Crimean offensive 1944 is considered one of the most important campaigns during the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War. It started on April 8th. Let us consider further how the liberation of Crimea from the fascist invaders took place.

The situation on the peninsula

On September 26 - November 5, 1943, the Melitopol landing operations took place, and on October 31 - November 11 of the same year, the Kerch-Eltegen landing operations took place. Soviet troops managed to break through the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus. Bridgeheads were captured on and in the southern part of Sivash. However, there were not enough forces to completely liberate Crimea. The peninsula was occupied by a fairly large enemy group, relying on layered defense. On the Perekop Isthmus and opposite the bridgehead on Sivash, the enemy positions consisted of three, and on the Kerch Peninsula - four lines.

Positions of the parties

Having expelled the enemy from the peninsula, the USSR Black Sea Fleet could regain its key strategic base. This would improve the conditions for deploying ships and conducting battles. In addition, the Crimean Peninsula covered the strategic Balkan flank of the Germans, their main communications passing through the straits to the western part of the coast. In this regard, the German leadership, in turn, attached great importance holding territory. They believed that this would preserve the support of Turkey and the Balkan allies. The leadership of the 17th Army, based on the peninsula, was tasked with holding the area to the last. However, the enemy command developed a detailed plan "Adler" in case of retreat.

Balance of power

By the beginning of 1944, the German army was reinforced with two divisions. By the end of January, the 73rd, and by the beginning of March, the 111th infantry units arrived on the peninsula. In April, the enemy troops consisted of 12 divisions. Among them were 7 Romanian and 5 German. In addition, the forces included 2 assault brigades, different reinforcements. In general, the number of troops was more than 195 thousand people. The units had about 3,600 mortars and guns, 215 tanks. The army was supported from the air by 148 aircraft. The 4th Ukrainian Front was to play a key role in the battles on the Soviet side. The command of the troops was carried out by Gen. Tolbukhin. The troops included:

1. 51st and 2nd Guards Armies.
2. 78th and 16th fortified areas.
3. 19th Tank Corps.

Also, the 4th Ukrainian Front was supported by the 8th Air Army. The troops included a separate brigade under the command of Eremenko. Its actions were also supported by air support. Ships were involved in the battles. They were commanded by Oktyabrsky Philipp Sergeevich. His forces were supposed to support the offensive and disrupt enemy communications. In addition, the Azov military flotilla was present as part of the Soviet troops. It was commanded by Rear Admiral Gorshkov. His forces supported the advance of the Separate Maritime Army.

The total number of the Soviet group was about 470 thousand people. The troops had about 6 thousand mortars and guns at their disposal, 559 self-propelled units and tanks. From the sea, the infantry was supported by 4 cruisers, 1 battleship and 2 patrol ships, 6 destroyers, 8 base minesweepers, 80 patrol ships and 47 torpedo boats, 29 submarines, 34 armored boats, 3 gunboats and other auxiliary vessels.

Active support for the Soviet Army was provided by the Crimean partisans, whose detachments were formed at the beginning of 1944. Their total number was about 4 thousand people. The detachments united into the Eastern, Northern and Southern formations. The USSR forces had a significant superiority over the enemy army. The actions of the Soviet troops were also coordinated by Voroshilov.

Problems with timing

The liberation of Crimea in 1944 was supposed to begin in February, on the 18th-19th. On February 6, the battle plan was presented. However, the start of the campaign was subsequently postponed several times. At the same time, battles took place on the coast of the Dnieper. The command headquarters sent Vasilevsky instructions to begin the offensive no earlier than the liberation of the territories up to Kherson.

Subsequently another order was given. In particular, Vasilevsky received instructions to begin the operation no later than March 1, regardless of how the liberation of the Dnieper coast would proceed. However, the head of the troops reported to Headquarters that, taking into account weather conditions, the battles would have to be postponed until mid-March. The High Command agreed with this deadline. However, already on March 16, Vasilevsky received new instructions, according to which the operation had to begin after the capture of the Nikolaev region and advance to Odessa. But after that, due to meteorological conditions, the battles had to be postponed until April 8.

The liberation of Crimea in 1944 was supposed to be carried out by a breakthrough 170 km deep. It was planned to capture enemy positions in 10-12 days. At the same time, the average daily rate of advance for the infantry was supposed to be 12-15 km, for the tank corps - 30-35 km. The command's plan was to simultaneously launch attacks from the north - from Sivash and Perekop, and from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula. Carrying out the liberation of Sevastopol and Simferopol, it was planned to split and eliminate the enemy group, preventing its retreat from the peninsula. The main blow was supposed to be delivered from a bridgehead in the southern part of Sivash. If the action was successful, the main forces reached three Perekop enemy positions. Having taken possession of Dzhankoy, Soviet troops got the opportunity to advance to Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula behind German lines. An auxiliary attack was planned on the Perekop Isthmus. The Separate Primorsky Army was tasked with breaking through the defenses of the invaders north of Kerch. Its part was to attack along the southern coast of the peninsula. The main forces were aimed at the liberation of Sevastopol and Simferopol.

Liberation of Crimea 1944: the beginning of the battles

Five days before the attack, heavy artillery strikes destroyed many long-term enemy structures. On the evening of April 7, combat reconnaissance was carried out. She confirmed the information the Soviet command had about the enemy group. On April 8, aviation and artillery preparations began. In total it took 2.5 hours. The liberation of Crimea in 1944 began with attacks by the 51st Army under the command of Lieutenant General Kreiser. The attack was carried out from a bridgehead in the southern part of Sivash. Fierce fighting raged for two days. As a result, Soviet troops managed to break through the German defenses. The 51st Army invaded the flank of the Perekop group. At the same time, Zakharov’s 2nd Guards Division entered Armyansk. On the morning of April 11, the 19th was captured by Dzhankoy.

Under the command of Vasilyev, the unit successfully approached Simferopol. The Germans, escaping from encirclement, left the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus and began to retreat from the Kerch Peninsula. On the night of 11.04, the attack was launched by the Separate Primorsky Army. By morning, the troops captured Kerch, a fortified defensive hub in the eastern part of the peninsula. The pursuit of the Germans, who were retreating to Sevastopol, began in all directions. The attack of the 2nd Guards developed along the western part of the coast. army towards Evpatoria. The 51st Army, taking advantage of the successful actions of the 19th Corps, began advancing through the steppe strip towards Simferopol. The forces of the Separate Army marched through Belogorsk (Karasubazar) and Feodosia to Sevastopol. On April 13, Soviet troops liberated Feodosia, Simferopol, Evpatoria, and on the 14-15th - Yalta, Bakhchisarai, Alushta.

Meanwhile, the Germans continued to retreat. Aviation of the 4th and 8th armies launched powerful attacks on German troops and communication centers. Oktyabrsky Philip Sergeevich, commanding Soviet ships, gave instructions to sink ships with evacuated invaders.

Partisans

Crimean underground fighters showed exceptional heroism and courage in battle. The partisan formations were faced with the task of destroying nodes, communication lines, and enemy rear lines, setting up ambushes and blockages at mountain crossings, destroying railroad tracks, disrupting the work of the port in Yalta, preventing the German-Romanian troops from advancing to it and evacuating. The underground also had to prevent the enemy from destroying transport and industrial enterprises and cities.

Assault on Sevastopol: preparation

On April 15-16, the Soviet Army began preparations for the attack. The main attack was expected to come from the Balaklava area. Units and formations of the center of the Separate and left flank of the 51st Army were to participate in its application. Soviet troops needed to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Sapun Mountain area and at a height northeast of Karan. Thus, the enemy group would be cut off from the bays located west of Sevastopol. The command believed that the defeat of the enemy on Sapun Mountain, despite all the difficulties that accompanied the assault, would make it possible to disrupt the stability of the enemy’s defensive positions. In the zone of the 2nd Guards. The army was planning to launch an auxiliary strike. To divert the attention of the invaders, it was supposed to be 2 days earlier than the main assault. The Soviet command set the troops the task of breaking through the defenses southeast of Belbek with units of the 55th Rifle and 13th Guards Corps. The army had to develop an offensive on the eastern part of the Northern Bay in order to push the enemy group to the water and destroy it.

Fighting

On April 19 and 23, two attempts were made to break through the main defensive positions of the Sevastopol region. However, the Soviet troops failed. The command decided to regroup forces, prepare the army, and wait for fuel and ammunition to arrive.

The assault began on May 5. Forces of the 2nd Guards. The armies went on the offensive, forcing the enemy to transfer groups from other directions. At 10:30 on May 7, the general assault began with powerful air support. The troops of the main Soviet group were able to break through the enemy defenses in a 9-kilometer area. During fierce battles, the troops captured Sapun Mountain. On May 9, Soviet soldiers broke into Sevastopol from the southeast, east and north, liberating the city. The remaining forces of the enemy's 17th Army, pursued by the 19th Corps, retreated to where they were completely destroyed. 21 thousand enemy officers and soldiers were captured. Soviet troops captured enemy equipment and weapons.

Completion of battles

In 1941-1942. It took the enemy 250 days to capture Sevastopol, whose inhabitants heroically defended its walls; Soviet troops needed only 35 days to liberate it. Already by May 15, headquarters began to receive information about parades held in formations and military units dedicated to the expulsion of the enemy from the peninsula.

Conclusion

The liberation of Crimea in 1944 made it possible to return the most important economic and strategic region to the Soviet country. These were the main goals of the fighting that were achieved. At the end of the battle, a reward project was created for participation in expelling the enemy from the territory of the peninsula. However, the medal for Crimea was never established at that time.

In April - May 1944, our troops attacked Stalin's third crushing blow against the enemy in the area of ​​Crimea and Odessa . It took the Germans 250 days to capture Crimea, and Soviet troops liberated it in 5 days (May 7 - 12, 1944).

On May 9, 1944, 70 years ago, after a general assault, Sevastopol was liberated. By May 12, the remnants of the German 17th Army, who fled to Cape Chersonesus, were completely defeated. “Stalin’s third blow” - the Crimean offensive operation, led to the complete liberation of the Crimean peninsula from the Nazis. Having recaptured Crimea and Sevastopol, the Soviet Union regained control of the Black Sea.

General situation before the start of the operation. Previous operations.

1943 The German military-political leadership clung to Crimea until the last opportunity. The Crimean peninsula had enormous military-strategic and political significance. Adolf Hitler demanded to hold Crimea at any cost. Berlin needed the Crimean peninsula not only for operational reasons (a base for the air and sea fleet, a forward outpost of ground forces allowing to stabilize the position of the southern flank of the entire front), but for political ones. The surrender of Crimea could affect the position of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the general situation on the Balkan Peninsula. The loss of Crimea strengthened the capabilities of the Soviet Air Force and Black Sea Fleet.

On August 13 - September 22, 1943, troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin, during the Donbass offensive operation, reached the line of the Dnieper and Molochnaya rivers. Conditions appeared for the liberation of Northern Tavria and the Crimean Peninsula. From September 9 to October 9, 1943, the Novorossiysk-Taman operation (Liberation of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula) was carried out. During this operation, Soviet troops liberated Novorossiysk, the Taman Peninsula and reached the coast of the Kerch Strait. The successful completion of the operation created favorable opportunities for attacks on the Crimean Wehrmacht group from the sea and through Kerch Strait.

The position of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front continued to deteriorate further. From September 26 to November 5, 1943, the Southern Front (from October 20, 1943 - the 4th Ukrainian Front) carried out the Melitopol offensive operation. October 24-25, 1943 19th Tank Corps of General I.D. Vasiliev, Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of General N.Ya. Kirichenko and rifle units broke through the German defenses. The Red Army was rapidly advancing towards Perekop, Sivash and the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

As a result of the Melitopol operation, the Red Army defeated 8 enemy divisions and inflicted heavy damage on 12 divisions. Soviet troops advanced 50-230 km, liberating almost all of Northern Tavria and reaching the lower reaches of the Dnieper. German troops in Crimea were cut off from other troops. By the end of the day on October 31, the advanced units of the 19th Tank Corps and Cavalry Corps approached the Turkish Wall and broke through it on the move. On November 1, Soviet soldiers fought in the Armyansk area. The attack of Soviet tankers and cavalrymen on the Turkish Wall was so sudden that the Nazis did not have time to organize a powerful defense.

The problem of the advanced units was that they did not have enough artillery, ammunition, and besides, the rifle units lagged behind. The German command, realizing that the Turkish Wall had been broken, organized a powerful counterattack. There was a stubborn battle all day. On the night of November 2, the Nazis again occupied the Turkish Wall with an attack from the flanks.

