« Big game“or “War of Shadows” is the name given to the rivalry between Russia and Britain for influence in South and Central Asia that unfolded in the second half of the 19th century. It was a geostrategic and political confrontation. And also - a duel between the intelligence services of two powerful empires, replete with the most interesting twists.
hating each other, but not wanting war.
G. J. Palmerston
How the Crimean War turned out
The course of the “Great Game” cannot be understood without knowing the events of previous decades, so we cannot do without an extensive preamble.
The “Great Game” was a consequence and continuation Crimean War, starting almost immediately after its completion. Therefore, two words about that war. We have become accustomed to the thesis about the “humiliating” Treaty of Paris, which summed up the “shameful defeat” of Russia in the Crimean War, although for some reason we are not talking, for example, about the truly shameful defeat of Napoleonic France in 1812–14, which ended with the occupation of Paris.
One can call one or another treaty, treaty or pact successful or humiliating only after the passage of time, which can change the initial conclusions. American historian J. Ledonne ( John P. LeDonne) asserts ( The Russian Empire and the World. 1700–1917. — Oxford University Press, 1997) that the consequences of the Crimean War turned out to be a complete failure precisely for Russia’s opponents: the reorientation of the Russian foreign policy caused the catastrophe of France in 1871 and led to just such a development of events that England tried to prevent for many years, considering it mortally dangerous for its empire - to the entry Central Asia in Russia.
In addition, the secondary theater of military operations, Kamchatka, was happily forgotten in Paris. The Anglo-French squadron tried to capture Petropavlovsk in August 1854, but was defeated, and the squadron commander, Admiral Price, was killed. At the cost of an insignificant softening of their demands regarding the Black Sea and the Baltic, the Allies could well have obtained from Russia at the Paris Congress the concession of all of Kamchatka (by that time, Russian forces had been completely evacuated from there to the mouth of the Amur - to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, founded for this occasion ). But the memory of the Peter and Paul defeat forced the British and French to pretend that Kamchatka was a trifle of no interest to anyone. It was from Nikolaevsk that the direction to the south began, right up to the Korean border, Russian development Far Eastern shores. Which played a role in the final stage of the “Great Game”.
Back in the 18th century, the British began to worry Russian movement South. They did not believe that Russia's goal was to protect Transcaucasian Christians. The British were just getting their hands on India, pushing out their direct rivals (the French, Portuguese, Dutch) with all their might, but just in case they kept an eye on even the distant approaches to their main prey and took precautions.
Map of British India (1909)
That is why during the Russian-Persian War of 1804–1813. the Russian army had to fight an enemy trained by English military instructors - fortunately, unimportant instructors, judging by those victories with small forces of General Pyotr Kotlyarevsky (the battle of Aslanduz on October 20, 1812 and the capture of Lenkoran on January 1, 1813), which forced the Shah recognize the inclusion of Georgia into the Russian Empire. The British even had to help conclude the corresponding treaty - after all, at the time of its signing, Russia and England had already been allies in the fight against Napoleon for several months.
But this is not yet an episode of the “Great Game” - just like the murder of the Russian ambassador A.S. Griboedov in Tehran in 1829 (popular literature claims that at the instigation of the British, but there is no evidence). They also ask the following question: when England tried to prevent Russia from gaining a foothold in the Caucasus, helping the highlanders with money and weapons, wasn’t this the beginning of the “Great Game”? Did not have. Instead of “England” you should write here: several ardent English Russophobes. Everything is true about weapons and money; here you can add their secret trips to the Caucasus and campaigns in the press. These activists did their best to provoke their government into conflict with Russia and were angry that their efforts were being thwarted by the caution of London. The strength of their anti-Russian passion did not fade over the years: many years later, in 1877, the most ardent of them, David Urquhart, died of grief after learning that Russia had declared war on Turkey for the liberation of the Balkan peoples.
Once it began, the “Great Game” consisted, like a game of chess, of alternating exchanges of moves and complex multi-move combinations. As such, it began in 1857. It is important to understand the motivations of the players. First of all, these were empires that acted according to the rules and customs of the empires of their time. Today it is customary to condemn imperial policies, but later, non-retroactive laws cannot be applied to any country. The historian V.P. Buldakov is right: “Empire is a way of spatial-historical self-affirmation of an excessively powerful culture. Empire is not a historical sin, but a law of universal human development.”. England's main motive during the Great Game period was the fear of losing India. British India of the 19th century included, in addition to India itself, the territories of what are now Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma. The main financial basis for the economic growth and prosperity of England for more than two centuries was the income coming from this huge colony, is a fact known then to any literate Englishman.
Southern underbelly of Russia
Russia did not have even a remotely similar feeding trough. The Trans-Ural expanses, of course, brought her income in the form of valuable furs in the 16th–18th centuries, but they hardly repaid the efforts invested. Russia only invested in all its subsequent territorial acquisitions - before the development of Baku oil began. There was no point in thinking about making a profit from them. Many considered this a mistake. General Rostislav Fadeev in newspaper articles of the 1860s–70s. and in notes addressed to the highest name he proved that Asian possessions hang like chains on Russia. He was outraged by the fact that the tax burden of a Transcaucasian resident is a quarter, and a Central Asian resident is a fifth of what a resident of native Russia pays. But we got ahead of ourselves.
Being in natural-geographical isolation (and often in military-political isolation in the western direction), Russia was preoccupied with finding new trade routes. As befits an empire, it has repeatedly tried to build them by force. Hence the Khiva campaign of 1717 of Prince Bekovich-Cherkassky and the Persian campaign (1722–23) of Peter I. Free trade with Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand and Herat was prevented by the warlike Kyrgyz-Kaisaks (Kazakhs), Kara-Kirghiz (Kyrgyz), Khivans, Turkmens and Karakalpaks. The entire 18th century passed under the sign of their raids on Russian, Kalmyk, and then on German settlements in the Lower Volga region. A chain of fortresses was created along the edge of the steppes opposite them - one of them appears in “The Captain’s Daughter”. And whoever read Leskov’s “The Enchanted Wanderer” will remember how Ivan Severyanovich Flyagin ended up as slaves of nomads in the steppes beyond Orenburg and was “bristled” by them so that he would not run away.
Nomads robbed caravans, took people captive, and then sold them into slavery in the Bukhara or Khiva Khanate. In the 1830s alone, about two thousand Russian citizens were kidnapped. Slavery and the slave trade were perhaps the main branches of the economy of Bukhara and Khiva. In 1845, the English official Joseph Wolff presented a report in London stating that of the 1.2 million population of the Bukhara Emirate, 200 thousand were Persian slaves. Looking ahead: among the first measures of the Russian authorities after the conquest of the three Turkestan monarchies was an order to their rulers to free all slaves and prohibit slavery. This alone allows us to accept the thesis of Soviet textbooks about “the progressive significance of the annexation of Central Asia to Russia”.
Russian historian E. Yu. Sergeev (The Great Game, 1856–1907. - M., 2012, p. 68) writes: “As documents show, the tsarist strategists, busy planning military operations in the Caucasus, ignored the Indian direction until the Crimean War.”. But fear has big eyes, and London alarmists accused their government of turning a blind eye to the Russian threat. The already mentioned Urquhart in print called the English Minister of Foreign Affairs (and future Prime Minister) Palmerston a “Russian agent” (does this remind you of anything?).
The Crimean War reminded that India is "Achilles' heel" British Empire. Senior military officials overwhelmed the General Headquarters with plans for a campaign against India. Moscow University professor I.V. Vernadsky (father of Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky) published in 1855 - the Crimean War was still in full swing - the book “Political Equilibrium and England”, where he warned: if you do not strike a preemptive strike on Hindustan, “British power will conquer China, just as it conquered India”. Note that this is exactly what almost happened soon, during the Second Opium War.
Having read the warlike staff notes, Alexander II did not give effect to any of them, preferring to take up his Great Reforms, in which, as we know, he succeeded. As for the burdens imposed by the Paris Congress, Russia got rid of them after 15 years. After which she liberated the Balkan peoples, at the same time regaining Southern Bessarabia, Batum, Ardahan and Kars. In those same years, she made her Central Asian acquisitions, which became a cause for extreme concern in London.
