National and religious politics National politics can and should be left entirely to the municipalities - so that each locality can decide for itself whether it considers itself “national” or not. Undoubtedly, this idea will not please the elites of existing

The national question was one of the central ones in the new historical circumstances at the beginning of the 20th century, when cardinal changes took place in the fate of the Fatherland. It is no coincidence that modern domestic historiography is distinguished by increased interest in the problems of the history of the Russian Empire on the eve of its collapse, during the years of the revolution and the Civil War. In practice, in the most severe military-political and social struggle for power, the ideological and theoretical developments and program provisions of political parties and organizations, public and government figures were tested. National problems occupied one of the main places, and therefore almost all researchers studying the historical experience of the early 20th century turn to this topic in one way or another.

At the same time, it should be noted the uneven nature of the thematic interests of scientists - the problems of national politics in pre-revolutionary Russia are considered much less than during the period of the revolution and the Civil War. This is natural due to the very significance of these issues in these periods. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, as evidenced by scientific developments in recent years, these issues were developed not only in the programs and doctrines of political parties and organizations, at the theoretical level in the works of specialists, but also in practical politics. At the same time, the main emphasis is quite naturally placed on the national-state aspect, which has become the embodiment of the right of nations to self-determination, which has come to the fore in national politics.

One of the characteristic features of recent historiography in recent years has also been the increase in the number and improvement of the level of research on regional topics. For example, A. A. Elaev studied the process of development of the national movement of the Buryat people at the beginning of the 20th century. He pointed out that a certain level of national independence within the foreign community in connection with the implementation of the “Charter on the Management of Foreign People” of 1822, compiled by M. M. Speransky, remained until the beginning of the 20th century. However, since 1901, the desire of the central government to liquidate the administratively separate self-government bodies of the Buryats and to impose on them an all-Russian management system has intensified. Together with the contradictions in the implementation of agrarian reform in Transbaikalia, this led to an increase in the activity of the tribal nobility, sending petitions, petitions, and deputations to protect ethnic interests and resulted in the introduction of martial law in the region in February 1904.

Elaev attaches great importance to the decisions of the Buryat congress in April 1917 in Chita, which, under the influence of centrifugal tendencies awakened throughout the country February revolution, developed the “Statute on temporary bodies for managing the cultural and national affairs of the Buryat-Mongols and Tungus of the Transbaikal region and the Irkutsk province.” Together with the creation of the so-called Burnatsky as a central autonomous body and local self-government bodies - aimaks - this meant a significant shift in political development and ethno-state building in Buryatia.

In general, being part of Russia contributed to the completion of the process of formation of the Buryat people and the beginning of their consolidation into a nation, which, accordingly, led to a territorial organization with its own self-government, the emergence at the beginning of the 20th century. national movement and the formation of national identity and the idea of ​​autonomy. By February 1917, the movement had grown into an autonomist one, the beginnings of autonomy arose in the form of aimaks and its own leadership center - Burnatsky, which served as a forerunner of the future Soviet autonomy (1).

D. A. Amanzholova, in a number of her works, analyzed in detail the issues of the formation of national demands and activities for their implementation in the pre-revolutionary period using the example of the Muslim movement in Russia, including through the IV State Duma. Priority attention in her works is given to the history of Kazakh autonomy in the pre-revolutionary period, and then after October 1917. The author believes that the national movements of Muslims and Kazakhs, in particular, developed in the general direction of democratization and modernization of the entire social life of society, responded to urgent requirements of ethnic groups of Russia.

Using specific examples, Amanzholova showed the specifics of the autonomist movement of the Kazakhs in 1905-1917, identified and reconstructed the history of the formation of the Alash movement, its relationship with all-Russian parties, especially the Cadets, its role in the search by the country's social forces for a model for resolving the national issue after the overthrow that was adequate to the requirements of the time. autocracy. According to the author, the autonomism of Russian Muslims, primarily on the territory of modern Kazakhstan, was not aimed at separation from the empire, but arose in the form of a cultural movement, and at the beginning of the 20th century. it turned political. In it, the demand for national-territorial autonomy arose only under the pressure of the all-Russian political situation after the collapse of the autocracy and especially after the October Revolution of the Bolsheviks as a counterbalance to the anarchy and dictatorial aspirations of Soviet power (2).

Amanzholova also analyzed the history of Siberian regionalism, expressed in the regionalism movement, which originated in the second half of the 19th century. and especially actively declared itself since 1905. The author showed that regionalism was a form of struggle for the democratization of the national sphere and the administrative-state structure of Russia, taking into account its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature, as well as the specifics of the development of regions, in particular

Siberia. In her opinion, the proposals and activities of Siberian regional officials for the implementation of regional autonomy with the provision of cultural and national autonomy to the indigenous peoples of the region met the requirements of modernization of the archaic management system, gave scope to meet the urgent needs of ethnic groups and objectively contributed to social progress countries. The projects put forward during the development of the regional movement within the framework of the Siberian Regional Duma and national self-government bodies of a number of Siberian ethnic groups were not fully implemented until 1917, and during the Civil War they were tested under the dictatorship of A.V. Kolchak within the framework of cultural-national autonomy and others forms of local government (3).

In a number of articles, Amanzholova also drew attention to the formulation and resolution of national problems in the activities of the pre-revolutionary State Duma. First of all, it talks about the project of Polish autonomy, which was put forward by the Polish Kolo, as well as the discussion around the autonomy of Finland in 1910, which ended with the practical elimination of self-government in this region (4).

This is noted in most detail in our monograph, prepared in collaboration with D. A. Amanzholova and S. V. Kuleshov - “The National Question in the State Dumas of Russia: Experience in Lawmaking” (M., 1999). Here we trace in great detail the history of discussions in all convocations of the pre-revolutionary parliament of issues interethnic relations and national policy, development and adoption of relevant legislation. Particular attention is paid to the role of various party factions and groups in the development of state policy in relation to autonomist and federalist proposals and initiatives of various structures, primarily using the example of Poland and Finland. In our opinion, the pre-revolutionary Duma, by virtue of its legal status, place in the system of supreme authorities, as well as the inability of the representatives of different political parties and movements who made up the deputy corps to find a mutually acceptable compromise and establish constructive cooperation with the executive branch, in most cases could not properly solve the problems of the peoples of Russia.

The monograph also gives a fairly detailed description of autonomist movements in Siberia, among Muslims in the European and Asian parts of the empire, but less attention is paid to the analysis of such phenomena using the example of the Western national outskirts. Of greatest interest is the book’s coverage of the role of the Duma in the practical elimination of Finnish autonomy in 1910, showing the nature and essence of the position of various parties and the head of government P. A. Stolypin on this issue. Our conclusion is that in tsarist Russia the central government did not allow any possibility of decentralizing the system of governance of the national outskirts, and at the beginning of the 20th century, on the contrary, sought to unify it, which ultimately created additional reasons for the crisis of the empire as an integral organism. Along with the collective monograph “National Policy of Russia: History and Modernity” (Moscow, 1997), this work reveals the authors’ intention to create a generally generalized, end-to-end picture of the development of national policy in Russia in the 20th century. (5).

The author of this monograph, in one of his studies, also covered in sufficient detail the question of how the Russian parliament of the 3rd convocation (1907-1912) built the relationship of the imperial Center with such autonomies as Finland and Poland. With the active participation of Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin and the unconditional support of the right, the State Duma in 1910 essentially eliminated the autonomy of Finland. This, along with the refusal to consider the Polish Colo project on the autonomy of Poland, as well as the discussion of the so-called Caucasian request, during which deputies from the left socialist and liberal factions raised the issue of expanding local self-government and national equality, demonstrated the course of the state leadership towards further centralization and unification of management .

It was the confrontation between the right and left factions in parliament, the reluctance to cooperate with each other in the national interests that largely reflected and intensified the socio-political instability in society. At the same time, the executive branch, not accepting even constructive criticism, preferred forceful and administrative methods of resolving ethnopolitical conflicts in the country, which in turn strengthened centrifugal tendencies and the popularity of political structures that advocated a federal reorganization of the state (6).

A certain contribution to the study of the pre-revolutionary history of federalism is made by T. Yu. Pavelyeva’s article on the Polish faction in the State Duma in 1906-1914. The author believes that the strength of the Polish Kolo was business feedback with movement activists in the Kingdom of Poland. At the same time, pursuing “free hands” tactics and not concluding permanent agreements with other factions, defending restrained opposition tactics, the Polish autonomists, led by R. Dmowski, sought to achieve decisions that would help strengthen the independence of the region within the Russian Empire. In the 3rd Duma, Kolo came up with a program for introducing self-government similar to the all-Russian one, reducing the rates of land and city taxes to imperial levels, restoring the rights of the Polish language, at least in the field of private education and self-government, as well as the participation of the Kingdom in a number of cultural events financed by the treasury, primarily in agrarian reforms.

All the activities of the Duma and the Colo, as Paveleva believes, clearly demonstrated the inability of the existing government to listen to even the most moderate demands that go beyond traditional political guidelines and, above all, in relation to nationalities. In particular, the Duma adopted a law separating the Kholm region from the Kingdom of Poland, which undoubtedly infringed on the interests of the Poles. The Polish colony no longer directly raised the question of autonomy, as it had done before (7).

Unfortunately, in the monograph dedicated to this period, “Russia at the beginning of the 20th century” (Moscow, 2002), these studies in the special section “Interethnic Relations” written by L. S. Gatagova were overlooked. In addition, a number of materials used almost verbatim from our work “The National Question in the State Dumas of Russia: Experience in Lawmaking” are for some reason given without reference to it, and the archival links are given incorrectly. There are also annoying factual errors: for example, the famous statesman A.V. Krivoshein in 1911 was not the governor of the Semirechensk region or Turkestan, as it is written on page 160, but was, as is known, the Chief Administrator of Land Management and Agriculture (8).

In general, the cross-section of inter-ethnic conflict “horizontally” taken by the author for analysis, the need to study which V.P. Buldakov drew attention to in 1997, is certainly of interest for a more complete coverage of the entire complex of national problems in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century and understanding their sociocultural specificity. However, it is not entirely legitimate to limit ourselves to only this aspect, but a brief mention of the “heated discussion of problems” related to national movements and interethnic conflicts, and the discussions of liberals and right-wingers without their thorough coverage or at least reference to the work already done by famous scientists on their analysis can hardly be considered sufficient. To a certain extent, this gap is filled in the introduction to the monograph, written by the head of the team of authors, A. N. Sakharov (9).

In addition, one cannot but agree with the opinion of V. A. Tishkov that one cannot directly seek answers to modern problems in history (a certain passion for historical conflictology can be traced, for example, in some of the works of D. A. Amanzholova). The stable domestic tradition of social scientific analysis is expressed, in particular, as the scientist correctly writes, in proving: the deeper this excursion, the more convincing the explanation of the problem. The powerful explanatory and mobilizing resource of history is, of course, not discounted, nor is the genre of academic narrative itself (10).

Noteworthy are the fruitful ideas and judgments expressed by V.P. Buldakov in the monograph “The Red Troubles” (M., 1997). The scientist emphasizes that ethnopaternalism was a basic feature of the Russian empire; it was sanctified by a kind of union of a tolerant autocrat with the peoples. At the same time, it is proposed to study national movements taking into account their diversity, avoiding romanticization, and also keeping in mind the imperial-ethno-hierarchical mentality of their leaders. In addition, it was correctly noted that such movements were mostly of a protective and ethnic identification nature; they were strongly influenced by the “soldierization” of the First World War period and local development circumstances. It is also important that Buldakov drew attention to the multifaceted nature of the national question in general, especially in connection with the impact of war and the army on it, gave a general description of the problems of the Muslim movement and came to the conclusion that it was not the “separatists” who destroyed the empire, but the figures of the central government itself, and the revolution itself subsequently turned into a victory for the Bolsheviks in the historical center of Russia (11).

Along the way, the place of national problems in the politics of pre-revolutionary Russia is also covered in some other works in relation to specific regions in biographical works about national figures, etc. Thus, A. Yu. Khabutdinov, examining the work of I. B. Gasprinsky and other Muslim leaders of the early 20th century, in particular, noted that already in January 1906, at the Nth All-Russian Congress of Muslims, the issue of autonomy aroused discussions . As is known, I. Gasprinsky and Yu. Akchurin opposed it, and the congress eventually decided on the desirability of introducing cultural-national autonomy for the country’s Muslims. In addition, it was Akchurin in the same 1906 who obtained consent from the Duma Cadets to recognize the need for religious and cultural-national autonomy of Muslims, along with other general cultural proposals (12). In general, the pre-revolutionary period in the history of national politics in Russia occupies an insignificant place in the research of Russian scientists over the last 15 years.

The most tangible layer of research in the 90s. XX century was dedicated to the history of the Civil War in Russia. As part of the study of this most difficult period in the past of the Fatherland, scientists also covered some aspects of national problems in the politics of the Reds and Whites. Thus, N.I. Naumova, in her PhD thesis “National Policy of Kolchakism” (Tomsk, 1991), noted as key great-power chauvinism and the patriotic idea of ​​the great “united and indivisible Russia” in the ideology of the government of A.V. Kolchak. As a result, the unitary state system was considered as a symbol of national power, the highest result and goal of social development, a universal means of solving socio-political problems. In addition, the nation was identified with the state and power, and political self-determination of peoples and federation were not accepted, since, according to the researcher, they violated the main idea of ​​Kolchak’s plan. This made compromise with national figures impossible. At the same time, for the White Guard politicians, a significant difficulty was the issue of state formations of peoples in the subject territory. Kolchak, who ruled the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Northern Kazakhstan, had to face the difficulty of allocating an ethnic territory here, like Poland and Finland, which, accordingly, made the national-territorial structure of the indigenous ethnic groups of a huge region problematic.

Almost for the first time, the course of the “white” government was analyzed in relation to the indigenous peoples of the Urals and Siberia, as well as national minorities, which is assessed negatively. Naumova also concludes that, in general, the severity, complexity and scale of the national question was not comprehended, and the pursued policy of force, Russification and exclusion of peoples from active political life was ineffective and ultimately led to the collapse of the Kolchak regime. In the chapter “Kolchakism and the problems of the national-state structure of the peoples of Russia,” Naumova described the regime’s relations with the Baltic, Transcaucasian republics, Ukraine, Poland and Finland, while drawing attention to the influence of Western states on the development of the political position of the Kolchak government in relation to these regions of the former empire (13).

The aforementioned A. A. Elaev studied the problem in more detail using the example of Buryatia. The author focused on the position of national forces in their relations with the whites and pointed out that it consisted of maneuvering and compromises in order to force the creation of national autonomy. This influenced the cooperation with Ataman Semenov, and also determined the creation of aimak detachments “Ulan-Tsagda” for the protection and protection of national zemstvos as bodies of self-government.

Elaev revealed the uniqueness of the situation in the region by the beginning of 1919, when both the Soviet government and the Semenov government recognized the Buryat authorities in 1918, which meant that the autonomists had achieved their goal, but at the same time it presented them with a choice. It was necessary to decide whether to achieve autonomy in the Russian state under the real dominance of the foreign-speaking majority or to try to create their own state with related Mongol-speaking peoples. In this regard, the work highlights the attempt of a number of national figures led by Ts. Zhamtsarano to create a federation - the “Great Mongolian State”, uniting Inner and Outer Mongolia, Barga and the lands of the Transbaikal Buryats. In February 1919, at a conference in Chita, this decision was made and even a “Provisional Daurian Government” consisting of 16 people was elected. But the idea of ​​pan-Mongolism, carried out under the influence of Ataman Semenov and the Japanese invaders, was never realized, and the researcher does not talk about the further development of events (14).

M. V. Shilovsky, including issues of national policy in the context of his work, studied the history of Siberian regionalism in the second half of the 19th-20th centuries. and showed that in the ranks of the movement there were both autonomists and federalists, as well as those who recognized Siberia as a single region and those who stood for its division. The author's merit is a detailed analysis of the decisions of the regional congresses held in 1917.

and aimed at implementing the idea of ​​Siberian autonomy, identifying the party composition of the regionalists. He came to the conclusion that their ideas were petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionary in nature and were used solely for tactical reasons at the initial and final stages of the Civil War in the region. The advantage of Shilovsky’s work, in our opinion, is the coverage of specific historical issues of the development and activities of autonomist governments in Siberia and Far East, their relationship with the Kolchak government, as well as their position on the issue of the state structure of Asian Russia during the Civil War (15).

In the already mentioned works of Amanzholova, Siberian regionalism is considered as one of the essentially democratic models of federal construction in Russia, which took into account the possibility of creating cultural-national and territorial autonomy of the peoples of the region, depending on the degree and level of their ethnic identification. This idea, by the way, can be traced in the collective works “National Policy of Russia: History and Modernity” (M., 1997) and “The National Question in the State Dumas of Russia: Experience in Lawmaking” (M., 1999). Amanzholova’s monograph “Kazakh Autonomism and Russia” (Moscow, 1994), using the example of modern Kazakhstan, also examines in detail the experience of implementing projects alternative to the Bolshevik doctrine of the national question and self-determination of peoples based on the recognition of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat in relation to Western Siberia and Kazakhstan.

According to Amanzholova, the national leaders of the Alash movement, like the Bashkir, Turkestan, and a number of others, did not think about secession from Russia and saw their task in ensuring the interests of their ethnic groups by creating autonomies within the framework of a democratic federation, relying on a legitimate authority - the All-Russian and national Constituent Assembly. Their options for solving national problems did not exclude cultural-national autonomy; moreover, national organizations everywhere, maneuvering between the two main opposing forces - white and red - acted quite flexibly and showed a readiness for a reasonable compromise. This allowed, in particular, the Alashorda residents to achieve the introduction by the Kolchak authorities of a democratic system of national legal proceedings, a certain independence of local governments, etc. (16).

