Of course, I would hardly write about this myself. It’s banal for me and it’s lazy to just write so many letters. But then one of my friends was given an assignment at university to write an essay on this topic. As soon as I found out, I immediately volunteered to help, troll the scoop once again- It’s always a holiday for me. This is what happened. Considering that the text was not written on my behalf, I tried as much as possible to deviate from my style, not to use harsh value judgments, and generally make it look at least somehow like an essay by an apolitical first-year girl. I was inspired, as always, by the work of Alexander Petrovich.

So, the collapse of the USSR: a pattern or malicious intent.

"The topic of the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the most controversial and most mysterious for ordinary people. If you ask a person who does not have more or less deep knowledge in the field of economics and politics, it is unlikely that he will be able to clearly answer this question. Most of the people with whom I had the opportunity to talk on this topic either openly admit that they do not know, or suggest various fantastic scenarios not supported by any factual material - the redistribution of power at the top, the machinations of Americans and dissidents, and other “conspiracy theories.”
Here we immediately come to the second version of the collapse of the Union, indicated in the topic - malicious intent. Of course, the Empire had many internal and external enemies, but I could not find any factual material to talk about the machinations of the enemies. And in various articles and books that talk about the death of the USSR, there are also no serious facts - only speculation of varying degrees of fantasticality. It is also difficult to imagine how, in reality, someone could deliberately harm a country that was already rapidly collapsing. Perhaps some actions of the then leaders of the Soviet Union pushed the country towards collapse, but they were not its cause, but only accelerated the inevitable process. In addition, an analysis of the reforms of the late USSR suggests that the people who made decisions were mistaken absolutely sincerely, and the mistakes were most likely due to the lack of economic knowledge among the members of the Politburo (most of whom came from the village with the appropriate level of education) and their excess faith in communism, the power of a planned economy and the sinfulness of market mechanisms.
At the same time, there are more than enough facts indicating the pattern of the country’s collapse. Let's start with the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics carried disintegration already in its very name. It fell apart precisely because it was SOCIALIST. After all, what is socialism essentially? This is an artificial equalization of the incomes of all elements of society. However, we know from the physics course that in order for work to be done, a potential difference is needed - energy flows from points with higher potentials to points with lower ones. When there is no potential difference, no work is done, and thermal death of the system occurs. And society lives by the same laws. In it, the difference in potential is ensured by a shortage of resources, the competitive struggle for which is the driving force of society.
Society in the Soviet Union was organized, to put it simply, according to the principle of “take away and divide,” formulated by Sharikov in “The Heart of a Dog.” The goal of the distribution machine of the USSR was an approximately equal distribution of goods among all members of society, that is, an almost zero difference in wealth, and therefore almost zero energy in society. In such a society, it makes no sense to create and produce anything beyond measure (unless, of course, the party orders it under pain of execution) - they will take it away anyway. By the way, this is precisely why civilization developed so slowly under feudalism - it was unprofitable for peasants to increase production, because the surplus was taken away by the landowner, and the feudal lords themselves had no incentive to somehow improve productivity and work in general - they were fed by serfs.
Therefore, in order for such a system doomed to thermal death to function at least somehow, it must be fed from the outside. For the USSR, such fuel was first the peasants, the brushwood of all the global projects of the last century. The exploitation of the countryside in general is one of the most striking sources of growth for totalitarian regimes. An example of this, in addition to the Union, is China and other countries of the socialist camp. A certain pattern even emerged - as soon as the demographic scales of a socialist country passed the equilibrium point, that is, as soon as the population in cities was compared with the number of residents in rural areas, the economy began to slow down and collapse. Statistics also speak about this. If you look at the graphs of socio-economic and demographic processes in the USSR (dynamics of GDP, labor productivity, production of consumer goods, agricultural products, nominal wages, retail trade turnover at current prices, etc.), then almost all of them have a sharp turning point of approximately in the mid-sixties, when the number of urban residents in the country equaled the number of rural ones. The reason is clear: the rise and very existence of industry in socialist countries was carried out at the expense of slave agriculture, from which everything was sucked to the limit, as under feudalism.
After this, the country turned completely raw. The USSR lived exclusively from the sale of oil. This money was used to purchase food and equipment. And then, when in the early 80s the price of oil fell sharply (more than 3 times in 6 years), Soviet Union began to take out loans en masse from other countries, which Russia, the legal successor of the USSR, has not been able to repay to this day. It was loans from abroad that, at the end of the empire, became the fuel that forced the energy-neutral system of socialism to work, at least. But it was impossible to take out loans indefinitely, and our own industry and Agriculture could not provide the country with everything it needed, more and more food had to be purchased every year, which ultimately led to natural famine and decay, which in that situation was the only way to save the population from starvation. President Gorbachev’s assistant Anatoly Chernyaev left the following note about that time (1991): “The harvest is dying, connections are being severed, deliveries are stopped, there is nothing in stores, factories are shutting down, transport workers are on strike. What will happen to the Union? I think that by the new year we will not have a country... There will be a shortage of bread. There are thousands of queues at those bakeries where it is... We are on the verge of a bloody catastrophe...” Now many people like to speculate about whether it was possible to save the Soviet Union. But by that time there was nothing left to save. And all the hardships of the nineties were not caused by the reforms of the beginning of the decade, but by the legacy of the late Union, which reverberated around the country for a long time. So, as we see, the collapse of the USSR is a clear pattern. No malicious intent is needed for a fundamentally non-working system to die.
The pattern of such conclusions is confirmed by the events that followed the collapse of the country. For example, in Russia, after the democrats came to power and the market mechanism was launched, it was possible to achieve a record short time eliminate hunger and shortages. By the end of 1991, the moment of the death of the USSR, there was a total shortage of everything in the country; almost all the few goods were issued using coupons. And just a year after that, the very word “deficit” practically disappeared from the vocabulary of Russian citizens.
So, let me summarize. The Soviet Union, like any socialist society, was initially doomed to collapse, and all the actions of the Soviet leadership were determined not by mythical evil intent, but by ignorance of the basics of economics and a sincere naive faith in the power of socialism and the State Planning Committee. And I cannot help but be concerned that the sad example of the USSR did not benefit everyone, and many people around the world are still trying to build societies similar to the Soviet one, based on the same false socio-economic premises".

perestroika collapse of the Soviet Union

In the early 70s, all concepts of a turn to a market economy were dealt a blow. The very word “market” has become a criterion of ideological unreliability. From the second half of the 70s. the organization began to change industrial production. Industrial research and production associations (NPOs) appeared. The practical result of such measures was only gigantism. The desired merger of science and production did not happen. But during these years there was a rapid and successful merger and interweaving of the official economy with the shadow economy - various kinds of semi-legal and illegal production and trading activities, into which entire enterprises were drawn. The income of the shadow economy amounted to many billions. By the beginning of the 80s. The ineffectiveness of attempts at limited reform of the Soviet system became obvious. The country entered a period of deep crisis.

Due to these and many other reasons, by the mid-80s. the opportunity for a gradual, painless transition to a new system of social relations in Russia was hopelessly missed. The spontaneous degeneration of the system changed the entire way of life of Soviet society: the rights of managers and enterprises were redistributed, departmentalism and social inequality increased. The nature of production relations within enterprises changed, labor discipline began to decline, apathy and indifference, theft, disrespect for honest work, and envy of those who earn more became widespread. At the same time, non-economic coercion to work remained in the country. The Soviet man, alienated from the distribution of the produced product, turned into a performer, working not out of conscience, but out of compulsion. The ideological motivation for work developed in the post-revolutionary years weakened along with the belief in the imminent triumph of communist ideals; in parallel, the flow of petrodollars decreased and the external and internal debt of the state grew.

In the early 80s. Without exception, all layers of Soviet society suffered from lack of freedom and experienced psychological discomfort. The intelligentsia wanted true democracy and individual freedom.

Most workers and employees associated the need for change with better organization and remuneration, and a more equitable distribution of social wealth. Part of the peasantry expected to become the true masters of their land and their labor.

However, ultimately, completely different forces determined the direction and nature of reform of the Soviet system. These forces were the Soviet nomenclature, burdened by communist conventions and the dependence of personal well-being on official position.

Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. the Soviet totalitarian system actually loses support in society and ceases to be legitimate. Its collapse becomes a matter of time.

The first concrete step towards political reform was the decisions of the extraordinary twelfth session of the USSR Supreme Council (eleventh convocation), held on November 29 - December 1, 1988. These decisions provided for a change in the structure of the highest bodies of power and public administration of the country, empowering the newly established Congress of People's Deputies and elected by it The USSR Supreme Council has real power functions, as well as changes in the electoral system, primarily the introduction of elections on an alternative basis.

