Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.
Explosion for the holiday
On September 9, 2017, North Korea celebrated the 69th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear weapons test.
First, several countries immediately recorded increased seismic activity in North Korea, which could mean a nuclear explosion.
Then the fact of nuclear testing was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. “The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen national nuclear forces in quantitative and qualitative terms to ensure the dignity and right to exist of the country in the face of the growing nuclear threat from the United States,” said a statement issued by the official North Korean news agency KCNA.
South Korea, the United States and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, at which the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang is expected to be raised.
The problem, however, is that sanctions on North Korea have virtually no effect. Moreover, there has been significant progress in North Korea's nuclear missile program.
How it all began
Even during the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of nuclear strikes across the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.
The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.
Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.
In the 1970s, Pyongyang, with the support of China, began the first work on creating nuclear weapons.
In 1985, the Soviet Union obtained the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor to Korea. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.
President Clinton's Failed War
Decay Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while at the same time conducting peace negotiations with it in hopes of liberalizing the political system and its dismantling according to the version of Eastern Europe.
The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang economic and technical assistance in the development of peaceful atoms. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.
Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected that a certain amount of plutonium was being hidden. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities that had not been declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities were in no way connected with the nuclear program and were of a military nature.
As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the agreement, but also withdrew from the IAEA.
During this period, as Newsweek magazine stated in 2006, the administration of US President Bill Clinton ordered a study of the issue of conducting military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would require expenditures of $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, with the losses of the US Army amounting to at least 100,000 people killed.
As a result, the United States returned to negotiation tactics.
Threats and promises
At the end of 1994, with the assistance of former US President Jimmy Carter, a “framework agreement” was reached, according to which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for supplies of fuel oil and the creation of two new light water nuclear reactors, which cannot be used for work on nuclear weapons.
Stability was established for several years. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States to other problems ensured a stable situation.
A new escalation began in 2002, when President George W. Bush came to power in the United States.
In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called “axis of evil.” Coupled with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.
In 2003, negotiations began on the DPRK's nuclear program with the participation of the PRC, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan.
No real progress was achieved on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it could only ensure its own security if it had its own atomic bomb.
North Korea has made no secret of the fact that nuclear research continues.
Bomb: birth
Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a South Korean reconnaissance satellite recorded a powerful explosion in a remote area of the DPRK (Yangang Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew above the scene.
On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom as explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.
Neither South Korean nor American experts confirmed that it was indeed a nuclear explosion.
Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the necessary resources and technologies to create a full-fledged atomic bomb, and we were talking about a potential, not an immediate danger.
On September 28, 2004, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister told the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into nuclear weapons. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrent force in conditions when the United States declared its goal to destroy the DPRK and threatened preventive nuclear strikes.
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation in the country atomic weapons. The world treated this statement as another bluff by Pyongyang.
A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that successful test nuclear charge, and its preparation was publicly announced before. The low power of the charge (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a nuclear device and not ordinary TNT.
North Korean acceleration
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to Russian military estimates, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.
Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.
Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion remained that Pyongyang is far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.
On December 10, 2015, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant a new step in the creation of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK declared to be a test of a hydrogen bomb.
South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests was the shortest in all years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in improving technology.
Most importantly, North Korea stated that this test was carried out as part of the development of nuclear warheads that can be placed on ballistic missiles.
If this is indeed the case, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating real military nuclear weapons, which will radically change the situation in the region.
The rockets are flying further and further
Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.
People talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - they exploded again, missed the target again, fell again.
Military experts monitoring the situation claim that North Korean specialists are for last years made a powerful technological breakthrough.
By 2016, the DPRK had created a mobile single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, the Hwasong-10, with a firing range of about three thousand kilometers.
In the summer of this year, the Pukkyukson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid-fuel missile is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was carried out precisely from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.
This does not at all fit with the idea of North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet aircraft and Chinese tanks.
Experts point out that the number of tests in the DPRK has been growing rapidly in recent years, and the technology is becoming more and more complex.
Within a few years, North Korea is capable of creating a missile with a flight range of up to 5,000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.
What to do with North Korea?
There is almost no doubt that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened. But previous experience shows that this does not affect Pyongyang in any way.
Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.
Moreover, he is not stopped even by the outright irritation of his main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region.
The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who have an extremely negative perception of Comrade Kim’s regime are convinced that it will not be possible to shake up the situation from within. Neither friends nor enemies can convince Pyongyang to “behave well.”
