Gazprom revealed the scale of liquidation and mothballing of gas transmission facilities, which were originally built under " South Stream", but turned out to be redundant for its successor - Turkish Stream. This has nothing to do with the implementation of the new project, experts say.
They built in vain
It's about about the Southern Gas Corridor (not to be confused with the project of the same name to pump Azerbaijani gas to Europe) from Yamal to Anapa. When launching South Stream, the gas holding expected to supply 63 billion cubic meters per year to Europe. To achieve this, it was necessary to expand the capacity of gas pipelines passing through Russia.
It was planned to build four lines of the new pipeline in two stages. The first stage of two lines with a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters was being built at an accelerated pace; the second stage had already begun when Bulgaria revoked the permit for the construction of South Stream on its territory, and the project was stuck in limbo.
Then it was decided to build two other gas pipelines: Nord Stream 2 with a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters and Turkish Stream with a capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters. In this configuration, these projects are now being implemented, collectively more than covering the volumes that were planned for South Stream. So the second stage of the Southern Gas Corridor for 31.5 billion cubic meters was simply not needed.
The question arises: why was the liquidation of these facilities not announced immediately after the start of construction of two new projects? “Perhaps the delay was due to hopes that the Bulgarians will come to their senses and we will return to the Southern Gas Corridor of 63 billion cubic meters,” suggests Igor Yushkov, leading expert of the National Energy Security Fund. “But as Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream progressed, it became clear that the configuration would not change.”
In fact, Gazprom has now finally admitted that it will not return to the South Stream project, at least in the foreseeable future. 506 kilometers of pipes laid from Pochinki to Anapa across the Krasnodar Territory, Saratov, Volgograd and Rostov regions, as well as the Morshanskaya gas measuring station, are subject to dismantling, Interfax reports.
The construction of the third and fourth stages of the Russkaya, Kazachya, and Korenovskaya compressor stations will be mothballed until “a decision is made on the implementation of these facilities in full,” according to the holding’s materials. The total cost of unfinished projects for South Stream at the beginning of 2017 was estimated at 46 billion rubles.
Where does the second thread break?
Experts believe that this story is unlikely to be related to the delay in issuing permission from Turkey for the construction of the onshore part of the second line of the Turkish Stream, which was previously reported by Reuters. Rather, this is due to some political issues, in particular regarding Syria (for example, will Moscow allow Turkish troops take Afrin or not). But there is hardly any need to seriously worry about the fate of the second thread.
In fact, the reason for the hitch is not so much in Turkey’s position as in the doubts of Gazprom itself, which does not give clear indications of where this route actually intends to lead. Therefore, the Turkish authorities cannot issue a construction permit.
“The intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Turkey on Turkish Stream says that the second pipe will go to the border of Turkey and Greece, and then it was assumed that it will go through Greece to Italy. But in fact, the most profitable option for Gazprom would be for the pipe to go to Bulgaria, and then along the old South Stream route - through Hungary to Austria, plus supplying Serbia and other Balkan countries,” says Yushkov.
There is another option that completely eliminates the need for partners to build a land route from Turkey to Bulgaria. For this it will be possible to use existing infrastructure. The fact is that gas is now supplied to Turkey not only directly via Blue Stream, but also via the Trans-Balkan Pipeline passing through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria.
When Turkish Stream is completed, the country will be able to receive all its gas directly from Russia, and the vacated gas pipeline can be used in the opposite direction, pumping gas from Turkey to Bulgaria. And there you only need to build small area for transportation of blue fuel to Serbia, Hungary and further to Austria.
But Gazprom's wishes are not enough. It is still unclear who and under what conditions could build the infrastructure in Europe to receive gas, analysts say, and one gets the feeling that Moscow itself has become a little more skeptical about the prospect of launching a second line in the near future.
So far, the Russian holding is discussing gas supplies via the Turkish Stream with all possible partners on the European shore - with Bulgaria, Greece and Italy, although back in 2016, the president of the Italian national energy operator Eni, Claudio Descalzi, said that his country is not interested in this pipeline.
