home Health technologies When the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan. Why and when did Soviet troops fight in Afghanistan?

When the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan. Why and when did Soviet troops fight in Afghanistan?

USSR War in Afghanistan 1979-1989

Completed by: Bukov G.E.

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 - armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a small curtain in this war, namely, the reasons and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

1. Reason for hostilities

The main reason war was foreign intervention in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed groups Afghan mujahideen (“dushmans”), enjoying political and financial support from leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the “April Revolution” - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose leader was in 1978, came to power. Nur Mohammad Taraki (killed by order of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and strife between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and the defense of the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to send troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this Supreme Council THE USSR.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention. But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to official version history, CIA assistance to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

December 1979 began the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Shpaka.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. Sending in troops is not easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

Operation STORM-333

The general plan for the operation in Kabul, carried out on December 27, was developed by the dishonest efforts of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, led by Major Y. Semenov. The plan of the operation, codenamed “Baikal-79,” provided for the seizure of the most important objects in the Afghan capital: the Taj Beg Palace, the buildings of the PDPA Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Communications of the DRA, the General Staff, the headquarters of the military air forces and the headquarters of the Central Army Corps, military counterintelligence (KAM), a prison for political prisoners in Puli-Charkhi, a radio and television center, post and telegraph, headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense... At the same time, it was planned to blockade military units and formations of the Armed Forces located in the Afghan capital DRA forces of paratroopers of motorized rifle troops arriving in Kabul. In total, 17 objects had to be captured. The appropriate forces and means were assigned to each object, and the procedure for interaction and control was determined.

In fact, at the beginning of the operation in Kabul there were special units of the KGB of the USSR (“Thunder” - a little more than 30 people, “Zenit” - 150 people, a company of border guards - 50 people), as well as quite significant forces from the USSR Ministry of Defense: air force airborne division, 154th special forces detachment of the GRU General Staff (“Muslim” battalion), units of the 345th separate parachute regiment, military advisers (in total more than 10 thousand people). They all fulfilled their tasks and worked towards the final result of the operation.

The most difficult and important object to capture was the Taj Beg Palace where the residence of H. Amin was located and he himself was located. Of all the officers and soldiers who took part in the assault on the Taj Beg Palace, almost no one knew the full plan of the operation and did not have control over the overall situation, and each acted in his own narrow area, in fact, in the role of a simple fighter.

Therefore, for most of them, the events in Kabul focused only on their objective, and for many fighters the operation still remains a mystery. For most of them, it was a “baptism of fire” - the first real battle in life. Hence the overflow of emotions in memories, the “thickening” of colors. Finding themselves in an extreme situation, each of them showed what they were worth and what they had achieved. The vast majority completed the combat mission with honor , showing heroism and courage. Many officers and soldiers were wounded, some died.

On the evening of December 25, General Drozdov, based on the results of reconnaissance of objects, held a meeting with the commanders of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the KGB of the USSR, and determined the place of each in the capture of Taj Beg. Everyone was ready, the situation was missing only the plan of the palace.

“Grom” and “Zenith” officers M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev conducted reconnaissance of the area and reconnaissance of firing points located nearby. Not far from the palace, on a high-rise building, there was a restaurant (casino), where senior officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext of needing to book places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the special forces visited there too. From there, the Taj Beck was clearly visible; all the approaches to it and the location of the storage posts were clearly visible. True, this initiative almost ended tragically for them.

By the beginning of Operation Storm-333, special forces from the KGB groups of the USSR thoroughly knew the object of capture of Haj Beg: the most convenient routes of approach; guard mode services; the total number of Amin's security and bodyguards; location of machine gun nests, armored vehicles and tanks; internal structure palace labyrinth rooms; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment.

The signals for the start of the general operation “Baikal-79” should have been powerful explosion in the center of Kabul. Special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" led by B.A. Pleshkunov was supposed to blow up the so-called “well” - essentially a neutral secret communication center with the most important military and civilian facilities of the DRA.