1989 was a year of radical changes, especially in the political structure of society. The elections of people's deputies of the USSR that took place in 1989 (March - May) were preceded by an election campaign unprecedented in our country, which began at the end of 1988. The opportunity to nominate several alternative candidates (9,505 candidates were nominated for 2,250 deputy seats) finally gave Soviet citizens a truly choose one of several.

A third of people's deputies were elected from public organizations, which allowed the communists, as the most massive " public organization“to have a majority at the Congress, or, as they say in civilized countries, a lobby. This was announced as an achievement: the share of communists among people's deputies was 87% against 71.5% of the previous convocation, on the basis of which the resounding conclusion was made that in conditions of freedom of choice the authority of the party was confirmed.

In the elections held on March 26, 1989 in 1,500 territorial and national-territorial constituencies, 89.8% of those included in the voter lists participated. These elections marked a significant shift in society towards democracy, or so it seemed at the time. The work of the Congress was followed by the whole country - a decrease in labor productivity was recorded everywhere.

The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May 25 - June 9, 1989) became a very major political event. This has never happened before in the history of this country.

Of course, now one can look with irony at the battles that took place at the Congress, but then it looked like a victory for democracy. There were few practical results of the Congress, in particular, a new Supreme Council of the USSR was elected. Several general resolutions were adopted, for example the Decree on the main directions of internal and foreign policy THE USSR.

Discussions at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 12-24, 1989) were more businesslike in nature compared to the first Congress. The Second Congress adopted 36 normative acts, incl. 5 laws and 26 regulations. One of the central issues on the agenda of the Second Congress of People's Deputies was the discussion of measures to improve the economy. The issue of combating organized crime was discussed. The congress considered reports by a commission devoted to both foreign policy problems (assessment of the non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939, political assessment of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979) and domestic political issues (about the Gdlyan investigative group, about the events in Tbilisi April 9, 1989, about privileges)...

When the First Congress of People's Deputies opened, many pinned their hopes for a better life on it. But, like many of the hopes of our people, they were not destined to come true. The First Congress is now called a “game of democracy,” which, in fact, it was. By the Second Congress, people's interest had already noticeably subsided. It has already become clear to the people that life cannot be made better in one magical stroke. Reform of the electoral system was a necessary matter, but it gave the people little concrete, urgent value.

Introduction of the presidency.

In the summer-autumn of 1989, reformers in the CPSU, who did not want to get rid of the tenacious embrace of the conservatives, gave the democrats the opportunity to gain political strength and influence, allowing them to present center-right unity in the CPSU as a strategic line, and not as a temporary tactical maneuver. The situation in the country required a decisive development of a course towards a mixed economy, the creation of a rule of law state and the conclusion of a new union treaty. All this objectively worked for the Democrats.

By the winter of 1989/90, the political situation had changed significantly. Gorbachev, not without reason fearing that the spring elections in the republics would lead to the victory of radical forces (Democratic Russia, RUH and others), who would immediately - following the example of the Baltics - try to take an independent position in relation to the Supreme Council of the Union headed by him, took a step , which he and his like-minded people opposed several months ago. Using his authority in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which he headed, he managed - with the resistance of the Interregional Deputy Group - to pass a decision on the establishment of the post of President of the USSR. Having become President, Gorbachev received broad political powers and thereby greatly strengthened his power in the country.

Then the political struggle moved to the state level. A de facto plurality of power arose, in which the union and republican structures could neither act without regard to each other, nor reach an agreement among themselves. The “war of laws” between the Union and the republics was waged with varying success and by the winter of 1990/91 reached its climax due to the tragic events in the Baltic states, the struggle over the Union Treaty and the Union budget. All this happened against the background of the rapid collapse of the economy and interethnic confrontation between the republics and within them.

As a result, there has been another shift in the mentality of society. After democrats came to power in the large industrial centers of Russia and Ukraine, a lot of time passed, but the situation continued to deteriorate. Moreover, democracy was clearly degenerating into anarchy, increasing the longing for a “strong hand.” Similar sentiments took hold of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: in December, fearing unpredictable developments, it delegated additional powers to the President, and at the same time additional responsibility. Gorbachev, in January of this year, formed a new Cabinet of Ministers, in which key positions were occupied by representatives of the “enlightened” bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex.

Speaking about the USSR, it is necessary to make a significant reservation about the first president of the Soviet Union, who became Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, since this also played a role in the history of the USSR, in particular in the collapse. The election of Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was not at all predetermined by the alignment of political forces. There was, as Mikhail Sergeevich himself admitted, another candidate. But as a result of a hidden hardware game, inaccessible to mere mortals, it was his team that won.

Naturally, Gorbachev needed to consolidate his hold on power. And in order to ideologically justify his fight against the “sclerotic gerontocrats”, the old party guard, he was forced to proclaim a course towards the renewal of socialism with its leading and guiding force - the CPSU. At first, in April, when people mourned the alcohol campaign, personnel changes began. One after another, the party leaders of the regions and republics went to their well-deserved rest. The cleaning of the apparatus was led by the now half-forgotten Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, and in two years he completed his task - he seated loyal people in all key positions.

This is where all the party “perestroikas” before Gorbachev, as a rule, ended, but Ligachev’s influence in the party increased so much that the secretary general felt his competitor’s breath on the back of his head. And before the new nomenklatura had time to fall to the trough, Gorbachev announced that perestroika was continuing.

However, it was not so easy to “overthrow” Ligachev in the party arena, and Gorbachev, in the end, had to create alternative structures in the form of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People’s Deputies in order to keep the apparatchiks in constant tension. In sitting on two chairs at once, Gorbachev found an undoubted benefit for himself: the partycrats could always be intimidated by the democrats, and the democrats by the glory of the CPSU.

The struggle in the country's political arena was mainly around two points. The first is the general scenario for the development of perestroika. Will this be a gradual ingrowth of established management structures into the market economy and the introduction of state-bureaucratic capitalism “from above”? Or, on the contrary, the liquidation of these structures and the spontaneous formation of capitalism “from below”?

The second key point: since reforms require obviously unpopular measures, responsibility for their adoption and all associated costs are assigned, as a rule, to political opponents. Most often, the Center acted as the scapegoat. This was manifested, for example, during the political scandal that erupted in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, when the Union government announced a decision to introduce negotiated prices for a number of goods (in November 1990). Meanwhile, this decision was agreed upon with B.N. Yeltsin, and with I.S. Silaev. The opposite cases are also known, when

The center itself found the “goat”: the five percent sales tax introduced by decree of the President, which took just under a billion (931.5 million) rubles from the pockets of the population in January-February 1991 alone, was “blamed” on the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.

By the end of 1990, a stalemate had established itself: neither the communist reformers nor the liberals could, each individually, achieve positive changes in the economy, politics, social sphere. The main thing is that they could not stand alone against the threat of general anarchy. The first - because they have largely lost the support of the people, the second - because after their first victories they managed to lose many of their adherents.

Understanding of the need for political compromise was observed in both one and the other camp. Communist reformers (and even communist conservatives represented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR) in their documents of the second half of 1990 called for civil harmony, expressed their readiness to create not just a bloc of forces of “socialist orientation”, but to enter into an alliance with all democratic parties and movements. Their opponents, having taken a liking in the decision practical issues, which they encountered when they came to power at the local, and in some places at the republican level, also seemed to be internally ready to cooperate. The idea of ​​a compromise with part of the apparatus and the center and the creation of a strong executive power is, for example, the leitmotif of the December program article by G.Kh. Popov, entitled, not without pretension: “What to do?” The idea of ​​civil harmony through the suspension or complete dissolution of all political parties became popular by the end of 1990 and appeared on different flanks of the liberal democratic movement. A.A. also talked about this. Sobchak, and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia V.V. Zhirinovsky. The liberals apparently realized that their time was running out before it began.

The political wind rose of perestroika has changed in Once again. An acute crisis of the existing political system broke out. Having proclaimed the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”, the reformers did not even think about the fact that the Soviets, which had ceased to be the transmission belts of the CPSU, were unable to organize a normal process of political development. The CPSU press sharply criticized the “incompetent democrats” who did not know how to organize the work of those Soviets in which they held the majority. “Incompetent democrats” nodded at “sabotage” on the part of the former ruling caste - the executive apparatus, mafia structures. However, the point is deeper. The political crisis of the end of 1990 is the result not so much of incompetence or sabotage as of an outdated type of statehood.

Each political force sought to find its own way out of this crisis. The most painful reaction to it was the “state estates” - those strata whose very existence was now at stake. They increasingly energetically pushed the President and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to establish an authoritarian presidential regime under nominal Soviet power. Gorbachev, although not without hesitation, was forced to do this. He needed support, but there was nowhere to get it: the CPSU had lost its mobilization abilities, and cooperation with the liberals did not work out - the inertia of confrontation affected it.