The mentioned collective monographs also show that the Kolchak government sought to take into account the sentiments among the regionalists and national structures, responded quite flexibly to their initiatives and was not clearly rigidly unificationist in its internal policy regarding the problems of self-government of the indigenous ethnic groups of the region.

Recently, new works on this problem have appeared. Thus, O. A. Sotova, in her Ph.D. thesis “The national policy of the cadets as part of the White Guard governments during the Civil War in Russia” (M., 2002), traces the evolution of the program provisions, tactics and forms of the national policy of the cadets in all major white governments. Unfortunately, the author did not take into account that many issues of the problem were discussed in some detail in the already mentioned monographs “National Policy of Russia: History and Modernity” and “The National Question in the State Dumas of Russia: Experience in Lawmaking.” In addition, the author admits an inaccuracy: the abstract says that the cadets created the Ministry of Native Affairs in the Siberian government (17), while the credit for its creation and activities belongs to the Siberian regionalists.

Literature covering the history of national politics in 1900-1922. from various points of view, it is distinguished by a multi-vector approach, which is determined by the goals of the authors and the specific subject of their research. Thus, considering the problems of the ethnography of the peoples of the USSR, V.V. Karlov stated in the early 90s that the work of social scientists is dominated by interest in the specific history of revolutionary events, social, economic and political transformations in various national regions of the country, as well as generalization of experience solving the national question during the construction of a socialist society, which began in 1917.

He believed that the historical significance of the forms of national statehood and autonomies in Russia and the USSR was primarily in ensuring guarantees of ethnic reproduction and the use of the economic, social and cultural potential of the country for all peoples “on equal terms.” At the same time, Karlov rightly emphasized that although in reality national policy in the USSR differed significantly from its “ideal model,” despite all its contradictions, national-state institutions undoubtedly played an important role in “fixing,” preserving and developing the ethnocultural characteristics of all the peoples of Russia in their long historical interaction (18). This position was directed against the straightforward denial of the entire historical experience of national politics in the 20th century, characteristic of many journalistic and a number of scientific works immediately after the collapse of the USSR.

An example of this kind can be some publications that were published in national republics in the wake of growing centrifugal tendencies and are distinguished by a clearly expressed political agenda. D. Zh. Valeev, in particular, with his works is an example of an opportunistic (in connection with the politicization of ethnicity) approach to rather complex issues. He, for example, accused the leader of the Bashkir national movement in 1917-1919. 3. Validov in limiting the national self-determination of the Bashkirs to the framework of autonomy within the borders of federal Russia. In his opinion, Validov was unable to completely subordinate the Bashkir movement to pan-Turkism and was never a supporter of the creation of an independent Bashkir state. A more radical formulation of the problem, Valeev argued, would predetermine the appropriate choice of means and program goals. This, in turn, could lead the Bashkir people to a broader status, “which would undoubtedly play a positive role.”

Such radicalism, which little corresponds to historical realities, and even to the objective requirements necessary for gaining sovereignty, is not only erroneous in scientific terms, but also extremely harmful in a political sense, both for Russian statehood in general and for Bashkir ethnopolitical interests. In addition, Valeev’s book contains a simplified judgment that both Soviet power at the beginning of the Civil War, and A.V. Kolchak, and A.I. Dutov during its development were united in their desire not to provide the Bashkirs with national-territorial autonomy due to domination The Bolsheviks and Whites have an imperial mindset. He shows that Validov's alliance with the Whites was conditioned by the Bolsheviks' refusal to meet various proposals for autonomy. According to the author, Validov advocated a federal Turkic state, and Bashkortostan did not think about creating an independent and absolutely sovereign state, “although such an idea could have taken place at that time” (19).

Valeev’s assessment of the history of the national-state building of the Bashkirs within the framework of the RSFSR can be called no less populist. Rightly emphasizing the artificial nature of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic of 1918, he at the same time proves that “the will of the people for V.I. Lenin did not matter at all, and in essence the policy pursued by the Center in national regions was imperial-colonialist, it was only lightly covered by the fig leaf of self-determination of nations.” Granting Soviet autonomy to the Bashkirs is regarded as a tactical and forced measure.

In general, autonomous entities similar to Bashkiria initially could not, under the conditions of the Soviet federation, serve as a radical means of resolving the national issue, Valeev argues. It turns out that he was hampered by the centuries-old traditions of imperial-totalitarian thinking, expressed in the rigid and unprecedented centralism of public life established by the Bolsheviks, which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR. Thus, Valeev equates the “colonial policy of tsarism” with the “Soviet imperial policy”, without distinguishing the multi-layered and ambiguity of both the historical process itself and the political component in the development of society at different stages. Quite logical in connection with such a subjectivist, nationalistic approach is Valeev’s demand to create a federal Russia today on a contractual basis of associated sovereign states, to provide union status to Bashkiria and the thesis that “in Bashkiria, no people, except the Bashkir people themselves, can decide what kind of national-state structure they should have, under what social system they should live” (20).

The approach of other historians of Bashkiria, whom Valeev criticized in his book, seems much more productive. Thus, already in 1984 and 1987, B. X. Yuldashbaev spoke out against the traditional thesis of Soviet historiography about the original counter-revolutionary nature of the Bashkir movement in 1917-1920. (as, indeed, other national movements in Russia), sought to show the complexity of the development of national movements in the Urals and adjacent areas during the years of the revolution and the Civil War. In later works, he writes that the movement of the peoples of Russia for self-determination and autonomy, which began after February 1917, was interrupted in October 1917. And although the entire Soviet history confirmed the utopianism of the Marxian doctrine artificially adapted to Russian reality and the model of the communist structure of society, development in a number of spheres of public life, despite the failure of the Bolshevik experiment, were still on the rise.

It should be noted here that in 1988, in the collective work “Bashkir ASSR. State-legal structure" (Ufa, 1988), along with the history of the constitutional development and legal status of the Republic, it was indicated that the experience of its creation was used in the formation of other Soviet autonomies. While admitting inaccuracies in describing the facts of the initial stage of construction of the BASSR, the authors also remained on the old ideological positions, accusing Validov of bourgeois nationalism and anti-people policies.

Yuldashbaev convincingly showed that within the Bashkir national movement there were opponents of territorial autonomy and Validov, who advocated national-cultural autonomy and supported Kolchak’s policies. At the same time, Validov also underwent a certain evolution in his ideas about the national interests and priorities of the Bashkirs, since at first he advocated the pan-Turkic autonomy of the peoples of the Russian East. The author emphasized the pan-Bashkir and democratic nature of nationalism, its supra-class character, linking this, among other things, with the historical fact of the impossibility of ethno-political consolidation and the national-state existence of the people in those specific conditions (21). The author also critically evaluates the historical experience of the Soviet autonomy of the Bashkirs. In his opinion, after the defeat of dissent in the person of Validov and his supporters and the expansion of the borders of the BASSR at the expense of predominantly foreign-language regions, “the national purpose of the autonomy of the Bashkir Republic, formed as a form of national self-determination of the Bashkir people, narrowed. In the name of “class” (proletarian-poor) internationalism, the autonomous republic was subjected to massive deformation, and the nationalism of a small and disadvantaged nation was indiscriminately turned into a negative label and a scarecrow: its democratic content was not recognized, only potential national extremism was emphasized.”

At the same time, Yuldashbaev sees the paradox of the situation in the combination, characteristic of the entire Soviet system, in different republics, of the infringement of the national legal independence of the Bashkirs with command and administrative guardianship over them, with various dubious advantages, benefits and discounts for a relatively small nation, including increased representation in the Central Election Commission and the Supreme Council of the autonomy and in general in the field of leadership positions. As a result, the book summarizes, in the era of Stalinism especially, and even to this day, the national question has not been resolved. Here, along with the correct formulation of most of the issues under consideration, a certain fetishization of the idea of ​​statehood as the main or even the only lever in resolving the diverse problems of national development is manifested. General assessment of the historiography of the Bashkir national movement in 1918-1920. given by A. S. Vereshchagin (22).

An earlier monograph by M. M. Kulydaripov specifically analyzes all aspects of the history of the formation of the Bashkir Soviet autonomy in 1917-1920. This work, substantial in scope and content, is based on a number of newly discovered archival sources and represents an attempt at a balanced, objective study of the controversial concrete experience of resolving the national question in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. The author separates his Leninist and Stalinist understandings, although he emphasizes the priority of the class approach for the entire theory and practice of Bolshevism.

In relation to the problem under study, it should be noted that Kulyparipov covered in some detail the development of sentiments and demands in the Bashkir national movement in 1917. He, like Yuldashbaev, noted the evolution of Validov’s views on this issue - from the desires for the creation of Turkestan autonomy, which had a certain pan-Turkic raid, to the actual Bashkir autonomy within the Russian Federation. Kulynaripov also drew attention to the difficult relationship between Bashkir and Tatar leaders on the issue of the possibility of forming the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. The book expresses considerations regarding erroneous or deliberately biased versions of the events of 1917; the development of autonomism in Bashkiria is linked to similar processes in other national regions of Russia, especially Muslim ones (23).

It is significant that Kulynaripov connects the national interests of the Bashkirs with the central issue of land for them. Thus, in November 1917, a decision was made on the need for territorial autonomy, the announcement of which was postponed. It was then, as stated in the decision (Farman No. 1), that all land should have been transferred to the disposal of the national government. In addition, Kulynaripov essentially concludes that the national leaders of the region were forced to declare autonomy due to the emerging threat of a military invasion by Cossacks or other armed forces that were fighting each other. Hence, as the historian writes, the neutrality of the Bashkir government - Shuro - towards the Dutovites.

The monograph also examines the problem of whites' attitude to the national question. As indicated, A.I. Dutov was interested in neutralizing the Bashkirs in the conditions of the triumphant march of Soviet power and therefore initially was more or less loyal to their autonomy. Kulydaripov also reveals the specific actions of nationalists in organizing power and administration in the autonomous territory, in creating national military units, in the land issue, in the cultural and spiritual sphere. Information about the relationship between the Bashkir autonomists and the Bolsheviks locally and in the Center during different periods of the development of the civil war is also very useful. According to the author, the Bolsheviks at the beginning of 1918 did not accept their ideas, considering the granting of autonomy a concession to bourgeois nationalists, and also citing the low level of development of the ethnic group, which had not matured into statehood. However, the transition to the whites, as the historian showed, did not give the Bashkir leaders the opportunity to realize their goals. This was due, first of all, to the dominance of the idea of ​​“united and indivisible Russia” in the politics of A.V. Kolchak. The main advantage of this part of the work is to highlight the details of the relationship between the Bashkir autonomists and the Whites on the national issue, as well as the vicissitudes of their transition to the Red side on the platform of recognition of federalism and the inclusion of the Bashkir Soviet Republic into the RSFSR. Like Amanzholova using the example of the history of Kazakh autonomism, Kulyparipov draws a conclusion about the intermediate position of the nationals between the main forces during the war, which were equally hostile and suspicious of them (24).

An important aspect of the history of national politics in connection with the creation of the BASSR is the version presented in the monograph about the attempts of Tatar leaders to organize the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic, relying on the support of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and the Bolshevik leaders' poor knowledge of the specifics of interethnic relations and ethnocultural problems. It was an important political step in the implementation of the slogan about the right of nations to self-determination and at the same time contradicted the real processes of national development of the ethnic groups of the Middle Volga and Urals. This plot most clearly demonstrates that the contours of national policy were formed by the ruling party in the process of struggle for power in national regions and were accompanied by the testing of a variety of models and projects, sometimes far from reality.

Based on the works of his predecessors and new archival data, Kulyparipov highlighted the process of reaching an agreement between the autonomists and the Bolshevik leadership on the formation of the BASSR, the activities of the Validov Bashrevkom for its implementation and emphasized that, unlike other Soviet autonomies, the Bashkir autonomies were proclaimed through bilateral negotiations and the signing of a special Agreement. Pointing out the complexities and contradictions of this process, the author generally has a positive assessment of the formation of the BASSR in March 1919 and the merit of V.I. Lenin in this matter, despite the curtailed nature of the autonomy. Kulsharipov shows the differences in the ideas of the Center and the nationals about the essence of federalism and the limits of independence of its subjects, which resulted in conflicts of a political, administrative and economic nature. The author sees their main source in the discrepancy between priorities in understanding the essence and purpose of the state system - for the Bolsheviks it was a class approach, for the autonomists - the idea of ​​national revival in all its diversity (25).

As a result, it was around the implementation of national-territorial autonomy and the principle of federalism, the problem of leadership and management of the republic that a sharp struggle flared up between the Bashrevkom and the regional committee of the RCP (b). Kulsharipov highlighted in detail the essence of these differences, which boiled down to the division of powers and subjects of competence, in modern terms. The matter was complicated by the military situation in the region, the aggravation of interethnic relations, and contradictions in understanding the essence of the problem within the party-Soviet leadership itself in the Center and locally. The author also drew attention to the uncertainty of the constitutional and legal position of the autonomous republics within the RSFSR in 1920, which special commissions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee were called upon to eliminate.

Analyzing the discussions regarding the BASSR and the actions of the authorities in preparing the corresponding changes, as well as the provisions of the decree on the state structure of the BASSR of May 19, 1920, Kulsharipov also draws a conclusion about the indicative nature of these processes. They testified to the ongoing bureaucratic centralization of management, since Bashkiria was actually deprived of both political and economic rights guaranteed by the Agreement of 1919. In this regard, the liquidation of the Bashrevkom was, he notes, a foregone conclusion. As a result, the self-determination of the Bashkirs became very conditional, and the fate of the national figures who stood for it turned out to be quite tragic (26).

In conclusion, Kulsharipov’s book states the historical significance of the experience of 1917-1920, which showed the opposition of the Bashkir movement for self-determination to Russian great-power chauvinism and Tatar chauvinism, and then faced with an attempt to split the national movement based on the idea of ​​class struggle. While defending the main thing - the creation of autonomy within the Russian Federation - the Bashkir nationals, Kulsharipov noted, were unable to defend its actual independence, moreover, opponents of autonomy subsequently met with the support of the central Soviet government. According to the author, the lessons of the past indicate the relevance of the problems of democratic development of peoples in a multi-ethnic country, the inconsistency of negative assessments of the leader of the Bashkir autonomy Z. Validov, as well as the incompatibility of the administrative-command system and the true self-determination of peoples. The appendices included in the monograph make it possible to document specific historical research on the history of national politics using the example of Bashkiria.

At the same time, it should be noted that, unfortunately, Kulyparipov subsequently began to take a much more radical and biased position, which seriously removed his scientific research from the search for historical truth in favor of the political situation and under the pressure of growing nationalism in a certain part of the intelligentsia. In particular, the author’s statement about the genocide and ethnocide of the Bolsheviks in relation to the Bashkirs, etc. is unfounded. (27).

Using the example of the same region, but taking into account the specifics of the entire Muslim movement in Russia, S. M. Iskhakov examined the problems of interest to us. He believes that the role of Muslims in the events of 1917-1918. in our historiography is very confused, and sometimes very distorted, and considers the struggle for national statehood on the territory of the Kazan, Ufa and Orenburg provinces. The author gave a general description of the position of Muslim leaders in the pre-revolutionary period, emphasizing their lack of separatism and their very cautious approach to the issue of the status of national regions, taking into account the dynamics of the socio-political situation in the country (28).

Iskhakov raised the issue of the creation of Bashkir autonomy and noted discrepancies in the translations of the famous firman No. 1, and also suggested that its announcement by the Bashkir Central Council in November 1917 was caused, first of all, by the desire of the leaders to get ahead of their local rivals in the struggle for power. In his opinion, the Bolsheviks were guided primarily by the same motives: it was they that dictated the tactics of the Bolsheviks, who were initially forced to reckon with the adherents of Islam as a real political force and their armed formations (in the fall of 1917, up to 57 thousand people). In the same regard, he evaluates the meaning of the appeal of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR dated November 20, 1917 “To all working Muslims of Russia and the East.” The desire of the Bolsheviks to seize the initiative in the struggle for the masses, we read further, was combined with attempts to put pressure on the Millat Majlisi, which opened in Ufa on November 20, 1917, and then its dispersal by the Ural Regional Military Council (29).

The author illuminated the actual outline of national policy and the activities of Muslim leaders of the Volga region and the Urals. He views the decision of the Millat Majlisi on November 29, 1917 to create the Idel-Ural state (republic) among the Russian states as a Turkic-Tatar state as a rejection of Soviet federalism and a manifestation of hope for a legitimate Constituent Assembly. At the same time, the researcher showed the contradictions between Muslim figures themselves on issues of statehood and federalism, the role and place of cultural-national autonomy in the program of the Millat Majlisi, which adopted the project “National Autonomy of Muslim Turkic-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia”, which did not have an anti-Russian character, published on January 16 1918

Iskhakov refutes the opinion existing in historiography that the ideologists of the Tatar commercial and industrial bourgeoisie sought to subordinate all Russian Muslims to their influence and were ardent opponents of Bashkir territorial autonomy. He also differentiates the Bashkir autonomists themselves into “sovereignists” and “Bashkirists”, depending on the recognition or denial of autonomy for the Tatars and Bashkirs together or only for the Bashkirs.

According to Iskhakov, unfortunately not confirmed by the facts in his work, the main economic reason for the desire of the latter, led by Validov, for territorial autonomy was the attempt of the Bashkir patrimonial people to preserve their lands, which were threatened by the Soviet decree on land. Sympathizing with the opponents of Bashkir autonomism in the person of the Millat Majlisi, Iskhakov writes that this body tried to reach a compromise and therefore decided on the need for a Federation in Russia, but negotiations with the Validovites failed, and Bashkir autonomy was proclaimed on December 20, 1917 (30).