Assault ladders, equipment, weapons and ammunition were being prepared. Under the leadership of the deputy battalion commander for technical matters, Senior Lieutenant Eduard Ibragimov, the Combat vehicles Ocular - secrecy and secrecy.

The Taj Beg Palace was located on a high, steep hill overgrown with trees and bushes, all approaches to it were mined. There was only one road leading here, guarded around the clock. The palace itself was also a difficult-to-reach structure. Its thick walls are able to withstand artillery attacks. If we add to this that the area around was shelled by tanks and heavy machine guns, then it becomes clear that it was very difficult to take possession of it.

At about six o'clock in the evening, Kolesnik was called by Colonel General Magomedov and said, “Due to unforeseen circumstances, the time of the assault has been postponed, we must begin as soon as possible,” and the operation began earlier than the set time. Literally fifteen to twenty minutes later, the capture group led by Captain M. Sakhatov left in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. Among them were two officers each from "Grom" and "Zenith", as well as the chief of reconnaissance of the battalion, Senior Lieutenant A. Dzhamolov. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in a barracks located at a distance of 150-200 meters from them.

When the car of M. Sakhatov’s group approached the location of the third battalion, shooting was suddenly heard there, which suddenly intensified. Colonel Kolesnik immediately issued the command “Fire!” for the soldiers and officers of the “Muslim” battalion and special groups of the KGB of the USSR. and “Forward!” Red rockets flew into the air. It was 19.15 on the clock. The signal “Storm-333” was sent over the radio networks.

Two anti-aircraft guns were the first to open fire on the palace at the command of senior lieutenant Vasily Prout. self-propelled units ZSU-23-4 “Shilki”, raining down a sea of shells on it. Two other installations hit the infantry battalion, supporting a company of paratroopers. AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers began firing at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the vehicles.

Units of the “Muslim” battalion began moving to their destination areas. The 3rd company of Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov was supposed to advance to the Taj Beg Palace; several subgroups of special forces officers from “Grom” were placed on its five infantry fighting vehicles along with the soldiers. Major Y. Semenov with the “Zenit” group on four armored personnel carriers of the platoon The 1st company of Lieutenant Rustam Tursunkulov was supposed to advance to the western part of the hill. Then, rush up the pedestrian stairs to the end of the Taj Beck, and at the facade of the building both groups had to connect and act together. But at the last moment everything got mixed up. As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and approached the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beg, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier where Boris Suvorov's subgroup was located was immediately hit and caught fire. The personnel immediately began to parachute, some were injured. The subgroup commander himself was hit in the groin by a ghoul, just below his body armor. It was not possible to save him - he bled to death. Jumping out of the armored personnel carriers, the Zenit fighters and the soldiers of Tursunkulov’s platoon were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the palace, and with the help of assault ladders they began to climb up the mountain.

At this time, the Thunder subgroups also began to advance towards Taj Beg.