Russian expansion from the Urals and Southern Siberia towards Central Asia was inevitable. The main reason there was an obvious difference in the potentials of the empire and the archaic agricultural and nomadic monarchies. Russian goods (textiles, sugar, flour, as well as tools, metal and glass products, watches, dishes and, since the 1850s, such a novelty as kerosene) were looking for new markets, Russian merchants needed access to Turkestan cotton, silk, astrakhan, carpets, spices, transit Chinese goods. But the caravans were subject to robbery attacks. Since the times of Peter the Great, Russia began to create fortified lines along the perimeter of the Great Steppe, gradually moving them to the south: Orenburg, New Orenburg, Syrdarya, Aral (not deployed). The fortifications later became cities: these are Fort Shevchenko on the Caspian Sea (Novopetrovsk fortress), Kazalinsk, Kokchetav, Pavlodar, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Shchuchinsk, Semipalatinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Ak-Mosque (in Soviet time– Kzylorda), Alma-Ata (former fortification Verny), etc.
Already at the end of the 1820s, English spies were spotted in Bukhara and Samarkand. The Turkestan oases were tantalizingly close to northern Afghanistan, which by default fell within the British sphere of influence. Having gained a foothold in these oases in a still neutral space, unfriendly England could, with a throw of the sepoy army, cut off Siberia from the old provinces of Russia - after all, they were connected to each other only by a thin “umbilical cord” of the Siberian Highway.
V. Vereshchagin. Spy, 1878–79
St. Petersburg's fears were intensified by the events of 1839–1842. The British, for an unclear purpose, brought their Indian troops into Afghanistan, which even three more than a year later they were still there. Information and rumors coming from Kabul were contradictory. Russia had the right to fear that the British had, in fact, already annexed Afghanistan and were about to move further north, capturing the Merv oasis to begin with, after which Samarkand and Bukhara would seem like easy prey to them. What will prevent them, having overcome the Hindu Kush, from spreading throughout the entire plain of Turkestan? True, in 1842 reliable news came that the British were completely defeated in Afghanistan and, having lost 18 thousand people, went home. But the threat was identified, and it was necessary to meet it not on the border of the Ural-Siberian “underbelly”, but on the southern, perhaps more distant approaches to it. Russia has firmly decided to shift its border here beyond a wide strip of barren deserts and semi-deserts. The fight against robbers faded into the background.
How did the advance to the south go? The Kazakh Khanate ceased to exist back in 1822. Khan Kenesary, who tried to revive it, died in 1847 in a civil war with the Kyrgyz. Almost all the lands of present-day Kazakhstan that were not previously included in the imperial citizenship are gradually included, but further Russian steps to the south were stopped by the Crimean War.
The results of this war were called in Russia painful, hateful, disastrous, sad, but the winners appreciated them little better. France, having lost 95 thousand people, could at least assure itself that it had taken revenge for the defeat of Napoleon. But it was not for nothing that the French ambassador in Vienna, Francois Bourqueney, said about the Paris Treaty: “It is impossible to understand, after reading this document, who is the winner and who is the loser”. England was shocked by the Crimean War in vain victims, it was called there "heroic disaster". Alfred Tennyson’s ballad “The Charge of the Light Brigade” was known to every schoolchild in England (the “light brigade” that fell near Balaklava consisted of the scions of eminent families of England, they saw a symbolic meaning in this). The shock from the costs of the war was no less shocking. The main disappointment was the more than modest win. Palmerston plotted to take away from Russia the Caucasus with Transcaucasia, Crimea, the Kingdom of Poland with Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, Estland, Finland with the Aland Islands, and all of Bessarabia. His dreams did not come true. Turkey (one of the “winners”!), like Russia, lost the right to have a navy in the Black Sea.
The annoyance of the two main rivals, Russia and England, over the outcome of the war gave the “Great Game” that unfolded a dangerous spirit of revanchism, but the very memory of this war kept them from taking completely rash steps.
In 1857, the Sepoy Mutiny broke out in India. We know about him mainly from Vereshchagin’s terrible painting “British Execution in India.” English rule was shaken by this uprising and barely survived. But, as the already quoted E. Yu. Sergeev writes, “all the intentions of the British press to find any traces of Russian incitement of the sepoys to revolt turned out to be in vain... The first secret emissaries were sent to India by the headquarters of the TurkVO only in the mid-1870s.”.
The game begins
Having finally pacified the Caucasus and coped (with the help of Prussia) with the Polish uprising of 1863, Russia resumed its expansion into Central Asia, which lasted almost until the end of the century. From now on, the empire did not act situationally, as had happened before, but purposefully, constantly keeping the English factor in mind. The "Great Game" has begun.
We’ll have to touch on the “imperial” topic again. We all know that 1857–1881 were the years of the Great Reforms, an era, as they say in textbooks, “introducing Russia to rights and freedoms according to European models”. In some television discussion about the reforms of Alexander II, the following was said: “What European reforms are we talking about? These reforms can only be called hypocritical, because it was during these years that Russia made its main colonial conquests.”. There was no one in the audience who would answer that Russia in this regard followed European models.
England continued its worldwide expansion during these years, annexing territories in South Africa, Burma, the West Indies, Nigeria, made the Gold Coast (Ghana), Bazutoland (Lesotho), Sikkim its colonies, completed the formation of its possessions in Canada and Australia, and in India subordinated semi-independent native principalities (numbering over 600!) to the British crown. Since 1864, it has occupied Egypt, captured Fiji and Cyprus, destroyed Afghanistan and Ethiopia, and colonized Malaya. And what are her European friends doing these years? Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia; the Germans take Schleswig-Holstein from the Danes, and Lorraine and Alsace from France; France “squeezes” Savoy and Nice from the Italians, includes Tunisia, Tahiti, and all of Indochina into its empire, and is fighting in Mexico; Spain captures Saint-Domingue (part of Haiti); Little Belgium makes the huge Congo its colony, little Holland makes gigantic Indonesia its colony. And don’t forget: the United States is unsuccessfully trying to take over Korea (the Philippines’ turn will come later). I repeat once again: no country can be judged outside the context of time and according to later, non-retroactive laws.
The history of Russian-English relations during this period is a history of jealous observation of each other, veiled threats, mutual trips, intrigues and temporary alliances at a high and very high level. high level. When bluffing, each side tried not to blink first; they folded more than once dangerous situations. But at their own level, negotiations took place between Russian and British officers and mid-level diplomats - not in the capitals, but in places of common interest or on neutral ground nearby. There were no problems with understanding: both parties owned French. Before the advent of the telegraph, reports to the capitals took weeks, and the situation often had time to cool down on its own. Negotiations were conducted on narrow matters, but sometimes ideas were voiced for transmission to the very top, which was helped by a mutually respectful tone. Undercover scouts and travelers also met with each other, but also with military ranks. Together they helped to avoid direct clashes.
At the same time, both Russia and England always had ready plans for a military solution to problems. A note from General N.P. Ignatiev to Foreign Minister Gorchakov, written in 1863, is typical: “In order to be at peace with England and force her to respect the voice of Russia, avoiding a break with us, it is necessary to bring English statesmen out of their pleasant delusion about the security of Indian possessions, the impossibility [for] Russia to resort to offensive actions against England, our lack of enterprise and sufficient availability of routes through Central Asia for us". Ignatiev wrote knowledgeably: the General Staff at that time had prepared at least three plans for a campaign against India along different routes.
In Russia they believed that it would be safer for everyone if Russian and English possessions did not come into direct contact. It is better if they are separated by independent Persia and Afghanistan, and better if they remain independent. It is with them that Russia should border directly, since British India already borders with them on the “reverse” side. True, the northern borders of Persia and especially Afghanistan were not entirely clear. The situation in the Pamirs was also dark, not to mention the Eastern Tien Shan. And the question remained: should we strive to absorb the Central Asian khanates or would it be enough to make them protectorates of Russia with the right of movement of Russian troops?
Despite the backwardness of their monarchies, the khans and emirs of Central Asia were quite warlike. Thus, the Kokand Khanate actively seized the lands of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz and fought with Bukhara with varying success. She did not give up and continuously fought with the Khiva and Kokand khanates for Merv, Chardzhuy, Khojent, Shakhrisabz (Tamerlane’s favorite city). But the activities of the rulers covered up a different picture. We find it in the orientalist (General Staff officer and friend of Dostoevsky) Chokan Valikhanov (183–1865), a Kazakh by birth, who did not consider it necessary to sweeten the pill. He writes about the terrible decline of vast expanses, “this gigantic wasteland, on which from time to time one comes across abandoned aqueducts, canals and wells”, about the mounds of ancient cities, long covered by sands, where wild donkeys and saigas roam, about “pathetic adobe huts”, the wretched inhabitants of which are “crushed by their faith and the tyranny of their rulers".