He explains the differences among Bashkir leaders with the influence of tribal interests of the local elite and contradictions between Sufi brotherhood orders, while the local population did not understand the intentions of the leaders, and the Russians perceived the idea of ​​Muslim autonomy as an infringement of their rights. The article highlights facts from the history of the proclamation of the Soviet Volga-Ural or Idel-Ural Republic (IUSR) as a federal part of Soviet Russia, and clarifies the position of Z. Validov in relation to this entity. In this regard, it is indicated that already in January 1918, and not in March 1919, he tried to achieve national-territorial autonomy for the Bashkirs within Soviet Russia through the Idel-Ural Soviet Republic. As a result, it is further said that by March 1918 the Bolsheviks were able to create a counterweight to the Idel-Ural Soviet Republic by arresting the initiators of its creation and declaring the Kazan province a Soviet Republic (31).

In addition, Iskhakov’s additions regarding the proclamation of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic on March 23, 1918 are interesting.

He believes that this maneuver of the Bolshevik Center represented by the People's Commissariat of Nationalities was aimed at the final elimination of the IUSR, which existed for one month and was liquidated as created by liberal reformers. The new project also questioned the feasibility of an autonomous Bashkiria in the southeast of the ethnic territory led by Validov, but Stalin’s plan did not take into account the ethnic composition of the population and was a utopia. Iskhakov supports the previously expressed assessments in this regard, as well as the conclusion of other scientists about Stalin’s desire to extend the model invented in the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities to other Muslim regions. Amanzholova also wrote about this in detail in the above-mentioned monograph.

Despite the short duration of its existence, the cultural-national autonomy of the Muslim Turkic-Tatars of internal Russia and Siberia was a successful attempt to put into practice (taking into account Russian conditions) the theory of such autonomy. Iskhakov also draws attention to the need, when analyzing the whole problem, to take into account the strong attachment of the Turkic peoples of Russia to the idea of ​​independence, the uniqueness of the perception of decisions and propaganda of the Bolsheviks under the influence of cultural and historical experience, as well as Islam. Muslim nationalism, Iskhakov believes, was manifested in their desire for equality with the Russian people, and autonomism - in an attempt to preserve the state, and not destroy it in conditions of sliding into chaos (this position was also expressed earlier by other scientists).

On this basis, Iskhakov concludes that the actions of Russian Muslim leaders in 1917-1918 were objective. were aimed at preserving a huge power, were not conservative and counter-revolutionary. He justifies the young Muslim socialists, who replaced the liberals by the spring of 1918 and perceived the Bolshevik agitation not as a communist teaching, but as a call for the creation of a national government that in practice meets the interests of all peoples in a particular Muslim state (32).

Iskhakov’s interpretation, additional information and sources involved in scientific circulation, provide a new perspective in the study of a multifaceted and complex topic. It is especially important to pay attention to intra-ethnic and intra-Muslim contradictions in the development of national movements, the interconnection of economic, socio-cultural and political aspects of the national question. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the monograph by A. B. Yunusova “Islam in Bashkortostan” (Ufa, 1999), which serves as a good concrete historical addition to the topic.

However, speaking about Iskhakov’s position, we note some obvious idealization of the role and significance of the position and activities of the Muslim leaders of the Volga region and the Urals, who formed the backbone of all-Russian Muslim organizations, as well as a certain one-sidedness in the interpretation of the Bolshevik tactics.

However, other researchers pay attention primarily to the pragmatism of Bolshevik politics. Thus, A.G. Vishnevsky writes that the events of 1917 influenced the tactics of the winning party, and not the essence of the attitude towards the national question. The Federation began to seem like a boon to opponents of the collapse of the empire, and all subsequent activities of the Bolsheviks were aimed at its restoration, built on a combination of declared federalism and implemented centralism. I. M. Sampiev believes that V. I. Lenin defended in fact the principles of self-determination and federalism in unity, which was especially clearly manifested at the VIII Party Congress when the II Party Program was adopted in 1919 (33).

Another interesting example of the interpretation of the national question in the Volga region and the Urals is provided by the works of the Tatar scientist I. R. Tagirov. In 1987, his monograph “On the Road of Freedom and Brotherhood” was published in Kazan. The work provides a comprehensive coverage of the history of national Tatar statehood and the national movement from 1552 to 1920. In relation to the period under study, the author proves that the Bolsheviks’ attitude to the demands of national movements changed under the influence of political circumstances; recognition of the bourgeois federation was also allowed under certain conditions. The basis of the concept of a socialist federation, in his opinion, was regional autonomy and democratic centralism. Thus, the author does not go beyond the framework of the interpretation that developed during the Soviet period, proving, in particular, the fallacy and unnecessaryness of the project of cultural-national autonomy for Muslims and other peoples of the region, which was supported by the Muslim Socialist Committee and M. Vakhitov in July 1917. At the same time, Tagirov writes that it was local councils with their inherent internal autonomy that could practically resolve the issue of nation-state building, of course, of a Soviet nature (34).

Considering the vicissitudes of the struggle and discussions around the issue of the principles and essence of the autonomies of the peoples of the Volga region and the Urals, ways of satisfying the socio-economic and cultural aspirations of the national masses, Tagirov, for example, argued that the courage of Z. Validov, who spoke out with the demand for territorial autonomy of the Bashkirs, was based on the alliance he concluded shortly before with Russian gold miners and Ataman A.I. Dutov. The author considers the proclamation of the Ural-Volga state and cultural-national autonomy of Muslims of internal Russia to be the result of an agreement between counter-revolutionary elements, the only form of achieving nationalist goals, and a manifestation of the desire of the Tatar bourgeoisie to establish its dominance in the region.

Attention should also be paid to Tagirov’s explanation of the history of the proclamation of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic. He considers it one of the options in the fight against bourgeois nationalists, along with the project of a regional congress of councils on joint autonomy for all the peoples of the Volga and Urals regions. He emphasizes the democratic content of the Regulations of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the Republic of March 22, 1918, since it did not finally resolve the issue of borders and allowed for the possibility of internal autonomy of Bashkiria. In fact, this approach was determined by the lack of clarity in the Center’s ideas about how to resolve these issues. Tagirov also points out that the Chuvash, Mari, and Mordovians did not intend to create their own republics and enthusiastically greeted the idea of ​​the People's Commissariat and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, expecting to join the Tatar-Bashkir autonomy. Only nihilists and bourgeois nationalists, having emasculated its essence, led the Republic to extinction, the author believes. Tagirov’s work covers in some detail the history of the proclamation and formation of the borders of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920-1921, as evidence of the greatest results of Lenin’s national policy of the CPSU and unprecedented scope for the development and strengthening of friendship between peoples, the elevation of the authority of the Russian people (35).

In the new monograph “Essays on the history of Tatarstan and the Tatar people (XX century)” (Kazan, 1999), Tagirov adjusted his concept in the spirit of what unfolded in the late 80s - 90s. in the Republic of the movement for maximum independence from the federal Center - Union and Russian. He emphasizes that the Bolsheviks did not come to power under socialist slogans, and using the most powerful opportunistic factors associated with the imperialist war and the exhaustion of Russia’s imperial development, as well as the sharp deterioration in the life of all layers of society. In addition, the very national-state building of Tatarstan, the historian believes, took on tragic forms and was associated with continuous loss of life (36).

Turning to the facts of the history of the early 20th century already covered in earlier works, Tagirov places some new accents in the interpretation of events. Thus, the author no longer notes the fallacy and uselessness of cultural-national autonomy, but states that it was placed in a secondary place in the decisions of the Millat Mejdis at the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918. A negative assessment of the speech of the Bashkir leader Z. Validov is accompanied by references to his pessimism on the issue of the structure of Russia in the form of states and Tatar territorial autonomy, as well as the desire to form a sovereign Bashkiria without Russian settlers. There is no mention of his dependence on gold miners.

Tagirov believes that the idea of ​​the Idel-Ural state was based on a Soviet basis and, if implemented, could provide a truly federal democratic structure of the Soviet state. Regarding the Tatar-Bashkir autonomy, the author notes: its initiator was M. Vakhitov, the project was unacceptable for the Mari, Udmurts, Chuvash and other ethnic groups, since it did not take into account their interests. The author again places the blame for its failure on national nihilists and part of the Tatar and Bashkir public.

Tagirov’s monograph also details the history of the formation of the TASSR in 1920. At the same time, ideas about different approaches to its creation are detailed; in the spirit of modern nationalist trends in Tatarstan, the presence of a stable tendency in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) towards the creation of a low-power Tatar republic without Kazan, Ufa and other territories of cohabitation of Tatars and other peoples is emphasized, and a well-known narrowing of the rights of autonomy is stated in the decree of May 27, 1920 about its education in comparison with existing projects.

Tagirov also drew attention to the contradictory developments of events related to the definition of the boundaries of autonomy, described the attempts of S. Said-Galiev and especially M. Sultan-Galiev to expand its rights, the history of discrediting and eliminating the latter from the political arena. Noting also the difficulties of relations between Russians and Tatars in the Republic in the late 20s, the author negatively assessed the pace and nature of the policy of “indigenization” of the state apparatus and the replacement of Arabic script with the Latin alphabet, and then the Cyrillic alphabet. In general, he summarized: “No matter how difficult the project of national autonomy of the Tatar people is to implement,” no matter how meager the rights of the Tatar Republic were, it became the basis on which the struggle for the creation of sovereign statehood developed in subsequent years (37).

The problems of national policy during the period under study were also studied using the example of other large Russian regions. Thus, K.K. Khutyz, speaking about the Civil War on the territory of Adygea, drew attention to the strong influence of cruelty and violence on the part of the Reds and Whites on the position of the indigenous population towards them. In his opinion, among backward peoples, autonomy as a form of statehood often turned out to be unrealistic, and at first it was necessary to impose the principle of national self-determination from the outside by creating “national bodies” for a certain territory (38).

An interesting overview of the problem is given in N. A. Pocheskhov’s candidate dissertation “Civil War in Adygea: Reasons for Escalation.” The author, in particular, examined the process of intensifying political confrontation in Adygea in connection with the attempt to create Cossack-mountain statehood. In his opinion, this question was basic and reflected the process of a tireless search for forms of government, taking into account the specifics of the Kuban region, the presence of the Cossack and mountain population.

At the same time, the main and unchangeable principle for the unification of state entities of the South-East of Russia was the principle of federalism. At the same time, the specific alignment of social, class and political forces greatly influenced the essence and number of projects for solving the national question and state structure, Pocheskhov rightly notes, and the path of their development ran from federalism to separatism and “independence.” It was the desire to realize national self-determination that contributed to the deepening of political contradictions during the Civil War between the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban and Terek, between individual groups of the Kuban Cossacks, between the Cossacks and the highlanders, between the Kuban regional government and the command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. In general, the author concludes, the presence of different programs for the administrative-state structure of Kuban and Russia, superimposed on other no less complex and important circumstances in interethnic relations, politicized society, predetermined the expansion of confrontational processes and created the preconditions for the accelerated formation of the Armed Forces of revolution and counter-revolution (39 ).

T. P. Khlynina also turned to the history of national politics in the Kuban region. She believes that the provision of Soviet-style independence in the region in many cases was shaped by the Center, and the national question was identified with socio-economic reform. In addition, the attachment of the Bolshevik model to the expectation and preparation of the world revolution played a role. Its delay, Khlynina believes, was corrected by various forms of federal connection, which absorbed autonomies by inclusion in complex structural administrative-territorial divisions.

According to Khlynina, the acquisition of national statehood by the Kuban mountaineers embodied, in various shades of autonomism (an amorphous socialist formation with vague rights and clear responsibilities), a flexible restraint of national satisfaction within the framework of the Soviet system, the stability of which was supported by continuous transformations at the administrative-territorial level and the illusion of the possibility of increasing its state status constituent parts. As a result, the declarative status of the autonomies gradually came into conflict with their practically increased status. The expected role behavior of the autonomous region did not coincide with the image associated with it, which gave rise to a long-term conflict between the Adyghe Autonomous Region and the Kuban-Black Sea region (40).

White policy in the North Caucasus, including in the national sphere, is touched upon by historians of the white movement in the South of Russia. Thus, V.P. Fedyuk, when characterizing the history of the volunteer movement, points out that it was constantly in conflict with the Cossack “independents” who stood for the creation of the Russian Federation with the recognition of members of the union as separate states. In the initial period of the formation of the Volunteer Army, the leaders of the white movement considered the separatist sentiments of the Cossacks as a source of immunity against Bolshevism, but as the military situation developed, there was no need to talk about decentralization in the management of such an ethnically and socially complex region, and the line of strict unity of command prevailed.

Fedyuk highlighted in some detail the nature of the conflicts between the Denikin government and the Kuban Rada regarding the creation of the South Russian Union with the autonomy of the Cossack regions, and noted the dependence of the position of both forces on the military-political situation. In addition, the work highlights the development of events in Hetman Ukraine - relations between Kyiv and Petrograd on the issue of self-determination of Ukraine, with the German command, and reveals the conditional and very illusory nature of the independence of Skoropadsky’s Ukrainian state, which rested on the presence of the Germans.

According to Fedyuk, the problem of the nationalities of Ukraine and the North Caucasus played an important role in the evolution and fate of the white movement. It was impossible for the anti-Bolshevik forces to seriously count on victory as long as some fought for a free Don or an independent Ukraine, while others proclaimed the slogan of re-creation “one and indivisible.” Unity led by the Armed Forces of the South of Russia was achieved not through compromise, but through subordination, and contradictions were driven inside, which led to acute conflicts volunteers with the Cossacks and national state entities on the outskirts of Russia (41). However, in general, the national policy of the whites in such an important region in the ethnopolitical sense is clearly insufficiently covered, moreover, the Cossacks can only be considered as a subethnic group, and it would be more appropriate to analyze the activities of the Cossack structures in the field of interethnic relations in the North Caucasus, like the Denikin government.

The historian’s characteristic fascination with specific historical details and a certain factual nature did not allow us to provide an analysis of the subsequent policy of the Whites in the South of Russia on the problem under study in the following work, written in co-authorship with A.I. Ushakov. It only mentions that at the beginning of 1920, representatives of the Cossack regions again returned to the idea of ​​​​creating a union state, and the development of the idea and the relationship of Denikin and Wrangel with these and other national and autonomist structures in the region is not traced (42).

Another researcher of anti-Bolshevism, V. Zh. Tsvetkov, paid closer attention to the problems of interest to us in relation to the history of the white movement in the South of Russia. However, it is mainly written about the problems of autonomy. He, in particular, believes that A.I. Denikin advocated the cultural autonomy of Ukraine, which can be seen in his Address “To the Population of Little Russia,” and rejected any cooperation with the UPR government. Petlyura was outlawed, and the teaching of the Ukrainian language in state educational institutions was prohibited. At the Special Meeting, from January 1919, there was a Commission on National Affairs, headed by Professor A.D. Bilimovich, which was supposed to develop a “regional structure” taking into account the national and cultural characteristics of the South of Russia.

As for the North Caucasus, V. Zh. Tsvetkov noted that in 1919 Kabarda, Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan were allocated into special autonomous okrugs. They were to be governed by “rulers elected by the people,” under which special Councils were created from the most authoritative persons. They conducted local government and economic affairs, Sharia courts and Sharia law were preserved. At the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Terek-Dagestan Territory, General I. G. Erdeli, the position of “adviser on mountain affairs” was introduced, elected at the All-Caucasian Mountain Congress. In Chechnya, Ossetia, Dagestan, as well as the Trans-Caspian region, which became part of the Terek-Dagestan region, the whites relied, notes V. Tsvetkov, on loyal nobility. These included the Chechen National Committee, the People's Congress of Ossetia, the All-Turkestan Maslikhat in Transcaspia, etc. The Terek Cossacks retained independent governance structures, equal in rights to the mountain peoples. In addition, it was planned to alienate part of the Cossack lands in favor of the highlanders who fought in the white armies. However, forced mobilization into its ranks caused uprisings in Chechnya and Dagestan in September 1919 - March 1920, which were brutally suppressed by the Whites.

P. N. Wrangel, who replaced A. I. Denikin, Tsvetkov believes, did not reject federalism as a principle of the state structure of Russia. In a conversation with the chairman of the National Ukrainian Committee I. Markotun, he declared his readiness to “promote the development of national democratic forces,” and in September-October 1920, the Wrangel government tried to enter into an alliance with representatives of the former Mountain government, including Shamil’s grandson, an officer of the French service by Saidbek, on the basis of recognition of the federation of mountain peoples (43).

Noting these and other similar facts, Tsvetkov, however, does not give them a more detailed assessment. How did the leaders of the white movement act - in accordance with their ideological and political doctrines, which included a detailed justification and program for the implementation of one or another method of solving the national question in Russia? Or were their actions much more dictated by short-term prospects and problems of the fight against Soviet power and the Bolsheviks, the desire to create a social support in the subject territory for successful military operations?

The desire to give a generalized description of anti-Bolshevism in Russia, including to a certain extent its national policy, distinguishes the monograph by G. A. Trukan. It talks about all the most significant anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevik governments and armed structures that operated during the Civil War, including the democratic alternative to Bolshevism in the person of Komuch, and the Russian Political Conference. The narrative is based on a presentation of the main phases of the development of the white movement as a military-political force that opposed the Bolsheviks, as well as the main features of the programs, tactics and organization of the whites in various regions of Russia. At the same time, however, the author does not highlight in any detail the question of the attitude of the anti-Bolshevik forces to a very important national issue; in essence, he does not characterize the national policy of the anti-Bolshevik governments.

