Offensive Operation Citadel(July 5 - July 12, 1943) - summer strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk bridgehead; upon detection of waste Soviet troops it was planned to deliver cutting blows from the top of the Kursk ledge.
The goal of the offensive is “to encircle the enemy troops located in the Kursk area and destroy them through a concentric offensive.” At the same time, it was supposed to “make wide use of the moment of surprise,” “ensure maximum massing of striking forces in a narrow area,” and “carry out an offensive at the fastest possible pace.”
The successful completion of the Citadel offensive should “free up forces for subsequent tasks, especially mobile formations,” and the planned victory at Kursk by the Nazi command should be a torch for the whole world.
To repel the summer offensive of the Germans, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, with the direct participation of the headquarters of the Military Fleet and the Central Front, developed a strategic plan for the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, which was a series of interrelated strategic operations fronts of both defensive and offensive nature. Directly to disrupt the offensive according to the Citadel plan, a deliberate defense operation was developed, which received (after successful completion) the name Kursk strategic defensive operation (July 5 - 23). Distinctive feature This (judging by the name) defensive battle was an offensive action (counterattacks) of the Soviet troops, planned both in advance and during the battles on the Northern and Southern fronts of the Kursk Bulge.
The Germans were never able to strike at the top of the Kursk salient; The Soviet command managed to use all the strategic advantages of the Kursk bridgehead, delivering a powerful blow from its western part (top) of the army groups of the Central Front and the Air Force in the Kiev and Sumy directions.
Planning a spring-summer campaign
In the spring of 1943, Hitler’s leadership was faced with the task of developing a further strategic line and a combat plan for the summer period.
March 1943
Operational order of Wehrmacht Headquarters No. 5
In conclusion, it talks about the preparation time - “To report to the army group commanders on their plans by March 25”.
Order from Hitler's Headquarters of March 22, 1943
April 1943
Reports from the headquarters of the Central Front and the Military Fleet
The offensive, originally scheduled for May 3, was first postponed by decision of the Fuhrer on April 29, since the tank, self-propelled and anti-tank equipment of the attacking divisions turned out to be insufficient compared to the powerful enemy defense system. Based on likely delivery times for equipment for heavy tanks and anti-tank guns The start of the operation is scheduled for June 12. Events in the Mediterranean region, however, caused a new postponement of Operation Citadel. However, on June 18, the Fuhrer, taking into account the considerations of the operational leadership headquarters, finally spoke out in favor of carrying out the offensive Operation Citadel. On June 21, the Fuhrer scheduled the offensive for July 3, and on June 25 he set the final date of July 5.
From the diary of military operations of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht
The Diary also talks about information cover for the operation, in connection with which the chief of staff of the operational leadership gave instructions to the head of the propaganda department regarding the Citadel offensive:
Widespread propaganda of the offensive power of the troops is necessary without revealing the tasks for this year in the East. Our true intentions - an attack with a limited purpose - must not be revealed. Therefore, it is advisable to imagine the situation in such a way that the offensive was launched by the Russians, but was thwarted by our defensive actions, which turned into a counteroffensive, which led to the defeat of the enemy. Such a depiction of the situation will reduce the offensive power of the enemy and emphasize the power of our defenses and reserves in the East. Thanks to this, the opening of a second front by the Allies can be delayed until the end of the fighting in the East.
June 1943
Northern group
“It is assumed that the enemy is preparing his own offensive operation in case our operation is not carried out. (This refers to the Oryol offensive operation “Kutuzov”. - E. Shch.)"
Southern group
Crisis of the offensive operation "Citadel"
Northern front
South face
Meeting on July 11 in Dolbino
The issue of introducing reserves was raised at a meeting on the morning of July 11, 1943 (Dolbino station, on the Belgorod - Kharkov stretch), which E. von Manstein also does not mention in his memoirs. Nevertheless, V. Zamulin writes that the field marshal “was forced to gather all the commanders and their chiefs of staff at Dolbino station (on the Belgorod-Kharkov stretch) in order to resolve the issue”:
An excerpt from the transcript of the discussion, according to V. Zamulin, “paints a bleak picture that emerged after six days of the offensive of the most powerful Wehrmacht group on Eastern Front» :
“Manstein: The turn to the south and the movement in a southern direction must be carried out by more than one division. An offensive in the northeast (Prokhorovka direction - Z.V.) is still possible now, but will be impossible later, since the enemy has concentrated new tank forces in this area (in the Prokhorovka area - Z.V.). If the attack of the 3rd Tank Corps is unsuccessful, then it should go on the defensive and it will be possible to use its formations on the right flank (4th Tank A. - Z.V.) or north of Oboyan to develop an offensive in a westerly direction. The 24th Tank will not arrive until July 17, and is planned to be used for the attack in a western direction if the 3rd Tank still cannot be used for this. Fangor: It would be good if the 2nd SS Tank Tank continued its offensive to the northeast (towards Prokhorovka - Z.V.), since everything planned earlier was built with this in mind. And what would be better for a strike to the south/southeast (towards the 3rd tank tank - Z.V.) to use the 24th tank tank, and not the 2nd tank tank of the SS.