“There are still big questions with the second line: the entrance is clear, the exit is unclear,” Sergei Pikin, director of the Energy Development Fund, previously explained to Reedus. According to him, the main problem of the Turkish Stream is that Europe as a whole, represented by the European Commission, prevents pipelines from entering its territory from Russia.
These are questions of politics, not economics. And the interests of individual countries are not taken into account here. And if Germany, the main locomotive of the European economy, in the situation with Nord Stream 2 can still take its own position, independent of the European Commission, then the countries of South-Eastern Europe, which the Turkish Stream is aimed at, cannot afford such luxury .
The main goal of the project is to increase the security of gas supplies to Europe, reduce Russia's share as a gas supplier and exclude Ukraine as a gas transit country. The declared cost of the project is about 45 billion dollars.
It should be noted that, according to the Third Energy Package, Gazprom may require 50% of the capacity of the specified gas pipeline to be provided to it, because This EU law prohibits the owner of a gas pipeline from using more than 50% of its capacity. The European Commission has confirmed that it will comply with European legislation. Thus, although the gas pipeline may slightly reduce Gazprom’s supply volumes, on the other hand, the project may turn out to be an EU investment in a gas pipeline system for Gazprom, bypassing Ukraine.
At the moment, it is unclear how the resource base of the gas pipeline will be filled. Current supply volumes from Azerbaijan are not enough even to completely fill the TAP gas pipeline. The volume of gas production in Azerbaijan from the Shah Deniz field is about 10 billion cubic meters, which, taking into account the consumption of part of the gas in Turkey, is not enough even to completely fill the first stage of the gas pipeline, especially taking into account the already functioning Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. Gas supplies through Turkmenistan are hampered by the uncertain legal status of the Caspian Sea. Supplies from Iraq and Iran require the laying of gas pipelines in the war zone of the civil war in Syria and through areas of armed conflict between the Kurdish Workers' Party and Turkish troops.
The first deliveries are planned to begin first in 2018 to Turkey, and then in 2019 to Europe. At the same time, in the first stage, the throughput capacity of the new gas pipeline is estimated at approximately 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, with the possibility of further expansion to 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year.
Expert opinions about the project
As during the implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, this project is largely perceived as another attempt to end Russia’s monopoly on the export of energy resources to European countries. However, despite this, some experts do not consider the Southern Gas Corridor project as a threat to Russian gas supplies. For example, Mikhail Krutikhin, partner and analyst of the RusEnergy consulting agency, believes that “Implementation of the Yuzhny project gas corridor“Does not pose an immediate threat to Russia, but in the future, if other suppliers join along this route, it will be serious competition for Russian gas supplies.” Krutikhin bases his opinion on the fact that gas supplies will not begin soon, and if realized, Azerbaijan will not be able to export more than 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, but if countries such as Iran, Turkmenistan, Iraq join the project, the volume exports will amount to 30 billion cubic meters per year, which will already begin to seriously compete with Russia in the matter of energy exports to Europe.
On the other hand, professor and member of the economic committee of the Federation Council Evgeny Tarlo believes that “this project should be considered not from the point of view of Russia’s possible losses in the gas market, but as normal market competition.” He is confident that Azerbaijani gas is not able to occupy a significant place in the market, replace and completely displace Russian gas from the market, but at the same time this project is an example of normal market competition. At the same time, he emphasized that Azerbaijan has every right to extract and sell its resources on the market, and therefore there is no point in considering this project as a possibility of economic losses for Russia in the gas market.
Azerbaijani experts also very soberly consider the Southern Gas Corridor from the point of view of competitiveness with Russia. For example, Azerbaijani political scientist Farid Guliyev is confident that Azerbaijani gas supplies to Europe will not affect Russian supplies in any way. However, he said, the new gas corridor will help Azerbaijan become a major energy supplier in the region and will support declining revenues from oil exports, which will be especially noticeable after 2020. Although, by his own admission, Azerbaijan’s gas exports will not be able to catch up with oil in terms of profits received over the past ten years.
