A.Vukolov.

The construction of large-scale defensive lines was widespread during the interwar period of the twentieth century. For the most part, these powerful fortifications, into which a lot of labor and money were invested, “did not work,” except, at a stretch, for the Mannerheim Line. The reasons for this situation were varied and did not always lie on a military plane. Let's try to briefly consider what happened in the USSR in the field of fortification construction before the war and at its very beginning.

The Great Patriotic War, as we know, started unsuccessfully for us. Dozens of books have been written on this topic and many films have been made. Enough has also been said about the reasons for the retreat of the Red Army and the tragic confusion at the front and in the rear during the initial period of the war. But already during the war, the unpreparedness of the country’s border for defense was cited as one of the factors of the defeat in the summer of 1941.

And this is a little strange: the Soviet state had a defensive military doctrine. It was supposed to defeat the enemy on his territory, having previously exhausted him in a defensive battle. But the defense must rely on something - the first thing a soldier does upon arriving at the place of supposed contact with enemy forces is to begin to dig in. That is, it creates the simplest field defensive structure - a trench or rifle cell. The first thing a country does when it receives some addition to its territory is to establish new borders. Moreover, the USSR ended the Winter War with Finland a year and a half before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and many remembered how much effort it cost us to break through the Mannerheim Line. Plus, the whole of Europe had another line of fortifications on its lips - the Maginot. Did the Soviet Union really not build anything similar?

This is not true, of course. We had the “Stalin Line” (quotes because this system of fortifications was never called that in official documents), which, according to German intelligence, included 2962 casemates and bunkers for guns and machine guns. The figure becomes even more impressive if we do not forget that a long-term firing point does not stand alone in the field, but is surrounded by a system of trenches, communication passages, and covered by engineering barriers; The infrastructure of the fortified area, which will be discussed below, is generally very complex.

So where were all these fortifications in June 1941? The key word in this phrase is “where”. They were on the old border formed as a result of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1921, when significant territories of Ukraine and Belarus went to Poland. In 1939, the Soviet Union returned these lands, and in addition to them - the Baltic republics, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.
Thus, the border moved away from the line of fortified areas by 35-300 km. In this regard, as well as in connection with the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, a decision was made to mothball the “Stalin Line” and to begin construction on new frontiers of the “Molotov Line” (this line of fortifications was not even called that unofficially, this is the latest invention ).
The construction of a defensive line on the new (old) border began, but out of more than 5,800 DOS (long-term defensive structures) planned for construction, only 880 were built. The garrisons of the bunkers were also not brought to full strength. In addition, we should not forget that a fortified area is not only a system of firing points with garrisons. A single bunker or even a defense unit consisting of several bunkers is bypassed, blocked and subsequently relatively easily destroyed by the enemy if it does not have cover. And the so-called “field filling” of fortified areas on the new line was extremely insufficient.

Here, stepping back a little from the main question, we can recall the sad history of the Belgian fort Eben-Emael. The fort was located on the Belgian-Dutch border, took three years to build and was considered the largest in the world. This powerful structure was designed to protect Belgium from German aggression. And what? The fort, which had a garrison of 1,200 people, was taken by 78 (this is an exaggeration, but it was they who did the main job) German paratroopers, who landed their gliders on the roof of the fortress. This event is considered the first operation using amphibious gliders. But there is only one conclusion - new technical means require new approaches to tactics.
The advent of rapid-fire weapons and new means of communication gave rise to trench warfare. After all, now, while the soldiers were gnawing through the defenses, the enemy had the opportunity to quickly transfer reinforcements to the threatened area. The multi-day (!) artillery bombardment turned out to be ineffective - it was very difficult to kill every last one of the people buried in the ground. The situation was moved forward by the appearance of tanks on the battlefields. Military leaders never neglected fortification, but after the First World War, engineering preparation of positions came to the fore, especially where there were no previously prepared defense lines. When the war began, Moscow’s defensive lines were not covered, because our military doctrine, as mentioned above, assumed military operations on foreign territory.

...The ancient Assyrians had engineering units as a separate “arms branch”. On the bas-relief of the 7th century. BC. warriors are depicted trying to break through the wall of an assaulted fortress using a hand drill and pickaxes under the cover of the heavy shields of other warriors. However, every Assyrian soldier had a pickaxe, but no state at that time, or since, had special units designed to lay roads, build bridges and remove rubble. In addition, the “engineering troops” of the Assyrian Empire were responsible for siege towers, battering rams, etc., i.e. had not only defensive, but also offensive functions. This quality of the engineering troops has been preserved to this day...
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army included 9 engineering and 9 pontoon-bridge regiments, in addition there were 252 engineer, bridge and pontoon battalions. Each rifle division had a sapper battalion. Up to half of the engineering units of the Red Army took part in the battle of Moscow.

The situation with equipping engineering and construction units with equipment was not very good. In civil engineering, imports were used mainly - excavators, trenching and excavation machines, but there were few of them. For example, subsequently the world's largest Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, the famous Magnitka, was built according to the recollections of eyewitnesses “from a pick and a shovel.” Photographs from those years show that the soil is removed manually and transported using “grabbers” - horse-drawn carts. The situation subsequently improved somewhat - automobile equipment and 25 American excavators appeared. In addition, pile drivers and other mechanisms were adjusted.

The construction of another facility - the White Sea-Baltic Canal - was carried out, as you know, by prisoners, so the mechanization there was even worse. The widespread use of lifting mechanisms using muscular traction became one of the hallmarks of this large construction project. One of the builders later recalled how he worked on a capstan - a manual gate that lifted trolleys with soil from the pit. He called this gate “Egyptian.”

The mechanization of army units also left much to be desired. The pontoon parts were in better condition, but there was not enough equipment there either. Although before the war, experiments were carried out to create bridge laying vehicles based on T-26 and BT tanks, they were not brought to large-scale production. To some extent, Lend-Lease helped out, supplying the Red Army with the well-known Studebaker, Dodge, GMC, etc. cars, as well as Caterpillar bulldozers and other equipment; however, this happened much later. The Soviet excavator industry began its development in 1930, when it was decided to replace the fleet of imported machines with domestic ones. The first Soviet excavator was produced at the Votkinsk plant and M-III. It was a steam rotary excavator weighing 65 tons and with a bucket capacity of 1.5 m3. The construction of excavators and non-self-propelled scrapers developed, but this technology was not enough.

Back on July 18, 1941, when it became clear that we had lost the border battle, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to build defense lines on the approaches to Moscow. Construction was carried out in a semicircle that surrounded the capital from the north, west and east. Strategic defense lines were created in the Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk and Maloyaroslavl directions. Their total length was up to 10,000 kilometers and up to 300 kilometers deep. Defensive positions were also established on the nearby approaches and in the city itself. Thus, by the beginning of October, the Mozhaisk and Vyazemsk defense lines and the Moscow defensive region were created.

Here we need to remember that the engineering troops do not only “dig”. On the Vyazemskaya defense line, engineering units installed more than 80 thousand anti-tank mines. According to incomplete data, more than 400 German armored vehicles and several dozen tanks were blown up by mines. Mine-explosive, wire and even electrified barriers were equipped. The enemy was literally stunned by the effective use of remote-controlled landmines. Some of them were radio controlled.
Many people know that the population actively helped to equip the defensive lines. The fact is that, due to the lack of mine-explosive means, it was necessary to use a large number of “traditional” obstacles - anti-tank ditches, scarps, counter-scarps, and create rubble on roads and forests. The length of the rubble was 1,500 linear kilometers, and 600 km of anti-tank ditches were dug.

Reliance on these defensive lines allowed our troops to wear out enemy strike forces in multi-day battles. As K. Simonov wrote, our parts resembled a spring, which is being compressed and compressed, but someday it will definitely straighten out...
By the time of the transition to the counteroffensive, the Western and Kalinin fronts had 19 engineer, 19 sapper and 6 pontoon battalions. The Western Front included an entire sapper army (1st). In all winter offensive operations of 1941, engineering units supported the offensive - they laid column tracks and roads, and carried out mine clearance. In addition, they helped repel enemy counterattacks and counterattacks.

The contribution of the engineering troops to the defense of Moscow and to further counter-offensives is great. Next came the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, and the capture of Berlin. The assault on cities without sappers is now generally difficult to imagine, but this experience was developed precisely then.
Any army in the world now has engineering troops, however, the construction of lines of fortified areas modeled on the “Stalin and Molotov lines” is a thing of the past - with the advent of new weapons they are no longer needed. It is interesting to note that we were also the last ones here, it seems, having until recently a line of fortified missiles on the border with China. But that's another story.

author
Colonel V. N. Yastrebov

The brochure examines the fortification equipment of the defensive lines of the Nazi troops on the Western Front in the period 1942/43 and the types of fortifications used on them.
The brochure is intended for officers of the engineering troops.

