opinion of the political elite?

Vladimir Korobov:

Of course, the opinion of the elite. Our institution of public opinion is poorly developed. In order for public opinion to be taken into account, some extraordinary events are needed - Maidan, revolution, uprising, storming the cabinet. Decisions are made behind the scenes, their adoption is influenced by elite groups: Klyuev, Kolesnikov, Akhmetov, Firtash, etc. There is no place for public opinion in this process. Only the risks of a mass uprising are taken into account. Other forms of protest are not taken into account and are not taken seriously. The tax code was adopted despite the objections of traders, their rallies and protest demonstrations.

Alexander Pelin:

Professor Grushin once thundered with his rhetorical question: “Does Genghis Khan need sociology?” Do officials need public opinion to make decisions? This is also a rhetorical question.

Pavel Krupkin:

As a result of what was said earlier, Russia turns out to be like a ship on a stormy sea, controlled by a drunken (but rather good-natured) chimpanzee with a limited channel of perception. Accordingly, the government decisions taken are very situational, and it is the current social situation that filters what can take part in the lot to be selected for taking into account when making a decision by the upper level of the Russian government. So it turns out that the interests of people, and the interests of business, and the interests of the bureaucracy “shine” in this “casino” as “influencing” the outcome, given the presence of a certain predominance of the interests of the ruling class, of course.

Yuri Yuryev:

Public opinion is still rather weak; everything is decided by the “elites” without referendums or polls. Society has no means of influencing the government, except for rare elections, and a people's jury has not been created. Thus, extra-legal methods remain. And they are growing, and are capable of giving rise to even more “extra-legal methods”.

Daniel Steisslinger:

Naturally, the opinion of the elite. They pass it off as public opinion, sometimes they simply form public opinion with the help of the media, throwing in incomplete or distorted information.

David Eidelman:

The very concept of “public opinion” appeared in England in the 16th century, but, like most ideological things of that era, it quickly moved to France, where it became fashionable and received proper decorative reinforcement. In the middle of the 18th century - during the era of Absolutism and Enlightenment, it was at first interpreted not generally as the opinion of the public (in the modern meaning of the term), but as a promulgated point of view of the intellectual elite, which became public knowledge, included in academic circles and literary salons. This point of view was opposed to the expression of private interests of a “narrow circle”, a “political handful”, as the then royal power appeared in the eyes of the “enlightened” public. Even then, “public opinion” was something like an ideological war machine, which was produced by the elite in order to confirm or undermine the political legitimacy of the regime and the opposition by all available means. The elite have always been fond of this game. That's why they are elites.

Michael Dorfman:

It is more correct to ask how much public opinion influences the decision-making of the elite. It has much less influence than we would like. Let's say 65-67% of Americans have a positive attitude towards the possibility of “socialized medicine”, adopted in all Western countries. However, the interests of big business prevailed, and during the debate about Barack Obama's medical reform, this option was not even discussed. Another example is the ongoing occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan - unpopular in public opinion.

Alexander Khokhulin:

The greed of the political elite.

Victor Gleba:

Power in society cannot be exercised by either one person or all people at once. “...The authority or power of a leader is rooted in the support of his followers...” wrote Nicolo Machiavelli. In his opinion, all major conflicts unfold between elites: the minority holding power and the minority moving to power. Orientation towards power, the desire to achieve it, is fraught with a potential danger for the social order, the guarantor of which is the one who already has this power. The influence on decision-making is multi-vector (this includes the press, protesters and international experts), but the main factor is the protection of the interests of certain influence groups (stakeholders) that represent the elites (business media, power structures and all branches of government).

Larisa Beltser-Lisyutkina:

Government decisions are made as a result of a long process of seeking consensus. Public opinion and the opinion of political elites are not always opposed to each other. But different segments of both society and elites may have different opinions. They must be discussed and agreed upon before the decision is put to a vote.

Vladimir Bukarsky:

Basically, most decisions are made by political elites, and the role of global and transnational elites in the modern world is much more important than the role of national elites. Of course, none of the elites is able to ignore public opinion. However, it is hardly worth describing in detail how easily this public opinion can be manipulated. It is much more difficult to manipulate national cultural and religious traditions and behavioral stereotypes that have been formed from generation to generation. The role of these traditions is extremely high, and moreover, in the global world it is growing even more. The world elites take this into account and try to use the influence of local traditions to their advantage.

Vladimir Belyamov:

The opinion of those who consider themselves to be among the elites, who are considered to be a “guiding star” in all spheres of the country. Only, often, all this looks deliberately “elite”: from mediocre projects on TV, when the basic requirements of professionalism are not applied to the announcers, at least to read the text with correct accent, when tastes in the media are instilled by odious girls who imagine themselves to be socialites and talk about it in their author’s programs. The same is true in politics and business. Everywhere where the particular and narrow is presented as general and broad.

Vadim Bulatov:

Russia during the Putin era was characterized by reliance on popular opinion. Medvedev relies on the opinion of the elite. This is noticeable at least in his interest in the blogosphere, which represents a certain elite part of the people. In the blogosphere, only the message that questions the people is put and promoted. Which is consistent with the self-awareness of the elite.

: Are the concepts of classical democracy and public administration in the modern world compatible with a narrow elite layer of society?

Vladimir Korobov:

The word "democracy" is pleasantly vague. This word doesn't mean anything. “Classical democracy” is even more nonsense than just “democracy”. Today this word is used so often appropriately and inappropriately that it has lost its power. Everyone in Ukraine understands that the social system that we have developed can be called “democracy” only on a grand scale. In Kherson, the mayor of the city was elected by 9% of the townspeople (34% of the turnout for local elections) - is this democracy? The regional governor is appointed by the president, the citizens of the region do not elect him, is this democracy? In the Russian-speaking region, there are no Russians in the leadership of the region and the regional center - is this democracy? The list of such questions can be extended indefinitely. We have only an imitation of democracy, decorative democracy, there is no trace of any real democracy.

By the way, it is not a fact that democracy is the only correct form of government. We have been living under “democracy” for twenty years, and we have eaten our fill of it. No better than the old “totalitarianism”. The same anti-people regime, only the words are different.

Alexander Pelin:

If there is no national elite, then “democratic” decisions are made by tossing a coin.

Pavel Krupkin:

Let me remind you that the egalitarianism of modern Western democracies is a relatively recent acquisition. Before that for a long time all democratic political systems were quite elitist. For example, in 1824 in the United States, the president of the country was elected by only 3.5% of the population.

The defining quality of democracy is more connected with the turnover of the generalized authorities than with the egalitarianism of the political system. It is in this place that the democratic city states, the democracies of the early modern era, and modern Western and Eastern democracies had in common.

Yuri Yuryev:

Both “democracy” and “elitocracy” have problems, since power is not given, power is taken. And whoever took power is the one who rules.