However, even if it had happened, the authoritarian transformation of the regime could hardly have been avoided. For liberals - at least those of them who determine the weather on the political horizon - considered the strengthening of executive power and authoritarian methods of transition to a market economy as something long-term, and not as a temporary tactical measure, therefore, strictly speaking, not only democrats, but and they were liberals only in quotation marks. It was enough to read the draft Constitution of Russia to see: the totalitarian regime is supposed to be replaced not by universal democracy, but by authoritarian power. At the same time, however, unlike the communist reformers, the liberals aimed at changing the foundation of the political system, at transforming Soviet power into a parliamentary republic.

The year 1990 was marked by the unilateral decision of some union republics (primarily the Baltic ones) on self-determination and the creation of independent national states.

Attempts by the union center to influence these decisions with economic measures were ultimately unsuccessful. A wave of proclamation of the sovereignty of union republics, the election of their presidents, and the introduction of new names swept across the country. The republics sought to get rid of the dictates of the center by declaring their independence.

The real danger of an uncontrolled collapse of the USSR, threatening unpredictable consequences, forced the center and the republics to look for a path to compromises and agreements. The idea of ​​concluding a new union treaty was put forward by the Baltic popular fronts back in 1988. But until mid-1989, it did not find support either from the political leadership of the country or from people's deputies, who had not yet freed themselves from the remnants of imperial sentiments. At that time, it seemed to many that the agreement was not the most important thing. The center finally “ripened” to realize the importance of the Union Treaty only after the “parade of sovereignties” changed the Union beyond recognition, when centrifugal tendencies gained strength.

It is impossible not to mention the putsch in 91, since it accelerated the process of the collapse of the USSR, that is, after the putsch, the USSR actually ceased to exist.

The signing of the new Union Treaty, scheduled for August 20, 1991, prompted conservatives to take decisive action, since the agreement deprived the top of the CPSU of real power, posts and privileges. According to the secret agreement of M. Gorbachev with B. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, which became known to the Chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, after the signing of the agreement it was planned to replace the Prime Minister of the USSR V. Pavlov with N. Nazarbayev. The same fate awaited the Minister of Defense, Kryuchkov himself, and a number of other high-ranking officials.

However, on the night of August 19, 1991, President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was forcibly removed from power. Group high-ranking officials, which included Vice President G. Yanaev, KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, Defense Minister D. Yazov, and Prime Minister V. Pavlov, formed the self-proclaimed, unconstitutional State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP).

By resolutions of the State Emergency Committee, a regime was introduced in a number of regions of the country, mainly in the RSFSR state of emergency, rallies, demonstrations, and strikes were prohibited. The activities of democratic parties and organizations, newspapers were suspended, and control was established over the media.

But the State Emergency Committee was able to hold on to power for only three days, encountering active resistance from the Russians from the first days.

Krupa Tatyana Albertovna, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Russian History and Archival Science of the Far Eastern Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education federal university", Vladivostok [email protected] Okhonko Olga Ivanovna, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Russian History and Archival Science, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok

The collapse of the USSR in the context of random and natural factors

Abstract. The article discusses random and natural factors collapse of the USSR. The role and place of the United States in the destruction of the USSR is assessed. The impact of internal political factors on the collapse of the USSR is analyzed. A complex of internal and foreign policy consequences of the collapse of the USSR is given. Key words: domestic political, foreign policy, natural, perestroika, putsch, collapse, union treaty, accidental, USSR, factors.

The appeal to this topic is due to memorable dates: 90 years since the formation of the USSR and 21 years since its collapse. The collapse of a huge state that existed on the territory of Europe and Asia had a lot of obvious and hidden reasons, as well as a complex of negative consequences. The purpose of this article is to try to understand the domestic and foreign policy factors of the collapse of the USSR, to determine whether these factors were natural or random. In theoretical terms, the problem remains not fully studied. The lack of archival materials and the presence of closed sources causes ambiguity and understatement; discrepancies in assessments of this catastrophe raise many questions. When studying this problem, the points of view of not only Russian historians and politicians were analyzed, but also the positions of foreign leaders who had a direct influence on the events taking place. In the content of this article, a book called “WorldTransformed” is analyzed, its authors are George W. Bush (senior) and his security adviser B .Scowcroft.The book provides answers to important questions of history and modern times - how the conditions were created for the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Warfare, which led to serious consequences in the balance of power in the world. From a number of factors that influenced the collapse of the USSR, the role of the United States cannot be excluded, which understood the real threat contained in the military potential Soviet Union. This is confirmed by the facts reflected in the above-mentioned book, written in 1998. It assesses the role and place of George W. Bush in the history of the United States and in world history. It is emphasized that the George W. Bush administration has achieved the fulfillment of the national goal that many Americans strived for - the liberation of Eastern Europe and the destruction of the mortal threat to the United States. The USSR, having a huge stockpile of nuclear missile weapons, theoretically posed a threat to the military-political structures of the United States. The perestroika started in the Soviet Union and the new foreign policy course of M. Gobachev suited the United States. M. Gorbachev's reforms made it possible to strengthen the position of the United States in Eastern Europe. G. Bush and B. Scowcroft note that, having begun to implement perestroika, “Gorbachev set in motion forces whose consequences were unpredictable - they were unknown even to himself.” Largely unexpected for the United States were the numerous concessions made by M. Gorbachev in relations with the countries of the former “socialist camp” that were members of the Warsaw Department. In this book, George Bush writes that “Gorbachev does not understand the actual situation in Eastern Europe. It appears he was trying to cultivate “little Gorbachevs” who would win public support.” Obviously, he hoped for a multiplier effect from perestroika, which would be extended to all countries of Eastern Europe. However, the process of the collapse of the Department of Internal Affairs was irreversible, American plans to blow up the Department of Internal Affairs from the inside were implemented, thereby, as they believe in the United States, the split in Europe was put to an end. In such a context, the conclusion suggests itself about the formation of random factors, which played a certain role in the collapse of the USSR, they did not prevent the process of collapse, did not delay, but, on the contrary, accelerated it. Analyzing their impression of the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the authors of the book exclaim: “Even in my dreams I could not have dreamed that during my life they will see this: Europe is united and free.” Losing control of Eastern Europe had enormous negative consequences for the Soviet Union. In particular, the GDR was a “prize” for the USSR after the end of World War II, a reliable military ally and an important economic partner. The loss of the GDR meant the end of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's foreign policy position caused a negative reaction among Soviet politicians, military officers, diplomats and in broad circles of the USSR public. Gorbachev gave up one position after another. He made concessions to American pressure on many foreign policy issues, and this was disastrous for the USSR. For many years, throughout the Cold War, plans were developed in the United States to destroy the Soviet Union. For this purpose, huge amounts of money were spent, nuclear arsenals were created, radio stations were financed in third countries, etc. When Perestroika and glasnost began, the USSR became more open to the world. In conditions of worsening economic difficulties and changes, which made it possible to talk about everything out loud, it would be strange if the United States suddenly abruptly abandoned the idea of ​​​​destroying the USSR and did not take advantage of the opportunities that opened up before them. It turns out that the United States had a better handle on the situation in the USSR than in the Union itself. Unfortunately, Gorbachev largely did not understand the seriousness of the danger that threatened the Soviet Union. By 1991, an internal political crisis was rapidly developing in Moscow. The American side was informed about the impending putsch by the State Emergency Committee. The US Ambassador to the USSR J. Matlock was notified of the upcoming putsch by the mayor of Moscow G. Kh. Popov. US politicians in their memoirs about the collapse of the USSR note that the American side immediately informed M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin about the impending putsch. In domestic literature, the putsch is still presented as an emergency situation and this is stated in history textbooks. In this context, it becomes clear why Gorbachev stated that he would never tell the whole truth about the August events.