When the group's machine gunner jumped out onto the platform in front of the Taj Beg, they came under heavy fire from heavy machine guns. It seemed like they were shooting from everywhere. The "Grom" employees rushed to the palace building, and the soldiers of Sharipov's company lay down and began to cover them with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and also repel the attack of the Afghan soldiers located in the guardhouse. Their actions were led by the platoon commander, Lieutenant Abdullaev. Something unimaginable was happening. A picture of hell. “Shilkas” shoot “beautifully”. Everything was mixed up. But everyone acted in one impulse, there was not a single one who tried to evade or sit in cover to wait out the assault. The number of assault groups was melting before our eyes. With incredible efforts, the special forces managed to overcome the resistance of the Afghans and break through to the palace building. The fighters of the “Muslim” battalion provided them with great help in this. All groups and fighters mixed up, and everyone was already acting at their own discretion. There was no single team. The only goal was to run faster to the walls of the palace, somehow hide behind them and complete the task. The special forces were in a foreign country, in a foreign uniform, without documents, without any identification marks, except for white armbands, there was nothing. The density of fire was such that the triplexes on all infantry fighting vehicles were broken, the bulwarks were pierced on every square centimeter, that is, they looked like a colander. The special forces were saved only by the fact that they were all wearing bulletproof vests, although almost all of them were wounded. The soldiers from the “Muslim” battalion were without body armor, since at Koslesnik’s command they handed over their body armor to the fighters of the assault groups. Of the thirty "Zenith" and twenty-two fighters from "Thunder", no more than twenty-five people managed to break through to Taj Beg, and many of them were wounded. These forces were clearly not enough to guarantee the elimination of Amin. According to Alexander Ivashchenko, who was next to Colonel Boyarinov during the battle, when they broke into the palace and met stubborn resistance from the guards, they realized that they could not complete the task with small forces. By the time the special forces entered the palace, the Shilki should have ceased fire, but contact with them was lost. Colonel V. Kolesnik sent a messenger, and “The Shilkas transferred the fire to other objects. Infantry fighting vehicles left the area in front of the palace and blocked the only road. Another company and a platoon of AGS-17 grenade launchers and ATGMs fired at the tank battalion, then the soldiers captured the tanks, simultaneously disarming the tankers. A special group of the “Muslim” battalion took possession of the anti-aircraft regiment’s weapons and captured its personnel. In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100-150 people) resisted steadfastly, without surrendering. What ruined them was that they were all armed mainly with MG-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor.

The Shilkas again shifted their fire, starting to hit the Taj-Bek, the area in front of it. A fire started on the second floor of the palace, which caused strong impact on the defending guards. As the special forces advanced to the second floor, the shooting and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guard, who mistook the special forces for their own rebel unit, heard Russian speech and surrendered to them. Lights were burning everywhere in the palace. All attempts by Nikolai Shvachko to turn it off ended in vain. The power supply was autonomous. Somewhere in the depths of the building, perhaps in the basement, electric generators were working, but there was no time to look for them. Some fighters shot at the light bulbs in order to somehow take cover, because they were in full view of the palace defenders. By the end of the assault, only a few anti-aircraft devices remained intact, but they were burning. The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). Having received information about Amin’s death, the company commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Sharipov, also began to call Colonel V. Kolesnik on the radio to report on the completion of the task, but there was no communication. He finally managed to contact the battalion chief of staff, Ashurov, and allegorically reported that Amin had been killed. The chief of staff reported this to the battalion commander, Major Khalbaev and Colonel Kolesnik. Major Khalbaev reported on the seizure of the palace and the liquidation of Amin to Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov, and he - to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov. After Assadul Sarvari, who arrived at the palace (he did not participate in the assault), was convinced and confirmed that Amin was really dead, the corpse of the head of state and leader of the PDPA was wrapped in a carpet... The main task was completed. Success in this operation was ensured not so much by force as by surprise, audacity and swiftness of pressure. Immediately after the capture of Taj-Bek, Drozdov reported to Ivanov on the completion of the task, and then handed over the radio station to Evald Kozlov and ordered the results of the battle to be reported to the leadership. When Kozlov, who had not yet recovered from the battle, began to report to General Ivanov, he interrupted him with the question “What’s wrong?” Oak ? Ewald began to select words to speak veiledly about Amin’s death, but Ivanov again asked: “Is he killed?” Kozlov replied: “Yes, killed.” And the general immediately interrupted the connection. It was necessary to urgently report Yu.V. to Moscow. Andropov about the completion of the main task, and the group of Captain M. Sakhatov arrived at the palace building with two tanks captured from the Afghans. He reported to Kolesnik about the completion of the combat mission and said: when we drove past the third battalion of the security brigade, we saw that an alarm had been declared there. Afghan soldiers received ammunition. The battalion commander and two other officers stood next to the road along which the special forces were passing. The decision came quickly. Jumping out of the car, they captured the Afghan battalion commander and both officers, throwing them into the car, and drove on. Some soldiers who managed to get cartridges opened fire on them. Then the entire battalion rushed in pursuit - to free their commander. Then the special forces dismounted and began firing machine guns and machine guns at the fleeing infantry. The soldiers of Kurban Amangeldyev's company, which was supporting the actions of Sakhatov's group, also opened fire. During the night, special forces guarded the palace because they feared that the divisions stationed in Kabul and a tank brigade would storm it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers working in parts of the Afghan army and airborne troops deployed to the capital did not allow them to do this. In addition, the security services paralyzed the control of Afghan forces in advance. Some units of the Afghan security brigade continued to resist. In particular, we had to fight with the remnants of the third battalion for another day, after which the Afghans went into the mountains. Probably, some of their compatriots also suffered from their own: in the dark, the personnel of the “Muslim” battalion and the special group of the KGB of the USSR recognized each other by white armbands, the password “Misha - Yasha” and obscenities. But everyone was dressed in Afghan uniform, and they had to shoot and throw grenades from a decent distance. So try to keep track here in the darkness and confusion - who has a bandage on their sleeve and who doesn’t?! Moreover, when the captured Afghans began to be taken out, they also had white armbands on their sleeves. After the battle, the losses were counted. In total, five people died in the special groups of the KGB of the USSR during the storming of the palace. Almost everyone was wounded, but those who could hold weapons in their hands continued to fight. In the “Muslim” battalion and the 9th parachute company, 14 people were killed and more than 50 were wounded. Moreover, 23 people who were wounded remained in service. The battalion medic took the seriously wounded soldiers in an infantry fighting vehicle, first to the first aid station, and then to various medical institutions deployed at that time in Kabul. In the evening, the seriously wounded were transported to the Soviet embassy, and the next morning they were sent by plane to Tashkent. On the same day, December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd division and units of the 345th regiment, as well as the forces assigned to them from the border guards, the KGB groups of the USSR "Zenit" and "Grom" reached the location of military units and formations , important administrative and special facilities in the capital and established their control over them. The capture of these key objects took place in an organized manner, with minimal losses.