A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war on their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.
In theory, Pyongyang could be satisfied with guarantees that would ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.
That's just recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in modern world is the “nuclear club” that North Korea is working to create.
Tags:
On testing an intercontinental ballistic missile with a thermonuclear warhead
On Sunday night, the Chinese Seismological Center recorded two earthquakes of magnitude 6.3 and 4.6, which experts interpreted as an underground explosion. The conclusions of experts from the Middle Kingdom were subsequently confirmed by South Korean and Japanese experts.
At the same time, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the DPRK has created a hydrogen bomb that can be installed in the head of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
It was indicated that the power of the bomb could vary from ten to hundreds of kilotons, and all its components were produced in the country. In this situation, the key question is: is North Korea really capable of placing a hydrogen bomb on an ICBM capable of reaching the United States?
North Korea's missiles could reach the US
The West is powerless in the face of North Korea, China can help
As a result, North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons at its disposal, but is unlikely to be able to launch a missile with such a serious filling. Nevertheless, such a prospect is a matter of time, and it may take North Korean scientists five to ten years to refine the technology.
However, it remains unclear how Western countries will be able to influence the DPRK. China will probably have to take on the main role in resolving the situation.
Does North Korea have the resource base for a nuclear program?
Nuclear charges can be made from either weapons-grade plutonium (plutonium-239) or highly enriched uranium (uranium-235). The DPRK conducted its first two nuclear tests - in 2006 and 2009 - using charges made from weapons-grade plutonium, writes the American non-governmental Arms Control Association. North Korea's key nuclear facility, which houses most of the country's equipment, research and development related to both peaceful and military nuclear activities, is the Yenbyon Center, located 90 km north of Pyongyang. In 1986, a gas-graphite reactor was launched there; experts consider it the main source of weapons-grade plutonium (capable of producing up to 6 kg per year).
How much weapons-grade plutonium the DPRK has accumulated is unknown. According to data for 2008, cited by the Nuclear Threat Initiative website, North Korea could have received 39 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. However, the head of the Center international security IMEMO RAS Alexey Arbatov believes that as of 2017, Pyongyang has approximately 50-60 kg of weapons-grade plutonium.
In 2016, North Korea admitted that it was producing highly enriched uranium from low enriched uranium, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said. The plant, opened back in 2010, according to the Arms Control Association, is capable of annually producing 2 tons of low-enriched uranium or about 40 kg of highly enriched uranium. Alexey Arbatov says that North Korea acquires nuclear technologies, materials and even specialists on the global black market. “There is a huge market for nuclear materials - low-enriched uranium, uranium ore. Having certain technologies, it is possible to make highly enriched uranium from low-enriched uranium,” says Arbatov.
Total: reserves of weapons-grade plutonium - 39-60 kg, production capabilities of weapons-grade plutonium - 6 kg per year, highly enriched uranium - up to 40 kg per year.
How many ready-made nuclear warheads does North Korea have?
On September 3, North Korea announced that it had conducted a test thermonuclear bomb(the sixth nuclear test in the country’s history, the first took place in 2006). However, there is no independent confirmation of this information. International experts reported that on the day of the test, an earthquake measuring 5.8 on the Richter scale occurred in North Korea. According to the Norwegian Foundation for Geophysical Research (NORSAR), the power of the underground explosion that caused it was 120 kt of TNT equivalent. It is possible to verify that it was a hydrogen bomb that was tested only by taking samples of rocks in the testing area, the researchers point out.
Regardless of what type of bomb Pyongyang tested, NORSAR notes that the power of North Korea's explosive devices increases with each new test. If the charge power during the first test in 2006 was approximately 1 kt in TNT equivalent, then ten years later, in September 2016, it reached about 20 kt, the report says.
According to SIPRI, North Korea has 10-20 nuclear warheads. Bloomberg, citing American military analysts, claims that the DPRK's arsenal includes 60 nuclear warheads.
Total: the number of nuclear warheads is at least ten, the power is at least 20 kt in TNT equivalent.
What means of delivering nuclear weapons does the DPRK have?
North Korea has been developing a missile program since the 1960s. The USSR, China, and the countries of the Middle East provided assistance in this. According to the Arms Control Association, North Korea had 15 types of ballistic missiles in August 2017.