The advanced Soviet units were forced to fight surrounded. German attacks followed one after another. Komkor Vasiliev was wounded, but remained in service and continued to lead the troops. As of November 3, units had 6-7 rounds per gun and 20-25 rounds per rifle left. The situation was critical. The front headquarters ordered to leave the encirclement, but if possible, to hold the bridgehead. Commander of the 19th Tank Corps Ivan Vasiliev (By Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated November 3, 1943, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Vasiliev was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union) decided to hold the bridgehead and, with a blow from it (from the south), again break through the German positions on the rampart. At night, two small assault detachments (each with 100 soldiers) made up of tankers, dismounted cavalrymen, sappers, signalmen and drivers broke through the German defenses. Thus, they were able to hold a bridgehead south of the Turkish Wall, 3.5 km wide and up to 4 km deep.

At the same time, units of the 10th Rifle Corps of Major General K.P. Neverov crossed Sivash and captured another important bridgehead. The German command, realizing the danger of this breakthrough, sent reinforcements with tanks and artillery into the battle. However, Soviet troops also received reinforcements. The bridgehead was retained and expanded to 18 km along the front and 14 km in depth. Thus, the operation ended with the capture of bridgeheads on Perekop and south of Sivash, which played a crucial role during the Crimean operation.

Soviet troops are crossing the Sivash

The commander of the 17th Army, General Erwin Gustav Jäneke, fearing a “new Stalingrad”, drew up a plan for the evacuation of German troops from the peninsula through Perekop to Ukraine (“Operation Michael”). The evacuation was planned to take place on October 29, 1943. However, Hitler at the last moment banned this operation. Hitler proceeded from the strategic and military-political importance of the peninsula. He was also supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral K. Doenitz. The German Navy needed Crimea to control a significant part of the Black Sea; the loss of the peninsula sharply worsened the capabilities of the German fleet. The admiral promised that in a critical situation the fleet would evacuate 200 thousand people. 17th Army in 40 days (with bad weather- over 80). However, the naval command was mistaken in its forecasts and assessment of the capabilities of the Navy and Soviet troops. When the need arose, the 17th Army could not be quickly evacuated, which became the reason for its destruction.

From October 31 to November 11, 1943, Soviet troops conducted the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. The Soviet command planned to liberate the Kerch Peninsula. It was not possible to liberate the peninsula, but an important bridgehead was captured and significant enemy forces were attracted to this direction. The German command was forced to transfer troops from the northern (Perekop) direction, where the Nazis planned to launch a strong counterattack on the advancing troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The German 17th Army became even more bogged down in the Crimea, now under threat of attacks from two directions. The Romanian leadership, having lost confidence in the Germans, began to evacuate its troops from Crimea.

1944 German forces and defense.

The 17th Army of Yeneke (Yeneke) was still a powerful and quite combat-ready group. It consisted of up to 200 thousand soldiers, 215 tanks and assault guns and about 360 thousand guns and mortars, 148 aircraft. The headquarters of the 17th Army was located in Simferopol.

The army received orders from Adolf Hitler to stay on the peninsula. Subsequently, the 17th Army, together with the 6th Army located in the Nikopol area, was to launch a counterattack against the Red Army and restore land connections with the rest of the German troops cut by Soviet troops. The 17th Army was to play an important role in disrupting the Soviet offensive on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. Back in November 1943, plans for “Litzmann” and “Ruderboot” were developed. They provided for the breakthrough of most of the 17th Army from Crimea through Perekop to join the 6th Army holding the Nikopol bridgehead, and the evacuation of a smaller part of the army by naval forces.

However, the actions of Soviet troops thwarted these plans. Units of the 10th Rifle Corps, which held the bridgehead south of Sivash, improved their tactical position and expanded the bridgehead during several local operations. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in the Kerch region also carried out a number of local operations, improving their position and expanding the bridgehead. The 17th Army found itself in an even more difficult situation. As General E. Jenecke noted on January 19, 1944: “... the defense of Crimea hangs by a “silk thread” ....”

The situation of the 17th Army was also aggravated by the actions of the Crimean partisans. On December 20, 1943, the operational and reconnaissance departments of the 5th Army Corps recognized the futility of fighting partisan detachments, since:

“The complete destruction of large gangs in the mountains is only possible with the involvement of very large forces.”

The command of the 17th Army also recognized the hopelessness of fighting the partisans. The partisan detachments were supported by an “air bridge” with the USSR. The Germans tried to suppress resistance through terror, including exterminating the population of foothill villages among which the partisans were hiding. However, punitive measures did not produce the expected results. In addition, Crimean Tatars were brought in to fight the partisans, who massively collaborated with the occupiers.

By April 1944, three partisan formations were actively operating in Crimea, with a total number of up to 4 thousand fighters. The most powerful was the Southern partisan unit under the command of I. A. Makedonsky. The southern detachment was located in the reserve of the Southern Coast of Crimea, in the Alushta - Bakhchisarai - Yalta region. The northern formation under the command of P.R. Yampolsky was stationed in the Zuysky forests. The Eastern Union under the leadership of V.S. Kuznetsov was based in the Old Crimean forests. In fact, Soviet partisans controlled the entire mountainous and forested part of the peninsula. Throughout the occupation they strengthened their positions. Even some invaders went over to them. So, a group of deserted Slovaks fought on the side of the partisans.

On January 22-28, the Separate Primorsky Army conducted another local operation. The offensive did not lead to success, but showed the precarious position of the 17th Army. The German command had to transfer reserves from the northern direction, which thwarted the possibility of a counterattack at Perekop. From January 30 to February 29, 1944, troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts carried out the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation (Stalin’s second strike. Part 3. Defeat of the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog enemy group). The Nikopol bridgehead was liquidated, which finally deprived the Germans of hope of restoring land communications with the 17th Army encircled in the Crimea. The 4th Ukrainian Front was given the opportunity to direct all its forces to the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula.

True, in January-February, the 73rd Infantry Division from the 44th Separate Army Corps was airlifted to Crimea from the south of Ukraine, and in March, the 111th Infantry Division from the 6th Army of Army Group “A”. The German high command still wanted to hold Crimea. However, the command of the 17th Army understood that reinforcements were not capable of changing the situation, they would only prolong the agony. Jenecke and his staff repeatedly reported to the high command about the need for a speedy evacuation of the army.

By April, the 17th Army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 brigades of assault guns. In the Perekop area and against the bridgehead on Sivash, the defense was held by the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps (50th, 111th, 336th Infantry Divisions, 279th Assault Gun Brigade) and the Romanian Cavalry Corps (9th Cavalry, 10th -I and 19th Infantry Divisions). In total, the Northern group consisted of about 80 thousand soldiers. The group's headquarters were located in Dzhankoy.

The German defense in the Perekop area consisted of three stripes up to 14 km long and up to 35 km deep. They were occupied by the 50th Infantry Division, reinforced by several separate battalions and units (in total about 20 thousand bayonets, up to 50 tanks and assault guns and 325 guns and mortars). The main defensive line was up to 4-6 km deep, had three defensive positions with full-profile trenches and long-term firing points. The main defense center was Armyansk. From the northern direction, the city was covered by a deep anti-tank ditch, minefields and anti-tank guns. The city was prepared for a perimeter defense, the streets were blocked with barricades, and many buildings were turned into strongholds. Communication passages connected Armyansk with the nearest settlements.

The second line of defense took place in the southern part of the Perekop Isthmus between Karkinitsky Bay and lakes Staroe and Krasnoe. The depth of the second defense line was 6-8 km. Here the Germans built two defensive positions, covered by an anti-tank ditch, minefields and other obstacles. The defense was based on the Ishun positions, which blocked access to the steppe regions of the peninsula.

The third line of defense, the construction of which was not completed at the beginning of the Red Army's offensive, ran along the Chartylyk River. In the gaps between the defense lines there were separate resistance centers and strongholds and minefields. An anti-landing defense was prepared on the coast of the Karkinitsky Gulf. The command of the 17th Army expected the main attack of the Red Army in the Perekop area.

On the southern bank of Sivash, the Germans built 2-3 defensive lines up to 15-17 km deep. They were occupied by the 336th German and 10th Romanian infantry divisions. The defensive positions ran along the shores of four lakes and had a land length of only 10 km. Due to this, a high density of defense was achieved, rich in manpower and firing points. In addition, the defense was strengthened by numerous engineering obstacles, minefields, pillboxes, and bunkers. The 111th German Infantry Division, the 279th Assault Gun Brigade and part of the 9th Romanian Cavalry Division were in reserve at Dzhankoi.

The Kerch direction was defended by the 5th Army Corps: the 73rd, 98th Infantry Divisions, the 191st Assault Gun Brigade, the Romanian 6th Cavalry Division and the 3rd Mountain Rifle Division. In total, the group numbered about 60 thousand soldiers. Coastal defense in the area from Feodosia to Sevastopol was entrusted to the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (1st and 2nd Mountain Rifle Divisions). The same corps was engaged in the fight against partisans.

The coast from Sevastopol to Perekop was controlled by two cavalry regiments from the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division. In total, about 60 thousand soldiers were allocated for anti-landing defense and the fight against partisans. The headquarters of the 17th Army and the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps were located in Simferopol. In addition, the 17th Army included the 9th Air Force Anti-Aircraft Division, an artillery regiment, three coastal defense artillery regiments, the Crimea mountain rifle regiment, a separate Bergman regiment and other units (security, engineer battalions, etc. .).

There were four defense lines on the Kerch Peninsula. Their total depth reached 70 kilometers. The main line of defense rested on Kerch and the heights surrounding the city. The second line of defense ran along the Turkish Wall - from Adzhibay to Lake Uzunlar. The third lane ran near the settlements of Seven Kolodezei, Kenegez, Adyk, Obekchi and Karasan. The fourth band covered the Ak-Monai Isthmus (“Perpach position”). In addition, the Germans equipped rear defense lines on the line Evpatoria - Saki - Sarabuz - Karasubazar - Sudak - Feodosia, Alushta - Yalta. They covered Simferopol. Sevastopol was a powerful defensive hub.

Operation plan and Soviet forces.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) considered the Crimean Peninsula as a strategically important area. The liberation of Crimea restored the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol was the main base of the Soviet fleet. In addition, the peninsula was an important base for the German fleet and aviation, covering the enemy’s southern strategic flank. Crimea had important in determining the future of the Balkan Peninsula and influenced Turkish policy.

The operation to liberate Crimea began to be prepared in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front presented the plan for the Crimean operation to Headquarters. On February 22, 1944, Joseph Stalin approved the decision to direct the main attack from Sivash. For this purpose, crossings were organized across Sivash, through which they began to transfer manpower and equipment to the bridgehead. The work took place in difficult conditions. The sea, German air raids and artillery strikes more than once destroyed the crossings.

The date for the start of the operation was postponed several times. From the beginning, this was due to the expectation of liberation of the Dnieper coast to Kherson from the Nazis, then due to weather conditions (because of them, the start of the operation was postponed for the period between March 15 and 20). On March 16, the start of the operation was postponed in anticipation of the liberation of Nikolaev and the entry of the Red Army to Odessa. On March 26, the Odessa offensive operation began (Stalin's Third Strike. Liberation of Odessa). However, even after Nikolaev was liberated on March 28, the operation could not begin. The bad ones got in the way weather.

The general idea of ​​the Crimean operation was that the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army of Army General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, would deliver a simultaneous blow to general direction to Simferopol and Sevastopol. They were supposed to break through the German defenses, dismember and destroy the German 17th Army, preventing its evacuation from the Crimean Peninsula. Offensive ground forces supported by the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky and the Azov Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov.

The naval forces included battleship, 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 2 patrol boats, 8 base minesweepers, 161 torpedo, patrol and armored boats, 29 submarines and other ships and vessels. From the air, the offensive of the 4th UV was supported by the 8th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Timofey Timofeevich Khryukin and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The 4th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin supported the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army. In addition, the partisans were supposed to hit the Germans from the rear. Representatives of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union, K. E. Voroshilov and A. M. Vasilevsky, were responsible for the coordination of the troops. In total, about 470 thousand people, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 1,250 aircraft took part in the operation.

Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, member State Committee Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky at command post 4th Ukrainian Front

The main blow was dealt by the 4th UV. It included: the 51st Army, the 2nd Guards Army and the 19th Tank Corps. The main blow from the Sivash bridgehead was delivered by the 51st Army under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Yakov Grigorievich Kreiser and the reinforced 19th Tank Corps under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Ivan Dmitrievich Vasiliev. Ivan Vasiliev will be wounded during reconnaissance, so the offensive of the corps will be led by his deputy I. A. Potseluev. They received the task of advancing in the direction of Dzhankoy - Simferopol - Sevastopol. In case of a breakthrough German defense and the capture of Dzhankoy, the main group of the 4th UV went to the rear of the German positions at Perekop. It could also develop an attack on Simferopol and behind the Kerch enemy group.

The 2nd Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov launched an auxiliary attack on the Perekop Isthmus and was supposed to advance in the direction of Evpatoria - Sevastopol. Zakharov’s army also had to clear the western coast of Crimea from the Nazis. The separate Primorsky Army received the task of breaking through the German defenses near Kerch and advancing towards Vladislavovka and Feodosia. In the future, part of the forces of the Primorsky Army was supposed to advance in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, the other part - along the coast, from Feodosia to Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and Sevastopol.

