August putsch
Mass demonstrations in Moscow against the August 1991 coup.
	The planned transformation of the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States with the initial participation of only the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR./p>
Primary goal:	Stop the collapse of the USSR and prevent it from turning into a confederation.
	The failure of the coup. The political victory of Boris Yeltsin, the failure of the signing of a new Union Treaty between the republics of the USSR, a significant weakening of the positions of the CPSU, the formation of the State Council, consisting of the President of the USSR and the heads of the union republics.
Organizers:	State Emergency Committee of the USSR
Driving forces:	State Emergency Committee Political support in the RSFSR: Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union Russia Communist Party RSFSR Union republics that supported the State Emergency Committee: Azerbaijan Azerbaijan SSR Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Belarusian SSR International support for the State Emergency Committee: Iraq Iraq Libya Libya Serbia Serbia Sudan Sudan Palestine flag PLO
Opponents:	RSFSR: Russia Defenders of the White House Russia Supreme Council of the RSFSR Russia Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Russia Administration of the President of the RSFSR Russia Lensoviet, and its defenders Republics that rejected the acts of the State Emergency Committee: Latvia Latvian SSR Lithuania Lithuanian SSR Moldova Moldavian SSR Estonia Estonian SSR International condemnation of the State Emergency Committee: EU Flag European Parliament United States of America USA
Dead:
Those injured:	Unknown
Arrested:

August putsch- an attempt to remove M. S. Gorbachev from the post of President of the USSR and change the course he was pursuing, undertaken by the self-proclaimed State Committee for state of emergency(GKChP) - a group of conservative conspirators from the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR government, the army and the KGB on August 19, 1991, which led to radical changes in the political situation in the country.

The actions of the State Emergency Committee were accompanied by the declaration of a state of emergency for 6 months, the deployment of troops to Moscow, the resubordination of local authorities to military commandants appointed by the State Emergency Committee, the introduction of strict censorship in the media and the banning of a number of them, and the abolition of a number of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. The leadership of the RSFSR (President B.N. Yeltsin and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR) and some other republics, and subsequently also the legitimate leadership of the USSR: President M.S. Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR qualified the actions of the Emergency Committee as a coup.

The goal of the putschists

The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, should have begun on August 20 during the first stage of signing a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR, and the remaining future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.

One of the first statements of the State Emergency Committee, disseminated by Soviet radio stations and central television, indicated the following goals, for the implementation of which a state of emergency was introduced in the country:

It is worth noting that if a new agreement was signed and the existing management structure of the USSR was abolished, members of the State Emergency Committee could lose their senior government positions.
According to sociological research Foundation "Public Opinion" conducted in 1993, the majority (29% of respondents) said that the goal of the Emergency Committee was to seize power, and for this they wanted to “overthrow Gorbachev” and “prevent Yeltsin from coming to power” (29%). 18% express the idea that members of the State Emergency Committee wanted to change the political structure of society: “preserve Soviet Union“,” “bring back the old, socialist system,” and for this “establish a military dictatorship.”
In 2006, the former chairman of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, stated that the State Emergency Committee did not aim to seize power:

Timing

Members of the State Emergency Committee chose the moment when the President was away - on vacation at the Foros state residence in Crimea - and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.

State Emergency Committee forces

Active members and supporters of the State Emergency Committee

• Achalov Vladislav Alekseevich (1945-2011) - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Baklanov Oleg Dmitrievich (b. 1932) - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council
• Boldin Valery Ivanovich (1935-2006) - Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR
• Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich (1923-2009) - Commander-in-Chief Ground forces- Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Generalov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich (b. 1946) - head of security at the residence of the President of the USSR in Foros
• Kryuchkov Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1924-2007) - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
• Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich (b. 1932) - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
• Pavlov Valentin Sergeevich (1937-2003) - Prime Minister of the USSR
• Plekhanov Yuri Sergeevich (1930-2002) - head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR
• Pugo Boris Karlovich (1937-1991) - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
• Starodubtsev Vasily Alexandrovich (b. 1931) - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR
• Tizyakov Alexander Ivanovich (b. 1926) - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communications Facilities of the USSR
• Shenin Oleg Semenovich (1937-2009) - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee
• Yazov Dmitry Timofeevich (b. 1923) - Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Yanaev Gennady Ivanovich (1937-2010) - Vice-President of the USSR

Force and information support of the State Emergency Committee

• The State Emergency Committee relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dzerzhinsky Division) and the Defense Ministry (Tula Airborne Division, Taman Motorized Rifle Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional airborne units were transferred to the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Riga.

Commanded the troops Airborne generals P. S. Grachev and his deputy A. I. Lebed. At the same time, Grachev maintained telephone contact with both Yazov and Yeltsin. However, the State Emergency Committee did not have complete control over its forces; So, on the very first day, parts of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division, Yeltsin delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters.

• Information support for the State Emergency Committee was provided by the State Television and Radio of the USSR (for three days, news releases certainly included revelations of various acts of corruption and violations of the law committed within the framework of the “reformist course”), the State Emergency Committee also secured the support of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but these institutions were unable to have a noticeable impact on the situation in capital, and the committee was unable to mobilize that part of society that shared the views of the members of the State Emergency Committee.

Leader of the State Emergency Committee

Despite the fact that the nominal head of the State Emergency Committee was G. I. Yanaev, according to a number of experts (for example, former Lensoviet deputy, political scientist and polytechnologist Alexei Musakov), the real soul of the conspiracy was V. A. Kryuchkov. The leading role of Kryuchkov is repeatedly mentioned in the materials official investigation conducted by the USSR KGB in September 1991.

Despite this, according to Russian President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin:

Opponents of the State Emergency Committee

The resistance to the State Emergency Committee was led by the political leadership Russian Federation(President B.N. Yeltsin, Vice-President A.V. Rutskoy, Chairman of the Government I.S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R.I. Khasbulatov).
In an address to Russian citizens on August 19, Boris Yeltsin, characterizing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup, said:

Khasbulatov was on Yeltsin’s side, although 10 years later in an interview with Radio Liberty he said that, like the State Emergency Committee, he was dissatisfied with the draft of the new Union Treaty:

As for the content of the new Union Treaty, in addition to Afanasyev and someone else, I myself was terribly dissatisfied with this content. Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to a meeting on August 20? And finally, I convinced Yeltsin by saying that if we didn’t even go there, if we didn’t form a delegation, it would be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union. There was, after all, a referendum in March on the unity of the Union. Sixty-three percent, I think, or 61 percent of the population were in favor of preserving the Union. I say: “You and I have no right...”. That’s why I say: “Let’s go, form a delegation, and then we will motivate our comments on the future Union Treaty.”

White House Defenders

By call Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation (“White House”), among whom were representatives of various social groups- from the democratically minded public, students, intelligentsia to veterans of the Afghan war.

According to the leader of the Democratic Union party, Valeria Novodvorskaya, despite the fact that she was kept in a pre-trial detention center during the days of the coup, members of her party took an active part in street protests against the State Emergency Committee in Moscow.

Some of the participants in the defense of the House of Soviets, who were part of the “Living Ring” detachment on August 20, 1991, formed the socio-political organization of the same name, the “Living Ring” Union (leader K. Truevtsev).

Another socio-political association that formed near the Council House during the days of the putsch is the “Social-patriotic association of volunteers - defenders of the White House in support of democratic reforms - the “Russia” detachment.”

Among the defenders of the White House were Mstislav Rostropovich, Andrei Makarevich, Konstantin Kinchev, Margarita Terekhova, the future terrorist Basayev and the head of the Yukos company Mikhail Khodorkovsky

Background

• On June 17, Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics agreed on the draft Union Treaty. The project itself caused a sharply negative reaction from security officials from the USSR Cabinet of Ministers: Yazov (Army), Pugo (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Kryuchkov (KGB).
• July 20 - Russian President Yeltsin issued a decree on departition, that is, prohibiting the activities of party committees in enterprises and institutions.
• On July 29, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev met confidentially in Novo-Ogaryovo. They scheduled the signing of a new Union Treaty for August 20.
• On August 2, Gorbachev announced in a televised address that the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20. On August 3, this appeal was published in the Pravda newspaper.
• On August 4, Gorbachev went to rest at his residence near the village of Foros in Crimea.
• August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin and Gorbachev’s assistant Boldin meet at the “ABC” facility - the closed guest residence of the KGB at the address: Academician Vargi Street, possession 1. Decisions are made to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, to form the State Emergency Committee, to demand Gorbachev to sign the corresponding decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Yeltsin to be detained at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan for a conversation with Yazov, then act further depending on the results of the negotiations.