Only when covering the history of the Volunteer Army and the dictatorship of General A.I. Denikin does Trukan write about the important proposals that B. Savinkov put forward in December 1919, after a serious deterioration in the position of the Whites in the South of Russia to save their entire cause.

The complex of these measures included, in particular, an agreement with the seceded peoples to ensure broad social support for whites. Savinkov considered it necessary to improve relations with Poland through mutual concessions and to attract such Baltic bloc countries as Latvia and Lithuania to his side by granting broad autonomy, while he considered Estonia the most irreconcilable supporter of independence.

Savinkov also emphasized the impossibility of a further policy of intransigence towards Ukraine, where broad local self-government should be introduced. Speaking about the enormous importance of the Caucasus and the growth of sentiment for independence in this region, he also proposed starting negotiations on the limits and characteristics of each individual autonomy, first of all with Armenia, then Azerbaijan. Georgia, Savinkov believed, would be most opposed to this, like Estonia (44). However, these ideas turned out to be unpopular among Denikin’s circle and for the White leader himself in the South of Russia, which largely determined their defeat. The monograph, unfortunately, does not provide an analysis of the political position of the Whites on the entire range of issues of national policy, which were so relevant at that time in Russia and, moreover, seriously influenced the fate of the White cause.

The complex history of the development, formation and change of authorities in Crimea during the Civil War - Soviet, city and zemstvo, national, the Crimean Tatar movement - was traced by A.G. and V.G. Zarubins. Thus, the Crimean People's (Democratic) Republic of the Crimean Tatars, proclaimed at the end of 1917, remained only in the text of the Constitution (45). This document was published in a new translation into Russian by Iskhakov. In the preface to the text, he again emphasized the groundlessness of accusations against Muslim figures, in this case the Crimean Tatars, of separatism and pan-Turkism. Following other researchers, he also repeated that their main task was the survival of the people in extreme conditions, especially since regionalism and ethno-regionalism were then characteristic of other parts of Russia (46).

For V.I. Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership in general, Crimea was an outpost of resistance to German troops, i.e. both of them relied not on reasonable forecasting, but on building tactics after entering the battle. In addition, the population itself did not know about the existence of Taurida, which existed only until the end of April 1918 and was an alien growth. Noting the proclamation of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Taurida in March 1918, historians draw attention to the discrepancies in explaining the reasons for this act between local workers and the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The first emphasized the intrinsic value of the Republic, created to maintain neutrality in negotiations with Germany and build communism on a separate peninsula.

According to A.G. and V.G. Zarubin, the attempt of General M.A. Sulkevich to create an independent state under the conditions of German occupation (April-November 1918) was also unsuccessful. And the regional government of S.S. Crimea was unable to implement the program of cultural-national autonomy and other democratic measures due to the opposition of A.I. Denikin and financial and economic problems. The Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic, created after this by the will of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), was also a pragmatic move of the Bolsheviks. They sought to resist the armed forces of the whites and soften the aggravated national question; in fact, they showed some flexibility in their policy, but already in June 1919 the Republic was liquidated.

The subsequent history of the dictatorship of the white general Ya. A. Slashchev and the reign of P. N. Wrangel is considered by the authors as opposite political types. Wrangel, they point out, was the first in the history of the white movement to try to get away from “non-decisionism” and advocated, in particular, for a federal structure of Russia. However, the disintegration of the white camp and rear and the incomparability of Wrangel’s potential in comparison with the Reds initially cast doubt on the feasibility of his program (47). The Zarubins' article contributes to a detailed restoration of the concrete historical picture of the development of various models of national politics using the example of an ethnopolitically, strategically and socially complex region.

The topic of national-cultural autonomy in the history of Russia seems especially important. An interesting and useful addition to its study is a collection of documents published in Tomsk on the history of cultural-national autonomy in Russia. It is built on materials covering the events of 1917-1920. in Siberia and the Far East, and includes various, mainly archival and partly new documents, usually adopted at regional and local congresses, conferences, meetings of government and self-government bodies, public organizations and political parties and movements. The author-compiler I.V. Nam and the editor E.I. Chernyak believe that Siberia was a kind of testing ground for cultural and national autonomy. They gave a general description of its essence and showed the differences in attitude to the problem between different parties. If the Cadets saw in national-personal autonomy a universal way to solve the national question, a real alternative to an ethno-territorial solution in the form of a federation or national-territorial autonomy, then the Socialist Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, Mensheviks, and many national parties considered it the optimal means of solving the problem of national minorities.

In Siberia and the Far East, during the years of the revolution and the Civil War, national-territorial and cultural-national autonomies were actually combined, and the Ministry of National Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic implemented the principles of extraterritoriality and personality. Under the influence of representatives of the Muslim movement, Siberian regionalists and other structures in the region, national councils were created and operated under the Siberian Regional Council and locally - Muslim, Ukrainian (communities and councils), Lithuanian, Polish, Latvian, Jewish (councils, unions, committees, etc.) .P.). Legislative activity in the Far Eastern Republic was based in this matter on the self-organization of national minorities, but in 1922 cultural-national autonomy was ended. The Soviet model of state building was established (48). The publication provides a good basis for a detailed study of the history of national politics during the critical years of Russia's development using the example of one of the largest multi-ethnic and multi-confessional regions.

Numerous works on the history of revolutions and civil war characterize and analyze the position and activities of various political forces in resolving the national question using the example of the events of the first 20th anniversary of the 20th century. and subsequent development in the USSR. For example, S.V. Loskutov, in his Ph.D. thesis, gave a general description of the development of the Mari people and the formation of their statehood throughout the 20th century. In his opinion, after the overthrow of the autocracy on the territory of the Mari region, dual power did not develop, since both the public security committees and the Soviets became advisory bodies under the commissioners of the Provisional Government, but the alienation between the authorities and the people persisted and grew, and as a result, already in July 1917. At the First All-Russian Congress of Mari in the city of Birsk, decisions were made to change the administrative-territorial structure taking into account the national composition of the population, which meant the birth of the autonomist movement.

Under the influence of the Bolshevik Party, Loskutov believes, from the autumn of 1917 to the spring of 1918, the national movement developed towards the radicalization of demands, and in February 1918, at the National Congress of the Mari, a program was introduced that provided for the creation of the Mari Commissariat under the Kazan Provincial Council and the Mari department People's Commissar. The implementation of these provisions was the most important factor, the author believes, in ensuring the “triumphant march of Soviet power” in the Mari region (49).

Priority attention when analyzing national issues during the years of the revolution and the Civil War is given to the Bolshevik party. In particular, M. L. Bichuch considers the slogan of self-determination tactical for the Bolsheviks and notes that the path and methods of solving the national question were understood by them locally differently: the Ural Bolsheviks, for example, emphasized not the national, but the economic principle of building a federation . However, in general, a consistent class approach, orientation towards world revolution, ethnocentrism, despite deviations from it in the practice of state building of autonomies and some confederalist ideas of V.I. Lenin, laid the foundations for the collapse of the USSR.

If in the 20s, Bichuch believes, the authorities pursued a more or less cautious policy of bringing peoples closer together, then under I.V. Stalin, violence and bureaucratization triumphed, and the Constitution of 1977 mothballed the Soviet model, moreover, in the republics of the 70s. e years Authoritarian-nationalist regimes emerged. As indicated in the work, the ethnic form of organization in a multinational state, despite its simplicity, is conflicting in the sense of the tasks of political consolidation, and empires (obviously, the author considers the federal USSR to be an empire) should be replaced by a commonwealth of peoples (50).

Researcher of national and cultural construction in the RSFSR in 1917-1925. T. Yu. Krasovitskaya drew attention to the sociocultural factors of national policy in Russia after the October Revolution. It emphasizes the important role of historical traditions that connected many regions of the country, the coexistence of a number of distinctive and autonomous centers in the historical and cultural sense, the incompleteness of the ethnogenesis of many peoples despite the presence of real statehood in a number of them, the diversity of legal frameworks and historical circumstances of the entry of peoples into the Russian Empire.

According to Krasovitskaya, the revolution aggravated the cultural “centrifugality” of peoples historically inherent in Russia, some of whom (Poles, Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Armenians, etc.) had a developed spiritual infrastructure, high level national identity and experience of state organization. This has led to a discrepancy in ideas about the direction of civilizational processes to one or another transformation program, especially regarding the ways and means of their implementation. Krasovitskaya believes that this is confirmed by the separation and reunification of the statehood of Finland, Poland, and later the Baltic countries close to the European level of development, and the creation of independent Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia. She rightly notes that the complex issue of the Russian people’s reproduction of the declaration of the rights of peoples to freedom, sovereignty and the formation of independent states has not yet been sufficiently studied, that the Russian ethnos and its spiritual and cultural sphere as a result of the revolution were split by an orientation toward revolutionary and religious ideas.

Krasovitskaya briefly highlighted specific examples of solving the national question using the example of a number of peoples within the RSFSR (Kazakhs, Buryats, Altaians, etc.) and emphasized that the Bolshevik Party in this process took little into account or was even nihilistic about the specifics national traditions. In the initial period, in her opinion, Soviet workers pursued not a policy, but a political response to historical conditions and circumstances. In an effort to make the Russian community of peoples a successor to the European model of a rational structure, they did not take into account the national systems of perception and understanding of the picture of the world, as well as the correspondence of their own ideas to reality (51). Unfortunately, so far the fruitful ideas expressed by Krasovitskaya regarding the influence of ethno-confessional, ethno-cultural and ethno-psychological factors on national policy have not been sufficiently developed in the historiography of the national question, especially using the example of the RSFSR.

In general, summing up some general results of the development of research on the problems of national policy in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. over the past 15 years, it should be emphasized that positive changes have occurred in this regard. The geography of research centers and the subject field have expanded significantly scientific analysis. Many documentary and monographic publications appeared, including not only in the capitals, but also in large regions - the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia, and the North Caucasus. When analyzing the political history of the country 1900-1917. scientists are paying more and more attention not only to political doctrines, ideological and theoretical developments of representatives and leaders of leading political parties on national problems, but also to the direct activities of various public, state and other forces and structures in this direction. The greatest attention is paid to socio-political parties and movements of an all-Russian and regional nature.

At the same time, the following question is much less actively studied: how state authorities and self-government bodies in the Center and locally solved the problems of modernizing the system of meeting the economic, social, spiritual, religious needs of Russian ethnic groups, forms of government and administrative-territorial organization of the Russian geopolitical space in connections with the growing ones at the beginning of the 20th century. objective needs of democratization of statehood. Only on the example of the State Duma of Russia has this important aspect been analyzed quite successfully recently, but many others remain outside the field of view of scientists - the role and activities of the government and State Council, systems of local authorities and self-government, primarily in the national regions of the empire, the interaction of central and local (regional) bodies and institutions in ensuring a balance of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies and controllability by a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional power, etc.

The process of studying national politics during the years of the revolution and the Civil War is developing noticeably more successfully and fruitfully. In fact, using the example of all the largest national regions of the former Russian Empire, scientists show how and in what specific forms the development of national movements took place, what “models” and projects for solving national problems were developed and tested in practice in connection with the collapse of imperial statehood and the search for an optimal form state structure of the new Russia.

The general conclusion of historians is that the majority of the peoples of Russia have no separatist sentiments and programs and the enormous popularity of the idea of ​​​​creating a Russian democratic federal republic, in which all the peoples of the former outskirts could have opportunities for comprehensive and full-fledged national progress, integration into the all-Russian civilizational space with the least losses.

Research in recent years has shown the differences in the policies of the main forces opposing the Civil War - the Reds and the Whites - in the field of state national policy. Despite the fact that, ultimately, the majority of national movements and the peoples of Russia went over to the side of the Soviet government and the Bolsheviks, who most decisively advocated the self-determination of peoples, this process was not simple and easy. This conclusion is consistent with many studies today. Specific historical contradictions and the content of the process of recognition of the Soviet version of national policy by national movements and organizations are identified and traced.

At the same time, as follows from works on the history of anti-Bolshevism and the White movement in Russia, the anti-Soviet forces had a fairly large potential for a democratic solution to national problems, actively and successfully used the form of cultural-national autonomy rejected by the Bolsheviks, namely in the spiritual and cultural sphere, much more carefully approached the issue of continuity in the organization of the system of management and self-government at the local level. However, the predominance of chauvinistic and especially monarchical sentiments in the ranks of the whites to varying degrees in different centers of anti-Bolshevism predetermined the general collapse of the white movement as a whole.

Continuation of research in these directions should contribute to a more in-depth and accurate, objective and comprehensive analysis of the entire complex of the most important and complex issues in the history of Russian national policy at the beginning of the 20th century, identifying alternatives to the historical process, positive and negative aspects of the past, relevant aspects in modern conditions, when problems of ensuring interethnic harmony and the effectiveness of the Russian government must be resolved in accordance with the new challenges of the 21st century.

As noted earlier, in a climate of discontent and crisis, a tendency to bring together anti-right republican forces into a single association - the Popular Front - begins to appear. Republicans and radicals as well as socialists, communists and autonomists come to the conclusion that to preserve the republic and all constitutional guarantees, a broad coalition of anti-government forces is necessary. Numerous negotiations are beginning to create such a coalition.

Just on December 30, 1935, another government crisis broke out. A few days later, the President of the Republic N. Alcala Zamora dissolved the Cortes and scheduled new elections for February 16, 1936. A very convenient opportunity to create and unite an anti-right coalition. The culmination of this process can be called the signing on January 15 of the so-called “Electoral Pact of the Left Parties” - the official name of the document that went down in history as the “Popular Front Pact”. This document represented the official jointly developed program of the Popular Front.

The pact was signed by representatives on behalf of left-wing parties, namely the Republican Left Party, the Republican Union and Socialist Party» "UGT", "National Federation of Socialist Youth" "CPI", "Syndicalist Party" "POUM", "Esquerra Catalana" and "BNP". The program included, in particular: "granting a broad amnesty to political prisoners arrested after November 1933, hiring those who were fired for their political beliefs, protecting freedom and the rule of law." It was also envisaged to improve the situation of the peasantry. In order to protect national industry, a requirement was put forward to pursue a policy of protectionism and take the necessary measures to support small industry and trade.

Regarding the national issue, the program briefly stated: “All peoples of Spain have the right to receive cultural and political autonomy following the example of Catalonia without any restrictions. We believe that in the current situation it would be blasphemy to ignore the rights of the peoples of Spain to obtain cultural and political autonomy. Just as Catalonia once did in 1932, other regions of Spain, primarily the Basque Country and Galicia, should receive their own autonomous statutes.”

With such a program, the Popular Front, which united the majority of parties, went to the general elections, which took place on February 16, 1936. Contrary to all expectations, the victory was won not by the right, but by the Popular Front. Of the 473 seats in the Cortes, the Popular Front received 283, the right - 132, the center - 42. The results of the nationalist parties were as follows: Esquerra Catalana received 21 seats in the Cortes, the Regionalist League - 12, the BNP - 9, the Galician parties - 3, "Farmers' Union" - 2, "Party of Catalan Workers" - 1.

Thus, the Popular Front was significantly ahead of its opponents in Madrid, Bilbao, Seville, in other words in Castile, the Basque Country, Catalonia, i.e. in industrial regions and those areas where the national issue was especially acute.

Based on the voting results, we can come to the following conclusion: the election results showed the division of the country into 2 camps, the camp supporting the Republic and the camp supporting right-wing monarchists, fascists and center parties. This state of affairs did not suit either one or the other. The military is already preparing new protests against the coalition government. The central government of the Popular Front was ready to defend the right to power it had won.

And already in the spring of 1936, the political situation in the country became very tense: various rallies and demonstrations were held, as well as various types of strikes. Thus, on February 28, a rally was held in Madrid in support of the Popular Front, which was attended, according to various sources, by over 100 thousand people. A similar rally, but in support of the right, took place in Bilbao; according to various sources, 20 thousand people attended it.

In such a tense political and social situation, the first government after the elections on February 16 was formed, headed by M. Azaña, which also included one representative of Esquerra Catalana. It is also worth noting that Azaña’s government did not include two major political forces - the PSOE and the PKI, which by that time had significantly strengthened its position. Representatives of the PSOE in particular stated: “Since the country faces the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, then the government should be represented only by bourgeois parties.” Nevertheless, the “bourgeois” government enjoyed the full support of both the PSOE and the PKI, since they declared their firm intention to implement the electoral program of the Popular Front.

The position of the CPI on the national issue was determined in accordance with the program guidelines of the patria. Since its creation in 1921, the PCI has stood on the "principle of recognizing the demands of the autonomists of Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia." This principle was one of the most important tasks that the CPI set for itself in the 20s. XX century, namely: “Defend truly national movements, and not attack them, as did the socialist leaders who supported the power of the oppressors led by the Madrid government.” In the 30s The CPI did not deviate from its principles and program guidelines, still declaring that “only the close connection of the Communist Party with the vast majority of the country’s population was the basis for the success of its policy in strengthening the Popular Front.”

Another party that, together with the PCI, is becoming a significant political force is the “Spanish Phalanx and HON” by J. A. Primo de Rivera. The leading idea of ​​this party was the achievement of “the unity of the fatherland, torn apart by separatist movements, inter-party contradictions and class struggle,” and the political ideal was a “new state” - “an effective, authoritarian instrument in the service of the unity of the Motherland.”

As noted by the researcher of Spanish fascism S.P. Pozharsky’s “ideological preparation of the majority of the phalangists was very primitive and boiled down to ultranationalism and hatred of the “leftists” and separatists, i.e. supporters of autonomy for Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The phalanx has always emphasized national character his party."

