On September 18, 2016, elections to the State Duma of the country will be held in all populated areas of the Russian Federation (cities, towns, villages). The original Election Day date of December 4 has been changed. Due to the prematureness of the elections and early termination of work, all re-elected deputies will receive monetary compensation during the period of unemployment. Representatives of 14 parties are competing for seats in the Duma, but not all of them will gain the required number of “percentages”. In the question of who will win the State Duma elections in 2016, there are many aspects that are not yet fully understood, although the three leaders in opinion polls have already been determined. According to the results of a voter survey and the opinion of experts, three parties will definitely enter the State Duma: United Russia, LDPR and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
Who will win the State Duma elections in 2016 - expert opinion
According to experts, despite the rapid decline in trust in the United Russia party, the majority of Russians who fear change will still support United Russia. In percentage terms, the number of seats for deputies from United Russia can range from 40% to 55%: September is still far away, and changes are constantly taking place in the political arena of Russia and the world. In the summer of 2016, the popularity of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s party, the LDPR, grew at an all-time high. Thanks to the well-thought-out policy pursued by the party and the charismatic, original personality of Vladimir Volfovich himself, the LDPR “took away” a huge part of the percentage of voters from “United Russia” and “A Just Russia”. From the very beginning of the Crimean events, the LDPR supports the decision of the Crimeans and the position of the Russian President, which is also approved by the majority of the country’s citizens. In addition, the liberal democrats “took” part of the electorate from the communists. Gennady Zyuganov is supported by many pensioners and young communists, but their number is smaller than those who adhere to the LDPR party line. However, it is these three parties, among which United Russia is likely to receive the majority of votes, that will determine who will implement reforms and pass laws in Russia, starting in September 2016.
Who will win the State Duma elections in 2016, forecast
According to the forecast of most political scientists, the United Russia party will win the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in 2016. The number of seats going to representatives from the Communist and Liberal Democratic parties is likely to be approximately the same. About 28-30% of all deputies will be represented by these parties. Most likely, deputies from Yabloko and PARNAS will enter the State Duma. Today, on social networks, in particular, such as VKontakte and Facebook, groups have been created where community members discuss the upcoming Duma elections in 2016 and the likelihood of who will win the fight. In almost each of these communities, a mini-vote is carried out for a particular party. Today, independent voters are going to support the parties United Russia, Parnas, LDPR and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Do not forget that the majority of VK users are young people, so the picture (from an age point of view) is incomplete. It is with the aim of understanding who supports whom in the future Duma that public opinion polls are conducted.
Who will win the State Duma elections in 2016, results of the opinion poll
According to the latest summer polls of Russians, in the elections in State Duma At least 45% of Russian citizens are planning to take part. For some, this percentage may seem low, but in previous elections to the State Duma, the number of citizens participating in them was less than half of the electorate. Today, more than half of those who will take part in the elections on September 18 will vote for United Russia. About 15% of citizens are confident that they will support the LDPR, and about 20% - the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Today, about 4% of voters would vote for A Just Russia, while Yabloko is still trusted less (about 2%). About 2% of Russians surveyed generally stated that they intended to spoil the ballots in some way; the same number plans to vote “against all”, crossing all parties off the ballot. The latter are confident that no matter the balance of power, United Russia will win the elections, and it is simply impossible to change anything here.
Today, not only experts and political scientists know for sure the answer to the question of who will win the State Duma elections in 2016. Their forecasts completely coincide with the opinions of the majority of people expressed during opinion polls conducted both in the capital and in other cities of the country. The leader will be the United Russia party, but the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party will definitely enter the parliament. The percentage of deputies from the remaining 11 parties participating in the elections to the State Duma is difficult to predict. The situation is changing every day, which is especially dangerous for the Yabloko and A Just Russia parties, which are almost confident of overcoming the required 5% barrier and receiving required quantity votes.
Predicting the mood and choices of citizens is difficult. Photo by Vladimir Smirnov/TASS
United Russia will strengthen its position in the next State Duma, and Rodina can count on the creation of a single-member faction. This is the conclusion reached by the authors of the expert survey of the Deputy Club project. In their opinion, only the Duma four have a chance of entering parliament on the party list. Appearance large number reports with the same conclusions may be due to the Kremlin’s desire to prepare voters for the inevitability of victory for the party in power.
In principle, this alone raises questions about representativeness: is it possible to generalize these data and claim the objectivity of the forecast? In fact, it’s unlikely, but this research is notable for several other reasons.
Among the trends of the current election campaign are a shift in the degree of struggle to single-member districts, unpredictability of results, and competitiveness. As for the last point, as experts emphasize, “not party brands, but individuals” will compete. Meanwhile, the expectations of party headquarters significantly exceed the number of deputy mandates. Political scientists predict intense competition in 67 single-mandate constituencies - although without explaining what these territories are.
It is interesting how exactly the difference between expectations and forecasts is distributed. For example, United Russia plans to recruit 171 deputies in single-mandate constituencies. Experts’ forecast – 159. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation expects 42 victories, while political scientists give them only 24. And further: “A Just Russia” – 28 (versus 15), LDPR – 14 (7), “Rodina” – 6 (5) , Party of Growth" - 4 (4), "Yabloko" - 3 (3). That is, the error in the forecasts of the party in power is insignificant, while for the parliamentary opposition it is somewhere around 50%. It’s even worse for self-nominated candidates – 15 versus 4. However, it is noteworthy that experts recognize the possibility of independent candidates getting into the Duma, because previously they did not give them the slightest chance.