V. Vereshchagin. Mausoleum Gur-Emir. Samarkand, 1869– 70
The memory of ancient kingdoms, poets and astronomers, amazing manuscripts, palaces and mausoleums - all this in itself could not become driving force, capable of pulling the impoverished region out of the Middle Ages. Locked in the depths of the continents, the kingdoms flourished only as long as stable trade routes ran through them. But the Great Silk Road died out - and the lands along it fell into stagnation and regression. There are no navigable rivers; the Oxus and Yaxartes (Amu Darya and Syr Darya) lead to a dead end in the Aral Sea. Backwardness and desolation reign in the Fergana Valley, Khorezm, Badakhshan, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Merv. Only an external force could pull them out of this state.
Could England become this force? It seems that she was not against her possessions adjoining the Russians without any buffer zones. Cavalry Colonel Kazakov reported to the top in 1862: “In Tashkent, Kokand and especially in Bukhara there are already many Englishmen training native troops in military craft... They are pleased and encouraged by our slowness... There were Englishmen in disguise in our Kyrgyz steppes, which clearly proves the desire of this nation for dominion in Central Asia.”. But in the realities of the Great Game, the British at that time, most likely, had already missed the chance for such dominion.
(What could have happened if the British had tried to get ahead of the Russian army is suggested by events that happened 15 years later. In 1879, the English Prime Minister Disraeli, who did not like the negotiations of the Afghan Emir Sher-Ali with the Russian General N. G. Stoletov, sent to Afghanistan from India, a 39,000-strong army. Having removed the emir, this army would have entered Russian borders. The emir was removed, his successor signed an unequal treaty with the British, but guerrilla warfare broke out, and soon the British were besieged by an army of almost one hundred thousand rebels. As a result, Disraeli lost his post , and Gladstone, who replaced him, returned the troops back to India. It was confirmed: in order to enter Central Asia from Afghanistan, the British first needed to cross it without losses.)
Campaign in Central Asia and “skillful inaction”
On the initiative of Minister of War Milyutin, the great campaign to Central Asia began in 1864. Until the end of 1865, several important cities of the Kokand Khanate were taken, including Tashkent. The following year, Khojent, located at the entrance to the Fergana Valley, was occupied, and the path to Kokand was open. However, a new campaign was not needed, negotiations began, and the war ended in 1868 with the signing of a trade agreement between Khudoyar Khan of Kokand and the Governor-General of Turkestan, Konstantin von Kaufmann. Despite the modest name, this agreement brought the status of the Kokand Khanate closer to vassal and opened up for Russia direct access to the Chinese market, since Kokand owned two passes leading to Kashgaria (Western China). It was not possible to take advantage of this advantage immediately: for several more years the Fergana Valley was rocked by uprisings against the “infidels.” As a result, the Khanate was abolished in 1876, and its territory was divided into two regions: Syrdarya (with its center in Tashkent) and Fergana.
The Emir of Bukhara also did not submit immediately, but after the capture of Samarkand he capitulated. The Samarkand region was separated from the territory of the emirate, and to console the emir, the Russian army returned the breakaway rebel outskirts under his control and restored contact with the Bukhara possessions in the Pamirs.
At first, England reacted with feigned skepticism. In The Times one could read: “In St. Petersburg they are still thinking about projects for including the East into one big empire... Such projects will inevitably represent an extravagant and impossible dream.”. Judging by the (temporary) absence of strong counter moves, the English elite considered it best to stick to this point of view for now. Viceroy Northbrook of India wrote to Secretary of State for India Argyll: "How more Russia expands its possessions [in Turkestan], the more it is open to our attack and the less strength it has to repel it.”. They say, let the situation mature, we will respond at the right time. Such views are called "skillful inaction" (masterly inactivity), but their dominance could not last forever.
The English press was less cool. She reinforced her fears at all stages of the “Great Game” information war. The imaginary “Testament of Peter the Great” was endlessly quoted with a whole program for the conquest of the world (a fake that was published back in 1836). Russian world domination, according to the “Testament,” was impossible without the capture of Constantinople and India. Therefore, any step by Russia in the Caucasus or Turkestan, even a trifling one, was perceived by the press as the beginning of an operation to take away the “pearl of the British Empire,” giving rise to exclamations: "Here! Here! We told you so! The Russians are carrying out Peter’s plan!” Let us note in parentheses that Peter I clearly continued to edit his will from the other world: in reprints late XIX– beginning of the 20th century. there were points regarding Persian Gulf, China and, what is especially touching, Japan, the very existence of which Peter I was barely aware of.
Caricature from the time of the “Great Game”
Since the beginning of the 1860s, Russia has every time found itself one step (or a move) ahead, and England did not dare to raise the stakes for several decisive years. The author of the fundamental work on the “Great Game,” E. Yu. Sergeev, believes that Russia created the Turkestan Governor-General at the right time (in 1867). And in time (in 1869) she founded a port on the Caspian Sea, thus beginning the annexation of the vast Trans-Caspian region (present-day Turkmenistan - by modern standards these are three Bangladeshes and Ceylon in addition). This territory did not have a single ruler, belonging to a number of warlike semi-nomadic tribes, and control over it ultimately became decisive in the outcome of the “Great Game”. The historian shows that these two events forced London to turn to St. Petersburg on October 30, 1869 with the idea "cordial agreement" (entente cordiale; That’s when the idea of the Entente was first voiced!). Negotiations on the spheres of influence of the two empires from that moment were no longer interrupted, taking almost 40 years. The search for agreement has more than once hung by a thread.
This happened during the Russian-Turkish War (1877–1878) for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. It was then that a plan was developed in London for a full-scale war against Russia from Asian directions: through the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, Persia and Afghanistan, combined with uprisings on the southern borders of the Russian Empire - they would be prepared by British agents. Disraeli wrote to the queen: “By our troops the Muscovites must be driven out of Central Asia and thrown into the Caspian Sea.” But making a plan is easier than putting it into practice. It would hardly have been possible to involve Persia in it, so the plan remained on paper. It is interesting that at the same time, the Russian military attache in London, General Gorlov, was secretly approached by the leaders of Irish nationalists with a proposal to create a brigade of Irish volunteers within the Russian army, ready to fight against the British. Petty Indian princes and sons of maharajas came incognito to Tashkent and even St. Petersburg, persuading them to free India from the British yoke.
Strictly speaking, the annexation of Turkestan to the Russian Empire became irreversible only in 1886, with the commissioning of the main section of the Trans-Caspian railway– from the Caspian Sea to the Amu Darya. Laid in incredibly difficult conditions along the very edge of the Karakum desert, the road guaranteed, if necessary, the rapid delivery of reinforcements (transferred by sea from the Caucasus or from Astrakhan) to any threatened point on the southern periphery of the Turkestan General Government. Further to the east, the rather wide Amu Darya served as a natural boundary. Disraeli's threat was now impossible to carry out. The road was completed for another five years and was brought to Samarkand, and then to Tashkent.
On the border of empires
But the question remained of a clear demarcation between Russia and England in the space between the Caspian and Pamir. In 1885, due to uncertainty on this issue, things came to a direct military clash, the only one in the entire “Great Game”. By annexing the Turkmen lands (Trans-Caspian region), the Russian Empire thereby pledged to protect the interests of the Turkmens. Residents of Merv, which swore allegiance to Russia in January 1884, insisted that the Pendinsky oasis, 250 km to the south, was inhabited by Turkmens and the border between them was inappropriate. General Alexander Komarov received orders to reach the new border line. Because in the title "Empress of India"(English Queen Victoria was also her) Afghanistan was also listed, the British considered this step the beginning of an invasion of India and demanded that the Afghan emir stop the Russians. The British can be understood: a hundred kilometers from Pende to the south lay ancient Herat, beyond which the easy way to India through flat Afghanistan, bypassing the mountain systems. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that there were no plans to invade Afghanistan, but it was not heard.
Afghan units under the command of British officers immediately occupied the disputed oasis and several neighboring ones. Russia took this as a challenge. In response to Komarov’s request to the representative of the British side, General Lamsden, to order the Afghan troops to leave, the Briton refused. Then, in March 1885, Komarov’s Cossacks recaptured the occupation. German Emperor Wilhelm I congratulated Alexander III on his "brilliant victory at Penda". The expectation of war reigned. In London, Prime Minister Gladstone asked the House of Commons for a loan for the military operation. But things didn’t come to war, Gladstone resigned, and in September a preliminary agreement was reached: the Penda oasis on the Kushka River (later a city of the same name, the southernmost in the empire, was founded here) remains with Russia, but Russia does not advance further.