Unlike the right-wing parties, the phalanx marched under the slogan of the “national revolution,” the essence of which was revealed in its program - in the so-called “26 points,” drawn up in November 1934 personally by J. A. Primo de Rivera. She, in particular, demanded the establishment of a new order and called for a “struggle against the existing order” through a national revolution. The first section of this program, entitled “Nation, Unity, Empire,” painted with energetic strokes the image of the future greatness of Falangist Spain: “We believe in the highest reality of Spain. The first collective task of all Spaniards is to strengthen, elevate and exalt the nation. All individual, group and class interests must be unconditionally subordinated to the fulfillment of this task.”

Also in the second paragraph it was stated: “Spain is an indivisible destiny. Any conspiracy against this indivisible whole is disgusting. Any separatism is a crime that we will not forgive. The present Constitution, since it encourages the disintegration of the country, is an insult to the united nature of Spanish destiny. Therefore, we demand its immediate recall."

As for the military, who shared the views of the phalanx and accordingly joined it, they, as ardent centralists, stood up for the territorial integrity of the country and the national unity of the Spaniards. These two postulates were fundamental in the ideas of the future ruler of Spain, General F. Franco.

Another reason for the military to act on the side of the right forces was the fact that the Republican governments from 1931 to 1936, on whose side in particular were all the political forces of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country, made blunder after blunder in their attitude towards the Spanish armed forces.

The military reform, hasty and offensive to the overwhelming majority of the officer corps, did not bring positive dividends to the Republicans on the part of the army. The reformers, being purely civil people, did not take into account the mentality, traditions and value orientations Spanish military. They could not fully understand that the fundamental value, the constant interest of the army in the socio-political life of the country at all its stages of historical development was the preservation of the integrity of Spain, its state sovereignty, and not the desire for political leadership and complete independence from society.

As long as these core values ​​of the Spanish military were not threatened, they unquestioningly carried out their duty and the orders of the Republican government. The suppression of the uprising of General Sanjurjo in 1932, the Asturian Revolution and the Catalan uprising in 1934 took place on the direct orders of the Republican leaders with the active participation of the Spanish army.

The political weakness of the republican leadership of Spain objectively determined for the army decisive role in the life of the state, ensuring its internal unity and stability. The use of military units by the Republican governments to forcibly suppress various unrest and uprisings destroyed among army officers respect for the constitutional institutions of society and its laws, presenting pragmatism as the best way to carry out domestic policy.

The Church, which was one of the four pillars of traditional Spanish society, expressed its position on the national issue according to the basic tenets Catholic Church Spain: "Religion, One Nation, Family, Order, Labor and Property".

Also in the “Joint Address of the Spanish Bishops to the Bishops of the World,” it was stated: “It was the legislators in 1931 and then the executive power of the state and the traitors and traitors of Catalonia who supported it, suddenly giving our history a direction completely contrary to the nature and needs of the national spirit, and especially the religious feelings prevailing in the country. The Constitution and the secular laws deriving from its spirit” - here in particular we are talking about the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia - “have been a sharp, ongoing challenge to the national conscience. The Spanish nation, which for the most part retained the living faith of its ancestors, endured with admirable patience all the insults inflicted on its conscience by dishonorable laws.”

However, in the Basque Country, priests, who were very often natives of this region and faced daily manifestations of Basque nationalism, maintained good relations with the population. A similar situation arose in Catalonia, where, despite militant anti-clericalism, rural parish priests, who interacted with the peasants on a daily basis, did not remain indifferent to national feelings.

But let's move on to the government, which began to implement the pre-election program guidelines of the Popular Front. At the end of April 1936, it solemnly proclaimed “the right of all peoples of Spain to have their own autonomous government.”

This meant that areas that had not previously received autonomous governance (Galicia and the Basque Country) could count on receiving autonomy.

Catalonia was returned to its autonomous status. A new Catalan government was also formed, headed by L. Companys.

Galicia finally receives permission from the central government to hold a referendum on the approval of the statute of autonomy. It took place on June 28, 1936. 1,000,963 people took part in it, of which 993,351 people expressed their consent (i.e. 99.23%), 6,161 people (i.e. 0.61%) were against.

Galicia spoke out in favor of an autonomous statute, which was still developed in 1932, but due to political debates was not even discussed by the Cortes. Finally, it was accepted by the resolution of the Cortes on July 15, 1936. The text of the statute was identical to the Catalan one, and proclaimed the same freedoms in regional politics, in relations with the central government.

But Galicia will be able to exist in the long-awaited autonomy for only a few days because... The Civil War begins and the Francoists who came here will abolish all the democratic freedoms gained during the years of the Republic.

Thus, Spain approached the most tragic stage in its history - the Civil War. Over the course of three years, it will decide whether there will be a Republic or not, and whether Catalonia, the Basque Star and Galicia will be able to maintain their autonomous rights.

After all, the republic, won in the elections of February 16, represented a form of government that gave the people a real opportunity to follow the path of freedom, peace and social equality. Realizing their powerlessness to reverse the democratic development of Spain by legal means, right-wing forces, fascists, military and church clerics decided to resort to violence, starting preparations for an armed uprising against the Republic.

The country at that point in time was following the path of gradual fascisation of social and political life - the Phalanx and KHONS attracted more and more supporters. The victory of the Popular Front was an important achievement for the republic and a complete failure for the right-wing parties.

Thus, the country gradually moved towards an armed uprising of the losers, which was destined to escalate into a Civil War.

It all started on July 17, when military garrisons in the Spanish zone of Morocco rebelled against the republic. Then, on July 18, the military rebelled in the main garrisons and cities of the country. Events developed with lightning speed. The army rebelled against the Republic. Bloody battles began in all cities, storming city municipalities and administrative buildings with the aim of seizing power in the city; executions and executions on both sides. What began as a military mutiny of a group of soldiers and officers, with the aim of overthrowing the existing government, from that moment on escalated into a bloody Civil War.

Two main opposing camps collided in it: the military and the fascists who joined them, who sought the overthrow of the Republic and the government, as well as the return of the old order, and representatives of the Popular Front, who advocated the preservation of democratic freedoms and the republic.

As for the three regions in question, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, they found themselves in different situations at the beginning of the war. If Galicia, having shown significant resistance, was captured seven days after the start of the rebellion, then in Catalonia and the Basque Country, local authorities represented by the governments of L. Companys (in Catalonia) and J.M. Aguirre (in the Basque Country) were able to resist the rebel military and prevent them from seizing power in the region.

Gradually the situation stabilized. The rebels managed to hold their positions in the southern provinces, as well as in Galicia, Navarre, and Aragon.

Thus, from the very beginning of the Civil War, Galicia lost all hope of recognition of its national identity, its linguistic peculiarities, as well as the right to self-government of its territories. Galicia was now part of the “new”, unified Spanish state as a regional province.

A different situation developed at the beginning of the war in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Here, having eliminated the hotbeds of military rebels and fascists, they were in no hurry for large-scale transformations and actions. From the very beginning of the war, the Catalan government chose the tactic of non-intervention, i.e. Catalonia sought to secede from Spain and thereby remove itself from the fight against fascism. For this reason, the Catalan government often sabotaged the orders of the central government.

Basque nationalists took more moderate positions than in Catalonia. After all, in the fall of 1936, the Cortes were supposed to consider the issue of gaining autonomy for the Basque Country. And in view of the fact that there were a significant number of adherents of fascism on the territory of the Basque Country, the Cortes did not hesitate.

In October 1936, after many years of anticipation (the draft statute was prepared back in 1933, but was not adopted because the right-wing centrists came to power), the draft Basque Autonomous Statute was approved, according to which a new government was formed headed by H. A. Aguirre.

According to the text of the statute of autonomy, the Basque Country received the right: “to have its own regional parliament and regional government; to recognize the Basque language as an official language along with Spanish; for the execution of civil justice, with the exception of cases related to a military tribunal; on the appointment of judges to local courts; to manage the education system and develop national culture; for leadership in the field of transport and logistics; to lead the civil fleet and aviation; to manage local media, etc.” .

Based on the above, it can be recognized that the Basque Country enjoyed significant independence in financial, social and cultural matters.

However, the Basque Country was not able to enjoy its success for long. Already in June 1937, under the pressure of superior Franco forces, as well as with significant support from German aircraft and tanks, the Basque resistance was broken. After this, the Basque Autonomous Government emigrated first to Barcelona, ​​and when it was captured in February 1939 to France.

Here, as in Galicia, significant changes have occurred. The attitude towards the two Basque provinces of Biscay and Gipuzkoa, which fought against the Francoists on the side of the Republic, was based on a decree unprecedented in legal practice (dated June 28, 1937). According to the text of this decree, the provinces of Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa were declared “traitor provinces.” Unlike other provinces that also fought for the Republic, where traitors were severely punished but the provinces were not declared traitors, Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa were now considered hostile territories and therefore had to undergo extensive changes in order to meet the demands of the new authorities.

Based on this, the Basque Country set a course for including the region in the newly created unitary state, and for this purpose autonomy was abolished, political parties, trade unions and cultural organizations that preached the identity of the Basque people were dissolved. The Basque language was banned. Office work and training were conducted only in Spanish. The population was prohibited from calling their children Basque names, singing Basque songs, or displaying the “icurrinho” - the Basque flag. In this regard, the statement of the military governor of the province of Alava, appointed by F. Franco, is interesting: “Basque nationalism must be destroyed, trampled, uprooted.”

Indeed, echoing this statement, hundreds of people were arrested and shot in the Basque Country. According to various sources, 100-150 thousand Basques fled the country to avoid repression and violence.

As for Catalonia, which was one of the last to suffer defeat and was captured by the Francoists, the situation was somewhat different. As mentioned earlier, Catalonia wanted to secede from Spain, and thereby not participate in the Civil War.

This position did not suit the central government, which did not want to lose a region so rich in industrial, financial and human resources in such a difficult war.

On this occasion, the President of the Spanish Republic M. Azaña in particular noted: “The generality is captivating public services and appropriates the functions of the state in order to achieve a separate peace. He makes laws in areas that are not within his competence, and manages what he is not authorized to manage. The double result of all this is that the Generalitat is busy with matters that have nothing to do with it, and that it will all end in anarchy. A rich, densely populated, industrious region with powerful industrial potential is thus paralyzed for military operations.”

Another stumbling block was Catalonia's refusal to place its troops under command General Staff army, as well as demanding the honorable right to form their own army.

But the realities, as well as the situation at the front, were different, and Catalonia still had to enter the war. The lack of coordination of actions still made itself felt. However, Catalonia managed to hold out for two years. Only on December 23, 1938, when a large-scale Franco offensive began, Catalonia fell. On January 26, 1939, the capital of the region, Barcelona, ​​was occupied by the Francoists. And two months later, on March 28, Franco entered Madrid, thereby finally conquering the entire territory of Spain.

One remarkable document has also remained in history - one of the last ones relating to the work of the last republican government of J. Negrin - this is the so-called program for the peaceful reconstruction of Spain, called the “13 points”. For us, this document is important because it contained the following: “In the event of the end of the war, the peoples of Spain are recognized as having the right to create full-fledged autonomies within the framework of the Spanish Republic.”

But, unfortunately, this was not destined to happen. The Republic fell, and was replaced by the fascist dictatorship of F. Franco, which does not recognize any autonomy, and this period will be called by contemporaries as a period of “national stagnation”, when the supreme power will not notice the originality and originality, the cultural diversity of the Spanish nation, and “ stifle" the national interests of their regions.

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Nation-state building 1917-1922. Education USSR

Introduction

1. The end of the Civil War and the national question

2. The struggle within the Bolshevik Party on the issue of the state structure of the country

3. Education of the USSR

4. Constitution of the USSR 1924

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

Throughout its thousand-year history, Russia has been and remains a multinational state in which, one way or another, it was necessary to resolve interethnic contradictions. During the period of the Russian Empire, this problem was solved quite simply: all residents of the country, regardless of nationality, were subjects of the Sovereign Emperor of All Russia, the Tsar of Little and White Russia, etc., etc. However, by the beginning of the 20th century. - this formula no longer suits anyone. And in 1917, the huge multinational empire was blown up by the contradictions that tore it apart.

Having won the Civil War, the Bolsheviks under the leadership of V.I. Lenin was also faced with the need to somehow solve the problem of state-territorial structure and the national question. It cannot be said that the most optimal option was chosen. On the contrary, the basis of the new union state was laid as a kind of “time bomb”, which, in conditions of crisis - already at the turn of the 1980-1990s. blew up the Union.

And here it is important to note that in many ways these problems have not been resolved and continue to be present in the government structure of the Russian Federation. Of course, the current authorities are trying to solve these problems, but it is obvious that this will take more than one decade. Therefore, turning to the history of the creation of the USSR and its constitutional foundations is still relevant today.

1. Completion of Citizenswhat war and the national question

At the end of the civil war (1917-1921), the territory of the country was, especially on the outskirts, a conglomerate of various state and national-state entities, the status of which was determined by many factors: the movement of the fronts, the state of affairs on the ground, the strength of local separatist and national movements. As the Red Army occupied strongholds in various territories, the need arose to streamline the national-state structure. There has been no consensus among the Bolshevik leadership about what it should be like since the party discussions on the national question Boffa J. History Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1994. P. 173. .

Thus, a significant part of the Bolsheviks generally ignored the idea of ​​national self-determination, relying entirely on “proletarian internationalism” and advocating a unitary state; their slogan is “Down with the border!”, put forward by G.L. Pyatakov. Others supported the so-called “self-determination of workers” (Bukharin and others). Lenin took a more cautious position. Rejecting the idea of ​​“cultural-national autonomy” adopted in the programs of a number of social democratic parties in the West, he raised the question of the form of national self-determination desired by the Bolsheviks depending on specific historical conditions and on how the “revolutionary struggle of the proletariat” would develop. At the same time, at first Lenin’s sympathies were obvious: he was a supporter of a centralist state and the autonomy of the peoples living in it. However, realizing the complexity of the problem, Lenin insisted on a special analysis of it, which should be entrusted to a representative of national minorities. Consolidation in the party for I.V. Stalin's role as a specialist on the national question was apparently due to the fact that his “developments” closely coincided with the thoughts of Lenin himself. In his work “Marxism and the National Question,” Stalin gave a definition of a nation, which largely still exists today, and came to the unequivocal conclusion about the need for regional autonomy in Russia for Poland, Finland, Ukraine, Lithuania, and the Caucasus.

Having headed the People's Commissariat for National Affairs (Narkomnats) after the revolution, Stalin essentially changed his position little. He stood for the creation within Russia of the largest possible independent state associations, taking into account their national specifics, although he viewed the formation of such conglomerates as a solution to purely temporary problems, preventing the growth of nationalist sentiments Recent history Fatherland. Ed. A.F. Kiseleva. T. 1. M., 2001. P. 390. .

At the same time, the revolution and the practice of nation-state building “from below” in the period 1917-1918. showed that the importance of the national question for Russia was clearly underestimated by the Bolsheviks. Lenin was one of the first to note this when analyzing data on the elections to the Constituent Assembly.

A number of territories, led by national governments, fell away from Russia altogether. In the territories under Bolshevik control, the principle of a federal structure was established, although in the turbulent events of wartime there was no time to resolve national problems.

Nevertheless, the relations between the “independent” republics were formalized through special treaties and agreements (in the field of military, economic, diplomatic, etc.). During the period 1919--1921. a whole series of such agreements were signed, which provided for joint defense activities in the field of economic activity, diplomacy. According to the agreements, there was a partial unification of government bodies, which did not, however, provide for the subordination of the highest and central bodies of the Soviet republics to a single center and a single policy. In the conditions of strict centralization inherent in the period of “war communism,” conflicts and tensions constantly arose between central and local authorities. The problem was also that among the communists themselves, especially locally, nationalist and separatist sentiments were very noticeable, and local leaders constantly sought to raise the status of their national-state formations, which were not finally established. All these contradictions, the struggle between unifying and separatist tendencies could not but have an impact when the Bolsheviks, having moved on to peaceful construction, set about defining the national state structure.

In the territory where Soviet power was established by 1922, the ethnic composition, despite the change in borders, remained very diverse. 185 nations and nationalities lived here (according to the 1926 census). True, many of them represented either “scattered” national communities, or insufficiently defined ethnic formations, or specific branches of other ethnic groups. For the unification of these peoples into a single state, there undoubtedly were objective preconditions that had deep historical, economic, political and cultural foundations. The formation of the USSR was not only an act of the Bolshevik leadership imposed from above. This was at the same time a process of unification, supported “from below” by Boffa J. History of the Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1994. P. 175. .

From the moment various peoples entered Russia and annexed new territories to it, no matter what representatives of national movements say today, they were objectively bound by a common historical destiny, migrations took place, mixing of the population took place, a single economic fabric of the country took shape, based on the division of labor between the territories, a common transport network, a postal and telegraph service were created, an all-Russian market was formed, cultural, linguistic and other contacts were established. There were factors that hindered the unification: the Russification policy of the old regime, restrictions and restrictions on the rights of individual nationalities. The relationship between centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, which today are fighting with renewed vigor in the territory former USSR, is determined by a combination of many circumstances: the duration of the joint “residence” of different peoples, the presence of a compactly populated territory, the number of nations, the strength of the “cohesion” of their ties, the presence and absence of their statehood in the past, traditions, the uniqueness of the way of life, the national spirit, etc. At the same time, it is hardly possible to draw an analogy between Russia and the colonial empires that existed in the past and call the former, following the Bolsheviks, a “prison of nations.” The differences characteristic of Russia are striking: the integrity of the territory, the multi-ethnic nature of its settlement, peaceful predominantly popular colonization, the absence of genocide, historical kinship and the similarity of the fate of individual peoples. The formation of the USSR also had its own political background - the need for the joint survival of the created political regimes in the face of a hostile external environment Gordetsky E.N. The birth of the Soviet state. 1917-1920. M, 1987. P. 89. .