When the State Emergency Committee arose on August 19, 1991, George W. Bush was the first of the leaders of Western states to support Yeltsin. As Gorbachev's real power diminished, the US President's attitude towards the two rival leaders gradually changed towards Yeltsin. The Americans had good opportunity observe from the outside the internal political struggle in the USSR, especially since B. Yeltsin kept G. Bush informed of all the details related to the State Emergency Committee. On August 21, B. Yeltsin had a conversation with G. Bush, in which he congratulated the US President on the fact that in our country “Democracy has won greatest victory“Thank you very much for providing us with tremendous assistance.” This act of B. Yeltsin can be regarded as a betrayal of the Soviet Union. Even George Bush refused to comment on what was done. B. Yeltsin expected congratulations, and G. Bush simply replied that he understood him and felt “a little awkward.” B. Yeltsin was confident that the country was now freed from “the global center that commanded us for more than seventy years.” He launched a frontal attack on the USSR and openly “took away the Union brick by brick in order to then transfer most of the rights of the Union to Russia.” Much of what has been analyzed suggests that given the crisis situation in the USSR on the eve of its collapse (economic crisis, political crisis, party crisis, etc.), this process was initiated artificially both from within and from without. The impact of the information factor on the collapse of the USSR cannot be ruled out. Glasnost as structural element perestroika played its part decisive role , it consisted in weakening censorship and removing the numerous information barriers that existed in Soviet society. The people were in a state of shock and bewilderment for a long period; it was difficult to understand “who is who.” All information means were put into use, because glasnost, democratization swept the USSR, everyone reveled in it, not understanding what was really happening. Discussions were launched about the horrors of the Soviet system; they were aimed primarily at the ideological destruction of the foundations of Soviet society, the press was inundated with negative information, where the image of a terrible homeland and wonderful abroad clearly emerged. Performances on the street and publications in the press, the meaning of many works of culture had a certain informational component: criticism of Soviet political and ideological system and the Soviet Union in general. Such a similar direction of action of various factors could only be explained by leadership from a single center. In other words, an information attack was carried out on our country, and it produced devastating results. Signs of ideological collapse began to appear throughout the country. The leadership of the USSR did not take effective measures to stop this destructive process; it was split. Many researchers characterize the actions of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin as a policy of “purposeful inaction.” On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, tension grew in the union republics. The positions of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin on the issue of the fate of the republics were completely different. M. Gorbachev was a supporter of a gradual transition to their independence. B. Yeltsin spoke about the right of the union republics to secede from the USSR, as a result of which we can conclude that he “hit the backbone of the Soviet state, shaking its political structure to the core.” When the union republics declared sovereignty in 1991, the question was raised about the continued existence of the Soviet Union and its transformation into a democratic federal state. In the same year, a resolution was adopted “On the general concept of the union treaty and the procedure for its conclusion.” But at the beginning of the preparation of the new union treaty, the extreme aggravation of relations between the leadership of the USSR and Russia played a role. In April-May 1991, negotiations between M. Gorbachev and the leaders of nine union republics on the issue of a new union treaty took place in Novo-Ogarevo (the residence of the President of the USSR near Moscow). Doctor of Historical Sciences Z.A. Stankevich emphasized that by the spring of 1990, “the tendency towards “chaotic decentralization of economic, political and socio-cultural life in the USSR” had intensified.” It became obvious that a radical renewal of the Union was necessary on the basis of a new union treaty. At the fifth (last) Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, it was proposed to prepare an agreement on the Union of Sovereign States, in which each of the republics “would independently determine the form of its participation in the Union.” On November 6, 1991, the President of the USSR sent to the State Council a draft Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States (USS), a union democratic state exercising state power. Until December 1991, the agonizing process of saving the Union in some form continued, but the situation became more and more uncontrollable every day.

Ukraine pointedly distanced itself from even participating in the preliminary discussion of the union treaty. In mid-November in NovoOgarevo, only 7 participants remained at the negotiating table: Russia, Belarus and five Central Asian republics. On December 1, in a referendum in Ukraine, 90.3% of participants voted for its independence. The United States immediately declared its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it, and Boris Yeltsin was the first to recognize the independence of Ukraine. Thus, the Union Treaty, before it was born, died. Events were coming to a close. The USSR locomotive approached the crash site in the little-known Belarusian village of Vaskuli, in the wilds of Belovezhskaya Pushcha, where back in the days of N. Khrushchev a hunting lodge was built for the rest of former party officials: here it was easier to keep their plans secret. The main characters B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk, S. Shushkevich were in fear. They understood that their actions were not entirely legal and even to some extent criminal. On December 25, 1991, M. Gorbachev made a statement on television: “Due to the current situation with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I am ceasing my activities as President of the USSR.” At 19:38 on December 25, 1991, the red flag of the USSR was replaced over the Kremlin tricolor Russian. Of course, one can assume that the Soviet Union has outlived its usefulness, and Gorbachev has become a brake on the path of reform, but in this situation it would be legal at the negotiating table for all leaders of the republics to officially declare the abolition of the treaty on the creation of the USSR of December 30, 1922. The Belovezh Treaty was illegal and criminal, because three people did not have the legal authority to decide the fate of the entire state.

To ratify the Bialowieza Agreement, it was necessary to convene a supreme body state power-Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, since the agreement affected government system republic and entailed changes to the constitution. In April 1992, the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies three times refused to ratify the agreement and exclude references to the constitution and laws of the USSR from the text of the Constitution of the RSFSR, which would subsequently become one of the reasons for the confrontation between the Congress of People's Deputies and President Yeltsin, which would subsequently lead to the tragic events of October 1993. Thus, Despite the fact that the de facto USSR ceased to exist, the Constitution of the USSR of 1977 de jure continued to operate on the territory of Russia until December 25, 1993, when the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted by popular vote, came into force, which did not contain any mention of the Constitution and laws of the USSR. After 21 year after the collapse of the USSR, an interview with ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Pyotr Kravchenko appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda under the heading “It is not true that the document on the CIS was waved without looking by the half-drunk B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk and S. Shushkevich.” He claims that the document is based on the Russian-Ukrainian and Belarusian-Russian agreements on friendship and cooperation of 1990, i.e. “from bilateral documents we made a multilateral one, which allowed us to create the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Disputes over assessing the significance of the Belovezhskaya Agreement continue to this day. The Belovezhskaya Agreement became one of the episodes of the accusation against Boris Yeltsin. A special commission of the State Duma stated that B. Yeltsin, having signed the Belovezhskaya Agreement, committed a gross violation of Article 7476 of the USSR Constitution and committed these actions contrary to the will of the peoples of the RSFSR about the need to preserve the USSR, expressed during the popular vote (referendum) held on March 17, 1991. The commission also accused Boris Yeltsin of treason by preparing and organizing a conspiracy to unconstitutionally seize union power, abolish the then existing union institutions of power, and illegally change the constitutional status of the RSFSR. In search of an answer to the question: “was the collapse of the USSR the result of objective processes or the result of the destructive actions of specific historical individuals and forces?”, one should proceed only from an analysis of specific facts and circumstances of that time. And the most important argument in this dispute should be the position of the peoples of the USSR; it is the people who are the bearers of sovereignty, the will of the people is the highest power in the country. But this did not play a decisive role, although it should be taken into account that the referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held late. And the main thing, in our opinion, was that the will of the people did not correspond to the personal interests of the group of then politicians led by Boris Yeltsin. They were not stopped even by the fact that these separatist actions contradicted the Constitution and were not approved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, the highest body of state power. The RSFSR did not have legal force insofar as it related to the termination of the existence of the USSR. After the end of the Great Patriotic War The USSR did not know great shocks, but in the 1990s of the twentieth century it experienced events that, in their consequences for the population, can be compared with a real war. This is what current President Vladimir Putin thinks. Vast territories were lost, the population decreased, industry fell into decay, and devastation reigned for many years. Summing up, it should be noted that in the problems of the collapse of the USSR, the patterns or accidents of this fact, it is too early to draw any deep conclusions. Many questions remain unclear to this day. We need archival materials, documents of that period and a truthful, objective interpretation of them. Our convictions do not exclude serious economic, political, ideological and many other factors that undermined the power of a great power. But at the same time, we believe that the collapse of the USSR is a consequence of gross miscalculations and mistakes of politicians, the action of destructive centrifugal forces that made Belovezhskaya Pushcha a symbol of irresponsibility and voluntarism in politics. Particular responsibility for this deed falls on two leaders - the President of the USSR - M. Gorbachev and the President Russian Federation - B. Yeltsin, who in 1996 stated that he regretted signing the Belovezhskaya Agreement. M. Gorbachev also admitted his mistakes, but no one has yet told the whole truth about what he did. Historical analysis of previous eras shows that our country is for a period of more than a thousand years of history faced the threat of collapse during the period of feudal fragmentation in the 13th century, and during the Time of Troubles in the 17th century, and during the years of great social upheaval in 1917-1922. External and internal enemies tried to destroy the state through non-recognition, blockade, famine, and destructive wars. They did not succeed, since there were always forces within the state that opposed this threat. The greatness of Russia at all times rested on spiritual potential nation.