In general, the forecast for the elections, according to the report, is the kind of campaign the Kremlin would like to see. A big lead for United Russia, in the future – the majority of self-nominated candidates joining the faction of the party in power, a full range of political structures in the future Duma. As a result, “direct representation of voters and territories in the Duma will improve the quality of parliamentary work.” According to the aggregate estimate - including single-mandate members and list members - the next convocation will look like this: United Russia will have 279 mandates, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation will have 69, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Socialist Republic will have 41 each, Rodina will take 5, all the rest will take 15.
Thus, the new State Duma, according to experts, will be replenished with one more or less large “single-mandate faction,” that is, the Rodina party. Non-parliamentary structures have no chance of passing the five percent barrier: they will recruit 15 deputies in the districts, and then either join the existing Duma factions or form their own, but extremely small ones: “Patriots of Russia” and “Civil Platform”, according to the forecast, have two seats in parliament. At the same time, the party in power will improve its position through single-member districts. Let us remind you that the alignment in the outgoing Duma is as follows: United Russia – 238 deputies, Communist Party of the Russian Federation – 92, SR – 64, LDPR – 56.
It must be said that in Lately There is a veritable wave of expert reports on election forecasts. Some people think that this is a competition between pro-government political scientists, others think that we're talking about about the Kremlin’s safety net: they say that the regions have their own risks and their own problems, and therefore the presidential administration, through political strategists, is trying to prepare the public for them. In other words, research on this topic has itself become a trend, in which a number of commonplaces can be traced.
For example, no one is talking about the prematureness of the forecasts: single-mandate constituencies continue to be replenished with new election participants, and until the entire composition has been formed, until the Central Election Commission has checked all the data and sifted through the candidates, it is not entirely correct to judge the future so confidently. In addition, experts, despite the fact that the forecasts were made ahead of schedule, stubbornly do not give the slightest chance to anyone from the non-parliamentary opposition, thus forming a new trend - no one except the current Duma parties will overcome the five percent barrier. But what is the basis for confidence in the conditional weakness of Yabloko or the no less conditional strength of Rodina is not entirely clear. Media patriotic rhetoric or assumptions about social consolidation around paternalistic leaders, to whom experts usually appeal, are all rather ideas that exist in the virtual plane.
Reality is formed at the local level, and the situation in Russian regions is changeable. Citizens have suffered a number of painful financial and social blows, and it is difficult to predict their mood. Chairman of the Board of the Center for Political Technologies Boris Makarenko and head of the program “Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions” of the Carnegie Moscow Center Andrei Kolesnikov in their report “Elections 2016: Routine or Change?” do not rule out the possibility of consolidation of dissatisfied voters around Yabloko. Although they also admit that the likelihood of such an option is extremely low.
As for the forecast for the election results, experts from the International Institute newest states”, it would seem, they themselves are directing United Russia into an electoral trap. Today there is a lot of talk about the lack of a catalyst to unite the non-systemic opposition and revive the “angry citizen”. Hypothetically, the improved result of the party in power through single-mandate constituencies could become the spark for the flame of protest. If United Russia takes fewer mandates than expected, then what is the price for such forecasts by political scientists?
Apparently, expert reports need to be considered in their entirety, but with a shift in emphasis to an analysis of the reasons for their occurrence. It is quite possible that this is not preparation for any possible problems and not competition, but informational artillery preparation before the massive entry of United Russia into the State Duma. All studies are focused on single-member constituencies, through which United Russia will secure a majority. It is much more difficult to challenge the victory of one or another candidate there than on the party list, because it is not parties that are fighting, but individuals. This means that the chances of political protest by those who are dissatisfied with the election results are minimized.
Post-election conflict in this situation is significantly reduced. Let us recall that the reform of the electoral system with the transition to mixed type elections was a consequence of the street protests of 2011–2012. For the current election cycle, the government has created a showcase of democracy. But behind it, if we continue this thought, there is still hidden the goal of improving the position of the authorities themselves.
Optimists will attribute the relatively small number of detailed forecasts for the outcome of the September State Duma elections to the unpredictability of the upcoming campaign, while pessimists, on the contrary, will grumble something in the spirit of “what to predict - everything is clear!” Everyone chooses their side, but not “Bottom Now”! We will try to acquaint our readers with all notable statements on this topic - both Nizhny Novgorod and federal.
In the vanguard (which is probably logical) is the Civil Society Development Foundation, which is close to the Kremlin, and its director, Konstantin Kostin. In today's lengthy interview, he trashes the “non-system people,” reassures supporters of the current government and pours balm on the soul of romantics who are waiting for fair competition. We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of publishing full text interview.
– What are the forecasts for the State Duma elections, how much will they differ from the 2011 elections, and how can they affect the composition of the Duma? mixed system?
– All forecasts indicate that four parliamentary parties will definitely overcome the five percent barrier on the list.