Democracy is good when it is not called out every few years, but every day and is able to call rulers to account immediately. This is not the case. In the meantime, this is not the case - the elites are competing. While they compete peacefully, but even with this “peaceful” competition they alienate the people, which is very dangerous for these “elites”, because there is no one to protect them...

In general, the concept of “elites” throughout history has been based on the principle of military force, and since the most powerful armies are obtained from universal conscription with general military training of the “interested people, as co-owners of the power,” the elites are doomed to serve the people’s power, or their states will be swept away by stronger ones . In the easiest version, the “non-people’s” elites will be robbed with impunity by the bankers who keep their funds, and they will not even receive a pension from the people...

Kirill Pankratov - Ph.D. (Acton, Massachusetts, USA):

And what, in former times, public administration was carried out by broad layers? Of course not. In general, the connection between the quality of key decisions made and the degree of participation of different social strata in them is far from obvious. Leaders can make mistakes, just like the expert community and the population as a whole.

Let's take, for example, clearly defined key decisions - about the start of wars, especially "bad" wars, those that led to great casualties and destruction, but did not achieve their goals. I do not see a correlation between the quality of such decisions and the breadth of social strata involved in them.

The obviously erroneous decision to invade Afghanistan was made by a very narrow group in the Politburo of the CPSU; there was no public discussion or participation in it. On the other hand, the most liberal and “democratic” government in the history of modern Russia took responsibility for starting the disastrous first Chechen war in 1994. Although this government won the elections (not entirely by honest means), society as a whole did not support the war. The second Chechen war had some, but not too much, public support. But it quickly grew when it became clear that the government was waging this war much more competently than the first.

The decision to escalate the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s was made by the most competent and well-educated government in American history at that time (since the Founding Fathers). But this did not prevent him from quickly losing public support and getting into a serious crisis, heavy losses and, ultimately, defeat. Perhaps the entire American society, and not just the Bush administration, is responsible for the start of the Iraq War in 2003. The fact that the reason for the war was built on a complete lie, and that Iraq does not pose a threat to the United States, was clear from the very beginning. But America was embittered after the 9/11 terrorist attack and wanted to “punch someone in the face.” Iraq seemed like a convenient candidate. The entire country, with few exceptions, smugly grunted and applauded as bombs fell on Iraqi cities. It was only when thousands of coffins and tens of thousands of maimed people began to return home that support for the war plummeted.

If we look back to the First World War, the decision was made by the generally well-educated and politically experienced elites of the European powers of the time, and the war was initially greeted with enthusiasm by large sections of most countries. So “democraticism” and the breadth of discussion of important decisions are not at all a guarantee of their correctness.

Daniel Steisslinger:

Classical democracy is a fiction. It is possible in a community of up to a thousand people. Next, representative democracy arises with the emergence of a stratum of professional politicians, and they already have their own interests, which do not always coincide with the public good, and sometimes are directly opposite to it. But Churchill is right - nothing better has yet been invented. Maybe in the very distant future it will be possible to transfer power to artificial intelligence, which is simply devoid of personal interests by definition.

David Eidelman: One of the Seven Wise Men of the Seven Wise Men of ancient Greece was the Corinthian tyrant Periander son of Cypselus (c. 660-585 BC). Herodotus describes Periander as an evil and intelligent tyrant, an ideologist of tyranny. According to his story, having received power, Periander sent a messenger to Miletus to ask for advice from the old Milesian tyrant Thrasybulus. Thrasybulus listened to the question and suddenly said to the messenger: “Do you want to see how my grain grows in the field?” The perplexed messenger followed and watched as Thrasybulus waved his staff: where he saw a taller and better ear, he knocked it down with his staff and pressed it into the ground. Having finished his walk, Thrasybulus said: “Go back and tell me what you saw.” Upon the herald’s return to Corinth, Periander was curious to know Thrasybulus’ answer. And the herald announced that he had not brought any answer and was surprised how Periander could send him for advice to such a crazy man who was devastating his own land. Then he told what he had seen at Thrasybulus. Periander understood the lesson of Thrasybulus, realizing that he was advising him to kill prominent citizens and began to deal harshly with everyone who stood out in his city for their nobility or wealth. Exterminating the most influential Corinthian aristocrats, Periander distributed the lands confiscated from them to representatives of the demos. He forbade the surviving aristocrats from buying slaves and luxury goods, doing gymnastics, living in the city, and having feasts.

Democracy, unlike tyranny, needs an elite. The great Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin wrote: “Democracy deserves recognition and support insofar as it implements a true aristocracy (i.e., it brings out the best people to the top).”

Michael Dorfman:

The concept of classical democracy, in contrast to direct democracy, is that society instructs its representatives to express its will. A hundred years ago, the socialist philosopher Robert Michels formulated the “Iron Law of Oligarchy” - any form of social organization, democratic or autocratic, inevitably degenerates into the power of a select few - an oligarchy. So far there have been no exceptions, although modern technology now provides many opportunities for direct democracy.

Alexander Khokhulin:

I don't know what classical democracy is. I don't know of any countries with similar governance. Except that Ukraine under the previous president, who was a national democrat, did the first half according to his soul, and the sponsors obliged him for the second.

Victor Gleba:

Democracy is the rule of law and the right to choose. Compliance with norms and laws is the main thing in a democratic (demos - people) society, in which the right belongs to the majority and power to the minority. Public administration is an order (decision) of the minority to be carried out by the majority. Elitism, as the best in decisions and implementation of these decisions, is characteristic of professionals. But the spirit of serving the people (the Tsar and the Fatherland) distinguishes professionals from patriots. Remember the film “Forward Midshipmen” - the romanticism of the perception of power and the people elevates the young elite of the empire, but at the same time destroys democracy. It’s a paradox, but it was the “elites” who killed the tsars in Russia.

Larisa Beltser-Lisyutkina:

The concept of “classical democracy” is an abstraction, it is a standard, an ideal type (according to Max Weber). In reality, such a model has never existed anywhere. It is needed as a terminus technicus for analysts and specialists.

Vladimir Bukarsky:

This question can be answered differently depending on what is meant by “classical democracy”. If direct democracy based on national traditions, then, naturally, elite management is in no way compatible with it. This is why Robert Dahl coined the word "polyarchy". Modern Western democracy implies, first of all, competition among elites, over which the bulk of the population has scant influence. By the way, democracy promoters in the USSR and Russia in the 80-90s, and even in modern times, stubbornly kept silent about the theory of polyarchy. However, modern propagandists of Western democracy have already adopted the doctrine of “demos and ochlos,” where “demos” means precisely this extremely narrow, radically Westernized layer of society, and “ochlos” means the bulk of the population. Therefore, current Russian and post-Soviet liberals quite sincerely consider themselves consistent supporters of classical democracy. But for them the majority of the population of their own countries is not “demos”, but “ohlos”.