The beginning of the coup

• On August 18 at 8 o’clock in the morning, Yazov informs his deputies Grachev and Kalinin about the upcoming introduction of a state of emergency.
• 13:02. Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, General V.I. Varennikov and the head of the security of the President of the USSR Yuri Plekhanov fly from the Chkalovsky airfield on a TU-154 military aircraft (tail number 85605), assigned to the Minister of Defense Yazov, to Crimea for negotiations with Gorbachev in order to obtain his consent to declare a state of emergency. At about 5 p.m. they meet with Gorbachev. Gorbachev refuses to give them his consent.

• At the same time (at 16:32) all types of communications were turned off at the presidential dacha, including the channel that provided management of strategic nuclear forces THE USSR.
• On August 19, at 4 a.m., the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros. By order of the Chief of Staff of the USSR Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's flight assets are located - a Tu-134 plane and a Mi-8 helicopter.

Version by G. Yanaev

• According to GKChP member Gennady Yanaev, on August 16, at one of the special facilities of the USSR KGB in Moscow, a meeting was held between USSR Minister of Defense Yazov and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, at which the situation in the country was discussed. On August 17, at the same facility, a meeting was held with the same composition, to which the Chairman of the USSR Government, Valentin Pavlov, was also invited. It was decided to send a group of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to Foros to demand that Mikhail Gorbachev immediately introduce a state of emergency and not sign a new Union Treaty without an additional referendum. On August 18, at about 20:00, Yanaev, at the invitation of Kryuchkov, arrived in the Kremlin, where a meeting was held with a group of Politburo members who had returned from Foros from Gorbachev. Yanaev was offered to head the State Emergency Committee. After a long discussion, he agreed only around 1:00 on August 19th.

White House Defenders

August 19

• At 6 o’clock in the morning, the USSR media announced the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the inability of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev to perform his functions “for health reasons” and the transfer of all power to the State Emergency Committee. At the same time, troops were sent to Moscow.
• At night, Alpha moved to Yeltsin’s dacha in Arkhangelskoye, but did not block the president and did not receive instructions to take any action against him. Meanwhile, Yeltsin urgently mobilized all his supporters in the upper echelon of power, the most prominent of whom were R. I. Khasbulatov, A. A. Sobchak, G. E. Burbulis, M. N. Poltoranin, S. M. Shakhrai, V. N. Yaroshenko. The coalition compiled and faxed an appeal “To the Citizens of Russia.” B. N. Yeltsin signed a decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee.” Echo of Moscow became the mouthpiece of opponents of the coup.
• B. N. Yeltsin’s condemnation of the State Emergency Committee during a speech from a tank of the Taman Division at the White House. Russian President B.N. Yeltsin arrives at 9 o’clock The White house"(Supreme Council of the RSFSR) and organizes a center of resistance to the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Resistance takes the form of rallies that gather in Moscow near the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment and in Leningrad on St. Isaac's Square near the Mariinsky Palace. Barricades are being erected in Moscow and leaflets are being distributed. Directly near the White House there are armored vehicles of the Ryazan regiment of the Tula Airborne Division under the command of Major General A.I. Lebed] and the Taman Division. At 12 o'clock, from a tank, B.N. Yeltsin addresses those gathered for the rally, where he calls what happened a coup d'etat. From among the protesters, unarmed militia detachments are created under the command of deputy K.I. Kobets. Afghan veterans and private employees take an active part in the militia. security company"Alex." Yeltsin is preparing space for retreat by sending emissaries to Paris and Sverdlovsk with the right to organize a government in exile.
• Evening press conference of the State Emergency Committee. V.S. Pavlov, who developed a hypertensive crisis, was absent from it. The members of the State Emergency Committee were noticeably nervous; The whole world went around the footage of G. Yanaev’s shaking hands. Journalist T. A. Malkina openly called what was happening a “coup,” the words of the members of the State Emergency Committee were more like excuses (G. Yanaev: “Gorbachev deserves all respect”).

At 23:00, a company of paratroopers of the Tula Airborne Division on the 10th BRDM arrived in the vicinity of the House of Soviets. Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Major General A.I. Lebed, arrived with the fighters.

Plot in the program “Time”

• The USSR Central Television, in the evening edition of the Vremya program, unexpectedly airs a story prepared by its correspondent Sergei Medvedev about the situation at the White House, into which Yeltsin finds himself reading out the Decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee” signed the day before. In conclusion, S. Medvedev’s commentary is heard, in which he directly expresses doubts about the possibility of airing this story. However, the story was seen by a huge audience of television viewers throughout the country; it contrasted sharply with the rest of the content of the program (with stories in support of the actions of the State Emergency Committee) and made it possible to doubt the actions of the State Emergency Committee.
• The author of the story, Sergei Medvedev, explains his exit this way:

It is worth noting that in 1995, Sergei Medvedev became the press secretary of President Boris Yeltsin and held this post until 1996.

August 20

• By order of the State Emergency Committee, officers of the Ministry of Defense, KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs V. A. Achalov, V. F. Grushko, G. E. Ageev, B. V. Gromov, A. I. Lebed, V. F. Karpukhin, V. I. Varennikov and B.P. Beskov carried out preparations for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR by units of security forces. According to experts, the capture plan they developed was impeccable from a military point of view. Units totaling about 15 thousand people were allocated to carry out the operation. However, the generals responsible for preparing the assault began to doubt the feasibility. Alexander Lebed goes over to the side of the White House defenders. The commanders of Alpha and Vympel, Karpukhin and Beskov, ask Deputy Chairman of the KGB Ageev to cancel the operation. The assault was called off.
• In connection with the hospitalization of V. Pavlov, the temporary leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to V. Kh. Doguzhiev, who did not make any public statements during the putsch.
• Russia creates a temporary republican Ministry of Defense. Konstantin Kobets is appointed Minister of Defense.
• At 12:00, a rally sanctioned by the Moscow city authorities begins near the House of Soviets. Several tens of thousands of people gathered there. The organizers of the rally are the Democratic Russia movement and the Soviets labor collectives Moscow and Moscow region. The officially declared slogan of the rally is “For law and order”
• At 15:00 on the first channel of the USSR Central Television in the “Time” program, under conditions of strict censorship on other channels, an unexpected story was released, later described by the famous journalist E. A. Kiselyov:

I then worked at Vesti. Vesti was taken off the air. We sit, watch the first channel (...) And the announcer appears in the frame, and suddenly starts reading messages news agencies: President Bush condemns the putschists, British Prime Minister John Major condemns it, the world community is outraged - and at the end of the day: Yeltsin declared the State Emergency Committee outlawed, the Russian prosecutor, then Stepankov, initiates a criminal case. We are shocked. And I imagine how many people, including participants in the events who at that moment caught the slightest hint of which way the situation was swinging, ran to the White House to Yeltsin to sign their allegiance and loyalty. On the third day, in the evening, I meet Tanechka Sopova, who was then working in the Main Information Editorial Office of Central Television, well, hugs, kisses. I say: “Tatyan, what happened with you?” “And this is me, the Bad Boy,” says Tanya. I was the responsible graduate." That is, she was collecting a folder, selecting news. And there was an order: go and coordinate everything. “I come in,” he says, “once, and the whole synclite is sitting there and some people, complete strangers. They are discussing what to broadcast at 21:00 on the Vremya program. And here I am, little one, poking around with my papers.” She really is such a tiny woman. “They tell me in plain text where I should go with my three-hour news: “Do the layout yourself!” - well, I went and did it.”

According to Kiselyov, Tatyana Sopova is “a little woman, because of whom the putsch may have failed in August 1991.”

August 21

• On the night of August 21, tank units controlled by the State Emergency Committee carried out maneuvers in the area of ​​the White House (the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR). Supporters of Boris Yeltsin clash with a military column in the tunnel under New Arbat. (see Incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring)
• Alpha Group does not receive orders to storm the White House.
• At 3 o’clock in the morning, Air Force Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov suggests that Yazov withdraw troops from Moscow and that the State Emergency Committee “be declared illegal and dispersed.” At 5 o'clock in the morning a meeting of the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense was held, at which the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces supported Shaposhnikov's proposal. Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow.
• On the afternoon of August 21, a session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR begins, chaired by Khasbulatov, which almost immediately accepts statements condemning the State Emergency Committee. Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoi and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev fly to Foros to see Gorbachev. Some members of the Emergency Committee fly to Crimea on another plane to negotiate with Gorbachev, but he refuses to accept them.
• A delegation from the State Emergency Committee arrived at the presidential dacha in Crimea. M. S. Gorbachev refused to accept her and demanded to restore contact with outside world. In the evening, M. S. Gorbachev contacted Moscow, canceled all orders of the State Emergency Committee, removed its members from government posts and appointed new heads of the USSR law enforcement agencies.