The Black Sea Fleet received the task of disrupting enemy sea communications. Submarines and torpedo boats were supposed to attack enemy ships on the near and distant approaches to Sevastopol. Aviation (more than 400 aircraft) was supposed to operate along the entire length of German maritime communications - from Sevastopol to Romania.

Large surface ships did not participate in the operation. Headquarters ordered them to be preserved for future naval operations. The actions of the Black Sea Fleet were coordinated by a representative of the Headquarters - the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Naval Forces, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov. The Azov flotilla transported troops and cargo through the Kerch Strait and supported the advance of the Separate Primorsky Army from the sea.

Long-range aviation under the command of Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov (more than 500 aircraft) was supposed to paralyze the work of railway junctions and ports with massive night strikes, strike important enemy targets, and sink German ships and vessels. Long-range aviation was supposed to strike the most important Romanian ports of Galati and Constanta.

Crimean partisans received the task of disrupting German traffic on the roads, interrupting wire communications, organizing attacks on enemy headquarters and command posts, preventing the Nazis from destroying cities and towns during their retreat, and preventing the destruction and abduction of the population. They were also supposed to destroy the Yalta port.

Offensive.

Breakthrough of German defense.

On the evening of April 7, Soviet troops conducted reconnaissance in force, which confirmed previous information about the location of enemy positions in the area of ​​Perekop and Sivash. Before the offensive, heavy artillery struck long-term enemy installations for several days. On April 8, at 8:00, a powerful artillery preparation began in the zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which lasted 2.5 hours. It was accompanied by air strikes on German positions. Immediately after the artillery barrage, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive.

The commander of the 17th German Army, having correctly determined the main direction of attack of the 51st Army, quickly brought up army reserves. The fighting became fierce. The 1st Guards and 10th Rifle Corps (commanded by Generals I.I. Missan and K.P. Neverov) of the 51st Army in the Tarkhan-Ishun direction, which delivered the main blow, were able to break through only the first and partially the second enemy trenches. Advancing in the auxiliary directions - Karankino and Toytyubinsky, the 63rd Rifle Corps of General P.K. Koshevoy acted more successfully. He broke through the defenses of the 10th Romanian Infantry Division. On April 9, the front command, to develop the success of the corps, introduced a division of the second echelon of the same corps into the breakthrough, reinforcing it with a guards tank brigade and a guards tank regiment. The strike was also supported by artillery and aircraft of the 8th Air Force. As a result, the auxiliary strike of the 51st Army of the Cruiser began to develop into the main one. On April 9 there were fierce battles. The 63rd Corps, repelling fierce counterattacks of the 111th German Infantry Division, the 279th Assault Gun Brigade and the 10th Romanian Division, advanced 4-7 km, capturing several enemy strongholds. The front command reinforced the rifle corps with a brigade of rocket artillery and transferred the 77th rifle division from the army reserve.

At the same time, Zakharov’s 2nd Guards Army was fighting heavily in the Perekop direction. On the first day of the offensive, the guards liberated Armyansk. By the end of the day on April 9, the army had failed the German defenses at Perekop. German troops began to retreat to the Ishun positions. At the same time, the Nazis constantly counterattacked. So, on April 9, soldiers of the 13th Guards and 54th Rifle Corps repelled 8 enemy counterattacks. On the night of April 10, to facilitate the offensive of the 13th Guards Corps, a landing force was sent to the rear of the Germans (a reinforced battalion under the command of Captain F.D. Dibrov and Captain M.Ya. Ryabov). For successful actions, the entire battalion was awarded state awards, and Dibrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By the end of April 10, the 51st and 2nd Guards Armies penetrated the German defenses at Sivash and Perekop.

The command of the 17th Army requested permission from the headquarters of Army Group A for the withdrawal of forces to Sevastopol. Permission was given. The 5th Army Corps received an order to retreat to Sevastopol. On April 10, the German command began evacuating rear services, transport, civil servants, collaborators and prisoners. However, Hitler stopped the evacuation. On April 12, he ordered the defense of Sevastopol to the end and not to evacuate combat-ready units. This decision was opposed by the command of the 17th Army, Army Group " Southern Ukraine"and Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Kurt Zeitzler. They wanted to preserve the combat effectiveness of the army. But Hitler insisted on his decision.

The command of the 17th Army, realizing that Crimea could not be held, tried to carry out preparatory measures for the removal of troops. Already on April 8, the development of instructions on the creation of evacuation groups began. First of all, they planned to remove units and subunits that did not directly participate in the hostilities. For supplies and technical support they left only a large number of of people. “Hiwis” were brought to the rear - “voluntary assistants” of the Wehrmacht who served in auxiliary units, as well as former punishers, builders, counterintelligence and propaganda agencies. They ordered to transport as much ammunition and food as possible to Sevastopol.

At the same time, the Germans began to destroy the infrastructure of Crimea. The German command planned to destroy or disable communications, harbors, ports, important economic buildings, airports, communications facilities, etc. According to the Nazi plan, the USSR had to spend a long time restoring Crimea and would not be able to use the peninsula as an operational base. Own military property was removed or rendered unusable. The Germans did everything carefully and punctually. Roads were destroyed, villages burned, pillars were destroyed, people were killed. However, the advance of Soviet troops, assisted by partisans, was so rapid that most of the plan to destroy Crimea was never realized.

On April 10, Tolbukhin ordered the 19th Tank Corps to be pulled closer to the front line in order to throw it into battle on the morning of April 11. The tankers had to liberate Dzhankoy, and then advance in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol in order to cut through the enemy’s Crimean group and prevent the enemy from carrying out an organized retreat. The 19th Tank Corps, with reinforcement units before the offensive, included: 187 tanks, 46 self-propelled guns, 14 armored personnel carriers, 31 armored vehicles, more than 200 guns and mortars, 15 BM-13 rocket launchers. During an inspection of the area, Komkor Vasiliev was seriously wounded by a fragment of a bomb dropped from an airplane, so his deputy, Colonel Potseluev, took command of the corps (although he was also slightly wounded). He commanded the corps until the end of the Crimean operation.

Before the 19th Tank Corps entered the battle, the Germans were unaware of its location on the Sivash bridgehead. The command of the 17th Army read that the Soviet tank corps was in the Perekop area, where they expected the main attack of the 4th UV. Although all the equipment and weapons of the corps were transferred to a bridgehead south of Sivash in March 1944. The crossing was carried out at night or in bad weather conditions. Engineers and sappers prepared camouflaged shelters. The tracks of the caterpillars were covered. Therefore, the attack by Soviet tankers at Sivash was unexpected for the enemy.

At 5 o'clock on April 11, troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps, with the support of the 19th Tank Corps, completed the breakthrough of the German defense in the Sivash sector. Soviet tank crews were rapidly advancing towards Dzhankoy. Already at 11 o'clock on April 11, the advance detachment broke into the northern part of the city. Motorized riflemen supported the attack from the south. The German garrison, consisting of up to an infantry regiment, two artillery divisions, four assault guns and an armored train, stubbornly defended itself. The city was liberated from the Nazis by the evening of April 11. In addition, Soviet tank crews destroyed a German airfield in the Vesely area (15 km southwest of Dzhankoy), and captured an important railway bridge 8 km southwest of Dzhankoy.

On April 11, the command of the 4th UV formed a mobile front group in order to quickly liberate the Crimean Peninsula. It included the 19th Tank Corps, the 279th Rifle Division (two regiments were mounted on vehicles) and the 21st separate anti-tank artillery brigade. The mobile group was headed by the deputy commander of the 51st Army, Major General V.N. Razuvaev.

The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, noticing the withdrawal of the German 5th Army Corps, also launched an offensive. At 21:30 on April 10, after strong artillery and air preparation, the advanced units of the army went on the attack, and at 2:00 on April 11 - the main forces. Formations of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps under the command of General A.A. Luchinsky broke through the German defenses and occupied the well-fortified German stronghold of Bulganak and began to advance to the Turkish Wall. Troops of the 11th Guards Corps under General S.E. Rozhdestvensky and the 16th Rifle Corps under General K.I. Provalov also broke through the German defenses and liberated Kerch. Many Germans and Romanians did not have time to escape and were captured.

On April 11, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin expressed gratitude to the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, who broke through the powerful enemy defenses at Perekop, Sivash and liberated Dzhankoy, as well as the Separate Primorsky Army, which liberated Kerch. Fireworks went off in Moscow in honor of the victorious Soviet troops.

Liberation of the peninsula.

The cutting blow of the front's mobile group played a decisive role in the pursuit of the retreating enemy. The attack of the mobile group on Simferopol cut off the northern group of the 17th Army of the Kerch group. The advancing troops of the 19th Tank Corps were greatly supported by Soviet aviation, which was called in using radio stations located at the head of the corps. Soviet aviation had complete advantage in the air.

The left flank of the mobile group (202nd tank brigade, 867th self-propelled artillery regiment and 52nd separate motorcycle regiment) advanced in the direction of Dzhankoy - Seytler, Karasubazar - Zuya, towards the Separate Primorsky Army. On April 12, Soviet troops occupied Seitler. On the same day, Soviet tank crews, with the support of partisans, in the Zuya area defeated a large enemy column that was retreating towards Simferopol. Thus, the mobile group of the 4th UV cut the path to Sevastopol through Simferopol for the troops of the German 5th Army Corps. At this time, the main forces of the 19th Tank Corps continued their attack on Simferopol. The 51st Army of the Cruiser was also advancing in the same direction.

The main forces of the 19th Tank Corps in the Sarabuz area met a strong point of resistance. Here the defense was held by a newly created battle group under the leadership of the commander of the German 50th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Sixt. The battle group included a grenadier battalion of the German 50th Infantry Division, a Romanian motorized regiment, an engineer battalion and a battery of anti-aircraft guns. Soviet tank crews did not get involved in a protracted battle and, bypassing enemy positions, continued to move towards Simferopol.

On April 12, Zakharov’s 2nd Guards Army lied to German positions on the Chartolyk River. Zakharov’s army began to develop an offensive along the western coast and towards Yevpatoria. In all directions, mobile detachments pursued the enemy. On April 12, the advanced forces of the Separate Primorsky Army reached the enemy’s Ak-Monai positions. However, they were unable to break through the German defenses on the move. Only by bringing up artillery and delivering a powerful artillery and bomb strike (aviation made 844 sorties per day), Eremenko’s army broke through the German defenses. By the end of the day, the entire Kerch Peninsula was liberated from enemy forces.

General A.I. Eremenko decided to send a mobile army group to Old Crimea, Karasubazar, to establish contact with the troops of the 4th UV. They advanced in the same direction forward detachments and the main forces of the 11th Guards Rifle and 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps. The 16th Rifle Corps received the task of attacking Feodosia and further along the coast to Sudak, Yalta and Sevastopol. The troops of the German 5th Corps mostly retreated along the coast. Partisans played a major role in the pursuit of the enemy. Thus, Crimean partisans defeated the German garrison in Old Crimea. True, the Germans brought up reinforcements and drove the partisans out of the city. In Old Crimea, the Nazis carried out a bloody massacre, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians.

On April 12, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army were approaching Feodosia. On this day, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet launched a powerful bombing attack on the Feodosia port and the ships that were located there. As a result, the evacuation of German troops by sea from Feodosia was disrupted. On April 13, troops of the 16th Rifle Corps liberated Feodosia. On the same day, a large group of attack aircraft and bombers of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, under the cover of fighters, attacked the port of Sudak. Soviet planes sank three large barges with enemy soldiers and damaged 5 barges. After this raid, the Germans no longer risked evacuating troops by sea to Sevastopol.

The soldiers, who saw three barges overcrowded with people go under water, categorically refused to board the ships. The Germans and Romanians continued their retreat to Sevastopol along mountain roads. Aviation of the 8th and 4th Air Armies and the Black Sea Fleet launched powerful attacks on the retreating enemy columns and transport hubs. Attack aircraft and bombers created rubble on mountain roads. The moving parts of the advancing corps and armies, the partisans did not give the Germans a break.

The mobile group of the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of the commander of the 227th Infantry Division, Colonel N. G. Preobrazhensky (it included formations of the 227th Infantry Division on vehicles and the 227th Separate Tank Regiment) reached the Old Crimea. With the support of the partisans of the Eastern detachment of Kuznetsov, the mobile group liberated the settlement. Then the mobile detachment, with the support of the partisans of the Northern detachment, liberated Karasubazar. Here the enemy column heading to Simferopol was defeated. On the same day, in Karasubazar, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front united here with units of the Separate Primorsky Army.