Vladimir Belyamov:

Democracy and majority rule are, in essence, legalized anarchy and chaos. Everyone and no one, everyone and no one. I believe that it is incompatible, since everyone should be responsible for their actions, and not shift the resolution of issues to the collective mind, which, like collective stupidity, has no boundaries.

Vadim Bulatov:

There is Roman classical democracy. And there is Greek classical democracy. In Roman democracy there is a narrow layer of elite and the ochlos, who choose the people's tribune. The people's tribune kicks open doors, humiliates the elite in every possible way, has the right of veto, and generally works for the public and to soften protest sentiments. We recognize our modernity here with excitement. Greek classical democracy functions under the condition large quantity people involved in the elite. This is old Western and Northern Europe(except England) USA in the pre-Barack or even pre-Reagan era.

: What can cause the struggle between political elites and what can the lack of consensus between them lead to?

Vladimir Korobov:

Considering that our Ukrainian elite is more or less homogeneous in origin and ideology, the intraspecific struggle among them is associated with the redistribution of property. Firtash, Akhmetov, Klyuev and Kolesnikov are fighting not over how best to protect the rights of Russian-speaking people, but over how to make more profit, how to get richer. The struggle within the elite is caused by the play of its base interests. The lack of consensus within the elite leads to the self-destruction of the Ukrainian state. We are facing the real possibility of the disappearance of the state “Ukraine” from the world map; such an end could be a logical consequence of intra-elite clashes.

Alexander Pelin:

The struggle of the “political elites” is again a substitution of concepts. The political elite may have different campaigns, but "struggle." “Struggle” is the lot of political clans, between which there can be no consensus. Merger, unilateral suppression and mutual destruction are possible between political clans.

Pavel Krupkin:

The struggle of elites stems from the divergence of interests of elite groups; it is the driving force of the development of society, and when it weakens below a certain level, society falls into stagnation and decay. On the other hand, without political mechanisms for reproducing the integrity of society, the struggle of elite groups can lead to a split and civil war. That is, in fact, for the normal existence of society, the energy of the elite struggle should be kept within certain limits, not allowing it to either get too hot or cool down enough. Such self-regulation of the elite is the main point of elite consensus, ensuring the existence of society and the state in its integrity and development.

The most “stupid” and primitive mechanism for reproducing the integrity of society is provided by a strong personality (“The State is me!”), which gives rise to authoritarian political systems. Along with this, there is also a communal mechanism (“We are faithful to our gods, and united in serving the common good”), which sets the basis for collegial forms of decision-making and ensuring social integrity. These two mechanisms can exist either separately or together.

Yuri Yuryev:

We open the Bible and look at the number of disappeared countries and peoples... As for consensus, it is ideally given by the people, since citizens liable for military service interested in defending the country are the basis of long-term statehood.

Kirill Pankratov:

The degree of consensus or confrontation in the political elite largely determines the state of society as a whole. Marxism taught us that social dynamics are essentially a struggle between classes, “upper” and “lower.” In fact, most revolutions and social upheavals are conflicts between different parts of the elite, and not between the elite and the “common people.” But the elite factions also rely on broad layers for support.

As a rule, social instability and revolutions occur when there is “elite overproduction,” when elite circles make up a larger share than society can afford. And the point is not only in the purely material aspects of the “division of the pie”, but in the fact that there are too many “extra people” - educated and self-important applicants for all sorts of prestigious positions in society, in comparison with the objectively justified number of such positions. In an era of revolutions and long-term conflicts within society, part of the elite finds itself destroyed, expelled or declassed. Then the share of the elite falls sharply, society gradually calms down, and the cycle begins again.

There is almost never a complete consensus among the elites, and this is not necessary: ​​there must be healthy competition between its various parts. But when competition develops into irreconcilable confrontation, difficult times await the entire society.

Daniel Steisslinger:

The struggle of political elites can be explained by competition for access to material and administrative resources. The lack of consensus gives society minimal opportunity to influence the situation, because when the elites are united, it is almost impossible to break through their defenses.

David Eidelman:

According to Machiavelli, all the main conflicts of the state and society unfold between the elites: the minority holding power and the minority moving to power. Even if this power is purely informal.

The constant replacement of one elite by another is due to the social dynamics of society. Ensuring the balance of the social and political system requires the constant replacement of one elite with another.

It is desirable, of course, that the change of elites occur without crises, cataclysms and revolutions. After all, evolution is the same revolution, only without the letter “r”.

Michael Dorfman:

“Elites” in the plural, in our American political discourse, are the lot of the so-called. conservative propaganda, not sociology. It is more correct to talk about various groups within the elite, or, in a more radical case, about groups that aspire to become the elite. Political struggle in a narrow sense is a struggle for power, and in a broader sense, it is also for the public’s trust in the elite. Society can be as critical of its elite as it likes, but recognize that, in principle, it acts in the general interests. When a society loses confidence in its elite, then the end of such an elite is near and they are not happy that, according to Michels, they will be replaced by another elite. The lack of consensus within the elite indicates a crisis in society.

Alexander Khokhulin:

Political elites have always fought for power; this is the meaning of their existence and there cannot be a consensus between them in principle.

Victor Gleba:

Always in the history of states (see Machiavelli), the struggle of political elites and the lack of consensus between them was caused by the desire to seize POWER. At the same time, monarchies, empires, totalitarian-unitary states were distinguished by their special cynicism, using the most brutal methods of destroying opponents, using the ELITE.

Larisa Beltser-Lisyutkina:

The struggle is constant. Mainly for access to resources and for promoting their projects and ideas. A prolonged lack of consensus means a halt in the political process, i.e. political or managerial crisis. Its resolution involves the entire society, which means that the system is failing. Depending on its initial state and traditions, the struggle can escalate into outright violence and destruction.

Vladimir Bukarsky:

We see what the struggle of political elites can lead to in the example of Ukraine and Moldova - permanent political chaos, economic ruin, and quite possibly, the collapse of states. Therefore, the search for national consensus is a necessary condition for maintaining statehood. However, such a national consensus can be difficult to achieve if the country is strictly divided along national or civilizational lines, which, again, is the example of Ukraine and Moldova.

Vladimir Belyamov:

The struggle of political elites takes place classically, within the framework of class struggle, within the framework of the struggle for resources, for the redistribution of limited benefits. Nothing has changed since the days of the primitive communal system. Lack of agreement is fraught with the life of society in a state of eternal seething and crowding in place. As long as there are divisions within society, while the country is busy sorting out relations within itself, it finds itself thrown to the sidelines of the geopolitical and geo-economic process. To the delight of spiteful critics and those who from the outside support such “manifestations of democracy,” thus cracking down on competitors to whom “democracy” is instilled.