Progress of the war

The Soviet command hoped to entrust the suppression of the uprising to Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and were unable to cope with this task. For a number of years, a “limited contingent” controlled the situation in the main cities, while the rebels felt relatively free in rural areas. Changing tactics, Soviet troops tried to deal with the rebels using tanks, helicopters and airplanes, but highly mobile groups of Mujahideen easily avoided attacks. The bombing of populated areas and the destruction of crops also did not produce results, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan and Iran. Supplies of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages: stage: December 1979 - February 1980. Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects. stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. stage: May 1985 - December 1986. Transition from active combat operations primarily to support operations Afghan troops Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place. Stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

afghanistan war soviet contingent

5. Conclusion Soviet wars from Afghanistan

Changes in foreign policy Soviet leadership during the period of “perestroika” contributed to a political settlement of the situation. The situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Western forecasts that the Kabul regime would fall immediately after the end of the Soviet military presence due to its complete unviability, and that a coalition government of Mujahideen groups would lead the country to peace after the expulsion of the “communist plague” turned out to be unfounded. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a phased peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. The Soviet government pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as various mujahideen factions continued to fight for power among themselves.

According to updated official data, the irretrievable losses of Soviet army personnel in the Afghan War amounted to 14,427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. St. received wounds and concussions. 53 thousand people. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

Consequences of the war

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) lasted another 3 years and, having lost Russian support, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of mujahideen field commanders. During the war years in Afghanistan, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared and groups of Islamic radicals grew stronger.

Political consequences:

In general, Soviet troops did not experience any particular difficulties in conducting military operations in Afghanistan - the main problem was that military victories were not supported by the political and economic actions of the ruling regime. Assessing the consequences of the Afghan war, it can be noted that the benefits from the intervention turned out to be negligible in comparison with the damage caused national interests USSR and Russia. The intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan caused sharp condemnation by most of the international community (including the USA, China, member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including Pakistan and Iran, and even some socialist countries), weakened the influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, and marked the end of the “era of détente.” "The 1970s led to increased economic and technological pressure on the USSR from the West and even, to some extent, aggravated the crisis in the USSR itself.