The first place will most likely be taken by United Russia. And nothing changes here.
If we talk about other parties, many believe that, in addition to those already represented in parliament, Yabloko has a chance to overcome the 5% barrier, but I don’t really believe in it. If you look at the current polls, the rating of this party does not yet give reasons for optimism, but the Yabloko single-mandate members may perform well. Let's say that Vladimir Ryzhkov has good chances in Barnaul, there are a number of other strong candidates, but let's first wait for their nomination.
If we are talking about list competition, I think that the main struggle will take place between the Duma parties. By the way, there are some intrigues there. This is a question of second place: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Liberal Democratic Party. In my opinion, the situation here is extremely unstable, since lately the LDPR has been pushing the Communists under pressure. Although, of course, much will depend on what programs and slogans these parties will launch into the campaign.
Of course, if we are talking about the number of factions, then in any case the Communist Party of the Russian Federation will be in second place. Because even if they do not perform very convincingly on the list, then at the expense of strong single-mandate candidates (this includes Leonid Kalashnikov, Vladimir Bortko, Vadim Solovyov and others) they will restore their status quo.
– How much more competitive will this company be than in 2011? What will be the price of the mandate in votes?
– I think the competition will be much higher. First of all, this is due to the fact that not 7, but 14 parties will take part in the elections to the State Duma of this convocation, and, of course, with the return of elections in single-mandate constituencies. Therefore, of course, the more applicants for one mandate than more campaigns, the higher the competition. It will not be easy to win even for strong politicians who have a good level of fame and who actively worked in their region during the inter-election period.
Plus, there is an important difference from 2011: simultaneously with the State Duma elections, 38 campaigns for elections to the legislative bodies of the constituent entities will be held. That is, this is the imposition of the regional agenda on the federal one and, as a result, higher competition between regional elites and parties within the regions.
– How will the return of the majoritarian election system, when 50% of candidates will be elected from lists and 50 from single-mandate constituencies, affect the new composition of the Duma? Will it be reflected at all?
- Strongly. By the way, this is another of the intrigues of this campaign - the parties have politicians who are able to work effectively in single-member districts. It seems to me that it is extremely important that regional elites and residents of the constituent entities will receive their representatives in the federal parliament. This will balance the system as a whole – party and political. In addition, this will give good opportunities to expand political representation in the next Duma.
When we talked about list competition, as I already said, the composition of the parties that will overcome 5% is unlikely to change.
But if we are talking about campaigns in single-member districts, then we see that quite a lot of parties have strong politicians who can win in single-member districts, who have the starting capabilities to gain a mandate. And there are such candidates large quantity parties. For example, Rodina, Patriots of Russia, and the Party of Growth.
So, it seems to me that the return of elections in single-member constituencies will certainly help expand political representation, and, as a result, improve its quality. That is, more views, approaches, ideas, ideological positions will be presented in the State Duma of the 7th convocation.
– And if we compare the political situation in 2011, in your opinion, how different are protest activity and the level of support for the authorities?
– The initial conditions of the 2016 campaign are determined by several factors: high rating president and political institutions, as well as a completely different political competitive environment. In this sense, the initial conditions of 2011 were no worse or better, they were different. Yes, there was no crisis then, but now there is one. But the main electoral consequences of any economic crisis have a delayed effect; they will definitely make themselves felt in a few years at the elections various levels. Despite the fact that people say that they feel the crisis themselves, that their lives have worsened in some aspects, nevertheless, this has not yet had a decisive impact on political preferences and social well-being.
– Will United Russia be able to repeat its result this time – 49%? In your opinion, it can be higher, lower, and on what factors it will depend?
– Any election is a period of serious fluctuations in ratings, especially for the ruling party, which is in the zone of criticism, primarily from opponents who are multiplying their information activity, and, consequently, the volume of reproaches to the authorities. That's okay, though.
At the beginning of the electoral cycle, the rating of the party in power always decreases, not only in our country, but as it approaches election day, it increases, including as a result of information and campaign work. Therefore, calling interest rates now is akin to fortune telling with a crystal ball. For correct forecasts of the election result as a whole, a sociological cross-section is needed, made in conditions close to the voting day itself. But the limits within which the EP result will be according to the list are already obvious today - it is 40-50%. In my opinion, the lower “point of resistance” is somewhere around 43-45%.
In addition, United Russia candidates appear to be favorites in more than 70% of single-member constituencies. So consider what happens. I'll make a reservation that election campaign- this is a multifactorial process, and the final result of all participants in the race will depend on their work, in fact, within the framework of the campaign - information and propaganda, on the mistakes of opponents, and on the economy, and on external factors, and, even if you want, on the weather. In any case, I think that the elections will be interesting and difficult for all parties.
- Why?
– Firstly, because, as I already said, competition has increased. Secondly, we are still in a difficult economic situation. Now 14 parties of various ideologies will participate in the elections. It seems to me that any citizen will find someone to vote for. At the same time, let’s not forget that the four parliamentary parties plus Yabloko, according to the results of long-term polls and electoral statistics, express the political preferences of approximately 85-90% of Russian citizens. So newcomers do not have a very wide potential electoral base.
– They only have 10% left?