2. The struggle within the Bolshevik party on the issue of the statennom structure of the country

To develop the most rational forms of nation-state building, a special commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was created, which from the very beginning had differences with the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. Stalin and his supporters (Dzerzhinsky, Ordzhonikidze, etc.) were mostly from among the so-called “Russopetov”, i.e. persons of non-Russian nationality, who had lost touch with their national environment, but acted as defenders of the interests of Russia, put forward the idea of ​​autonomization of the Soviet republics. Cases when precisely such groups proclaim themselves bearers of great power represent a curious psychological phenomenon of human history.

Already at the X Congress of the RCP (b), which marked the transition to the NEP, Stalin, speaking with the main report on the national question, argued that the Russian Federation is the real embodiment of the desired form of state union of republics. It should be added that it was the People's Commissariat of Nationalities in 1919-1921. was engaged in the construction of most of the autonomies within the RSFSR, determining their borders and status, often through administration in the wake of haste and thoughtlessness. (1918 - German Volga Labor Commune; 1919 - Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; 1920 - Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Karelian Labor Commune. Chuvash Autonomous Okrug, Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Votskaya (Udmurt) Autonomous Okrug, Mari and Kalmyk Autonomous Okrug, Dagestan and Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (on its basis a number of other autonomies were later created); 1921 - Komi (Zyryan) Autonomous Okrug, Kabardian Autonomous Okrug, Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.)

The decision of the congress on the national question was drawn up taking into account the opinions expressed. It emphasized the expediency and flexibility of the existence of various types of federations: those based on contractual relations, on autonomy and intermediate levels between them. However, Stalin and his supporters were not at all inclined to take criticism of their position into account. This was clearly manifested in the process of nation-state building in Transcaucasia.

Transcaucasia was a complex set of national relations and contradictions that had survived from ancient times. This region required a particularly sensitive and balanced approach. The period of existence here in previous years of local national governments, swept away by the Red Army and local Bolsheviks, also left a certain mark on the consciousness of the population. Georgia, for example, during the period of its independent existence in 1918-1921. has established quite extensive connections with outside world. Its economy had rather peculiar features: weak industry, but a very noticeable role of small-scale production and small traders. The influence of the local intelligentsia was strong. Therefore, some Bolshevik leaders, and above all Lenin, believed that special tactics were needed in relation to Georgia, which did not exclude, in particular, an acceptable compromise with the government of Noah Jordania or similar Georgian Mensheviks, who were not absolutely hostile to the establishment of the Soviet system in Georgia. the history of homeland. Ed. A.F. Kiseleva. T. 1. M., 2001. P. 395. .

Meanwhile, nation-state building in the region ended with the creation of the Transcaucasian Federation (TCFSR), but the interests of the population of individual republics and national territories were trampled upon. According to the agreement of 1922, the republics transferred their rights to the Union Transcaucasian Conference and its executive body - the Union Council in the field of foreign policy, military affairs, finance, transport, communications and the Russian Foreign Ministry. Otherwise, the republican executive bodies remained independent. Thus, a model of unification was developed, which soon had to undergo a test of strength in connection with the resolution of the issue of relations between the Transcaucasian Federation and the RSFSR.

In August 1922, to implement the idea of ​​​​unifying the Soviet republics in the center, a special commission was formed under the chairmanship of V.V. Kuibyshev, but the most active role in it belonged to Stalin. According to the project he drew up, it was envisaged that all republics would join the RSFSR with autonomous rights. The draft sent out to the localities caused a storm of objections, but it was approved by the commission itself.

Further events are characterized by Lenin's intervention. This was, perhaps, the last active attempt by the party leader, who, under the influence of illness, was gradually withdrawing from leadership, to influence the course of state affairs. Lenin's position on unification was unclear and insufficiently defined, but it is obvious that he was an opponent of the Stalinist project. He instructed his deputy L.B. to “correct the situation.” Kamenev, who, however, did not have firm convictions on the national issue. The project he compiled took into account Lenin’s wishes and, rejecting the idea of ​​autonomization, provided for a contractual method of state unification of the republics. In this form, it was supported by the party plenum of Boff J. History of the Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1994. P. 180. .

Meanwhile, the history of the conflict continued. In October 1922, the party leaders of Georgia announced their resignation as they disagreed with the terms of joining a single state through the Transcaucasian Federation, considering it unviable (which, however, was later confirmed) and insisting on a separate formalization of the agreement with Georgia. The head of the Regional Committee, Ordzhonikidze, became furious, threatened the Georgian leaders with all sorts of punishments, called them chauvinistic rot, saying that in general he was tired of babysitting old men with gray beards. Moreover, when one of the workers of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia called him a Stalinist donkey, Ordzhonikidze brought his fist down on his face. The story received wide publicity and is known in literature as the “Georgian incident.” It to some extent characterizes the morals prevailing in the party leadership at that time. The commission created to examine the “incident” under the chairmanship of Dzerzhinsky justified the actions of the Regional Committee and condemned the Georgian Central Committee Boffa J. History of the Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1994. P. 181. .

civil Bolshevik constitution national

3. Education of the USSR

On December 30, 1922, at the Congress of Soviets, where delegations from the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus and the Trans-SFSR were represented, the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was proclaimed. The Union was built on a model developed in Transcaucasia. The corresponding Declarations and Agreement were adopted. The Declaration indicated the reasons and principles of unification. The Treaty defined the relationships between the republics forming the union state. Formally, it was established as a federation of sovereign Soviet republics with the preservation of the right of free secession and open access to it. However, a “free exit” mechanism was not provided. Issues of foreign policy, foreign trade, finance, defense, communications, and communications were transferred to the competence of the Union. The rest was considered the responsibility of the union republics. The supreme body of the country was declared to be the All-Union Congress of Soviets, and in the intervals between its convocations, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which consisted of two chambers: the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities. In the entire history of the formation of the USSR, one cannot help but pay attention to the fact that party functionaries, their whims and caprices, play a large role in all events. They put their actions into practice through intrigue and behind-the-scenes maneuvers. The role of representative bodies was reduced to approving decisions made not by them, but by party bodies. For a long time it was believed that with Lenin’s intervention it was possible to achieve the elimination of incorrect attitudes from the point of view of solving the national question from the Bolshevik practice, and the straightening of the Stalinist line. Amirbekov S. On the question of the constitutionality of the Russian system at the beginning of the 20th century. // Law and Life. -1999. - No. 24. P. 41. .

On the day when the formation of the union state took place, Lenin’s work “On the Question of Nationalities and Autonomization” was published. It shows Lenin’s dissatisfaction with the whole history connected with the formation of the USSR, Stalin’s untimely idea, which, in his opinion, “led the whole matter into a swamp.” However, Lenin’s efforts, his attempts to “deal with” the manifestations of Great Russian chauvinism and punish the perpetrators of the “Georgian incident” did not have any special consequences. The flow of events in the party rushed in the other direction and took place without Lenin’s participation. The struggle for his inheritance was already unfolding, in which the figure of Stalin increasingly appeared. It can be said that, having shown himself to be a supporter of a centralist state and harsh and crude administrative decisions in the national question, Stalin changed little in his attitude towards national politics, constantly emphasizing the danger of nationalist manifestations.

The Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, held in January 1924, in the mourning days associated with the death of Lenin, adopted the Union Constitution, which was based on the Declaration and the Treaty, and the rest of its provisions were based on the principles of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918, reflecting the situation of acute social confrontation. In 1924--1925 the constitutions of the union republics were adopted, basically repeating the provisions of the all-union Gordetsky E.N. The birth of the Soviet state. 1917-1920. M, 1987. P. 93. .

One of the first events carried out within the framework of the Union was the “national-state delimitation of Central Asia.” Until 1924, in the region, in addition to the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, formed back in 1918, there were two “people’s” Soviet republics - Bukhara and Khorezm, created after the Bolsheviks overthrew the Bukhara emir and the Khiva khan from the throne. The existing borders clearly did not correspond to the settlement of ethnic communities, which was extremely variegated and heterogeneous. The question of the national self-identification of peoples and the forms of their self-determination was not entirely clear. As a result of lengthy discussions of national issues at local congresses and kurultai and redrawing of borders, the Uzbek and Turkmen union republics were formed. As part of the Uzbek SSR, the autonomy of the Tajiks was allocated (later receiving the status of a union republic), and within it the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Okrug. Part of the territory of Central Asia was transferred to the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (which also later became a union republic). The Turkestan and Khorezm Karakalpaks formed their own joint-stock company, which became part of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and subsequently transferred to the Uzbek SSR as an autonomous republic. The Kirghiz formed their own autonomous republic, which became part of the RSFSR (later it was also transformed into a union republic). In general, the national-state demarcation of Central Asia allowed the region to gain stability and stability for some time, but the extreme patchwork of ethnic settlement did not allow the issue to be resolved in an ideal way, which created and continues to create a source of tension and conflict in this region Boffa J. History of the Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1994. P. 189. .

The emergence of new republics and autonomous regions also occurred in other regions of the country. In 1922, the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Okrug, the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Okrug (from 1923 - ASSR), the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Okrug, the Circassian (Adyghe) Autonomous Okrug, and the Chechen Autonomous Okrug were formed as part of the RSFSR. As part of the TSFSR, the Adjara Autonomous Region (1921) and the South Ossetian Autonomous Okrug (1922) were created on the territory of Georgia. Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia, two territories with a long-standing national conflict, were formalized in 1924 by an internal union treaty. As part of Azerbaijan, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1921, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug, populated predominantly by Armenians, was formed in 1923. In 1924, the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic arose on the territory of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dniester.

4. Constitution of the USSR 1924

An analysis of parts of the basic law shows that the main meaning of the USSR Constitution of 1924 is the constitutional consolidation of the formation of the USSR and the division of rights of the USSR and the union republics. The Constitution of the USSR of 1924 consisted of two sections: the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR and the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR.

The Declaration reflects the principles of voluntariness and equality in the unification of the republics into the USSR. Each union republic was given the right to freely secede from the USSR. The declaration, as it were, denoted the achievements of the young Soviet government. Constitutional law of Russia: Soviet constitutional law from 1918 to the Stalin Constitution // Allpravo.ru - 2003.

The Treaty secured the unification of the republics into one federal federal state. The following were subject to the jurisdiction of the USSR:

a) representation of the Union in international relations, conducting all diplomatic relations, concluding political and other agreements with other states;

b) changing the external borders of the Union, as well as resolving issues of changing borders between union republics;

c) concluding agreements on the admission of new republics to the Union;

d) declaration of war and conclusion of peace;

e) concluding external and internal loans of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and authorizing external and internal loans of the union republics;

f) ratification of international treaties;

g) management of foreign trade and establishment of a system of internal trade;

h) establishing the foundations and general plan of the entire national economy of the Union, identifying industries and individual industrial enterprises of national importance, concluding concession agreements, both all-Union and on behalf of the Union republics;

i) management of transport and postal and telegraph business;

j) organization and leadership of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

k) approval of the unified State budget of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which includes the budgets of the union republics; the establishment of all-Union taxes and revenues, as well as deductions from them and surcharges to them, going to the formation of the budgets of the Union republics; authorization of additional taxes and fees for the formation of the budgets of the union republics;

l) establishment of a unified monetary and credit system;

m) establishment of general principles of land management and land use, as well as the use of subsoil, forests and waters throughout the entire territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

o) all-Union legislation on inter-republican resettlement and the establishment of a resettlement fund;

o) establishing the fundamentals of the judicial system and legal proceedings, as well as civil and criminal legislation of the Union;

p) establishment of basic labor laws Constitutional law of Russia: Soviet constitutional law from 1918 to the Stalin Constitution // Allpravo.ru - 2003;

c) establishment of general principles in the field of public education;

r) establishment of general measures in the field of public health protection;

s) establishment of a system of weights and measures;

t) organization of all-Union statistics;

x) basic legislation in the field of Union citizenship in relation to the rights of foreigners;

v) the right of amnesty, extending to the entire territory of the Union;

w) repeal of resolutions of the congresses of Soviets and central executive committees of the union republics that violate this Constitution;

x) resolution of controversial issues arising between the Union republics.

Outside these limits, each union republic exercised its power independently. The territory of the union republics could not be changed without their consent. The Constitution established a single union citizenship for citizens of the union republics.

The supreme authority of the USSR, in accordance with Article 8 of the Constitution, was the Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The approval and amendment of the fundamental principles of the Constitution is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Congress of Soviets of the SSR was elected from city councils at the rate of 1 deputy per 25 thousand voters and from provincial or republican congresses of Soviets at the rate of 1 deputy per 125 thousand inhabitants. The Basic Law (Constitution) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. // Allpravo.ru - 2003. .

In accordance with Art. 11 of the Constitution, regular congresses of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are convened by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics once a year; extraordinary congresses are convened by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by its own decision, at the request of the Union Council, the Council of Nationalities, or at the request of two union republics.

In the period between congresses, the highest authority was the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which consisted of two equal chambers: the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities.

The Union Council was elected by the Congress of Soviets of the USSR from representatives of the union republics in proportion to the population of each in the amount of 414 people. They represented all union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and provinces. The Council of Nationalities was formed from representatives of the union and autonomous republics, 5 from each and one representative from the autonomous regions, and was approved by the Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The Constitution did not establish the quantitative composition of the Council of Nationalities. The Council of Nationalities, formed by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR, consisted of 100 people. The Union Council and the Council of Nationalities elected a Presidium to guide their work.

In accordance with Art. 16 of the Constitution, the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities considered all decrees, codes and resolutions coming to them from the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, individual people's commissariats of the Union, central executive committees of the Union republics, as well as those arising on the initiative of the Union Council and Council of Nationalities Basic Law (Constitution) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. // Allpravo.ru - 2003. .

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had the right to suspend or cancel decrees, resolutions and orders of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as congresses of Soviets and central executive committees of the union republics and other authorities on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Bills submitted for consideration by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics receive the force of law only if they are accepted by both the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities, and are published on behalf of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Article 22 of the Constitution).

In cases of disagreement between the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities, the issue was referred to the conciliation commission created by them.

If an agreement is not reached in the conciliation commission, the issue is transferred to a joint meeting of the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities, and, in the absence of a majority vote of the Union Council or the Council of Nationalities, the issue may be referred, at the request of one of these bodies, to the resolution of a regular or emergency congress Councils of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Article 24 of the Constitution) Constitutional law of Russia: Soviet constitutional law from 1918 to the Stalin Constitution // Allpravo.ru - 2003.

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR was not a permanent body, but convened at sessions three times a year. In the period between sessions of the USSR Central Executive Committee, the highest legislative, executive and administrative body of the USSR was the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee, elected at a joint meeting of the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities in the number of 21 people.

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR formed the Soviet government - the Council of People's Commissars. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was the executive and administrative body of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and in its work was responsible to it and its Presidium (Article 37 of the Constitution). The chapters on the highest bodies of the USSR enshrine the unity of legislative and executive power.

To manage the branches of public administration, 10 People's Commissariats of the USSR were created (Chapter 8 of the USSR Constitution of 1924): five all-Union (for foreign affairs, military and naval affairs, foreign trade, communications, mail and telegraphs) and five united (the Supreme Council of the National Economy , food, labor, finance and workers' and peasants' inspection). All-Union People's Commissariats had their representatives in the Union republics. The United People's Commissariats exercised leadership on the territory of the Union republics through the people's commissariats of the same name of the republics. In other areas, management was carried out exclusively by the union republics through the corresponding republican people's commissariats: agriculture, internal affairs, justice, education, health care, social security.

Of particular importance was the increase in the status of state security agencies. If in the RSFSR the State Political Administration (GPU) was a division of the NKVD, then with the creation of the USSR it acquired the constitutional status of a united people's commissariat - the OGPU of the USSR, which has its representatives in the republics. “In order to unite the revolutionary efforts of the union republics to combat political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry, a United State Political Administration (OGPU) is established under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the chairman of which is a member of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the right deliberative voice” (Article 61). Within the framework of the Constitution, a separate chapter 9 “On the United State Political Administration” is highlighted. Constitutional Law of Russia: Soviet Constitutional Law from 1918 to the Stalin Constitution // Allpravo.ru - 2003.

Conclusion

The acquisition of statehood by the peoples of the former Russian Empire had twofold consequences. On the one hand, it awakened national self-awareness, contributed to the formation and development of national cultures, and positive changes in the structure of the indigenous population. The status of these entities constantly increased, satisfying the growth of national ambitions. On the other hand, this process required an adequate, subtle and wise policy of the central union leadership, consistent with national revival. Otherwise, national feelings, driven inwards for the time being and their ignoring, concealed the potential danger of an explosion of nationalism in an unfavorable scenario. True, at that time the leadership thought little about this, generously carving up territories into individual state entities, even if the indigenous inhabitants did not make up the majority of the population, or easily transferring them “from hand to hand”, from one republic to another - another potential source of tension.

In the 1920s within the framework of national-state formations, the so-called policy of indigenization was carried out, which consisted of attracting national personnel to public administration. Many of the national institutions that were created did not have their own working class or any significant intelligentsia. Here the central leadership was forced to violate the principles of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in favor of national equality, attracting very heterogeneous elements to the leadership. This side of indigenization marked the beginning of the formation of local elites with their inherent national specifics. However, the center made a lot of efforts to keep these local leaders “in check,” not allowing excessive independence and mercilessly dealing with “national deviationists.” Another aspect of indigenization is cultural. It consisted of determining the status of national languages, creating a written language for those peoples who did not have it, building national schools, creating their own literature, art, etc. We must pay tribute: the state paid a lot of attention to helping peoples who were backward in the past, equalizing the levels of economic, social and cultural development of individual nations.