V. Putin called the collapse of the USSR the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. And he emphasized that in order to survive in an era of upheaval, it is precisely “spiritual bonds” and the unity of the people that are needed. In general, one can note the domestic and foreign policy consequences of the collapse of the USSR. Foreign policy ones include: the loss of control over the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Department, the unification of Germany, the formation of a number of independent states in place of the former USSR. Among the internal political factors, three groups can be distinguished: territorial, demographic, economic, internal political and social. Territorial factors include a decrease in the territory of the Russian Federation compared to the territory of the USSR by 24% (from 22.4 to 17 million km²), while the territory of Russia has remained virtually unchanged compared to the territory of the RSFSR. Demographic factors include a decrease in population by 49% (from 290 to 148 million people). Streams of refugees and internally displaced persons were formed, not only of the Russian-speaking population of the republics of the former USSR, but also of many other ethnic groups of the huge disintegrated country, the regions of their exit: central Asia, Transcaucasia, Northern Caucasus. Economic factors include: the collapse of the ruble zone, the decline in production, the depreciation of the ruble, the destruction of economic relationships between enterprises. Political factors include: the cessation of the existence of unified Armed Forces USSR, there was a massive reduction in the military. Termination of legal powers of the USSR and absence legislative framework in the newly created Russian Federation led to a “war of laws,” which resulted in the tragic events of October 1993. Significant changes occurred in the social structure of Soviet society. New social strata appeared, including “poor working people”, homeless people, street children and many others who were unable to adapt and adapt to other living conditions within the new state. There was a deep stratification of society, at one pole - oligarchs, officials, high-ranking entrepreneurs; on the other are low-income and low-income citizens of Russia. Was the collapse of the USSR a historical inevitability, a coincidence or a betrayal of leading Soviet politicians led by M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin? Questions that are usually classified as debatable problems of history. In any case, it is too early to put an end to this issue, especially considering the dire consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

1.Bush G., Scowcroft B.A. World Transformed. NewYork–Toronto, 1998.590 p. Quote by: Ivanov R.F. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. American version // Historiography and source studies. 2000. No. 5. P. 167174.2. Ivanov R.F. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. American version // Historiography and source studies. 2000. No. 5. P. 167174. 3. Matlock J. Death of an Empire: the American Ambassador’s view of the split of the Soviet Union. M.: Rudomino, 2003. 321 p. 4. Fortunatov V.V. National history for humanitarian universities. M., 2008.345 p. 5. Reports of the US Ambassador to Moscow J. Matlock // New and recent history. 1996. No. 1. P. 5668.6. Stankevich Z.A. Historical and legal aspects of the collapse of the USSR: Abstract of a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Legal Sciences. M., 2002.52 p. 7. Alekseev V.V., Nefedov S.A. The death of the Soviet Union in the context of the history of socialism // Social sciences and modernity. 2002. No. 6. P. 6687.8. Zlatopolsky D.L. The destruction of the USSR: reflection on the problem. M., 1992.291 p. 9. Shakhnovich T. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Pyotr Kravchenko: “It is not true that the document on the CIS was waved without looking by the half-drunk Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich...” // Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 8, 2012 No. 185.С.8.10. Isakov V.B. Dismemberment: who and how destroyed the Soviet Union: a chronicle. Documents. M., 1998.344 p. 11. Kostikov V. Confused generation // Arguments and facts. No. 49.2012. P. 6.12. Yasin E.G. Who ruined our wonderful Union? // Knowledge is Power. 2001. No. 4. P. 7687.

Krupa Tatiana, PhD in sociology, assistant professor of Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok [email protected] Okhonko Olga, PhD in history, assistant professor of Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok Disintegration of USSR in context casual and natural factors.Abstract. In the article are considered casual and natural factors of the disintegration of the USSR. The role and place USA are Valued in destruction USSR. The influence of domestic political factors is analyzed on the decay of the USSR. Happens to the complex inwardly and outward politicalconsequence wreckages USSR.Keywords: inside political,outward political, natural, realignment, putsch, disintegration, union agreement, casual, USSR, factors.

REX news agency publishes an article in two parts by historian Boris Rozhin (Crimea, Sevastopol) as part of the story “20 years without the USSR.”

7. The USSR collapsedand communists. Lenin and Stalin built who knows what, and then their heirsthey destroyed it themselves.

There is a classic attempt here to shift responsibility from the killer to the victim.
The statement itself postulates that the USSR was destroyed due to malicious intent. And the communists are to blame for this evil intent. They say that the entire heritage of our ancestors was wasted. In fact, everything is very transparent here. The Soviet elite of the mid-80s can be divided into those who wanted the collapse of the USSR and those who advocated its preservation. Those who wanted and worked for the collapse of the USSR were anti-communists, because together with the USSR they sought to destroy communism “in a single country.” In this they were helped by both anti-communist public groups and the generally anti-communist West. It was within the framework of their will and actions that the murder was carried out. That’s why the USSR was destroyed by anti-communists (of course, not without the help of other factors).

What is the fault of the “communists”, read those who wanted to preserve the country? After all, they had solid resources and public support expressed in the 1991 referendum. First of all, “in criminal negligence leading to the death of a person.” Having failed to provide adequate resistance to the anti-communists who were destroying the country, the elite groups that advocated the preservation of the USSR showed criminal inaction. This is their main historical fault. And the same share of responsibility lies with the pro-Soviet silent majority, which was criminally inactive at the moment when the anti-communists were killing the country. Moreover, what should be indicated separately, not only the communists, who constituted only a significant, but still percentage of the entire population of the country, were inactive. Those who did not have a party card were also inactive, but also silently watched as the USSR was killed. Therefore, the responsibility of communists and non-communists who were silent when the country was being killed is equal. Those people who dared to speak out during the period of collapse were rare - some were members of the party, others were not. But neither one nor the other can provide a complete alibi for their group - the silent majority of party and non-party members who voted for the preservation of the USSR showed equally criminal inaction. Therefore, for the most part, this pro-Soviet party and non-party majority, representatives who were already more than 18 years old during the Perestroika period, bears one degree or another of responsibility for not resisting the death of the country.

The responsibility of the killer and the one who did not stop him (although he could) are different, but, nevertheless, it exists. Therefore, of course, we must understand that without this “non-resistance” it would have been much more difficult for anti-communists to destroy the country. There are no calls to repentance here. Understanding this point is necessary so that the next time at a critical moment for the country, the silent majority does not just as passively watch the killer do his job.

8. The USSR collapsed because Stalin did not leave worthy heirs

This moment is especially funny, if only because Stalin did not leave any heirs at all, if only due to the circumstances of his death. Nevertheless, this stamp is often found, and what is especially interesting, among anti-communists. The logic here is simple - they say, okay, let the “bloody tyrant” be “ effective manager, but then he died, and there was no one to replace him. This is very revealing historical ignorance, since this thesis postulates the idea that statesmen of Stalin's caliber appear at the behest of human will. Stalin worked not with those whom he could imagine in his dreams, but with those who were at his disposal. When such “guilt” is attributed to Stalin, stretching into decades into the future, one can only ask who Stalin should have made a “worthy heir.” Which store sells it? statesmen of such a caliber that in the entire history of Russia there are, at best, 5-6 people? Who is the “magic correct successor” whom Stalin did not appoint? Beria? Well, so after his death he actually ruled the country, although he was killed. Is Stalin to blame for the murder of Beria? Or maybe Beria is to blame for allowing himself to be killed?
I wish I could find out the name of this very “worthy heir.” After all, from the position of post-knowledge, we know very well that there was no figure equal to Stalin after his death - we would like to hear alternative personalities. But there are none. Someone will say - yeah, that’s where you got caught - around Stalin there were only mediocrities and after his death there were also only mediocrities and will even quote something about “a lion leading the rams.”

In fact, the circle of Stalin's people's commissars was a group of quite talented people. Talented in their narrow fields of activity. But to manually control such a complex structure as the USSR, a universal statist like Stalin was required, who was able to adequately manage the country in the multidimensional space of tasks and functions facing him. Everyone who came after Stalin did it worse. And not even because they were untalented - they simply did not possess all the qualities that Stalin had, and therefore ruled the country worse than Stalin in some respects. Therefore, claims to Stalin - “Damned one, where is the good heir?” are essentially a claim – “Bloody Stalin, why didn’t you find another bloody Stalin for us?” And you can’t undermine it - Stalin after Stalin, according to the logic of things, would definitely be no worse. In this regard, claims against the “successor of Stalin” are reminiscent of the current search in modern Russia for a “new Stalin.” It’s true that it is not clear, if in the USSR for 38 years after Stalin’s death they did not find a figure equal to him, then why should we expect such a figure literally right now? Is Stalin also to blame? To say that Stalin is responsible for what happened in the country after his death is ridiculous. Stalin was in demand until his death as a leader. After his death - from those who ruled the country after him. From Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Brezhnev and others. But as we know, Stalin is the most convenient historical character for blaming anything on him - from “unprepared heirs” to forest fires in 2010.