We are talking rather about a “redistribution of spheres of influence.” The newcomers have a free niche - 10-15%, and plus they need to somehow win back the established base electorate from these heavyweights.
– Will these non-parliamentary parties lose their desire to participate in election campaigns? They also have to calculate, it’s expensive.
For newcomers (non-parliamentary parties), these elections are, to a certain extent, the moment of truth. In order to remain in politics after the current electoral cycle, they ideally need to achieve two targets during the campaign: gain more than 3% in order to qualify for state funding, or gain representation in the federal parliament at the expense of single-mandate voters. Or better yet, both.
These are absolutely necessary conditions in order to develop the party over the next 5 years. For those who cannot do this, it will be much harder. Many of them will slowly cease to exist de facto, will go into sleep mode or into discharge public organizations. This is also normal. 
– At the beginning of the year, United Russia loudly announced that it would abandon the practice of “steam locomotives”. But we recently learned that they will still be there; in a number of regions, the lists will once again be headed by governors. What do you attribute this to? Is it a lack of staff or something else?
– I think that United Russia was misunderstood here. She abandoned the nomenclature principle of forming lists. That is, because the regional list should a priori be headed by the governor. It is not right. But in those regions where the governor is actively involved in the life of the party, he has high level support among the population, this is justified, especially if the structure of the electoral list allows it.
Any governor should strive to be not only an effective public administrator, but also a political leader in the subject.
Therefore, there is a mutual interest here. It is quite natural that regional heads are engaged in political work, including participating in federal elections.
– How do you assess the chances of the opposition liberal parties? What will their role be?
– We have already talked about Yabloko. I think that Parnas has no chance at all of getting any noticeable results on the list. It will be within the statistical error range - less than 1%. Here, to determine the rating, you will probably need a microscope. The last asset that Parnas has left is to nominate strong, more or less recognizable candidates in those districts in which they have a chance of winning. But looking at what is happening with the primaries in the democratic coalition, at their internal squabbles, at how decisions are made there, I strongly doubt that they will do this either. Unfortunately, pragmatism and common sense give way to unfounded ambitions and reckless struggle with each other. Just some kind of constant dizziness from unachieved successes.
– Regarding the protest agenda. How much will it be in demand?
– She will first of all be in demand by the Duma opposition. And all parties will build their campaigns on this. To a greater extent the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. But this will also be present in the rhetoric of both the LDPR and A Just Russia.
But, in my opinion, society’s demand is absolutely obvious not only for criticism, but also for specific proposals, for a clear image of the future, supported by real deeds. Because it’s not enough to say that everything is bad, you need to offer something.
This is precisely the question of programs, the question of serious proposals for the development of the country. I often argue with communists on various talk shows, where they criticize everything very well. I ask them, well, let’s say you got the majority, what will you do next? And then some fragmentary sentences or tired quotes are heard that are very reminiscent of the ideas that led to the collapse great country. I think that if people listen to all this carefully, then instead of additional votes the communists will lose a lot.
– What will the voters themselves ask for? What will they be willing to vote for?
– It seems to me that there are several completely obvious public demands. Firstly, it is an increase in the level of professional competencies. Moreover, you don’t have to be an expert in everything. You can be a specialist in one or two areas, because people understand that one person cannot understand all the problems that exist in our country: in law, in economics, in politics, and in the public sphere. But they want their representatives of interests in parliament to be experts and controllers of various government bodies. This is a very clear request, it is visible in all studies.
Secondly, of course, this is the localization of the agenda, especially if we are talking about elections in single-member districts.
There, in essence, a contract is concluded with voters. And the greatest success will be those candidates who will say absolutely clearly what exactly they will do in the 5 years of the next convocation, how and what they are going to decide.
Thirdly, this is a request for an update. The voter wants to see new faces in the new Duma. And we must pay tribute to United Russia, which, unlike other participants in the election race, both through the procedure preliminary voting, and through other internal party mechanisms, offers voters a largely updated composition of candidates for deputies, which is very different from the current deputy corps.
– In your opinion, what percentage of representation in the new Duma can the ONF as a political force count on?
– I wouldn’t talk about percentages. Representatives of the ONF, who will become candidates based on the results of the United Russia preliminary vote, have very good opportunities for election.
– Could the number of ONF candidates double compared to this convocation?
– I think that the ONF has a real prospect of expanding its representation in the State Duma. An analysis of the past primaries of United Russia showed that about a hundred “front-line soldiers” have good chances, first of being included in the lists and nominated in single-mandate constituencies, and then of being elected. Also, do not forget that the ONF also includes representatives of other parties, not only United Russia. They also have a real chance of being elected to new line-up parliament.
– In general, should the ONF be perceived as an independent political force?
– The ONF, of course, has emerged as a national independent socio-political movement of V.V. Putin’s supporters. This makes it possible for representatives of a wide variety of parties to participate in it. Today it is Rodina, Patriots of Russia, and A Just Russia. But the main political interface of the ONF is, of course, United Russia.
– Which regions may turn out to be the most competitive in these State Duma elections?