An analysis of the content of the Basic Law shows that the Constitution of the USSR of 1924 is unlike other Soviet constitutions. It does not contain characteristics of the social structure, there are no chapters on the rights and responsibilities of citizens, electoral law, local authorities and management. All this is reflected in the republican constitutions that were adopted somewhat later, including the new Constitution of the RSFSR of 1925.

Bibliography

1. Basic Law (Constitution) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. // Allpravo.ru - 2003

2. Avakyan S.A. Constitution of Russia: nature, evolution, modernity. M., 1997.

3. Amirbekov S. On the question of the constitutionality of the Russian system at the beginning of the 20th century. // Law and Life. -1999. - No. 24.

4. Boffa J. History of the Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1994.

5. Gordetsky E.N. The birth of the Soviet state. 1917-1920. - M, 1987.

6. History of Russia. XX century (edited by B. Leachman). - Ekaterinburg, 1994.

7. Carr E.. History of Soviet Russia. - M., 1990.

8. Constitutional law of Russia: Soviet constitutional law from 1918 to the Stalin Constitution // Allpravo.ru - 2003.

9. Korzhikhina G.P. The Soviet state and its institutions. November 1917 - December 1991. - M., 1995.

10. Kushnir A.G. The first Constitution of the USSR: on the 60th anniversary of its adoption. - M.: 1984.

11. Recent history of the Fatherland. Ed. A.F. Kiseleva. T. 1. M., 2001.

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Thesis

Puchenkov, Alexander Sergeevich

Academic degree:

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Place of thesis defense:

Saint Petersburg

HAC specialty code:

Speciality:

National history

Number of pages:

Chapter. 1. V.V. Shulgin and the national policy of the South Russian white movement

Chapter 1. 1. V.V. Shulgin and national politics Volunteer Army S. 17-27.

Chapter 1. 2. The origin of the Russian revolution and the Jewish question in the coverage of V.V. Shulgin P. 27-40.

Chapter 1. 3. V.V. Shulgin and the Jewish pogroms of the Volunteer Army P. 41-53.

Chapter 1. 4. V.V. Shulgin and the fight against “Ukrainianism” during the Civil War P. 54-71.

Chapter 2. The national question in the ideology and politics of the South Russian White movement during the Civil War

Chapter 2. 1. The national question in the ideology and politics of the South Russian White movement during the Civil War pp. 72-136.

Chapter 2. 2. Pogrom movement during the Civil War in Ukraine: general characteristics, analysis of causes, background pp. 136-152.

Chapter 2. 3. Jewish pogroms of the Volunteer Army P. 152-201.

Introduction of the dissertation (part of the abstract) On the topic "The national question in the ideology and politics of the South Russian White movement during the Civil War. 1917-1919."

The Civil War was one of the most significant events in the history of Russia in the 20th century. IN fratricidal The massacre involved millions of people who were unable to find a common language regarding the solution of the most important issues of the state existence of Russia. The antagonism between the “tops” and “bottoms” of Russian society that existed everywhere, and a whole complex of other acute problems gave the Civil War a truly all-Russian character. The Civil War acquired significant scope in the south of Russia, which became the base for the formation of the Russian “Vendee”. It was in the South that the first pockets of serious resistance to Soviet power appeared; in the South, Volunteer an army that, from its very inception, laid claim to all-Russian status. At the same time, the fact that the Volunteer Army arose in the South of Russia, in turn, predetermined the special importance of national policy in the general course of the Whites: fleeing from Bolshevik Central Russia, the leaders of the Russian counter-revolution fled to the South, where the ethnic composition of the population was very diverse. Under these conditions, the white national policy automatically came to the fore: the whites could not ignore relations with the indigenous population of the southern Russian provinces. The author took into account the need for a balanced, well-founded approach to considering the stated topic. This appears to make this study particularly valuable.

The relevance of the dissertation topic lies in the significance of the historical problem that is the subject of the dissertation research. The conducted research makes it possible to clarify some historical assessments related to such issues as the attitude of the South Russian White movement to the Jewish question; Jewish pogroms of the Volunteer Army; the struggle of the Denikin regime against Ukrainian separatism, relationships volunteer administration with the mountaineers of the North Caucasus; the white administration's approach to the national question; the role of V.V. Shulgin as the ideologist of the national policy of the white movement, etc.

Chronological The scope of the dissertation covers the period from November 1917 to the end of 1919, i.e., the time of the birth and heyday of the South Russian White movement. The initial milestone was due to the emergence of the Alekseevskaya organization on November 2 (15), 1917, which became the prototype

Volunteer Army. The withdrawal of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia from Orel and the beginning of the decomposition of the Whites determined the final stage of the study - the end of 1919. Thus, the dissertation examines the development of the national policy of the South Russian White movement throughout the entire period of its existence, with the exception of 1920, when the final defeat of Denikin’s followers, and then the Wrangelites were predetermined.

The territorial scope of the dissertation covers vast territories of the former Russian Empire: the North Caucasus, Ukraine, Bessarabia and other territories.

The degree of knowledge of the topic being developed. The study of the dissertation topic developed in the context of studying the politics of the South Russian White movement as a whole. No special studies have yet been written that comprehensively cover the problem: at the same time, there is no reason to assert that it has not been studied by historians at all. The general political course of A.I. Denikin was fruitfully studied in the 1920s. in USSR . The works of those years were distinguished by a solid source base; Soviet authors actively used memoirs of leaders of the White movement, White Guard and emigrant periodicals, and archival materials. However, some

1 All dates, except where otherwise noted, are given according to the old Julian calendar, which was in force in the white South of Russia.

2 Further in this work we use the abbreviation - VSYUR. the conclusions were openly propagandistic in nature, denouncing “ great power"and the "chauvinist" policy of A.I. Denikin. Particular attention in Soviet historiography of that period was paid to the “Jewish” policy of the regime of A.I. Denikin. Among the Soviet or pro-Soviet publications, one should highlight the works of B. Lekash, prominent Soviet and party leader Yu. Larin, Z. Ostrovsky, D. Keene, M. Gorev, S. I. Gusev-Orenburgsky, A. F. Maleev and others.3 These books, based on an extensive documentary base (official data, eyewitness testimony, etc.), examined the history of the volunteer pogrom. Let us note that D. Keene’s book became for many decades the only work devoted to a comprehensive examination of the whites’ internal course. It examined in detail the relationship of the Denikin regime with the Jewish population of Ukraine, the basic principles of the approach of the leaders of the white movement to the national problem, etc. D. Keene wrote: “The Russian great-power counter-revolution alienated the bourgeoisie of small nations and state new formations: the triumph of the whites meant their death state " independence" His imperialist politics and an unbending line for restoration " United, Great, Indivisible Russia» White Guard managed to very quickly turn Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, the Baltic states, and at the same time the Entente, mainly England, against itself.”4 D. Keane’s conclusions seem to have formed a stable attitude towards the White national policy for many years historiographical stamps. Over the next decades, the white movement was not studied as an independent research problem. As a result, the stated topic for many years

3Lekash B. When Israel Dies. L., 1928. Larin Y. Jews and anti-Semitism in the USSR. M.; L., 1929. Ostrovsky 3. Jewish pogroms of 1918-1921. M., 1926. Keen D. Denikinism. L., 1927; It's him. Denikinism in Ukraine. [Kyiv], 1927. Gorev M. Against anti-Semites. Essays and sketches. M, 1928. Gusev-Orenburgsky S.I. A book about Jewish pogroms in Ukraine in 1919. Editorial and afterword by M. Gorky. M., 1923. Maleev A.F. 30 days of the Jewish pogrom in Krivoye Ozero. From personal observations and experiences of a Russian teacher. Odessa, 1920. Petrovsky D. Revolution and counter-revolution in Ukraine. M., 1920; Counter-revolution and pogroms. [B, M.], 1919; Eletsky P. About the Jews. Kharkov, 1919; Mekler N. In the Denikin underground. M., 1932.

4 Kin D. Denikinshchina.S. 250. was essentially closed to scientists. In the meantime, it was studied quite fruitfully in exile. Among the emigrant publications devoted to the national policy of the AFSR, one can highlight the works of N. I. Shtif,5 I. B. * Shekhtman,6 I. Cherikover,7 D. S. Pasmanik,8 S. P. Melgunov9 and others.

Let us note that the interest of researchers was limited mainly to the same “Jewish theme.” Emigrant journalists in the Parisian newspapers “Common Cause”, “ Last news" and "Renaissance" there was an active debate on the role of Jews in the Russian revolution; about the reasons volunteer pogroms, etc. Similar articles were found in the Soviet press at that time. In general, the national policy of whites, as a rule, was considered in the context of the entire general political course of whites. In the post-perestroika period, there has been a steady interest in the history of the white movement in our country. Several dissertations were defended that shed light on certain problems in the history of the white movement, including our topic. Let us note, for example, the work of the Yaroslavl historian V.P. Fedyuk.10 Valuable information on the white policy in the national question is also contained in the dissertation of G.M. Ippolitov.11 Interesting judgments about the national policy of the regime of A.I. Denikin are contained in the works of V.P. Buldakova,12 V. Zh. Tsvetkov,13 O. V. Budnitsky .14 In 1996, Kharkov historians O. V. Kozerod and S. Ya. Briman published a small but informative monograph, which examined

5 Shtif N.I. Pogroms in Ukraine. The period of the Volunteer Army. Berlin, 1922.

6 Shekhtman I.B. History of the pogrom movement in Ukraine 1917-1921. T.2. Pogroms of the Volunteer Army. Berlin, 1932.

7 Cherikover I. Anti-Semitism and pogroms in Ukraine. Berlin, 1923.

8 Pasmanik D.S. Russian Revolution and Jewry. Bolshevism and Judaism. Berlin, 1923; It's him. Revolutionary years in Crimea. Paris, 1926.

9 Melgunov S.P. Anti-Semitism and pogroms // The Voice of the Past on the Other Side. T. 5(18). Paris, 1927. pp. 231-246.

10 Fedyuk V. P. White. White movement in the South of Russia 1917-1920. Dissertation of Doctor of History Sci. Yaroslavl, 1995.

11 Ippolitov G. M. Military and political activities of A. I. Denikin, 1890-1947. Dissertation of Doctor of History Sci. M„ 2000.

12 Buldakov V.P. Red Troubles: The nature and consequences of revolutionary violence. M., 1997; It's him. The crisis of the empire and revolutionary nationalism of the early 20th century. in Russia // Questions of history. 1997. No. 1. pp. 29-45.

13 Tsvetkov V. Zh. White movement in Russia. 1917-1922 // Questions of history. 2000. No. 7. pp. 56-73.

14 Budnitsky O.V. Russian liberalism and the Jewish question (1917-1920)//Civil War in Russia. M., 2002. pp. 517-541. pogrom movement of the Volunteer Army.15 Among the newest works of domestic historians, one should mention the joint article by V.P. Fedyuk and A.I. Ushakov, published in 1998.16 The authors managed to comprehensively cover the problem by considering the most important aspects white national policy. In general, domestic historians for a long time did not pay due attention to the stated topic, which is due to the specifics of development historiographical process in our country, which has only in recent decades emerged from the party framework. Among foreign historians, a special contribution to the development of the stated topic was made by the works of the American historian P. Kenez. In his concept, the historian proceeds from the position that anti-Semitism was a kind of religion, a surrogate for the ideology of the South Russian white movement.17 P. Kenez points out the corrupting influence that Jewish pogroms had on Volunteer army. As a rule, the works of foreign historians touch on the issues studied by the author only indirectly, in the context of studying the entire white movement.

The dissertation is largely based on materials from the state archives of Moscow and St. Petersburg, periodicals from the white South of Russia, Soviet and Ukrainian periodicals, and emigrant newspapers. The dissertation is based on factual material identified by the author in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), the Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), the Russian State Military Archive fleet (RGA Navy), the Department of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library (OR RSL) and the Department of Manuscripts of the Russian

15 Kozerod O.V., Briman S.Ya. Denikin's regime and the Jewish population of Ukraine: 1919-1920. Kharkov, 1996.

16 Ushakov A.I., Fedyuk V.P. The White Movement and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination // Problems of the Political and Economic History of Russia. M., 1998. pp. 102-118.

17 Kenez P. Ideology of the White Movement//Civil War in Russia: a crossroads of opinions. M., 1994. P. 94105; Kenez P. The Civil War in South Russia. 1919-1920. The defeat of the Whites. Berkeley, 1977.

National Library (OP RNL). In particular, the GARF studied materials from the funds of A. I. Denikin (F. R-5827), V. V. and E. G. Shulgin (F. R-5974), A. A. von Lampe (F. R-5853), N. And Astrov (F. R-5913) and other figures of the white movement. In the fund of A.I. Denikin, the author managed to find unpublished documents shedding light on the position of the leadership of the Volunteer Army in relation to the Jewish question; other valuable materials were also identified. Of great interest is the “Diary” of Colonel (in emigration he was promoted to general) A. A. von Lampe. The diary of A. A. Lampe is interesting because of the author’s extraordinary judgments: Lampe focuses his attention on the reasons for the failure of Whites; on the policy of the volunteer administration in the Jewish question; analyzes the deep origins of Bolshevism, etc. The applicant paid special attention to the study of materials from the fund of Vasily Vitalievich and Ekaterina Grigorievna Shulgin. We managed to discover the unpublished memoirs of V.V. Shulgin “1919”. This work by V.V. Shulgin is very interesting: Shulgin examines in this book the key problems of the history of the Civil War: the genesis of the Russian revolution; Jewish participation in Bolshevism; the origin of Ukrainian separatism; reasons for Denikin's failure. “1919” is one of the best books by V.V. Shulgin. This book, unfortunately, has not yet become available to the mass reader. There is also considerable interest unpublished diary of V.V. Shulgin, reflecting the personal impressions of its author during his stay in a Soviet prison in February 1918. The diary briefly presents Shulgin’s views on the historical problems already outlined above. Currently, the author is preparing V.V. Shulgin’s diary for publication in the historical and documentary almanac “Russian Past”. A significant number of other documents from V.V. Shulgin’s collection were also studied, which made it possible to take a fresh look at his participation in the white movement in the south of Russia and to reassess the degree of his influence on the ideology and practice of the white movement. The most interesting results are obtained from the study and analysis of materials deposited in the personal fund of Nikolai Ivanovich Astrov. The applicant devotes significant space to the consideration of this subject in his work. In addition to the personal funds of the leaders of the white movement, the author also studied the funds of political institutions of the white South of Russia. For example, materials from the funds of the Political Chancellery at the Special Meeting at Commander-in-Chief VSYUR (F. R-446). The collection of the Political Chancellery contains documents that are unique in their value, shedding light on the relationship of the Denikin administration with Poland, Finland, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Bessarabia, the allied command, etc. The author was able to familiarize himself with analytical reports affecting the relationship of the volunteer administration with the Ukrainian command, the Jewish population of Ukraine, etc. The importance of these materials for the development of our topic can hardly be overestimated, therefore they are actively used in our work. Of great interest are also the materials from the fund of the Propaganda Department at the Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of the AFSR (F. R-440). By getting acquainted with the materials of this fund, the researcher can find various kinds of propaganda articles, reviews of the political situation in the North Caucasus, Ukraine, Bessarabia and Soviet Russia, which is also of great interest when studying the stated topic. In the collection of individual memoirs of the White Guards (F. R-5881), we studied the memoirs of V. A. Auerbach and Drozdovite P. P. Kuksin, which shed light on the political sentiments of the Russian bourgeoisie and the pogrom movement of the Volunteer Army, respectively.

The materials identified by the author during his work at the RGVA are of great importance. Thus, in fund 39540 (Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army) materials were discovered that shed light on the practice of volunteer pogroms in August-September 1919. A number of other cases from this fund are also of significant interest to the researcher. Materials from funds 39693 (2nd Separate Combined Brigade. Previously Chechen Cavalry Division), 39668 (Chief of Staff of the Kiev Region Troops), 39666 (Quartermaster General of the Kiev Region Troops Headquarters), first introduced by the author into scientific circulation, confirm what was previously established in the memoir literature point of view about the active participation of Chechen and Kumyk white volunteers in the pogrom movement of the Volunteer Army. Archival data indicate the complete moral decay of the White Guards, a total decline in military discipline in the ranks of the White Army.

Materials from the collections of the Russian State Archive of the Navy, the Russian State Historical Archive and the Russian State Historical Archive allow us to clarify some historical subjects related to the study of our topic. Of particular importance here are materials from the funds of the Russian State Administration of the Navy, which allow us to take a fresh look at the participation of Denikin’s people in the Civil War in Transcaucasia, in particular, the details of the whites’ stay in Georgia and Azerbaijan are recreated, and the history of their relationships with the governments of these Transcaucasian republics is traced.

The author also managed to discover interesting materials during his work at the RSL OR. In the V. G. Korolenko fund (F. 135) materials on the Jewish question were discovered, which the famous writer collected during the Civil War. This is, in particular, a recording of a conversation between the delegation of Jewish communities and Commander-in-Chief VSYUR A.I. Denikin, held on July 26, 1919, is important for understanding the views of the white military leader on the Jewish question. In the ORN RNL, the author used the memoirs of a prominent participant in the white movement, Colonel B. A. Engelhardt, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” deposited in his personal collection (F. 1052). Engelhardt's memoirs touch on the most important issues in the history of the Civil War and the white movement. In total, the author ^ used about 100 archival files from 7 archival repositories in Moscow and

St. Petersburg.

In addition to archival materials, the author actively used periodicals. Periodicals can be divided into the following groups: 1) White Guard newspapers; 2) Soviet newspapers; 3) Ukrainian newspapers; 4) emigrant newspapers.