Chapter 1. Building the defense of the Nazi troops
Chapter 2. Fortification equipment of the defensive lines of the Nazi troops.
Frontier equipment basics.
Features of the equipment of strongholds and defense units.
Features of fortification preparation of populated areas.
Chapter 3. Types of fortifications and camouflage of Nazi troops.
Trenches and communication passages.
Fire structures.
Observation points.
Obstacles.
Shelters for troops.
Disguise.
Chapter 4. Fortification equipment of individual elements of the defense depth.

Chapter 1
BUILDING THE DEFENSE OF THE GERMAN-FASCIST FORCES

In the period from August 1942 to March 1943, the Germans were not active on the Western Front and limited themselves to conducting reconnaissance in force in small groups of infantry up to a battalion in size.
During the same period of time, our troops at the front carried out August and November-December local army operations, as a result of which the German defenses were broken into and certain areas temporarily captured by the enemy were occupied.
In general, the positional nature of the struggle at the front remained, which determined the construction and organization of the German defense and the strengthening of the positions they occupied.
Taking advantage of the situation, the Germans had the opportunity to conduct defensive work for 6-7 months, and in some areas up to a year.
When strengthening positions, the German command, in addition to troops, attracted the population of the occupied areas. Local building materials were widely used for the construction of fortifications. The positions were constantly being improved - new fortifications were erected and barriers were created. Positions equipped for tough defense were mostly prepared to regimental depth. In the divisional and army rear areas, only the directions of possible attacks were covered and, for the purpose of self-defense, the areas where divisional, corps and army reserves and rear facilities were fortified. Shortly before the February-March offensive of the troops of the Western Front (January-February 1943), the Germans began to create intermediate lines in the depths of the defense, but due to the successful offensive actions of the Red Army, they left the work unfinished and were forced to retreat to deeper lines.
In the most important directions, the Germans built two or three defensive lines.
The first line (the main battlefield), most fully prepared for defense, was occupied by troops. To defend the first line, most of the forces were allocated to its front edge.
The size of divisional defense lines was determined depending on the nature of the terrain and the importance of the direction. On the main directions (Minsk highway, Warsaw and Kiev highways, roads from Kaluga, etc.), the infantry division usually occupied a strip of 5 to 12 km
along the front, with a depth of 3 to 5 km.
In inaccessible, rugged, wooded and swampy terrain, limiting the widespread use of tanks, the division occupied a front of 10 to 30 km. At the same time, the regimental sector had a front length of up to 7 km.
The depth of the regimental area, as a general rule, did not exceed 3-4 km. The battalions were usually located side by side - in a line. In the depths there was a regimental reserve; the latter in most cases was the training battalion of the regiment.
The rifle company, depending on the location of the platoons, occupied a defense area with a front length of 1.5-2 km. When two platoons were located at the front edge, the third was usually withdrawn to the rear 1-1.5 km from the front edge and was used as a reserve for the company commander; If there were three platoons at the front line, the training platoon served as a reserve.
In most cases, the platoon defended an area with a front length of 400-600 m.

Fig.1. Scheme of the defensive zone of the Nazi troops

The defensive line consisted of defense nodes and strongholds and fortified spaces between them (Fig. 1). Defense centers and strong points were located in the most important directions in populated areas, at command heights, at road junctions, defiles and in other places that provided good visibility and shelling of the terrain ahead.
Inside the lines, all command heights and local objects were fortified, providing good visibility and shelling of the area or creating favorable conditions for the deployment of reserves. It should be noted that in rugged terrain, the defense acquired a pronounced nodal character. On level ground and in forested areas, the defense was linear; the depth of defense in these cases depended on the importance of the direction and tank accessibility of the front edge (Fig. 2).

Fig.2. Equipment of the German defensive line in the area of ​​the villages of Rusinovo, Pavlovo, Kr. Gorka

The Germans chose positions in such a way that their front line always passed along natural, hard-to-reach lines: command heights, steep banks of rivers, ravines, lakes and swamps, along the outskirts of forests running parallel or at an angle to the front. The outline of the leading edge was determined by local objects; their use contributed to the clear organization of the fire system of all types of weapons and, in particular, fire cover of even minor natural approaches to obstacles. When choosing defensive lines, the Germans especially carefully observed the requirements for choosing the front line and used the instructions of the field regulations, giving the formation commander the right to leave areas of terrain that were captured but unfavorable for organizing defense.
For most defensive lines, the front edge is characterized by the presence of so-called fire bags. To form them, strongholds were moved forward, located at dominant heights and in populated areas. This arrangement of strong points ensured flanking of the approaches to the front edge and the gaps between strong points (see Fig. 1).
The main forces and firepower were always concentrated in defense centers and strongholds. Between the strong points, gaps were left, the size of which varied and was determined by the conditions of the situation and terrain, as well as the possibilities of organizing observation and shelling them with actual fire. The gaps, as a rule, were necessarily covered by flank artillery, mortar or machine-gun fire and reinforced by various obstacles. First of all, explosive anti-tank and then anti-personnel obstacles were installed at the gaps. At the obstacles there were machine gunners, for whom cells or light fire structures were built. In the intervals between strongholds in swampy areas, every 100-200 m, groups armed with an easel, light machine gun or company mortar were located. From the strong points to the gaps, maneuver routes were provided for manpower and firepower allocated to defend the gaps when attacking them.
By placing most of the infantry's automatic weapons and light mortars directly on or near the front line, the Germans achieved good shelling of the entire terrain ahead, while the most likely approaches were held under multi-layered fire. At night, the area in front of the front line was systematically illuminated with rockets and fired with tracer bullets according to prepared data for firing.
The described defense formation required the presence of a developed road network to ensure the maneuver of reserves from the depths and along the front, to which the enemy paid special attention. Roads for horse-drawn and sometimes motor vehicles were usually extended to the rear of the first line companies, and in some closed areas even to the front edge. Uninterrupted use of roads running along the front and approaching from the depths was ensured by the widespread use of camouflage means. Sections of roads viewed by ground observers were blocked from view by vertical masks (mask fences) made of cut vegetation. Communication was provided by various means: messengers on cars, motorcycles, bicycles, horses and was duplicated by a developed telephone network.
The second defensive line, at a distance of 3-6 km from the first, was prepared only in certain directions and was occupied by the forces of divisional and corps reserves. Settlements included in the line, as a rule, were prepared for all-round defense.
The third defensive line was located in the depths of the defense, 16-20 km from the front line and was usually occupied by army reserves.
The border consisted of individual strongholds and defense nodes, whose tasks were to cover important directions, most often road junctions.
The Germans did not erect false lines, limiting themselves to camouflage of occupied lines and strict adherence to camouflage discipline.

Chapter 2
FORTIFICATION EQUIPMENT OF THE DEFENSIVE BORDER OF GERMAN-FASCIST FORCES

Frontier Equipment Basics

U The fortified positions of the Germans in their developed form were continuous strips, equipped with a depth of 2-3 km, and in some of the most critical areas - up to 6 km.
The main element of the fortification equipment of lines on any terrain was a system of trenches and communication passages with numerous anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. The number of trenches ranged from two to four, and in the main defense centers it reached six or seven.
In secondary areas, one or two trenches were torn off; behind them, hidden from ground observation, there were wood and earthen structures for machine guns intended for flanking and dagger fire.
The first trench was located, as a rule, on the combat ridge of the front slopes of the heights, which provided good visibility and shelling of the terrain ahead.
The second trench opened behind the first at a distance of 100-200 m.
The third trench was often located on the reverse slopes. The distance between the second and third trenches was 250-300 m.
The distance between the third and fourth trenches, as well as between all other trenches located in depth, ranged from 300 to 500 m.
All trench lines were connected by numerous communication passages. Communication passages were most developed at the front edge and especially in its outgoing corners.
The location of the obstacles depended on the importance that the Germans attached to this or that section of the defensive line. Most often, anti-personnel wire and explosive obstacles were located in front of the first trench. They were 15-70 m away from the first trench. Anti-personnel mines, land mines, and surprises were installed either behind the wire obstacles or directly in the zone of the latter. In a number of cases, anti-personnel mines and subtle wire obstacles were installed directly on the parapet of the first trench. The main anti-tank obstacles, mainly minefields, were located between the first and second trenches; they were installed in front of the first trench only in the most important tank-dangerous directions.
A diagram of a section of the line in a tank-hazardous direction, characterizing the fortification of the area by German troops using a trench system, is shown in Fig. 3.