August 22

• Mikhail Gorbachev returns from Foros to Moscow together with Rutskoi and Silaev on a Tu-134 plane. Members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.
• Moscow declared mourning for the victims. A mass rally was held on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment in Moscow, during which demonstrators carried out a huge banner of the Russian tricolor; At the rally, the President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia. (In honor of this event, in 1994 the date August 22 was chosen to celebrate the Day of the State Flag of Russia.)
• The new state flag of Russia (tricolor) was installed for the first time at the top of the Council House building.
• The defenders of the White House are supported by rock groups (“Time Machine”, “Cruise”, “Shah”, “Metal Corrosion”, “Mongol Shuudan”), who are organizing the “Rock on the Barricades” concert on August 22.

August 23

At night, by order of the Moscow City Council, in the presence of a massive gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

IN live Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree suspending the Communist Party of the RSFSR

Further events

On the night of August 23, by order of the Moscow City Council, in the presence of a massive gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

Live, Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree suspending the Communist Party of the RSFSR. The next day, Gorbachev announces his resignation as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The statement on this matter said:

The Secretariat and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee did not oppose the coup. Central Committee failed to take a decisive position of condemnation and opposition, did not rouse the communists to fight against the violation of constitutional legality. Among the conspirators were members of the party leadership; a number of party committees and the media supported the actions of state criminals. This put the communists in a false position. Many party members refused to cooperate with the conspirators, condemned the coup and joined the fight against it. No one has the moral right to indiscriminately accuse all communists, and I, as President, consider myself obligated to protect them as citizens from unfounded accusations. In this situation, the CPSU Central Committee must make a difficult but honest decision to dissolve itself. The fate of the republican communist parties and local party organizations will be determined by them themselves. I do not consider it possible for myself to continue to perform the functions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and am resigning the corresponding powers. I believe that democratically minded communists, who have remained faithful to constitutional legality and the course towards the renewal of society, will advocate the creation of a new basis a party capable, together with all progressive forces, of actively participating in the continuation of fundamental democratic transformations in the interests of working people.

Confrontation of the putschists in Leningrad

Despite the fact that the main events took place in Moscow, the confrontation between the State Emergency Committee and democratic forces in the regions, especially in Leningrad, also played an important role.

On the morning of August 19, the city radio and television broadcast: Appeal of the State Emergency Committee to to the Soviet people, a statement by Anatoly Lukyanov in his support, and after them - an appeal from Colonel General V.N. Samsonov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, whom the State Emergency Committee appointed military commandant of Leningrad. In it, Samsonov announced the introduction of a state of emergency and special measures in the city and surrounding areas, which included:

• a ban on holding meetings, street processions, strikes, as well as any public events (including sports and entertainment);
• prohibition of dismissal of workers and employees due to at will;
• a ban on the use of duplicating equipment, as well as radio and television transmitting equipment, the seizure of sound recording, amplifying technical means;
• establishing control over the media;
• introduction of special rules for the use of communications;
• restricting the movement of vehicles and conducting their inspection;

And other measures.

General Samsonov also announced the creation of an emergency committee in the city, which, in particular, included the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU Gidaspov.

The building of the Leningrad City Council (Mariinsky Palace), in which the democratic faction was the strongest, on August 19 turned into the headquarters of opposition to the coup, and St. Isaac's Square in front of it became a permanent spontaneous rally. Megaphones were installed on the square, transmitting the latest reports on events and speeches from the meeting of the Lensovet Presidium, which opened at 10 o'clock. The square and the streets adjacent to the palace, as well as the streets near the television center, were covered with barricades.

The mayor of the city, A. A. Sobchak, arrived in Moscow the day before to participate as part of the Russian delegation in the planned signing of a new Union Treaty. Having compiled, together with B.N. Yeltsin and other leaders of the democratic resistance, the text of the Appeal to the citizens of Russia, he flew to Leningrad at about 14:00. Immediately upon arrival, he went not to the Mariinsky Palace, as expected, but to the headquarters of General Samsonov, where he convinced the latter to refrain from sending troops into the city. He then spoke at an emergency session of the Leningrad City Council, which opened at 16:30, and later addressed the townspeople on television (on August 19, 1991, Leningrad television was the only one in the USSR that managed to air a program directed against the putschists). Together with Sobchak in the studio were Chairman of the Leningrad City Council Alexander Belyaev, Chairman of the Regional Council Yuri Yarov and Vice-Mayor Vyacheslav Shcherbakov. They ended their speech with a call to the townspeople: to go to Palace Square on the morning of August 20 for a protest rally.

On August 20, at 5 am, the Vitebsk Airborne Division of the KGB of the USSR and the Pskov Division of the USSR Ministry of Defense approached Leningrad, but did not enter the city, but were stopped near Siverskaya (70 km from the city). The movements of military units in the surrounding area and their pull towards the city continued on the night of August 21 (they were regularly reported by Radio Baltika), but in the end V. N. Samsonov kept his word to A. A. Sobchak and bring them into the city didn't.

At the rally on August 20 on Palace Square, in which about 400 thousand people took part, along with city leaders A. Belyaev, V. Shcherbakov and A. Sobchak, many prominent political and cultural figures (people's deputies M. E. Salye) condemned the State Emergency Committee and Yu. Yu. Boldyrev, poet and composer A. A. Dolsky, academician D. S. Likhachev and others).

The free radio stations Baltika and Open City continued to broadcast in the city.

Victims

• Architect of the design and construction cooperative "Kommunar" Ilya Krichevsky
• Participant of the war in Afghanistan, forklift driver Dmitry Komar
• Economist joint venture"Ikom", son of Rear Admiral Vladimir Usov

All three died on the night of August 21 during an incident in a tunnel on the Garden Ring. On August 24, 1991, by decrees of USSR President M. S. Gorbachev, all three were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union “for courage and civic valor shown in defending democracy and the constitutional system of the USSR.”

Suicides of USSR leaders

USSR Minister of Internal Affairs (1990-1991), member of the State Emergency Committee B.K. Pugo committed suicide by shooting himself with a pistol when he learned that a group had arrived to arrest him.
According to the founder of the Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky, on August 22, 1991, he personally participated in the operation to arrest Pugo together with the General Director of the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR, Viktor Ivanenko:

Three shell casings were found at the scene of Pugo's death. Grigory Yavlinsky, citing investigative data, says that the last shot was fired by Pugo’s wife Valentina Ivanovna, who also shot herself and died three days later without regaining consciousness.
August 24, 1991 at 21:50 In office No. 19 “a” in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the security officer on duty Koroteev discovered the corpse of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev, who worked as an adviser to the President of the USSR. According to investigators, the marshal committed suicide, leaving a suicide note in which he explained his act as follows:

At about five in the morning on August 26, 1991, the manager of the affairs of the CPSU Central Committee, N. E. Kruchina, under unclear circumstances, fell from the fifth floor balcony of his apartment in Pletnevy Lane and fell to his death. According to information provided by journalists from the Moscow News newspaper, Kruchina left a suicide note on the table in which he wrote the following:

According to Moscow News journalists, Kruchin left a thick folder with documents containing detailed information about illegal commercial activities CPSU and KGB, including the creation of offshore enterprises with party money outside the USSR for last years. An interesting fact: on October 6 of the same year, Kruchina’s predecessor as head of the CPSU Central Committee, 81-year-old Georgy Pavlov, fell from the window of his apartment.

Symbolism

The Russian tricolor, which was widely used by forces opposing the State Emergency Committee, became a symbol of victory over the putschists. After the defeat of the State Emergency Committee, by a resolution of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR of August 22, 1991, the white-blue-red historical flag of Russia was recognized as the official national flag of the RSFSR.

Another symbol of the putsch was the ballet “ Swan Lake”, which was shown on television between breaking news broadcasts. In the popular consciousness, the putsch was associated with Pinochet's Chilean putsch. So Anatoly Aleksandrovich Sobchak called the State Emergency Committee a junta, and Yazov tried to distance himself from this image, saying: “I will not be Pinochet.”

August putsch in culture

• In 1991, the short cartoon “Putsch” was shot at the Pilot studio.
• Alexander Prokhanov’s novel “The Last Soldier of the Empire” was entirely dedicated to the events of August 1991.
• 2011 - on the 20th anniversary of the coup, the documentary film “Tomorrow Everything will be Different” was released on Channel One.
• 2011 - on the 20th anniversary of the coup, the Rossiya channel released the documentary film “August 91. Versions".

The theory about Gorbachev's participation in the activities of the State Emergency Committee

It was suggested that M. S. Gorbachev himself, who knew about the conservative lobby in the Kremlin leadership, was in collusion with the State Emergency Committee. Thus, A.E. Khinshtein in the book “Yeltsin. Kremlin. Case history" writes:

However, Khinshtein does not indicate the source of this information. On February 1, 2006, in an interview with the Rossiya TV channel, Boris Yeltsin stated that Gorbachev’s participation in the State Emergency Committee was documented.