Vadim Bulatov:

The struggle for power and resources in Russia is aggravated by the struggle for legitimacy. If you lose, then you become just a nobody. This also creates a lack of consensus between the elites.

: How do you imagine the education of the political elite and elite education?

Vladimir Korobov:

The question is not easy. The main thing is that the education of the elite should not be the same as it happened in Ukraine. How is it going today? People become members of the elite by inheritance. High-ranking officials and wealthy businessmen send their children to the Kiev Institute international relations. There are high tuition fees + huge bribes for admission. The level of education there is low. The morals among students are terrible - drug addiction, homosexuality, etc. Nevertheless, it is considered prestigious to study there. Another part of the elite studies in foreign universities, where students completely lose touch with their native society and cease to understand it. For both of them, the idea of ​​serving the homeland and people is completely absent and can only cause ridicule. Is this the elite? These are an immoral rabble, useless mutants.

Elite education must be based on the democratic principles of natural selection. The elite must be trained from among those representatives of the people who have demonstrated extraordinary abilities, regardless of the financial capabilities of their families. It is necessary to create barriers for mediocre “sons” to enter the elite. And most importantly, the elite should include those who serve their homeland and people, and do not only set the goal of personal enrichment at any cost.

Alexander Pelin:

How do you imagine the upbringing of the political elite and elite education? Political and cultural elites cannot be educated, trained or chosen. Political and cultural elites are formed through popular recognition.

Pavel Krupkin:

The principles of educating the political elite have long been known. Mainly they include instilling respect for the common good and other common “gods” of society, training skills in using deliberative practices for coordinating interests and finding compromises, strategic vision and the ability to formalize one’s interests, and determining the motivational model of others for better understanding. Along with this, violation of generally accepted elite social norms is usually taboo, as is violence, especially violence towards “friends.”

And then, based on the results of the constant rejection of violators of social taboos, supplemented by the application of the principles of meritocracy to those remaining in the applicants for entry into the elite strata, the replenishment of the elite of society occurs. This way the quality of the elites for which Western countries are famous can be ensured.

Yuri Yuryev:

Like the fiercest competition for public support. Otherwise, states are doomed to compete with financial, military, scientific and other elites, and it is not a fact that the competition is for the interests of the people, and not other elites or other states. Namely, the desire for approval by the people gives birth to a government capable of ruling for a long time, which means predictable, and therefore stable, and therefore civilized and progressive.

As for education, I like the ancient method, when the descendants of any level of rulers serve “contractual” service on an equal basis with everyone else, and having already known the land, people and nature “in their own skin,” they study further and are ready not to hide behind their parents’ chairs, but to excel in deed or simply serve the deed.

Kirill Pankratov:

Elite education must exist. Every more or less significant and developed country must have internal structures for educating its elite - preferably at the high school and university level; in more early age elite upbringing produces only stupid arrogance and snobbery.

If there is no good elite education within a country, its elite will still try to give it to their children - but in other countries. To a certain extent, this is quite normal: you need to learn from the best world experience. But if the elite is almost entirely focused on foreign education for their children, this will have negative consequences for the country as a whole.

Another important issue is the availability of elite education for children from non-elite circles. No society in history has been fully an "equal opportunity society." No matter how the education system is structured, the elite will always find an opportunity to provide the best “pieces” of it for their children. You need to take this calmly. But the opportunity to obtain an elite education for talented and hardworking children from low-income groups must be ensured, provided with sufficiently stringent measures and public funds. But this, I repeat, should be achieved not through equalization in education, but through access specifically to elite, limited education for some people from non-elite groups.

Daniel Steisslinger:

Ideally, this should be a high-quality "encyclopedic" education. A person must have a good command of the basics of economics, sociology and jurisprudence, but also the natural sciences, so as not to give billions to be cut up by notorious “petriks” or “torsion bar specialists”. In addition, from childhood he must master communication literacy skills. But this is the ideal. In fact, penetration into the elite often occurs through corruption and related (which are also corrupt) mechanisms.

David Eidelman:

The difference between the elite and the general was described very well in his time by G.P. Shchedrovitsky. In each country there are two or three or several, depending on the size of the country, privileged educational institutions, and it is very difficult to get there. And they enter them not only to study, gain knowledge, etc. They go there to study in order to get into a company that will then go through life as one “landing group”, helping people from “their circle” to occupy the appropriate heights.

Michael Dorfman:

There is no need to imagine. Antonio Gramsci famously described this process in his writings on hegemony theory. I once had an internship at Princeton University, and I got a full understanding of how this is done. It is enough to spend a few days at a prestigious university like Harvard or Yale to see first-hand how prestigious hegemony is created, and how a person, without any violence, bends over backwards to fit in.

Alexander Khokhulin:

An outstanding Ukrainian politician of the past was once the director of a vegetable depot, the most famous current Ukrainian politician in the past was the director of a motor depot. Basic and elite education are synonymous in our country.

Victor Gleba:

Not the elite who drinks sweetly and eats heartily, sleeps softly and dresses beautifully, but the one who thinks systematically; demands more from himself than from others; learns constantly; sincerely loves; defends his thoughts with conviction; works for the benefit of his family, friends, like-minded people, and the state. In England they talked about the need for “three diplomas” in order to be considered an educated (elite) person - diplomas from grandfather, father and son. But the foundation is laid in children's education and discipline. Lessons of elitism must be taught by personal example. But the main question is “WHY BE ELITE?” Will elitism help a person in life and after death?

Larisa Beltser-Lisyutkina:

These are very different things. There is nothing in common between them. I don't know who can educate the political elite. Nobody raises her or raises her as such. In each generation, a “reboot” occurs; the elites are replenished with people from a variety of social strata as a result of weeding out the less capable and fortunate. To some extent, belonging to the elite may be hereditary, but this is by no means necessary. In German society, any capable person can make a political career. Bundeschancellor Schröder came from a single-parent family, his mother was a cleaner, and he did not have a father.

As for elitist education, it does not work to produce power elites. It works to transmit exclusive knowledge and education. And how those who acquired it will manage this resource, whether they will become politicians or specialists in the field of “orchid sciences”, this will depend on their choice. An elite education produces multifunctional individuals capable of being successful in many areas.

Vladimir Bukarsky:

The political elite must come from the people. It is necessary to completely overcome caste and search for truly the best representatives from all strata of society. In Soviet times, this task was effectively handled by mass organizations - the party, the Komsomol, trade unions, and so on. However, the penetration of elitism and caste into these structures led to their separation from the bulk of the people, moral and intellectual degeneration, and, as a consequence, the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of their own people.