Fig.3. Layout of trenches and obstacles

In this case, two strips of anti-tank mines were installed in front of the first trench. A reinforced fence was installed between them. Behind the second strip of anti-tank mines there was a strip of wire obstacles 10-15 m wide. Nets on low stakes or thrown wire were installed here. In front of the second trench, in tank-hazardous directions, there were anti-tank minefields 15-25 m deep (5-8 rows of mines). In front of the third trench, anti-tank minefields were also installed, consisting of 9-11 rows of mines.
The area in front of the front edge of the defensive lines was carefully cleared; in a strip 400 m deep, everything that made it difficult to fire and observe was destroyed.
Firing structures located in trenches provided flanking and oblique fire and mutual fire support, which was facilitated by the winding or broken layout of the trenches in the plan.
To flank sections of trenches with minor breaks, cells and platforms were equipped, moved forward and connected to the trench by communication passages.
In a number of cases, the trenches were located in such a way that fire bags were created in front of them or infantry traps were set up.

Rice. 4 Infantry trap in the trench system

An example of such a trap is the trench section shown in Fig. 4.
The trap was set in front of the main trench and was also a trench of a unique design, similar to the bastion one. In the outgoing corners of this trench, located 100-150 m from one another, cells were set up for longitudinal shelling of the trench with machine gun fire. The trap was designed for the fact that the attacker, finding himself under pre-prepared destructive mortar fire, would try to take cover in a trench and would be destroyed by machine gun fire.
The first trench was the main one and was usually the most fully equipped in combat terms.
For each fire weapon, spare positions were equipped, which ensured maneuver of fire weapons and increased their survivability in battle.
Fire from the first trench was supplemented by frontal fire from heavy small arms placed in the second trench.
Artillery positions of 37-, 45- and 75-mm guns and 81-mm mortars were usually equipped between the second and third trenches. Behind the third and sometimes fourth trench, positions were set up for batteries of 105- and 150-mm guns and 120-mm mortars.
In the depths of the defense there was a small number of covered firing structures intended for firing along the gaps between the trenches.
Shelters for the troops occupying the trench were arranged in the front steepness of the trenches or adjacent to communication passages.

Rice. 5 German trench in a wooded and marshy area

Dugouts for regimental and divisional reserves were built in such a way that they could be used to organize self-defense and close-range fire.
All elements of the regimental rear - warehouses, garages, first aid stations, kitchens, baths, etc. - were usually located 1.5-2.0 km from the first trench. The sanitary dugouts of regimental units were usually adjacent to the second trench.
The relative position of the elements of the defensive line described above was predominant.
There was some originality in the arrangement of lines in wooded and wooded-swampy areas, as well as in the location of defensive lines behind water barriers.
In wooded and wooded-swampy areas, the first trench was usually located at the edges of the forests; where it was difficult to cut a trench, a wood-earth barrier was made instead, in which rifle cells and machine-gun sites were built.
In front of the barrier, 30-70 m from it, wire obstacles were installed or rubble was arranged, covered with anti-personnel mines and landmines.
Behind the first trench (barrier) a second, and sometimes a third, was built. To flank the approaches to these trenches (barriers), clearings were built in front of them.
In the depths behind the trenches, clearings were also made and wood-earth structures such as blockhouses were erected for shelling them.
Various shelters were located in close proximity to trenches and barriers and partly deep in the forest.
When defending rivers with gentle banks, the first trench was located from the shore at a distance of 50-100 m; in the presence of steep, steep banks, the first trench was opened directly at the cliff, and obstacles (mainly anti-personnel) were installed at the very edge of the water. It was established that in the presence of a significant water barrier, in a number of cases the first trench was engaged only in combat guarding, and the main forces were located in the second trench.
The considered system for strengthening the field line gave the enemy the following advantages:
a) the use of a trench system ensured freedom of maneuver for forces and firepower and facilitated the camouflage of the battle formation;
b) the proximity of obstacles to the trenches made it easier to flank and guard them;
c) the location of anti-personnel mines and surprises in front of the wire obstacles and in the obstacles themselves made it difficult to make passages through them;
d) the location of minefields behind the main anti-personnel obstacles made reconnaissance and mine clearance difficult; placing mines directly on the parapet made it difficult for the attacker to penetrate the trench;
e) the location of anti-tank mines behind the first trench made it difficult to reconnaissance and clear them before the attack.

Features of the equipment of strong points and defense units

In the most important directions of tactical importance, the Germans, both along the front edge and in the depths, equipped strongholds and defense centers.
Strong points and defense centers were created at commanding heights, at road junctions, defiles, and in populated areas.
The strong point usually occupied 1.0-1.5 km along the front and was defended by a company of infantry, reinforced with mortars, anti-tank rifles and artillery. In some cases, strong points were defended by reinforced platoons.
Defense centers usually consisted of three or four strong points and were defended by one or two battalions and, in some cases, an infantry regiment.
Strong points and defense centers were prepared for all-round defense and had a large number of machine gun and artillery positions that ensured the maneuver of fire weapons.

Rice. 6 Scheme of the Rylyaki - Maginot stronghold

The most typical strong point is shown in Fig. 6. This strong point was occupied by a reinforced company of infantry. The basis of the strongpoint equipment were trenches connected by communication passages. The front edge of the strong point mainly ran along the river bank. Ressa and embankments of the Warsaw Highway, which were natural anti-tank obstacles.
The bulk of firepower was concentrated at the front edge, providing flanking and oblique fire and shelling of obstacles located along the front edge.
Anti-tank artillery (three 45 mm guns) was placed on the flanks in depth; Several spare and additional positions were prepared for each gun.
A typical reference point for flat, open terrain is shown in Fig. 7. It occupied about 2 km along the front and up to 2.5 km in depth and was defended by a company of infantry.

Rice. 7 Diagram of a strong point in the Sapovo area

The basis of the fortification equipment of this strong point were also trenches and communication passages. The first trench had a broken outline, ran along the battle ridge and was the main one. It had prepared positions for light small arms; for heavier fire weapons (anti-tank rifles, mortars, anti-tank guns) positions were prepared near the second trench. The strong point and the platoon defense areas included in it were prepared for all-round defense; it was ensured by the location of trenches on the ground and the adaptation of individual sections of communication trenches to the defense.
Basic shelters for troops (dugouts) were available in sufficient quantities; they were located behind the second and third trenches and in depth - in the area of ​​defense of the platoon of the second echelon of the company.
Considering that the strong point was being prepared in an open area, the enemy created a developed network of communication passages connecting platoon defense areas and all trenches. This ensured free maneuver of the company reserve from the depths to any part of the front line of defense, and also facilitated live communication and battle control. Separate dugouts for the company's officers were directly adjacent to communication passages leading to the rear.
Concluding a brief description of the equipment of strong points, it is necessary to point out that when strengthening strong points, the Germans often prepared separate well-camouflaged firing positions for light and heavy machine guns in front of wire obstacles. These positions were intended to flank sections of the front edge and approaches to it, difficult to see and shoot through, from the first trench. The system of obstacles covering strong points and defense nodes was basically no different from that described above.
Strongholds in secondary directions, as well as those located in the depths of the divisional defense line, did not have trenches. Fire weapons were located in separate trenches and light wood-earth fortifications.
The above-described features of the equipment of strongholds and defense units make it possible to make the following battlefields:
a) strongholds located along the front edge stood out little from the general defense line, since the basis of their equipment were trenches and communication passages;
b) numerous firing positions prepared in trenches and in individual sections of communication passages ensured a wide maneuver of fire weapons and their survivability in battle, and at the same time, the fire system remained difficult to decipher for the attacker;
c) the flanks and rear of the strong points were relatively weaker equipped and were the most vulnerable places.

Features of fortification preparation of settlements

The settlements that were part of the defensive zone were prepared and used by the Germans as strongholds or defense centers. The peculiarity of the preparation of settlements for defense was that, along with the construction of a developed network of trenches and communication passages, the Germans adapted individual buildings, groups of them and the ruins of buildings for defense.
The first, main trench in most cases was torn off on the outskirts of a populated area. The second, and sometimes the third, trenches were prepared inside and outside the settlement. For the purpose of camouflage, trenches and communication passages passing inside the populated area were located behind fences, fences, and fences. In some cases, trenches were torn off under buildings. Sections of trenches adjacent to buildings were usually covered, which ensured their use during fires.
Wooden buildings were adapted for defense relatively rarely. In most cases, they were used as masks for firing positions located in trenches, and also ensured the hidden movement of the garrison in a strong point.

Rice. 8 Scheme of a strong point including settlements

The diagram of a strong point, which includes two small settlements, is shown in Fig. 8.
The basic principles of preparation for the defense of large populated areas can be seen in Fig. 9, which shows a diagram of the defense center of the Nazi troops in the city of Rzhev.