Manstein: The 24th Tank will arrive too late and suggested that the commander of the 4th Tank consider the option in which the 16th Tank Division would be used to help the attacking 3rd Tank in the northern direction.”
Zamulia V.N. 3forgotten battle of the Fire Arc. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2009.
Order XXIV of the Labor Code on regrouping
Manstein writes that “the XXIV Tank, due to the threat of an enemy offensive on the Donetsk front, was subordinated to the group, but not for its free use.” Zamulin V.N. cites archival data that says “on the evening of July 12, when there was still no talk of stopping the operation, Manstein gave a number of orders to implement the plan for a further offensive. Thus, at 21.10 he sent an order to V. Nering to regroup the formation in Belgorod area:
“SS Panzer Division “Viking” - to the Belgorod area, namely: Bolkhovets (5 km north-west Belgorod - Bolkhovets road) - 6 km south-west. roads Belgorod - Repnoye. 23rd tank division- in the areas of Dolzhik, Orlovka, Bessonovka, Almazovka. The support group of the II Tank SS, located in this area, immediately, secretly for enemy reconnaissance, roll up to liberate the territory ""
NARA, T. 313, R. 366, f. 00421
As we can see, on July 12 at least two tank divisions were transferred to Belgorod, and "Support Group II TK SS" was already there.
see also
Intelligence War. Secret operations of the German intelligence services. 1942-1971 Gehlen Reinhard OPERATION CITADELOPERATION CITADEL From the beginning of May 1943, reports received through the Abwehr indicated that the Russians were planning measures to repel the expected German offensive in the Kharkov-Kursk area. According to information from a reliable source, we knew as early as April 17, 1943 that Stalin ordered a meeting to be held in Moscow on April 23, 1943, with the participation of all senior commanders of various defense sectors and army commanders. The following issues were to be addressed at this meeting: a) signs of an offensive being prepared by the Germans; b) improving interaction between military branches; c) morale of personnel; d) material and technical support for troops. On April 27, 1943, another reliable source reported that an incomplete rifle division, a tank brigade, two tank battalions and two field artillery regiments had arrived in Valuiki from Saratov. Along with this, tanks, tank engines and weapons are delivered daily from tank factories in Kazan and Gorky to the Kupyansk-Kursk-Oryol front. On April 28, 1943, another source, albeit unverified, reported that the Soviets feared a major German offensive in the near future in the Kharkov-Kursk area. From these and other reports received through the Abwehr, it was clear that the Soviet command had become aware of German plans for an offensive in the Kursk area and that it was taking measures to meet it in full readiness. Therefore, I took every opportunity to warn the command about the danger of carrying out a large-scale offensive near Kursk. When it became obvious that the top German military leadership (Hitler) was not going to abandon Operation Citadel - broad offensive operations in the Kursk region, on July 3, 1943, I prepared a report “Assessment of the expected actions of the enemy during Operation Citadel.” It stated the following: “With the start of Operation Citadel, the enemy can either confine himself to this operational area in order to meet the advancing German troops in defensive battle formations, attracting reserves from neighbors and conducting counterattacks, or undertake counter offensive operations as in the combat zone of Army Group South.” , and Army Group Center while simultaneously repelling our offensive actions, if it considers that the situation allows this. Assuming the enemy’s own readiness to conduct offensive actions and taking into account the situation in the area Mediterranean Sea, the latter option seems more likely to us, although a limited reaction cannot be ruled out at first. Therefore, we can assume that soon after the start of our offensive, the enemy will launch strong counterattacks on those sectors of the front of Army Groups “South” and “Center”, where his preparation for offensive actions is noted, both in order to pin down our forces and ease the situation of his defending troops . To determine the forces and means that will be used to deliver strikes and the directions of these strikes, we can proceed from the construction of battle formations and concentrations of enemy groups prepared to carry out our proposed offensive operations against Army Group South and the right flank of Army Group Center. Taking into account the above, we can assume the following development of events during our offensive: 1) In the zone of German offensive operations. The large enemy forces located in the Kursk-Valuiki-Voronezh-Elets area (which were originally intended for an offensive in the Kharkov region and partly to attack the Weiss group) as a result of the German offensive will be cut up in such a way that the bulk of them will be east of the attacking “corner” forward" of the battle formations of the German troops, and the smaller one - in the area west of Kursk. Therefore, we can assume that our advancing troops will be subjected to strong flank attacks from the east - from the area northeast of Belgorod and west of Liven. 2) In the zone of Army Group South. It should be expected that the enemy's upcoming operations against the southern flank and center of the army group will be carried out soon after the start of the German offensive in order to divert our forces from the Kursk area. Taking into account the enemy’s assessment, one should take into account the possibility of his offensive actions with the aim of covering the 6th and 1st Tank Army - in the direction of Donbass, as well as with a strike from the Kupyansk area in the direction of Kharkov in order to penetrate deeply into the flank of the advancing German troops. 3) In the zone of Army Group Center. The enemy, apparently, can strike with strong operational reserves, which have not yet been fully discovered, from the Tula-Kaluga-Sukhinichi-Plavsk area against the 2nd Tank Army in order to divert our advancing troops. Based on his assessment, we assume that attacks will be delivered on the eastern and northeastern flanks of the army in the direction of Orel with the aim of reaching the rear of the advancing German troops. Moreover, one must also take into account the possibility of the enemy carrying out offensive actions with limited goals while attracting appropriate forces and means with the task of pinning down the forces of Army Group Center. 