Ballistic missile medium range(MRBM) “Nodon-1” is capable of covering a distance of about 1.5 thousand km, that is, it is capable of hitting Japan and South Korea. Another MRBM, Musudan, can theoretically cover up to 4 thousand km (its tests were not successful). Tested in May 2017, the Hwasong-12 can hit targets within a radius of approximately 4.5 thousand km (American Guam is located 3.4 thousand km from the DPRK). The Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, first tested in July 2017, is capable of delivering a charge over a distance of more than 10 thousand km, that is, it can reach the United States. According to some reports, missiles of these modifications are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
In addition, the DPRK is developing KN-08 and KN-14 missiles, the flight range of which can be up to 11.5 thousand km.
The exact number of missiles in the composition strategic forces unknown to the North Korean army. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative website, North Korea has about 200 Nodong missiles. , however, independent experts consider this number to be overestimated.
Alexey Arbatov, in a conversation with RBC, said that North Korea has from 80 to 100 ballistic missiles of different ranges (from 100-200 km to 1000-1500 km).
As noted by Vasily Kashin, senior Researcher The Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies of the Higher School of Economics, according to the most conservative estimates, the DPRK has only a few Hwasongs and it is unlikely that their number reaches even ten. These missiles are still in the development and testing stage, which means they have not yet been put into service and are not ready for mass production. In addition, the DPRK simply will not be able to support more than 20-30 Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 missiles, even if tests are completed and mass production begins. The maintenance of such missiles is very expensive: in addition to production, they require a certain infrastructure for maintenance and safety, explains Kashin. The DPRK has about 100 missiles of the Nodon family, the expert believes.
Total: about 100 missiles with a flight range of up to 1.5 thousand km, less than ten missiles with a flight range of more than 4 thousand km.
Are North Korea's neighbors capable of defending themselves?
In response to the continuing threat from the DPRK, South Korea began deploying the American THAAD missile defense system. The United States began deploying THAAD systems in South Korea in March of this year and has deployed two of at least six planned.
THAAD in South Korea is not yet capable of covering the Seoul agglomeration, where 25 million people live, that is, half of the country’s population, notes Kashin. “It covers 60% of the territories of South Korea, so its usefulness has always raised certain doubts,” says the expert. Considering the fact that only two of the six complexes have been deployed so far, Seoul’s vulnerability is obvious, but if the remaining four complexes are deployed closer to the demilitarized zone, that is, to the border between the DPRK and South Korea, then the chances of minimizing the North Korean threat will increase, Kashin believes.
Japan, after the July tests of the DPRK, also decided to strengthen its defense. Tokyo is considering acquiring new installations for the US sea-based Aegis missile defense system and deploying its sister system, Aegis Ashore, on the coast to strengthen its defense capabilities.
Japan already has a two-level missile defense system - the naval Aegis and the Patriot complexes (Patriot Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3), equipped with surface-to-air missiles to hit targets at an altitude of 12 km. The Patriot complex will be used if the Aegis system fails to intercept flying objects; Aegis Ashore increases the likelihood of successful interception of missiles.
If the American missile defense system is able to intercept a missile with a nuclear warhead, it will simply collapse, but at the same time a radioactive substance will be released, explains Kashin. “A very complex process must take place for a nuclear charge to detonate. If the charge and rocket are destroyed, a release of radioactive material will occur. The interception itself occurs at an altitude of several tens of kilometers, so the consequences of this release will be insignificant. The contamination of the area will not be very strong,” the expert concludes.
However, the likelihood of North Korean missiles being intercepted by American missile defense systems in Japan and South Korea even with ideal conditions“It won’t be one hundred percent, because most of the tests were carried out in an environment far from combat,” Kashin believes. North Korea can launch dozens of missiles at a time, and intercepting such a salvo is unlikely. “Determine among the missiles coming in this salvo which one has a nuclear combat unit, and which one is ordinary is impossible. Accordingly, the likelihood that you will intercept a nuclear missile is small,” the expert concludes.
Even if Pyongyang hits Japan, the country will not cease to exist and will not turn into ashes despite the threats of the DPRK, notes Japanese scholar Dmitry Streltsov, head of the department of Oriental Studies at the Faculty of International Relations of MGIMO. However, in his opinion, in the event of an attack on Japan, “we can talk about major damage” and colossal casualties, given the high population density. However, this does not mean that “the islands will drown in the sea,” as Kim Jong-un promised.