9. In 1991, a natural revenge of the “white” losers in the Civil War took place.”.

Despite its obvious ahistorical nature, this thesis can often be found in discussions. With him, in principle, everything is very transparent - the opponents of the Bolsheviks, known as “whites,” were defeated in the Civil War and were either destroyed or expelled from the country. By the time the USSR collapsed, all that remained of them were pitiful scraps of mossy old men. What was the revenge? Were the losers able to return to their homeland? In fact, no—the vast majority died abroad. Were those who returned able to restore their pre-revolutionary privileges? No. Have they returned to power? No. Did you get the property back? No. What's the revenge, brothers? The fact that, sitting abroad, they gloated over the destruction of their homeland? Eco has fallen asleep in his old age.

In reality, who is in power now? They come from the CPSU, the KGB, the Komsomol, that is, products of the very system that drove the “whites” out of the country. Therefore, there is no revenge of the “whites” in nature. Those “whites” lost a long time ago, and those “reds” won a long time ago, and that Civil War ended long ago, no matter how the current “white sectarians” raged about its results.

In 1991, it was not the “whites” of the Revolution who won. The degenerated anti-communist partyocracy and the West won, and together they plundered the destroyed country. The role of the “whites” is, at most, wedding generals, at the festival of the total cutting of their former homeland. Therefore, the current “white revanchists” are very funny in their naive belief in the “great white revenge”, since during the entire period of the struggle of the West with the USSR, they obediently trudged along in the train of the army, which set as its goal the destruction of their homeland. As a result, the country was destroyed (without any serious participation of the “whites”), but it was not the “whites” who came to power. This is the “Great White Revenge”. Of course, there will be cries about the coat of arms and other pre-revolutionary symbols as visual evidence of “victory,” but we can just as well say that the Soviet anthem testifies to the “revenge of the Reds.”

10. The reasons are not important, the USSR was destroyed and that’s good.

This thesis is purely ideological in nature, but at the same time it is one of the most frequently encountered. The anti-communist and anti-Soviet genesis of this thesis is obvious. From the point of view of such people, the USSR was an absolute all-encompassing evil and therefore had to be destroyed. And it was destroyed, how and why it was done is not important. The main message is that the USSR has been destroyed, receive it and sign it. Of course, there is no analysis or reflection here, not even close - a purely ideological work on the cremation of the body. Why is such work being carried out and further attempts are being made to convince the population that the destruction of their country is good?

First of all, because the silent pro-Soviet majority has not gone away. It turned out to be a stranger at the post-Soviet “celebration of life.” Of course, there is a certain pattern in this - you have to pay for your silence during the murder of your own Motherland - in blood, shame, humiliation. This point is partially realized. But at the same time, sympathy for Soviet system have not gone away, and for the current state of affairs, these sympathies pose a certain threat, since this very silent pro-Soviet majority is, in fact, a nutritional base for groups whose goal is to revive the country/empire/union based on the Soviet experience. Shame is shame, but you can’t always feel sorry for yourself and engage in self-flagellation? IN last years, certain progress is being made towards the self-organization of this very silent majority, therefore, from the point of view of those who rejoice at the death of the USSR, further work is required to demoralize and atomize the pro-Soviet majority, which is still silent, but at a certain moment may, unlike 1991, speak out. In this regard, it is worth stating that the discussion on the topic of whether it is good or bad that the USSR collapsed is not only and not so much a discussion about the past and history. This is, first of all, a discussion about the present and the future, about the choice of development path.

From the point of view of modern Westernizers, the Soviet experience and soviet history must be sealed in the past and must bear the stamp of “criminal.” Therefore, when you see that the discussion is moving into this plane, you must understand that active ideological work is underway aimed at preventing the current ideological course from being changed.

The current wave of sympathy for the USSR, expressed in the idealization of Brezhnev’s times or the glorification of Stalin, poses a danger to the pro-Western course, first of all, because from the past, which should be sealed, ideals incompatible with our ideological reality penetrate into our everyday life. A conflict arises between current ideals and the seemingly destroyed Soviet ones, the bearers of which are beginning to become the youth, which in the future creates a certain threat. And, of course, some would like young people to really believe that the reasons for the collapse of the USSR are not important. The dominant point of view should be the emotionally charged assessment “USSR = evil.” Therefore, a meaningful discussion with such characters is not possible in principle, since people simply do their job. Such characters can be clearly seen, say, in the program “Historical Process”, where the position of “The USSR is absolute evil” is very clearly revealed in the speeches of Svanidze and company.

But what is especially pleasing is that every year the percentage of young people who seek to understand the reasons for the death of the USSR is growing. They grew up after the death of the country and their interest is their own reflection, young people who were not involved either directly or indirectly in the death of the country.

Their interest can no longer be attributed to the stupid Soviet agitprop; all their adult lives they listened to exactly the opposite - about the criminal past, the bloody Stalin, repressions, the Gulag and the ineffective economy, stupid soviet people, etc., and they were especially drummed into it that “the USSR is evil.” But as practice shows, this thesis is less and less satisfying to young people, who are looking in the past, albeit often idealized, for answers and ways on which to build the future. After all, who else but the youth thinks about how and where the country is moving - they have to live in it. Not finding answers in the bleak present, they look for them in the recent past.

And while interest in society, and primarily among young people, in the country’s development paths will continue, huge sympathy for the Soviet experience is objectively inevitable, since in the foreseeable past the USSR is the closest and most understandable example of how to make the country better, but with taking into account the sad experience of the collapse of the country, so as not to repeat the mistakes made in Soviet times. Therefore, attempts to divert public discourse from analyzing the complex of reasons that led to the death of the USSR will inevitably fail. The best way to describe this process is to quote Lincoln: “ You can deceive some of the peoplefor a while, and all the people for a while, but you cannot deceive all the people all the time.it's time».

The times when it was possible to deceive the entire people all the time are gradually ending. And therefore, a comprehensive study of the causes of the death of the USSR is extremely important. First of all, for our future.

Conclusion

In general, we can talk about this topic for a long time, which once again shows the complexity of such a historical problem as the “collapse of the USSR.” I don't pretend to cover all aspects - that would require a slightly different investment of time and effort. 10 theses are what, 20 years later, seem important to me in the public discourse about the causes of the death of the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that 20 years have passed since the death of the country, complete reflection has not occurred in society. All sorts of mythologies, both Soviet and anti-Soviet, are swarming in our heads; a comprehensive, detailed analysis of the causes of the death of the USSR has not yet been made, which means that society still lacks a clear understanding of how and why the Soviet Union died. This misunderstanding poses a certain threat, since the technologies that were used to destroy it are quite applicable to modern Russia. Moreover, they are already being used against her. Therefore, the main point in the permanent discussions around the causes of the death of the USSR is to seek an understanding of how to prevent a repetition of the destruction of our state, otherwise, after a certain number of years, our descendants will argue why it collapsed Russian Federation and who is to blame for this.