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Excerpt characterizing the Southern Gas Corridor
Gavrilo, Marya Dmitrievna’s huge traveling footman, met Anatoly.“Please see the lady,” the footman said in a deep voice, blocking the way from the door.
- Which lady? Who are you? – Anatole asked in a breathless whisper.
- Please, I've been ordered to bring him.
- Kuragin! back,” Dolokhov shouted. - Treason! Back!
Dolokhov, at the gate where he stopped, was struggling with the janitor, who was trying to lock the gate behind Anatoly as he entered. Dolokhov, with his last effort, pushed the janitor away and, grabbing the hand of Anatoly as he ran out, pulled him out the gate and ran with him back to the troika.
Marya Dmitrievna, finding a tearful Sonya in the corridor, forced her to confess everything. Having intercepted Natasha’s note and read it, Marya Dmitrievna, with the note in her hand, went up to Natasha.
“Bastard, shameless,” she told her. - I don’t want to hear anything! - Pushing away Natasha, who was looking at her with surprised but dry eyes, she locked it and ordered the janitor to let through the gate those people who would come that evening, but not to let them out, and ordered the footman to bring these people to her, sat down in the living room, waiting kidnappers.
When Gavrilo came to report to Marya Dmitrievna that the people who had come had run away, she stood up with a frown and folded her hands back, walked around the rooms for a long time, thinking about what she should do. At 12 o'clock at night, feeling the key in her pocket, she went to Natasha's room. Sonya sat in the corridor, sobbing.
- Marya Dmitrievna, let me see her for God’s sake! - she said. Marya Dmitrievna, without answering her, unlocked the door and entered. “Disgusting, nasty... In my house... Vile little girl... I just feel sorry for my father!” thought Marya Dmitrievna, trying to quench her anger. “No matter how difficult it is, I’ll tell everyone to be silent and hide it from the count.” Marya Dmitrievna entered the room with decisive steps. Natasha lay on the sofa, covering her head with her hands, and did not move. She lay in the same position in which Marya Dmitrievna had left her.
- Good, very good! - said Marya Dmitrievna. - In my house, lovers can make dates! There's no point in pretending. You listen when I talk to you. - Marya Dmitrievna touched her hand. - You listen when I talk. You have disgraced yourself like a very lowly girl. I would do that to you, but I feel sorry for your father. I'll hide it. – Natasha did not change her position, but only her whole body began to jump up from silent, convulsive sobs that choked her. Marya Dmitrievna looked back at Sonya and sat down on the sofa next to Natasha.
- He’s lucky that he left me; “Yes, I will find him,” she said in her rough voice; – Do you hear what I’m saying? “She put her big hand under Natasha’s face and turned her towards her. Both Marya Dmitrievna and Sonya were surprised to see Natasha’s face. Her eyes were shiny and dry, her lips were pursed, her cheeks were drooping.
“Leave... those... that I... I... will die...” she said, with an angry effort she tore herself away from Marya Dmitrievna and lay down in her previous position.
“Natalya!...” said Marya Dmitrievna. - I wish you well. You lie down, just lie there, I won’t touch you, and listen... I won’t tell you how guilty you are. You know it yourself. Well, now your father is coming tomorrow, what will I tell him? A?
Again Natasha's body shook with sobs.
- Well, he will find out, well, your brother, groom!
“I don’t have a fiance, I refused,” Natasha shouted.
“It doesn’t matter,” continued Marya Dmitrievna. - Well, they’ll find out, so why leave it like that? After all, he, your father, I know him, after all, if he challenges him to a duel, will it be good? A?
- Oh, leave me alone, why did you interfere with everything! For what? For what? who asked you? - Natasha shouted, sitting up on the sofa and looking angrily at Marya Dmitrievna.
- What did you want? - Marya Dmitrievna cried out again, getting excited, - why did they lock you up? Well, who stopped him from going to the house? Why should they take you away like some kind of gypsy?... Well, if he had taken you away, what do you think, he wouldn’t have been found? Your father, or brother, or fiancé. And he’s a scoundrel, a scoundrel, that’s what!