Vladimir Belyamov:

Education must again be elevated to the rank of elitism, as it was under the USSR. This may sound harsh, but not everyone needs it. What do we have today? The general penetration of higher education into all layers of society. From the outside it seems beautiful, but in reality it is grotesque. Ukrainians began to live by inertia, realizing that after school they will go to college, but they forget that everyone is inclined to do what they have talent for. Education must again be elevated to the rank where a person receives it with trepidation and a clear understanding of the process and knows that if he strives for this, this will be the key to his entry into the elite of the nation, and not into the gray mass of engineer-managers whom universities release into the world in batches, while demanding a certificate of employment, otherwise promising not to issue a diploma. So it turns out that our “employment of specialists” is 100%, only there is no one to grow bread, no one to stand at the machine, no workers, no one to build the infrastructure. So why is such a system needed?

Vadim Bulatov:

This is an interesting question that is being addressed modern methods management. First of all, the future elitist needs to decide the main question: does he want to earn money or take responsibility. Solve complex management problems or earn money. Accordingly, those who want to earn money need to create comfortable conditions at the bottom of the management vertical. For example, by toughening the punishment for large bribes with mandatory confiscation of property, including from relatives, creating a system of incentives for denunciations of bribes. And by reducing, or even canceling, the punishment for small bribes. A small person who wants to earn money would do it little by little, without climbing to the top.

Accordingly, such an elite must be educated in closed educational institutions similar to English private schools, but certainly in Russia. The learning process must be accompanied by certain deprivations and restrictions so that a wild life is possible only behind the walls. Unstable parents would withdraw their children from such schools and deprive them of the chance to become elite.

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Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education Vladimir State University named after Alexander Grigorievich and Nikolai Grigorievich Stoletov

Law Institute named after. MM. Speransky

in the discipline "Political Science"

Modern political elite in Russia

Vladimir 2015

WITHpossession

Introduction

1. The emergence of the concept and theory of political elites

1.1 Main directions of modern elite theory

1.2 Typology of the political elite

1.3 Main functions of the political elite

2. Types of political elite in Russia

2.1 Characteristics and features of the political elite in Russia

2.2 Structure of the political elite in Russia

Conclusion

Literature

INconducting

The elite, as a part of society, occupies a leading place in the system of developing social values ​​and norms by which all segments of the population are forced to live. Without an elite, society cannot exist in principle. Any society is always divided into a dominant minority (elite) and a controlled, managed majority (the masses), oriented towards the values ​​of the minority.

Therefore, in modern political science, particular attention is paid to elitology. There are many approaches to understanding the elite. In Russian political science, a structural-functional approach is used, when members of the elite are considered from the point of view of their position in the hierarchical system of social structures.

In fact, the elite is a full-fledged social group with a complex structure. The political elite is a relatively small layer of people (minority) occupying leadership positions in government bodies, political parties, public organizations, possessing political power, all the resources of political influence, and influencing the development of government management decisions and the implementation of policies in the country.

And in this regard, the role of the political elite in the public life of the country and in the ongoing political processes is enormous. As Cicero noted, “...a small, very small number of people placed at the head of the state is enough to correct or spoil the morals of the people.”

This paper presents the general ideas of the concepts of the formation of political elites, provides a typology of elites, functions, reflects the characteristic features of the Russian political elite, its problems, its structure, and on this basis appropriate conclusions are drawn.

1. The emergence of the concept and theory of political elites

1.1 The main directions of modern elite theory

The political elite is a relatively small social group, the core of which is a fairly significant amount of political power, ensuring integration, subordination and reflection in political attitudes of the interests of various sectors of society and creating a mechanism for the implementation of political plans. In other words, the elite is the highest part of a social group, class, or political social organization.

Translated from French, “elite” means “best”, “selected”.

Firstly, one of the meanings of this word implies the possession of some of the highest traits on an established value scale.

Secondly, in everyday life, “elite” is usually called the best, most valuable group for society, rising above the masses and called upon to rule the masses.

For example, in slave-owning and feudal societies, the aristocracy acts as the elite. (“Aristos” means “best”; aristocracy means “power of the best.”)

In political science, the term “elite” has the first, more neutral, meaning. Representatives of the political elite are the most prominent owners of managerial qualities in the field of politics and functions.

The theory of the political elite assumes the priority of politics over the economy, the social structure of society, therefore it is characterized by absolute incompatibility with the ideas of economic and social determinism, represented, for example, by Marxism, which treats politics merely as a superstructure over the economic base.

In this regard, the attitude to the study of the concept of the political elite, the structure of the ruling nomenklatura elite in Soviet social science, was considered as something pseudoscientific, not distinguished by positive features.

At the initial stages of the formation of political science, the French term “elite” became widespread at the beginning of the 20th century. thanks to the works of Sorel and Pareto, although the ideas of political elitism arose outside of France in ancient times. The ideas of elitism found their justification in the works of Confucius and Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Carly, Nietzsche.

For example, in Confucius society is divided into “noble men” (elite) and “low people” (common people). In Plato's ideas, the elite is a minority ruling over the majority.

According to Aristotle, democracy was a utopian idea, but democracy should be representative. That is, leaders must stand out from the general mass.

The ideas of elitism appeared more meaningful in the concepts of elites. XIX - beginning XX century G. Mosca, V. Pareto, R. Michels.

In the ideas of G. Mosca, the term “political class” was formulated for the first time. In his opinion, the political elite is a group of politically active people focused exclusively on power. Only people with wealth, military prowess and priesthood have access to the political class, the elite. Moreover, all political classes are oriented towards inheritance.

V. Pareto argued about the existence of two types of elite, dominant and potential. Within the ruling elite there has already been a loss of active activity, and within the potential elite there is a desire for this activity. And such mutual struggle leads to constant renewal of elites. That is, people who have the highest performance in their activities constitute the elite. Gifted people from the “bottom” rise to the elite, and members of the existing elite, degrading, fall down to the masses.

According to the concept of R. Michels, the elite is an integral companion of democracy. Power is never ceded to the “masses”, only transferred from leader to leader. It is mandatory for the state to create an organizational apparatus for the direct implementation of management. This apparatus is increasingly expanding and ultimately replacing the very idea of ​​democracy. Michels' concept is a kind of concept of bureaucratization of the ruling elite.

So, at the end of the twentieth century. Several basic concepts of the problem of elitism in society have emerged, which will be discussed below.

The first group consists of followers of the Machiavellian approach to the study of the problem under consideration, which received its name thanks to the ideas of N. Machiavelli.

Adherents of the concept of N. Machiavelli are united by the following ideas:

– the elite has special qualities, natural gifts and talents, exceptional education in work in the struggle for power;

– the elite is united into a group distinguished by a commonality of ideas, interests, social and professional status;

– recognition of the elitism of any society, its inevitable division into a privileged ruling creative minority and a passive, uncreative majority. And this kind of division is a completely natural phenomenon natural to human nature.