The collapse of the Soviet Union is in any case not an accident.
I will speak in simple everyday language, using an understandable image. Let's say there is some kind of family, husband and wife. They may have one child, two, three, five, ten, etc. If such a couple in the role of husband and wife gets divorced, is it an accident or not? When a family falls apart, there is always a reason.
The USSR is a big family.
In a family conflict, everyone can have their own truth. Either the husband has a mistress, or the wife has a lover, or they are generally tired of each other, or something else. If you lock two people in one room, they will still get tired of each other, get annoyed with each other and end up quarreling.
Between a man and a woman there is a sexual attraction called love. Children do not come from love, but from sexual desire. A similar process was observed in the Soviet Union. In the USSR, the friendship of peoples and “everyone is equal” was preached and, except for the Russians, no one else believed in this. All republics understood that the Russians were number one, and everyone else was secondary.
This can be proven simply - the USSR anthem was sung in Russian, not Ukrainian, not Armenian, not Kazakh or any other. All spoke Russian. And the words in the anthem "... united forever Great Rus'..." prove that the Russians knew that they were number one, that's why the anthem is sung like that - forever.
However, this "forever" fell apart. What's wrong?
Russia is a husband in its psychology. And a man, as is customary among us, must have one wife, and the most correct wife was Ukraine: in terms of population, territory, religion and history. And everyone else is like mistresses. For example, Belarus was a favorite mistress. But, let’s say, Kyrgyzstan, a not-so-favorite mistress. And mistresses are a costly and troublesome business, because funds are required to support and educate them.
Russian greatness is a demonstration of power to the whole world through junior countries: Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc. - was attractive to others: to Bulgaria, Vietnam... and similar lagging countries in Africa.
When money becomes tight in a family, neither the mistress nor the wife will love such a husband. (There are exceptions, of course.)
On December 8, 1991, in Viskuli (Belovezhskaya Pushcha, Belarus) “highest officials and heads of government of the three union republics: Boris Yeltsin and Gennady Burbulis (RSFSR), Stanislav Shushkevich and Vyacheslav Kebich (BSSR), Leonid Kravchuk and Vitold Fokin (Ukraine). The preamble of the document stated that "The USSR as a subject international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist".(Wikipedia) That is. they documented the collapse of the USSR. And Yeltsin “from a comfortable bear’s den, from a dark forest, a dense Pushcha,” called America and asked how they would look at this issue, what they would say. So he calls America because these “secretaries” of Belarus and Ukraine told him to. Shameless Yeltsin called to America: Here my mistress is interested in who will put on their shoes and dress them in such a difficult period of time. And other secretaries, including Nazarbayev N.A. I didn’t have the courage to get together and say to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: “if you don’t like it, goodbye.” Then a union of twelve or eight states would constitute a real geopolitical economic force. There were options for creating such a union.
* * *
Now let's move on to another “politically understandable” language.
What good can be said about the Union before its collapse? The Soviet Union lost more than two tens of millions killed, but, nevertheless, won the Second World War. The war was won thanks to the support all country because a little less than half were people from the union republics. Let’s say 15 million were Russians, and the remaining 10 were Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz...
The USSR created everyone with the same incredible efforts atomic bomb and military industry. Everyone served in the army, which means that about 30-40 percent were non-Russians. All the Union Republics were located around Russia, and the geopolitical component, like the military component, was a ring around Russia. That is, if some army tried to capture Russia... - and the capture of Russia is actually the capture of the entire Soviet Union - for example, Hitler sought to take Moscow, and not Tashkent, Ashgabat, Alma-Ata, etc. And Russia’s investments in these countries, as geopolitical military protection, are justified, since they would take the first blow from the outside. In addition, around all these republics there was another “ring” - for example, Eastern Europe.
Those. The USSR, based on the language, from the anthem, was a purely Russian empire, a friendly formation to all nations. Each formation, together with the Russian voice, felt strong and worthy. And Russia, as the main component of the USSR, generously shared its dignity and respect.
And the first part about mistresses-wives and the dark Pushcha is the story that turned out in the end. The story we see today. Where everyone is a bad mistress or a bad wife, but I was a good Russian husband. Everyone has their own truth.
Unfortunately, in all the republics that were connected with Russia with life and blood, today they also do not have very happy memories. Every year people in these countries speak Russian worse and worse. Thus, Russia loses its conscious, intellectual and emotional connection with these countries. The worse they know the Russian language, the more they will move away from Russia and, like weaker countries, will be drawn into the orbits of stronger and more developed countries. Someone will begin to revolve around Europe, someone around China, someone around America, someone around Iran, someone around Turkey. And few people will remain with the Russians and share their fate with the Russians - a multinational, multi-confessional people.
For example, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, especially Azerbaijan, are almost Turkic-speaking countries. They are already drawn into Turkey's orbit. Tajikistan - they speak the language of Iran. Ukraine - Russia left Crimea to them, left Sevastopol, there are a huge number of people there who speak Russian, but, nevertheless, the Poles are closer to them today. The Poles, who, neither Sevastopol nor Crimea, left them nothing at all. Moldova, gradually forgetting the Russian language, with Romania, which actually speaks the same language, is entering into close relations with it. That is, both Ukraine and Moldova are looking for ways to Europe.
All this listing is necessary to understand that if there is discord in the family, you can get so carried away in looking for someone to blame that you stop understanding anything. Understand what is happening. Romania did not collapse the USSR, Türkiye, Iran did not collapse the USSR. The USSR was destroyed by stupid, hopelessly stupid management. The USSR was not destroyed by Gorbachev, the USSR was destroyed by Yeltsin. He wanted to be the main and important one so much that we can’t come to our senses after him. Unfortunately, during Gorbachev’s time, his perestroika did not switch to Chinese rails. If this were so, then the anthem “...great Rus' has united us forever...” we would also sing in Russian.
Bottom line
The management elite were senile “old men” who had lost their minds. The USSR was destroyed by the party-oligarchic corrupt communist elite. And today, 20 years after the collapse, in our country, in Russia, the main enemy has come out, shown itself and identified itself. The word appeared - corruption. It originated in the USSR, Gorbachev could not heal it in the Chinese way. Under Yeltsin, corruption became the norm in political, economic and everyday life.
And today the question is: either corruption or Russia.

Socio-political, spiritual and economic problems in modern Russia
(Continuing the essay on the topic: “The collapse of the USSR: an accident or...?”)

My history teacher asked me the topic of the essay. Answering this question, I did not use documents, did not play with numbers, and did not examine in detail the political figures of that time. I used the thoughts, experience and worldly wisdom of those people whose active age at that time was from 30 to 40 years. They lived in modern Russia for about 20 years. Today they are over 50.
They have something to compare. After listening carefully about that period, I wrote an essay based on their experiences and worldly wisdom that I, my friends and adults of all ages can understand. But, nevertheless, a historian I respect described the essay “The Collapse of the USSR: An Accident or...?” as “sluggish.”
I will try to supplement the previous essay in a nutshell so that it is not sluggish, and to fill this essay with new topic about the socio-political, spiritual and economic problems of modern Russia. I decided to talk to the same people with whom I spoke about the non-accidental collapse of the Soviet Union.
Thus, I do not base my texts on history textbooks, because they describe the actions of politicians: this one did this, and this one did that. But their actions don't describe real life people, and the country has two stories. In one history of the country there are politicians, and in another history of the country there is a large part of the population, which, as it were, has nothing to do with history. As if it were some kind of inert, weak-willed mass that politicians crush like clay. And this very mass chooses politicians, and this very mass expects improvement from politicians own life. And the adults with whom I spoke and communicated saw the USSR live and, years later, understood what was happening in the country. In a country where information was hidden, in a country where there was no freedom of speech, in a country where information deception was the norm. Adults smart people politicians born in the USSR deceived, but they believed them. Informationally, they were so zombified that they believed that they were being led to some wonderful communist future, where there would be equality for everyone, brotherhood, friendship of peoples, and where there would be one freedom for all. And they believed it, because the symptoms of everything that was said were clearly visible.

Let me remind you how the previous essay ends:
"Bottom line.
The management elite were senile pensioners who had lost their minds. The USSR was destroyed by the party-oligarchic corrupt communist elite. And today, 20 years after the collapse, in our country, in Russia, the main enemy has come out, shown itself and identified itself. The word appeared - corruption. It originated in the USSR; Gorbachev could not heal it in the Chinese way (corruption is ineradicable and incurable, it can only be treated).
And today the question is: either corruption or Russia."

Under Yeltsin, corruption became the norm in political, economic and everyday life. Thus, under Yeltsin, deception swept the entire country, and such abnormality became the norm of life. In such conditions...what kind of spirituality, politics and economics can we talk about?
I wrote that modern Russia is the legacy of the Soviet Union. These are those who ruled before Gorbachev for 21 years: L.I. Brezhnev (1966 -1982), Yu.V. Andropov (1982-1984), K.U. Chernenko (1984-1985). That is, the Soviet Union was ruled by old, sick and economically illiterate people. We need to think about what a sick person might be thinking about - about the state or about his health? A doctor usually prescribes rest for a sick person. And politics, as I understand from adults, is the art of intrigue. And intrigue is anxiety, intrigue and anxiety is like giving a sick person not medicine, but poison. The art of intrigue is the art of holding oneself correctly and sincerely on the political stage, regardless of the truth or not, etc. This, in general, deceptive behavior, with the right facial expression, has become the norm in politics: playing at sincerity, playing at truth, and after the first handshake calling each other friends. Such a game of deception can cripple any person, in fact, this is a split personality, and it is difficult to talk about spirituality in such a playing person. Traces of corruption are lost between the split personalities in one person. To catch such an honest thief by the hand...
As I understood from the reasoning of adults, there are two fundamental concepts for a country: Motherland and State. So the state is governed by officials, governed through the law; and concept justice for officials it is not a spiritual concept. And the Motherland is for those who live in the country of Russia and do not govern the state. For them justice is a spiritual concept, not a law. (As a consequence, a conflict arises between law and spirituality.)

That is, a conflict arises between those who govern the state and between those for whom it is their homeland. (Do not confuse the modern democratic spiritual concept of equality, freedom with the religious spiritual concept.)
The USSR was ruled by senile people for at least 10 years - these are the last years of Brezhnev and those who came before Gorbachev. The socially oriented state, the USSR, was ruled by sick political intriguers. Also, they were economically illiterate managers. They were passionate about themselves, their insatiable families, and their selfishness was limitless. And therefore they are unspiritual persons, both in the modern and in the religious sense. Spiritual people love people, and unspiritual people love themselves.