Alpha's role

Alpha did not trust the State Emergency Committee because of the “betrayal” of the KGB leadership after the events in the Baltic states, when one of its fighters died. Therefore, Alpha hesitated, essentially maintaining neutrality. In an interview, the then commander of Alpha said that they could easily have captured the White House. But, according to him, there was no command from above. Otherwise, the White House building would have been seized.

The former head of the presidential security service, Alexander Korzhakov, in his book of memoirs “Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk” claims that in the early morning of August 19, 1991, special forces of the USSR KGB “Alpha” group, numbering about 50 people, arrived at Yeltsin’s dacha in Arkhangelskoye and stood guard near the highway, however, they did not take any action when Yeltsin’s motorcade left the dacha towards Moscow. After the president’s departure, at about 11 o’clock, according to Korzhakov, armed men approached the gates of the dacha, led by a man who introduced himself as a lieutenant colonel of the Airborne Forces, who stated that they allegedly arrived on behalf of the Minister of Defense to strengthen the security of the village. However, one of Yeltsin’s security officers recognized him as an Alpha officer who taught KGB courses. Yeltsin’s security invited the Alpha fighters to have lunch in the dining room. After lunch, the special forces sat in their bus for several hours and then left.

According to the BBC radio company, during the three days of the putsch, Alpha carried out only one order: on August 21 at 08.30 Karpukhin called the commander of the Alpha squad, Anatoly Savelyev, ordering him to go with people to Demyan Bedny Street, where the radio transmission center is located and “close the Ekho Moskvy radio station” because it “transmits disinformation.” At 10.40 the station went silent for several hours.

Opinions of event participants

In 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev commented on the situation in August 1991 as follows:

Member of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Dmitry Yazov in 2001 spoke about the impossibility of managing public opinion in 1991:

Alexander Rutskoy:

Meaning

The August putsch was one of those events that marked the end of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to popular belief, gave impetus to democratic changes in Russia. Changes took place in Russia itself that contributed to the expansion of its sovereignty.

On the other hand, supporters of preserving the Soviet Union argue that the country began to be in chaos due to the inconsistent policies of the then government.

Curious facts

• On the seventh anniversary of the events, in 1998, none of the representatives of the Russian authorities took part in the mourning events dedicated to the memory of the victims. By that time, over seven years, the number of supporters of the Emergency Committee in Russia, according to the Institute of Sociology of Parliamentarism, increased from 17% to 25%

• According to surveys by the Sociological Opinion Foundation in 2001, 61 percent of those surveyed could not name the name of any member of the State Emergency Committee. Only 16 percent were able to name at least one name correctly. 4 percent remembered the head of the State Emergency Committee Gennady Yanaev.

• In 2005, only about 60 people came to a meeting of former participants in the events on Gorbaty Bridge and an event at the Vagankovskoye cemetery in memory of those killed in the incident in the Garden Ring tunnel. The then leader of the Union of Right Forces, Nikita Belykh, said at the funeral event:

• In 2006, according to a sociological survey by the Public Opinion Foundation, 67 percent of Russian residents (including 58 percent of young people) found it difficult to give any assessment of the benefits or harm of the State Emergency Committee.

• In 2009, the Moscow mayor's office and the government of St. Petersburg completely banned the procession and rally dedicated to the anniversary of August 1991, citing in Moscow the fact that for the sake of it they would have to block the streets and thereby create inconvenience for Muscovites, and in St. Petersburg - by the fact that these activities will interfere with work on the pipeline.

On August 15, 1991, the draft Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics (USSR), developed on the basis of consultations in Novo-Ogaryovo with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev with the leaders of the union republics. According to the document, a new state was established in place of the previous one. political education- a union, in essence, sovereign states. The grandiose transformation of the USSR into a confederation was planned. Moreover, only nine out of fifteen republics agreed to sign the new Union Treaty. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia did not participate in the Novoogaryov process. Obviously, after reformatting the USSR, they would have to recognize their state independence. The signing of the Union Treaty by the heads of state power Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The remaining six republics were supposed to conclude an agreement by the end of October 1991.

The project immediately caused mixed reactions. He was welcomed in democratic circles. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Lukyanov harshly criticized him on August 16. The conservative press spoke more persistently than ever that the treaty was destroying the USSR as a state.

When in the European part of the country it was still morning on Monday, August 19, 1991, and in the Far East it was well after noon, citizens of yet another country suddenly learned that last night the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was removed from power “for health reasons,” that a State Committee for Emergency Situations (GKChP) was created in Moscow, which assumed full power, and that from 4 a.m. Moscow time in “certain localities of the USSR” (not specified) in which) a state of emergency has already been introduced. That same morning, Muscovites saw tanks on the streets, and in the evening they were told that there would be a curfew in the capital.

Such a disruption to the normal course of life of hundreds of millions of citizens pursued the following goals: taking “the most decisive measures to prevent society from sliding into a national catastrophe”; “ensuring law and order”; countering extremist forces that have taken “a course towards the liquidation of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the state and the seizure of power at any cost”; restoration in as soon as possible“labor discipline and order”; increasing the level of production.

Television news programs did not report any details of what was happening. From time to time, the ballet “Swan Lake” was broadcast, interrupted by news releases, during which the next decrees of the State Emergency Committee were read out and the unanimous approval of its actions from the “workers” of the entire country was said. A person far from the center of events inevitably had the impression that the entire leadership of the Russian Federation, starting with President B.N. Yeltsin should have already been arrested, and possibly shot without trial. After all, the entire previous political year in Moscow, since the summer of 1990, took place under the sign of growing confrontation between the leaders of the USSR and the RSFSR. But already on August 20, it became clear to many that the “coup” had somehow gone wrong.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that many leaders of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, power union ministries and departments expressed support for the State Emergency Committee. It is significant that the reaction to the State Emergency Committee was ambiguous in circles that are usually associated with democratic ones and which are oriented towards “progressive” world public opinion.

From the number Russian politicians The leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSS) V.V. publicly expressed solidarity with the State Emergency Committee. Zhirinovsky, shortly before, in June 1991, ran for the post of President of the Russian Federation for the first time and received about 8% of the vote. Therefore, the first decree of President B.N. Yeltsin, after the liquidation of the State Emergency Committee, announced the dissolution of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union along with the CPSU as parties that approved the “anti-constitutional coup.”

Many leaders of the republican communist parties spoke in favor of the State Emergency Committee; it was also welcomed by the then chairman of the Supreme Council of the Belarusian SSR N.I. Dementey. But the statement of the extremely anti-Soviet President of the Republic of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, about recognizing the State Emergency Committee and subordinating to it came as a complete surprise - first of all, for his supporters. After this moment, the political star of Gamsakhurdia, who was elected to the post of president of the republic with 87% of the votes only in May 1991, quickly declined. Obviously, Gamsakhurdia was frightened by the seriousness of the intentions of the GKCHPists and tried to ensure the preservation of his power, but, as it later turned out, he miscalculated.

Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine L.M. avoided a public assessment of the events in Moscow. Kravchuk. At the same time, he prevented the convening of the Verkhovna Rada to discuss what was happening. According to the memoirs of the then commander of the Carpathian Military District, Army General V.I. Varennikov, who was subsequently brought to trial along with the State Emergency Committee, Kravchuk confidentially expressed his intention to carry out all the instructions of the State Emergency Committee.

The Western reaction to the coup in Moscow was generally negative. The tone was set by US President George W. Bush, who demanded that the State Emergency Committee immediately end the isolation of M.S. Gorbachev and provide him with the opportunity to communicate with the media. The only thing that sounded dissonant was the statement by French President F. Mitterrand about his readiness to cooperate with the “new leadership of the USSR.” Nobody saw anything unusual in the fact that the government of the People's Republic of China announced the same readiness. As well as the fact that the then leaders of Iraq (Saddam Hussein) and Libya (Muammar Gaddafi) came out with warm support for the State Emergency Committee.

In conclusion, it should be said that the actions of the Emergency Committee never received legal assessment as a “coup d’etat.” All those brought to trial in this case were amnestied by the act State Duma Russia dated February 23, 1994. The only exception was General Varennikov. He refused to accept the amnesty, insisted on a trial and was completely acquitted due to the lack of corpus delicti in his actions. Therefore, the characterization of the events of August 19-21, 1991 as an “attempt at an anti-constitutional coup” currently has no legal basis.