And despite the change in the personal composition of the elite, the dominant attitude towards the masses always remains unchanged. So, for example, in the course of history, tribal leaders, monarchs, boyars and nobles, people's commissars and party secretaries, ministers and presidents were replaced, but the relations of dominance and subordination between them and the common people remained and always prevailed.

The struggle for power (latent or explicit, inevitable by its nature) is the main phenomenon of the formation and change of elites. This kind of struggle will always exist. There will definitely be people with a certain set of exceptional qualities, with the desire to occupy a privileged position in society. And not everyone who already occupies such a position is ready to give it up voluntarily.

The elite assumes a dominant, leading role in society and seeks to pass on its privileged position by inheritance, which, in turn, leads to the degeneration of the outstanding qualities of the elite.

Machiavellian theories of elites are not without reason subject to scientific criticism for exaggerating the importance of psychological factors, rejection of democratic principles, underestimation of the potential capabilities and activity of the masses, and a negative attitude towards the struggle for power.

To overcome and improve weaknesses Machiavelli's ideas were inspired by the value theories of the elite. Like Machiavellian concepts, they consider the elite to be the main constructive force in society, but their position towards democracy is softened.

The value concept is multivariate, but there are several basic ones that unite all adherents of the idea:

– first of all, a highly professional elite, people with outstanding abilities in various spheres of life. The composition of the elite has the ability to update the requirements for participants due to the constant continuous spiritual, value, and material evolution of society.

– the elite is represented exclusively by the mutual cooperation of individuals who care about the good of society, and do not pursue their own selfish goals in the struggle for power.

– the relationship between the elite and the masses is based on the dominant, authoritative principle of the ruling elite and the obedience of its power by the people. The elite must command the respect of the masses, confirmed by free elections.

– the formation of the elite occurs as a result of the natural selection by society of the most valuable representatives, and not at all as a result of a struggle for power. In this regard, society should strive to improve the mechanisms of such selection in all social strata.

– the presence of elitism as one of the main conditions for the effective functioning of any democratic society. Initially, people in a democratic state are provided with equal living conditions to start from (social equality) and, thanks to their efforts and activity, they will have their finish line. In this case, either leaders or outsiders appear.

The concepts of democratic elitism (elite democracy), which have become widespread in the modern world, are based on some essential provisions of the value theory of elites. The origins of this concept are in the understanding of democracy proposed by J. Schumpeter as competition between potential leaders for the trust of voters.

According to the concept of democratic elitism, the existence of real democracy is impossible without the elite as the guarantor of high-quality leadership elected by the population. And it is the quality of the elite that directly affects the quality of the social value of democracy.

The management team sufficiently possesses all the qualities necessary for management, and is the bearer and ensurer of the protection of democratic principles and values.

In 1960-1970 claims about the comparative democracy of the elite and the authoritarianism of the masses have been largely refuted by concrete research. It turned out that although representatives of the elites usually surpass the lower strata of society in accepting liberal democratic values ​​(freedom of personality, speech, competition, etc.), in political tolerance, tolerance of other people’s opinions, in condemning dictatorship, etc., but they are more conservative in recognizing the socio-economic rights of citizens: to work, to strike, to organize in a trade union, to social security, etc. In addition, some scientists (P. Bachrach, F. Naschold) have shown the possibility of increasing the stability and efficiency of the political system by expanding mass political participation.

The most widespread in modern elitist thought are the ideas of the value theory about the value-rational nature of the selection of elites in a modern democratic society. They can also be called functional theories of the elite.

The adherents of this concept do not reject the elite theory as a whole, but they support the need to revise its fundamental principles.

The main postulates of the pluralistic concept of the elite are the following:

– political elites are viewed exclusively as functional, that is, as groups whose members have certain special qualifications to occupy certain leadership positions in society. The main quality that determines membership in the elite is precisely their high qualifications to perform the functions of managing specific social processes, which is their superiority over other members of society.

– the elite cannot be considered as a single integrated privileged group. In a modern democratic society, there is a pluralism of elites, since power operates between various groups and institutions, which, with the help of direct participation, can defend their interests and find compromises. Each of the basic groups, professional, religious, regional, demographic and others, forms its own elite with values ​​and interests unique to it.

– there is no clear, pronounced division into the elite and the masses. This theory denies the form of “supremacy-subordination” in their relationships; rather, we are talking about relations of representation. Elites are controlled by their base groups. Through the use of democratic mechanisms of elections, referendums, polls, the press, pressure groups, etc., there is social competition among elites in society. All this prevents the formation of a single dominant group and makes it possible for the elites to be accountable to the masses.

– access to the leadership layer of basic groups is open to persons with high social status, great financial capabilities, possessing exceptional personal abilities, knowledge, skills, with a high activity indicator.

– in democratic states, elites are involved in performing important public functions related to governance.

The concepts of elite pluralism are quite widely used to theorize modern Western democracies. However, reality in these theories is significantly idealized.

According to numerous studies, a clear uneven influence of different social strata on politics and the dominance of capital has been discovered.

The ideological antipode of pluralistic elitism is left-liberal theories of the elite. The most important representative of this trend was R. Mills back in the 1950s. tried to prove that in the United States control belongs not to several, but to one ruling elite. This elite is the central core of the current system of society.

Sharing some provisions of the Machiavellian school, left-liberal elitism also has specific features:

– the main elite-forming feature is the possession of command positions and leadership positions, positions in various fields of activity.

– the diversity of the composition of the ruling elite, which includes political leaders and corporate executives, politicians, senior civil servants and senior officers. All these individuals should be united by the desire to maintain a privileged position in society, to ensure a lifestyle different from the masses, to maintain an educational and cultural level, and to form family and personal connections.

Hierarchical relationships have been formed within the ruling elite. Despite his sharp criticism of the ruling US elite and the connections of politicians with large property owners, Mills is still not a supporter of the Marxist class approach.

– recognition of the deep difference between the elite and the masses. However, people who come from the people have a chance, albeit small, of becoming members of the elite only after achieving high positions. Using finance and knowledge, the ruling elite actually controls the masses without control.

– renewal of the composition of the elite is carried out exclusively within its own environment on the basis of the acceptance of its socio-political values. The most important selection criteria are the possession of certain resources of influence, as well as business qualities.

– the primary task and function of the ruling elite in society is to ensure its own supremacy in the society of the state. And the solution of many management problems is subordinated to this function. However, Mills denies the inevitability of elitism in society and criticizes democratic positions.

Supporters of the left-liberal elite theory often deny the existence of a direct relationship between representatives of the economic elite and the political elite. However, political leaders of developed capitalist countries agree with the basic principles of the market system and see in it the optimal form of social organization for modern society. Therefore, in their activities they strive to guarantee the stability of the social order based on private property and pluralistic democracy.