During the offensive, Soviet soldiers showed heroism and dedication. So, on April 13, 1944, in the area of ​​​​the village of Ashaga-Dzhamin (the modern village of Heroiskoe) in the Saki region, nine reconnaissance officers of the 3rd Guards Motorized Engineering and 91st Motorcycle Separate Battalions took on an unequal battle with the enemy. The guard unit was commanded by Sergeant N. I. Poddubny, his deputy was Guard Junior Sergeant M. Z. Abdulmanapov. The detachment included Red Army guards P.V. Veligin, I.T. Timoshenko, M.A. Zadorozhny and G.N. Zazarchenko, Red Army soldiers V.A. Ershov, P.A. Ivanov and A.F. Simonenko. They fought for about two hours.

Soviet soldiers repulsed three enemy company attacks, and then several battalion attacks. The Germans were forced to conduct artillery preparation, and then took new attack. The scouts fought fiercely, when the ammunition ran out, they, many already wounded, entered into hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. The German command ordered to take the scouts alive. The surviving soldiers were tied up with barbed wire and tortured, their eyes were gouged out, bones were crushed, and they were stabbed with bayonets. Nobody said a word. Then German officer asked the young Avar guy Magomed Abdulmanapov: “Well, they are Russian, and who are you? Why are you silent? What have you got to lose? You are a stranger to them. Everyone should think about their own life. Where are you from?". The Soviet soldier replied: “It is known where from. We are all children of one mother, the Motherland!” After that, he was tortured for a long time and before his death, a star was cut out on his chest. After brutal torture, the Nazis shot the heroes on the outskirts of the village. Only one of them, machine gunner V. A. Ershov, who received 10 gunshot and 7 bayonet wounds, miraculously survived. On May 16, 1944, all nine heroes were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On April 13, the mobile group of the 4th UV liberated Simferopol from the enemy. Fighters from the Northern and Southern partisan formations also took part in the liberation of the city. On the same day, units of Zakharov’s 2nd Guards Army liberated Feodosia. In Moscow, victorious fireworks rang out three times in honor of the liberators of Feodosia, Yevpatoria and Simferopol.

The battle for Crimea continued with the same ferocity. The command of the 19th Tank Corps believed that it was advisable to send all forces from Simferopol to Sevastopol in order to break into the city on the shoulders of the Nazis. However, the commander of the mobile group of the front, Razuvaev, thought differently. He ordered part of the corps forces to go to the Karasubazar area to intercept the forces of the German Kerch group. Other troops were sent to Alushta to intercept enemy forces retreating along the sea coast. And only two tank brigades pursued the German troops, who were retreating through Bakhchisarai to Sevastopol. As a result, the forces of the front's mobile group were dispersed, and the German command was able to organize the defense of Sevastopol. The command of the 19th Tank Corps reported the situation to the front commander, and Razuvaev’s decision was canceled. However, parts of the mobile group were already carrying out the first order, and it was impossible to quickly change the situation. Precious time was lost.

Early in the morning of April 14, Soviet troops and partisans liberated Bakhchisarai. The partisans of the Southern Union managed to destroy the arsonists and saved the city from destruction. The command of the 19th Tank Corps regrouped its forces and decided to strike at Kacha, Mamasai, and then go to the northern outskirts of Sevastopol. By evening the tankers captured the villages. In the area of ​​the villages of Kachi and Mamashai, the brigades of the 19th Tank Corps linked up with the advanced forces of the 2nd Guards Army, which, bypassing the knots of German defense and without getting involved in protracted battles, quickly reached Sevastopol. On the night of April 14, Soviet troops, attacking from the north and east (the 16th Rifle Corps of the Separate Primorsky Army and the motorized rifle brigade of the 19th Tank Corps were advancing), with the support of partisans, took Alushta.

However, despite the high rate of advance of the Soviet troops, the main forces of the German northern group, the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps under the command of Rudolf Conrad, managed to win this race and retain artillery. Conrad's 49th Corps occupied the defensive lines of Sevastopol. On April 15, the main forces of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies reached Sevastopol. The command of the 4th Ukrainian Front decided not to wait for the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army to approach and try to take the city on the move.

Preliminary results.

During the seven days of the offensive, the Red Army liberated almost the entire Crimean Peninsula from the enemy. The German and Romanian units that reached the “fortress of Sevastopol” (as the German command called the city) were in a deplorable state. The Romanian formations essentially collapsed. The German divisions suffered heavy losses and became reinforced regiments. The losses of German and Romanian troops during this period exceeded 30 thousand people.

At the same time, the command of the 17th Army carried out an intensified evacuation. Rear, engineering and construction units, supplies, civil servants, collaborators and prisoners of war were evacuated. From April 12 to April 20, 67 thousand people were removed from the peninsula.

The assault on Sevastopol and the liquidation of the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht.

April. April 15, General F.I. Tolbukhin set the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front the task of capturing Sevastopol. The Soviet command looked for weak points in the enemy’s defenses and transferred the 19th Tank Corps from the right flank to the left. Aviation was involved long range. On April 15-16, she launched powerful attacks on the enemy’s railway station, warehouses, port facilities and watercraft.

During this period, Soviet troops in the Sevastopol area did not have superiority over the German-Romanian forces either in manpower or in heavy weapons. The lines of the advancing armies were stretched. Most powerful forces at the second stage, the pursuit of the enemy was left in the reserve of the army commanders, 50-60 km from the forward detachments. As a result, the 4th UV could not begin an assault on the Sevastopol fortress with all its forces.

Thus, the 13th Guards Rifle Corps of the 2nd Guards Army was located in the Ak-Mechet - Evpatoria - Saki area; 10th Rifle Corps of the 51st Army - in the Simferopol area. A separate Primorsky army has not yet reached Sevastopol.

Tanks, artillery, and aviation experienced a shortage of ammunition and fuel due to lagging logistics services. The 19th Tank Corps suffered serious losses in previous battles. In addition, Sevastopol had powerful fortifications, which consisted of three stripes. The strongest point of resistance was Sapun Gora, where there were six tiers of continuous trenches covered with anti-tank minefields and other obstacles. Mekenzieva Mountain, Sugarloaf and Inkerman were also powerful centers of resistance.

Therefore, it was not possible to organize a powerful artillery barrage and air strike during the first assault. A short artillery attack could not disable the enemy's long-term fortifications. The tankers had to fight against powerful German fortifications. In addition, German aviation was able to organize several attacks on the battle formations of the 19th Tank Corps. As a result, the battles for Sevastopol became protracted. The Soviet infantry was also unable to advance due to strong fire resistance. It was not possible to break into Sevastopol on the shoulders of the enemy.

At the end of the day on April 15, Tolbukhin was forced to give the order for more thorough preparations for the assault on Sevastopol. On April 16, Marshals A.M. Vasilevsky and K.E. Voroshilov, who were also personally convinced of the stubborn resistance of the enemy troops, decided to postpone the assault on the city until April 18. At the same time, the rifle units and the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of artillery and aviation, continued the offensive, slowly biting into the German defensive formations.

The separate Primorsky Army continued its offensive and on April 16, with the support of the partisans of the Southern Union, liberated Yalta. Thanks to the help of partisans and underground fighters, it was possible to keep many buildings and objects of the city intact. By the end of the day on April 16, the advanced forces of the army captured the important Baydar Gate pass and at the end of April 17 they began the battle for Balaklava.

On April 18, artillery and aviation preparations were carried out and Soviet troops again launched an assault on German positions. The separate Primorsky Army advanced 4-7 km, captured the villages of Nizhny Chorgun, Kamary, Fedyukhin Heights, the village of Kadykovka, and the city of Balaklava. The troops of the 51st Army, advancing together with the 19th Tank Corps, also had some success. However, it was not possible to take Sapun Mountain. The troops suffered heavy losses and retreated to their original positions.

Thus, the 19th Tank Corps, on April 18, had 71 tanks and 28 self-propelled artillery units on the move, and on April 19, 30 tanks and 11 self-propelled guns remained in the corps. On April 19, the 19th Tank Corps was transferred to the Separate Primorsky Army. The 2nd Guards Army was unsuccessful in its offensive on April 18-19. Soviet troops met stubborn resistance from the enemy, who relied on strong fortifications and launched fierce counterattacks.

It became obvious to the Soviet command that they needed to prepare more carefully for the assault. It required the concentration of artillery and aviation forces and the supply of ammunition. The calculation of the Soviet leadership that the German command was actively evacuating troops and would not be able to organize a powerful defense of Sevastopol did not come true. It was necessary to involve all the forces and means of the front in the assault. The general assault was scheduled for April 23. The fighting continued in the previous days. Soviet troops actively probed the German defenses, monitored their condition and were ready to immediately go on the offensive upon detection of the withdrawal of the main enemy forces. On April 20-22, individual detachments fought local battles. The 19th Tank Corps was being replenished with armored vehicles.

On the night of April 23, Soviet long-range aviation attacked German positions. On April 23 at 11 a.m., after an hour-long artillery barrage and air strike, Soviet troops went on the offensive. As a result of stubborn fighting, Soviet troops achieved minor successes. However, it was not possible to break through the German defenses. On April 24, after an hour of artillery and air preparation, the Red Army again went on the offensive. Stubborn fighting continued all day.

The Germans counterattacked with the support of assault guns and aircraft. Thus, in the area north of the Mekenzievy Gory station, the enemy launched 20 counterattacks with forces ranging from battalion to regiment. On April 25, Soviet troops attacked again. However, despite the fierce attacks, it was not possible to break through the enemy defenses. Soviet troops achieved only local successes. As Vasilevsky admitted: “... and our offensive did not bring due success.”

It was necessary to begin a new regrouping of forces and equipment, preparing troops for battles in mountainous conditions, creating assault groups, and practicing interaction between units. Before the next assault, we decided to subject the enemy’s fortifications to thorough artillery fire and bombing attacks. On April 29, Vasilevsky spoke with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on this issue. Stalin was dissatisfied with the delay in the assault on Sevastopol, but was forced to agree with Vasilevsky’s arguments. It was decided on May 5 to launch an offensive by the 2nd Guards Army in the auxiliary direction in order to mislead the enemy, and on May 7 - a general assault on Sevastopol.

The command of the 17th Army, realizing that Sevastopol could not be held, and wanting to preserve at least part of the combat-ready core of the army, repeatedly turned to Hitler with a request to evacuate troops. However, Hitler still demanded to hold Sevastopol. The order dated April 24, 1944 said: “... not a step back.” Alarmists and cowards were to be shot. The commander of the German Navy on the Black Sea, Vice Admiral Brinkmann, and the head of the Crimean naval region, Rear Admiral Schultz, reported to Hitler that the fleet was capable of supplying the Sevastopol garrison with all the necessary sea.

The Fuhrer believed that Sevastopol must be held for both political and military reasons. Among the political factors, the position of Turkey stood out, which after the fall of Sevastopol could go over to the side of the allies, as well as the situation in the Balkans. Militarily, Sevastopol was important because it pinned down a significant Soviet group. The 17th Army was supposed to defend Sevastopol and inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy. Therefore, the high command allowed only the wounded, Romanians and, collaborators, prisoners to be taken out of Crimea.

In addition, the forcible removal of the Soviet population was practiced; the Germans used it to protect themselves from Soviet air raids. Thus, equipment and soldiers were often loaded into the hold, and women and children were placed on the decks. The latter were warned that when they appeared Soviet aircraft they lifted the children up and threw away the white sheets. After Hitler's order to hold Sevastopol, the Germans increased the transfer of reinforcements by sea and air for the combat units of the 17th Army. They also brought a large amount of ammunition.

General assault on Sevastopol.

The Soviet command worked hard, preparing for the general assault. It was especially difficult to ensure the supply of ammunition and fuel, since front-line and army warehouses were still behind Sivash and in the Kerch region. All front artillery was concentrated towards Sevastopol. Intelligence conducted additional study of the German defensive system and the location of enemy troops. Local operations were carried out to capture or destroy individual important points in order to improve the position of the troops before the offensive. Along the entire front, Soviet aviation and artillery continued to strike German positions. The corps that remained in the rear were pulled up to the combat area.

In the period preceding the general assault, Soviet troops constantly harassed the Germans. Territorial gains were minor. But the German defense was weakened and well studied. The Germans lost more people in local battles than they received replacements. They could not replenish the equipment that was failing. And yet, the 17th Army still represented a significant force: on May 5, the army had 72.7 thousand people, 1,775 guns and mortars, 2,355 machine guns, 50 tanks and assault guns. Taking into account the fortified area, this made it possible to create a greater density of defensive formations and firepower. It took the Germans more than one month to create the Sevastopol fortified area. After the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, German troops began building defensive lines near Sevastopol. The Germans restored part of the old Soviet pillboxes and bunkers, and also allocated Special attention improvement of the fire system from field fortifications and mining of the territory. The defensive line ran along several important heights, which, due to the steepness of the slopes, were inaccessible to tanks and were reinforced with engineering structures. Their entire area was repeatedly shot through with cross-fire and oblique fire. Machine gun points were set up deep in the rocks; they could only be destroyed by a direct hit. German troops were ordered to defend to the last possible opportunity. The new commander of the 17th Army, Karl Allmendinger, appointed on May 1, addressed the troops on May 3 and demanded that “.. everyone defend in the full sense of the word, so that no one retreats, holds every trench, every crater, every trench.”