The events that took place from August to December 1991 in the USSR can safely be called the most important in the entire post-war world history. It was not for nothing that Russian President Vladimir Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. And its course was determined to a certain extent by the coup attempt carried out by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). 25 years have passed, new generations of Russian citizens have grown up, for whom these events are purely history, and those who lived in those years have probably forgotten a lot. However, the very fact of the destruction of the USSR and the timid attempt to save it still causes lively debate.

The weakening of the USSR: objective and artificial reasons

Centrifugal tendencies in the USSR began to be clearly visible already in the late 80s. Today we can confidently say that they were the consequences of not only internal crisis phenomena. Immediately after the end of World War II, the entire Western world, and primarily the United States of America, set a course for the destruction of the Soviet Union. This was enshrined in a number of directives, circulars and doctrines. Every year, fabulous funds were allocated for these purposes. Since 1985 alone, about $90 billion has been spent on the collapse of the USSR.

In the 1980s, the US authorities and intelligence services were able to form a fairly powerful agency of influence in the Soviet Union, which, although it did not seem to occupy key positions in the country, was capable of having a serious impact on the course of events at the national level. According to numerous evidence, the leadership of the KGB of the USSR repeatedly reported on what was happening to the Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as the US plans to destroy the USSR, take control of its territory and reduce the population to 150-160 million people. However, Gorbachev did not take any actions aimed at blocking the activities of Western supporters and actively opposing Washington.

The Soviet elites were divided into two camps: conservatives, who proposed returning the country to traditional ways, and reformers, whose informal leader was Boris Yeltsin, demanding democratic reforms and greater freedom for the republics.

March 17, 1991 An all-Union referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union took place, in which 79.5% of citizens who had the right to vote took part. Almost 76.5% of them were in favor of preserving the USSR , but with a cunning wording - how "a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics."

On August 20, 1991, the old Union Treaty was supposed to be canceled and a new one was signed, giving rise to a virtually renewed state - the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (or Union of Sovereign States), of which he planned to become Prime Minister Nursultan Nazarbaev.

It was, in fact, the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency who opposed these reforms and for preserving the USSR in its traditional form.

According to information actively disseminated by Western and Russian liberal media, KGB officers allegedly overheard a confidential conversation about the creation of the JIT between Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev and decided to act. According to the Western version, they blocked Gorbachev, who did not want to introduce a state of emergency, in Foros (and even planned his physical liquidation), declared a state of emergency, brought army and KGB forces to the streets of Moscow, wanted to storm the White House, capture or kill Yeltsin and destroy democracy. Arrest warrants were printed en masse in printing houses, and handcuffs were produced in huge quantities in factories.

But this theory has not been objectively confirmed by anything. What really happened?

State Emergency Committee. Chronology of main events

August 17 Some of the heads of law enforcement agencies and executive authorities held a meeting at one of the secret facilities of the USSR KGB in Moscow, during which they discussed the situation in the country.

August 18 Some future members and sympathizers of the State Emergency Committee flew to Crimea to see Gorbachev, who was ill there, to convince him to introduce a state of emergency. According to the version popular in Western and liberal media, Gorbachev refused. However, evidence from participants in the events clearly indicates that Gorbachev, although he did not want to take responsibility for making a difficult decision, gave the go-ahead to the people who came to him to act at their own discretion, after which he shook their hands.

In the afternoon, according to the well-known version, communications were cut off at the presidential dacha. However, there is information that journalists managed to call there using a regular phone. There is also evidence that government special communications were working at the dacha all the time.

On the evening of August 18, documents on the creation of the State Emergency Committee are being prepared. And at 01:00 on August 19, the Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev signed them, including himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev in the committee, after which the State Emergency Committee decided to introduce a state of emergency in certain areas of the Union.

On the morning of August 19th The media announced Gorbachev’s inability to perform duties due to health reasons, the transfer of power to Gennady Yanaev and the creation of the State Emergency Committee for the entire country. In turn, the head of the RSFSR Yeltsin signed a decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee” and began mobilizing his supporters, including through the radio station “Echo of Moscow”.

In the morning, units of the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are moving to Moscow, taking a number of important objects under protection. And at lunchtime, crowds of Yeltsin’s supporters begin to gather in the center of the capital. The head of the RSFSR publicly demands to “repel the putschists.” Opponents of the State Emergency Committee begin to build barricades, and a state of emergency is introduced in Moscow.

August 20 A large rally is taking place near the White House. Yeltsin personally addresses its participants. Participants in mass actions are beginning to be frightened by rumors of an impending assault.

Later Western media They will tell heartbreaking stories about how the putschists were going to throw tanks and special forces at the “defenders of democracy,” but the special forces commanders refused to carry out such orders.

Objectively, there is no data on the preparation of the assault. The special forces officers would later deny both the existence of orders to attack the White House and their refusal to carry them out.

In the evening Yeltsin appoints himself and... O. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the territory of the RSFSR, and Konstantin Kobets- Minister of Defense. Kobets orders the troops to return to their places of permanent deployment.

In the evening and at night from August 20 to 21 In the capital, there is a movement of troops, local clashes occur between protesters and the military, and three participants in mass actions die.

The command of the internal troops refuses to move units to the center of Moscow. Armed cadets educational institutions The Ministry of Internal Affairs arrives to protect the White House.

As morning approaches, the troops begin to leave the city. In the evening, Gorbachev already refuses to accept the State Emergency Committee delegation, and Yanaev officially dissolves it. Prosecutor General Stepankov signs a decree on the arrest of committee members.

August 22 Gorbachev returns to Moscow, interrogations of members of the State Emergency Committee begin, and they are relieved of their positions.

August 23“Defenders of Democracy” demolish the monument Dzerzhinsky(reminds me of nothing?), the activities of the Communist Party are prohibited in Russia.

website

On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and proposed that the Central Committee dissolve itself. The process of the collapse of the USSR became irreversible, ending with the well-known events of December 1991.

Life after the USSR. Assessment of the events of 1991

Judging by the results of referendums and elections that took place at the end of 1991 in various parts of the USSR, the majority of the population of the Union then actually supported its collapse.

There is no time on the territory single state Wars and ethnic cleansing began to break out one after another, the economies of most republics collapsed, crime increased catastrophically and the population began to decline rapidly. The “dashing 90s” burst into people’s lives like a whirlwind.

The fate of the republics developed differently. In Russia, the era of the aforementioned “dashing 90s” ended with the coming to power Vladimir Putin, and in Belarus - Alexandra Lukashenko. In Ukraine, the drift towards traditional ties began at the start of the 2000s, but it was interrupted by the Orange Revolution. Georgia was moving away from the general Soviet history jerkily. He came out of the crisis relatively smoothly and rushed to Eurasian integration Kazakhstan.

Objectively, nowhere in the post-Soviet territory does the population have social guarantees at the level of the USSR. In most of the former Soviet republics, the standard of living did not approach the Soviet one.

Even in Russia, where household incomes have increased significantly, social security problems call into question the thesis of an increase in the standard of living compared to what it was before 1991.

Not to mention the fact that a huge superpower, which shared first place in the world in military, political and economic power only with the United States, of which the Russian people were proud for many years, ceased to exist on the world map.

It is indicative how Russians assess the events of 1991 today, 25 years later. The data from a study conducted by the Levada Center to some extent sums up the numerous disputes about the State Emergency Committee and the actions of Yeltsin’s team.

Thus, only 16% of Russian residents said that they would come out to “defend democracy” - that is, they would support Yeltsin and defend the White House - if they were the participants in the events of 1991! 44% answered categorically what to protect new government they wouldn't. 41% of respondents are not ready to answer this question.

Today, only 8% of Russian residents call the events of August 1991 a victory of the democratic revolution. 30% characterize what happened as a tragic event that had disastrous consequences for the country and people, 35% - simply as an episode in the struggle for power, 27% found it difficult to answer.

Talking about possible consequences after the victory of the Emergency Committee, 16% of respondents said that with this development events Russia would live better today, 19% - that it would live worse, 23% - that it would live the same way as it lives today. 43% could not decide on an answer.

15% of Russians believe that in August 1991 the representatives of the State Emergency Committee were right, 13% - that Yeltsin’s supporters. 39% claim that they did not have time to understand the situation, and 33% do not know what to answer.

40% of respondents said that after the events of August 1991 the country went in the wrong direction, 33% said that it was in the right direction. 28% found it difficult to answer.

It turns out that approximately one third to half of Russians are not sufficiently informed about the events of August 1991 and cannot unambiguously assess them. Among the remaining part of the population, those who evaluate the “August revolution” and the activities of the “defenders of democracy” negatively predominate moderately. The overwhelming majority of Russian residents would not take any action to counter the State Emergency Committee. In general, few people today are happy about the defeat of the committee.

So what really happened in those days and how to evaluate these events?

State Emergency Committee - an attempt to save the country, an anti-democratic putsch or a provocation?