4) It is not yet clear whether any action can be expected on the part of the enemy in the zones of action of Army Groups “A” and “North”. It is likely that he will speed up preparations for the resumption of offensive operations against the Kuban bridgehead and to expand the “corridor” to Leningrad. The enemy, one must assume, will strive to pin down all available German forces and reserves as much as possible, carrying out offensive actions on other sectors of the front, even if of a limited nature. If the enemy, contrary to expectations, limits his countermeasures to the Citadel area, then in the event of protracted battles we must take into account the need to attract our additional forces from other sectors of the front. As noted in previous assessments, the Russians will most likely try to launch a pre-emptive strike and go on the offensive themselves, developing it in the directions of the lower Dnieper and Orel.” The next day, July 4, 1943, I re-analyzed Operation Citadel and presented the following assessment to management: “Based on the general military situation, the conduct of Operation Citadel at this time is not justified or justified. For any successful operation, two indispensable conditions are the prerequisites: superiority of forces and the moment of surprise. Both of these prerequisites actually existed at the beginning of the development of the operation. Now the enemy’s assessment shows: there is neither one nor the other. The Russians have been expecting our advance in this area for several weeks. With their characteristic energy, they not only carried out the necessary engineering work to create multi-lane positions, but also concentrated there the appropriate forces and means sufficient to repel our offensive. Thus, it is unlikely that our strike will have the necessary penetrating force. Considering the number of Russian reserves at their disposal, it cannot be expected that Operation Citadel will overwhelm them and the enemy will not be able to begin to carry out his planned intentions at the right time. The German side, taking into account the general military situation (the aggravation of the situation in the Mediterranean!), will be deprived of much-needed reserves, since they will already be involved and spent. “I consider the planned Operation Citadel a mistake, for which I will have to pay a serious price later.” Despite the considerations presented to him, Hitler did not deviate from his plan. The military diary of the Wehrmacht High Command records the following about this: “The Fuhrer ordered Operation Citadel. This is the first major offensive operation this year. The attack on Kursk is given exclusively important. It should give us back the initiative. The victory at Kursk will impress the whole world as a harbinger of decisive events...” “In the Kursk area, our troops that have gone on the offensive are moving forward very slowly due to stubborn enemy resistance. Numerous enemy counterattacks were repulsed. On the front of the 2nd Tank Army, the enemy resumed strong tank attacks in three sectors of our breakthrough, where he managed to somewhat push back the German units. In other directions of the Eastern Front there are battles of local significance...” “The offensive grouping of troops of Army Group South has advanced somewhat. The enemy is launching counterattacks along the entire front of the 9th Army, but they are successfully repulsed..." “The enemy continues the counter-offensive, supported by strong artillery fire, tanks and aircraft. Attacks against the 17th, 6th and 1st Tank Army were either repulsed or localized. In the Kharkov-Oryol area, the front line is being held. North-west of Orel, the enemy, counterattacking with superior forces, managed to achieve success in several places. Due to the fierce counterattacks of the enemy, the further implementation of Operation Citadel seems impossible. The offensive is stalling..." A situation arose that I predicted in my report on assessing the enemy. As you know, Operation Citadel was the last attempt by the Germans to take offensive action during the Russian campaign. This attempt in July 1943 failed. Military happiness in Russia has finally turned its back on us. German troops were forced to go on the defensive and were no longer able to take the initiative into their own hands. The Foreign Armies of the East department continued to carry out its tasks. We tried, to the best of our ability, to provide the command with the necessary data for decision-making, made thoughtful assessments of the enemy’s position, and predicted his actions. And the more our assumptions and assessments were confirmed by the course of subsequent events, the less the “arbiter of military destinies” Hitler listened to them, although these data were regularly used in the reports of the chief General Staff. We not only promptly, but also persistently reported to the command about the plans and intentions of the Soviets. The department used a variety of analysis and forecasting techniques, including drawing up diagrams and schedules. If we compare the diagrams of the directions and areas of deployment of Soviet reconnaissance and sabotage groups that we identified, drawn up several weeks before the start of the Soviet offensive on November 1, 1944, when they crossed the Vistula, with the course of the actual development of subsequent events, then the conclusion involuntarily suggests itself: how accurate even according to these intelligence data could be used to judge the intentions and operational directions of the offensive actions planned by the Russians. The IAV department operated successfully throughout the war. This was greatly facilitated by the fact that the Chiefs of the General Staff (Halder, Zeitzler and Guderian) and the Chiefs of Operations (General Heusinger and his successors) always supported the department and me personally and defended me from all attacks, no matter where they came from. My reasoning and arguments will achieve their goal only if it becomes clear from them that: 1) the military and political leadership of the country must fully use the capabilities of the intelligence service and carefully listen to its assessments and forecasts; 2) mistakes and criminal inaction, no matter how high goals and compelling reasons they are justified, as evidenced by the distant past and present times, can