On May 5, after 1.5 hours of artillery preparation, the 2nd Guards Army launched an offensive in the Balbek-Kamyshly area. The tactics of using small assault groups (20-30 fighters each) paid off, and the army achieved some successes. The Soviet infantry advance was supported by hurricane artillery fire and continuous air attacks. On May 6, the 2nd Guards Army resumed its offensive. However, on this day the resistance of German troops intensified. The Germans carried out 14 counterattacks during the day. Soviet troops advanced only a few hundred meters. However, the 2nd Guards Army completed its main task - it misled the German command regarding the direction of the main attack. The command of the 17th Army finally decided that the 4th UV would deliver the main blow in the Mekenzi Mountains region (repeating the German offensive of 1942).

On May 7, the general assault began. The main blow was delivered in the Sapun-Gora - Karan section. The attack was preceded by a powerful artillery barrage - from 205 to 258 artillery barrels and mortars were deployed along 1 km of the front. Three of the four Guards mortar brigades armed with the BM-31-12 MLRS, eight of the ten Guards mortar regiments and three separate Guards mountain-pack mortar divisions were involved here. In addition, Soviet aviation launched powerful attacks on German positions - aircraft of the 8th Air Army carried out 2,105 sorties per day.

A fierce battle lasted for nine hours. The Germans fiercely defended the multi-tiered fortifications of Sapun Mountain, which had 63 pillboxes and bunkers. Soldiers of the 63rd Rifle Corps under the command of Major General P.K. Koshevoy and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps under Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky fiercely attacked German positions. There was no quick breakthrough anywhere. Every now and then the Russians and Germans engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Many positions changed hands more than once. The enemy counterattacked, the Germans fought hard and skillfully. There were four German positions on Sapun Gora, and the enemy did not want to surrender each one. However, Soviet soldiers took this impregnable position - the key to Sevastopol. This assault predetermined the outcome of the entire battle for Sevastopol.

After unsuccessful night counterattacks, fearing encirclement of their forces, the German command began a partial withdrawal of troops north of the Northern Bay (in the area of ​​​​the offensive of the 2nd Guards Army). On May 8, fierce fighting was still raging. By the end of the day, the 2nd Guards Army reached the Northern Bay. The troops of the 51st Army, having finally broken through the outer perimeter of the German fortifications, reached the inner perimeter of the Sevastopol fortress. A separate Primorsky Army captured the Karan Heights and created conditions for the entry of the forces of the 19th Tank Corps into battle. The enemy was intensively evacuating.

In such a critical situation, the commander of Army Group South, Ferdinand Schörner, on the evening of May 8 asked Hitler to allow the evacuation of the main forces of the 17th Army, since further defense of Sevastopol was no longer possible. On May 9, the command of the 17th Army received such permission, but it was too late. Now I had to run. Units of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies reached the Korabelnaya side.

Units of the Primorsky Army in the area of ​​the Rudolfov settlement - Otradny. On May 9, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps and the 16th Rifle Corps, with the support of the 19th Tank Corps, attacked the German rear line (evacuation cover line). In all sectors, the Germans continued to actively defend themselves and launch counterattacks. By the end of May 9, Sevastopol was liberated from the enemy.

At about one in the morning on May 10, an order from Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin was broadcast on the radio, which emphasized the enormous importance of the liberation of Sevastopol from German troops. Gratitude was expressed to the Soviet soldiers. At the same time, Moscow saluted the liberating soldiers with 24 salvos from 324 guns. A spontaneous fireworks display was also held in Sevastopol.

The fighting still continued. The Germans defended themselves with the despair of the doomed and tried to evacuate their forces from the area of ​​​​Cape Chersonesos. Here lay their last line of defense. Combat groups were formed from the remnants of various formations, military branches and services, headed by the most experienced and decisive commanders. Almost all the remaining artillery was concentrated in this area, increasing the density of barrels to 100 per 1 km. Moreover, there was an unlimited amount of ammunition and they were not spared.

However, all the efforts of the German command were in vain. On the evening of May 9, Soviet artillery began shelling a German airfield in the Khersones area. The Air Force leadership was forced to transfer the last fighters to Romania. Thus, German troops lost air support. From Romania, the German Air Force could no longer solve the problem of supporting its ground forces. The ability to evacuate has also decreased. On the night of May 11, only the command and headquarters of the 17th Army were removed. By this time, there were still more than 50 thousand Germans and Romanians remaining on the peninsula.

Normal evacuation was disrupted. The Wehrmacht vehicle began to malfunction. There weren’t enough ships, they were late, they continued to carry ammunition that was no longer needed (they were simply thrown overboard). Many ships were not fully loaded; their captains were afraid to stand under fire for a long time. People crowded around the piers waiting for ships and were forced to wait under artillery and air strikes. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz personally ordered more than 190 German and Romanian ships (minesweepers, transports, barges, boats, etc.) to be put out to sea, which would be enough for 87 thousand people. However, the force eight storm forced some ships to return and others to stop. The operation was forced to be postponed to May 12. German troops in Crimea had to withstand the attacks of the Red Army for another day. On the night of May 11, panic began. The soldiers fought for places on the ships. Many ships were forced to leave without finishing loading.

Intelligence obtained information that German troops received an order at four o'clock on May 12 to begin withdrawing to Cape Khersones for evacuation. Therefore, the front command decided to launch a night assault on the last German defensive line in order to prevent the withdrawal and evacuation of enemy troops. After a short artillery raid, at 3 am, Soviet troops launched the final assault. The German defenses were broken through. The evacuation was disrupted. By 12 o'clock on May 12, 1944, Soviet troops completed the capture of the remnants of the German troops, who began to surrender en masse.

In the area of ​​Chersonesus, more than 21 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured, and a lot of equipment, weapons and ammunition were captured. Among the prisoners were the commander of the enemy forces in the Kherson region, the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Böhme, and the commander of the 111th Infantry Division, Major General E. Gruner. The commander of the 336th Infantry Division, Major General Hageman, was killed. A significant part of the German ships that arrived for the evacuation, scheduled for May 12, were sunk by artillery and air strikes. In total, German-Romanian troops during the general assault on Sevastopol and the liquidation of the remnants of the Crimean group in the Kherson region on May 7 - 12, 1944 lost more than 20 thousand people killed and more than 24 thousand people captured. The command of the ground forces blamed the navy for the tragedy. The investigation continued for many months after the death of the 17th Army.

The cruiser "Red Crimea" upon returning to Sevastopol

Results of the operation.

The Crimean offensive operation ended in complete victory for the Red Army. If in 1941-1942. It took the Wehrmacht 250 days to take Sevastopol, which was heroically defending itself, but in 1944, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s strong fortifications and cleared the entire Crimean Peninsula of it in 35 days.

The goal of the Crimean operation was realized. Soviet troops broke through the enemy's deeply layered defenses at Perekop, Sivash and on the Kerch Peninsula, stormed the powerful Sevastopol fortified area and virtually destroyed the German 17th Army. The irretrievable losses of the 17th Army amounted to about 120 thousand people, of which more than 61 thousand people were captured. In addition, the Germans suffered heavy losses during the evacuation. Thus, the Romanian Black Sea flotilla was virtually destroyed, which lost 2/3 of its available ship strength. In particular, soviet planes large transports “Totila” and “Thea” (convoy “Patria”) were sunk. It is believed that up to 8-10 thousand people died on them. Therefore, the total losses of the German-Romanian troops are estimated at 140 thousand people. In addition, almost all the equipment of the German army fell into the hands of the Red Army. Soviet troops and navy lost more than 17 thousand people killed and more than 67 thousand people wounded in this operation.

Strategically, the Crimean victory returned an important economic region to the Soviet Union, and the fleet - the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. The threat from the southern strategic flank of the Soviet-German fleet was finally removed. The Red Army eliminated the last major German bridgehead that threatened the Soviet rear. The Soviet Union regained control of the Black Sea and dramatically increased the operational capabilities of its fleet and air force in the region. The political weight of the Third Reich in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey decreased even more. Romania began to seriously think about a separate peace with the USSR.

The Crimean peninsula suffered seriously from the German occupation. Many cities and villages were severely damaged - especially Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Evpatoria. More than 300 industrial enterprises and many resorts were destroyed. Severely damaged Agriculture, almost the entire livestock was killed. Many people were driven to Germany. A good picture of the destruction is shown by the population of Sevastopol. On the eve of the war, more than 100 thousand people lived in the city, and by the time the hero city was liberated, about 3 thousand inhabitants remained in it. In Sevastopol, only 6% of the housing stock survived.

The course and results of the Crimean operation showed the increased skill of the Soviet troops. The 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army quickly broke through the powerful enemy defensive lines that were being created for a long time. The Crimean operation once again showed the advantage of the offensive over the defensive.

No defense, even the strongest, can withstand the onslaught of well-trained, courageous troops. When the command skillfully chooses the direction of the main attacks, organizes the interaction of troops, skillfully uses the fleet, aviation and artillery. For heroism and skillful actions, 160 formations and units of the Red Army received the honorary names of Kerch, Perekop, Sivash, Evpatoria, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Feodosia and Yalta. Dozens of units and ships were awarded orders. 238 Soviet soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, thousands of participants in the Crimean operation were awarded orders and medals.

Liberation of Odessa

70 years ago the Red Army liberated Odessa. On April 10, 1944, troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Rodion Malinovsky liberated an important Soviet port from the Nazis. The liberation of the city became part of the Odessa offensive operation (March 26 - April 14, 1944), carried out by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet. The operation became part of the so-called. "Stalin's third blow", which ended with the liberation of Odessa and Crimea with Sevastopol. In turn, the “third strike” was a continuation of the “second strike” - a series of offensive operations to liberate Right Bank Ukraine (Dnieper-Carpathian strategic operation).

Conditions before surgery

The Odessa operation was preceded by the Bereznegovato-Snigirevo operation (March 6-18, 1944). During it, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front defeated the forces of the German 6th Army. Nine German divisions were defeated. As the Soviet newspaper Pravda noted, the second composition of the 6th Army repeated the fate of the first 6th Army, which was destroyed at Stalingrad. A significant German group was threatened with complete destruction. Therefore, on March 12, the German command was forced to withdraw all the forces of the 6th Army to the line of the Southern Bug River.

Units of the 17th and 44th German army corps, suffering heavy losses and abandoning heavy weapons, managed to break through the Southern Bug and in the direction of Nikolaev. However, part of the German group blocked in the Bereznegovatoye and Snigirevka area was eliminated. Soviet troops crossed Ingulets and liberated Kherson on March 13. On March 15, Bereznegovatoye and Snigirevka were liberated from the Nazis. By March 16, the Germans had lost more than 50 thousand people killed and captured, more than 2.2 thousand guns and mortars, 274 tanks and many other weapons and equipment. On March 20, the commander of the 6th Army, Colonel General K. Hollidt, lost his position and was replaced by General Z. Henrici.

On March 24, troops of the 37th Army reached the Southern Bug and, after two days of stubborn fighting, liberated the city of Voznesensk, occupying an important bridgehead. In the zone of the 46th Army, units of the 394th Infantry Division, with heroic efforts, managed to cross the Southern Bug in the Troitskoye area. On March 19, Soviet troops captured an important enemy stronghold in Andreevka-Erdeleva. In fierce battles, Soviet soldiers defended and expanded the bridgehead. However, the entire front failed to cross the Southern Bug on the move. The German command concentrated a significant group in the Nikolaev area and was able to create a stable defense.

In general, the armies of Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky advanced 140 km. Significant territories of Right Bank Ukraine between the Ingulets and Southern Bug rivers were liberated from the Germans and Romanians. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was able to occupy an advantageous position for a further offensive in the Odessa direction. The Soviet armies inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy and, having liberated the area between the Ingulets and the Southern Bug, seizing bridgeheads on the right bank of the Southern Bug, created the conditions for a strike on the Nikolaev-Odessa Wehrmacht group and an offensive in the direction of the lower Dniester.

Operation plan and strengths of the parties

Even during the Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters clarified the task of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. On March 11, Stalin set the task of pursuing enemy troops, crossing the Southern Bug, liberating Nikolaev, Tiraspol and Odessa, and reaching the river. Prut and the northern bank of the river. Danube on the state border of the Soviet Union with Romania.

The plan for the Odessa operation was developed by front commander Rodion Malinovsky and Headquarters representative Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky. On March 19, 1944, they presented their report to Stalin, in which they asked to provide support to the front with tanks, artillery tractors and fighter aircraft, as well as to speed up the arrival of reinforcements necessary to make up for the losses suffered by the armies during the Bereznegovato-Snigirevo operation. On the same day, the operation plan was approved.