The next crisis that aroused militant feelings in England was the Pamir crisis. Anyone who is familiar with geography remembers that the Pamirs look like an almost regular trapezoid on the map. But these are the outlines of the Soviet, Tajik Pamir. From the west and east, this trapezoid is adjacent to the powerful ridges of the Afghan and Chinese Pamirs. There was a lot of wealth in this mountainous country - gold, rubies, lapis lazuli, rock crystal, noble spinel, tourmaline, alexandrite, gems have been the subject of legends since ancient times, but there were no borders even in the late 1880s. This worried the main rivals: the Russians could, without formally violating anything, penetrate into Kashmir, the British and Afghans into the Fergana Valley. China also showed a keen interest in the Pamirs. There was clarity only with Badakhshan: this inhabited corner of the “roof of the world” had been paying taxes to the Bukhara emir since ancient times, so it should have been left behind Bukhara.
The Pamir disputes - with the dispatch of armed expeditions, skirmishes, with the construction by the Russian military of a secret strategic road from the Fergana Valley to the Pamirs, with the exchange of loud statements and notes, with campaigns in the press - lasted seven years. To journalists and writers who did not have accurate information, everything seemed as simple as shelling pears, just like today. The talented militarist Kipling wrote in 1891:
And yet a clever solution was found. Looking at a map of Afghanistan today, it is difficult not to notice the thin and long appendix protruding from its northeastern corner. We are talking about the so-called Wakhan corridor, artificially carved out in 1895 from the Southern Pamirs to separate British India from the Russian Empire. And it worked! But a new round of the “Great Game” was already brewing - in the Far East.
Shifting Russian Focus to China and the Shores Pacific Ocean many in London perceived it as an attempt to get closer to India, this time from the northeast. The activity of Russian explorers in and near Tibet, the travel of Russian Buddhists (Buryats and Kalmyks) to Lhasa, Russia's involvement in the conflict between the Chinese and Muslims in western China, the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and now the creation of naval bases in Vladivostok and Port- Arthur - everything was interpreted exactly like that. Based on this, plans were being prepared in England for an attack on the Ussuri region and the mouth of the Amur, preferably in alliance with China and Japan. English strategists did not know that (as historian E. Yu. Sergeev found out) back in 1888, in anticipation of such a turn of events, “a special commission began work in Vladivostok to consider scenarios for the actions of cruisers at sea against the British and Qing fleets”. And again everything worked out.
The end of the “Great Game” was put by an agreement between Russia and Great Britain, signed in St. Petersburg on August 18 (31), 1907. Russia recognized the British protectorate over Afghanistan, England recognized Russian protectorate over Bukhara and Khiva and the direct entry of the rest of Central Asia into the Russian Empire. In Persia, Russian (in the north) and English (in the south) spheres of influence were distinguished, which came in handy in 1941, when the USSR and England sent their troops into this country for the duration of the war.
Results of the “Great Game”
The Great Game kept all of Europe and almost all of Asia in suspense for half a century. Over time, it gave rise to a whole literature with an emphasis on secret and behind-the-scenes episodes, intelligence operations, etc. But these fascinating works usually lack the main conclusion: the many years of efforts of the two empires helped, without resorting to force (almost without resorting), to solve insoluble issues about the spheres of influence of each of them, including the most conflicting areas, to reconcile irreconcilable interests. There were enough “hawks” on each side, but patience prevailed, common sense, desire to find compromises. The “Great Game” enriched diplomatic practice with the concepts of “buffer state”, “natural border”, “détente”, “consent”, “sphere of influence (interests)”, which were previously absent from the conceptual apparatus of international relations.
Bukhara general and officers
As is now clear, the main benefit from the “Great Game” came from the peoples of the territories annexed to the Russian Empire, torn out of the Middle Ages. Left to its own devices, Central Asia today would be something like a gigantic Afghanistan. It is not for nothing that in 1995 a monument to Nicholas II was erected in Khorog (Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan, Pamir) - long before the appearance of such monuments in Russia. Let us ask ourselves: would the Russian Empire have taken such an unheard-of costly step as annexing and modernizing these dry, hot and alien khanates, if not for the English threat? But the British too - would they have sought to put a knife to the Russian underbelly, making their way through Punjab, Kashmir, Kashgaria and Dzungaria, through the same hostile Afghanistan, if not for the fear that the Russians were about to loom over India?
Central Asian affairs were taken to heart by Russian society, giving rise to furious newspaper controversy. It was then that the phrase was born "Englishwoman shits". Like the expression "Gentlemen of Tashkent". Last words Tyutchev on his deathbed were: “Is there any news about the capture of Khiva?” Gumilyov’s poem “Turkestan Generals” was a clear reminder to everyone in 1912 of a glorious era, still so recent.
We recognize the right of national elites to see things differently, but it would be a pity if in the history of Russia there was no Central Asian period, there were no adventures of Chernyaev and Stoletov, there was no Vereshchagin, Karazin, Semyonov-Tyanshansky, Przhevalsky, Mushketov, a brilliant galaxy of cartographers, surveyors, geologists, botanists, there were no Semirechensk Cossacks, Kushka with its gigantic cross looking south, if Tibet - the “roof of the world”, the Fedchenko glacier, the ridge of Peter the Great, the great border passes of Irkeshtam and Torugart were not part of Russian history.
The point of empires is not always the profit they bring, and in the Russian case it’s definitely not that. The Empire has the right to be unprofitable. Empires are cultural expansion, strategic rear areas, stimulating challenge. Russia gratefully preserves the memory of the time spent with the peoples of Central Asia under a common state roof, of the common victims of wartime, of the millions who escaped thanks to the fact that there was somewhere to evacuate, and before that, who escaped during the famine years, when, for example, a fair part of the Volga region rushed to Tashkent - the city of grain and to similar places.
Russia annexed the sparsely populated and backward Turkestan, whose peoples had long experienced their former splendor, wealth and glory; Over the course of a century and a quarter, they went through two modernizations - imperial and Soviet - and set off on a free voyage, no longer needing guardianship. The initial impetus for this development of events was largely given in the 19th century by the “Great Game”.
Additional reading: E. Yu. Sergeev. The Great Game, 1856–1907: myths and realities of Russian-British relations in Central and East Asia. – M., 2012 ( treatise); A. B. Shirokorad. Russia – England: unknown war, 1857–1907. – M., 2003 (for the general reader).
– josser
Is the “Great Game” coming back to life in Central Asia? This is supported by many experts and journalists who write about this region and its significance for the whole world. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the five Central Asian republics, this has been a dominant theme in much of the analysis on the region.
In the 30s of the 19th century, an officer of the 6th Regiment of the Bengal Native Light Horse, Captain Arthur Conolly, created the concept of the “Great Game”. Later, in 1901, English writer Rudyard Kipling immortalized the term in his novel Kim. At its core, the Great Game was simply a struggle for power, control of territory, and political dominance that took place in the 19th century between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia. This imperial contest of maneuver and intrigue came to an end in 1907, when both states were forced to focus their resources on more serious threats. The British had to prepare and take measures to contain the rise of assertive Germany in Europe, and the Russians had their hands tied by a fierce struggle with the Japanese in Manchuria.
Today, the US invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of military bases in Central Asia, as well as Chinese economic expansion in the region, have convinced experts that a new “Great Game” is already underway. German journalist Lutz Klevemann writes that “the Great Game is raging in the region.” Quoting Bill Richardson, former Secretary of Energy and US Ambassador to the UN during the Clinton years, Clevenman points out that the US is involved in Central Asian affairs not only to defeat al-Qaeda, but also to “diversify [its] sources of oil and gas, [and] prevent strategic encroachment by those who do not share [their] values.” Johns Hopkins University professor Niklas Svanstrom comes to the same conclusion in his article “China and Central Asia: New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” proves that the US and China are locked in a geo-economic rivalry over the natural resources of Central Asia. According to him, “the situation in Central Asia seems to be developing in the direction new version Big Game".
Contrary to popular belief, China's goal in Central Asia is not to play games with other regional powers, but to gain the support of "countries in the region in suppressing the anti-Beijing movement of Uyghur nationalists" and to create conditions for Chinese firms to invest in energy resources of Central Asia. Nature has generously endowed the Central Asian states with oil reserves and natural gas, and China, as a dynamic economic power and the second largest consumer of energy, has a clear interest in increasing its presence in the region. China's efforts to build highways, improve infrastructure and improve railway lines indicate the country's growing involvement in Central Asia. As China's ties to the Central Asian republics develop, "its relationships with major powers, namely the United States and Russia, could suffer," says regional expert Kevin Shives.