Western political science sharply criticizes the main provisions of the left-liberal concept of the elite, especially the assertions about the closed nature of the ruling elite and the denial of its connection with big business. In Marxist literature, on the contrary, this direction was assessed very positively.

Thus, the main idea that permeates all existing concepts of political elitism is that the existence of elites is due to the fact that it is impossible to provide power to everyone, to carry out direct participation of the masses in making administrative government decisions, and exercising power. If this power of the elite were available to everyone and everything, its exclusivity would be lost.

1.2 Typology of the political elite

By type of activity, all elites are divided into political, economic, military, bureaucratic and cultural-informational.

The political elite is called upon to provide leadership in the development and implementation of political decisions. Most researchers call the political elite the ruling elite.

According to the method of recruiting (selecting) the elite, there is an open (entrepreneurial) and closed (guild) elite.

Depending on their place in the political system of society, there is a ruling, opposition (counter-elite) and non-ruling intellectual and cultural elite. The ruling elite is directly involved in political decision-making, while the counter-elite promotes its opposition-minded line. The intellectual and cultural elite does not play a decisive role in public administration, but its influence on the minds of the public and on behavior in society is great.

According to the nature of intra-elite relationships, a united elite, an ideologically united, a consensually united, and a divided political elite are distinguished. In the united elite there is no open confrontation; there is a unity of opinions and views. By consensus, the elite forms a certain kind of decisions on separately identified areas of policy. In a divided elite, there is constant confrontation between factions.

According to the degree of representation, there are political elites with a high degree of representation and a low one.

Elites with a high degree of representation express the interests of significant strata of society, while those with a low degree of representation express the interests of a limited circle of social strata of society.

By level of competence they denote the highest (federal level), middle (regional) and local (municipal, regional, republican) political elites.

Based on the type of government, they distinguish between totalitarian (using authoritarian power), liberal (using democratic separation of powers) and dominant (compromising), democratic elites.

All political elites are closely interconnected and cannot exist without each other.

1.3. Functions of the political elite

Political elites perform the following functions in society:

– expression of the combined interest of all classes and strata of society, development of ideas for reforming the country’s spheres of life;

– determining the political course, supporting political and management decisions (strategic and organizational functions);

– carrying out personnel policy at the highest level, promoting political leaders;

– rational distribution of values ​​and resources in society;

– ensuring the protection of values, ideas, special goals of the country’s society (communicative function);

– pursuing a policy of preventing conflict situations in society and measures to resolve them, ensuring the stability of political and economic systems (integrative function).

2. Types of political elite in Russia

2.1 Characteristics and features of the political elite in Russia

Based on the analysis of the above theories of elitism, O. Kryshtanovskaya gives the following definition of the elite, representing it as the ruling group of society, which is the upper stratum of the political class and has the maximum power. In her opinion, this group does not have special qualities, and it can include both people of outstanding qualities and mediocre individuals.

As a rule, the main principles for entering the elite are the presence of money, power, origin, etc., but, by no means, the most worthy individuals are granted access to the elite of society.

The evaluative approach has been overcome in the political elite and it is customary to include only persons who occupy a certain status in the political system, allowing them to make appropriate political decisions.

The modern political elite of Russia began its formation in the early 1990s. It was during that period of transition to a market economy that radical changes took place in the structure of the country's political elite.

The service-nomenklatura principle of forming the political elite was replaced by the principle of elite pluralism (the creation of multiple centers of power).

Accordingly, researchers of the theory of elitism highlight the “Yeltsin” and “Putin” periods of formation of the elite in the country.

During the “Yeltsin” period, the supreme power collapsed, its integration never happened. The “Putin” period resolved the problems of the “Yeltsin” period. Federal Center the necessary amount of power over the regions was returned, a strong system of executive power was created without violating democratic principles.

A distinctive feature of the recruitment of elites under V. Putin was the dominance of the “siloviki” and the reduction of “intellectuals”.

The problem of forming a highly professional political elite, which is not indifferent to the fate of the country and enjoys the trust of the population, is becoming increasingly acute. In this case, a more stringent selection of politicians who are capable of taking personal responsibility for decisions and transformations in the country should be carried out.

At present, the requirements for the professionalism of members of the elite, ruling groups, for the effectiveness of their rule, for the level of moral and educational level, and the ability for progressive development have been clearly formed. One of the most important problems in the development of the elite was the personnel policy, the system of training, retraining and advanced training.

The personal composition of the political elite is constantly changing. The formation and reproduction of the elite is a continuous process. However, its job structure remains virtually unchanged.

The modern political elite of Russia is headed by the president. Next comes the Prime Minister, members of the government, deputies of the Federal Assembly, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Arbitration Courts, the presidential administration staff, members of the Security Council, presidential plenipotentiaries in the federal districts, heads of power structures in the constituent entities of the federation, the highest diplomatic and military corps, some other government positions, leadership of political parties and large public associations, and other no less influential persons.

Speaking about the Russian ruling political elite, it is necessary to note that the burden of historical traditions of political culture largely predetermines the methods of political activity, political consciousness and behavior of the new wave of “Russian reformers”, who by their nature and essence do not perceive other methods of action other than those that were successfully used both by themselves and their predecessors.

Political culture is multi-layered, it has been developing over centuries, it is embedded in the history of Russia in traditionalism, collectivism, paternalism, and it is not possible to subject it to radical modernization in a short period of time. Currently, there is an attempt to mechanically transfer Western European liberal ideology to Russian soil.

In modern Russia, the issue of creating a public administration system with an appropriate personnel training infrastructure for it has become acute. Thus, one of the main problems of the elite environment is the problem of increasing the managerial potential of the modern political elite. And in this case, an important fact of such an increase is the expansion of the base of elite recruitment at the expense of the sub-elite.

The problem of increasing intellectual capital, the formation of a complex of competent, loyal elite, capable of effective, positively impactful management is urgent. It is necessary to continue to take measures to reduce the incidence of corruption in the circles of the political elite.

It is extremely important to introduce democratic values ​​and principles of humanism into the political elite, and to orient the work of elite circles towards the protection of public interests.

The weakness of the modern Russian political elite is manifested in the lack of a clear ideological orientation. The composition of the elite must be constantly updated, since it is the outdated layers of the elite that are often ardent opponents of modernization measures. But historical facts show that many major modernization events in countries took place thanks to the effective work of the modernization-minded political elite.

A “centre of modernization”, a certain group of like-minded people united by common ideological ideas, should be created within the political elite.

According to scientific research, many modernization projects in the country failed, largely due to the weakness of modernization attitudes in the political elite.

In this regard, a large-scale program of reform of public administration and civil service is currently being implemented.

