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Offensive Operation Citadel(July 5 - July 12, 1943) - summer strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk bridgehead; upon detection of waste Soviet troops it was planned to deliver cutting blows from the top of the Kursk ledge.

The goal of the offensive is “to encircle the enemy troops located in the Kursk area and destroy them through a concentric offensive.” At the same time, it was supposed to “make wide use of the moment of surprise,” “ensure maximum massing of striking forces in a narrow area,” and “carry out an offensive at the fastest possible pace.”

The successful completion of the Citadel offensive should “free up forces for subsequent tasks, especially mobile formations,” and the planned victory at Kursk by the Nazi command should be a torch for the whole world.

To repel the summer offensive of the Germans, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, with the direct participation of the headquarters of the Military Fleet and the Central Front, developed a strategic plan for the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, which was a series of interrelated strategic operations fronts of both defensive and offensive nature. Directly to disrupt the offensive according to the Citadel plan, a deliberate defense operation was developed, which received (after successful completion) the name Kursk strategic defensive operation (July 5 - 23). Distinctive feature This (judging by the name) defensive battle was an offensive action (counterattacks) of the Soviet troops, planned both in advance and during the battles on the Northern and Southern fronts of the Kursk Bulge.

The Germans were never able to strike at the top of the Kursk salient; The Soviet command managed to use all the strategic advantages of the Kursk bridgehead, delivering a powerful blow from its western part (top) of the army groups of the Central Front and the Air Force in the Kiev and Sumy directions.

Planning a spring-summer campaign

In the spring of 1943, Hitler’s leadership was faced with the task of developing a further strategic line and a combat plan for the summer period.

March 1943

Operational order of Wehrmacht Headquarters No. 5

In conclusion, it talks about the preparation time - “To report to the army group commanders on their plans by March 25”.

Order from Hitler's Headquarters of March 22, 1943

April 1943

Reports from the headquarters of the Central Front and the Military Fleet

The offensive, originally scheduled for May 3, was first postponed by decision of the Fuhrer on April 29, since the tank, self-propelled and anti-tank equipment of the attacking divisions turned out to be insufficient compared to the powerful enemy defense system. Based on likely delivery times for equipment for heavy tanks and anti-tank guns The start of the operation is scheduled for June 12. Events in the Mediterranean region, however, caused a new postponement of Operation Citadel. However, on June 18, the Fuhrer, taking into account the considerations of the operational leadership headquarters, finally spoke out in favor of carrying out the offensive Operation Citadel. On June 21, the Fuhrer scheduled the offensive for July 3, and on June 25 he set the final date of July 5.

From the diary of military operations of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht

The Diary also talks about information cover for the operation, in connection with which the chief of staff of the operational leadership gave instructions to the head of the propaganda department regarding the Citadel offensive:

Widespread propaganda of the offensive power of the troops is necessary without revealing the tasks for this year in the East. Our true intentions - an attack with a limited purpose - must not be revealed. Therefore, it is advisable to imagine the situation in such a way that the offensive was launched by the Russians, but was thwarted by our defensive actions, which turned into a counteroffensive, which led to the defeat of the enemy. Such a depiction of the situation will reduce the offensive power of the enemy and emphasize the power of our defenses and reserves in the East. Thanks to this, the opening of a second front by the Allies can be delayed until the end of the fighting in the East.

June 1943

Northern group

“It is assumed that the enemy is preparing his own offensive operation in case our operation is not carried out. (This refers to the Oryol offensive operation “Kutuzov”. - E. Shch.)"

Southern group

Crisis of the offensive operation "Citadel"

Northern front

South face

Meeting on July 11 in Dolbino

The issue of introducing reserves was raised at a meeting on the morning of July 11, 1943 (Dolbino station, on the Belgorod - Kharkov stretch), which E. von Manstein also does not mention in his memoirs. Nevertheless, V. Zamulin writes that the field marshal “was forced to gather all the commanders and their chiefs of staff at Dolbino station (on the Belgorod-Kharkov stretch) in order to resolve the issue”:

An excerpt from the transcript of the discussion, according to V. Zamulin, “paints a bleak picture that emerged after six days of the offensive of the most powerful Wehrmacht group on Eastern Front» :

“Manstein: The turn to the south and the movement in a southern direction must be carried out by more than one division. An offensive in the northeast (Prokhorovka direction - Z.V.) is still possible now, but will be impossible later, since the enemy has concentrated new tank forces in this area (in the Prokhorovka area - Z.V.). If the attack of the 3rd Tank Corps is unsuccessful, then it should go on the defensive and it will be possible to use its formations on the right flank (4th Tank A. - Z.V.) or north of Oboyan to develop an offensive in a westerly direction. The 24th Tank will not arrive until July 17, and is planned to be used for the attack in a western direction if the 3rd Tank still cannot be used for this. Fangor: It would be good if the 2nd SS Tank Tank continued its offensive to the northeast (towards Prokhorovka - Z.V.), since everything planned earlier was built with this in mind. And what would be better for a strike to the south/southeast (towards the 3rd tank tank - Z.V.) to use the 24th tank tank, and not the 2nd tank tank of the SS.

Manstein: The 24th Tank will arrive too late and suggested that the commander of the 4th Tank consider the option in which the 16th Tank Division would be used to help the attacking 3rd Tank in the northern direction.”

Zamulia V.N. 3forgotten battle of the Fire Arc. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2009.

Order XXIV of the Labor Code on regrouping

Manstein writes that “the XXIV Tank, due to the threat of an enemy offensive on the Donetsk front, was subordinated to the group, but not for its free use.” Zamulin V.N. cites archival data that says “on the evening of July 12, when there was still no talk of stopping the operation, Manstein gave a number of orders to implement the plan for a further offensive. Thus, at 21.10 he sent an order to V. Nering to regroup the formation in Belgorod area:

“SS Panzer Division “Viking” - to the Belgorod area, namely: Bolkhovets (5 km north-west Belgorod - Bolkhovets road) - 6 km south-west. roads Belgorod - Repnoye. 23rd tank division- in the areas of Dolzhik, Orlovka, Bessonovka, Almazovka. The support group of the II Tank SS, located in this area, immediately, secretly for enemy reconnaissance, roll up to liberate the territory ""

NARA, T. 313, R. 366, f. 00421

As we can see, on July 12 at least two tank divisions were transferred to Belgorod, and "Support Group II TK SS" was already there.

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