South Korea is in a more difficult position: the DPRK can use conventional weapons to attack it. For example, the heavy artillery of North Korea, deployed near the border, is capable of causing irreparable damage to Seoul in the very first hours of the war. However, we are not talking about the immediate destruction of South Korea. Finally, there are reasonable doubts about the ability of the DPRK to use nuclear missile weapons to inflict at least some damage on the island of Guam or the continental United States, not to mention “wipe the United States into ashes and darkness.”
North Korea nuclear tests
North Korea conducted its first nuclear tests, the power of the explosion was about 1 kiloton of TNT. The tests triggered an earthquake measuring 4.2 on the Richter scale.
The power of the explosion is about 5 kt in TNT equivalent. The magnitude of the earthquake after testing was 4.7 on the Richter scale.
The power of the third underground nuclear explosion was 10-15 kt, the tests caused an earthquake with a magnitude of about 5 on the Richter scale. North Korean authorities said they have tested a miniature nuclear warhead that can be placed on ballistic missiles of various ranges.
Pyongyang announced its fourth nuclear test - a hydrogen bomb. Its power, according to various sources, ranged from 15 to 20 kt. The explosion triggered an earthquake measuring 5 on the Richter scale.
The power of the fifth test was, according to the American Arms Control Association, 20-25 kt of TNT equivalent. The magnitude of the earthquake after the explosion reached 5.2 on the Richter scale.
North Korean authorities said that a hydrogen bomb was used again during the sixth nuclear test. According to the NORSAR Foundation, the explosion, with a yield of about 120 kt of TNT, led to an earthquake measuring 5.8 on the Richter scale.
Sources: Norwegian Foundation for Geosciences, American Arms Control Association
Since the opening of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK in 1965, the world has been arguing about how dangerous Korea's policy is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that the republic is developing and testing weapons of mass destruction that will be used in the event of a threat to the system. However, experts disagree on how great North Korea's power really is. Questions also arise over whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who is the ally in creating weapons that could cause untold casualties.
Military potential of the DPRK
North Korea is one of the twenty poorest countries on the globe. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Juche political system, aimed at militarizing the country.
The needs of the army come first economically, and this is bearing fruit: North Korea’s army is the largest in the world.
But the number of soldiers is not a guarantee of success. Insufficient funding leads to the army using outdated equipment and weapons.
At the same time, the North Korean government has claimed since 1974 that the country is conducting continuous work to create nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this has become an additional reason for dissatisfaction among countries trying to resolve the conflict. North Korea claims that the weapons are being created solely for defensive purposes, but it is difficult to confirm the veracity of the claims.
At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermonuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb, was demonstrated. The government claimed that it existed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, a powerful earthquake was recorded in China near the border with the DPRK. Pyongyang authorities explained this as a test of a hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.
Sources of financing
The question of where North Korea got its nuclear weapons is closely related to the economic state of the country. Testing requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. It makes me think about financial assistance from the outside. China is considered North Korea's official partner, but during Kim Jong-un's reign, relations between the countries have deteriorated. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.
It is assumed that a new alliance – the DPRK and Russia – will enter the world political arena, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more reciprocal “courtesy” from Moscow. This means that financing comes from internal sources.
Experts suggest that money for the development of nuclear weapons comes from the following industries:
- social;
- agricultural;
- energy;
- heavy industrial.
There are reports in the media that North Korea is facing an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings They are turned on only for 3-4 hours a day; the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night images of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.
Claims that North Koreans are starving are unfounded. In the last decade, there has been economic growth in the country, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards that previously used to issue food rations. So the information that missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.
North Korea's nuclear potential
The times when threats about the presence of weapons of mass destruction were considered a bluff are behind us. The presence of powerful weapons in the DPRK is a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create 6 to 12 new missiles.
However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:
- the materials required to assemble nuclear warheads are not produced in North Korea and must be imported into the country;
- even with the creation of new charges, the problem remains with the construction of carriers for them;
- waste generated during the production of nuclear fuel is not exported from the country, and the conditions for its safe storage can only be met in small volumes.
However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing its experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts of the country, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Under threat from the United States, the DPRK can only afford one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un responded that the DPRK would strike if necessary.
PEACE AND SECURITY
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Park Sang Hoon
Institute of Foreign Policy and national security(Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-gu Seocho-dong, 13-76-2, 137-863
The article analyzes modern aspects of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons using the example of international approaches to the DPRK nuclear program, as well as the efforts of the world community to resolve it, especially through the Six-Party Talks.