Significant quantities of files were processed White Guard newspapers - “Kiev Life”, “Kiev Echo”, “Evening Lights”, “New Russia”, “Dawn of Russia”, “Free Don”, “ Great Russia", "United Russia", "To Moscow! ", "Life", "New Morning of the South". Despite the obvious bias, newspapers contain a lot of factual material, which is an important aid in research work - conversations with representatives of the white administration, White Guard commands, official orders, etc. In addition, we note that articles in white newspapers touched upon the key problems of the civil war - agrarian, Jewish, Ukrainian and other issues. Among the newspapers published with the direct participation of V.V. Shulgin, mention should be made of “Kievlyanin”, the Ekaterinodar newspaper “Russia”, Odessa “Russia”, “United Russia” and the newspaper “Great Russia”, published in Rostov-on-Don. Of particular interest here are the articles by V.V. Shulgin. Also, such prominent politicians as V. G. Iosefi, A. I. Savenko, V. M. Levitsky, E. A. Efimovsky and others actively collaborated in these newspapers. These newspapers represented the so-called “Kievite” direction and actively promoted ideas Russian nationalism. There was no ideological unity in the white press: some newspapers propagated the idea of ​​cultural autonomy of Ukraine within Russia; others ignored even the term “Ukraine” itself, allowing only the name “Little Russia”. Almost all white newspapers touched on the topic of Jewish pogroms, condemning them as an anti-state phenomenon. At the same time, the editor of “Kievlyanin” V.V. Shulgin, who was called guilty of inciting anti-Semitic sentiments, was subjected to fierce criticism.

The author also used Ukrainian newspapers of that period in his work: “Ukraine”, “ Selyansk community”, “Selyanska Dumka”, “Trudova Community”, “Strshetsky Dumka”, “Strshets”, “Ukrashske Slovo”, etc. The newspapers represented the opposite political direction for the volunteers. “Ukrainians” sought to oppose themselves to Russia, sharply criticizing both the Reds and the Whites. As a result, Denikin’s followers are called “Moscow Black Hundreds”, and the Bolsheviks “ Moscow communists", etc. Some accusations against the White Guards are openly propaganda character. Nevertheless, individual articles are an object of research interest. Of the emigrant newspapers used in the work, mention should be made of the newspapers “ Last news", "Russian Newspaper", "Renaissance", "New Time", etc. Emigrant newspapers published numerous materials, mainly memoirs and analytical ones, dedicated to the history of the white movement. Some articles shed light on certain aspects of the topic. Of the Soviet newspapers, the work used the Moscow “Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee”, “Pravda” and the Voronezh “Voronezh Poor People”. The Soviet press paid considerable attention to the consideration of the pogrom practices of the White Guards. The pogroms were viewed by Soviet journalists as a manifestation of the restoration aspirations of volunteers, the “Black Hundred reaction,” etc. Nevertheless, Soviet newspapers represent an interesting source on the stated topic. In total, 56 newspaper titles were used in the work, including not only long-term publications, but also newspapers published over several months.

Memoirs are an interesting source on the topic of the dissertation. Here the fundamental “Essays on Russian Troubles” by A. I. Denikin stand out. In volumes 3, 4 and 5 of his work, the white military leader gives a mature, based on the unique documents available to him, characterization of the political regime of which he was the head.18 Denikin talks in detail about how the relationship between the volunteer administration and the mountaineers of the North Caucasus developed, Poles, Ukrainians, Jews, etc. With rare exceptions, the judgment of A.I.

Denikin’s ideas are balanced and are confirmed in documentary sources. The memoirs of K. N. Sokolov,19 G. N. Mikhailovsky,20 A.21 also help shed light on the study of our problem.

Margolina and others. The influence of V.V. Shulgin on the ideological guidelines of the Denikin regime is difficult to overestimate. This is fully applicable to the national policy of the regime of A.I. Denikin. As a result, Shulgin’s memoirs and his newspaper articles, published both during the Civil War and in emigration, are of enormous interest to the researcher of our problem. Among the books by V.V. Shulgin dedicated to the Civil War, one should name “1920”,22 “1917-1919”.23 The theme of the Civil War is also actively involved in V.V. Shulgin’s book “What WE Don’t Like About THEM: About Anti-Semitism in Russia.”24 Of considerable interest is the work of V.V. Shulgin “Lenin’s Experience”, published in

25 of the magazine “Our Contemporary”. It contains Shulgin's interesting reflections on the First World War, the Revolution and the Civil War. During the Civil War, V.V. Shulgin worked in “Kievlyanin”, “Great Russia”, “United Rus'”, “Russia” (Odessa and Ekaterinodar"); in emigration - in the Belgrade “New Time”, the Parisian “Russian Newspaper”, “Renaissance”, the Sofia “Rus”. Everywhere V.V. Shulgin actively published his articles, many of which were in one way or another connected with the history of the Civil War, the White movement, etc. Comparison of numerous works by V.V. Shulgin, organically complementing one another, studying the epistolary heritage of the object of study , identification and analysis of articles by V.V. Shulgin in White Guard and emigrant

18 Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. T. 3-5. M., 2003.

19 Sokolov K.N. The Board of General Denikin. Sofia, 1921.

20 Mikhailovsky G. N. Notes from the history of Russian foreign policy departments. 1914-1920. In two books. Book 2. October 1917 - November 1920. M., 1993.

21 Margolin A. Ukraine and the politics of the Entente: Notes of a Jew and a Citizen. Berlin, 1921.

22 Shulgin V.V. 1920//Days. 1920: Notes. M., 1989.

23 Same. 1917-1919/Preface and publication by R. G. Krasyukov; comments by B.I. Kolonitsky//Persons: Historical and biographical almanac. 1994. No. 5. pp. 121-328.

24 Same. What WE don’t like about THEM: About anti-Semitism in Russia. SPb., 1992. periodicals allow you to create a complete picture of the Civil War.

Generally historiographic the analysis shows that the topic under study has been studied rather haphazardly. Historians still have to engage in their work with a huge number of previously unexplored documents, the processing of which will allow for a new look at many seemingly established historical assessments. The relevance of the topic and the insufficient degree of scientific development, the need for a balanced approach in the absence of strict ideological guidelines allowed the author to choose it as a dissertation research.

The methodological basis of the dissertation is the methods of concrete historical research. The main ones are historicism, objectivity, systematic scientific analysis, which made it possible to consider the facts in their interdependence and interconnection.

Work structure. Structurally, the work consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature. The first chapter of "V. V. Shulgin and the national policy of the South Russian White movement” is dedicated to the role of V. V. Shulgin as the ideologist of the national policy of the Whites; the second chapter, “The National Question in the Ideology and Politics of the South Russian White Movement during the Civil War,” talks about the practical implementation of the ideological constructs of the White national policy. Thus, both chapters of the dissertation are in close and inextricable connection and are a single whole.

Conclusion of the dissertation on the topic "National History", Puchenkov, Alexander Sergeevich

Conclusion.

The national question occupied a significant place in the ideology and politics of the South Russian White movement. This was explained primarily by the fact that from the very beginning the movement acquired a pronounced regionalist character: The volunteer movement arose on the outskirts of Russia, central Russia was bolinized, the leaders of the future white movement, fleeing for their lives, fled to the south and the Russian

"Vendee" found its existence in territories with an exceptionally variegated ethnic composition. Under these conditions, white national policy automatically came to the fore. The birth of the white movement took place during the period of the so-called “national revolutions,” when the outskirts spontaneously broke away from the traditional Great Russian center. Under these conditions, the slogan “One and Indivisible

Russia,” which became fundamental for the white movement, was seemingly absurd: the separatism of the outskirts, on which the white army was based, was opposed to the concept of state unity of Russia, the conductors of which were volunteers at that moment. This policy turned out to be suicidal for the white movement. At the same time, only the slogan of Russian state unity could at that moment attract new like-minded people under the banner of the White Army. The internationalism of the Bolsheviks was contrasted with white state nationalism, which became the key idea of ​​the white movement. It was precisely the national feeling humiliated after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and revanchism that were able to make the white movement to some extent mass, at least partially giving it the character of a national militia that the ideologists of the white struggle once dreamed of.

In many ways, the ideology of the South Russian white movement was shaped by the prominent politician and publicist V.V. Shulgin. Shulgin participated in the formation Volunteer the army was already at the initial stage in November 1917; was the editor and publisher of the newspaper “Kievlyanin”, “Russia”, published in Yekaterinodar and Odessa, “Great Russia”, “United Rus'”, etc. All these publications promoted the ideas that became basic in the national policy of the whites: struggle with Ukrainian separatism; rejection of Jewish participation in Russian political life; state unity of Russia with the broadest autonomy of the outskirts. All these ideas in different time expressed by V.V. Shulgin were actively implemented by the command of the AFSR. V.V. Shulgin was the creator and head of the Preparatory Commission for National Affairs at the Special Meeting, which was engaged in the preparation of materials necessary for the creation of “ ethnographic» maps of Russia. It was the ethnographic principle that was to form the basis for the arrangement of the western borders of the Russian state recreated after the liquidation of Bolshevism. The commission also successfully developed the basic principles of decentralization of the white South. It must be said that Shulgin saw decentralization as a way to resolve the separatist tendencies existing in Ukraine. V.V. Shulgin considered the Ukrainian movement itself to be artificial, generated from outside during German days. Ukrainian statehood seemed to him a harmful idea, without the slightest historical basis, a treacherous idea. During the Civil War, V.V. Shulgin remained a staunch supporter of the Entente and was a consistent supporter of intervention. In many ways, it was the loyalty of Shulgin and his group to allied obligations that gave rise to diplomatic circles the idea of ​​the need - in the interests of France - to revive a strong and united Russia. V.V. Shulgin managed to gain strong influence on the French vice-consul in Kyiv E. Ennot. The latter became the main supporter and promoter of the idea of ​​French intervention in the South of Russia. During the French intervention in Odessa, Shulgin was a political adviser to the military dictator of Odessa, General A. N. Grishin-Almazov, whose political worldview largely coincided with the views of Shulgin himself. Using the levers of administrative influence available to him, V.V. Shulgin and his supporters pursued their own policy in Odessa, quite independent from Yekaterinodar, based on the implementation of the principles of decentralization and broad local self-government. Odessa “separatism” caused volunteer the command is very dissatisfied. Shulgin and his supporters took an exceptionally tough position on the issue of the formation of mixed French-Russian-Ukrainian units, finding it impossible to reach any agreement with the “Ukrainians,” even in the interests of a joint fight against the Bolsheviks. Shulgin's tough position found understanding in Yekaterinodar and became one of the reasons for the break between the French and the Denikinites. In the territory occupied by the volunteer troops of Ukraine, V.V. Shulgin and the Non-Party Bloc of Russian Voters were active in political activity. The main activity of Shulgin and his supporters was active anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The latter was carried out using unpopular methods and led to a diminishment of the prestige of the policies pursued by A.I. Denikin. In addition, V.V. Shulgin worked prolifically at Kievlyanin. V.V. Shulgin’s articles in “Kievlyanin” were devoted primarily to two main issues: the fight against Ukrainians and the “exposure” of Jewish collaborators of the Bolsheviks. Let us note that Shulgin's articles on the Jewish question were extremely harsh in tone and incited pogrom sentiments.

So, during the Civil War, V.V. Shulgin was, it seems, one of the main ideologists of the white movement. The author puts forward the position that V.V. Shulgin’s approach to the national question not only coincided with the similar views of A.I.

Denikin, A.M. Dragomirov, I.P. Romanovsky, A.S. Lukomsky and other leading personalities, but also largely determined their appearance. Shulgin’s work in the Preparatory Commission for National Affairs, his tireless journalistic activity, and leadership of the South Russian National Center, which propagated the ideas of Russian nationalism, allow us to say that without studying the views of V.V. Shulgin it is impossible to get an idea of ​​the national policy of the South Russian White movement. We emphasize, however, that Shulgin’s influence extended specifically to the ideology of the white movement; the policy was determined by a whole complex of reasons, the main one of which was war.

Above we noted the exceptional importance that the national question had in the entire general political course of the whites. However, it must be said that there is no time to implement some of the theoretical principles that formed the approach. volunteer command to the national problem, the white command had very little, literally a few months. Nevertheless, certain trends in the national policy of volunteer administration could be traced quite clearly. " United, Great and Indivisible Russia" This slogan was put into practice. However, it should not be taken absolutely literally: Denikin and his entourage, trying to preserve the fragments of the former Russian Empire, were ready to give the outskirts broad national and cultural autonomy, but, of course, within the framework single state. This is traditionally seen as the Great Russian chauvinism of the White Guards. This point of view is not entirely legitimate. State white nationalism did not at all imply the idea of ​​national exclusivity. Recovery " Great, United and Indivisible Russia“within the borders of pre-revolutionary times (with the exception of ethnographic Poland) was for whites a necessary condition for the very state existence of Russia. Such a policy can be considered as completely acceptable state patriotism. Brought up in the spirit of boundless devotion to the Fatherland, volunteers could not see the “Balkanization” of Russia, its fragmentation into many “powers,” each of which spoke condescendingly to the volunteers, not considering them as legal successors of autocratic power. It was difficult for the White Guards to get used to the new status of yesterday’s outskirts of the country. The fundamental difference in the national policies of the Bolsheviks and the Whites was precisely manifested in the fact that where the Bolsheviks spoke about the self-determination of nations, the Whites spoke about “treasonous separatism.” Such an approach at that moment could not but be disastrous for the outlying white movement. In fact, it was sawing off the branch on which the whites were sitting. However, apparently, the psychology and upbringing of the volunteers did not allow them to think and act differently. The all-Russian status of the Volunteer Army, which they proclaimed, did not help the White Guards either. Whites perceived themselves precisely as representatives of the central government, whose local directives must be carried out unquestioningly. For volunteers, national policy largely boiled down to the issue of subordinating the outskirts to the state center; the national issue was given a secondary role, since the White Guards viewed the growth of national self-awareness to a greater extent as a bad legacy of Bolshevism. Accustomed to thinking in terms of traditional army unity of command and strict discipline, the White Guards had difficulty getting used to the need to conduct flexible and not always honest diplomacy. This was especially difficult for the straightforward military man A.I. Denikin. The sharp, not always restrained general, never learned to speak with “foreigners.” This was especially evident in the North Caucasus, where the conflict with the highlanders turned into a real war for the volunteers. Feeling the opportunity to show their traditional warlike inclinations, the highlanders were not going to lay down their arms, turning the war into a profitable business. The pacification of the North Caucasus was very difficult for the Whites, and the struggle was never completed. Denikin’s relations with Georgia, which tried to talk with White Guards on equal terms, as an independent state. The conflict with the Georgian government led to war, diverting large parts of the whites from the main theater of war. The Transcaucasian policy of A.I. Denikin should be considered unsuccessful. Denikin also erroneously built his line of relations with Poland and Finland: while recognizing the right of these states to independence, the white military leader still did not find it possible to agree to further territorial concessions for Poland, and the independence of Finland would be finally recognized by the white government only after the signing of a convention beneficial to Russia . Such inflexibility of political thinking did not allow these two states to be included in the anti-Bolshevik front. Whites also approached the Ukrainian issue conservatively. Suffice it to say that the term “Ukraine” itself was declared illegal, and Ukraine began, as before the revolution, to be called Little Russia. Such an overt restoration did not contribute to the popularity of white politics. The missed opportunity to reach an agreement with Petlyura also does not characterize Denikin the politician from the best side. To be fair, we add that such an agreement, even if it took place, could not be durable. At the same time, it would be useful for tactical purposes, both for the sake of gaining time (so as not to be distracted by Petlyura during the attack on Moscow), and in propaganda purposes, given the popularity of Petlyura in Ukraine. Jewish pogroms were disastrous for whites. They harmed the popularity of whites in the eyes of the West; they were the trump card of red propaganda; they were a factor in the disintegration of the army; Finally, these inhumane pogrom excesses demonstrated to the whole world the failure of the whites as a state power. The main reason for the pogroms was, of course, the anarchy that reigned in Ukraine, where pogroms had been going on since 1917. Anti-Semitism largely replaced the ideology of the Whites; in conditions of a rather blurred ideology, it, one might say, helped out the Whites: the appearance of the enemy became extremely material and found sympathy not only among the army, but also among the masses. At the same time, militant Judeophobia was mortally dangerous for the army as for a living organism: the search for a Jew became an end in itself for the volunteer. When the object of hatred was discovered, the volunteer became uncontrollable. We emphasize, however, that in addition to “ ideological anti-Semites“, in the volunteer environment there were also people in abundance who participated in the pogroms, solely for economic reasons, who had never previously encountered Jewry and had no reason to hate Jews. These include, first of all, the mountain Cossacks, who were particularly cruel in pogrom actions.

The reason for all national conflicts in the white South of Russia, it seems to us, was one thing: national policy was carried out exclusively by force. The only instrument of persuasion was the army, which personified the entire state system of White Russia. Such a policy could not but be unsuccessful: any more or less major military failure inevitably resulted in national uprisings in the rear.

It must be said that the study of the national policy of the South Russian white movement makes it possible to clarify certain previously formed historical stereotypes, one of which is the accusation that whites defend at all costs “ United and Indivisible Russia" We can say that the White government debated the issue of granting individual peoples fairly broad autonomy, but within the framework of a single Russian state. Of course, relations with small nationalities, on whose territory the AFSR was based, were quite complicated, which did not contribute to the viability of the Denikin regime.

The ethnic conflicts in which whites find themselves embroiled cannot be explained solely by intransigence volunteer command. It is enough to notice the coincidence of “hot spots” on the political map of the former Russian Empire and on the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, the inability of the whites to skillfully carry out their national policy characterizes Denikin’s entire general political course and is deeply indicative.

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