The problems of modern Russia begin with the USSR, with these unspiritual, not loving people, political idiots. And modern Russia was built by B.N., who collapsed the USSR. Yeltsin was a man from their communist environment, only he was younger and more energetic. And people believed him that this young and energetic Yeltsin will improve the health of both the state and the Motherland. I didn’t see him myself, but the adults remembered that at first he was, indeed, a very strong person, who, before our eyes, suddenly suddenly showed up as a drunkard, showing his essence. He, as the heir-disciple of Soviet pensioned senile politicians, eventually turned into a creature similar to them. That is, internal political intrigues acted on him in exactly the same way, not as a medicine, but as a poison. He rejoiced at his intriguing victories and forgot about the state and the people for whom this state is the Motherland.
He destroyed the USSR; the economy of all republics was tied to Russia. And all the logistics came from the center, from the Kremlin. Through the collapse of the economy of the entire country, he put both Russian people and non-Russian people under extinction. (Those who had oil were eventually lucky - the price of oil rose. And those who did not have oil were brought to the brink of extinction.)
The either sick or half-drunk leader of Russia appeared on TV. What kind of socio-political or spiritual or economic life in Russia can there be in such conditions, with such management, if the guarantor of social, spiritual and economic stability is either drunk, or sick, or doesn’t care about anyone, both Russians and not in Russian.

The beginning of the 90s turned out to be frankly gangster. All adults, who are under 50 or more, vividly remember how at every stall, young people in leather jackets jostled with each other and found out who was protecting whom here. And they, poor fellows, just wanted to eat. At least most of them. The whole country was embroiled in petty money disputes. Banditry during Yeltsin's time was openly street in nature. And, under the guise of such banditry, the country was divided between oligarchs according to the law; not according to justice, but according to written laws. And so we grow from there - from the troubled nineties. As a result, today's main topic is corruption and the fight against it.(Question: will the fight against corruption be by law or by justice?)
But politics is an intriguing matter: where the truth is and where it is not true is very difficult for an inexperienced person to understand. Who is corrupt and who is not is very difficult for an inexperienced person to understand. And who is catching whom, and why he is catching is also very difficult for an inexperienced young person to understand.

In times of crisis, the fight in Europe against immodest super-incomes looks like “calming the crowd”, and this works for politicians. They are gaining points, maybe for the next elections. This is in Europe. And we are not quite Europe. They have been a democracy for 500 years, but we have people for whom the country is the Motherland, who do not yet think about the law: they want justice, and therefore, when V.V. Putin enters into a conversation with the people, the people turn to him personally: to him, and not to the law. (For those who administer the law, it turns out that this is a business, which is why they are corrupt, but justice is important to people, and the law is not a business for them).
People for whom the country is their homeland pay taxes, that is, they bring benefits. And the people who govern the state... they distribute taxes... But corruption is such that it covers the entire population, and everyone, without exception, suffers from it. Let's say there is no state. Where will the official receive his salary? And where will he receive his envelopes? And, as the adults explained to me, it is impossible to get rid of corruption; it can be reduced so that the state does not collapse. For thinking corrupt officials, the state is a business, and only crazy people can destroy their business. In the 90s, this is exactly what happened - the destruction of the state, so all the money went offshore. Today, corruption can be reduced, but it cannot be eliminated.

* * *
If Russia inherited corruption from the USSR, then the question arises: did the USSR really give birth to corruption?
When the Soviets came to power in 1917, they did not know how to govern the state, because they were completely incompetent in this matter. They invited and forced officials who actually ruled Tsarist Russia and managed its economy. And the economy is responsible for social stability, and social stability is the basis of strong political power.
If the economy, strong political power, people, social strata are balanced and harmonized, then a subtle spiritual connection arises between layers of society which can be expressed in one word - justice. Such a society feels whole and protected.
Tsarist power fell to a small group of Bolsheviks, from which it follows that the first World War Russia was plunged into a deep economic crisis. Russian families, who are mostly peasants, are tired of losing their male breadwinners. No breadwinner means hunger. And so it was.

I have a father and mother, with them I feel protected. I have been taken care of since childhood, and since childhood I remember constantly the warm hands of my mother. Every family, like a child, wants this kind of attitude from the state. When families lose breadwinners who are not fighting for their country, it means that this is an unjust war. Because the First World War was a political war, that is, a war of international intriguers. A just war is to defend your homeland, and those who help defend their homeland are true friends. Eventually, The unjust war for Tsarist Russia became the main reason for its collapse.
And then the Bolsheviks began to rule the former tsarist state, inviting and coercing tsarist officials. And each official was assigned his own spy, “an October boy, a pioneer, a Komsomol member and a communist.” A communist revolutionary studied with an official, then taught a Komsomol member, a Komsomol member taught a pioneer, a pioneer passed on knowledge to an October child, and, as a result, this October child became a pioneer, became a Komsomol member, became a communist, became a revolutionary, and eventually destroyed the USSR. But the tsarist corrupt officials, who understood what a state was and served their state, remained back in 1917. Those who replaced them only knew how to fight and destroy, but never learned how to govern the state and serve the state.
As a result, the form of management was distorted. Even before that, under the tsar, she was the subject of denunciations, but in the USSR snitching simply became the norm.
I used my family as an example - what child would be happy being left without a father? The government, which does not care about fathers - breadwinners, is rotten, so a bunch of Bolsheviks overthrew her. True, nothing good came of it, a civil war began, a global purge began, millions of people were killed. And it was not Stalin who started the purge, but Lenin. And Stalin completed it, as Lenin’s faithful disciple.
I remind you of this because at the same pace as in 1917, the Soviet Union collapsed - overnight. In Pushcha, at night three secretaries communist party Russia, Ukraine, Belarus destroyed the Soviet Union and, in fact, formally, for good measure, they invited the secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. (December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in Belovezhskaya Pushcha signed an agreement to create the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nazarbayev is alone famous example grievances, and there were fifteen republics).
Considering these two experiences, in modern Russia we must draw a conclusion and remember that the powerful Tsarist Empire collapsed, and the even more powerful USSR collapsed overnight. And we need to understand this not by the numbers, what happened in what years, but by the essence of the question: why did this happen? This happened because between people for whom the country is the Motherland and for whom the country is the state, the spiritual connection that binds society into one whole has been lost. And it was lost due to the impoverishment of some and the enrichment of others. The impoverished and the enriched seem to speak the same language, but these are people who seem to be from different countries, one country is called the Motherland, and the other is the State.
* * *
Looking at Russia today, we see how the head of state is trying to fight corruption. What benefits can be achieved if corruption is defeated by at least 10 percent? This is the return of capital back to the treasury. This can improve the lives of pensioners, help the sick, put our roads in order, and everyone needs roads, and ordinary people and economics. Let’s imagine that the price of oil does not rise, and 10 percent of corruption is the same as the price of oil skyrocketing.
The fight against corruption is another opportunity, like oil, to incredibly enrich Russia. What if it's 20 percent? or the absolutely incredible, to defeat corruption by 30 percent? Russia will become one third richer overnight.
Policies aimed at social well-being attract people. Spirituality, as a clear ideology, unites people. And the economy contains such a union.

If the economy is weak, then spirituality, as a coherent ideology that unites politicians and people, will be weak. And weakness does not unite, but separates - this is proven by historical experience. Today's weakness is proven by the fact that officials have begun to be held accountable: “Where do you get this for EVERYTHING if everyone is poor?” Well, let’s say we forgot the year 17, but the collapse of the USSR was literally yesterday. There, secretaries and their families grew fat non-stop, and people for whom the USSR was their homeland became poor. The situation is dangerously repeating itself.
Today's fight against corruption is a consequence of the economic crisis that has gripped the whole world. During a crisis, the owner begins to count money: income and expenses, just as it happens in any normal family. And wastefulness leads to ruin.
What is the conclusion? Unfortunately, the fight against corruption is a necessary measure. Because if there had not been a global crisis, then we might not have had a fight against corruption, or it would have been sluggish. They are fighting corruption in Europe, and we have begun to fight it, because we and Europe are economically intertwined, and our corruption harms both us and them. Our corruption harms the real sector of the international economy and puts a spoke in the wheels of development.
Let's imagine the crisis is over. As a result, will the fight against corruption end or not? Will the fight against corruption in today's Russia bog down or not? And by the next elections it will be clear how well the president has dealt with corruption: by 5, 10 percent - by how much?
I don’t understand much about economic figures, but the adults explained that 10 percent is a lot. 20 percent means there will be no economic everyday problems in Russia. And 30 percent - we will stand firmly on our feet, and we will be reckoned with, as they were reckoned with the USSR, as they were reckoned with the Russian Empire.
To conclude the topic, we can say that the socio-political, spiritual and economic problems of modern Russia are a legacy from Tsarist Russia. Only if in Tsarist Russia corruption was a child, then in the USSR it matured, and in Russia it became a businessman.
Thus, until corruption is defeated by at least 10 percent, the socio-political, spiritual and economic development of Russia will be problematic, both within the country and in the world.