Key words: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear problem, Six-Party Talks.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which almost led to a global nuclear missile war, the USSR and the USA, as the leading nuclear powers, came to the conclusion that, firstly, the arms race should be limited to some extent, and secondly - that access of new members to the “nuclear club” should be closed. As a result, in 1968, the USSR, USA and Great Britain, as well as about fifty other countries, which had already determined for themselves that they did not need their own nuclear weapons, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 d. After France and China joined it in 1992, all five nuclear powers - permanent members of the UN Security Council - became its members. However, unfortunately, this did not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Back in the 1970s. Israel created its first nuclear devices, collaborating in this area with the apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa. The Shah's Iran would have had several years to acquire the potential to create nuclear weapons, but the revolution of 1979 prevented this. At the same time, all these countries categorically denied even the existence of such intentions.
The situation changed in 1998, when India and Pakistan, which were not members of the NPT, voluntarily joined the “nuclear club.” The situation was further aggravated when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) first withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and then officially announced its first nuclear test in 2006, followed by another in 2009.
but suspicions also arose regarding the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
From a formal legal point of view, India and Pakistan cannot be condemned for violating the provisions of the NPT, since they are not members of it. Both countries claim that they need nuclear weapons solely for self-defense against each other, but could join the NPT if the other side joins. But this is unlikely, because India has another potential adversary that “legally” possesses nuclear weapons - China. Iran, in fact, is only suspected of striving to become a “threshold state,” which the NPT does not prohibit.
The situation with North Korea is completely different. It openly declares that it has conducted nuclear tests and has nuclear weapons. At the same time, in addition to the border with the Republic of Korea, it also has common borders with two nuclear powers, but not hostile to it - the PRC and Russia, and also deals with the nuclear-armed forces of the United States of America based in the region, which it considers as its own. the most dangerous enemy. Therefore, it is clear that the possibility of North Korea renouncing nuclear weapons on a reciprocal basis with any or all three regional nuclear powers is completely absent - it is possible only unilaterally. This makes the North Korean nuclear problem particularly complex and complex, and it has many dimensions or levels. It seems appropriate to conceptualize it at three levels - global, regional and national.
At the global level, this problem is a serious threat to the nonproliferation regime and serves as a negative example for other countries. This fact is obvious to any unbiased researchers.
At the regional level, the conflict over this issue is at the heart of the broader security problem in Northeast Asia. There seem to be justified fears that if, when North Korea appears nuclear potential If doubts arise about the readiness of the United States to fulfill its obligations to protect its allies, the latter will most likely also rush to possess nuclear weapons.
At the national level, North Korea's military nuclear program is a major obstacle to economic development North and South Korea, for inter-Korean reconciliation and eventual reunification of the country. This level includes factors and processes at the level of individual states involved in the conflict and their governments. At this level, the development of the situation is most influenced by the steps taken by the Republic of Korea (ROK), the USA, China, Russia and Japan.
It should be recalled that in response to the US withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991, the ROK and the DPRK signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in December of the same year, and the Joint Declaration of the North and South in January of the following year on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, already in 1993, the first nuclear crisis broke out, when the DPRK very briefly suspended its participation in the NPT. And then President of the Republic of Korea Kim Yong Sam closely linked the nuclear problem with progress in the two-hundredth century.
mutual relations. In 1994, the mediation of former US President John Carter helped the parties agree to hold a summit, but the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung eliminated the prospects for negotiations.
Nevertheless, the DPRK remained in the NPT, and in 1998, the new South Korean President Kim Dae-jung began to actively pursue a fundamentally new policy of comprehensive and active interaction with the North, which continued throughout the presidency of his successor Roh Moo-hyun. However, this policy of “solar warmth”, symbolized by the “Kim-Kim” summits, i.e. Kim Dae-jung and the new leader of the DPRK Kim Jong-il (2000) and the “No-Kim” summit, i.e. Noh Moo Hyun with Kim Jong Il (2007), extended mainly to economic and humanitarian exchanges. It has failed to launch a peace process because the North has refused to discuss security issues, including the nuclear issue.
Thanks to the Framework Agreement, reached through a series of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea in 1994, the first nuclear crisis ended, but the preconditions for it remained. From the beginning of the second nuclear crisis in 2003, the Six Party Talks with the participation of both Korean states, the USA, China, Russia and Japan became a new platform for discussing the problem. However, such important breakthroughs as the Joint Declaration of September 19, 2003 and the Agreement of February 13, took place only thanks to bilateral US-North Korean negotiations.