Rice. 9 Scheme of preparing the Germans for the defense of Rzhev

This junction was a tete-de-pont (bridgehead), covering the city and bridges across the river. Volga.
The main position ran along the outskirts of the city and its flanks abutted the river. The front edge of the main position passed through terrain that made it easier to organize fire and monitor the approaches to the city.
The main position was a continuous defensive line; the basis of the equipment were trenches and communication passages with numerous cells and platforms for firing from small arms. Sections of the position intercepting the roads to the city were prepared as strongholds.
All kinds of buildings and entire villages in front of the main position, which interfered with observation and firing, were destroyed.
In preparing for the defense of the city itself, the enemy proceeded from the main goal: to ensure free movement of reserves and the rapid concentration of strike groups on threatened sections of the outer perimeter to carry out a counterattack.
The city had separate strongholds, which included groups of stone buildings adapted for firing. Structures that made it difficult to fire from strongholds were destroyed. The streets intended for maneuvering reserves and communication were shot at from strongholds, while the remaining streets were closed with barriers.
The main defense forces (reserves, strike groups) were located in the city and, if necessary, arrived at threatened areas along the streets left for this purpose, as well as along the communication lines leading from the city to the front edge of the main position.
Particular attention was paid to the defense of bridges. Bridges, as a rule, were covered with wire obstacles, reinforced with anti-personnel mines and other explosive devices. All streets adjacent to the bridges were mined. The passages left in the barriers could be quickly closed, for which purpose stocks of anti-tank mines were stockpiled directly near them.
The part of the city located across the river was poorly prepared for defense; A trench was being prepared along the shore, but in fact only the section shown in the diagram was ready. Individual brick buildings were also adapted for defense.

Chapter 3
TYPES OF FORTIFICATIONS AND MASKING OF GERMAN TROOPS

Trenches and communication passages

The fascist German troops began to use trenches as the main element of a fortified position from the moment of the transition to defensive battles in the winter of 1941 -1942. During the same period, alluvial type trenches from snow.
Depending on the combat mission and terrain conditions, the trenches were located on the combat ridge, on the topographic ridge, and on the reverse slopes.
In plan, the trenches had a sinuous or broken outline. The normal length of straight sections ranged from 10 to 25 m. Straight sections of long length were rarely used even on flat terrain: however, straight sections with a length of up to 100-150 m were encountered.
Separate sections of the trenches protruded forward, as a result of which fire bags were created between them.
Trenches were generally carefully applied to the terrain; their bends and fractures mainly followed (along the horizontals.
The profile of the trenches was different. The width of the trenches at the top was 0.8-1.0 m, the width at the bottom was 0.4-0.5 m. The depth of the trenches in most cases was 1.5 m, and in areas where the enemy defended for a long time, it reached 2.0 -2.5 m. From the captured official instructions of the enemy it is clear that a narrow and deep trench is considered the best shelter from fire and tanks. However, trenches 0.5-1.1 m deep were often encountered; in these cases they were covered with masks 1.5-2.0 m high to conceal movement. The masks were installed on the parapet or in close proximity to it.
The parapets of trenches 0.5-0.6 m high and 0.8-1.0 m thick, as a rule, were not leveled or masked.
In forests and swampy areas, instead of trenches, wooden and wood-earth barriers up to 1.5 m high were installed. Wooden barriers were made from logs 18-22 cm thick; the logs were stacked in two or three rows between posts driven into the ground. From the front, barriers were usually reinforced with earthen filling. The passages in the barriers were closed with slingshots.
Wooden and wood-earth barriers simultaneously served as obstacles against tanks and infantry.
The communication passages had a broken outline; their faces were 10-15 m long. In certain areas with heavy traffic, in order to avoid oncoming traffic, paired communication passages were installed, spaced 25-35 m from each other.
As a special case that took place in the area of ​​​​the city of Yukhnov, it should be noted the course of communication for the movement of horse-drawn and even automobile transport directly to the first trench.
There were no dead ends or widenings for carrying out the wounded on stretchers or divergences during oncoming traffic. On the parapets there were prepared slingshots and hedgehogs to block movement in the trenches. Bypass and adjacent traverses were not erected. The covered sections of the first trench had stepladders up to 2.5-3.0 m long for quick exit from the ditch to the surface of the earth. In the trenches running in the forest, in the rear steepness, ramps 0.6-1.0 m wide were dug every 50-70 m.
Latrines and garbage pits were located every 100-200 m; they communicated with the trench using communication passages 30-40 m long.

Fire structures

Fire fortifications mainly provided protection from bullets and shrapnel; they were simple and, as a rule, of low quality. Indoor structures of a reinforced and heavy type were rarely erected; they were built only in the largest tactically important strongholds and resistance centers and were located in the depths of the defense behind the masks. For the construction of structures, the enemy very widely used locally available materials (wood, stone, sand, clay, etc.). At the end of 1942 and 1943, the Nazi-German troops almost completely abandoned the use of reinforced and heavy wood-earth fire structures, especially along the front line of defense, citing the fact that they give out the fire system, tie up the maneuver of the fire weapon, and limit the firing sector , do not provide the garrison with the ability to use hand grenades and, being a good target for artillery and mortar fire, are quickly destroyed.
When choosing the types of structures and when planting structures on the ground, local conditions and objects were used: settlements, individual buildings, steep slopes, trees and shrubs, road embankments, etc. Careful consideration of local conditions ensured natural camouflage of individual structures and the defense system as a whole from ground and air reconnaissance. The fortifications were extremely diverse both in design and layout. In each case, the type of structure, its design and layout were determined by the fire task, location and availability of available materials.

Rice. 10 Section of the trench at the anterior edge

Firing structures, especially those located in the first trench, were mostly open cells and platforms, at best providing protection from bullets, shrapnel and mortar fire. Cells for shooters in most cases were located every 6-10 m along the entire length of the trenches. In some cases, a group arrangement of cells was observed (Fig. 10). Groups of 8-10 cells were separated at a distance of 1.5-2.0 m from one another. Machine-gun platforms were set up on the flanks of these groups; the cells cut into the front steepness of the trench by 0.9-1.0 m; The depth of the cells was 1.0 m, the width at the top was 0.8 m. A berm about 0.3 m wide was installed in the parapet in front of each cell.
Platforms for machine guns, anti-tank rifles and light mortars were either located in the front steepness of the trenches, or were brought forward and connected to the trench by means of communication. They were usually prepared to fire in a sector from 90 to 150°.

Rice. 11 Open machine gun area

An open machine gun platform is shown in Fig. eleven.
Sometimes a section of the communication passage connecting the site with the trench was used as cover. In this case, the communication path had an anti-fragmentation coating, as shown in Fig. eleven.
The steepness of the passage and the earthen machine gun table were usually dressed with brushwood! or poles. To reduce dispersion, the machine gun table was padded with felt, cotton blankets, etc.

Rice. 12 An open machine gun site built by the Germans near the village of Pavlovka in the forest

In wooded areas, open machine-gun sites were built on the surface of the ground from timber and soil. Such a platform is shown in Fig. 12.
The walls of the site are double, made of logs. The gaps between the logs were filled with soil. The gap at the top of the front wall was filled with paper bags of sand. To store ammunition, niches measuring 55X40X30 cm were built in the walls. Shelter for the machine gun and crew was an integral part of the structure; it was covered with one row of logs 20-25 cm thick.

Rice. 13 Covered machine gun nests

Covered machine gun nests (Fig. 13) were located on the reverse slopes and were intended mainly for conducting flanking fire. These structures had one or two embrasures with firing sectors of 60-180°. The covering was made from one row of logs 20-25 cm thick. The walls of the pit in most cases were covered with poles; machine gun tables were made of earth, covered with wood, their height was 1.0-1.1 m. There were two types of embrasures: with a bell facing the enemy and vice versa. The internal dimensions of the nest in plan were 1.6-2.0X2.0 m, height 1.8-2.0 m. The height of the zero line on flat ground was 0.4-0.5 m, on slopes O.1-0 .2 m, in the forest 1.0-1.3 m. The firing range ranged from 200 to 1200 m. One or two open areas were set up next to the covered nest, serving as backup positions or providing fire in additional directions.

Rice. 14 Covered machine gun nest in the forest

In wooded and swampy areas, covered machine-gun nests were built mainly on the surface of the ground. One of these structures is shown in Fig. 14. The walls of the structure, 1.0 m thick, were packages of logs 20-25 cm thick, laid between posts dug into the ground. The embrasure was made at a height of 1.2 m, its solution ensured firing in a sector of up to 90-110°: The covering consisted of one row of logs (the latter were usually fastened together with staples or smooth wire). The structure was camouflaged from aerial surveillance with spruce branches laid on the covering.
Anti-tank guns were placed in trenches.