For now, such a turn in strategy would be premature for China. China is currently facing many internal problems. For example, he has to deal with Tibet, Xinjiang and other semi-autonomous regions with separatist sentiments and aspirations for independence. China's highest priorities in Central Asia should be ensuring security, maintaining regional stability, pacifying Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and strengthening economic ties in the region.
To meet the needs of its 1.4 billion people, China must continuously search for resources around the world. Chinese corporations and state-owned companies are involved in economic life five Central Asian republics with huge reserves of natural gas and oil: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Given China's keen interest in security issues as well as its energy needs, its engagement with Central Asian countries will expand dramatically in the long term. Central Asian states also welcome China's growing expansion as they try to break Russia's monopoly over transport routes. Even after its founding in 2001 Shanghai organization cooperation China did not stop working on laying a new Silk Road, designed to connect Central Asia and the rest of the world with its northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The return of the Middle Kingdom to Central Asia should, in all likelihood, bring about changes in the geopolitical configuration of the region - hopefully for the better.
When they talk about Central Asia as the site of the “Great Game” of world powers or a transit point connecting China with the West of the “Silk Road”, the countries of the region are considered only as pawns on a chessboard.
This point of view is refuted by the past and present of the region. But the concepts of the “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” also carry very real risks, Nazarbayev University professor Alexander Morrison expresses confidence in his article on eurasianet.org.
Just a cliché?
The history of Central Asia is associated with two things - that the region was the scene of the great power clash in the 19th century known as the Great Game, and before that for two millennia it was central part a major trade route connecting China with Europe and known as the Silk Road.
But the modern understanding of the “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” is incorrect. These terms have become clichés that are sometimes used in the most absurd ways. For example, at the beginning of this year in Astana, opposite the university where I teach, Mega Silk Way, the largest shopping center in Central Asia, opened. The center is home to many restaurants and designer boutiques. There are also aquariums with inhabitants of tropical seas and even a dolphinarium. But it is located about a thousand miles north of the supposed Silk Road route. In general, this
the once historical term has become a ubiquitous brand
While clichés can sometimes be useful, helping to quickly understand a phenomenon or simplifying a complex concept so that the uninitiated can grasp it, clichés regarding the Great Game and the Silk Road are much less innocent.
These two terms now appear in countless books and articles about the region and are often used to explain contemporary events. The competition between Russia, China and the United States for control in Central Asia has been called the “New Great Game”, similar to the confrontation between Britain and Russia in the region in the 19th century. The Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative is also positioned as a successor to the ancient “Silk Road”. But all these are anachronisms that only confuse and do not explain what is happening in modern politics.
Was there a "Great Game"?
It is noteworthy that “The Great Game” and “Silk Road” are phrases of European origin that originated in the 19th century. These phrases do not have deep roots in the languages or culture of the peoples of Central Asia.
The "Great Game" was first mentioned in 1840 in a personal letter by Arthur Conolly, a captain in the Bengal Army of the British East India Company, in the context of the introduction of Central Asia to European civilization and Christianity. Conolly was executed by the Emir of Bukharan Nasrullah in 1842, but the phrase survived him and first appeared publicly in Sir John Kay's 1851 book History of the War in Afghanistan, and was then popularized by Kipling's 1901 work Kim. It became associated with adventure and desperate bravery in the service of the empire (Russian or British) in Central Asia, as well as with the confrontation between the two powers in the region.
any use of the term “Great Game” when describing interstate relations in Central Asia is incorrect - it was incorrect in the 19th century, it remains incorrect today
This phrase implies the presence of rules that are understandable to all parties, as well as clear strategic and economic goals, a mixture of adventurism and cold calculation in achieving these goals. It also implies that only great powers could, or can now, participate in the game, and Central Asia is just a huge chessboard.
Central Asian rulers, states and peoples are also given the role of extras, a colorful background for the actions of the great powers
But this was never true, even at the height of European colonialism in the 19th century. As Imperial Russian troops moved deeper into Central Asia, the British may have thought that the Russian side was motivated by a desire to encroach on British possessions in India. Meanwhile, the Russians were much more concerned about their relations with the Central Asian states and peoples.
Neither side could operate freely in the region: both faced significant logistical problems (for example, the movement of armies was carried out by camels provided by the local nomadic population) and at least initially had only a very limited knowledge of the society, culture and politics of the region .
The British suffered two catastrophic defeats in Afghanistan in 1841 and 1879, and in neither case could they be attributed to Russian intervention. These defeats were inflicted on them by the Afghans themselves. Emir Abdur Rahman (1881-1901), the ruthless architect of the modern Afghan state, used British subsidies and arms supplies to suppress internal resistance, but the British received very little in return.
As Alexander Cooley showed in his research, a similar dynamic is taking place today: the five independent post-Soviet states cannot compete with Russia, China or the United States in terms of economic or military power, but nevertheless they force big powers to play by “local rules” - rules that are determined by local specifics, including the internal politics of the countries of the region and the nature of Central Asian society.
Cheap exotics
The Silk Road, at first glance, may seem like a less complex case. It refers to the complex, centuries-old commercial and cultural relationships between Central Asia and the rest of the world. However, the term is also of European origin and is used to retrospectively impose a simplified vision of a more complex past. The term "Seidenstraße" ("Silk Road") was first used by the German explorer and geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877. But, as Daniel Waugh argues, Richthofen's use of the term was “very limited,” applying it “from time to time only in relation to the Han period, and only when speaking of the relationship between political expansion and trade, on the one hand, and geographical knowledge, on the one hand.” another".
Richthofen was primarily interested in the relationship between Europe and China, rather than how trade and information exchange could potentially affect Central Asia. He believed that most such contacts had ceased by the 8th century AD.
The term only gained popularity in the 1930s, largely through the writings of Richthofen's student, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, who used it to lend a romantic and scientific aura to his successful exercises in self-promotion. This touch of cheap exoticism remains in the use of this term to this day.
As Khodadad Rezakhani said,
“The Silk Road is not only a term from the 19th century, but in fact a modern historiographical invention,
which allows us to combine different historical events and draw connections where there were never any.”
In reality, the Silk Road was only a series of shorter trade routes that linked the Chinese capital (Xi'an/Chang'an) with various centers of trade in Central Asia, including Tashkent, Otrar and Samarkand. These centers in turn were connected to other points in India, Iran and the Middle East, and through them to Europe. None of the traders and almost none of the goods made the complete journey from China to Europe, and there was never just one “route”.
By focusing on the two ends of the road—China and the West—speakers tend to marginalize the areas in the middle, especially Central Asia, when in fact the West for most Chinese sources was Central Asia, not the modern European West.
Why is the passion for the “Silk Road” dangerous?
Also, as Rezakhani notes, no one can say exactly where the route from Central Asia to Mediterranean Sea. It also downplays the fact that silk was almost certainly not a major trade item (it had been produced in Western Asia since at least the 3rd century AD), and that Europe was not then nearly as prominent in the economy of the ancient world. like now. In addition, the cultural exchange along the supposed “Silk Road” was of a religious nature and it did not follow the “Europe-China” route: Buddhism came to China from India (that is, it went from south to north, and not from west to east) , and Nestorian Christianity, whose followers were driven out of Roman Syria as heretics, spread from the Sasanian Empire in Iran to India and Central Asia.
These historical reasons provide a sound scientific basis for abandoning the term "Silk Road" as a historical concept. And the modern abuse of this term gives even more justification. In the 2015 blockbuster Sword of the Dragon, Jackie Chan and his Chinese soldiers fight alongside Uyghurs and Indians to defend the Silk Road from an army of predatory Romans. From a historical point of view, the film is complete nonsense, but it has a very clear political message.
when the ruthless exercise of political and economic power is dressed in attractive historical clothing. An excellent example of this is the large-scale Chinese project “One Belt - One Road”, the launch of which was first announced by Xi Jinping from the rostrum at Nazarbayev University in Astana.
The Chinese premier directly linked his initiative to the legacy of the ancient Silk Road and presented it as a project based on “equality and mutual benefit, mutual tolerance and borrowing knowledge from each other.” But the purpose of the Belt and Road Initiative is not the exchange of goods, services and ideas on equal terms. It is about creating new markets and routes for Chinese goods in Asia, partly due to falling demand for them in Europe and the United States. In other words, this project is not at all altruistic in nature.
In this respect, the project is no different from many Western investments in developing countries. Even if Chinese investment brings real benefits, framing the Belt and Road Initiative as a “Silk Road” does nothing to help our understanding of the term.
