home Health technologies The first missile carriers. Weapon of Victory: Katyusha multiple launch rocket system

The first missile carriers. Weapon of Victory: Katyusha multiple launch rocket system

When, at range shooting, soldiers and commanders asked a GAU representative to name the “true” name of the combat installation, he advised: “Name the installation as usual artillery piece. This is important for maintaining secrecy."

There is no single version of why the BM-13 began to be called “Katyusha”. There are several assumptions:

1After the title of Blanter’s song, which became popular before the war, based on the words of Isakovsky< КАТЮША>.

The version is convincing, since the battery first fired on July 14, 1941 at a gathering of fascists on Bazarnaya Square in the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. She was shooting from a high steep mountain at direct fire - the association with the high steep bank in the song immediately arose among the fighters. Finally, the former sergeant of the headquarters company of the 217th separate communications battalion of the 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army, Andrei Sapronov, is alive, now a military historian, who gave it this name. Red Army soldier Kashirin, having arrived with him at the battery after the shelling of Rudnya, exclaimed in surprise: “What a song!” “Katyusha,” answered Andrei Sapronov. Through the communications center of the headquarters company, the news about a miracle weapon called “Katyusha” within 24 hours became the property of the entire 20th Army, and through its command, the entire country. On July 13, 2010, the veteran and “godfather” of Katyusha turned 89 years old.

2By the abbreviation “KAT” - there is a version that this is what the rangers called the BM-13 - “Kostikovsky automatic thermal” (according to another source - “Cumulative artillery thermal”), after the name of the project manager, (however, given the secrecy of the project, the possibility of exchanging information between rangers and front-line soldiers is doubtful).

3Another option is that the name is associated with the “K” index on the mortar body - the installations were produced by the Kalinin plant (according to another source, by the Comintern plant). And front-line soldiers loved to give nicknames to their weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed “Mother”, the ML-20 howitzer gun was nicknamed “Emelka”. Yes, and the BM-13 was at first sometimes called “Raisa Sergeevna,” thus deciphering the abbreviation RS (missile).

4The fourth version suggests that this is what the girls from the Moscow Kompressor plant who worked on the assembly dubbed these cars.

5Another, exotic version. The guides on which the projectiles were mounted were called ramps. The forty-two-kilogram projectile was lifted by two fighters harnessed to the straps, and the third usually helped them, pushing the projectile so that it lay exactly on the guides, and he also informed those holding that the projectile stood up, rolled, and rolled onto the guides. It was allegedly called “Katyusha” - the role of those holding the projectile and the one rolling it was constantly changing, since the crew of the BM-13, unlike cannon artillery, was not explicitly divided into loader, aimer, etc.

6 It should also be noted that the installations were so secret that it was even forbidden to use the commands “fire”, “fire”, “volley”, instead they were sounded “sing” or “play” (to start it was necessary to turn the handle of the electric coil very quickly), that , may also have been related to the song “Katyusha”. And for the infantry, a salvo of Katyusha rockets was the most pleasant music.

7There is an assumption that the initial nickname “Katyusha” was a front-line bomber equipped with rockets - an analogue of the M-13. And this nickname jumped from an airplane to a rocket launcher through the same shells.

And more interesting facts about the names of BM-13:

On the Northwestern Front, the installation was initially called “Raisa Sergeevna”, thus decoding RS - that is, a rocket.

In the German troops, these machines were called “Stalin's organs” due to the external resemblance of the rocket launcher to the pipe system of this musical instrument and the powerful stunning roar that was produced when the missiles were launched.

During the battles for Poznan and Berlin, the M-30 and M-31 single-launch installations received the nickname “Russian Faustpatron” from the Germans, although these shells were not used as an anti-tank weapon. From a distance of 100-200 meters, the guards pierced any walls using these shells.

Since the advent of rocket artillery - RA, its units have been subordinate to the Supreme High Command. They were used to strengthen the rifle divisions defending in the first echelon, which significantly increased their firepower and increased stability in defensive combat. The requirements for the use of new weapons are massiveness and surprise.

It is also worth noting that during the Great Patriotic War, the Katyusha repeatedly fell into the hands of the enemy (the first was captured on August 22, 1941, southeast of Staraya Russa by the 56th motorized corps of Manstein, and the BM-8-24 installation, captured on Leningrad Front, even became a prototype of the German rocket launchers 8 cm Raketen-Vielfachwerfer.