Stalin promised to help with tanks and tractors, but with reinforcements it was more difficult. As Vasilevsky noted, weather conditions at the beginning of the operation were negative. The rains completely destroyed the already poor dirt roads. Ammunition, fuel and all materials needed by the troops could only be transported using tractors and all-terrain vehicles. Therefore, the front offensive was postponed until March 26.

The 3rd Ukrainian Front was supposed to strike with the forces of seven combined arms armies: the 57th Army under the command of Nikolai Gagen, the 37th Army of Mikhail Sharokhin, the 46th Army of Vasily Glagolev, the 8th Guards Army of Vasily Chuikov, the 6th Army of Ivan Shlemin, the 5th shock army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 28th army of Alexei Grechkin. The front also included the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Trofim Tanaschishin (died on March 31, the corps was led by Vladimir Zhdanov), the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of Issa Pliev and the 23rd Tank Corps of Alexei Akhmanov. The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 4th Guards Cossack Cavalry Corps were part of the cavalry mechanized group under the overall command of General I. A. Pliev.

In total, the group of Soviet troops at the beginning of the operation numbered about 470 thousand soldiers and commanders, more than 12.6 thousand guns and mortars, 435 tanks and self-propelled guns and 436 aircraft. Soviet troops were significantly (almost 4 times) superior to the enemy in artillery, had an advantage in tanks (2.7 times), people (1.3 times), but were inferior in aircraft (1.3 times).

The front troops were supported by aircraft of the 17th Air Army under the command of Vladimir Sudets, as well as naval aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet of Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky. Parts Marine Corps were brought in to liberate coastal cities and ports. In addition, the armies of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front took part in the defeat of German troops between the Southern Bug and the Dniester.

The 57th and 37th armies of Hagen and Sharokhin were to advance in the general direction of Tiraspol. Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group, Glagolev's 46th Army, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army and Akhmanov's 23rd Tank Corps were to advance in the general direction of Razdelnaya station, bypassing Odessa from the north-west. Shlemin's 6th Army, Tsvetaev's 5th Shock Army and Grechkin's 28th Army attacked Nikolaev and Odessa.

Preparations for the operation took place under difficult conditions. The spring thaw and heavy rains completely ruined the dirt roads. In order not to slow down the pace of the offensive when the main forces were unable to move forward quickly, special mobile forward detachments were formed in the divisions. They included up to a company of riflemen, a platoon of sappers mounted on vehicles, several anti-tank guns, tanks or self-propelled guns. Mobile detachments had to bypass resistance centers, enemy strongholds, go behind the rear of German troops, and capture bridges, crossings and communication centers.

Soviet troops were opposed by the forces of the German 6th and Romanian 3rd armies of Army Group A (from April 5, “Southern Ukraine”). The left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was also opposed by troops of the 8th Army. The army group was commanded by Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist (from April 1, Colonel General Ferdinand Schörner). From the air, the German troops were supported by the air corps of the 4th Air Fleet.

Army Group A, despite heavy losses in the previous operation, still had significant forces. The German-Romanian group had 16 German and 4 Romanian divisions, 8 brigades of assault guns and other formations. In total, the army group consisted of about 350 thousand soldiers, 3.2 thousand guns and mortars, 160 tanks and assault guns and 550 aircraft (including 150 Romanian aircraft).

German troops had a fairly developed defense system. The construction of the main defensive line on the Southern Bug River began in the summer of 1943. Local residents were involved in the construction. In the operational depths, the Germans prepared auxiliary defensive lines on the Tiligul, Bolshoi Kuyalnik, Maly Kuyalnik and Dniester rivers. The approaches to Odessa were especially well fortified. The city was considered the "Fuhrer's fortress." In addition, Berezovka and Nikolaev were strong strongholds. The German defense relied on a significant number of serious water barriers that hampered the advancing troops.

Offensive

Crossing of the Southern Bug and liberation of Nikolaev.

On the night of March 26, the troops of the right flank and center of the 3rd Ukrainian Front began crossing the Southern Bug River, trying to break through the enemy’s defenses on the right bank. However, due to strong enemy resistance and a lack of transportation means, Soviet troops did not achieve success during the day. Then the Soviet command transferred the brunt of the attack to previously captured bridgeheads in the areas of Konstantinovka and Voznesensk. The armies of Hagen and Sharokhin, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, who created serious defenses at the bridgeheads, by the end of March 28, expanded the breakthrough to 45 km along the front and from 4 to 25 km in depth.

Malinovsky, assessing the success of the right-flank armies, decided to transfer Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group and Akhmanov’s 23rd tank corps to the offensive zone of the 57th and 37th armies. These corps were initially located in the 46th Army zone, north of New Odessa. The cavalry-mechanized group received the task of advancing on Razdelnaya, and the 23rd Tank Corps - on Tiraspol.

Feat of Olshansky's landing. On the very first day of the front's offensive, the armies of the left flank began the assault on Nikolaev. In order to support the ground forces and divert the forces of the German garrison, the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Alexei Grechkin, set the task of landing troops in the Nikolaev port. The naval paratroopers were supposed to land in the rear of the German troops, divert part of the forces from the front and try to cause panic and disorient the enemy. This task was entrusted to the soldiers of the 384th Separate Marine Battalion. The amphibious landing included 68 volunteers: 55 marines, 10 sappers (from the 57th separate engineer battalion of the 28th Army), 2 signalmen and a guide (fisherman A.I. Andreev). The detachment was led by senior lieutenant Konstantin Fedorovich Olshansky. The chief of staff of the detachment was Lieutenant G. S. Voloshko, and Captain A. F. Golovlev was appointed deputy commander for political affairs.

Marine paratroopers in the village of Oktyabrsky (Bogoyavlenskoye village), located on the banks of the Southern Bug, took several old boats and prepared them for the operation. Several fishermen and 12 pontoon boats from the 44th separate pontoon-bridge battalion sat on the oars. The paratroopers took significant ammunition, each soldier had 10 grenades. The movement of the detachment was accompanied by difficulties. There was a headwind of a storm, which slowed down the movement and damaged the boats. Along the way, one of the boats fell apart. The detachment had to land on the shore and regroup. The fishermen and pontoon boats were left on the shore, and the paratroopers sat at the oars. As a result, they were able to cover 15 km in only five seconds. extra hours. Because of this delay, the sappers, having completed making passes, were unable to return before dawn and were forced to remain with the guide.

At 4:15 a.m. on March 26, 1944, the Marines landed at the commercial port and, having eliminated the guards, occupied several buildings. The detachment took up a perimeter defense. The signalmen informed the command about the successful start of the landing operation. In the morning the Germans discovered that the elevator had been captured. Assuming that they were opposed by a small partisan detachment, the Germans attempted to push the enemy back with small forces. However, the Germans met serious resistance, suffered losses and retreated.

Then, during a continuous battle of many hours, the Germans launched 18 attacks, constantly increasing the pressure. The Germans threw superior forces into battle, artillery, six-barrel rocket launchers and armored vehicles, used smoke bombs and flamethrowers. The naval paratroopers did not surrender, suffered losses, but each new enemy attack was repulsed with heavy fire. The command received a second report: “We came into contact with the enemy. We are fighting a fierce battle and suffering losses.” On the evening of March 26, radio operators reported a difficult situation. Olshansky called fire on himself.

The fierce battle continued into the night. The radio operators were killed under enemy artillery fire and the radio was destroyed. Only 15 soldiers remained in the ranks. Many were injured. Olshansky, who was also wounded, ordered the foreman of the first article, Yuri Lisitsyn, who was an experienced intelligence officer, to get to his own and ask for air support. The scout successfully made his way across the front, but was already blown up by a mine near the location of the Soviet troops. However, he did not die. With an injured leg, he reached his own people and passed on the report.

The Marines fought like titans. Senior Lieutenant Konstantin Olshansky died a heroic death. Lieutenant Voloshko and Captain Golovlev were killed. The remnants of the detachment were headed by Sergeant Major 2nd Article K.V. Bochkovich. Sailor V.V. Khodyrev, who had already lost an arm during a German attack supported by tanks, volunteered to “meet them in Sevastopol style.” With two bunches of grenades (all anti-tank guns were already damaged), he destroyed an enemy tank. And at the cost of his life he thwarted the German attack.

On the morning of March 28, the surviving paratroopers, with the support of Il-2 attack aircraft, repelled the last, 18th, attack of German troops. A total of 11 soldiers survived, all were wounded, five in serious condition. The German command was confident to the end that the Russians had landed a significant force. The landing force destroyed more than a battalion of enemy personnel, several guns and tanks.

Olshansky's landing force completed its task. His heroic actions were forever included in the military annals of Russia as an example of military valor and skill of a military unit. The Motherland highly appreciated the feat of the Marines and sappers. All of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 55 of them posthumously. By order of Stalin, the 384th Separate Marine Battalion was given the honorary name “Nikolaevsky”.

On the night of March 28, formations of the 61st Guards and 24th Rifle Divisions of Shlemin's Army and the 130th Rifle Division of Tsvetaev's Shock Army crossed the Ingul River and broke into the city. At the same time, units of Grechkin’s army liberated the city from the southern direction. On March 28, Soviet troops liberated Nikolaev. Moscow celebrated the liberation of the city with a gun salute - 224 guns fired twenty artillery salvos.

The Germans, retreating, destroyed the bridge across the Southern Bug River in the Varvarovka area. This complicated the offensive of the 6th Army and the 5th Shock Army. However, by the evening, Soviet troops liberated Varvarovka. After the bridge was restored, the main forces of the two armies crossed.

Modern memorial to paratroopers K.F. Olshansky. Installed in Nikolaev (Ukraine) in 1974 according to the design of architects O.P. and V.P. Popov

Simultaneously with the offensive of the troops of the left flank, the formations of the right flank of the 3rd Ukrainian Front successfully crushed the enemy. During three days of stubborn fighting, the 57th and 37th armies on March 28 broke through the German defenses on the right bank of the Southern Bug on a front 45 km to a depth of 25 km.

On March 29, the 28th Army was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Simultaneously with the liberation of Nikolaev, the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front developed an offensive along the coast towards Odessa. On March 30, the 5th Shock Army under the command of Grechkin, with the support of an amphibious detachment landed from the sea, crossed the Dnieper-Bug estuary and liberated the city of Ochakov. Aircraft of the 17th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet, to the extent possible and taking into account weather conditions, provided support to the ground forces. Soviet aviation launched powerful attacks on retreating enemy columns and destroyed transport hubs. Aviation also disrupted the evacuation of German troops by sea. Transport aircraft, trying to solve the problem of supplying troops in conditions of spring thaw and poor roads, delivered fuel, ammunition and other cargo by air.

The German command, in the face of a breakthrough in the defenses on the left and right flanks, as well as the advance of troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (which created a threat of encirclement of the Nikolaev-Odessa group), began a hasty withdrawal of the main forces of the German 6th and Romanian 3rd armies across the Dniester River. At the same time, the Germans tried to detain the enemy at the intermediate line of the Tiligul River. However, troops of the 57th and 37th armies, the 23rd tank corps and the Pliev cavalry mechanized group broke through the German defenses.

By the morning of March 30, the main forces of the cavalry-mechanized group and the 23rd Tank Corps completed the crossing of the Southern Bug in the area of ​​Alexandrovka and Voznesensk. On March 31, having overcome stubborn enemy resistance, Soviet troops began pursuing him in the direction of Razdelnaya. On this day, near the city of Voznesensk, the commander of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Trofim Ivanovich Tanaschishin, died.

Already on April 4, units of Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group and Sharokhin’s 37th Army cut the railway that connected Odessa and Tiraspol and occupied the important railway junction of Razdelnaya. As a result, the German group was divided into two groups. Formations of the 30th and 29th Army Corps of the 6th Army (9 divisions and 2 brigades of assault guns), under the pressure of the armies of Sharokhin, Hagen and the 23rd Tank Corps of Akhmanov, rolled back to Tiraspol and beyond the Dniester River. The remaining troops of the 6th Army - formations of the 17th, 44th and 72nd Army Corps, formations of the 3rd Romanian Army (a total of 10 German and 2 Romanian divisions, 2 brigades of assault guns, separate tank battalions and other units) - retreated to Odessa. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front covered the German group from the northern and northwestern directions. They were pressed towards Odessa. On April 5, a cavalry-mechanized group broke through to Strasbourg (Kuchurgan), and there was a threat of encirclement of the Odessa enemy group.

The front command, in order to finally cut off the Germans’ escape route beyond the Dniester, turned the cavalry-mechanized group from the Razdelnaya area to the southeast. On April 7, Soviet troops occupied Belyaevka and reached the Dniester estuary. The threat of a large “cauldron” has intensified. At the same time, units of the 8th Guards and 6th Army bypassed Odessa from the northwest, and the 5th Shock Army continued its offensive along the sea coast.