"Big Games" versus "Local Rules"
The concept of a "catechism of clichés" was coined by the great Brian O'Nolan in his Irish Times column in the 1940s. For him, as for George Orwell, clichés were “petrified” or “mortified” phrases that people accepted without questioning them. The “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” are not the only clichés regularly applied to Central Asia, but they are undoubtedly the most persistent and the most pernicious.
While the term " Great game" is now perhaps really nothing more than a cliché - a dead phrase used by writers when nothing better comes to mind - the "Silk Road" remains a powerful myth, widely used for modern purposes, a myth that is growing in popularity both in Central Asia and in China.
These two terms are united by disdain for Central Asia and an attitude towards it only as a stage for grandiose geopolitical projects
Moreover, these terms and the meanings behind them modern concepts tend to ignore the abilities and interests of the inhabitants of the region, concentrating only on the great powers.
“Great Games” must adapt to “local rules,” which often have deep roots in Central Asian society and culture, and “Silk Roads” that fail to adapt to local realities are likely to become roads to nowhere.
Lieutenant General Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev
The development of Central Asia by Russia in the second half of the 19th century was a difficult and rather lengthy process. It was accompanied by a deterioration in the international situation, an increase in tensions in relations with Great Britain, which saw any attempt by St. Petersburg to move south as a threat to its colonial possessions, primarily India. The problems of Asian politics were also on the radar of the Russian public and the press, although in the decade after the end of the Crimean War there were enough controversial issues and controversial changes in the empire. Taming the wild archaic khanates, whose prosperity had long been a subject, and whose existence was supported largely by robbery and the slave trade, Russia had to constantly feel the invisible British presence in Asia.
The expansion of the Russian Empire into Asia was one of the components of the Cold War of that time, in which it was opposed by the most powerful power in the West - Great Britain. For such a complex rivalry, where the main role was played not by guns, cannons and battleships, but by politicians, diplomats and journalists, an appropriate ideological and scientific platform was needed. It was necessary not only to clearly understand, identify, explain and argue for Russian interests in Central Asia, but also to outline Britain’s hostility towards Russia in this and other issues. An important point Detailed and thorough documentation of all stages of the development of Central Asia and the history of this process should also be considered. One of these people, who shouldered the burden of not only military, but also scientific service to the Fatherland, was the outstanding orientalist, linguist, publicist and inventor, Lieutenant General Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev.
Career as a warrior, scientist, linguist
The future orientalist and general was born on January 8, 1837 in the family of a landowner from the Voronezh province, Afrikan Yakovlevich Terentyev. My father was an extraordinary person. He graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps in 1830, where he continued to serve for the next five years. He has become quite widely known for his numerous publications on the development and management of Agriculture and history and ethnography of the Voronezh region. The son, Mikhail Afrikanovich, followed in his father’s footsteps, choosing a military career and entered the Voronezh Cadet Corps. In 1853 he transferred to the Konstantinovsky Cadet Corps.
At the end of the reign of Nicholas I, Russia fought the unsuccessful Crimean War. Like many young men like him, Terentyev wants to quickly get to the theater of operations. On November 18, 1855, he was released as a cornet into the 11th Chuguev Uhlan Regiment and at the beginning of 1856 he finally found himself in Crimea. Heroic Defense By this time, Sevastopol had already ended, and the Allied army, tired of huge losses, did not dare to advance deeper into the peninsula. Both sides harassed each other with reconnaissance raids and sabotage, Napoleon III's fighting impulse was exhausted, and he was increasingly inclined to a peace agreement with Russia. In March 1856, the Paris Treaty was signed, so that the Chuguevsky regiment soon returned to its places of permanent deployment. The garrison service proceeded smoothly - in October 1860, Terentyev was promoted to lieutenant.
Being a naturally gifted person, Mikhail Afrikanovich had a thirst for knowledge and therefore decided to enter the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, which he successfully accomplished in 1862. In 1864, he graduated from the Department of Oriental Languages at the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Arabic and Turkish. While in St. Petersburg, he showed interest in scientific and technical creativity. Among his inventions are a needle gun with a semi-metallic cartridge and a reflective compass with rotating diopters. However, these fruits of invention remained experiments and did not receive further approval.
Mikhail Terentyev will carry out his service to Russia in a completely different field. Having served for two years after graduation at the headquarters of the Kharkov Military District, Terentyev in June 1867 was transferred to the West Siberian Military District with instructions “for training in General Staff" Soon he received an appointment: assistant to the Aulieata district chief. Until recently, the Aulie-Ata fortress was part of the Kokand Khanate, but in 1864 it was captured by a small detachment under the command of Colonel M.I. Chernyaev. Knowledge of languages and excellent linguistic abilities helped Terentyev study the customs and customs of the local population, which made the recent graduate of the Academy a very valuable officer. Mikhail Afrikanovich was noticed by the Governor-General of Turkestan and came into his possession.
Kaufman had enough worries: in 1867, the war with Bukhara, which had begun a year earlier, continued. Attempts to come to an amicable agreement with the emir, as expected, did not lead to success, and then the time came for forceful solutions. Together with Governor General Kaufman and the detachment of troops under his command, Mikhail Terentyev took part in the campaign against Samarkand. Against 4 thousand Russians, the ruler of Bukhara concentrated, according to various estimates, from 40 to 50 thousand soldiers, settling on the Chupanatinsky heights near the Zarafshan River. Kaufman, through envoys, appealed to his enemy, demanding that the troops withdraw from the crossing and warning that otherwise his positions would be taken by storm.
There was no response, and the order to attack was given - Russian infantry crossed Zarafshan under enemy fire almost chest-deep in water. The soldiers' boots turned out to be filled with water and, in order not to waste time taking off their shoes and pouring out the water, they stood on their hands, while their comrades shook their legs. The Bukharans perceived such an action as some kind of secret Russian ritual, and in subsequent clashes they tried to repeat it. Naturally, this did not bring any success to the enemy. Having crossed to the other side, the Russians took the positions of the Bukharans on the Chupanatina Heights with hostility. Unable to withstand the onslaught, the enemy fled, throwing away for ease of escape. Kaufman's detachment received 21 guns and many rifles as trophies. The Russians' own losses reached no more than 40 people.
Riflemen of the Turkestan linear battalions, photo 1872
The next day, May 2, 1868, Samarkand opened the gates. Leaving a small garrison in the city, Kaufman continued the campaign. After neutralizing the uprising in Samarkand and the final defeat on the Zerbulak Heights, Emir Muzaffar was forced to ask Russia for peace. Bukhara recognized the supremacy of St. Petersburg over itself, lost part of its territory and paid a monetary indemnity. However, Emir Muzaffar also had certain benefits from the agreement. Now the Russian command, if anything happened, was ready to provide him with military assistance, for which the recent enemy turned to his victors already in the same 1868.
In Karshi Bekstvo, Russian troops, at the request of Muzaffar, defeated the rebels who rebelled against the emir, who sought to elevate his eldest son to the throne, who promised to continue the war with the infidels. For his active participation in the Bukhara campaign, Mikhail Terentyev was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav with swords, 3rd degree. They didn’t bypass him either foreign awards: The Shah of Persia awarded Terentyev the Order of the Lion and the Sun, 3rd degree. Persia, like Russia, was interested in stability in the Central Asian region and also suffered from raids by numerous nomadic hordes, primarily the Khivans. Therefore, the pacification of the violent khanates Russian Empire was received with understanding in Tehran.
On August 18, 1869, Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev was promoted to captain and sent to serve as an official on special assignments under the head of the Zeravshan district. The Zeravshan district was formed from territories ceded from Bukhara in accordance with the peace treaty signed with it. Most big city Samarkand was in the district. This was not a provincial backwater - in fact, Russia’s frontier in Central Asia, where its interests and policies were already closely colliding with the ambitions, fears and desires of another powerful empire, which had its own vision of almost all problems in all corners of the globe.
Great Game in Asia
While in St. Petersburg and Tehran they perceived the activities of the Turkestan Governor-General Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman with satisfaction and calm, other forces looked at what was happening with growing alarm. London considered itself a virtual monopolist in world hegemony and a trendsetter in political trends. There were practically no worthy competitors left in Europe - France was feverish with periodic revolutions and coups, Austria and Prussia were too focused on internal problems. And only distant Russia loomed in its vague enormity in the East. After the Congress of Vienna, the former alliance that began in the wars against Napoleon began to rapidly melt away, and Russia and England gradually returned to the mainstream of traditional relations - competition and rivalry.