The war in Afghanistan led to numerous casualties, wasted enormous material resources, destabilized the situation in Central Asia, contributed to the strengthening of Islam in politics, the intensification of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. In fact, this war was one of the factors in the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. If we talk about a lesson, then the Afghan people really taught us a lesson of courage and valor in the struggle for their age-old traditions, culture, religion, and Motherland. And all valor should be glorified and admired even in the enemy. The main conclusion drawn from the Afghan war is that fundamentally political problems cannot be solved by military means.

Information sources

1. ru.wikipedia.org - article “Afghan War 1979-1989” on Wikipedia;

History.org.ua - article “Afghan War 1979-1989” in the Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine (Ukrainian);

Mirslovarei.com - article “Afghan War” in the Historical Dictionary on the “World of Dictionaries” website;

Rian.ru - “War in Afghanistan 1979-1989.” (RIAN reference);

Rian.ru - “The statistics of losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan do not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR” (RIAN message).

Alexander Lyakhovsky - Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan

Psi.ece.jhu.edu - secret documents of the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee related to the entry of Soviet troops and their stay in Afghanistan;

Ruswar.com - archive of war photographs and video chronicles;

Fergananews.com - “The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed” (B. Yamshanov).

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1. a brief description of forces that came to power in April 1978. Events preceding the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

Nine years, one month and eighteen days... That’s how long the “Afghan war” lasted. The war that became the “swan song” of the Soviet Army and the Soviet Union.

A war that claimed 14,427 lives, through which a total of 620 thousand people passed, and which became one of the powerful preconditions for a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the world.

What events preceded the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan? Was he vital for our country or was it clean water adventure?

Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan after repeated requests from the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which took the helm as a result of a coup d'etat unexpected for the USSR in April 1978. But even then the PDPA party did not represent a single whole, but consisted of two opposing factions - “Khalq” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The division into factions occurred almost immediately after the formation of the party in 1965. The Khalq faction adhered to the class principle of admission to the party, stood on radical left political positions, and set as its main task “the establishment of national democracy”, “resolving the land issue in favor of landless and land-poor peasants with the broad participation of the entire peasantry in this process.” The leader of the Khalq faction, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who later became the head of Afghanistan, considered the party “the vanguard of the working class,” not taking into account the fact that in Afghanistan the working class, if present, constituted a very insignificant part of Afghan society. In such conditions, the ideological work of the “Khalqists” was aimed primarily at the democratic intelligentsia and officers Afghan army. Ultimately, the Khalqists wanted to build a socialist society in Afghanistan.

Parcham, on the other hand, took a more moderate position and proposed accepting people into the party based not on class principles, but on a person’s desire to work. They considered themselves the most prepared revolutionaries, “Marxists-Leninists.” Their ultimate goal was the establishment of a democratic society in Afghanistan; For this, they intended to widely use the methods of parliamentary struggle, relying on the intelligentsia, civil servants, and the military, considering these layers to be the most real force with which they could achieve their goals.

It should be noted that at that time (late 1960s-early 1970s) the Soviet Union was not interested in fundamental changes government system Afghanistan. At that time, Kabul had a strong central government, personified by King Zahir Shah. Afghanistan has been a traditionally friendly state for our country. Soviet specialists took an active part in building the Afghan economy and in training their own Afghan personnel. Under the leadership of specialists from the USSR, the famous Salang tunnel was built in 1964, which made it possible to connect Kabul with the northern provinces of the country by the shortest route. Under the strong rule of the king, all the numerous tribes of Afghanistan lived peacefully and did not conflict with each other.

In July 1973, an anti-monarchist coup took place in Afghanistan, led by Zahir Shah’s cousin, Mohammad Daoud, who personified the moderate nationalist “third force” that stood between traditional Islamic forces and the PDPA.