The day before it became known that the CIA predicted the emergence of the State Emergency Committee back in April 1991! An unknown speaker from Moscow informed the leadership of the intelligence service that “supporters of tough measures”, traditionalists, are ready to remove Gorbachev from power and reverse the situation. At the same time, Langley believed that it would be difficult for Soviet conservatives to retain power. A Moscow source listed all the leaders of the future State Emergency Committee and predicted that Gorbachev, in the event of a potential revolt, would try to maintain control over the country.

It is clear that there is not a word about the US response in the information document. But of course they had to be. When the State Emergency Committee arose, the US leadership harshly condemned it and did everything to achieve similar actions from other Western countries. The position of the heads of the USA, Great Britain and other Western states was voiced by journalists directly in the Vesti program, which, in turn, could not but influence the consciousness of doubting Soviet citizens.

In the whole story with the State Emergency Committee, there are a number of oddities.

Firstly, The leaders of the powerful security forces of the USSR, undisputed intellectuals and excellent organizers of the old school, for some reason acted spontaneously, uncertainly and even somehow confused. They were never able to decide on a tactic of action. Yanaev’s shaking hands while speaking on camera went down in history.

From which it is logical to assume that the creation of the State Emergency Committee was a completely unprepared step.

Secondly, Yeltsin’s team, which was by no means composed of such experienced and powerful people as their opponents, worked like clockwork. Warning schemes, transport, and communications operated effectively; the defenders of the barricades were well fed and watered; leaflets were printed and distributed in huge quantities; their own media worked.

Everything indicates that Yeltsin was well prepared for such a development of events.

Third, Mikhail Gorbachev, who continued to be the official head of the USSR, fell ill at the right time and left Moscow. Thus, the country was deprived of supreme power, and he himself remained as if he had nothing to do with it.

Fourthly, The President of the USSR did not take any measures to try to stop the leaders of the State Emergency Committee. On the contrary, with his words he gave them complete freedom of action.

Fifthly, Today it is known that back in June 1991, the US authorities discussed the prospect of a putsch in the USSR with Gorbachev and the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Surely, in two months, the President of the Union, if he wanted, would not have prevented it?

All these strange facts raise questions and doubts in the official interpretation of the victorious side, according to which the State Emergency Committee was an illegal military junta that, without the knowledge of Gorbachev, tried to strangle the sprouts of democracy. Moreover, all of the above suggests the version that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could deliberately provoke their political opponents to take active action at an inconvenient time for them.

On the one hand, the signing of the new Union Treaty was a victory for the reformers. But the victory, to put it mildly, was half-hearted. The traditionalists, who occupied virtually all the key positions in the state, had, if they had been well prepared, all the necessary tools to disrupt the signing of the treaty during the event itself through political means and for a political counterattack during the crisis that would inevitably follow the signing itself. In fact, the traditionalists found themselves forced to act without preparation, at an inconvenient time, against opponents who, on the contrary, were well prepared for the fight.

Everything indicates that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could simply have lured the organizers of the State Emergency Committee into a trap, after falling into which they were forced to act according to someone else’s scenario. Everyone who could stop the death of the USSR in 1991 was thrown out of the game overnight.

Some of the members of the State Emergency Committee and people sympathizing with the committee died soon after the coup under mysterious circumstances, committing strange suicides, and the other part was quietly amnestied in 1994, when they no longer posed any threat. The Gakachepists were framed, but when this became clear, it was too late to do anything.

The events of August 1991 fit perfectly into the scheme of color revolutions, with the only difference being that the head of state actually played on the side of the “revolutionaries - defenders of democracy.” Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev could probably tell a lot of interesting things, but he is unlikely to do so. A man whom fate had elevated to the very top of world politics, the head of a superpower, exchanged all this for advertising pizza and bags. And Russian citizens, even 25 years later, understand this perfectly well and evaluate it accordingly.

Those who propose to forget the history of August 1991 as a bad dream are categorically wrong. Then we experienced one of the most tragic events in our history, and it is simply vital to correct mistakes in this regard. The bloody consequences of the collapse of the USSR still have to be dealt with - including in Ukraine: people are now being killed in the Donbass largely due to the fact that the State Emergency Committee was unable to stop the local princelings who wanted to tear apart the state for the sake of personal power.

At the same time, supporters of the other extreme, who deny the right to exist of the Russian Federation because of the tragedy of August 1991, are also wrong. Yes, the USSR was destroyed contrary to the will of the people, expressed in the referendum on March 17, but this is not a reason to deny Russia its current statehood - the guarantee of the sovereign existence of the Russian people. On the contrary, everything must be done to develop the Russian Federation as an internationally recognized successor to the USSR. And the ultimate task is to use it to restore the former greatness of our Fatherland.

The August 1991 coup plays a huge role in the collapse of the USSR

The August 1991 coup is considered the cause of the collapse of the USSR, despite the fact that its main goal was precisely an attempt to prevent the collapse of the country.

The reason for the relevance of this topic even today is that the events of that time still cannot find an unambiguous assessment by society. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are still called today either heroes who liberated the people, or criminals responsible for the collapse of a huge country.

In 2001, a survey was conducted in Russia of 1,600 citizens of the Russian Federation, who were asked to answer the question on whose side their sympathies were during the incidents of August 19-21 in 1991. The survey results are as follows:

• Opponents of the State Emergency Committee - 28%.
• The State Emergency Committee was supported by 14%.
• 31% did not have time to orient themselves in the events taking place.
• The rest found it difficult to answer the questions posed.

Perhaps the real truth about those events will never be revealed to the people, since not all “eyewitness accounts” can be called objective, and some are even deliberately false. And many documents that relate to those events are still classified. However, without a doubt, the August 1991 coup is a truly epoch-making historical event, when three days could change the balance of power throughout the world.

Reasons for the August 1991 coup

After a long period of stagnation in the Soviet Union, which led to the height of the political, economic, food and cultural crises, the country's situation was at a critical point. Therefore, it was urgently necessary to take resuscitation actions in the form of introducing new reforms and reorganizing the economy and the state administration system.

The country's President Gorbachev took upon himself this responsible task. At first, his reforms received positive assessment and began to be called “perestroika”. However, over time, it became clear that the reforms were not bringing the desired results and the country was still plunging into crisis.

This led to condemnation of Gorbachev’s actions, growing discontent among the ruling structures, and the emergence of a crisis of confidence in the president by both his opponents and recent associates. All these circumstances - the reasons for the August 1991 coup - became the reason for the emergence of the idea of ​​a conspiracy to overthrow the ruling government.

And when Mikhail Gorbachev decided to transform the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States (which meant the republics gaining political and economic independence) - this served the last straw all his opponents, including the conservative part of the ruling sector.

After Gorbachev left for negotiations in Foros, on August 5, a conspiracy was organized to overthrow the current president. The purpose of the conspiracy was to prevent the collapse of the country. Thus, the reasons for the August 1991 coup:

1. The failure of Gorbachev's domestic political activities.
2. Protest against the republics gaining independence.

Video about the August 1991 coup

Events of three days in August 1991

At 04.00 on the morning of August 19, the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros while in Moscow members of the new government read out the documents that had been adopted the day before. They pointed out the inability of the current government to fulfill its duties. Among these documents was a decree of Vice-President G. Yanaev, which stated that it was impossible for Gorbachev to govern the state due to his state of health, therefore Yanaev himself would act as his responsibilities.

Another statement read out from the “Soviet leadership” spoke of the proclamation of a new body of state power - the State Emergency Committee.

This was followed by an appeal by members of the State Emergency Committee to the people with a statement that Gorbachev’s actions led to the emergence of political freedoms and anti-Soviet structures seeking to seize power by force, the collapse of the country and its complete destruction. Therefore, to confront these structures, a change of power is necessary.

On the same day, August 19, a decree came into force prohibiting the creation of associations not legalized by the Constitution of the USSR. Many parties and circles in opposition to the CPSU were immediately dissolved, censorship was also reintroduced, and a large number of newspapers and other media were closed.

The live news conference showed the country its leaders visibly unsure of themselves, hesitating and stuttering. Mass demonstrations in defense of democracy were observed in many cities. The army, in a wait-and-see position, did not take decisive action, and some generals openly expressed disapproving opinions about the actions of the State Emergency Committee. The Republican leaders, as well as the army, took a cautious position, since it was extremely dangerous to openly take sides.

On the night of August 21, tanks appeared near the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, but they did not storm it. However, despite the fact that these events did not involve military action, three defenders of the White House still died as a result of local clashes.