lead to dire consequences. From the book If it weren't for the generals! [Problems of the military class] author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich From the book Stalin's Assassins. The main secret of the 20th century author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich“Citadel” And Operation “Citadel” (Battle of Kursk) was decisive for the Germans in the sense that the Battle of Kursk was their last battle, in which they still hoped to defeat the Soviet Union militarily. This is the last strategically active action of the Germans: after Kursk they From the book The Protracted Blitzkrieg. Why Germany lost the war author Westphal SiegfriedMilitary operations in the summer of 1943 Operation Citadel The views of individual representatives of the German command regarding the most appropriate method of conducting combat operations in the East in the summer of 1943 differed sharply. However, it was clear to everyone that a major From the book World War II author Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich"Citadel" The deciphered "Enigma" allowed the Western Allies to monitor "Citadel" starting on April 15, when Hitler explained to his commanders the goal of the upcoming operation: "to achieve success quickly and completely" in order to seize the initiative for the entire summer. "Victory From the book Comrades to the end. Memoirs of the commanders of the Panzer-Grenadier Regiment "Der Fuhrer". 1938–1945 by Weidinger OttoMay-December 1943 Operation Citadel The new commander of the SS regiment "Der Führer", SS-Obersturmbannführer Stadler, would like to preface the story of the period when the regiment was under his command with the following considerations. last time in the East the German army From the book War Diaries of the Luftwaffe. Chronicle of the fighting of the German Air Force in World War II by Becker CaiusChapter 3 OPERATION CITADEL Fast forward five months. After the loss of the 6th Army with its nineteen divisions, the Germans suffered other defeats on the Eastern Front. The entire territory extending to the Caucasus, conquered during the summer offensive of 1942, in From the book Japan in the War of 1941-1945. [with illustrations] author Hattori Takushiro From the book Secrets of the Mountain Crimea author Fadeeva Tatyana MikhailovnaThe citadel of Cape Teshkli-burun is a natural bastion: to turn this long and narrow cliff, bounded on all sides by cliffs, into a fortress, it was enough to cross the isthmus connecting it to the plateau, defensive structure 102 m long and 2.8 m thick. It consists of From the book Tank Ace No. 1 by Mikael Wittmann author Vasilchenko Andrey VyacheslavovichChapter 3. OPERATION “CITADEL” Since the events associated with the Battle of Kursk are covered in detail in many books and scientific publications, we will outline the strategic situation that developed by the summer of 1943 with only general strokes. Recapture of Kharkov by German troops From the book Tragedy Brest Fortress. Anthology of feat. June 22 - July 23, 1941 author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich From the book Loss and Retribution author Moshchansky Ilya BorisovichCitadel After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Brest area, the defense of the Brest Fortress itself continued for several more months. Three periods of defense of the citadel can be distinguished: the first - from June 22 to 30, the second - from June 30 to July 23, the third from July 23 to September 1941. There are also From the book Encyclopedia of the Third Reich author Voropaev Sergey“Citadel” (Citadel), the German code name for the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. In the hope of turning the tide of the war in the East, the Wehrmacht Supreme Command decided to deliver a massive blow to the enemy simultaneously from the north - from Orel and from the south - from Kharkov. From the book Frontiers of Glory author Moshchansky Ilya BorisovichOperation Citadel July 5–23, 1943 (Defensive battles on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge July 5–12, 1943) This chapter is devoted to the defensive actions of Soviet troops during the German offensive Operation Citadel from July 5 to July 23, 1943. Day after day From the book Japan in the War of 1941-1945. author Hattori Takushiro3. The first operation at Akyab and the operation to destroy the remnants of the enemy in Northern Burma The counter-offensive of the Anglo-Indian troops, which unfolded on the front in the Akyab region (Burma) at the end of 1942, and our counterattack operations had great importance For From the book Capital of the Theodorites author Dombrovsky O ICitadel Of Mangup's buildings, the citadel has been preserved more completely than others. It consists of a defensive wall, as if cutting off the Leaky Cape from the floor side, a gate covered with a box vault, and a two-story donjon located in the middle of the wall. When was the first time From the book History Soviet Union: Volume 2. From Patriotic War to the position of a second world power. Stalin and Khrushchev. 1941 - 1964 by Boffa GiuseppeOperation Citadel There was a pause in combat operations due to the spring thaw. As the year before, both sides used it to refine their plans. The Soviet command intended to resume the offensive, which was so abruptly interrupted, as before German code name for the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. By this time, it became clear to Hitler’s command that it would not be possible to conquer the USSR quickly, and it was no longer possible to count on a “blitzkrieg” - a lightning war. The Red Army was pushing the Wehrmacht troops to the west. Most of all, Soviet troops advanced westward in the Kursk region, where a large protrusion arose - an arc 600 km long; where Soviet troops penetrated deeply into the location of German troops. When planning military operations for the summer of 1943, the Wehrmacht command set the task of undermining the offensive power of the Soviet troops and regaining the strategic initiative. In April 1943, the German command developed a plan for Operation Citadel, the goal of which was to defeat the Soviet troops in Kursk Bulge, which would then make it possible to launch a general offensive against Moscow. In Operation Citadel, the German command decided to demonstrate new military equipment - heavy Tiger tanks, medium tanks - Panther, heavy self-propelled guns of the Ferdinand type. The German command decided to deliver the main blow with tank