Rice. 15 Trench for an anti-tank gun with cover

In open areas there were often trenches with shelter for guns and crew (Fig. 15). The site was being prepared for all-round shelling. The shelter was located in front of the platform and was connected to it by a ramp. To make it easier to roll out the gun onto the platform, rolling boards were laid along the ramp.
The dimensions of the shelter in plan are 2.1X3.0 m, height 1.2 m; a special niche was cut off for the muzzle of the gun. Shelter was provided from mortar fire: it was covered with two or three rows of logs and covered with soil. Ammunition was stored in a niche.
To camouflage the trenches, rope nets were used, into which available material (branches, grass, etc.) was woven.

Rice. 16 Artillery trenches: A - trench for a 75mm gun; B - trench for 45mm gun

There were gun trenches built on the surface of the ground (Fig. 16).
The gun and crew were protected by a parapet 1.0-1.15 m high, lined on the inside with 22-25 cm logs. Niches for shells were located under the parapet; they were torn off to a depth of 1.25-1.60 m and overlapped by two rows of logs.
The support for the gun openers was made of wooden shorts; the latter were either laid and fastened in a groove, or buried in the ground, forming
wall.
Such trenches allowed firing in a sector of 60-70°.

One example of the location and equipment of a position for an anti-tank gun is shown in Fig. 17. The position was located on the edge of the forest in the first trench. The firing area was covered by a parapet, which was a continuation of the trench parapet. All other elements of the position - shelter for guns, magazines for shells, shelter for crews - were protected from damage by shrapnel and light mines and were connected to each other by means of communication.
Two observation points were placed forward at the edge of the forest.

Observation points

The Germans paid serious attention to organizing uninterrupted surveillance. There were a large number of observation posts along the front line, as well as throughout the entire depth of the defense. They were located in trenches, in various buildings, on trees and on specially erected towers.
All observation points were placed in the area and carefully camouflaged.
The vast majority of observation points were open cells for observers in trenches. In their design, they were almost no different from ordinary rifle cells. Commander's observation posts, in addition, had light shelters for telephone operators, messengers and resting observers.

Fig. 18 German artillery OP near the village of Kotovichi

Observation points of the type shown in Fig. 1 were often encountered. 18. Observation points of this type consisted of an observation shaft and a shelter, connected to each other by a manhole.
Observation from the mine was carried out through a periscope extended through a hole in the mine cover. The shelter of the rack structure was made with dimensions in plan of 3.0X3.0 m and was covered with four to five rows of 22-25 cm logs. The entire structure was covered with soil; The thickness of the coating reached 0.8 m.

Fig. 19 German observation post in the forest

Of interest is the observation post erected by the Germans in the forest southeast of Buda-Monastyrskaya (Fig. 19). It consisted of an observation tower, a workroom for telephone operators and messengers, and a dugout for the resting crew. The workroom was a crowned structure with a floor and a roof that had a slight slope for water drainage. For greater strength, the walls were reinforced with compression logs dug into the ground to a depth of 1.0 m. The room had dimensions in plan of 2.7 X 2.7 m, height - 3.2 m, it had a table, benches, shelves for telephones and personal items. A brick stove was built for heating.
The observation tower was a log house, fixed above a hatch in the covering of the working room and secured with guy wires for stability. An open area for an observer was built above the log house. A staircase was built inside the log house and the working room to allow the observer to exit to the site. A dugout of the usual pit type with dimensions of 2.0 x 2.5 m protected vacationers from being hit by mortar fire: it was connected by communication with the work room.
The described observation post was camouflaged by trees.

Occasionally there were reinforced concrete observation posts, such as those shown in Fig. 20. The layout and dimensions of the structure are visible from the figure. Observation was carried out through viewing slits or through a hatch covered with an armored cover 50 mm thick (the cover had a hole for a periscope). The viewing slots were also adapted for firing from machine guns and machine guns.

Fig.21

The reinforced concrete observation post shown in Fig. 2 deserves attention. 21. It was erected on the main defensive line 500-600 m from our front line in a dilapidated barn.
So much attention was paid to camouflaging the structure that it was discovered by our troops only after the line was captured. The layout, dimensions and individual details are shown in the figure and do not require any special explanation. Observation was mainly carried out from the upper floor of the structure through a periscope passed through a hole in the 40 mm thick armored cover. At the same time, viewing slits in the middle floor were used for observation. The observation post could also be used as a firing structure at any time: viewing slots allowed firing in four directions.
Communication between floors was carried out via a ladder made of brackets embedded in concrete. There were two exits from the observation post: one outside and the other into a residential dugout located next to the main structure. The floor wall, reinforced with T-iron, was 1.0 m thick and protected against divisional artillery shells.
All observation posts were equipped with signaling devices hung at the doors of the shelters for serving personnel. The signaling devices were activated by wires stretched from them to the observation post.
Commander's observation posts, as a rule, had telephone communications.

Shelters for troops

The Germans set up dugouts and niches under the parapet as shelter for the units occupying the first trench. One dugout was built for 4-5 people and a niche for 1-3 people. The dugouts had lined walls and coverings of two or three rows of logs. The niches were covered with cobblestone frames. Near each machine gun platform, a sub-parapet dugout was installed for the crew and the machine gun.
For soldiers to rest between battles, dugouts were built behind the trench. In order for vacationers to quickly take up firing positions, these dugouts were located at a distance of no more than 30-50 m from the trench and were connected to observation posts with sound alarms.
The dugouts erected near the second and third trenches were very diverse, but almost all of them were built for 8-10 soldiers.
Most of these dugouts had chopped walls and a covering of three to five rows of 20-25 cm logs. The covering logs were tied together with staples or wire. A waterproofing layer of clay 10-15 cm thick was laid between the second and third rows of logs. The dugouts were covered with a layer of soil 0.3-0.5 m thick.
The dugouts had metal or brick stoves, a table and benches. For rest, two-tier bunks or beds made of metal mesh were arranged.
Almost all dugouts, especially for officers, had windows opening onto special pits. As a rule, window openings were adapted for firing in case of self-defense.
In the summer, tables and benches were set up near the dugouts, and lawns were laid out.

The soldiers' dugouts (Fig. 23) were distinguished by their simplicity in their design and equipment - apparently, they were erected by the infantry themselves without the participation of sappers.

Officers' dugouts (Fig. 24) were basically no different from soldiers' dugouts; they were only better decorated inside, better equipped and had more light openings. Officers' dugouts usually had several rooms. For placing personal items, food, water, etc. niches were arranged. There were tables, benches, stoves. Walls and ceilings were often trimmed with clean birch poles or lined with boards. The floors were mostly made of planks.

In wooded areas there were often shelters built on the surface of the earth. Some of them, located at advantageous points, were well adapted for defense.
For water supply, existing wells and open reservoirs were used, and shaft and small-tube wells were installed. Wells were generally kept clean and had lids with locks.

Disguise

The methods and techniques of camouflage were simple; they all boiled down to the use of natural conditions and application to the terrain, as well as the use of improvised materials for camouflage work.
The requirements of camouflage were, first of all, strictly taken into account when placing fire installations and obstacles on the ground and when choosing the types of fortifications.
To disguise the maneuver with fire and manpower, as well as the movement of vehicles, mask fences were widely used. They were arranged 1.5-2.0 m high. Horizontal poles or several rows of wire were tied to vertical stakes; sometimes metal nets were stretched over the stakes. Various materials were woven over this base: brushwood, branches, grass, hay, straw, etc.
Such masks were often installed in open areas to hide structures and troop movements in the depths of the defense; mask-fences, as a rule, were installed on the parapets of trenches, open for crawling and bending movement.
False structures were occasionally encountered; They were located along with the real ones in open, clearly visible areas of the area.

Chapter 4
FORTIFICATION EQUIPMENT OF SEPARATE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPTH OF DEFENSE

Artillery positions in the depths of the defense were located in strong points and defense nodes, which provided artillery from direct attack by enemy tanks and infantry. In addition to the main position, one or two spare ones were arranged for each battery. The main and reserve positions were connected with each other by dirt roads for maneuvering artillery with wheels.
Positions were chosen in places sheltered from aerial surveillance: on the edges of forests, among bushes, among the ruins of settlements, etc.