However, the State Emergency Committee's struggle for power was hampered by the opposition of Russian President Yeltsin, who issued a decree on the strict subordination of all executive bodies to the President of Russia. Thus, Yeltsin was able to organize an effective defense to counter the State Emergency Committee, as a result of which Yeltsin won victory on August 20. This was followed by immediate arrests of all members of the State Emergency Committee. To sum up, we can say that the August putsch of the State Emergency Committee was organized unsuccessfully.

Consequences of the August 1991 coup

After Gorbachev returned from Foros on August 21, he received a number of ultimatums expressed by the new government, to which he had to agree. Real power was in the hands of Yeltsin. On August 23, Gorbachev resigned from the post of Chairman of the CPSU Central Committee, signing a decree dissolving the CPSU. Later, in September, a decree was signed to terminate the existence of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the collapse of the communist regime, the collapse of the USSR followed. Soon after the putsch was crushed, the Baltic states seceded from the Soviet Union. Their exit was followed by the adoption of acts of state independence by other republics. Yeltsin, who enjoyed great authority at that time, played a significant role in these events. For several months the state lived in a state of dual power without a definite status.

Thus, the August 1991 putsch and the collapse of the USSR that followed it led to the cessation of the existence of the once huge and powerful, however, at that time already quite weakened “Communist Empire”. On the political map, which has changed radically after those events, today you will no longer see this huge socialist power.

Today, many view the actions of the three “Belovezhskaya conspirators” with ambivalence. Some believe that they decided to dissolve the Union without any preparation and without calculating the consequences of the transition period. The rupture of economic relations turned out to be so rapid that it led to rather negative consequences in the development of young states. The latter are still making considerable efforts to at least partially restore what was lost in a very short period of time when the August putsch occurred. The consequences of those events influenced the development of each of the new states in different ways.

The remaining republics no longer had to choose, and soon followed their accession to the Belovezhskaya agreements.

Video about the causes and consequences of the August 1991 coup

In 1991, on December 21, in Almaty, the former leaders of the republics of the Soviet Union (with the exception of Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) signed a declaration on the creation of the CIS, which marked the beginning of a new, post-Soviet period in their history.

It is worth noting that our country has undergone the most profound changes not in the political, but in social sphere. Over the years since the collapse of the USSR, Russians have lost many illusions and looked differently at themselves and at their state - the one that lives now and the one that will never exist. And today, finally, the time has come to understand what really happened to Russian society in those three days of the August putsch.

How do you feel about the events that took place during the August 1991 coup? Share your opinion on

Members of the Emergency Committee declared a state of emergency in the country, and troops were sent to Moscow. The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union... One of the symbols of the “August putsch” was the ballet “Swan Lake,” which was shown on television channels between news broadcasts.

Lenta.ru

17-21 AUGUST 1991

A meeting of future members of the State Emergency Committee took place at the ABC facility - the closed guest residence of the KGB. It was decided to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, form the State Emergency Committee, demand that Gorbachev sign the relevant decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Yeltsin was detained at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan for a conversation with Defense Minister Yazov, further action depending on the results of the negotiations.

Representatives of the committee flew to Crimea to negotiate with Gorbachev, who was on vacation in Foros, to secure his consent to declare a state of emergency. Gorbachev refused to give them his consent.

At 16.32, all types of communications were turned off at the presidential dacha, including the channel that provided control of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR.

At 04.00, the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros.

From 06.00, the All-Union Radio begins to broadcast messages about the introduction of a state of emergency in some regions of the USSR, a decree of the Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev on his assumption of duties as President of the USSR in connection with Gorbachev’s ill health, a statement by the Soviet leadership on the creation, an appeal to the State Emergency Committee to the Soviet people.

The State Emergency Committee included Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev, Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov, Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Boris Pugo, Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Yazov, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov, First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR Oleg Baklanov, Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR Vasily Starodubtsev , President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR Alexander Tizyakov.

At about 7.00, on the orders of Yazov, the second motorized rifle Taman division and the fourth tank Kantemirovskaya division began moving towards Moscow. Marching on military equipment, the 51st, 137th and 331st parachute regiments also began moving towards the capital.

09.00. A rally in support of democracy and Yeltsin began at the monument to Yuri Dolgoruky in Moscow.

09.40. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his associates arrive at the White House (House of Soviets of the RSFSR), in telephone conversation with Kryuchkov, he refuses to recognize the State Emergency Committee.

10.00. The troops occupy their assigned positions in the center of Moscow. Directly near the White House there are armored vehicles of the battalion of the Tula Airborne Division under the command of Major General Alexander Lebed and the Taman Division.

11.45. The first columns of demonstrators arrived at Manezhnaya Square. No measures were taken to disperse the crowd.

12.15. Several thousand citizens gathered at the White House, and Boris Yeltsin came out to them. He read from the tank “An Appeal to the Citizens of Russia,” in which he called the actions of the State Emergency Committee a “reactionary, anti-constitutional coup.” The appeal was signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Ivan Silaev and acting. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov.

12.30. Yeltsin issued Decree No. 59, where the creation of the State Emergency Committee was qualified as an attempt at a coup.

Around 2 p.m., those gathered near the White House began constructing makeshift barricades.

14.30. The session of the Leningrad City Council adopted an appeal to the President of Russia, refused to recognize the State Emergency Committee and declare a state of emergency.

15.30. Major Evdokimov's tank company - 6 tanks without ammunition - went over to Yeltsin's side.

16.00. By Yanaev's decree, a state of emergency is introduced in Moscow.

At about 17.00, Yeltsin issued Decree No. 61, by which the Union executive authorities, including security forces, were reassigned to the President of the RSFSR.

At 17:00, a press conference by Yanaev and other members of the State Emergency Committee began in the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Answering the question where the President of the USSR is now, Yanaev said that Gorbachev is “on vacation and treatment in Crimea. Over the years he has become very tired and it takes time for him to improve his health.”

In Leningrad, rallies of thousands took place on St. Isaac's Square. People gathered for rallies against the State Emergency Committee in Nizhny Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Tyumen and other cities of Russia.

The radio of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which had just been created in the White House, broadcast an appeal to citizens, in which they were asked to dismantle the barricades in front of the White House so that the Taman Division, loyal to the Russian leadership, could bring its tanks to positions near the building.

05.00. The Vitebsk Airborne Division of the KGB of the USSR and the Pskov Division of the USSR Ministry of Defense approached Leningrad, but did not enter the city, but were stopped near Siverskaya (70 km from the city).

10.00. A mass rally on Palace Square in Leningrad brought together about 300 thousand people. The city's military promised that the army would not interfere.

At about 11.00, the editors of 11 independent newspapers gathered at the Moscow News editorial office and agreed to publish the Obshchaya Gazeta, which was urgently registered with the Ministry of Press of the RSFSR (published the next day).

12.00. A rally sanctioned by the city authorities began near the White House (at least 100 thousand participants). The rally at the Moscow City Council - about 50 thousand participants.

In connection with the hospitalization of Valentin Pavlov, temporary leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to Vitaly Doguzhiev.

Russia creates a temporary republican Ministry of Defense. Konstantin Kobets is appointed Minister of Defense.

In the evening, the Vremya program reported on the introduction in the capital curfew from 23.00 to 5.00.

On the night of August 21, in an underground transport tunnel at the intersection of Kalininsky Prospekt (now Novy Arbat Street) and the Garden Ring (Tchaikovsky Street), clogged with armored vehicles of infantry fighting vehicles, three civilians died during maneuvering: Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky.

03.00. Air Force Commander Yevgeny Shaposhnikov suggests that Yazov withdraw troops from Moscow and that the State Emergency Committee “be declared illegal and dispersed.”

05.00. A meeting of the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense was held, at which the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces supported Shaposhnikov’s proposal. Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow.

11.00. An emergency session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR has opened. There was one issue on the agenda - the political situation in the RSFSR, “which developed as a result of the coup d’etat.”

At 14.18, the Il-62 with members of the State Emergency Committee on board flew to Crimea to visit Gorbachev. The plane took off a few minutes before the arrival of a group of 50 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, which was tasked with arresting the members of the committee.

Gorbachev refused to accept them and demanded that contact with the outside world be restored.

On another plane at 16.52, Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoy and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev flew to Foros to see Gorbachev.

White House Defenders

22:00. Yeltsin signed a decree on the annulment of all decisions of the State Emergency Committee and on a number of reshuffles in the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.

01:30. The Tu-134 plane with Rutsky, Silaev and Gorbachev landed in Moscow at Vnukovo-2.

Most members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.

Moscow declared mourning for the victims.

The winners' rally at the White House began at 12.00. In the middle of the day, Yeltsin, Silaev and Khasbulatov spoke at it. During the rally, demonstrators brought out a huge banner of the Russian tricolor; The President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia.

The new state flag of Russia (tricolor) was installed for the first time at the top of the building of the House of Soviets.