There were more than 6 enemy divisions in the Odessa area. On the morning of April 6, they launched a counterattack in the Razdelnaya area, trying to break through towards Tiraspol. The German troops attacked the formations of the 82nd Rifle Corps of the 37th Army. Soviet troops had not yet managed to create a strong defense; their artillery and rear forces lagged behind. At the cost of significant losses, part of the German troops were able to make their way to the crossings across the Kuchurgan River and united with their troops, who were operating northwest of Razdelnaya. The command of the 37th Army brought up additional forces and organized a counteroffensive. In the second half of April 7, German troops, who did not have time to break through to their own, were thrown back to the south and southeast of Razdelnaya. The 57th Army continued its offensive that day, but part of the German troops managed to retreat beyond the Dniester River.

On the evening of April 9, units of the 5th Shock Army under the command of Tsvetaev captured the Sortirovochnaya, Kyyalnik, and Peresyp stations and began the battle for the northern quarters of Odessa. At the same time, formations of the 8th Guards and 6th Armies of Chuikov and Shlemin approached the city from the north-west. The German command tried to evacuate part of the troops, military materials and property by sea. However, it didn’t work out. German ships and transports were subjected to constant attacks by aircraft of the 17th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet, attacks by torpedo boats and submarines. In total, more than 30 enemy transports were sunk, and others were damaged. Soviet bomber divisions also attacked ships in the port of Odessa. Therefore, the German troops had only one escape route - to Ovidiopol with the subsequent crossing of the Dniester estuary. Rear forces, transport and troops began to be withdrawn in this direction. Part of the German forces tried to break through Belyaevka. The retreating troops were constantly subjected to air strikes and suffered heavy losses.

On April 10, the Soviet armies, with the support of Odessa partisans and underground fighters, completely liberated the city from the Nazis. As the Germans themselves noted, Odessa became a real citadel during two years of occupation partisan movement. Partisans and underground fighters came out of dungeons and shelters and helped clear Odessa of the enemy. In addition, they provided invaluable assistance in preventing the destruction of the port, berths, warehouses, important buildings and objects that the Germans had prepared for bombing. Partisans of the Kuyalnitsky detachment under the command of L.F. Gorbel on the night of April 10 struck at the enemy’s rear and destroyed the German demolition team. The Germans planned to destroy the dam of the Khadzhibeyevsky estuary and flood Peresyp, which opened the way for Soviet troops to Odessa.

In Odessa, Soviet troops captured huge trophies that the Germans did not have time to evacuate. The entire railway from Vygoda station to the city itself was packed with carriages with military equipment, various equipment and looted property.

Night attack Soviet tanks T-34-85 at Razdelnaya station

Capture of the left bank of the Dniester

After the liberation of Odessa, the 6th and 5th shock armies were withdrawn to the second echelon of the front. The remaining armies of the front continued the offensive and pursuit of enemy troops. At the same time, on April 10, the 23rd Tank Corps became so wedged into the enemy’s battle formations that it was surrounded in the Ploskoye area. The tankers fought surrounded until units of the 57th Army arrived there on April 11. On April 12, units of Hagen’s army reached the Dniester, crossed the river on the move and captured small bridgeheads on the right bank.

At the same time, formations of Sharokhin's 37th Army reached Tiraspol and liberated its Nazis on the night of April 12. Soviet troops also captured a small bridgehead southwest of the city, up to 2 km along the front and up to 1.5 km in depth. Quite quickly, the bridgehead was increased along the front to 16 km and in depth from 6 to 10 km.

At the same time, Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army and Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group, breaking enemy resistance, advanced in the Ovidiopol direction. However, part of the cavalry-mechanized group (10th Guards and 30th Cavalry Divisions) found itself in a difficult situation. North of Ovidiopol, Soviet divisions came under attack from the retreating Odessa enemy group and, under pressure from superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat to the north. The formations of two corps of the 8th Guards Army, stretched along a 60-kilometer front, were unable to reliably block the German troops’ escape route to the west. Vasilevsky criticized the actions of the command of the 8th Guards Army, because of which German troops were able to calmly leave the Dniester.

Glagolev's 46th Army, advancing to the north, reached the Dniester in the area south of Chebrucha by the end of April 11. On April 12, the advanced battalions of the army crossed the Dniester. On April 14, the 8th Guards Army reached the Dniester Estuary and cleared its coast of the enemy. On the night of April 15, units of the 74th Guards Rifle Division crossed the Dniester near Ilyichevka (in the Belyaevka area). The further offensive of the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was stopped by the Headquarters, which on April 14 ordered a transition to defense at the achieved lines. It was necessary to restore strength, pull up the lagging behind, replenish units with people, bring up ammunition and fuel.

Results

The operation ended in complete victory for the Red Army. Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, supported by the left flank of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the Black Sea Fleet, defeated the German 6th and 3rd Romanian armies. German troops lost more than 38 thousand people killed and captured. More than 950 guns, about 100 warehouses with ammunition and food, as well as a large amount of other property and equipment were captured.

Soviet troops advanced up to 180 km and liberated the Nikolaev and Odessa regions from German-Romanian troops. Most of Moldova was also liberated. Many units and formations that distinguished themselves in the operation were awarded orders. 42 units received honorary names (“Nikolaevsky”, “Razdelnensky”, “Odessa” and “Ochakovsky”). At the same time, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front failed to encircle and destroy most of the forces of the German 6th and 3rd Romanian armies; they managed to retreat to the right bank of the Dniester and organize a stable defense at this line. Therefore, Soviet troops were unable to reach the state border of Romania.

The return of Nikolaev and Odessa allowed the Black Sea Fleet to restore its bases in the northwestern part of the Black Sea basin and relocate light ships and aircraft there. As a result of the blockade of the Crimean enemy group, it was seriously strengthened. Crimea was already surrounded by land. The capture of bridgeheads on the Dniester created the conditions for a further offensive by the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Next in line were the rest of Moldova, Romania and the Balkan Peninsula.

Before the Germans had time to recover from the attacks in the south, in June 1944, Stalin's fourth blow - defeat of the Finnish army in the Karelia region . As a result, the Red Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated part of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Under the influence of the successes of the Red Army, our allies were no longer able to further delay the opening of a second front. On June 6, 1944, the American-British command, two years late, began a large landing in Northern France.

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P.P. Sokolov-Skalya. Liberation of Sevastopol by the Soviet army. May 1944

On April 8, 70 years ago, the Crimean strategic offensive operation began. It went down in history as one of the most important offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. Its goal was the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula, an important strategic bridgehead in the Black Sea theater of military operations, by defeating the 17th German Army of Colonel General E. Eneke, who was holding Crimea.

As a result of the Melitopol (September 26 - November 5, 1943) and (October 31 - November 11, 1943) Soviet troops broke through the fortifications of the Turkish Wall on the Perekop Isthmus, captured bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Sivash and on the Kerch Peninsula, but liberated Crimea immediately It didn’t work - there wasn’t enough strength. A large group of German troops continued to remain on the peninsula, relying on deeply echeloned defensive positions. On the Perekop Isthmus and against the bridgehead on Sivash, the defense consisted of three, and on the Kerch Peninsula - of four lines.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) considered Crimea as a strategically important area, and its liberation as the most important opportunity to return the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, which would significantly improve the conditions for basing ships and conducting combat operations at sea. In addition, Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of German troops and their important sea communications running along the Black Sea straits to the western coast of the Black Sea. Therefore, the German leadership also attached great military and political importance to keeping Crimea in their hands, which, in their opinion, was one of the factors in maintaining the support of Turkey and its allies in the Balkans. In this regard, the command of the 17th Army was obliged to hold the peninsula to the last.

At the beginning of 1944 german army was reinforced by two divisions: at the end of January 1944 on the peninsula by sea The 73rd and, in early March, the 111th Infantry Divisions were delivered. By April, the army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 brigades of assault guns, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns. It was supported by 148 aircraft.

The Soviet leadership entrusted the task of defeating the enemy's Crimean group and liberating Crimea to the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commanding army general), which included the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, the 19th tank corps, the 16th and 78th nd fortified areas, air support was provided by aviation of the 8th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force; Separate Primorsky Army (commanded by Army General), whose operations were supported by aviation of the 4th Air Army; Black Sea Fleet (commander admiral), whose forces supported the offensive on the coastal flanks and disrupted the enemy's sea communications; Azov military flotilla (commanded by rear admiral), which supported the offensive of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army.

In total, the Soviet strike force consisted of about 470 thousand people, 5982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns (SPG), 1250 aircraft, including the Black Sea Fleet aviation. By April 1944, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla included a battleship, four cruisers, six destroyers, two patrol ships, eight basic minesweepers, 47 torpedo and 80 patrol boats, 34 armored boats, 29 submarines, three gunboats and other auxiliary vessels. In addition, the troops were supported by Crimean partisan detachments. Created in January 1944, the Crimean partisan forces, numbering almost 4 thousand people, were united into three formations: Southern, Northern and Eastern. Thus, the forces of the USSR significantly exceeded the enemy forces.

The balance of forces and means of the parties at the beginning of the Crimean strategic offensive operation

Strengths and means	Troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army	Troops of the 17th German Army
Divisions (calculated)	2,6	1
Total people	2,4	1
Guns and mortars	1,7	1
Tanks and self-propelled guns	2,6	1
Combat aircraft	4,2	1

The actions of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal.

Preparations for the Crimean offensive operation began in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front presented their considerations to the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding the conduct of the Crimean operation, which was supposed to begin on February 18-19.

However, the start date of the operation was subsequently postponed several times. So, on February 18, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Command Headquarters, ordered Army General F.I. Tolbukhin, the Crimean operation will begin after the entire coast of the Dnieper up to and including Kherson is liberated from the enemy. Despite this, the Headquarters in its further instructions demanded that the operation begin no later than March 1, regardless of the progress of the operation to liberate the Right Bank Dnieper from the enemy. A.M. Vasilevsky reported to Headquarters that, given the weather conditions, the Crimean operation could only begin between March 15 and 20. The Headquarters agreed with the target date, but on March 16 the front received new instructions that the Crimean operation “begin after the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front captured the area of ​​​​the city of Nikolaev and advanced them to Odessa.” However, the front, due to poor meteorological conditions, was able to begin the operation only on April 8, 1944.

The entire operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned to a depth of up to 170 km, lasting 10-12 days with an average daily rate of advance of 12-15 km. The rate of advance of the 19th Tank Corps was determined to be 30-35 km per day.

The idea of ​​the Crimean operation was to deliver a simultaneous strike in the general direction of Simferopol and Sevastopol, with the forces of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, to dismember and destroy the enemy group , preventing her evacuation from Crimea. The main blow was planned to be delivered from a bridgehead on the southern bank of Sivash. If successful, the main group of the front went to the rear of the enemy’s Perekop positions, and the capture of Dzhankoy opened up freedom of action towards Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula to the rear of the enemy group located there. An auxiliary attack was carried out on the Perekop Isthmus. The separate Primorsky Army was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses north of Kerch, deliver the main blow to Simferopol, Sevastopol, and with part of its forces along the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

On April 8, 1944, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. Five days earlier, heavy artillery destroyed a significant part of the enemy's long-term structures. On the evening of April 7, reconnaissance in force was carried out, confirming previous information about the grouping of Wehrmacht troops in the area of ​​Perekop and Sivash. On the day the operation began, at 8:00 am, artillery and aviation preparation began in the zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front for a total duration of 2.5 hours. Immediately after its end, the front troops went on the offensive, striking with the forces of the 51st Army of Lieutenant General from a bridgehead on the southern bank of Sivash. After two days of fierce fighting, thanks to the courage of Soviet soldiers, the enemy’s defenses were broken through. The 51st Army reached the flank of the German Perekop group, and the 2nd Guards Army of the Lieutenant General liberated Armyansk. On the morning of April 11, the 19th Tank Corps of the Lieutenant General captured Dzhankoy on the move and successfully advanced to Simferopol. Fearing the threat of encirclement, the enemy abandoned the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus and began to retreat from the Kerch Peninsula.

The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, having launched an offensive on the night of April 11, captured the fortified city of Kerch in the morning - a fortified center of enemy resistance on the eastern coast of Crimea. The pursuit of enemy troops retreating to Sevastopol began in all directions. The 2nd Guards Army developed an offensive along the western coast towards Yevpatoria. The 51st Army, using the success of the 19th Tank Corps, rushed across the steppes to Simferopol. A separate Primorsky army advanced through Karasubazar (Belogorsk) and Feodosia to Sevastopol. As a result, Yevpatoria, Simferopol and Feodosia were liberated on April 13, and Bakhchisarai, Alushta, and Yalta on April 14-15.