– It will be possible to give serious forecasts only after the nomination of candidates is completed. Today, more than seven dozen parties have such an opportunity, and let’s not forget about possible self-nominated candidates. But of course, 99% of this issue will be resolved by representatives of 14 parties who have a “federal license.” So far, only United Russia has an understanding, which has made the selection process open and involved citizens in determining their candidates through the preliminary voting procedure. All the other parties, so to speak, are still whispering on the sidelines. Although, there are certain positive developments. Recently, V. Zhirinovsky stated that the LDPR will begin to use the primaries procedure in its work from the next electoral cycle. All this says that public and open procedures for identifying candidates are the correct and popular way to develop the party system.
Obviously, there will be high competition wherever strong candidates meet. Of course, there is an agreement on the exchange between parliamentary parties, but it will include a maximum of 40 constituencies. In a significant portion of the remaining 185 single-member constituencies, we will probably see serious competition.
Traditionally, elections in the capitals - in Moscow and St. Petersburg - are of particular interest, and a high intensity of the struggle is possible in Siberia - in the Irkutsk, Novosibirsk and Omsk regions, in Far East.
– In 2011, some of the worst results for United Russia were in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, in the Smolensk region, in Perm region. In your opinion, has the situation changed in these regions?
– In Vladivostok, by the way, there were also one of the worst results, in Kirovskaya and Yaroslavl regions. Over the past 5 years, United Russia has done serious work on its mistakes and not only restored its positions, but also seriously improved them.
– But not the political and elite alignments within the regions?
– They also changed. Because the political configuration is largely determined by local and regional elections. After all, the issue of power is decided on them. And everywhere throughout recent years, these elections are over. There were even more of them than before, because gubernatorial elections were added. So it is better to focus on their results than on the results of the 2011 Duma campaign.
– The 2011 elections led to significant mass unrest in Russia. Then we remember what the “swamps” were like and everything else. Some believe that the National Guard appeared in Russia because there was political instability in the country. Should we expect any protests or discontent as a result of this campaign?
– There are no grounds for serious protest activity. Over the past few years, much has been done to avoid the crises of trust and representation that emerged in the wake of the 2011 elections. If we talk about the crisis of representation, then on the eve of the elections significant social groups took shape that did not receive their representation in parliament. Although these groups themselves were quite inert and, as a rule, did not go to elections or voted according to the principle only not for “United Russia”, they were dissatisfied with the absence of their representatives in the State Duma.
Today, as we said, 14 parties offering a variety of approaches, ideologies and programs can nominate their candidates without collecting signatures. Not to mention single-mandate seats. Voters are offered a very broad political menu.
As for the crisis of confidence, then quite serious efforts were made to discredit the Russian electoral system both within the country and by various foreign organizations, which articulated and scaled up imaginable and inconceivable violations. Of course, elections are always a clash of positions, interests and ambitions, so some conflict situations possible. But large-scale unrest requires serious reasons, and today there are none. The main task of election organizers today is to ensure that they are conducted openly, honestly and transparently. In this sense, it is appropriate to recall the words of the curator of domestic policy V.V. Volodin that one should not chase percentages, but think about ensuring that the election results are legitimate and inspire the confidence of voters. And in any case, talking about the National Guard in the context of elections, in my opinion, is incorrect and inappropriate.
– Now some politicians say that in Russia there are always forces interested in a coup, in the Maidan. In your opinion, is this true or not? Will they be able to take advantage of the situation?
– This is partly true. Forces exist, but they do not have opportunities. There are political characters who do not have serious support in society, but really want to be in power. Many of them are abroad and, in general, understand perfectly well that within the framework of the electoral process provided for by the constitution and legislation, they have no chance: no one in Russia will ever vote for them. But you really want power, and then the only one possible variant- This is an illegitimate scenario.
Khodorkovsky declares his desire to head the interim government. Mikhail Borisovich apparently decided to become the new Kerensky. He wants to gain power without going through constitutional procedures. In essence, we are talking about the usurpation of power that belongs to the people.
The main task of the interim government, according to Khodorkovsky, is to create conditions for new “real” elections. This is the scenario of a color revolution. Please note, we are talking about “real” elections, not fair ones. And the real elections, according to the oligarchs, are those elections that their proteges can win. And those elections in which they do not win are unreal and dishonest. Such a complex, confusing logic of Mr. Khodorkovsky. And in general, fair elections as a result of unconstitutional actions is an oxymoron.
Kasparov generally believes that the whole country must first repent: everyone who voted for United Russia and Vladimir Putin must go through the repentance procedure. It is not clear, however, how and, most importantly, why. For your views and preferences, for the freedom of choice that liberals love to gossip about? You probably need to come to Garry Kimovich personally and ask for forgiveness. And, apparently, only those who are forgiven will be allowed to vote. This will be stronger than the property qualification. These are our liberals. Within the framework of a legitimate electoral process, they have no chance of winning the elections. That's why they make such strange statements.
– That is, they want to win elections in Russia, essentially, with zero ratings...
“They don’t want to win elections, they want to gain power.” Elections are good for them only if they can get a noticeable result from them. But since the ratings are close to zero, they are forced to rave about interim governments, the collapse of the regime and other illegitimate scenarios. Can Kasyanov win the elections? No. Khodorkovsky maybe? No. Kasparov maybe? No. Even abroad, everyone understands perfectly well that it is impossible to impose on our country the power that our citizens do not want to see. But they will certainly add some wood to the protest fire. Another thing is that this fire is unlikely to flare up. Because there is no real electoral base, there are no big social groups ready to support this.