Already in August 1973, armed protests by supporters of the Islamic-monarchical system of Afghanistan began in the Panjshir Gorge, organized, as it was announced, by Pakistani military and political circles. From then on, the protests of Daoud's opponents began to expand.

In April 1978, a coup d'état took place in the country, the cause of which was the contradictions between the leadership of Afghanistan and the PDPA, which claimed power. On April 25, by order of M. Daoud, the top leaders of the PDPA Central Committee were arrested, including Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. The reason for the arrest was the accusation of the leaders of the PDPA of violating the Constitution, which prohibited the activities of any political parties. And already at 9 am on April 27, mass demonstrations began, led by the remaining leaders of the PDPA, including Hafizullah Amin. Already at 17.30 the arrested PDPA leaders were released from prison. During the storming of M. Daoud's palace by rebel military personnel, he and members of his family were killed. On April 30, Afghanistan was proclaimed a Democratic Republic, and on May 1, a new government consisting of 20 ministers was appointed.

This development of events was actually a surprise for the Soviet leadership. which turned out to be unprepared for such rapid developments. And the PDPA itself, tormented by internal contradictions, was in no way suitable for the role of the leading and guiding force of Afghan society, which, being under the strong influence of Islamic religious and secular authorities, was not inclined to immediately begin to destroy the established traditional foundations. Moreover, having come to power, the new leadership of Afghanistan, led by the Khalqist Taraki, immediately began a radical restructuring of all spheres of Afghan society. For example, surplus land was confiscated from large landowners, and a land ownership limit was set at 6 hectares. Poor peasants were freed from debt bondage. 296 thousand families were allocated land due to the seizure of land from wealthy landowners. However, landless peasants cautiously and cautiously accepted such “gifts” from new government, because traditional principles were strong in Afghan society, according to which the poor could not lay claim to the riches of the rich, “for it is so pleasing to the Almighty (“inshallah”).”

Another major miscalculation of the new government was the proclamation of the “Saur uprising” (“Saur” - “April” in one of the official languages of Afghanistan) “a proletarian revolution, part of the world proletarian revolution.” And this in a country where there were only about 100 thousand low-skilled workers for a population of 16 million. Most likely, statements about the proletarian nature of the revolution were made counting on the full assistance of the USSR. Considering as a whole positive feedback population to overthrow Daoud as approval of its coming to power, the PDPA began drastic socio-economic reforms that directly affected the interests of a fairly wide segment of Afghan society. The new authorities began to behave arrogantly towards farmers, completely ignoring the traditions and foundations that had developed in a virtually closed cell - the Afghan village. Thus they provoked massive influx the Afghan peasantry into the ranks of the political and armed opposition, the first units of which began to operate during the reign of Daoud. In addition, the sharply anti-religious policy of the new authorities (for example, on the first day of the new government, more than 20 mullahs were shot in Kabul alone) did not contribute to mutual understanding between atheist communists and the deeply religious Afghan people. All this led to a sharp intensification of anti-government protests in July-September 1978. This is due to a sharp increase in funding for intra-Afghan anti-government Islamic groups from such international Islamist groups as the Muslim Brotherhood.

By the beginning of the summer of 1979, the military-political situation in Afghanistan had sharply worsened. Almost the entire eastern province of Paktia was controlled by opposition units, and mutinies of the Afghan regular army broke out in the garrisons every now and then. In the current situation, the Afghan leadership was unable on its own, without a combat-ready army and without the support of the people, to stop the large-scale onslaught from outside of large armed groups financed from abroad.

Beginning in the spring of 1979, the Afghan leadership repeatedly appealed to the USSR to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan to help repel the external and internal “counter-revolution”. There are 14 such requests. Here are some of the requests:

“June 16th. Send Soviet crews in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the DRA to protect the government and Bagram and Shindand airfields.”

But the Soviet leadership refused every time.