“He’s better than all of you,” Natasha cried, standing up. - If you hadn’t interfered... Oh, my God, what is this, what is this! Sonya, why? Go away!... - And she began to sob with such despair with which people only mourn such grief, which they feel themselves to be the cause of. Marya Dmitrievna began to speak again; but Natasha shouted: “Go away, go away, you all hate me, you despise me.” – And again she threw herself on the sofa.
Marya Dmitrievna continued for some time to admonish Natasha and convince her that all this must be hidden from the count, that no one would find out anything if only Natasha took it upon herself to forget everything and not show to anyone that anything had happened. Natasha didn't answer. She didn’t cry anymore, but she began to feel chills and trembling. Marya Dmitrievna put a pillow on her, covered her with two blankets and brought her some lime blossom herself, but Natasha did not respond to her. “Well, let him sleep,” said Marya Dmitrievna, leaving the room, thinking that she was sleeping. But Natasha was not sleeping and, with fixed, open eyes, looked straight ahead from her pale face. All that night Natasha did not sleep, and did not cry, and did not speak to Sonya, who got up and approached her several times.
The next day, for breakfast, as Count Ilya Andreich had promised, he arrived from the Moscow region. He was very cheerful: the deal with the buyer was going well and nothing was keeping him now in Moscow and in separation from the countess, whom he missed. Marya Dmitrievna met him and told him that Natasha had become very unwell yesterday, that they had sent for a doctor, but that she was better now. Natasha did not leave her room that morning. With pursed, cracked lips, dry, fixed eyes, she sat by the window and restlessly peered at those passing along the street and hurriedly looked back at those entering the room. She was obviously waiting for news about him, waiting for him to come or write to her.
When the count came up to her, she turned restlessly at the sound of his man’s steps, and her face took on its former cold and even angry expression. She didn't even get up to meet him.
– What’s wrong with you, my angel, are you sick? - asked the count. Natasha was silent.
“Yes, I’m sick,” she answered.
In response to the count's worried questions about why she was so killed and whether anything had happened to her fiancé, she assured him that nothing was wrong and asked him not to worry. Marya Dmitrievna confirmed Natasha’s assurances to the Count that nothing had happened. The count, judging by the imaginary illness, by the disorder of his daughter, by the embarrassed faces of Sonya and Marya Dmitrievna, clearly saw that something was going to happen in his absence: but he was so scared to think that something shameful had happened to his beloved daughter, he He loved his cheerful calm so much that he avoided asking questions and kept trying to assure himself that nothing special had happened and was only grieving that due to her ill health their departure to the village had been postponed.
From the day his wife arrived in Moscow, Pierre was preparing to go somewhere, just so as not to be with her. Soon after the Rostovs arrived in Moscow, the impression that Natasha made on him made him hasten to fulfill his intention. He went to Tver to see the widow of Joseph Alekseevich, who promised long ago to give him the papers of the deceased.
This month we have seen a lot of headlines in the media about new pipeline projects in Europe. For example, Oilprice.com recently published an article about the Southern Gas Corridor entitled "Is It Really the Most Important Pipeline in the World?"
The article itself is an ordinary marketing ploy designed to make you think that Azerbaijani gas will change the entire European gas policy. The publication zerohedge.com examined this topic.
“The beginning of the article is most revealing: “Europe wants to become less dependent on Russian gas and use cleaner energy..." This is, of course, a lie.
Europe itself, on the contrary, does not want this, because it is simply not profitable for it. However, this is what European politicians want, who are in cahoots with Washington and who benefit from considering Russia an enemy of the EU.
Most of Europe wants Russia to supply them because Russian gas is cheap and because there is a lot of it. Of course, the United States is doing everything to prevent economic growth and Russian influence. The EU technocracy agrees that a strong Russia with a share of more than 40% of European gas sales is a Russia that cannot be destabilized through currency and proxy wars.
The Southern Gas Corridor is a gas pipeline project with a length of approximately 4,000 km to deliver natural gas Caspian Sea in southern Europe. According to preliminary estimates, about 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year will be transported through the pipeline starting in 2019.