– How would you assess the impact of the sanctions on domestic policy in Russia? In your opinion, what role did the West actually play?
– I have repeatedly said that the West does not understand the Russian mentality. In Russia it is impossible to achieve anything using external pressure, much less change the mood of people. This is where we can unite. It wouldn't hurt to just open it and read the story. Even in the version as American historians write.
Moreover, known fact that any pressure automatically causes consolidation around the leader. This is absolutely normal. This is such a reaction - since we are under pressure, it means we need to unite and resist it. This is normal for the national identity of any country, even a very small one. What can we say about Russia? With its potential - economic, scientific, human, and military. With its history, with its traditions. Unreal!
There is another important manifestation of sanctions in our social and political life. They, in fact, crossed out all pro-Western liberal party projects. Because it was the leaders of our non-systemic opposition that supported the sanctions. That is, they stood in solidarity with those who are against the country. This is a very simple matrix.
– That is, everyone feels bad, but I will support economic pressure and a decrease in income...
- Yes, this is an old Bolshevik principle: the worse, the better. Let it be even worse for the country and people, then maybe I, the oppositionist, will feel better.
The sanctions led to an increase in the government's ratings. Firstly, the president, because he is seen as a leader who is able to withstand external pressure and, accordingly, develop the country. Secondly, United Russia and, by the way, other parliamentary parties, including opposition ones, because they unanimously supported all the president’s foreign policy initiatives. And these are the two main consequences of the sanctions - an increase in the rating of the president and government institutions in general, as well as drawing the final line under pro-Western liberal projects.
Pre-election congresses were held in the country, and the election campaign began. Well, the FBK sociological service decided to do the first survey of this political season with party ratings.
You yourself would like to know with what numbers this campaign begins, and you will probably be interested in unbiased sociology.
Not to say that everyone is in great excitement about upcoming elections, although 56% of citizens know for sure that there will be elections to the State Duma in the fall:
Many opinion polls traditionally show high turnout and this one was no exception. In 2011, the official turnout was about 60%, but the real turnout, cleared of falsehoods, was probably around 50%.
Almost half of voters have not decided who they will vote for. These “undecided” votes will be distributed among the parties, and in the end, not necessarily in the same proportion as the votes of those voters who already confidently declare their support for one or another party. The practice of past years shows that the result of United Russia falls closer to the elections.
Overall, the results of our poll were quite close to the results of the latest Levada Center poll, except that they predicted very low turnout.
If you adjust for the difference in turnout, then all the interesting things are the same:
The LDPR is challenging the communists for second place;
SR is balancing on the verge of passing the barrier;
Non-parliamentary parties are not even close to becoming parliamentary.
However, our survey was still on the eve of the congresses. Now we want to conduct another one and examine party ratings more carefully, taking into account clarity about who is participating in the lists. Find out who people generally know among those who lead their parties.
Therefore, we are recruiting volunteers to help us with this survey. As usual: we are responsible for training and strict adherence to the most advanced sociological methods, and you are responsible for conscientious work under the supervision of experienced people.
Come, help us provide citizens with the necessary sociological data and see for yourself that ours is the most honest.
The initiative survey was conducted on July 22–25, 2016 on a representative all-Russian sample of the urban and rural population among 1,600 people aged 18 years and older in 137 settlements in 48 regions of the country.The study is conducted at the respondent's home using personal interviews.The distribution of answers is given as a percentage of total number respondents along with data from previous surveys.