During the Battle of Moscow, due to the difficult situation at the front, the command was forced to use rocket artillery on a divisional basis. But by the end of 1941, the number of rocket artillery in the troops increased significantly and reached 5-10 divisions in the armies operating in the main direction. Controlling the fire and maneuver of a large number of divisions, as well as supplying them with ammunition and other types of food, became difficult. By decision of the Headquarters, the creation of 20 Guards mortar regiments began in January 1942. “The Guards Mortar Regiment - GMP artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command of the RVG in the state consisted of three divisions of three batteries. Each battery had four combat vehicles. Thus, a salvo of only one division of 12 BM-13-16 GMP vehicles (Headquarters directive No. 002490 prohibited the use of RA in numbers of less than a division) could be compared in strength to a salvo of 12 heavy howitzer regiments of the RVGK (48 152 mm howitzers per regiment) or 18 heavy howitzer brigades of the RVGK (32 152 mm howitzers per brigade).
The emotional effect was also important: during the salvo, all the missiles were fired almost simultaneously - within a few seconds, the ground in the target area was literally plowed up by rockets. The mobility of the installation made it possible to quickly change position and avoid a retaliatory strike from the enemy.

On July 17, 1942, in the area of the village of Nalyuchi, a salvo of 144 launching frames equipped with 300-mm rockets was heard. This was the first use of a somewhat less famous related weapon - "Andryusha".

In July-August 42, the Katyushas (three regiments and a separate division) were the main striking force of the Mobile Mechanized Group of the Southern Front, which held back the advance of the German 1st Tank Army south of Rostov for several days. This is even reflected in the diary of General Halder: “increased Russian resistance south of Rostov”

In August 1942, in the city of Sochi, in the garage of the Caucasian Riviera sanatorium, under the leadership of the head of mobile repair workshop No. 6, military engineer of the 3rd rank A. Alferov, a portable version of the installation was created based on M-8 shells, which was later called the “mountain Katyusha”. The first “mountain Katyushas” entered service with the 20th Mountain Rifle Division and were used in battles at the Goytkh Pass. In February - March 1943, two divisions of “Mountain Katyushas” became part of the troops defending the legendary bridgehead on Malaya Zemlya near Novorossiysk. In addition, 4 installations based on railcars were created at the Sochi locomotive depot, which were used to protect the city of Sochi from the shore. The minesweeper "Skumbria" was equipped with eight installations, which covered the landing on Malaya Zemlya

In September 1943, the Katyusha maneuver along the front line made it possible to carry out a sudden flank attack on the Bryansk Front.During the artillery preparation, 6,000 rocket shells and only 2,000 barrel shells were used up. Eventually German defense It turned out to be “collapsed” in the zone of the entire front - 250 kilometers.

The famous Katyusha launcher was put into production a few hours before the attack Hitler's Germany to the USSR. A multiple launch rocket artillery system was used for massive attacks on areas and had an average effective firing range.

Chronology of the creation of rocket artillery combat vehicles

Gelatin gunpowder was created in 1916 by Russian professor I.P. Grave. The further chronology of the development of rocket artillery of the USSR is as follows:

five years later, already in the USSR, the development of a rocket began by V. A. Artemyev and N. I. Tikhomirov;
in the period 1929 – 1933 a group led by B. S. Petropavlovsky created a prototype of a projectile for MLRS, but the launch units were used on the ground;
rockets entered service with the Air Force in 1938, were labeled RS-82, and were installed on I-15 and I-16 fighters;
in 1939 they were used at Khalkhin Gol, then they began to assemble warheads from RS-82 for SB bombers and L-2 attack aircraft;
starting in 1938, another group of developers - R. I. Popov, A. P. Pavlenko, V. N. Galkovsky and I. I. Gvai - worked on a multi-charge installation of high mobility on a wheeled chassis;
the last successful test before the launch of the BM-13 into mass production ended on June 21, 1941, that is, a few hours before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR.

On the fifth day of the war, the Katyusha apparatus in the amount of 2 combat units entered service with the main artillery department. Two days later, on June 28, the first battery was formed from them and 5 prototypes that participated in the tests.