The fortification equipment of artillery positions consisted of setting up command posts for battery (division) commanders and equipping firing positions. At the firing positions, there were gun trenches, shelters for crews (and sometimes for guns), consumable magazines for ammunition and a command post for the senior at the firing position. Gun trenches were often built on the surface of the ground (alluvial type), depending on the terrain.
The most typical example of firing position equipment is shown in Fig. 25.
In this case, a battery consisting of four guns occupied an area of ​​approximately 60X60 m. Distances of about 40 m were taken between the guns. The command post of the senior at the firing position was located in the center, which ensured that the battery’s fire was controlled by voice.
Gun trenches are built on the surface of the ground; their circular parapet 0.6-0.8 m high was made of soil and covered from the inside with poles. Two to four niches for shells were built in the trench.
Command posts, bases, warehouses, supply stations, etc. covered themselves with anti-aircraft artillery fire.

The layout of the anti-aircraft battery of 75-mm automatic guns is shown in Fig. 26. This battery was located in a forest area in a clearing 1.5-2.0 m in diameter.
The position had three gun trenches, dugouts for crews, storage magazines for ammunition and a command post.
Gun trenches are open areas (Fig. 27) built on the surface of the earth. The earthen parapets of the trenches, 1.15 m high, were lined from the inside.

Fig.27
An open area for an automatic anti-aircraft gun and a dugout for crews

knurled, laid between the racks. The crew dugouts were located next to the trenches. To construct the dugouts, log houses of residential buildings were used, installed in pits 2.2 m deep. The covering of the log dugouts was insulated with a layer of hay, pine needles or soil. There were roofs over the dugouts. The dugouts had daylight, brick ovens and bunks for people to rest. The dugout was separated from the trench by an entrance vestibule.

The command posts of the formation headquarters (Fig. 28) were located in areas inaccessible to tanks and had a developed all-round defense, consisting of a number of strong points occupied by reserves and direct security of the headquarters. Strong points were located on the main directions and roads coming from the enemy. Characteristic of the fortification equipment of command posts is the compact, concentrated arrangement of all elements of the headquarters and especially the operational group, as well as relatively little protection from fire weapons. Almost no heavy fortifications were erected.
For the immediate defense of the command post, a circular trench was opened with rifle cells and platforms for heavy and light machine guns, machine gunners and anti-tank guns equipped in it. Minefields were laid in tank-dangerous areas. In some areas, wire obstacles were installed: reinforced fences, nets on low stakes, etc.

An example of command post equipment is shown in Fig. 28. The command post was located in the village of Pesochnaya. The workrooms, grouped into three groups, were located on both banks of the river. Sand (Fig. 28, A).
The location of individual buildings of one of the groups is shown in Fig. 28, B.
The working premises were pit-type structures, most of them cut into the steep banks of the river. They had daylight and were equipped for work and rest. The plan of the largest of these rooms is shown in Fig. 28, V. For shelter during an air attack, dug slots were built near the work premises.
All rear targets were prepared for immediate all-round defense. One of the typical examples of fortification equipment of the rear clothing and food warehouse of the corps is shown in Fig. 29. The warehouse was located in the forest; storage facilities were sheds made of poles and brushwood; Some of the property was stacked and covered with tarpaulins. Both sheds and stacks were camouflaged from aerial surveillance with improvised materials, vegetation, and brushwood. The section of the road adjacent to the warehouse was masked with horizontal masks. The ring road, which ran through the forest, was not camouflaged.
For immediate defense, a rampart of logs 1.1-1.4 m high was built around the warehouse. The rampart was equipped with open rifle cells and machine-gun platforms. Directly behind the shaft, on the inner side, a communication passage with a depth of 0.6 m was opened.

The construction of the defense of the Nazi troops discussed above and the fortification equipment of the defensive lines allow us to draw several main conclusions.
1. The fascist German army, in conditions of positional defense, starting in 1942, switched to the complete equipment of the occupied lines.
2. In order to ensure broad maneuver of manpower and firepower along the front and from the depths, the fascist German army used a system of trenches and communication passages as the basis of fortification equipment. This method of equipping defensive lines was not accidental; it was used by the Germans until the end of the war.
3. The Germans paid special attention to the choice of the front edge of the main defensive line. The leading edge was chosen in such a way that in front of it in a zone of 200-400 m it was possible to organize powerful flanking and oblique fire, as well as create fire bags.
4. The fortifications used by the Germans were mostly primitive in design and varied in layout and design. Most structures were protected from fragments of small-caliber mines. Reinforced and heavy structures were rarely erected; Such structures were mainly observation posts and dugouts, located mainly in the depths of the defensive zone. For construction, improvised materials were widely used.
5. The observation and guard service and the simplest signaling allowed the Germans to keep the main forces in the shelters of the second and subsequent trenches and ensured
timely occupation of their positions on alarm.
6. Camouflage discipline was strictly carried out throughout the entire combat life of the garrison. Both individual fortifications and the entire fire system were carefully camouflaged, using terrain conditions and available means. Vertical masks are widely used.
The gaps between strongholds and defense centers were the most poorly equipped in terms of fortification. They were the most vulnerable places in the German defense.

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In this guide, we will tell you about Warfronts in WoW Battle for Azeroth and their impact on the development and progression of your character.

0. How to get to the battle front in WoW?

If your faction controls a battle front, then you can queue for the front through the Front Map, which is located in the capital of your faction in Battle for Azeroth. If your faction does not control the front, then you can simply fly to the Arathi Highlands, but in this case you will only be able to kill monsters and players of the opposing faction.

1. Cycle of battle fronts

Battlefronts are full-scale battles between the Alliance and the Horde. This is cyclical content in which one of the factions controls the area (that is, has access to rare monsters, world bosses and corresponding loot), and the second, meanwhile, strengthens its position (surrenders items, gold, Resources for war). When the second faction fulfills the requirements, a battle takes place. Contribution to support battle fronts is taken into account for the entire region (similar to the Mage Tower from the Broken Shore). Each player who makes a contribution receives Azerite and reputation as a reward. After the battle, control of the area passes to the second faction, and the first begins to collect resources for the next battle.

2. Where to start

After the front opens, you will be able to complete simple introductory tasks - explore the surrounding area and make your first deposit. DO NOT CONTRIBUTE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO DO SO AS ASSIGNED! If you deposit too early, you will have to wait an extra day to complete the trial. In other words, wait until a yellow exclamation mark appears on the map among the blue exclamation marks.

3. Contribution to the development of the battle front

Contributions to the development of the battle front can be gold, Resources for war, or items created through professions. You can contribute daily and receive reputation as a reward, which is necessary for progress in the military campaign.

If you want to support your faction with gold, complete the quest Frontline Support: Gold (Alliance) / Frontline Support: Gold (Horde). This requires only 100 gold. This is a small amount that can be invested every day without much damage to the budget. The reward for each of these tasks is 500 units. Azerite and 150 units. reputation with or . Each daily task to contribute to the development of the front gives 500 units. Azerite and 150 units. reputation with the 7th Legion or the Army of Honor. Reputation with these factions is required to gain access to the Mag'har and Dark Iron dwarves. In one day you can complete 10 tasks. To do this you will need 100 gold, 100 Resources for war and various items made using professions. As a reward you will receive 1500 reputation and Azerite 500. The contribution accelerates the development of the front and brings the battle closer, during which you can get a level 370 item, as well as fight the world boss and rare monsters from the Arathi Highlands.

After the expansion launches, items created using professions will probably be expensive, but over time you will be able to buy them at auction without going broke. Characters who accept contributions may ask you for different items, so you can stock up on the auction for future use. Here is a list of items and materials that may be required to support the battle front.

Profession	Item(s)
Alchemy/Herbalism	Steelskin Potion x2 or Shore Mana Potion x20
Blacksmithing/Mining	Monelite-Reinforced Horseshoes x2 or Monelite-Reinforced Stirrups x2 or Monelite Ore x60
Cooking/Fishing	Seasoned Loin or Meaty Ham x60
Enchanting	Enchant Ring - Mark of Critical Strike x3 or Enchant Ring - Mark of Versatility x3
Engineering	Crow's Nest Scope x6 or Frosted Ammo
Typeface	War Scroll of Battlecry x3 or War Scroll of Intellect x3
Jewelry	Any cut stone of unusual quality x15
Leatherworking/Skinning	Drums of the Maelstrom or Rough Leather Horse Armor x2 or Rough Leather x60
Tailoring	Battle Banner: Quick Harvest or Sea Flax x60

It is currently unknown how many weekly contributions can be made and how long each faction will control the front. Based on data received on September 4, 2018, it can be assumed that the Hordes will gain access to the front within three days, after which the Alliance will begin to gather resources for a new offensive.