On the night of August 23, by order of the Moscow City Council, amid a massive gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

DOCUMENTS of the State Emergency Committee

Vice President of the USSR

Due to the impossibility for health reasons, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev assumed the duties of President of the USSR on the basis of Article 1277 of the USSR Constitution on August 19, 1991.

Vice President of the USSR

G. I. YANAEV

From the Appeal

to the Soviet people

State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR

...The crisis of power has had a catastrophic impact on the economy. The chaotic, spontaneous slide towards the market caused an explosion of egoism - regional, departmental, group and personal. The war of laws and the encouragement of centrifugal tendencies resulted in the destruction of a single national economic mechanism that had been developing for decades. The result was a sharp drop in the standard of living of the vast majority of Soviet people, and the flourishing of speculation and the shadow economy. It’s high time to tell people the truth: if urgent measures are not taken to stabilize the economy, then in the very near future famine and new round impoverishment, which is one step away from mass manifestations of spontaneous discontent with devastating consequences...

From Resolution No. 1

State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR

6. Citizens, institutions and organizations must immediately hand over all types of illegally held items. firearms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment and equipment. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR must ensure strict compliance with this requirement. In cases of refusal, they must be forcibly confiscated, with violators subject to strict criminal and administrative liability.

From Resolution No. 2

State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR

1. Temporarily limit the list of central, Moscow city and regional socio-political publications to the following newspapers: “Trud”, “Rabochaya Tribuna”, “Izvestia”, “Pravda”, “Krasnaya Zvezda”, “Soviet Russia”, “Moskovskaya Pravda” , “Lenin’s Banner”, “Rural Life”.

"BAD BOY"

August 20, the second day of the coup, nerves are at their limit. Everyone who has a radio listens to the radio. Those who have a TV do not miss a single news broadcast. I then worked at Vesti. Vesti was taken off the air. We sit and watch channel one. At three o'clock there is a regular episode that no one has watched before. And then everyone stuck. And the announcer appears in the frame, and suddenly begins to read messages from news agencies: President Bush condemns the putschists, British Prime Minister John Major condemns, the world community is outraged - and at the end: Yeltsin declared the State Emergency Committee outlawed, the Russian prosecutor, then Stepankov, initiates criminal proceedings case. We are shocked. And I imagine how many people, including participants in the events who at that moment caught the slightest hint of which way the situation was swinging, ran to the White House to Yeltsin to sign their allegiance and loyalty. On the third day, in the evening, I meet Tanechka Sopova, who was then working in the Main Information Editorial Office of Central Television, well, hugs, kisses. I say: “Tatyan, what happened with you?” “And this is me, the Bad Boy,” says Tanya. “I was the responsible graduate.” That is, she was collecting a folder, selecting news.

And there was an order: go and coordinate everything. “I come in,” he says, “once, and the whole synclite is sitting there and some people, complete strangers. They are discussing what to broadcast at 21:00 on the Vremya program. And here I am, little one, poking around with my papers.” She really is such a tiny woman. “They tell me in plain text where I should go with my three-hour news: “Do it yourself!” “Well, I went and made up the layout.”

AND THERE ARE STATISTICS

The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) annually conducts a survey of Russians on how they assess the events of August 1991.

In 1994, a survey showed that 53% of respondents believed that the putsch was suppressed in 1991, 38% called the actions of the State Emergency Committee a tragic event that had disastrous consequences for the country and people.

Five years later - in 1999 - during a similar survey, only 9% of Russians considered the suppression of the Emergency Committee a victory for the “democratic revolution”; 40% of respondents consider the events of those days simply an episode of the struggle for power in the country's top leadership.

A sociological survey conducted by VTsIOM in 2002 showed that the share of Russians who believe that in 1991 the leaders of the State Emergency Committee saved the Motherland, the great USSR, increased one and a half times - from 14 to 21% and one and a half times (from 24 to 17 %) the share of those who believed that on August 19-21, 1991, opponents of the State Emergency Committee were right decreased.

More impressive results were obtained in August 2010 based on the results of voting on the series of programs “The Court of Time”, conducted by N. Svanidze. When asked what the State Emergency Committee of August 1991 was - a putsch or an attempt to avoid the collapse of the country - despite the efforts of N. Svanidze, 93% of TV viewers surveyed answered - it was a desire to preserve the USSR!

MARSHAL YAZOV: WE SERVED THE PEOPLE

DP.RU: In fact, the State Emergency Committee was impromptu; you, as a military leader, should have understood that if the operation was not prepared, the forces would not be pulled together...

Dmitry Yazov: There was no need to pull together any forces, we were not going to kill anyone. The only thing we were going to do was to disrupt the signing of this treaty on the Union of Sovereign States. It was obvious that there would be no state. And since there will be no state, it means that measures had to be taken so that there would be a state. The entire government gathered and decided: we must go to Gorbachev. Everyone went to tell him: are you for the state or not? Let's take action. But someone as weak-willed as Mikhail Sergeevich could not do this. Didn't even listen. We left. Gorbachev made a speech, his son-in-law recorded it on tape, Raisa Maksimovna: “I hid it in such a way, and my daughter hid it in such a way that no one would have found it.” Well, it’s clear where she put this tape, of course, no one would have gotten into it. Who needed it, this film. The state is collapsing, and he expressed his resentment that his communications were cut off and he was not allowed to talk to Bush.

DP.RU: I heard that you yourself allocated a battalion to guard the White House.

Dmitry Yazov: Absolutely correct.

DP.RU: But then they said: the troops went over to Yeltsin’s side. It turns out that everything was wrong?

Dmitry Yazov: Of course not. Shortly before this, Yeltsin was elected president. Arrived in Tula. There Grachev showed him the teachings of the airborne division. Well, not the entire division - the regiment. I liked the teaching, drank well, and Yeltsin thought that Pasha Grachev was his best friend. When a state of emergency was introduced, Yeltsin was indignant, like a coup. But no one arrested him. No one had a hand in it at all. Yeltsin then, in 1993, could have turned off the lights, could have turned off the water, could have shot the Supreme Council... But we didn’t guess, such fools! Yeltsin was in Almaty the day before and then said that the State Emergency Committee delayed the plane’s departure for 4 hours in order to shoot down the plane. Can you imagine how mean it is! The newspapers wrote how he spent those 4 hours. Nazarbayev and I played tennis for 2.5 hours in the rain, then we went to wash... And he: they wanted to shoot me down!!! He arrived at the White House himself and called Pasha Grachev: assign security. Grachev calls me: Yeltsin asks for security. I say: Lebed went with the battalion. So that there really are no provocations.

We organized a patrol, a company of infantry fighting vehicles was marching... Here, right on Novy Arbat Avenue, they placed trolleybuses and made a barricade under the bridge. The tanks would have passed, but the infantry fighting vehicles would have stopped. There are drunk people there: some started beating with sticks, others threw up a tent so that nothing could be seen. Three people died. Who shot? Someone was shooting from the roof. The military did not shoot. Someone was interested. Everything was done to ensure that there was Civil War. And I took and withdrew the troops. I got ready to go to Gorbachev, and everyone came running. I say let's go. When they arrived, he took this pose. Didn't accept anyone. We humiliated him!!!

Rutskoi, Bakatin, Silaev arrived on another plane - those, excuse the expression, brethren who, it seems, hated both the Soviet Union and the Russian people. Well, Rutskoi, the man whom we rescued from captivity, later showed what he was like: for the president, a year later - against the president. Ungrateful people - of course, we didn’t need gratitude from them, we served the people. Of course, I saw that there would be an arrest now. It didn’t cost me anything to land a brigade at an airfield or land at another airfield myself, but it would have been a civil war. I served the people, and I would have to, because they want to arrest me, start a war, shoot at the people. Just from a human point of view, should this have been done or not?

DP.RU: War is always bad...

Dmitry Yazov: Yes. And I think - to hell with him, in the end, let him arrest: there is no evidence of a crime. But they are arrested, and immediately Article 64 is treason. But how can you prove to me treason? Yesterday I was the minister, I sent in troops to guard the Kremlin, to guard the water intake, to protect the Gokhran. Everything was saved. Then they plundered it. Diamonds, remember, were taken in bags to America... And how did it all end? Three people gathered - Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich. Did they have the right to liquidate the state? They signed it while drunk, slept through it, and reported to Bush first thing in the morning... What a shame! Gorbachev: I was not informed. But they didn’t report to you because they didn’t want you to be president. You made them sovereign - they became sovereign. And they didn't care about you. Yeltsin literally 3-4 days later kicked him out of the Kremlin and from the dacha, and now he hangs around the world.

State Emergency Committee member Dmitry Yazov: “The Americans put in 5 trillion in order to liquidate the Soviet Union.” Business Petersburg. August 19, 2011