However, the opinion of the Soviet leadership changed dramatically in September 1979, when one of the leaders of the PDPA, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, removed President Nur Muhammad Taraki. The internal party struggle, which had died down, flared up with renewed vigor, which threatened instability on the southern borders of the USSR. In addition, in foreign policy, Amin leaned more and more towards the West and the United States. And the internal political situation in Afghanistan sharply worsened due to the fact that Amin began brutal political repression against the “Parchamists.” It was necessary to take control of the situation in Afghanistan. After a comprehensive study of the situation around Afghanistan, the top Soviet leadership decided to eliminate Amin, install a more predictable leader and send troops to provide moral support to the Afghan people. The political decision to send troops was made on December 12, 1979 in the cabinet Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. However, according to management General Staff The USSR Armed Forces sending troops into Afghanistan would have led to an intensification of the rebellious movement, which, first of all, would have been directed against the Soviet troops (which subsequently happened). But no one listened to the opinion of the military.

2. Deployment of troops. The tasks initially faced by OKSV.

On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, in the Kabul direction, the TurkVO motorized rifle division stationed in Termez began crossing the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya and marching to Kabul. At the same time, military aviation aircraft with personnel and military equipment of the airborne division crossed the border, which landed at the Kabul airfield (From the certificate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR “On the issue of the circumstances of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan”).

On December 27, 1979, the USSR KGB special unit “A” (the famous “Alpha”), led by Colonel Boyarinov, who died during this assault, began an operation to storm the palace of H. Amin, as a result of which the latter was liquidated. At this time, Soviet units were already crossing the border. On December 28, 1979, the situation in Kabul was completely controlled by Soviet troops. On this day, Babrak Karmal, who was “on armor”, addressed the Afghan people on the radio. Soviet tanks returned in triumph from “honorable exile” from Czechoslovakia, where he was ambassador. Now he, a member of the Parcham faction, has become the new ruler of Afghanistan.

Before January 1, 1980, about 50 thousand military personnel were introduced into Afghanistan, namely: two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions, support units). One motorized rifle division, numbering 12 thousand people, entered Afghanistan in the direction of Kushka, Kandahar, while the main forces were in the direction of Termez, the Salang pass to Bagram and Kabul.

In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions were sent to Afghanistan. The total number of troops was 80 thousand people. The first commander of the 40th Army, which formed the backbone of the Limited Contingent of the Soviet Forces, was Colonel General Yuri Tukharinov.

By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army into Afghanistan was largely completed. Three divisions (2 motorized rifle divisions, 1 airborne division), an air assault brigade, and two separate regiments were concentrated on the territory of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the combat composition of the OKSV was clarified, and some units were reorganized in order to strengthen them. Finally, the OKSV included:

4 divisions (motorized rifle - 3, airborne - 1),

5 separate brigades (motorized rifle - 2, air assault - 1, special forces - 1)

4 separate regiments (motorized rifle - 2, parachute - 1, artillery - 1)

4 combat aviation regiments

3 helicopter regiments.

1 pipeline crew

1 logistics brigade.

Be that as it may, for peacetime such a transfer of troops, unprecedented in its scale, was generally successful, without serious complications.

The initial combat missions facing the Soviet troops were: protecting the main transport routes (Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar; Termez-Kabul; Kabul-Jalalabad; Kunduz-Fayzabad); protection of economic infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan, ensuring safe passage of convoys with national economic cargo. But the situation has made significant adjustments to these tasks...

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 -- an armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Cause of hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign interference in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed groups of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy political and financial support from leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to introduce .troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

Personnel losses according to official data. From a certificate from the USSR Ministry of Defense: “In total, 546,255 people passed through Afghanistan. Losses of personnel of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989. A total of 13,833 people were killed, died from wounds and illnesses, including 1,979 officers (14.3%). A total of 49,985 people were injured, including 7,132 officers (14.3%). 6,669 people became disabled. 330 people are wanted.”