formations and corps. The offensive was to be carried out by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal G.Kh. von Kluge and "South" by Field Marshal E. von Manstein. In the offensive area, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people; 16.5 thousand tanks, 2 thousand aircraft. The Soviet command became aware of the main provisions of Operation Citadel. On the Kursk Bulge, it was decided to create a strong defense, wear down the enemy on the defensive, and then, introducing fresh reserves, launch a counteroffensive and a general offensive. As a result of gigantic work, the Soviet command concentrated troops and material resources, for the first time since the beginning of the war, ensuring superiority of forces and means over the enemy: 1.3 million people; 3.4 thousand tanks, 3 thousand aircraft. The German offensive was to begin on July 5 at 3 am. But at dawn on July 5 at 2:20 a.m. unexpectedly for the German side, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts launched a pre-emptive massive artillery strike on the areas where German attack groups were concentrated. The German command, which did not expect this, was forced to postpone the offensive to a later time. From the very first hours German offensive began to choke. Only after 5-6 days of battles did the Nazis manage to wedge themselves into the Soviet defenses to a depth of 8-10 km in some areas. Then Field Marshal E. von Manstein decided to make a breakthrough with tanks in the area of the village of Prokhorovka. These plans also became known to the Soviet command. Additional tank units were urgently transferred to the Prokhorovka area. On June 12, the largest event occurred near Prokhorovka tank battle in world history: 1,200 tanks took part in it on both sides. On the Prokhorovsky field, the enemy left 400 tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers. Defensive battles on the Central Front were completed on July 12, on the Voronezh Front - on July 23. On July 12, the offensive of Soviet troops began in the Oryol direction with the forces of the Central, Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, and on August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The plan for Operation Citadel failed. Operation Citadel is one of the most striking and terrible events of the Second World War. On July 5, 1943, German troops launched a full-scale offensive in the Kursk area. With the support of artillery and aviation, tank formations launched a powerful blow in the direction of Prokhorovka. Their task was to break through the defenses and encircle the Soviet group. This was the beginning of the end of the Second World War, Operation Citadel. Revenge for the lost Stalingrad1943 The Germans continue to retreat along the entire front. Having been defeated at Moscow and Stalingrad, they still hope to change the course of the war. Adolf Hitler wants to take revenge on the Kursk Bulge. The Fuhrer is personally involved in the development of the operation, which he called “Citadel”. With attacks from the north, west, south, the Germans want to destroy the powerful Soviet group, and then launch an offensive on the Don, Volga and Moscow. The Fuhrer's strategic plansSmall station Prokhorovka Yuzhnaya railway Russia... It was here, according to the plan of the German command, that the decisive battle was to take place. It was planned that German tanks would go behind the rear of the Soviet troops, encircle them and destroy them. For this purpose, a powerful tank armada was brought here. The tanks had already been brought to the front lines. The Germans were preparing for the decisive push, the plan for Operation Citadel was ready to be executed. They knew that the Soviet command had brought huge tank forces here. However, Soviet T-34 tanks were inferior in armor thickness and firepower to the latest German Tigers. According to intelligenceThe outcome of the battle could only be decided by accurate information about the enemy’s forces and plans. Even before the war, the British managed to get hold of the German Enigma encryption machine. With its help, they deciphered secret German codes and obtained extremely important military information. According to the agreement between England and the USSR, which was concluded at the very beginning of the war, both sides undertook to inform each other about Hitler's plans. The secret center for deciphering German codes was located in Bletchley Park, 60 miles from London. Carefully vetted, qualified specialists processed the intercepted encoded information here. It was impossible to imagine that a foreign intelligence agent could penetrate here. And yet he penetrated. His name was John Cairncross. This man belonged to the legendary group Soviet intelligence officers, "Cambridge Five". The information that John Cairncross will convey to Moscow will be invaluable. Secret information from Cairncross1943 At the Kursk Bulge, the fascists decided to take revenge for the defeats inflicted on them. This time they were confident of victory. But the German command did not yet know that Germany’s military operations were already known in the Kremlin. Top secret information from John Cairncross contained details of the latest German military technology. The Soviet command became aware of details about the power, maneuverability and armor protection of combat vehicles. The agent reported on the latest tests at German testing grounds. For the first time, information was received about new and powerful tanks"tiger", which the Soviet command had no idea about. The Germans created a type of armor in which the armor-piercing shells of the Red Army were powerless. Thanks to such secret information in the Soviet Union for short time were able to produce new shells capable of making holes in fascist tank armor. The intelligence officer's information about the metal composition of the armor and its properties was received in April 1943, three months before the start of the Battle of Kursk. Preparing for the upcoming battleThe Soviet side was able to take emergency measures to develop new weapons that would penetrate this armor. The tests were carried out in the strictest secrecy. At that time, the entire industry of the Soviet Union worked for the war. After the completion of the tests, mass production of shells capable of destroying German “tigers” began. At the same time, Soviet tanks were modernized. In record time, the rear provided the army with the necessary weapons. There was a continuous stream of military