The estimated cost of the Southern Gas Corridor at the start of negotiations was more than $45 billion. The project itself is essentially a solution to a problem that has yet to be found. This is nothing more than a bribe of 45 billion dollars that the United States gives to the regime it pleases in Azerbaijan.
This is not the first time that the United States has used EU countries hostile to Russia (such as Poland or the Baltic states) to undermine new Russian gas projects in Europe.
In 2014, political pressure on Bulgaria from the European Union and the United States disrupted the South Stream gas project. The pipeline was supposed to deliver gas from Russia's southern fields to Bulgaria via the Black Sea. Bulgaria could make huge profits every year from transit fees.
The state gas company Gazprom quickly found a new solution, replacing the failed South Stream with Turkish Stream. The new pipeline will pass through Turkey and end in Greece. Last summer, Hungary already held negotiations with Gazprom on the Turkish Stream. All countries involved want to receive transit fees.
What do you think the cost of this project is? Just 12 billion dollars. Given that the pipeline will run along the bottom of the Black Sea.
Another pipeline, Nord Stream 2, will double the capacity of the existing Nord Stream gas pipeline, allowing cheap Russian gas to flow directly from St. Petersburg to Germany. The construction project will be completed by next year.
What is the cost of this project? Less than 10 billion dollars.
The EU has done everything possible to derail the Nord Stream 2 project, except perhaps by not writing a law simply banning construction, which it, of course, cannot do. Finally, all attempts were abandoned earlier this month.
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the situation: interests European politicians, obviously stand above interests ordinary people. European leaders do not take into account the interests of the people they are supposed to serve when making decisions.
In essence, EU leaders are ready to sell energy security Europe. Europe's future looks much safer with Turkish Stream and Nord Stream 2.
In the abundance of gas pipeline projects in Central Asia and Transcaucasia today can be confusing. There is a certain TAP - Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, running from the gas fields of Turkmenistan along the bottom of the Caspian Sea to the Sangachal terminal of Azerbaijan. There is a South Caucasus gas pipeline from Baku, through Georgia, to Turkey.
Then there is TANAP - the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, which runs across Turkey to its border with Europe, where it becomes the start of two other gas pipelines - NABUCCO through Bulgaria and again TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline) through Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea to the Italian city of Brindisi. Everywhere we see different volume figures, different launch dates and even different degrees of readiness.
For a long time, all of the above resembled an attempt to divide the skin of an unkilled bear. At the heart of everything was the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field, gas from which Baku wanted to sell directly to Europe, without Russian mediation. The interest of other countries was clear. Firstly, Georgia saw in the project an opportunity to obtain energy resources “not from Gazprom” (which promised to gain “energy independence”).
Secondly, the transit pipe to Turkey meant transit payments, to put it mildly, not unnecessary for the economy. However, the Turks viewed the issue in a similar way. Some of the gas goes to us, and some goes on for sale to the European Union. And not only them. The Greeks and Albanians looked at the “Azerbaijani pipe” in exactly the same way. And all together it was called the Southern Gas Corridor.
The other day it was even officially launched. On May 29, in Baku, the President of Azerbaijan attended the ceremony for the start of gas injection into the South Caucasus Pipe (also known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, BTE). As stated, approximately by June 12 of this year, the process of technological preparation will be completed and the first Azerbaijani gas will begin to flow into TANAP.
Thus, the Southern Gas Corridor, which bypasses Russia, will finally start operating, which means that the efforts of a pool of “small countries” to overcome the Russian gas monopoly and gain their geopolitical subjectivity have been crowned with success. The export of energy resources via a route not controlled by Moscow promises opportunities to expand independence in foreign policy. In theory. The reality, as always, turns out to be much more complicated.
Azerbaijan still does not have the 25 billion cubic meters of BTE pumping volume per year announced at the end of 2017. And the site itself allows only 18.6 billion cubic meters to pass through. It will be increased to its maximum only in 2020. And even then, it’s unlikely.
For the entire 2017, with all the investments in the development of the Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan managed to produce only 10.2 billion cubic meters of gas, of which it is able to export no more than 9 billion. While for loading TANAP, combined with the desire to supply also at least 10 billion cubic meters to Europe, Baku needs to have an export capacity of at least 27-32 billion cubic meters. In the best case, it will be possible to reach the 18 billion mark no earlier than 2020-2022.