Awards. More than 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, 71 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Afghan figures. Another certificate published in the Izvestia newspaper provides a statement from the Afghan government “about the losses of government troops - during 5 months of fighting from January 20 to June 21, 1989: 1,748 soldiers and officers were killed and 3,483 were wounded.” Recalculating losses for one year from a 5-month period, we find that approximately 4,196 people could have been killed and 8,360 wounded. Considering that in Kabul, both in the Ministry of Defense and in other government bodies, Soviet advisers controlled any information, especially from the front, it is quite obvious that the figures for losses of Afghan military personnel indicated in the newspaper are not only clearly underestimated, but also the ratio between wounded and killed. Nevertheless, even from these fake figures it is possible to approximately determine the actual losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

13 people daily! If we assume that fighting Mujahideen against Soviet troops in the same areas were fought with even greater ferocity and intensity, as against “non-believers and occupiers”, then we can roughly assume that our losses for the year were equal to at least 5 thousand killed - 13 people per day. The number of wounded is determined from the ratio of losses according to the certificate of our Ministry of Defense 1:3.6, therefore, their number will be about 180 thousand over ten years of war.

Permanent contingent. The question is, how many Soviet military personnel took part in the Afghan War? From fragmentary information from our Ministry of Defense we learn that there were 180 military camps in Afghanistan and 788 battalion commanders took part in the hostilities. We believe that on average a battalion commander lived in Afghanistan for 2 years. So, for 10 years of war numerical composition battalion commanders updated 5 times. Consequently, there were constantly about 788:5 - 157 combat battalions in Afghanistan each year. The number of military camps and the number of battalions agree quite closely with each other.

Assuming that at least 500 people served in the combat battalion, we get that there were 157 * 500 = 78,500 people in the active 40th Army. For the normal functioning of troops fighting the enemy, auxiliary units of the rear are necessary (supply of ammunition, fuels and lubricants, repair and technical workshops, guarding caravans, guarding roads, guarding military camps, battalions, regiments, divisions, armies, hospitals, etc. .). The ratio of the number of support units to combat units is approximately 3:1 - this is approximately 235,500 more military personnel. Thus, the total number of military personnel permanently stationed in Afghanistan each year was no less than 314 thousand people.

General figures. So, during the 10 years of the war, at least three million people passed through Afghanistan, of which 800 thousand took part in the hostilities. Our total losses amounted to at least 460 thousand people, of which 50 thousand were killed, 180 thousand wounded, including 100 thousand seriously wounded by mines, 1000 missing, 230 thousand patients with hepatitis, jaundice, and typhoid fever.

It turns out that in official data the terrible figures are underestimated by about 10 times.

And the republican system was established. This was the impetus for the start civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces of the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty destruction of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, strengthened the population's resistance to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, and NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had become sharply complicated, and the threat of overthrowing the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side initially rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the worsening Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) was to create a “cordon sanitaire” at the borders of the USSR in the face of the looming threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its complete mobilization. The first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before entry.

The commissioning and deployment of OKSV in the DRA began on December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat strength of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly updated in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four front-line regiments and two army aviation regiments, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, and since 1985 - Army General Valentin Varennikov. Direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, subordinate to the command of the TurkVO troops.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, and roads vital for the country, and carried out transport convoys with cargo through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, OKSV conducted active military operations of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous attacks on their garrisons and transport columns by opposition units, began to carry out military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive armed groups of the enemy. Thus, the Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan found themselves involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, to whom Pakistan provided the greatest assistance.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

Even after sending troops to Afghanistan, the USSR continued to look for opportunities for a political resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. Since August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, and since April 1986, to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, the obligations of which were assumed by the USSR and the USA. Deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were set: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the remaining units - after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which was completed on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620 thousand military personnel completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525.2 thousand people in the OKSV.

The losses of the 40th Army personnel were: killed and killed - 13,833 people, including 1,979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the fighting on the territory of Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel of state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. Due to injuries, 172 officers stopped serving in the Armed Forces. 6,669 Afghans became disabled, including 1,479 people disabled in the first group.

For military and other merits, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

When the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan. Why and when did Soviet troops fight in Afghanistan?

Tutoring

Introduction

Cause of hostilities