The first combat salvo of Katyusha officially took place on July 14. The city of Rudnya, occupied by the Germans, was shelled with incendiary shells filled with thermite, and two days later the crossing of the Orshitsa River in the area of the Orsha railway station was fired upon.

History of the nickname Katyusha

Since the history of Katyusha, as the nickname of the MLRS, does not have accurate objective information, there are several plausible versions:

some of the shells had an incendiary filling with the KAT marking, indicating the “Kostikov automatic thermite” charge;
the bombers of the SB squadron, armed with RS-132 shells, taking part in the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, were nicknamed Katyushas;
in the combat units there was a legend about a partisan girl with that name, who became famous for the destruction of a large number of fascists, with whom the Katyusha salvo was compared;
the rocket mortar was marked K (Comintern plant) on its body, and the soldiers liked to give the equipment affectionate nicknames.

The latter is supported by the fact that previously rockets with the designation RS were called Raisa Sergeevna, the ML-20 howitzer Emelei, and the M-30 Matushka, respectively.

However, the most poetic version of the nickname is considered to be the song Katyusha, which became popular just before the war. Correspondent A. Sapronov published a note in the Rossiya newspaper in 2001 about a conversation between two Red Army soldiers immediately after an MLRS salvo, in which one of them called it a song, and the second clarified the name of this song.

Analogues of MLRS nicknames

During the war, the BM rocket launcher with a 132 mm projectile was not the only weapon with own name. Based on the abbreviation MARS, mortar artillery rockets (mortar launchers) received the nickname Marusya.

Mortar MARS - Marusya

Even the German Nebelwerfer towed mortar soviet soldiers They jokingly called him Vanyusha.

Nebelwerfer mortar - Vanyusha

When fired in an area, Katyusha's salvo exceeded the damage from Vanyusha and the more modern analogues of the Germans that appeared at the end of the war. Modifications of the BM-31-12 tried to give the nickname Andryusha, but it did not catch on, so at least until 1945 any domestic MLRS system was called Katyusha.

Characteristics of the BM-13 installation

The BM 13 Katyusha multiple rocket launcher was created to destroy large enemy concentrations, therefore the main technical and tactical characteristics were:

mobility - the MLRS had to quickly deploy, fire several salvos and instantly change position before destroying the enemy;
firepower - from the MP-13 batteries of several installations were formed;
low cost - a subframe was added to the design, which made it possible to assemble the artillery part of the MLRS at the factory and mount it on the chassis of any vehicle.

Thus, the weapon of victory was installed on railway, air and ground transport, and production costs decreased by at least 20%. The side and rear walls of the cabin were armored, and protective plates were installed on the windshield. The armor protected the gas pipeline and fuel tank, which dramatically increased the “survivability” of the equipment and the survivability of combat crews.

The guidance speed has increased due to the modernization of the rotating and lifting mechanisms, stability in the combat and traveling position. Even when deployed, Katyusha could move over rough terrain within a range of several kilometers at low speed.

Combat crew

To operate the BM-13, a crew of at least 5 people and a maximum of 7 people was used:

driver - moving the MLRS, deploying to a firing position;
loaders - 2 - 4 fighters, placing shells on the guides for a maximum of 10 minutes;
gunner - providing aiming with lifting and turning mechanisms;
gun commander - general management, interaction with other crews of the unit.

Since the BM guards rocket mortar began to be produced from the assembly line already during the war, there was no ready-made structure of combat units. First, batteries were formed - 4 MP-13 units and 1 anti-aircraft gun, then a division of 3 batteries.

In one salvo of the regiment, enemy equipment and manpower were destroyed over an area of 70–100 hectares by the explosion of 576 shells fired within 10 seconds. According to Directive 002490, the headquarters prohibited the use of Katyushas of less than a division.

Armament

A Katyusha salvo was fired within 10 seconds with 16 shells, each of which had the following characteristics:

caliber – 132 mm;
weight – glycerin powder charge 7.1 kg, bursting charge 4.9 kg, jet engine 21 kg, combat unit 22 kg, shell with fuse 42.5 kg;
stabilizer blade span – 30 cm;
projectile length - 1.4 m;
acceleration – 500 m/s 2 ;
speed - muzzle 70 m/s, combat 355 m/s;
range – 8.5 km;
funnel – 2.5 m in diameter maximum, 1 m deep maximum;
damage radius - 10 m design, 30 m actual;
deviation - 105 m in range, 200 m lateral.