Part of the reason why the North Korean nuclear issue has failed to be seriously discussed at the inter-Korean level is the lack of will of previous South Korean governments. They tended to deal only with simpler issues, bowing without serious objection to Pyongyang's refusal to discuss the nuclear issue. Secondly, the characteristics of the North Korean nuclear crisis have changed over the years and have gone beyond North-South relations. The framework of the Six-Party Talks provided for the participation of the ROK in discussing the nuclear issue, but thereby they themselves limited the possibility of resolving it on an inter-Korean basis. Therefore, the disappearance of nuclear issues from the agenda of inter-Korean meetings was partly due to a lack of will on the part of Seoul, but the main reason is the changing characteristics of the problem over the past twenty years.
Since the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in South Korea in February 2008, inter-Korean relations have remained tense, especially regarding the existence of opposing points of view on the implementation of agreements reached as a result of two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. From the point of view of the new administration, the decade-long “warmth of the sun” policy, inter-Korean dialogues and exchanges, cooperation and assistance from the South to the North failed to push North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
The new South Korean administration began to pay more attention to the problem of denuclearization. At the same time, she made it clear that if the North demonstrates its determination to abandon nuclear weapons, then the South is ready to implement a comprehensive program for the development of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Pyongyang was extremely dissatisfied with such changes and began
express this by increasing hostile propaganda and real physical measures against the Republic of Kazakhstan. This was reflected in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2009, for which the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan laid the blame on Pyongyang, although the DPRK did not admit its involvement, and Russia and China took the position of supporters of the presumption of innocence in the shelling of the North Korean artillery of the South Korean island the next year, and in other actions.
Regarding the United States, it can be noted that, unlike the Clinton administration, which supported the “solar heat” policy, the initial approach of the George W. Bush administration to the problem was vague. Secretary of State C. Powell announced continuity, that the Republican administration would “pick up what President Clinton left behind.” In June 2001, the Bush administration announced its strategy towards the DPRK, which it defined as intensifying implementation of the Agreed Framework while taking a more comprehensive approach to negotiations. However, the Bush administration's "sunshine" policy soon became an irritant in relations between the United States and South Korea. Under Bush, the United States took a more restrained position regarding the involvement of the DPRK in cooperation. In a situation where North Korea persistently sought bilateral negotiations with the United States, the latter preferred multilateral negotiations involving the ROK, China, Japan and Russia in order to share responsibility for nuclear non-proliferation. This is especially true in the period after September 11, 2001, when the United States unveiled a new preemptive strategy international terrorism and the use of WMD, justifying this on the grounds that political and military deterrence strategies based on responding to what has already happened are no longer adequate.
The Bush administration quickly lost confidence in the Six Party Talks. Differences between the core interests, negotiating styles, and domestic priorities of each participating country complicated the process. The remaining five participants in the negotiations managed to return the DPRK to the negotiating table and develop agreements on the implementation of the Joint Statement. But the negotiations ran into Pyongyang’s reluctance to agree to mandatory clear verification.
Critics of George W. Bush's policy in the United States accused it of being inappropriate, of causing increased confrontation with North Korea, leading to the inaction of the Agreed Framework, and forcing the formation of the Six Party Talks mechanism without a clear understanding of how these steps were supposed to ensure the dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program . It was further noted that the administration was overly preoccupied with the invasion of Iraq, where nuclear weapons were never discovered, when there was a real and urgent nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula was allowed to spiral out of control. When the outcome of the Iraq War proved problematic, the Bush administration failed to bring an end to the internal debate, severely limiting its ability to move toward a policy of engaging North Korea constructively through some major, compelling proposal.
By the time the Obama administration took office, North Korea reportedly possessed enough plutonium to produce six to eight nuclear warheads and showed little interest in taking steps to build on its previous commitments. The Obama administration has declared its commitment to diplomatic methods. However, North Korea rejected these approaches and in 2009 denounced the 1992 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from its newly operational nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and abandoned - perhaps temporarily - The Six Party Talks declared that it would “no longer participate in such negotiations” and conducted a second nuclear test. In response, the United States stated that its vital interest was the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's military nuclear program.