It follows from this that for the next five years, Azerbaijani gas will only be enough to meet Turkish demand. To some, this result may seem successful. In the sense that not so much for Baku, but for Ankara, which is weakening its dependence on Gazprom. But the numbers tell a different story. Of the 50 billion cubic meters of its consumption, 24-25 billion are supplied by Russia. Iran gives another 10 billion. The Turks buy the rest wherever they can. It was the presence of a serious gas shortage that served as the basis for agreeing to the implementation of the first line of the Turkish Stream, after the completion of which an additional 15.75 billion cubic meters of blue fuel per year will come from Russia.
But the Turks do not like that their gas dependence on Russia will reach 80%, which will put all further development of Turkish industry, which is always based primarily on energy, under Moscow’s control. And this is where things start to get interesting.
According to statements from the Turkish side, they do not expect to receive more than 6 billion cubic meters per year from Azerbaijan until at least the end of 2022-2023. Despite the fact that we would like at least 10, and preferably 11 billion. But they are not there, which means there is absolutely nothing to pump through Greece, Albania and the Adriatic, and all statements by the Italians about the environmental threat are simply political PR. However, it is still theoretically possible to find gas at TAP, but it will never appear at NABUCCO. Unless, of course, we consider the second branch of the Turkish Stream as a source, the construction of which Turkey also gave permission for. But these additional 15.75 billion cubic meters of “Russian gas” completely cancel the basis of the concept of the Southern Gas Corridor as an important alternative line for importing energy resources to the EU, bypassing the Russian Federation.
Realizing that, despite all the rejection of reality, there is no other alternative, a number of oil and gas TNCs are trying to “find” the missing gas on the other side of the Caspian Sea - in Turkmenistan. Formally, any project there is impossible until the final demarcation of the water area, the process of which is underway, but is still far from completion. In practice, Western lawyers think that they have found a “gap” that allows them to begin designing a joint Azerbaijani-Turkmen project to lay the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Georgia has secured the support of the European Commission and expressed its readiness to finance the start of project work.
Turkmenistan's interest in “joining” the SGC is simple. In 2016, Russia stopped purchasing Turkmen gas, and at the beginning of 2017, Turkmenistan quarreled with Iran, as a result of which it lost exports there. As a result, the country is capable of producing 75-80 billion cubic meters of gas per year, but sells only 29.6 billion to the only buyer - China, which takes advantage of Ashgabat's desperate situation and pays little - only $ 185 per thousand cubic meters. The drop in export earnings has hit the country's income hard and forced the Turkmen government to significantly cut social guarantees. The incoming money is only enough to service loans received from China.
The implementation of TAP will make it possible to direct the “available surplus” through the Southern Corridor “to the West.” They are preparing to go 12-15 billion on the first line, then another 15-16 billion on the second. The project is actively supported by EU banks and that part of the European elite that actively does not like the forced rapprochement of the European Union with Russia.
Theoretically, Turkmen gas can provide both the additional load of TANAP and the needs of the Trans-Adriatic part of the SGC. In the future, even oust Gazprom. And if you look very far and take into account the very, very long-term plans (today rather just dreams, although not without reasonable grounds) of Turkmenistan to double its production with Western help, Europe can really get through the Southern Corridor (taking into account its expansion) to about 90 billion cubic meters of gas, which is approximately 70-75% of Gazprom's current supplies to the EU. In theory.
Because in practice, for the next five years, 6 billion cubic meters is all that can pass through the SGC from Turkmenistan. Consequently, they will not reach the European border of Turkey at all. At the same time, in the next three to four years, Nord Stream 2 and South Stream 2 will be commissioned, which will increase Russian gas exports to Europe from 155.9 (data for 2017) to 226-227 billion . cubes per year.