M-13 projectiles were assigned the ballistic index TS-13.

Launcher

When the war began, the Katyusha salvo was fired from rail guides. Later they were replaced by honeycomb type guides to increase the combat power of the MLRS, then spiral type to increase the accuracy of fire.

To increase accuracy, a special stabilizer device was first used. This was then replaced with spirally arranged nozzles that twisted the rocket during flight, reducing terrain spread.

History of application

In the summer of 1942, BM 13 multiple launch rocket combat vehicles in the amount of three regiments and a reinforcement division became a mobile strike force on the Southern Front and helped hold back the advance of the enemy’s 1st Tank Army near Rostov.

Around the same time, a portable version, the “Mountain Katyusha”, was manufactured in Sochi for the 20th Mountain Rifle Division. In the 62nd Army, an MLRS division was created by installing launchers on the T-70 tank. The city of Sochi was defended from the shore by 4 railcars with M-13 mounts.

During the Bryansk operation (1943), multiple rocket launchers were spread along the entire front, making it possible to distract the Germans to carry out a flank attack. In July 1944, a simultaneous salvo of 144 BM-31 installations sharply reduced the number of accumulated forces of Nazi units.

Local conflicts

Chinese troops used 22 MLRS during artillery preparation before the Battle of Triangle Hill during the Korean War in October 1952. Later, the BM-13 multiple rocket launchers, supplied until 1963 from the USSR, were used in Afghanistan by the government. Katyusha remained in service in Cambodia until recently.

"Katyusha" vs. "Vanyusha"

Unlike the Soviet BM-13 installation, the German Nebelwerfer MLRS was actually a six-barreled mortar:

a carriage from anti-tank gun 37 mm;
the guides for the projectiles are six 1.3 m barrels, united by clips into blocks;
the rotating mechanism provided a 45-degree elevation angle and a horizontal firing sector of 24 degrees;
the combat installation rested on a folding stop and sliding frames of the carriage, the wheels were hung out.

The mortar fired turbojet missiles, the accuracy of which was ensured by rotating the body within 1000 rps. The German troops had several mobile mortar launchers on the half-track base of the Maultier armored personnel carrier with 10 barrels for 150 mm rockets. However, all German rocket artillery was created to solve a different problem - chemical warfare using chemical warfare agents.

By 1941, the Germans had already created powerful toxic substances Soman, Tabun, and Sarin. However, none of them were used in WWII; the fire was carried out exclusively with smoke, high-explosive and incendiary mines. The main part of the rocket artillery was mounted on towed carriages, which sharply reduced the mobility of units.

The accuracy of hitting the target of the German MLRS was higher than that of the Katyusha. However, Soviet weapons were suitable for massive attacks over large areas and had a powerful psychological effect. When towing, Vanyusha’s speed was limited to 30 km/h, and after two salvos the position was changed.

The Germans managed to capture a sample of the M-13 only in 1942, but this did not bring any practical benefit. The secret was in powder bombs based on smokeless powder based on nitroglycerin. Germany failed to reproduce its production technology; until the end of the war, it used its own rocket fuel recipe.

Modifications of Katyusha

Initially, the BM-13 installation was based on the ZiS-6 chassis and fired M-13 rockets from rail guides. Later modifications of the MLRS appeared:

BM-13N - since 1943, the Studebaker US6 was used as a chassis;
BM-13NN – assembly on a ZiS-151 vehicle;
BM-13NM - chassis from ZIL-157, in service since 1954;
BM-13NMM - since 1967, assembled on ZIL-131;
BM-31 – projectile 310 mm in diameter, honeycomb type guides;
BM-31-12 – the number of guides has been increased to 12;
BM-13 SN – spiral type guides;
BM-8-48 – 82 mm shells, 48 guides;
BM-8-6 - based on heavy machine guns;
BM-8-12 - on the chassis of motorcycles and snowmobiles;
BM30-4 t BM31-4 – frames supported on the ground with 4 guides;
BM-8-72, BM-8-24 and BM-8-48 - mounted on railway platforms.

T-40 and later T-60 tanks were equipped with mortar mounts. They were placed on a tracked chassis after the turret was dismantled. The USSR's allies supplied Austin, International GMC and Ford Mamon all-terrain vehicles under Lend-Lease, which were ideal for the chassis of installations used in mountain conditions.