equipment and Combat vehicles. Thousands of German aircraft were based near the front line. The Fuhrer assigned a special role to Luftwaffe pilots in the operation on the Kursk Bulge. "Citadel" (military operation) as the Wehrmacht's last chanceOn July 1, 1943, Adolf Hitler returned to his "Wolf's Lair" command post in East Prussia. There will be no more delay. The day of Operation Citadel is set: July 4th. A. Hitler said: “We need a victory at Kursk to dispel the darkness in the hearts of our allies. Remembering the previous names of military operations, we can say that this is nothing. Only the Citadel will become the turning point of great Germany.” Despite the intensifying Allied bombing, some Nazi troops were transferred to the east. Although many divisions were understrength, the total number of troops participating in Operation Citadel was quite impressive. Among them are the most experienced soldiers and officers, a large number of soldier from the famous SS troops. The morale of the German military personnel was high. The defeat at Stalingrad had not yet been forgotten. The battle for the city named after Stalin involved mainly soldiers of the Italian and Romanian armies. This time, unreliable allies will not participate in the battle on the Kursk Bulge. Only victory will turn the tide of the warHitler decreed that Operation Citadel would be 100% a German affair. This confidence was reinforced by the large amount of modern equipment that arrived at the front every day. The airfields were unusually concentrated powerful forces Luftwaffe. In reality, all the weapons that Hitler intended to bring into battle in this battle were comparable to the amount prepared for the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. However, the sheer scale of the upcoming battle worried Adolf Hitler, and he ordered that no public announcement of the upcoming Operation Citadel be made in advance. The Fuhrer said: “The mere thought of this turns me over, but I see no other way out.” Morale of the Red ArmyGermany faced an enemy that bore no resemblance to the pitiful battalions that had so easily surrendered in the early stages of the war. The Myth of Invincibility German army was dispelled at Stalingrad. The defense capability of the Soviet side was strengthened. As a result, the superiority of our defense industry over the German military industry became noticeable. This superiority was manifested not only in quantity, but also in quality. In German military factories, products that did not meet accuracy standards were rejected. There was no culling at Soviet factories. Unusable shells were used as warheads for missiles. German infantrymen hardly cursed anything more than Soviet Katyushas. Operation Citadel beginsAt dawn on July 5, 1943, the Germans were waiting for the signal to attack. The first signal was given, but from the Soviet side. Having secret information about the start of the secret operation "Citadel", the Soviet command decided to strike first. More than 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns came together in a decisive battle on both sides in the Battle of Prokhorov. The Germans did not expect that our T-34 tanks would be able to hit the strong, heavy-duty armor of the Tigers. In fifty days, the Nazis lost half a million of their soldiers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 1,700 aircraft on these fields. These losses for Nazi Germany turned out to be irreparable. Didn't take it by surpriseMarshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) learned quite early about the upcoming Operation Citadel. Zhukov's headquarters guessed about the offensive. Hitler was very tempted to take revenge after the Battle of Stalingrad. During May and June 1943, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov ordered the laying of three deep belts of minefields along the perimeter of the arc. Before the start of this monumental battle, Soviet troops had numerical superiority. Against 900 thousand German soldiers, G. K. Zhukov fielded 1 million 400 thousand. The superiority of the Soviet troops was especially noticeable in artillery. They had 20 thousand guns, which is twice as many as the enemy. The Red Army deployed 3,600 tanks against 2,700 German ones, 2,400 planes against 2,000 Luftwaffe planes. Anxiety before the attackBy July 4, two large attacking groups were brought to full combat readiness. An atmosphere of gloomy anticipation reigned in the German troops, the reason for this was Operation Citadel. The Second World War gave many people the bitter taste of defeat and sweet taste victories Everyone knew that even for the greatest victories, soldiers always pay a high price. Tomorrow may not always come. Ten minutes before the German columns were supposed to begin moving, the Soviet side began artillery counter-preparation. It was an ominous warning. Start of the offensiveLarge attacking groups entered the battle. The skies filled with the roar of aircraft engines as thousands of aircraft from the two German fleets took to the air. On the first day, the 9th Army, whose armored forces were commanded by Field Marshal Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891-1945), advanced from the north to the south, advancing seven miles. The movement of the army from the south was led by Field Marshal General Manstein, Erich von (1887-1973). She walked 11 miles deep into Soviet territory. It was an encouraging success that barely resembled a blitzkrieg. The Soviet minefields turned out to be very deep, and the troops dug in were well prepared for defense. Imperfections of German technologyThe offensive continued, and the German troops encountered increasing difficulties. First of all, it turned out that specifications their tanks turned out to be worse than promised. The mechanical part of the “tigers” increasingly failed. By the end of the first day, out of 200 of these tanks, only 40 were fully suitable for combat. In the air, numerical superiority gradually also passed to the Russians. By the third day, the Germans had disabled more than 450 Soviet tanks. But the enemy still had superiority in armored forces. The Germans were especially disheartened by the fact that the Soviet military equipment, without any doubt, overtook the German one. The Soviets succeeded where Germany failed. The T-34 tank, previously familiar to the Germans, was equipped with a heavy 122-mm cannon. The Nazis heard rumors of even more formidable machines. The German offensive was difficult. Although