We plan to collect information about the materials that need to be handed over every day, in order to then determine patterns and calculate the moments for their profitable purchase and sale. On September 4, 2018, the situation on the American servers could have given the Horde:

• 100 gold

If you play on European servers and have similar information, we'd love to read your comments. If you play for the Alliance, please collect data for us as soon as you have the opportunity to contribute to the development of the front. This will help us create reliable material lists and forecast future material requirements.

4. Strategy for battle fronts

It is impossible to lose a battle at the front, but this does not mean that you should let things take their course. If your faction wins the battle faster, you will gain access to world bosses earlier.

During the battle, you can participate in combat operations or collect resources. If you're not dressed too well, you'd be wiser to go for resources. If you like collecting resources, the choice is also clear, because most will probably want to fight. If you belong to this very majority, join the detachment and go to seize positions.

4.1. First stage

At the moment there is only one battle front in the game, in the Arathi Highlands. A player entering the battle front for the first time finds himself in enemy territory and must defeat a mini-boss. After the boss dies, you need to capture the nearest mine and mill. At the mine and mill you need to collect Iron and Wood, which are necessary for construction. If there are too many people at the mine, go to the mill or vice versa. If you have a connection with other players in the group, invite them to split up and go to the mine and mill in equal groups.

4.2. Second phase

You can build buildings at the front that will speed up the victory of your faction. The faster you collect resources, the faster you can build buildings.

• Town Hall→ Fortress→ Lock- The Town Hall and its improved analogs speed up the collection of Iron and Wood, at the second level they give access to barracks and the commander, and at the third they increase the damage from siege weapons and give access to the commander’s special ability.
• Altar of Storms→ This building gives the player a powerful boost in exchange for resources - Raging Power increases maximum health, outgoing damage and healing by 10%, stacks up to 4 times; also grants the Storm Call effect when finding Storm Essence (a rare item that can be dropped from defeated enemies).
• Barracks - this building allows you to hire troops that will defend your base and attack opponents. The resource required for hiring is iron.
• Mill - this building allows you to exchange resources for weapons and armor for units.
• Workshop - this building allows you to construct combat vehicles that provide a quick victory.

Priorities for the assembly team

1. Collect 140 units. iron and 140 units. wood and build barracks.
2. Collect 260 units. iron and 140 units. wood and build a mill.
3. Collect 260 units. iron and 140 units. wood and build an altar to the storm.
4. Collect 380 units. iron and 180 units. wood and upgrade the town hall to a fortress.
5. Collect 500 units. iron and 220 units. wood and build a workshop with siege engines.
6. Collect 620 units. iron and 260 units. wood and improve the fortress to the castle.

All collectors should remember that iron is usually required more than wood, so it needs to be collected more actively. The construction of barracks and a mill significantly increases the combat power of the units, and the construction of an altar of the storm - the combat power of the players themselves. Upgrading the town hall to a fortress speeds up the process of collecting resources and the production of siege engines in the workshop, that is, it enhances the destructive potential of the entire team. Further improvement of the fortress further speeds up the process of collecting resources, allows you to hire additional troops and build siege engines.

In the process of collecting resources, a team of collectors needs to respond to waves of enemies and protect the mine and mill from them. Build and upgrade buildings until three cars appear in the workshop. After that, focus on producing vehicles and defending your base.

While one team is collecting resources, the other team must capture strategic points on the map.

Attacking team priorities

1. Capture Novozemie to be able to recruit stronger troops.
2. Capture the Nest to allow your siege engines to pass through the center of the map unhindered.

After that, help the assemblers to speed up the process of building machines, break through the enemy gates as early as possible and gain access to the enemy commander.

4.3. Third stage

At this stage, you need to finish off the surviving opponents and take what is rightfully yours. Escort the siege engines to the gate, destroy the gate and kill the enemy commander. In the third stage, collectors and attackers must act together. After destroying the gate, go into the courtyard in an orderly manner, kill the boss and celebrate your victory.

5. World bosses on the Battle Front

The faction that controls the battle front has access to world bosses: Howl of Death for the Alliance and Lion's Roar for the Horde. Bosses drop level 370 equipment equivalent to heroic loot, as well as special toys. The Alliance toy is called the Toy Siege Tower, and the Horde toy is called the Toy War Machine.

6. Awards and loot from Battle Fronts

The faction that controls the front also has access to treasures and rare monsters.

Five mounts

• Donkey - drops from Overseer Crix, who is located at coordinates (27,56) for the Horde and (33,37) for the Alliance (in both cases in the cave)
• Headpiece - falls from Headpiece, which is located at coordinates (57, 46)
• Swift albino lizard - drops from Tamer Kama, which is located at coordinates (67,66)
• Direwing of the Wither Skin tribe - drops from Nimar Soulkiller, which is located at coordinates (67,61)
• Alliance only, Highland Mustang - dropped by Doomrider Helgrim, who is located at coordinates (54,57)
• Horde only, Bruised Highland Mustang - drops from Knight-Captain Aldrin, who is located at coordinates (49,40)

9 pets

• Escape Aldrius - drops from Tree Lord Aldriya, who is located at coordinates (22,22)
• Plague Egg - drops from the Plague Buzzard, which is located at coordinates (38,61)
• Fozruk fragment - drops from Fozruk, which walks along the road with a point (51,53)
• Fluffy rustle - falls from Yadomar, which is located at coordinates (57,53)
• Evil-looking egg - drops from Brightbeak, which is located at coordinates (18,28)

Established in 1939–1940, after the annexation of the Baltic states, Western Belarus, Ukraine, Western Ukraine, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, along the old state border there was also a line of fortified areas, which was conventionally called the Stalin line. In Soviet times, domestic researchers and other authors describing the initial period of the war unanimously stated that in the early 40s the fortifications of this line were mothballed and their equipment was dismantled. Therefore, they simply preferred not to mention the reasons for the enemy’s rapid breakthrough of the fortified areas of the second line.

One day I came across issues of the almanac “Military Historical Archive”, in which the memoirs of V.A. were published. A recruit who in 1941 was the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. He writes, in particular:

“Due to the sharp deterioration of the situation at the front, our 6th Army began, by order, to withdraw from the intermediate line Krasnoe - Rohatyn to the old state border to the line Novograd-Volynsky - Shepetivka - Starokonstantinov - Khmelnitsky (Proskurov). All our hope was in fortified areas. We believed that the fortified areas were already occupied by garrisons who, having let us through, would greet the Germans with dignity. And we, having rested and received reinforcements, will go on a counter-offensive. The troops could no longer bear the word “withdraw.” Even ordinary soldiers demanded to stop the retreat and go on the offensive. And we, the staff, relied on fortified areas...

Before leaving for the old border, the army commander ordered me to inspect the Starokonstantinovsky fortified area, assess the old fortified zone and its readiness for defense. It was also proposed to choose a place where it would be better to position the retreating troops.

By car I drove through Volochysk, Podvolochysk, Starokonstantinov. I drive, I drive, I carefully examine the area. And I’m perplexed, annoyed at myself, at my inability to detect pillboxes. Good, I think, intelligence officer-general staff!

Having lost hope of finding fortified areas, I ask one old man:

Grandfather, tell me, where do the military live here, right in the field, in the ground?

Ah! Why are you asking about bunkers? And they have been gone for a long time. Everything was destroyed and transferred to the collective state department. At the same time we keep salted cabbage and cucumbers there.

I decided that my grandfather was fooling me. He put him in the car and drove him to Starokonstantinov to the chairman of the collective farm. However, the chairman had already managed to evacuate. We found a deputy. I ask him:

Is it true that you took all the defensive structures for vegetable storage?

“That’s right, comrade commander,” he answers, “some of them were blown up, and some were handed over to us.” We store vegetables in them.

Come with me and show me where these pillboxes are.

We drove along the defensive line for two hours. I examined many bunkers, that is, former bunkers. Some were actually razed to the ground, while others contained collective farm vegetables.

I was dumbfounded. There was no defensive line. Our hopes for the possibility of a respite, for reinforcement with weapons and manpower collapsed.”

Of course, I, who was not a direct participant in the events of the summer of 1941, do not have the moral right to trust or categorically refute eyewitness accounts. But as a military historian, I have the opportunity to express my opinion on this issue.

Regarding the destruction of bunkers along the old USSR border in the summer of 1940 and spring of 1941, I want to express complete distrust to the author. Firstly, there was neither any particular need nor strength to rush to destroy the bunkers at that alarming time. Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. would not have allowed this. Shaposhnikov, who was directly responsible in the People's Commissariat of Defense for fortified areas. Secondly, during my service in the Carpathian Military District, in particular in Khmelnitsky, I personally saw the bunkers of the Stalin line in an undestroyed state. But if in some areas they were nevertheless blown up on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, then this cannot be regarded as anything other than the sabotage activities of the commanders of the troops of the border military districts.