People's Republic of China since the early 1990s. avoided an active role during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. At that time, China emphasized its principle of non-interference and emphasized that this problem must be decided by the parties directly involved. However, when the second crisis broke out, he abandoned his role as a cautious observer and took a more active position. Following North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, China organized the Tripartite Talks with the United States and North Korea in April as a prelude to the Six Party Talks, and in August 2003 all six parties met for the first time , and, remarkably, in Beijing.
China's approach is driven by its need to maintain domestic stability and promote economic development. The driving force behind the PRC's resistance to a harsh international response to the DPRK's actions is fears that the collapse of the North Korean regime or the economic crisis caused by severe sanctions could generate a huge flow of North Korean refugees across the common border. At the same time, Beijing sometimes makes constructive contributions to the development and application of tough UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. He wants to improve his image in the world and build a more positive relationship with the United States, and his role as chairman of the Six Party Talks and, in effect, the lead mediator between the parties was intended to help achieve these goals.
Given China's close relationship with the DPRK and its incomparable influence over it, China, if more deeply involved in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, would play a key role in any resolution. North Korea's dependence on China for economic ties and political protection makes it a powerful and authoritative force. The PRC's approach to the DPRK apparently reflects both a genuine desire to prevent international sanctions that could destabilize this country, and an equally genuine desire to keep Pyongyang from taking certain rash steps.
Since North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, China has become more receptive to the idea of new UN sanctions.
But this did not find any real implementation. The reason is that while denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is desirable for China, the more pressing priority for Beijing is to keep North Korea on the peninsula as a viable ally. In theory, China could use its position as a major source of energy, food and other vital goods to force Pyongyang to abandon its military nuclear program. However, in reality, Beijing is very afraid of the possible consequences of using such a powerful “lever”. Beijing is most concerned about the possibility of military action on the peninsula, the collapse of the state in the North, the flow of North Korean refugees to China, and, even more so, the reunification of Korea, which would lead to a US military presence north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, although China favors resuming the negotiation process, its value to Beijing should not be exaggerated. Compared to preserving the DPRK, it ranks much lower on the scale of Chinese diplomacy priorities.
The participation of the Russian Federation in the Six-Party Talks all this time remained cautious, but principled and was based on two principles, namely, “a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula” and “peaceful resolution of the conflict.” Russia's position is fully consistent with its consistent commitment to the NPT. It was the USSR that at one time convinced the DPRK to sign the NPT and provide the opportunity for IAEA inspectors to work as a condition for its long-term cooperation with Pyongyang. Only after this did Moscow agree to supply North Korea with four light water nuclear reactors.
Russia is concerned not only that North Korean nuclear weapons will jeopardize the overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, pushing Japan and South Korea to create such weapons and, accordingly, accelerating the build-up of Chinese nuclear capabilities, but also that the DPRK's possession of them will harm global nonproliferation efforts. The costs associated with an arms race in the region would be very large, and the chain reaction nuclear proliferation in the world - very serious. Russia itself is also concerned about avoiding armed conflict or any unexpected changes on the Korean Peninsula. Due to its geographic proximity to North Korea, a sudden collapse of the regime or the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would be detrimental to the Russian Far East, since both radiation and refugees are known to not respect state borders.
These considerations have led Russia to resist any proposal to use force or any other scheme aimed at bringing about abrupt regime change in the DPRK. Russia takes the view that a solution to the current nuclear crisis can be found through a negotiated settlement and believes that threats, sanctions and accusations against North Korea could be counterproductive. At the same time, information reports on contacts between Russian diplomats and North Korean colleagues have long contained the same statement that Russia hopes for the resumption of six-party negotiations.
As for Japan, as a country that survived Hiroshima and is experiencing Fukushima, it is also extremely concerned about the North Korean nuclear problem. Stability in Northeast Asia is critical to the economic well-being of this country, and the DPRK's military nuclear program (as well as its missile program) is perceived by Japan as a direct threat to national security. The main goal of Japanese policy towards the DPRK is to normalize relations with it, in cooperation with the United States and the Republic of Korea, by resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.