The British crowded at the court of the Turkish Sultan, getting under their feet in the long-suffering Balkan affairs. Their commercial and not-so-commercial agents scurried around in Persia, gradually penetrating into the depths of Central Asia. In London, they well remembered Pavel Petrovich’s initiative to send a detachment of Cossacks under the command of Matvey Platov to conquer India, for which and not only for this, poorly received on the banks of the Thames, the emperor died of an “apoplectic” stroke.
The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857–1859, which was suppressed only with great effort, showed the British that their latent fears about the possible loss of control over the jewel of the British crown were not without foundation. Moreover, such a powerful performance of the broad masses of the native population revealed the deep vulnerability and imperfection of the entire British policy in India. The uprising was drenched in blood and covered in lead, but the smartest and most insightful heads were fully aware that only a compact torch would be enough for the Hindustan Peninsula to flare up again. And, according to these strategically minded gentlemen, the fire of this torch can be lit in India by a Russian soldier. Measures were required to avoid such a terrible development of the situation. To achieve this, it was planned to expand the zone of British possessions and influence to the north of India in order to rid the most valuable British colony of the Russian sword of Damocles.
To the north of India lay Afghanistan, a wild Mountain country, which does not tolerate aliens - even if they drink expensive tea and recite Shakespeare by heart and are engrossed in Dickens. The first attempt to test the Afghan realities dates back to 1838, long before the Crimean War and the sepoy uprising. The main reason was that the then local emir Dost Mohammed, fighting against tribes supported by the British, dared to ask for help from no one other than the Russians. Through his envoys, the persistent emir reached the Governor-General of Orenburg V.A. Perovsky, and through him to higher authorities. The result of the negotiations was the dispatch of a Russian mission to Afghanistan, led by Lieutenant Jan Vitkevich. This outrageous fact overwhelmed the depths of British patience, and the British began a war against Afghanistan.
Then the British had successes that turned out to be superficial and temporary, an uprising in Kabul, the high-profile destruction of General Elphinstone’s column retreating from the Afghan capital, and the complete withdrawal of British troops from the country in 1842. The first attempt to fight the ghost of a Russian bear, making scary faces from behind the snow-capped Himalayan peaks, ended, like any other attempt to overcome a phantom threat, in failure. Collateral damage amounted to almost 20,000 dead and missing British soldiers, £24 million, and the dangerous realization that the whites were losing too. The next milestones of Great Britain's expansion to the north date back to the second half of the 19th century, when, after the suppression of the sepoy uprising, London had a free hand.
In April 1863, the Ambelakh operation was undertaken when a British force of five thousand invaded Afghan territory in response to numerous raids. In the end, after a series of clashes, the British were forced to retreat to Peshawar by the end of the year. In 1869, after several years of traditional civil strife, power in Afghanistan was concentrated in the hands of Emir Shir Ali Khan, who began to centralize government administration. Lord Mayo, the then governor of British India, decided to make Afghanistan relatively loyal through diplomatic means - to provide the emir with vague guarantees, to bestow status gifts on him, and in exchange to subordinate the policy of Afghanistan to the will of the British Empire. In March 1869, Shir Ali Khan and Lord Mayo met on Indian soil to negotiate a possible arrangement.
Shir Ali Khan in 1869
At first, the Afghan ruler increased his worth by listing all the real and imaginary grievances and claims against the English side, but in the end he accepted a large batch of weapons as a gift and willingly agreed to an annual English financial subsidy. Shir Ali Khan responded by demanding guarantees from Lord Mayo that Britain would recognize him as the sole heir youngest son Shira-Ali Abdullah Khan. The governor categorically objected to this, since the entire system of British policy in the colonies was based on the opposition of rulers and their heirs in order to easily carry out the necessary castlings at the right moment. Nevertheless, Lord Mayo agreed to non-interference in the internal politics of Afghanistan in exchange for the coordination of all its foreign policy with British representatives.
Afghan affairs became the subject of intense and lengthy bargaining between the diplomatic departments of Russia and England. Also in 1869, a meeting between Prince Gorchakov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Clarendon, took place in Heidelberg. The English side, expressing their extreme concern about the advance of troops in Central Asia (London's approval after the victory at Waterloo clearly only caused the advance of English troops), the occupation of Samarkand and the involvement of the Bukhara Emirate in the field of Russian influence. The fact of the founding of the Krasnovodsk fort on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, in which the British saw almost a springboard for the conquest of all of Central Asia, added fuel to the fire.
Clarendon suggested that Gorchakov create a neutral zone in Central Asia between Russian and English possessions. The Russian chancellor did not fundamentally object to considering such a problem, but the discussion stumbled over different views on the borders of Afghanistan. More specifically, about the regions of Wakhan and Badakhshan, which St. Petersburg did not consider subject to the Afghan emir. Disputes over the Afghan borders dragged on for almost three years, but by 1873 Russia was preparing to carry out a military operation against Khiva, and the relative calm of British diplomacy and the London press, greedy for creating illusory threats, but dressed in brown bearskins, would have been useful for it. In January 1873, Gorchakov gave the go-ahead for the recognition of the Wakhan and Badakhshan regions as the territory of the Afghan emir.
In 1874, Gladstone's liberal cabinet was replaced by the conservative team of the more decisive-minded Disraeli. The new Prime Minister was somewhat upset by how few, in his opinion, there were places on the globe painted in the colors of Great Britain, and therefore considered it necessary to carry out colonial expansion wherever possible. Disraeli firmly decided to reduce the number of independent and semi-independent states along the perimeter of British possessions - Afghanistan was also supposed to become another possession of the British Empire. At the same time, Disraeli was not deprived a sober look on international relations and did not want to intensify confrontation with Russia.
In order to find a platform for a possible next geopolitical agreement with St. Petersburg, in May 1875, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Disraeli government, Lord Derby, informed Gorchakov that, in connection with new trends in London high offices, England was abandoning the strategy of a neutral zone in Asia, and in relation to Afghanistan will now enjoy complete freedom of action. Alexander II, in his own way interpreting “freedom of action,” gave permission for the Khanate of Kokand to join Russia in 1876. In London they realized that they were in a bit of a hurry - the Russians calmly annexed the territory of a state that should formally be neutral, being located on the demarcation line. But difficult-to-reach Afghanistan still had to be conquered, remembering the bitter experience of the war of 1838–1842.
The Afghan ruler, Emir Shir Ali Khan, for the time being more or less honestly (from an eastern point of view) worked off the British investments. He pursued a policy hostile to Russia where he could, causing harm in small ways, sending his agents and condoning raids in Central Asia. Although, by English standards, the emir was “our son of a bitch,” they nevertheless kept him on a short leash. The British did not lose sight of the influential Afghan nobility in order to turn their ambitions and lust for power against Shir Ali Khan if something happened.
The emir, in turn, receiving money and weapons from the white sahibs, did not at all want complete submission. Already in 1873, having obtained from the Russian side the recognition of Wakhan and Badakhshan as territories controlled by the Afghan emir, the British, for their part, demanded that their junior “partner” station British emissaries in Kabul. Bearing in mind that where the British embassy or mission is located, intrigue, espionage and intense mouse fuss immediately begin, the emir categorically refused. In 1876, the new Viceroy of India, Lord Edward Lytton, demanded the admission of British emissaries in a much more stringent manner. As a member of Disraeli's team, he fully implemented the new political course aimed at sharply reducing the number of compromise agreements with native rulers. Shir Ali Khan responded with a predictable refusal.
Anglo-Afghan friendship was rapidly cooling down, and it began to smell more and more clearly of gunpowder fumes. Negotiations in Peshawar came to nothing. The emir could not even suspect that all these appeals from the viceroys with obviously impossible requests, the protracted fruitless negotiation process, were nothing more than a sham. The decision to war with Afghanistan long before these events was made in offices on the banks of the distant Thames. In 1877, the British imposed an embargo on the supply of weapons to Afghanistan, and troops began to converge on its borders. Having now fully realized what a pleasant surprise his British “friends” were preparing for him, and having demonstrated enviable maneuverability in a difficult situation, Shir Ali Khan began to send benevolent messages full of all sorts of pleasantries to the governor of Turkestan von Kaufmann, claiming that he, the khan, had always been for friendship and good neighborly relations with Russia - the English devil just misled him.