2.2 Structure of the political elite in Russia

The political elite of Russia is heterogeneous in its essence and internally differentiated and diverse. It is divided into

– ruling at the federal level, possessing state power;

– regional ruling;

– opposition (counter-elite);

– non-ruling intellectual and cultural;

- near-elite environment. And another division into:

– the highest, making decisions that are significant for the state;

– average, taking into account public opinion;

– lower (local);

– administrative (bureaucracy).

The ruling elite is represented by the President of the country, the Vice President, all members of the presidential staff, heads of representative bodies of power, the Prime Minister, his deputies, deputies, heads of ministries, administrations, senior military officials, heads of diplomatic missions abroad, leaders of political parties, social movements , leading media.

The control elite is filled with members of opposition parties, movements, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, and academic staff. As such, the counter-elite is not endowed with power and does not have access to managerial functions.

The intellectual and cultural political elite is the most creative and socially advanced. It includes the creative intelligentsia, active businessmen, theater workers, artists, and journalists.

The near-elite environment is represented by assistants (advisers, consultants, lawyers, managers, scientists, etc.) of persons directly involved in politics, who have the opportunity to indirectly influence management decision-making. These representatives are a kind of conductors between representatives of other groups.

In fact, the niche of the highest political elite is filled by leading political leaders, persons holding high positions in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (immediate circle of the president, prime minister, speakers of parliament, heads of government bodies, leading political parties, factions in parliament).

In quantitative terms, this is a fairly limited circle of people who make the most significant political decisions for society and the state as a whole. Belonging to the highest elite is determined by the established reputation in the social system, financial position (the so-called “oligarchs”), as well as position in the power structure.

The average political elite is formed from a large number of elected officials: deputies of the State Duma, members of the Federation Council, heads of administrations and deputies of legislative assemblies of the constituent entities of the federation, mayors of large cities, leaders of various political parties and socio-political movements, heads of electoral districts.

The ruling political elite in Russia, in its structure, also consists of a number of groups, between which there is a constant struggle for dominance in the upper echelons of power. The horizontal integration of the political elite is quite low. Healthy political competition of its kind in the elite and sub-elite environment does not yet exist at a sufficient level.

The middle elite consists of approximately 5% of the population, who simultaneously possess three qualities: income, professional status and education. People with high level education and low incomes are more critical of existing social relations and gravitate towards left radicalism or centrism. Representatives of the middle elite, whose income exceeds their level of education, are adherents of right-wing political positions and are the most critical of their social status.

In modern conditions, there is also a tendency to increase the role of the middle elite, civil servants, managers, scientists, administrators, in the formation of public opinion, preparation, adoption and implementation of political decisions. It is this “subelite” that is ahead of the top elite in awareness and ability to act in solidarity. However, the development of this trend, as a rule, is restrained by authoritarian political regimes, striving by all means to keep the “subelite” in line with their policies. Therefore, the process of forming a stable democratic elite is very complex. But only this type of political elite is capable of having a close connection with the people, the highest level of interaction with all layers of society.

The local political elite includes political figures on a local scale (districts, cities, villages, etc.).

The administrative functional elite (bureaucratic) is the highest stratum of civil servants (bureaucrats) occupying senior positions in ministries, departments and other government bodies. Their role is to prepare general political decisions and organize their implementation in those structures of the state apparatus that they directly supervise.

The structure of Russia's political elite also includes a variety of groupings. The ideas of justice, public order, and the effectiveness of government are shared by all parties, in which ways they are similar to each other, despite differences in foundations.

In addition to those listed above, the political elite includes representatives of the ruling class who are not formally associated with politics, but have an indirect influence on it.

Conclusion

Summarizing the above, it should be noted that a complete, smoothly working system for replenishing the political elite still does not exist in modern Russia, which indicates the lack of maturity of the country’s political system as a whole. The elite formation process in our country continues to this day.

The way out of this situation will be the introduction of a new system for recruiting elites, based on competitive principles, institutionalizing requirements for the business and moral qualities of members, which will create a highly professional elite with a set of the best professional, business, and moral qualities, which will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the effectiveness of Russia's development.

The effectiveness of the country’s modernization strategy directly depends on the elite. Consequently, an ineffective elite only contributes to the demodernization of society.

With V. Putin coming to power, the ruling elite took many steps to transform both the political system and the country’s political elite into an authoritarian-democratic one. The Federal Assembly, the main political parties, the business elite, most regional leaders, and the main electronic media were controlled by the head of state.

For a democratic state, of which Russia is included, the primary task at present is to form the most qualified elite, politically useful for society, authoritative, morally healthy, interested in the stability of society, dedicated to the idea of ​​​​the prosperity of Russia, and suppressing the process of turning the elite into a closed, dominant, privileged group.

“The country will definitely have an elite of real leaders, truly talented politicians and competent managers on a national scale. Strong-willed qualities, dedication and even decency alone are not enough for such an elite. We need a high legal, managerial and spiritual-moral culture. Only an elite consisting of people of such qualities, in close alliance with those who have achieved success in science, culture and business, will be able to ensure the security of the country and a decent life for people, successfully fight corruption and terrorism, and guarantee the steady strengthening of Russia’s role in international affairs ."

Thus, it seems that the future of the Russian political elite will depend on the individuals within it and the social motives that guide these individuals in their activities. For the sake of their own survival and improvement, the political elite must take measures to improve the health of society as a whole and recruit its representatives. This is precisely the key to preserving Russia as a state.

Literature

1. Message from the President of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly Russian Federation // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 2007. April 27.

2. Ashin G.K., Ponedelkov A.V., Ignatov V.G., Starostin A.M. Fundamentals of political elitology: Textbook. - M.: PRIOR, 1999

3. Baranov N.A. Tutorial. Political relations and the political process in modern Russia: A course of lectures. St. Petersburg: BSTU, 2004.

4. Gorbach K. Post-Soviet elites: convulsions of a newborn child. M., 2005

5. Kryshtanovskaya O. Anatomy of the Russian elite. M.: Zakharov, 2005

6. Ozhegov. S.I. Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language: 80,000 words and phraseological expressions / S.I. Ozhegov. M.Yu. Shvedov. -M.: 2004

7. Ponedelkov A.V., Starostin A.M. Elitologists about elites. Rostov-on-Don: SKAGS Publishing House, 2007

8. Gorelov. A.A. Political science in questions and answers / A.A. Gorelov.-M.: Eksmo, 2009

9. Abramova I.E., Ponomarenko T.V. Russian political elite in the context of modern political development // Theory and practice of social development. 2013. No. 12. T. 2.

10. Ashin G.K. Recruitment of elites // Power. - 1997. - No. 4.

11. Ashin G. The ruling elite and society // Free Thought. - 1993. - No. 7

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