Statistical sampling error 1600 people(with probability 0.95) does not exceed:
3.4% for rates close to 50%
2.9% for rates close to 25%
2.0% for rates close to 10%
1.5% for indicators close to 5%
WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS MOST ACCURATELY REFLECT YOUR INTENTION TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA OF RUSSIA? (one answer)
|
Sep. |
Sep. |
Sep. |
Sep. |
Sep. |
Jan. |
Feb. |
Mar. |
Apr. |
May. |
Jun. |
Jul. 16 |
|
| I am sure that I will not vote in the State Duma elections | 25 | 19 | 16 | 19 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 14 |
| I doubt I'll vote | 13 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 11 |
| I don't know whether I'll vote or not | 17 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 24 | 20 | 22 | 25 | 26 | 20 | 25 |
| Most likely, I will vote in the State Duma elections | 18 | 16 | 22 | 28 | 32 | 30 | 30 | 32 | 26 | 25 | 27 | 26 |
| Absolutely, I will vote in these elections (of course, unless nothing happens to me before that moment) | 24 | 37 | 33 | 20 | 24 | 21 | 21 | 19 | 21 | 19 | 21 | 20 |
| Difficult to answer | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
(one answer; closed question; in % of ALL SURVEY PARTICIPANTS)
| Jan.16 | Feb.16 | Mar.16 | Apr.16 | May.16 | Jun. 16 | Jul.16 | |
| United Russia (D. Medvedev) | 39 | 40 | 40 | 42 | 35 | 35 | 39 |
| 10 | 10 | 13 | 10 | 14 | 11 | 10 | |
| 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 10 | |
| 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | |
| PARNAS (M. Kasyanov) | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | 1 |
| Apple (E. Slabunova) | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | 1 |
| – | – | <1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Youth Party (V. Popov)* | – | – | – | – | – | – | <1 |
| Civil force (K. Bykanin) | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | <1 |
| Party of Growth (B. Titov) | – | – | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 |
| – | – | – | – | <1 | <1 | <1 | |
| 1 | <1 | 1 | 1 | <1 | 1 | <1 | |
| Homeland (A. Zhuravlev) | <1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | <1 | <1 | <1 |
| – | – | – | – | <1 | <1 | <1 | |
| Patriots of Russia (G. Semigin) | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 |
| Other | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | <1 | <1 |
| – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |
| No, I don’t know which party I would vote for | – | 10 | 11 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| I wouldn't vote | 19 | 16 | 12 | 10 | 12 | 14 | 11 |
| No, I don’t know if I would vote or not | – | 11 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 10 |
| Difficult to answer | 22 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
IF THE STATE DUMA ELECTIONS WERE HELD THIS SUNDAY, WOULD YOU TAKE PART IN THESE ELECTIONS, AND IF SO, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? (one answer; closed question; in %% of those respondents WHO ARE READY TO VOTE IN THIS ELECTION AND HAVE DECIDED ON THE PARTY)
| Jan.16 | Feb.16 | Mar.16 | Apr.16 | May.16 | Jun.16 | Jul.16 | |
| United Russia (D. Medvedev) | 65 | 64 | 59 | 60 | 53 | 55 | 57 |
| Communist Party (CPRF) (G. Zyuganov) | 16 | 17 | 19 | 15 | 21 | 18 | 15 |
| Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) (V. Zhirinovsky) | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 15 |
| A Just Russia (S. Mironov) | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| PARNAS (M. Kasyanov) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Apple (E. Slabunova) | 1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | 1 | 1 |
| Communists of Russia (M. Suraikin) | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Youth Party (V. Popov)* | – | – | – | – | – | – | <1 |
| Civil force (K. Bykanin) | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | <1 |
| Party of Growth (B. Titov) | – | – | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | <1 |
| Russian environmental party “Greens” (A. Panfilov) | – | – | – | – | <1 | <1 | <1 |
| Civil platform (R. Shaikhutdinov) | 1 | <1 | 1 | 1 | <1 | 1 | <1 |
| Homeland (A. Zhuravlev) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | <1 | 1 | <1 |
| Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice (E. Artyukh) | – | – | – | – | <1 | <1 | <1 |
| Patriots of Russia (G. Semigin) | 1 | <1 | <1 | <1 | 1 | <1 | <1 |
| Other | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | <1 | <1 |
| She would have ruined/taken away the ballot | – | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
* For the purpose of the experiment, the respondent was offered a fictitious party on the card among the list of real parties, which received 0.3% of the votes from all respondents.
IN YOUR VIEW, THE FOLLOWING PARTIES EXPRESS THE INTERESTS OF WHICH CLASSES OF THE POPULATION?
| Communist Party of the Russian Federation | UNITED RUSSIA | LDPR | A JUST RUSSIA | APPLE | PARNASSUS | |
| 6 | 30 | 9 | 6 | 12 | 12 | |
| 6 | 23 | 9 | 6 | 9 | 7 | |
| 8 | 26 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 5 | |
| 3 | 28 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1 | |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 2 |
| 15 | 13 | 16 | 13 | 6 | 3 | |
| 17 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 7 | 3 | |
| 31 | 8 | 17 | 15 | 3 | 2 | |
| 23 | 3 | 9 | 10 | 2 | 1 | |
| Everyone without exception | 15 | 25 | 19 | 14 | 8 | 5 |
| Difficult to answer | 24 | 15 | 27 | 37 | 55 | 71 |
Dynamic data
IN YOUR VIEW, UNITED RUSSIA EXPRESSES THE INTERESTS OF WHICH CLASSES OF THE POPULATION? (multiple answers possible)
| Jun.03 | Jan.04 | Oct.07 | Jul.11 | Jul.16 | |
| “Oligarchs”, bankers, large entrepreneurs | 18 | 18 | 21 | 40 | 30 |
| “Siloviki”: employees of special services, army, Ministry of Internal Affairs | 12 | 22 | 16 | 32 | 28 |