German troops continued to retreat. Aviation of the 8th and 4th Air Armies carried out massive attacks on retreating enemy troops and communications centers. The forces of the Black Sea Fleet sank its ships and transports with evacuated troops. The enemy lost 8,100 soldiers and officers from attacks on sea convoys and single ships.

Crimean strategic offensive operation April 8 - May 12, 1944

Crimean partisans and underground fighters fought courageously. Crimean partisan formations received tasks to destroy enemy rear lines, nodes and communication lines, destroy railways, set up blockages and ambushes on mountain roads, disrupt the work of the Yalta port and thereby prevent the withdrawal of German-Romanian troops to it and other loading points for evacuation to Romania . The partisans were also entrusted with the task of preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial and transport enterprises.

On April 15-16, Soviet troops reached Sevastopol and began preparations for the assault on the city. In accordance with the decision of the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, approved by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, the main blow was planned to be delivered from the Balaklava area by formations and units of the left flank of the 51st and the center of the Primorsky Army, which on April 18 became part of the 4th Ukrainian Front. They had to break through the enemy’s defenses in the area of ​​​​Sapun Mountain and the heights northeast of the settlement of Karan with the task of cutting it off from the bays located west of Sevastopol. According to the front command, the defeat of the enemy on Sapun Mountain, despite the difficulty of its assault, should have allowed the stability of the German defense to be quickly disrupted. The auxiliary strike was planned in the zone of the 2nd Guards Army and, in order to divert the enemy’s attention, was planned two days before the main strike. The army had to break through the enemy’s defenses in the area southeast of Belbek with the forces of the 13th Guards and 55th Rifle Corps and develop an offensive on the Mekenzi Mountains and the eastern shore of the Northern Bay in order to press the German group to the sea and destroy it.

On April 19 and 23, front troops made two attempts to break through the main defensive line of the Sevastopol fortified region, but they ended in failure. A new regrouping and training of troops was required, as well as the supply of ammunition and fuel. On May 5, the assault on the city’s fortifications began - the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive, which forced the enemy to transfer troops to Sevastopol from other directions.

On May 7 at 10:30, with massive support from all front aviation, Soviet troops began a general assault on the Sevastopol fortified area. The troops of the front's main strike group broke through the enemy defenses along a 9-kilometer stretch and captured Sapun Mountain during fierce battles. On May 9, front troops from the north, east and southeast broke into Sevastopol and liberated the city. The remnants of the German 17th Army, pursued by the 19th Tank Corps, retreated to Cape Khersones, where they were completely defeated. At the cape, 21 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured, and a large amount of equipment and weapons were captured.

Soviet tanks on Frunze Street (now Nakhimov Avenue) during the liberation of the city from German invaders. May 1944

The Crimean offensive operation is over. If in 1941-1942. While it took German troops 250 days to capture heroically defended Sevastopol, in 1944 Soviet troops only needed 35 days to break through powerful fortifications in Crimea and clear almost the entire peninsula of the enemy.

Fireworks in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944 Photo by E. Khaldei

The objectives of the operation were achieved. Soviet troops broke through the deeply echeloned defenses on the Perekop Isthmus, the Kerch Peninsula, in the Sevastopol region and defeated the 17th Field Army of the Wehrmacht. Its losses on land alone amounted to 100 thousand people, including over 61,580 people captured. During the Crimean operation, Soviet troops and naval forces lost 17,754 people killed and 67,065 people wounded.

Combat strength, number of Soviet troops and human losses*

Name of associations and the timing of their participation in surgery	Combat composition and troop strength to the start of the operation		Casualties in the operation
	quantity connections	number	irrevocable	sanitary	Total	average daily
4th Ukrainian Front (all period)	SD - 18, tk - 1, selection - 2, UR - 2	278 400	13 332	50 498	63830	1 824
Separate Primorskaya and 4th Air Army (all period)	SD - 12, sbr -2, selection - 1
Black Sea Fleet and Azov military flotilla (all period)
Total	Divisions-30, buildings-1, brigade-5, UR - 2	462 400	17 754 3,8%	67 065	84819	2 423

List of abbreviations: sbr - separate tank brigade, sbr - rifle brigade, sd - rifle division, tk - tank corps, ur - fortified area.

The victory in Crimea returned an important economic region to the country. In general, a territory covering an area of ​​about 26 thousand square meters was liberated. km. During the years of occupation, the Nazi invaders caused enormous damage to Crimea: more than 300 industrial enterprises were put out of action, livestock was almost completely exterminated, cities and resorts were severely destroyed - Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Yevpatoria were especially affected. Thus, at the time of liberation, 3 thousand inhabitants remained in Sevastopol out of 109 thousand people in the city on the eve of the war. Only 6% of the housing stock in the city survived.

Considering the progress and assessing the results of the Crimean operation, it is clear that its successful completion was predetermined by the skillful choice by the Soviet command of the directions of the main attacks, the good organization of interaction between strike groupings of troops, aviation and naval forces, the decisive dismemberment and defeat of the main enemy forces (Sivash direction), and the capture of key defensive positions in short time(storm of Sevastopol). Mobile groups (advanced detachments) of armies were skillfully used to develop the offensive. They quickly penetrated into the operational depth of the enemy's defense, preventing his retreating troops from gaining a foothold on intermediate lines and in defense areas, which ensured a high rate of attack.

For heroism and skillful actions, 160 formations and units were given the honorary names of Evpatoria, Kerch, Perekop, Sevastopol, Sivash, Simferopol, Feodosia and Yalta. 56 formations, units and ships were awarded orders. 238 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, thousands of participants in the battles for Crimea were awarded orders and medals.

As a result of the Crimean operation, the last large enemy bridgehead that threatened the rear of the fronts operating in Right Bank Ukraine was eliminated. Within five days, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, was liberated and favorable conditions were created for a further offensive in the Balkans.

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* The Great Patriotic War is not classified. Book of losses. Latest reference publication / G.F. Krivosheev, V.M. Andronikov, P.D. Burikov, V.V. Gurkin. - M.: Veche, 2010. P. 143.

Anna Tsepkalova,
Research Institute employee
military history of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Start the operation to liberate Crimea. The Crimean operation itself was carried out from April 8 to May 12, 1944 by the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla.

On May 5-7, 1944, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) stormed German defensive fortifications in heavy battles; On May 9, they completely liberated Sevastopol, and on May 12, the remnants of enemy troops at Cape Chersonese laid down their arms.

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I dedicate this photo collection to this significant event, friends.

1. The facade of the Sevastopol Palace of Pioneers damaged by shells after the liberation of the city. May 1944

2. German minesweeper in the bay of Sevastopol. 1944

3. German attack aircraft Fw.190, destroyed Soviet aviation at the Kherson airfield. 1944

4. Meeting of Soviet partisans and boat sailors in liberated Yalta. 1944

5. The commander of the 7th Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left), and the commander of the XXXXIX Wehrmacht Mountain Corps, General Rudolf Conrad (first from left), at the 37-mm RaK 35/36 cannon in Crimea. 02/27/1944

6. Meeting of Soviet partisans in liberated Yalta. 1944

7. The Soviet light cruiser "Red Crimea" enters Sevastopol Bay. 05.11.1944

8. The commander of the 7th Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left), and the commander of the XXXXIX Wehrmacht Mountain Corps, General Rudolf Conrad (center right) pass by a mortar crew during a review in the Crimea. 02/27/1944

9. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

10. Soviet soldiers with a flag on the roof of the destroyed Panorama building “Defense of Sevastopol” in liberated Sevastopol. 1944

11. Tanks Pz.Kpfw. 2nd Romanian Tank Regiment in Crimea. 03.11.1943

12. Romanian General Hugo Schwab and German General Rudolf Conrad in Crimea. 02/27/1944

13. Romanian artillerymen fire from an anti-tank gun during a battle in Crimea. 03/27/1944

14. The commander of the XXXXIX Mountain Corps of the Wehrmacht, General Rudolf Conrad, with Romanian officers at an observation post in Crimea. 02/27/1944

15. Pilots of the 3rd squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force study a map of the combat area at the airfield near Yak-9D aircraft. In the background is the plane of Guard Lieutenant V.I. Voronov (tail number “31”). Saki airfield, Crimea. April-May 1944

16. Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, member of the State Defense Committee, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky at the command post of the 4th Ukrainian Front. April 1944

17. Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko with the command of the North Caucasus Front and the 18th Army is considering the plan for the operation to cross the Kerch Strait. From left to right: Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, Colonel General K.N. Leselidze, Army General I.E. Petrov. 1943

18. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

19. Soviet boat SKA-031 with a destroyed stern, abandoned at low tide in Krotkovo, awaiting repairs. A boat from the 1st Novorossiysk Red Banner Sea Hunter Division of the Black Sea Fleet. 1944

20. Armored boat of the Azov military flotilla in the Kerch Strait. Kerch-Eltingen landing operation. December 1943

21. Soviet troops are transporting military equipment and horses through Sivash. In the foreground is a 45mm anti-tank gun. December 1943

22. Soviet soldiers transport a 122-mm M-30 model 1938 howitzer on a pontoon across the Sivash Bay (Rotten Sea). November 1943

23. T-34 tanks on the street of liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

24. Marine soldiers at the arch of Primorsky Boulevard in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

25. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

26. Partisans who participated in the liberation of Crimea. The village of Simeiz on the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula. 1944

27. Sapper, Lieutenant Ya.S. Shinkarchuk crossed Sivash thirty-six times and transported 44 guns with shells to the bridgehead. 1943.

28. Architectural monument Grafskaya pier in liberated Sevastopol. 1944

29. Fireworks at the grave of fellow pilots who died near Sevastopol on April 24, 1944. 05/14/1944

30. Armored boats of the Black Sea Fleet are landing Soviet troops on the Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait on the bridgehead near Yenikale during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943

31. The crew of the Pe-2 dive bomber “For the Great Stalin” of the 40th Bomber Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet after completing a combat mission. Crimea, May 1944. From left to right: crew commander Nikolai Ivanovich Goryachkin, navigator - Yuri Vasilyevich Tsyplenkov, gunner-radio operator - Sergei (nickname Knopka).

32. Self-propelled gun SU-152 of the 1824th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment in Simferopol. 04/13/1944

33. Soviet soldiers cross Sivash in December 1943.

34. A Marine installs the Soviet naval flag in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

35. T-34 tank on the street of liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

36. Transportation of Soviet equipment during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943

37. Destroyed German equipment on the shore of Cossack Bay in Sevastopol. May 1944

38. German soldiers killed during the liberation of Crimea. 1944

39. Transport with German soldiers evacuated from Crimea docks in the port of Constanta, Romania. 1944

41. Armored boat. The Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait, most likely a bridgehead near Yenikale. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. Late 1943

42. Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol. May 1944

43. Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol. May 1944

44. Yak-9D fighters, 3rd squadron of the 6th GvIAP of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. May 1944

45. Liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

46. ​​Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol.

47. Soviet soldiers pose on a German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighter abandoned in the Crimea. 1944

48. A Soviet soldier tears off a Nazi swastika from the gates of the metallurgical plant named after. Voykova in liberated Kerch. April 1944

49. At the location of the Soviet troops there is a unit on the march, washing, dugouts. Crimea. 1944

50. Crew of a Soviet regimental gun at a firing position in Crimea.

51. Soviet marines install a ship's jack on the highest point of Kerch - Mount Mithridates. Crimea. April 1944

52. In liberated Sevastopol, view of the Southern Bay. 1944

53. Soviet soldiers salute in honor of the liberation of Sevastopol. May 1944

54. Captured German sailors near Kerch. 1944

55. Captured German sailors near Kerch.

56. Crew of the Soviet 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun model 1939 61-K on the Istorichesky Boulevard in Sevastopol. In the foreground is a rangefinder with a one-meter stereoscopic rangefinder ZDN. 1944

57. Liberated Sevastopol from a bird's eye view. 1944

58. In liberated Sevastopol: an announcement at the entrance to Primorsky Boulevard, left over from the German administration. 1944

59. Sevastopol after liberation from the Nazis. 1944

60. In liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

61. Soldiers of the 2nd Guards Taman Division in liberated Kerch. Soviet troops began crossing the Kerch Strait following the Germans fleeing the Taman Peninsula on October 31, 1943. On April 11, 1944, Kerch was finally liberated as a result of a landing operation. April 1944

62. Soldiers of the 2nd Guards Taman Division in the battles to expand the bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula, November 1943. With the defeat of German troops on the Taman Peninsula, the path to the Kerch Strait opened, which the guards took advantage of when landing to seize the bridgehead in the Crimea still occupied by the Germans . November 1943

63. Marine landing in the Kerch area. On October 31, 1943, Soviet troops began crossing the Kerch Strait. As a result of the landing operation on April 11, 1944, Kerch was finally liberated. The severity and fierceness of the battles during the defense and liberation of Kerch is evidenced by the fact that for these battles 146 people were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 21 military units and formations were awarded the honorary title “Kerch”. November 1943

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