Several M-13s were mounted on KV-1 light tanks, but they were taken out of production too quickly. In the Carpathians, Crimea, Malaya Zemlya, and then in China and Mongolia, North Korea torpedo boats with MLRS on board were used.

It is believed that the Red Army's armament consisted of 3,374 Katyusha BM-13s, of which 1,157 on 17 types of non-standard chassis, 1,845 units on Studebakers and 372 on ZiS-6 vehicles. Exactly half of the BM-8 and B-13 were lost irretrievably during the battles (1,400 and 3,400 units of equipment, respectively). Of the 1,800 BM-31s produced, 100 units of equipment out of 1,800 sets were lost.

From November 1941 to May 1945, the number of divisions increased from 45 to 519 units. These units belonged to the artillery reserve of the Supreme Command of the Red Army.

Monuments BM-13

Currently, all military MLRS installations based on the ZiS-6 have been preserved exclusively in the form of memorials and monuments. They are located in the CIS as follows:

former NIITP (Moscow);
"Military Hill" (Temryuk);
Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin;
Lebedin-Mikhailovka (Sumy region);
monument in Kropyvnytskyi;
memorial in Zaporozhye;
Artillery Museum (St. Petersburg);
WWII Museum (Kyiv);
Monument of Glory (Novosibirsk);
entry to Armyansk (Crimea);
Sevastopol diorama (Crimea);
Pavilion 11 VKS Patriot (Cubinka);
Novomoskovsk Museum (Tula region);
memorial in Mtsensk;
memorial complex in Izium;
Museum of the Korsun-Shevchenskaya Battle (Cherkasy region);
military museum in Seoul;
museum in Belgorod;
WWII Museum in the village of Padikovo (Moscow region);
OJSC Kirov Machinery Plant May 1;
memorial in Tula.

Katyusha is used in several computer games, two combat vehicles remain in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Thus, the Katyusha MLRS installation was a powerful psychological and rocket-artillery weapon during the Second World War. The weapons were used for massive attacks on large cluster troops, at the time of the war surpassed the enemy’s counterparts.

"Katyusha" on the streets of Berlin.
Photo from the book "The Great Patriotic War"

The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and world history as the name of one of the most terrible types of weapons of the Second World War. At the same time, not a single type of weapon was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and misinformation.

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our father-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after its first combat use it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of “Katyusha” was kept “closed sealed” for many years, both because of ideological principles and because of the ambitions of the designers.

Question one: why was rocket artillery used only in 1941? After all, gunpowder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, missiles were used quite widely in European armies (missiles by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others). Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their enormous dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron – “tails” – were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French fired missiles at Odessa from rowing barges, and the Russians fired missiles at Central Asian cities in the 50s–70s of the 19th century.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, gunpowder rockets became an anachronism, and between 1860–1880 they were removed from service by all European armies(in Austria - in 1866, in England - in 1885, in Russia - in 1879). In 1914, only signal flares remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for military missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and smokeless gunpowder rather than black gunpowder was used as fuel. Moreover, the fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work out an interesting project, but dismissed it out of the blue. It is curious that the designer was Hieromonk Kirik.

It was only during the First World War that interest in rockets was revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

Second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - “flying whatnots”.

And finally, the most main reason– the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.

CHEMICAL PROJECTILE

Back on June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov, and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev, on preliminary tests of 132/82-mm short-range chemical rocket mines . This ammunition complemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, testing of which was completed by May 1936. Thus, “RNII has completed all preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful means of short-range chemical attack, and expects from you a general conclusion on the tests and instructions on the need for further work in this direction. For its part, RNII considers it necessary to now issue a pilot order for the production of RKhM-250 (300 pieces) and RKhM-132 (300 pieces) for the purpose of conducting field and military tests. The remaining five pieces of RKhM-250 from preliminary tests, of which three are at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RKhM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions."

According to the RNII report on the main activities for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of chemical agent were manufactured and tested. The tests, carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU RKKA, gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMU did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave RNII new assignments for shells with a longer range.

The Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was first mentioned on January 3, 1939 in a letter from the People's Commissar of Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: “In October 1938, an automobile mechanized rocket launcher for organizing a surprise chemical attack on the enemy in "Basically, it passed factory firing tests at the Sofrinsky control and testing artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Test Site in Prichernavskaya."