At the same time, the Japanese side regularly raises the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens in the past by North Korean agents. Tokyo's position on the issue of these abductions is delicately criticized by other participants in the Six-Party Talks, who believe that progress on denuclearization should not be held hostage to this important, but much more specific issue. However, without his decision, Tokyo refuses to provide any energy assistance or other positive incentives to North Korea. In September 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized to Prime Minister D. Koizumi for the abductions, apparently believing that this would resolve or at least soften the issue. However, on the contrary, the very recognition of the fact of abductions sharply worsened the attitude of Japanese public opinion towards the DPRK. Of course, this issue definitely needs a final resolution, but it is more likely only in an atmosphere of improved bilateral relations. In principle, it can be stated that of all five of Pyongyang’s counterparties in the negotiations, Tokyo apparently took the toughest position, thereby exposing cracks in the regional multilateral system and provoking sharp disagreements regarding procedural issues and principles regarding the development of the negotiation process.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provided a fundamental, although not entirely effective, legal framework for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In April 2010, the United States and Russia signed the New START treaty, ratified eight months later, and then at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 47 world leaders unanimously agreed to make efforts to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear materials from terrorists.
In the context of the global problem of non-proliferation, resolving the North Korean nuclear problem is an issue that concerns not only inter-Korean relations, even if it causes the greatest concern in the ROK, but also an important regional and global task. However, stronger norms and more effective institutions on their own are unlikely to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, since it grew out of that country's domestic and international security deficiencies, as well as its unique history and the worldview of its leaders.
The experience of studying the foreign policy of the DPRK shows that it is very consistent in its own way. If any changes occur in it, then they are caused by changes in the internal environment and external influences. As for the first, with all the apparent immutability of inner life,
However, in some respects it differs from what it was about thirty years ago. The influence of external factors - for example, sanctions - is limited by the balance of power and the far from identical interests of the states present in the region, all of which would like changes to one degree or another, but none - catastrophic shocks. Because of this, the significance of the change in North Korean leaders should not be exaggerated. Of course foreign policy Kim Jong Il differed in some details from the line of his father Kim Il Sung, but no one will be able to determine under which of them she was tougher or, on the contrary, more prone to compromise.
Likewise, it is difficult to speculate on whether North Korea will return to negotiations and, if so, in what format. After the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a reasonable impression that in the conditions of rendering humanitarian aid and compensation for the nuclear program freeze, including through assistance to the peaceful nuclear program, as well as through the "warmth of the sun" policy pursued by the Kim Dae-jung administration, this country will gradually open up to the outside world and move to a more peaceful position. However, in the new century these hopes were hardly realized.
Taking into account this experience in relation to the new leader Kim Jong-un, one can only assume that Pyongyang’s positions on foreign policy issues, including the problem of denuclearization, will probably and most likely be formed as a resultant of the positions of various informal groups in the ruling elite, which, in turn, will be determined to an increasing extent not so much by ideological attitudes as by real material interests. It can be assumed that the DPRK, in essence, although without declaring it, will also strive to solve its problems primarily through contacts with the United States and China as the main geopolitical actors in the region and only secondarily with their regional allies and partners.
LITERATURE
Naji Khalife. Security in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear program // Bulletin of RUDN University. Series " International relationships" - 2010. - No. 4.
Byung-joon Ahn. South-North Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Challenge // Coping with Korea's Security Challenge. - Vol. 2. - Future of ROK-US Alliance, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2003.
David C. Kang. Kim's Nuclear Obsession // The National Interest online, April 13, 2010. URL: http://nationalinterest.org
Hillary Clinton, Press Conference at ASEAN Summit, 22 July 2009. URL: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126320.htm
Natalya Bazhanova. North Korea's Decision to Develop an Independent Nuclear Program // North Korean Nuclear Program. Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia. - N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2000.
Sung Bae Kim. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea? // Policy Forum Online 10-035, 1 July 2010, Nautilus Institute.
Patrick M. Morgan. The Role of the United States in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis // Korean Security in a Changing East Asia. - N.Y.: Praeger Security International, 2006.
Press availability conducted between Colin Powell and Swiss Foreign Minister on March 6, 2001. URL: http://2001-2009. state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/1116. htm.
Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea // Crisis Group Asia Report No. 179, November 2, 2009.
Ted Galen Carpenter. False Hopes // The National Interest online, 11 March 2010. URL: http://nationalinterest.org
The Korean Peninsula: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia // CSCAP Russian National Committee Report, September 2010.
Yevgeniy P. Bazhanov, James C. Moltz. China and the Korean Peninsula: Managing an Unstable Triangle // North Korean Nuclear Program. Security, Strategy and New Perspectives form Russia. - N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2000.
Yoichi Funabashi. The Peninsula Question. - Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007.
NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-dong, Seocho-gu, 137-8631, 3-76-2
The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.
Key words: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear problem, Six-Party Talks.