Now regarding the transfer of bunkers in fortified areas to local collective farms. This statement also does not stand up to criticism. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, any military facility was specially registered not only by the People's Commissariat of Defense, but also by the NKVD. No agreements were found between these two departments regarding the write-off of these objects. Moreover, there are instructions from the People's Commissar of Defense to leave certain forces to guard defensive structures along the line of the old state border. It is unlikely that the district commanders decided to transfer military facilities to collective farms by their decision.

And finally, V.A.’s statement seems completely ridiculous. Novobets that the bunkers of the fortified areas at the end of July 1941 were adapted by collective farmers for storing vegetables and therefore could not be used to strengthen the defense of the retreating Red Army troops. Firstly, at this time of year, collective farms had not yet made any large vegetable reserves for the winter, since potatoes, cabbage, beets, carrots and other vegetables were harvested only at the end of summer and beginning of autumn. This means that at the end of June 1941, all collective farm vegetable storage facilities were empty. Secondly, even if there were some kind of containers (barrels, boxes) in the bunkers, it only took a few hours to clean them, and in war conditions, any commander or commander could, under the threat of execution, involve the local population for this.

Thus, the work of V.A. The new recruit cannot in any way serve as a basis for assessing the condition of the fortified areas located on the old border of the USSR. It can only be assessed from the position that the author thus tried by all possible means to justify the command of the 6th Army, which failed to fulfill the defensive task assigned to it.

At the same time, the question quite legitimately arises as to whether the Soviet command had enough forces to stop the enemy’s advance at the old state border.

Operational calculations show that the Soviet troops were not doomed to find themselves under a sudden first strike by the enemy. According to the Cover Plan, the first echelon of armies was supposed to have 63 divisions, of which more than 75% were located at a distance of up to 50 kilometers from the border. In the second echelon of the armies there were 51 divisions, including 24 tank, 12 motorized, 4 cavalry, which were 70–90 kilometers from the border. Another 45 divisions, located at a distance of 100 to 350 kilometers from the border, were in the reserve of district (front) commanders. Also on the territory of the border districts, at a considerable distance from the state border, there were 11 divisions that were directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Red Army.

Thus, the enemy's sudden first strike could only hit a small part of the covering troops. The main forces remained in depth and, if necessary, could occupy one or more rear defense lines, and when breaking through each of these lines, the enemy had to lose forces, means and time. But it was necessary to be able to conduct not only positional, but also maneuverable defense.

The First World War showed the exceptionally high effectiveness of positional defense. Therefore, the defense, which was built in accordance with the Field Regulations of the Red Army of 1929, was positional defense in nature. This meant that the main defensive forces were located within the first line, and it itself was designed to ensure that “the advancing enemy must be defeated before he approaches the front edge of the defensive line by fire from successively engaging fire weapons (artillery, machine guns and rifles) , concentrated along predetermined lines.”

Of course, positional defense is good. But it can be fully realized only when all available forces and means take their positions before the enemy begins the offensive. At the beginning of the war this is practically impossible to do. It is impossible to keep millions of people, tens of thousands of machine guns and thousands of artillery pieces in trenches for years near the state border, aimed at a potential enemy, who is given the right to decide for himself when to launch an offensive.

In this case, another defense could be more effective, in which only duty forces and assets are located directly at the border, and the main troops are located in depth. In this case, the enemy is deprived of the opportunity, having achieved the surprise of the outbreak of hostilities, to hit the main forces of the defending side with artillery fire and military strikes. Its powerful first blow will fall on the forces on duty, which must determine the time of the start of hostilities, the composition and direction of the enemy’s main attacks, and also inflict maximum defeat on them before the main forces enter the battle at a prepared defensive line located in the depths of their territory. The combat regulations provided for such defense, and they called it “mobile” or “maneuverable.”

At the same time, the pre-war regulations did not provide an accurate description of this defense and the procedure for its conduct, which gave rise to various discussions. Moreover, young Soviet military leaders, who grew up in the battles of the Civil War and were brought up on the ideas of world communism, had an extremely negative attitude towards defense, and even more so towards mobile defense, which allowed the temporary abandonment of one’s territory. The slogan “Beat the enemy on his own soil” sounded too often and was perceived as a program for action.

Nevertheless, the Temporary Field Manual of the Red Army of 1936 (PU-36), which mainly deals with positional defense, also discusses mobile defense. The same thing happens in the 1939 Draft Field Regulations.

But in practice, during the training of commanders, commanders, staffs and troops, defensive topics are worked out extremely rarely, and mobile defense is not worked out at all.

In 1940, the next draft of the Field Manual of the Red Army was published. It also covers mobile defense. With regard to mobile defense, all the wording of the draft Field Regulations of 1939 was generally retained. However, some provisions have received more specific development. In particular, requirements were established for the distance of intermediate boundaries from each other.

At the December meeting of the highest command of the Red Army in 1940, the commander of the Siberian Military District, Lieutenant General S.A., sharply spoke out against the mobile defense. Kalinin. In particular, he said: “I believe that the unfortunate expression in our charter is “mobile defense”... We must remember that where there is no determination to fight, depth will not save. I believe that the main thing is the decision to fight, and we must fight with all our might, starting from the battalion commander and ending with all command levels, be sure to put all our strength into the work we have begun... I believe that the defense must be tough and the order for it must be given to every commander - die, but protect your defense area."

This was the opinion of the majority of Soviet military leaders of that time, but not all. Thus, in his concluding speech, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko paid special attention to defense issues. He noted that positional defense should be understood as defense, “which aims to hold a specific area prepared for defense.” But “if a defense, with a lack of forces and means to create a positional defense, is built on the principles of mobile actions of troops and strives to weaken the enemy, preserve one’s strength, even sometimes without taking into account the loss of space, then this will be a maneuverable defense.”

S.K. Timoshenko believed that “in the first case, it is necessary to create and develop a defensive zone and protect it by all means; in the second, defense is based on quick and sudden counterattacks or retreat to a new line.”

This was precisely the situation at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when border corps, divisions and regiments were subjected to a sudden strong attack by the enemy, but the main forces of the armies and military districts located in the depths were practically undamaged. Also, already on the first day of the war, the forward line of fortified areas in the directions of the enemy’s main attacks was broken through, but in the depths there remained an equally powerful second line, located along the old border of the USSR. Almost ideal conditions were created for conducting mobile (maneuverable) defense. But the Soviet command, which had never practiced such defense, seemed to have suddenly forgotten about its existence. Troops from the depths, without proper knowledge of the situation, were thrown forward into oncoming battles, which they entered in parts, at different times, at random lines and without proper preparation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the results of these battles for the Soviet troops were truly catastrophic.

Thus, it must be admitted that the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war did not seem to master the art of defense at all. It was not possible to organize the overwhelming majority of defensive battles of the divisions; not a single defensive battle was organized on the scale of an army corps, much less a defensive operation on the scale of armies covering the state border. From the very first days, a retreat began everywhere, which in many directions resembled a disorganized flight. Almost without a fight, advantageous natural borders along the rivers, large cities, and then the line of fortified areas along the old border of the USSR were abandoned. It seemed that the experience of positional defense during the First World War and the provisions of combat regulations and instructions of the interwar period had been completely forgotten.

Losses have always been used as criteria for the military art of the warring sides. Moreover, one must understand that, according to the logic of military art, the defending side, which makes extensive use of the terrain and various engineering obstacles, should suffer fewer losses than the attacking side. But at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, quite the opposite happened.

The Military Diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, indicates that from June 22 to July 13, 1941, the total losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces on the Eastern Front amounted to 92.1 thousand people.

Moreover, it is known that during the strategic defensive operation in the Baltic states during the first 18 days of the war, Soviet troops retreated 400–450 kilometers, losing 88.5 thousand people. During the defensive operation in Belarus, they retreated 450–600 kilometers in 18 days, losing 417.8 thousand people. During the defensive operation in Western Ukraine, they retreated 300–350 kilometers in 15 days, losing 241.6 thousand people. Thus, in the first 18 days of the war alone, the losses of Soviet troops (not counting the Arctic) reached almost 748 thousand people.

From all this, one conclusion suggests itself: the Soviet leadership and the high command of the Red Army at the beginning of the war simply “forgot” or did not “want” to remember the statutory provisions on maneuver defense, although they should have been law for any lower-level commander. Such disregard for the law (a set of well-established and well-known provisions) in an extreme situation (enemy aggression) cannot be regarded other than as betrayal at the highest level. At the same time, it must be said that a number of fortified areas of the Stalin Line still fulfilled their function.

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