Please note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Administration and, finally, the missile warheads were exclusively chemical.

132-mm chemical shells RHS-132 were tested by firing at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was carried out with single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing in a series with full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of explosive agent, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo from 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was carried out with unstable explosive agents. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of explosive agent when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing 152-mm chemical projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The vehicle-mounted mechanized chemical attack missile launcher was tested to show significant advantages over artillery systems. The three-ton vehicle is equipped with a system capable of firing both a single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds. Travel speed is normal for a truck. Transferring from traveling to combat position takes 3–4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cabin or from cover.

The warhead of one RCS (reactive chemical projectile - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of agent, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of 12 hectares, one salvo from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of contamination with chemical agents in one salvo is 6–8 hectares.”

I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. Thus, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket and a six-barrel tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barrel mortar. Testing of the mortar began in 1937. The system was named “15-cm smoke mortar type “D”. In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), that is, a 15-cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with toxic substances. Interestingly, Soviet soldiers called the 15 cm Nb.W 41 “Vanyusha”, by analogy with the M-13, called “Katyusha”.

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The flight range of the 22.7 kg rocket was 1300 m, and a Van Deren system mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our missiles during the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the engine's powder bombs. Seven 24-mm powder bombs, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) pieces in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred finned rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with a ring stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such projectiles could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight using a ring stabilizer. Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-blade tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the span of the tail, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The tail, with a span of more than 200 mm, shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened flight stability. Lightening the tail by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for finned missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the projectiles. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. The USSR also tested turbojet missiles, but they did not go into mass production. As often happens with us, the reason for failures during testing was explained not by poor execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST SALLOS

Whether we like it or not, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems for the first time in the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” was sounded, and the devil’s dance began. The earth began to shake. Nine batteries of the 4th Special Purpose Mortar Regiment also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and fell on the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th artillery regiment rained down their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - Soviet artillery positions. It seemed that the strength of the fortress would not leave one stone unturned.”

This is how historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15-cm rocket launchers. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The projectiles were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by the blast wave. Mine fragments flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The warhead contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol grade 40/60. It is curious that both 28 cm and 32 cm German mines (missiles) were transported and launched from a simple wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of the Katyusha came as a complete surprise to the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barrel flamethrower gun... The shot is fired by electricity. When fired, smoke is generated... If such guns are captured, report immediately.” Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled “Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles.” It said: “┘The troops are reporting that the Russians are using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command on the same day.”

Where the name “Katyusha” came from is not known for certain. Pyotr Guk’s version is interesting: “Both at the front and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I came across a variety of explanations for how the formidable weapon received a maiden name. Some believed that the beginning was made by the letter “K”, which the Voronezh Comintern members put on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the Guards mortars were named after the dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.”

When, at a firing range, soldiers and commanders asked a GAU representative to name the “true” name of the combat installation, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. This is important for maintaining secrecy."

Soon, Katyusha had a younger brother named Luka. In May 1942, a group of officers from the Main Directorate of Armaments developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead, made in the shape of an ellipsoid, with a maximum diameter of 300 mm, was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.

After successful field tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. IN Stalin times All important issues were resolved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 guards mortar divisions had been created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charge single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo accordingly amounted to 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Beleva. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental salvoes fell on German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were razed to the ground, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modification M-31) made a great impression on both the enemy and our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and fabrications about “Luka” at the front. One of the legends was that the warhead of the rocket was filled with some kind of special, especially powerful explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of the explosion. In fact, the warheads used conventional explosives. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through salvo firing. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of an entire group of shells, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, the high-explosive warhead was mainly used. For the characteristic shape of the M-30's head section, front-line soldiers called it “Luka Mudishchev” (the hero of Barkov’s poem of the same name). Naturally, the official press preferred not to mention this nickname, unlike the widely circulated “Katyusha”. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from the wooden sealed box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight, of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war the journalistic and literary fraternity appropriately and inappropriately remembered “Katyusha”, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother “Luka”. In the 1970s–1980s, at the first mention of “Luka,” veterans asked me in surprise: “How do you know? You didn’t fight.”