| Federal and regional officials, bureaucracy | 16 | 19 | 20 | 34 | 26 |
| Everyone without exception | 5 | 14 | 16 | 20 | 25 |
| “Directorial corps”: managers of large enterprises | 15 | 19 | 19 | 32 | 23 |
| “Middle class”: people with above-average incomes | 17 | 22 | 15 | 16 | 13 |
| Intellectuals: teachers, doctors, engineers, ordinary specialists | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 8 |
| “Ordinary people”: employees, workers, rural workers | 16 | 19 | 15 | 11 | 8 |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 4 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 8 |
| 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | |
| Difficult to answer | 23 | 13 | 20 | 10 | 15 |
IN YOUR VIEW, THE INTERESTS OF WHAT STRATS OF THE POPULATION IS EXPRESSED BY THE CPRF? (multiple answers possible)
| Jun.03 | Jan.04 | Oct.07 | Jul.11 | Jul.16 | |
| “Ordinary people”: employees, workers, rural workers | 37 | 39 | 26 | 40 | 31 |
| The poorest segments of the population, the unemployed, the disadvantaged people | 29 | 27 | 20 | 30 | 23 |
| Intellectuals: teachers, doctors, engineers, ordinary specialists | 15 | 16 | 11 | 20 | 17 |
| “Middle class”: people with above-average incomes | 10 | 12 | 8 | 14 | 15 |
| Everyone without exception | 4 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 15 |
| Federal and regional officials, bureaucracy | 6 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 8 |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| “Directorial corps”: managers of large enterprises | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| “Oligarchs”, bankers, large entrepreneurs | 4 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| “Siloviki”: employees of special services, army, Ministry of Internal Affairs | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Difficult to answer | 22 | 21 | 38 | 23 | 24 |
IN YOUR VIEW, DO THE LDPR EXPRESS THE INTERESTS OF WHICH CLASSES OF THE POPULATION? (multiple answers possible)
| Jun.03 | Jan.04 | Oct.07 | Jul.11 | Jul.16 | |
| Everyone without exception | 4 | 9 | 9 | 14 | 19 |
| “Ordinary people”: employees, workers, rural workers | 9 | 22 | 9 | 17 | 17 |
| “Middle class”: people with above-average incomes | 9 | 15 | 10 | 15 | 16 |
| Federal and regional officials, bureaucracy | 12 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 11 |
| Intellectuals: teachers, doctors, engineers, ordinary specialists | 4 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 11 |
| “Oligarchs”, bankers, large entrepreneurs | 13 | 8 | 13 | 14 | 9 |
| “Directorial corps”: managers of large enterprises | 10 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 |
| The poorest segments of the population, the unemployed, the disadvantaged people | 5 | 14 | 5 | 9 | 9 |
| “Siloviki”: employees of special services, army, Ministry of Internal Affairs | 10 | 12 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 7 |
| Difficult to answer | 39 | 29 | 44 | 26 | 27 |
IN YOUR VIEW, THE INTERESTS OF WHICH CLASSES OF THE POPULATION IS EXPRESSED BY A FAIR RUSSIA? (multiple answers possible)
| Jan.04 | Oct.07 | Jul.11 | Jul.16 | |
| “Ordinary people”: employees, workers, rural workers | 29 | 14 | 19 | 15 |
| Intellectuals: teachers, doctors, engineers, ordinary specialists | 15 | 8 | 18 | 15 |
| Everyone without exception | 9 | 7 | 9 | 14 |
| “Middle class”: people with above-average incomes | 15 | 10 | 15 | 13 |
| The poorest segments of the population, the unemployed, the disadvantaged people | 15 | 8 | 8 | 10 |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 5 | 4 | 9 | 8 |
| Federal and regional officials, bureaucracy | 4 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
| “Directorial corps”: managers of large enterprises | 3 | 8 | 9 | 6 |
| “Oligarchs”, bankers, large entrepreneurs | 3 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| “Siloviki”: employees of special services, army, Ministry of Internal Affairs | 7 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| Difficult to answer | 34 | 47 | 37 | 37 |
INTERESTS OF WHAT STRATEGES OF THE POPULATION DOES PARNAS, IN YOUR VIEW, EXPRESS? (multiple answers possible)
| Jul.11 | Jul.16 | |
| “Oligarchs”, bankers, large entrepreneurs | 8 | 12 |
| “Directorial corps”: managers of large enterprises | 4 | 7 |
| Federal and regional officials, bureaucracy | 3 | 5 |
| Everyone without exception | 3 | 5 |
| Intellectuals: teachers, doctors, engineers, ordinary specialists | 2 | 3 |
| “Middle class”: people with above-average incomes | 2 | 3 |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 1 | 2 |
| “Ordinary people”: employees, workers, rural workers | 2 | 2 |
| Poor people, unemployed, disadvantaged people | 1 | 1 |
| “Siloviki”: employees of special services, army, Ministry of Internal Affairs | 1 | 1 |
| Difficult to answer | 79 | 71 |
IN YOUR VIEW, APPLE EXPRESSES THE INTERESTS OF WHICH CLASSES OF THE POPULATION? (multiple answers possible)
| Jun.03 | Jan.04 | Oct.07 | Jul.11 | Jul.16 | |
| Oligarchs,” bankers, large entrepreneurs | 9 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 12 |
| “Directorial corps”: managers of large enterprises | 9 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 9 |
| Everyone without exception | 2 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 8 |
| Federal and regional officials, bureaucracy | 8 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 7 |
| Cultural and scientific elite | 16 | 19 | 12 | 11 | 7 |
| Intellectuals: teachers, doctors, engineers, ordinary specialists | 26 | 29 | 11 | 11 | 7 |
| “Middle class”: people with above-average incomes | 19 | 21 | 10 | 7 | 6 |
| “Ordinary people”: employees, workers, rural workers | 7 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| “Siloviki”: employees of special services, army, Ministry of Internal Affairs | 3 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 VKontakte |