Kaufman responded to the emir no less kindly, completely sharing and approving of the feelings that suddenly gripped the Afghan ruler. A diplomatic mission was sent to Kabul under the command of Major General N. G. Stoletov, which signed a friendly convention with Shir Ali Khan in August 1878, which recognized his independence. It should be noted that this event occurred at the height of the Anglo-Russian crisis at the final stage of the war with Turkey, when the Russian army was already near Istanbul. An army group of more than 20 thousand people was concentrated in Central Asia for a possible military expedition to India. The friendly neutrality of the Afghan emir in the current situation was more useful than ever; in addition, one could count on help from the mountain tribes, who had old scores to settle with the British.
However, in St. Petersburg they made a different decision. Istanbul was not taken, coastal batteries were not erected on the banks of the Bosphorus, and the Turkestan battalions never moved. The Great Game has remained uncompromising, tough, often mean and treacherous - but a game. And in capturing, describing and directly participating in the rounds of the Russian-English confrontation in Asia, much credit goes to Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev, a military man and scientist.
Orientalist scientist in uniform
In 1867, in St. Petersburg, authored by Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev, “Tolmach - a companion of Russian soldiers for inevitable questions and negotiations in languages: Russian, Turkish, Serbian and Greek” was published, which became a phrasebook for the Russian army. In 1872, the “Russian alphabet for schools of Central Asia” compiled by him was published. The administration of Turkestan paid sufficient attention to improving the cultural level of the local population, without violating traditional customs. In addition, Terentyev regularly publishes various works on Orientalism, which have not only scientific but also military value. Central Asia is inhabited by many tribes and peoples, often with different traditions and worldviews, so it was necessary for those serving here to have an understanding of local conditions.
Plan of part of the fortress wall of Khiva
Mikhail Terentyev was engaged in scientific activities in his free time from work. In 1870, he was appointed assistant to the head of the Khudzhent district, and the following year, 1871, to the same position, only in the Chimkent district. Also in 1871, he was seconded to the district headquarters for various works. This vague formulation actually concealed a lot of preparation and planning. military operation against Khiva. As a recognized expert on Turkestan, under the leadership of the Governor-General of Turkestan Konstantin Petrovich Kaufman, together with a group of officers, Terentyev took part in the development of a plan for a military campaign. Important issues were the problems of relations between the Khiva Khan and various tribal entities, the internal social situation of this state and the degree of support for the ruler in the event of hostilities with Russia. For a number of reasons, primarily of a foreign policy nature, this expedition took place only in 1873 and was crowned with complete success.
After the pacification of Khiva, on behalf of Governor-General Kaufman, Terentyev began creating an essay about Russia’s conquest of Central Asia. For a number of reasons, including the outbreak of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878. this work was not completed then, and the author will return to it only after his resignation. Based on the collected material, two fundamental works were published: “Russia and England in the Struggle for Markets” and “Russia and England in Central Asia.” These books describe in detail and impartially the history of economic, political and diplomatic relations between the Russian state and Great Britain, as well as the Central Asian khanates. The first work pays great attention to the economic component of Russian policy in Central Asia, the prospects for the development of trade and sales markets. The second talks about the main milestones and stages of Russia’s advance into Siberia and Asia, and provides the political, military and economic justification for these processes. For their manner of presentation and impartiality, both books were appreciated by the “Western partners” themselves - the British. The works were translated into English and published in the 70s. in Kolkata.
Terentyev continues to expand his scientific horizons - in 1875 he graduated from the Military Law Academy in St. Petersburg and received the rank of major. On the eve of the expected Russian-Turkish war, the orientalist again demonstrates his knowledge and skills in the service of the Fatherland. He creates the “Military Translator” (Russian-Turkish-Romanian-Bulgarian) - as an army phrasebook for the Balkan theater of military operations. The Military Translator was printed in large quantities and distributed to the troops. Terentyev was directly involved in Russian-Turkish war. Awarded in 1877 the Order of St. Stanislaus, 2nd class with swords and bow, and the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with swords and bow. In 1878 he received the Order of Anna, 2nd degree.
Subsequently, the career of Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev followed the military-legal path. He became a military investigator of the Vilna Military District. Gradually implemented career: Terentyev grew to colonel. In 1895, he was again transferred to Turkestan, where he spent his youth, to the post of military judge of the Turkestan Military District. The organizer of the Turkestan region, K.P. Kaufman, had long since passed away, but the Great Game in Asia continued. Soon the Far East will also be in its orbit.
In 1902, Terentyev retired with the rank of lieutenant general. Now Mikhail Afrikanovich could concentrate on main job of his life - the major work “History of the Conquest of Central Asia with Plans and Maps” in three volumes. This work is a fundamental historical study of Central Asia. The three-volume work turned out to be not only a concentration detailed description military operations, various historical information, everyday and ethnographic sketches, sometimes made not without a healthy sense of humor, but also includes the author’s reflections on economics, politics, religious issues and the problems of contact, interaction and confrontation between civilizations. On a number of issues and areas, Terentyev’s work has no analogues to this day. The author managed to capture in detail, vividly and colorfully, the most important component of the Great Game: Russia’s advance in Central Asia and its tense and uncompromising, complex and confusing, reaching to the point of cocked, confrontation with the British Empire. This now almost forgotten Cold War of the 19th century, skillfully picked up by overseas “cousins” from the weakening Foggy Albion in the 20th century, continues without signs of fatigue in the 21st century.
Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentyev died in St. Petersburg on March 19, 1909 and was buried at the Volkovskoye cemetery. He lived a colorful life, inseparable from the history of his Fatherland, the monument of which remains a modest line on the title page of the “History of the Conquest of Central Asia”: General-Lt. M. A. Terentyev.
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Is the “Great Game” coming back to life in Central Asia? This is supported by many experts and journalists who write about this region and its significance for the whole world. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the five Central Asian republics, this has been a dominant theme in much of the analysis on the region.
In the 30s of the 19th century, an officer of the 6th Regiment of the Bengal Native Light Horse, Captain Arthur Conolly, created the concept of the “Great Game”. Later, in 1901, English writer Rudyard Kipling immortalized the term in his novel Kim. At its core, the Great Game was simply a struggle for power, control of territory, and political dominance that took place in the 19th century between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia. This imperial contest of maneuver and intrigue came to an end in 1907, when both states were forced to focus their resources on more serious threats. The British had to prepare and take measures to contain the rise of assertive Germany in Europe, and the Russians had their hands tied by a fierce struggle with the Japanese in Manchuria.
Today, the US invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of military bases in Central Asia, as well as Chinese economic expansion in the region, have convinced experts that a new “Great Game” is already underway. German journalist Lutz Klevemann writes that “the Great Game is raging in the region.” Quoting Bill Richardson, former Secretary of Energy and US Ambassador to the UN during the Clinton years, Clevenman points out that the US is involved in Central Asian affairs not only to defeat al-Qaeda, but also to “diversify [its] sources of oil and gas, [and] prevent strategic encroachment by those who do not share [their] values.” Johns Hopkins University professor Niklas Svanstrom comes to the same conclusion in his article “China and Central Asia: New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” proves that the US and China are locked in a geo-economic rivalry over the natural resources of Central Asia. According to him, “the situation in Central Asia seems to be developing towards a new version of the Great Game.”
Contrary to popular belief, China's goal in Central Asia is not to play games with other regional powers, but to gain the support of "countries in the region in suppressing the anti-Beijing movement of Uyghur nationalists" and to create conditions for Chinese firms to invest in energy resources of Central Asia. Nature has generously endowed the Central Asian states with oil and natural gas reserves, and China, as a dynamic economic power and the second largest consumer of energy, is clearly interested in increasing its presence in the region. China's efforts to build highways, improve infrastructure and improve railway lines indicate the country's growing involvement in Central Asia. As China's ties to the Central Asian republics develop, "its relationships with major powers, namely the United States and Russia, could suffer," says regional expert Kevin Shives.
For now, such a turn in strategy would be premature for China. China is currently facing many internal problems. For example, he has to deal with Tibet, Xinjiang and other semi-autonomous regions with separatist sentiments and aspirations for independence. China's highest priorities in Central Asia should be ensuring security, maintaining regional stability, pacifying Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and strengthening economic ties in the region.
To meet the needs of its 1.4 billion people, China must continuously search for resources around the world. Chinese corporations and state-owned companies are involved in the economic life of five Central Asian republics with huge reserves of natural gas and oil: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Given China's keen interest in security issues as well as its energy needs, its engagement with Central Asian countries will expand dramatically in the long term. Central Asian states also welcome China's growing expansion as they try to break Russia's monopoly over transport routes. Even after the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, China continued to work on building a new Silk Road to connect Central Asia and the rest of the world with its northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The return of the Middle Kingdom to Central Asia should, in all likelihood, bring about changes in the geopolitical configuration of the region - hopefully for the better.