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father-commanders wanted it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and reports of victory rushed to headquarters. If you believe the secret publication “Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War” (Moscow, 1955), then Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes, 95 enemy tanks were destroyed by Katyushas! If this were true, it should have been disbanded anti-tank artillery and replace it with multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of destroyed tanks were influenced by the fact that for each damaged tank the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Unfortunately, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure “Tables for firing M-13 rocket projectiles,” published in 1942. It follows from it that with a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the lateral deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of projectiles could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the likelihood of a missile hitting a tank at such a distance. If we theoretically imagine that a combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at a tank at point-blank range, then even here the muzzle velocity of a 132-mm projectile was only 70 m/s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of a Tiger or Panther.

It is not for nothing that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 missile, the average deviation in range in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the lateral deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more correct, in which the dispersion increased almost 1.5 times, so that in the 1944 tables there are errors in calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification for raising morale personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 shell hits a medium or light tank, then it will be disabled. The M-13 shell is not able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand m, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their enormous dispersion; at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

Here is another example told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshan offensive operation on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The landing party from the tanks jumped off and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “covered the viewing slots with mud, covered the sighting holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on the hatches and tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone shouted: “Rus, kaput! Give up!” But then two BM-13 combat vehicles arrived. The Katyushas quickly descended into the ditch with their front wheels and fired a direct fire salvo. Bright fiery arrows, hissing and whistling, rushed into the ravine. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions cleared, the tanks stood seemingly unharmed, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot...

Having repaired the damage to the tracks and throwing out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha left for Mogilev-Podolsky.” So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans at point-blank range, and their tarpaulin was only burned.

WAR STATISTICS

The first installations for firing the M-13 had the index BM-13-16 and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82-mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 cars, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

Launchers M-8 and M-13 missiles were mounted on anything in 1941–1942. Thus, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guide shells were installed on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway vehicles platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942–1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc. Over the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willys with mountain launchers) – 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the designation BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the Studebaker BM-31-12 chassis.

But in the post-war years, Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was called an “all-terrain vehicle.” Mutant Katyushas on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of vehicles, which are stubbornly passed off as genuine military relics, were erected on numerous pedestals, but the genuine BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132 mm M-13 and 82 mm M-8 shells back in 1941. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, based on the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although externally the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were set obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in stabilizing the projectile, but it eliminated the eccentricity of the thrust of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But eccentricity, that is, a displacement of the engine thrust vector due to uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.

Based on the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole series of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small series. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. The M-13 and M-31 missiles with oblique tails were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

The apotheosis of the combat use of “Katyusha” and “Luka” was the storming of Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the wealth of experience they acquired in the battles for Poznan, which consisted of direct fire with single M-31, M-20 and even M-13 projectiles.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Firing single rockets during battles in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created in the guards mortar units: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8-10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets expended in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army the following were expended: M-13 shells - 6270; M-31 shells – 3674; M-20 shells – 600; M-8 shells - 1878.

Of this amount, the rocket artillery assault groups expended: M-8 shells - 1638; M-13 shells – 3353; M-20 shells – 191; M-31 shells – 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious “Katyusha” and her unjustly offended brother “Luka” became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

The famous Katyusha installation was put into production a few hours before Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. A multiple launch rocket artillery system was used for massive attacks on areas and had an average effective firing range.

Chronology of the creation of rocket artillery combat vehicles

Gelatin gunpowder was created in 1916 by Russian professor I.P. Grave. The further chronology of the development of rocket artillery of the USSR is as follows:

five years later, already in the USSR, the development of a rocket began by V. A. Artemyev and N. I. Tikhomirov;
in the period 1929 – 1933 a group led by B. S. Petropavlovsky created a prototype of a projectile for MLRS, but the launch units were used on the ground;
rockets entered service with the Air Force in 1938, were labeled RS-82, and were installed on I-15 and I-16 fighters;
in 1939 they were used at Khalkhin Gol, then they began to assemble warheads from RS-82 for SB bombers and L-2 attack aircraft;
starting in 1938, another group of developers - R. I. Popov, A. P. Pavlenko, V. N. Galkovsky and I. I. Gvai - worked on a multi-charge installation of high mobility on a wheeled chassis;
the last successful test before the launch of the BM-13 into mass production ended on June 21, 1941, that is, a few hours before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR.

On the fifth day of the war, the Katyusha apparatus in the amount of 2 combat units entered service with the main artillery department. Two days later, on June 28, the first battery was formed from them and 5 prototypes that participated in the tests.