Against this background, even if Azerbaijan manages to increase production to at least 18 billion, and Turkmenistan manages to miraculously extend the first line along the bottom of the Caspian Sea, then even in this case, at most 22-24 billion cubic meters will reach Europe, which will amount to at most 10% of Russian volumes. They will certainly bring additional money to suppliers, but they will not be able to have any serious impact on the overall balance of supply and demand in the European gas market, especially given the decline in European production. There is no alternative to the dominance of Russian gas in Europe.
The first part of the Southern Gas Corridor project was opened in Baku, through which Azerbaijan will be able to directly export gas to Europe. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev took part in the ceremony. By turning the key, he symbolically launched the supply of “blue fuel” from the Shah Deniz field on the Caspian Sea shelf to Europe.
Azerbaijani diplomacy of the 21st century: the secret of success in the international arena
The Southern Gas Corridor consists of three puzzles. The first stage is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). This gas pipeline connecting Azerbaijan with the Turkish city of Erzurum through Georgian territory was built back in 2007. But after the European Commission signed the declaration on the “Southern Gas Corridor” in 2011, a decision was made to expand the SCP. The pipeline runs parallel to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, through which Azerbaijan exports oil to the EU through the Mediterranean port of Turkey.
Google Map Data, 2018
The second phase of the project is associated with the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), starting at the Turkish-Georgian border and crossing the whole of Asia Minor. At the Greek border, TANAP will be connected to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which runs through Greece, Albania and Italy.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
The first supplies of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey are scheduled for 2018. In mid-May, Turkish Energy Minister Berat Albayrak announced the opening date of TANAP. This will happen on June 12. The gas pipeline from Greece to Italy, to which Bulgaria intends to join via interconnectors, will be put into operation around 2020. TAP will provide about 17% of Italy's gas consumption.
The capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor is estimated at 16 billion cubic meters per year, six of which will go to the needs of Turkey, and the remaining 10 will be supplied to Europe.
New gas war between Russia and Ukraine: Gazprom does not intend to be a sponsor of the Kyiv regime
Will Azerbaijani gas compete with Russian exports? The capacity of the Turkish Stream, when its second line is built, will be twice that of the Southern Gas Corridor. And taking into account the almost 200 billion cubic meters that Russia annually exports to the Old World, 16 billion from Shah Deniz is unlikely to “make a difference” in the European market, where the demand for gas is growing from year to year. We must also keep in mind the ongoing construction of the Russian Nord Stream 2, which will carry no less than 55 billion cubic meters per year.
It is worth noting that the Southern Gas Corridor is the fourth project aimed at increasing the energy transport independence of the South Caucasus republics from Russia. In 1999, the construction of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline to Georgia was completed. Seven years later, the aforementioned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was built. At the same time, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline was being implemented. The territory of three countries - Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey - passes through and was put into operation in the fall of 2017. Railway"Baku - Tbilisi - Kars."
The Southern Gas Corridor, as comparative statistics show, is not a direct competitor of Gazprom in the European gas market. Moreover, Russia itself is diversifying gas supplies at the expense of China.
Photo: Merkushev Vasiliy / Shutterstock.com
At the recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also announced his interest in “blue fuel” from Russia. A little earlier, Bulgarian President Rumen Radev hinted at the possible reincarnation of South Stream.
At the same time, to assert that the Southern Gas Corridor is not a project bypassing Russia would be strange, at least from a geographical point of view. Without pretending to compete, Azerbaijan is strengthening its status as an independent international player, without being tied to either Russia or the West. The EU and the USA, as well as Western companies led by BP (participating in almost all oil and gas projects in Azerbaijan) are interested in expanding their influence in the South Caucasus, and in the future weakening the role of Gazprom in Europe. But Azerbaijan’s deposits alone are not enough for this. Gas pipelines bypassing Russia have real power only if Iran and Turkmenistan, the 2nd and 4th countries in the world in terms of “blue fuel” reserves, are connected to them. But there are a number of obstacles on this path: the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea, which is preventing the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, and the Kurdish factor, which complicates the supply of Iranian gas. The United States is also making its contribution by delaying the development of one of the ten largest gas fields in the world, South Pars, by withdrawing from the nuclear deal.