slowly, Hitler’s two armies gradually moved closer together. Especially Field Marshal Manstein, Erich von, had a slight advantage. The Soviet style of command underwent noticeable radical changes. Field commanders Marshal G.K. Zhukov mastered the skill of tactical withdrawal and probing counterattacks, and they lured German tanks into traps. The Soviets also invented other methods. They created the so-called front package - a complex tactical grouping designed for both offense and defense. His first line consisted of formidable Katyusha installations, followed by heavy artillery positions. When the latter did their job, the heavy tanks moved forward, carrying with them the infantry, which moved on board the lighter tanks. Operation Citadel began to crack. The constant order of attack of the front package allowed the Germans to develop the necessary countermeasures. But this did not help, such attacks still caused serious damage to the Wehrmacht soldiers. After a week of brutal and uncompromising fighting, the German armored forces were significantly weakened, and the German command was forced to withdraw some of its units from the line of fire. This was required for a respite and regrouping of troops. Battle of ProkhorovkaThe Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel) marked a decisive turning point in World War II. Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, and nothing could stop this impulse. From this moment on, Hitler's troops would never go on the offensive again. They will only retreat. On July 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov launched a counteroffensive in the north of the arc, in the Orel area. The preliminary maneuvering produced unexpected but very serious consequences. On this day, 700 German tanks of the 4th Army advanced near the small village of Prokhorovka. By coincidence, 850 Soviet tanks from the 5th Guards Tank Army were moving in the opposite direction. Neither side was aware of the other's approach until the tank crews, to their great horror, saw approaching enemy tanks through the viewing slits. Two large columns collided with each other. The result was a battle unprecedented in scale. Never before or since have such a number of tanks - more than one and a half thousand - taken part in one battle. This unprepared clash was not justified by strategic decisions. Once the battle began, there was no tactical planning and no clear unified command. The tanks fought separately, firing directly. The equipment collided with the enemy’s equipment, mercilessly crushing it, or dying under its tracks. Among the tank crews of the Red Army, this battle became a legend and went down in history as a death raid. Eternal memory to the heroesFrom July 5 to July 16, 1943, Operation Citadel continued. The Second World War saw many glorious military victories. However, this battle occupies a special place in human memory. Today only monuments remind of past battles on Kursk land. Thousands of people contributed to this momentous victory, earning the admiration and memory of posterity. To more accurately explain how Operation Citadel took place, it is necessary to introduce some military concepts. Under front line refers to a straight line along the entire length of which troops are located. It should not be interrupted or take other forms, since the effectiveness of defense depends on this. However, during combat operations on the front line, for various reasons, so-called "protrusions" and "dips". As a rule, the warring parties try to eliminate them, that is, to level the front line. When this fails, a strategic and tactical game begins around these ledges. This is what happened with the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. The ledge was formed during the Ostrog-Rossoshan operation in the winter of 1943. The 60th Army of General Chernyakhovsky, as part of the Voronezh Front, broke through the enemy’s defenses on January 25, liberated Voronezh and advanced 150 kilometers without encountering resistance. There were 25 kilometers left to Kursk, and the offensive potential of the army was not exhausted. Our units rushed to the Kursk area and on February 8 the city was liberated. After this, the troops switched to positional defense. This is how the Kursk ledge was formed. Subsequently it received the name "Kursk Bulge". Objectives and position of the parties on the eve of the operationIn the spring of 1943, it became clear that the main summer campaign would develop in the Kursk salient. The German army suffered a number of defeats this year. In particular, The Battle of Stalingrad was lost, a turning point came in the battle for the Caucasus, not counting many less significant defeats. The offensive initiative was slipping away from the hands of the Wehrmacht army. Hitler needed a major victory to continue his strategic offensive. In addition, it would have a huge propaganda effect, showing the whole world the futility of resisting the German armed forces.
Operation Citadel was the last attempt by the German army to maintain the strategic initiative. By the summer the Red Army had a number of successes. In addition to those listed above, this was the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad, Operation Mars near Rzhev, the liquidation of the Demyansk bridgehead and others like them. In the spring of 1943, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Front switched to a deliberate defense in the Kursk region. In April 1943, reports, texts and plans of the Nazis with a detailed description of Operation Citadel fell into the hands of the command. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to prepare a deeply echeloned defense on the Kursk ledge, with the creation of strong second echelons and reserves. The depth of defense in some areas reached three hundred kilometers. The total length of trenches, trenches and communication passages was approximately ten thousand kilometers. The main ideas were:
To ensure the stability of defense and carry out unexpected tasks, the Steppe Military District was created with its center in Voronezh. Balance of forces and means. Preparing for battleBy the beginning of July, the Red Army in the Kursk direction managed to achieve some numerical superiority. The overall superiority of forces and means over the Germans at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk was as follows:
Here, Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy by 1.5 times in personnel, 1.8 times in artillery, and 1.5 times in tanks.
The superiority of our troops was 1.4 times in personnel, 2 times in artillery, and 1.1 times in tanks. Hitler attracted selected units to Operation Citadel. In total, 50 divisions (of which 16 tank divisions), 3 separate tank battalions, and 8 assault gun divisions were concentrated in the Kursk direction. Many formations, such as “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, “Adolf Hitler” were the elite of the Wehrmacht. The most experienced generals were chosen for the operation. New types of equipment and weapons from Germany arrived in the combat area. German industry has mastered serial production the latest tanks"Tiger", "Panther" self-propelled units"Ferdinand". In addition, 65% of all combat aircraft were involved in the operation. For two months, the combat unification of units was carried out, the development of new equipment was carried out, and exercises were held in the depths of the defense on the topic of upcoming military operations. Numerical superiority was on the side of the troops of the Soviet Union and did not allow the Nazis to carry out a successful offensive operation. However, the army group commanders managed to create the necessary superiority in certain sectors of the front and achieve the required artillery density to begin the operation. By July, the command of the Soviet troops had also completed planning and preparation for the battle. The two fronts received serious reinforcements from April to July. Namely 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank fighter brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 8 guards mortar regiments, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. In terms of the number of weapons, these are 5,635 guns, 3,522 mortars, 1,294 aircraft. In the front defense zones, eight defensive lines up to three hundred kilometers deep were prepared, with engineering and minefields. Classes, drills and exercises were conducted. The combat unification has been completed, the interaction between the military branches has been worked out. Progress of hostilitiesOn the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, formations and units of the enemy's 9th Army concentrated in the initial areas for the offensive. The troops of the Central Front prepared for defense. The Soviet command knew not only the date, but also the time of the start of the offensive. Therefore, our troops launched a pre-emptive strike, the so-called artillery counter-preparation. The Germans suffered their first losses, the effect of surprise was lost, and troop control was disrupted. The Nazi offensive began at 5.30 am on July 5 after artillery and air preparation. On the first day, with the fifth attack, the Nazis managed to break through the defenses of the first echelon and penetrate no more than 6-8 kilometers in depth. On July 6, the enemy again launched an offensive with artillery and air preparation. The Soviet command launched a counterattack, but it did not have much effect; it was only possible to push the enemy back by 1-2 kilometers in some areas. In the first two days, our fighter aircraft were carried away in air battles with Nazi fighters and left enemy bombers unattended. Taking advantage of this opportunity, they broke through the defenses, and the bombs successfully reached the target. This error was subsequently fixed. On July 7 and 8, battles took place for the second line of defense. The enemy brought in more and more forces, but our troops successfully held back the attacks. On July 9, the German command involved almost all the formations that were part of the 9th Army in the battle. The commander had only one tank division and one infantry division left in reserve. On July 12, the offensive resumed, but due to attacks by Soviet troops on the Bryansk Front north of the Kursk ledge, the Wehrmacht headquarters ordered the troops of the 9th Army to go on the defensive. On the southern front, events developed somewhat differently. Here, the German offensive operations began on July 4, but the main operation unfolded the next day. After lengthy artillery preparation and air raids, the Nazis went on the offensive. It was carried out by units and formations of the 4th Panzer Army of the Kempf Task Force in two directions of the main attacks. On the first day, the Germans were able to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 8-10 km and continued their offensive towards the flanks. And on the night of July 6, we reached the second line of defense of our troops, gradually introducing fresh forces and increasing the pressure. On July 7-8, the enemy continued to increase their efforts and slowly advanced. At the same time, an air battle broke out in the air. In the first three days, our pilots conducted more than 80 air battles and shot down over 100 Luftwaffe aircraft. By July 9, the reserves of the Voronezh Front were exhausted, and the enemy continued to introduce more and more new forces. In the current conditions, the Headquarters ordered the transfer of two armies from the Steppe Military District to the front commander and the promotion of three more to the Kursk-Belgorod direction. On July 10-11, a crisis had already emerged in the enemy’s actions. The Nazis made a roundabout maneuver towards Prokhorovka. There, on July 12, the largest military history tank battle. According to various estimates, up to 1,200 tanks took part in it on both sides. German tank The Tiger was superior to the T-34 in its combat capabilities, but the Soviet troops gained the upper hand in this battle. The enemy had exhausted all offensive potential and, having failed to achieve a breakthrough to the city of Kursk from the south, began to retreat.
Results and significance of Operation CitadelHitler lost the Battle of Kursk. The battle, which should have ended with the rapid encirclement of a million-strong group of Soviet troops, ended in complete collapse for the Wehrmacht. From this defeat Hitler's Germany never recovered.
Fairly shabby fascist army, having lost all her fighting spirit, continued her shameful retreat. |
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