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Crisis in relations with China. The five most acute conflicts between the USSR and China

What consequences for the international situation did the transition of Soviet-Chinese differences into open confrontation have?
2. How did the aggravation of intra-Chinese relations in 1969 affect the Soviet-Chinese conflict?
3. In what situation did the Soviet-Chinese confrontation reach its climax?
4. How was it possible to normalize US-China relations?
5. How did the normalization of relations between China and Japan occur?
1, The rupture of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy in 1959 was a sign of fundamental differences between the USSR and the PRC. In 1960, Soviet specialists left the PRC, which aggravated the economic chaos in China caused by the inept economic management of the CPC during the “Great Leap Forward” period. Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in 1959 was inconclusive.
There were several groups of contradictions between the USSR and China, primarily related to China’s reluctance to play the role of a junior partner of the USSR. The leader of the PRC, Mao Zedong, tried to take advantage of the death of Stalin and the fluctuations in the international positions of the USSR in order to promote the PRC to a leadership position, or, at a minimum, to achieve the strengthening of the international position of his country at the expense of the USSR.
The growth of Soviet-Chinese contradictions began to spill over into the foreign policy sphere. In 1962, during the armed conflict between the PRC and India, the Soviet government took a neutral position, refusing to support China. The Sino-Indian conflict almost coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this situation, the Chinese side for the first time allowed itself to openly criticize Moscow’s foreign policy in the press, calling the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba adventurism, and their withdrawal by agreement with the United States - capitulation. The controversy began in 1963, the year the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed. Sharp statements began to be published in the Soviet and Chinese press. The CPSU Central Committee and the CPC Central Committee exchanged harsh messages. Meanwhile, since 1962, tensions have noticeably increased on the Soviet-Chinese border, where cases of illegal crossing by the PRC have become more frequent.
But the most important thing was something else: the leadership of the PRC stated that it considered the treaties between China and Tsarist Russia to be unequal. But how: since these treaties determined most of the border line between the two countries. Beijing's statement implied the possibility of its non-recognition. In the USSR, the position of the PRC was perceived as an encroachment on the territory of the Soviet Union, which made them think about a threat to them from China. But, fearing a conflict with the PRC, the Soviet leadership agreed to enter into consultations with China on clarifying the line of the state border. These consultations stalled in the summer of 1964, after Mao Zedong spoke to foreign journalists about the possibility of presenting a “bill” to the Soviet Union for territories east of Lake Baikal, which, in his opinion, had been illegally seized by the Russian Empire. Although the PRC did not officially put forward territorial claims against the USSR, the question of strengthening the borders with China arose in Soviet strategic plans. The number of Soviet troops at Far East began to increase.
For its part, the Chinese leadership was convinced of the impossibility of cooperation with the USSR in creating a “united anti-imperialist front.” The last attempt of the CPC to return to cooperation with the USSR on an anti-American basis was made during the visit to Moscow of the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, after the removal of N. S. Khrushchev from power in October 1964. But since the new Soviet leadership intended to continue the line of avoiding war with the United States , the Chinese sounding was not successful. The refusal of the CPC to send a delegation to participate in the XXIII Congress of the CPSU in 1966 meant a formal break in relations between the two communist parties. In addition to measures to strengthen the Sino-Soviet border, in January 1966 the USSR concluded a new Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Mongolia. Following this, Soviet troops and heavy equipment were stationed on Mongolian territory. 1Since the end of 1967, the number of personnel in the border zone of the USSR with the PRC and the MPR was estimated at 250-350 thousand people.
Convinced of the impossibility of bringing the USSR to the side of the “Chinese revolution,” the leadership of the PRC took the path of confrontation with both the Soviet Union and the United States. The “three worlds theory” put forward by China provided the rationale new policy. In accordance with it, all states of the world were divided into three groups - superpowers, small and medium the developed countries(Western European states and the bulk of the countries of the “socialist camp”) and the “Third World” developing countries. The leaders of China proclaimed themselves the leader of the “third world” in the struggle for the victory of the ideas of national liberation and development.
Keyword
Cultural Revolution- a period of intense struggle for power within the Communist Party of China (1966-1976), accompanied by massive political repressions against opponents of Mao Zedong and a sharp deterioration in relations between the PRC and most countries in the world.
In 1966, the “cultural revolution” began in China (1966-1976). Sharp mutual criticism and tension in relations between the USSR and the PRC reached their highest point. The danger of the situation was so obvious that the sober part of the Chinese leadership, primarily Zhou Enlai, began to try to draw the attention of Mao Zedong to the need to reconsider the line of simultaneous confrontation with the USA and the USSR. Zhou Enlai himself was inclined towards reconciliation with the United States. The political opponent of this line was Marshal Lin Biao, who was opposed to improving relations between China and the United States. Both leaders agreed with each other in recognizing the weakening of the US position in Asia, associated with the unsuccessful war in Vietnam for the United States. But if Lin Biao believed the moment was right for the development of a pan-Asian revolution - in Thailand, Japan, Indonesia, Laos, and the Philippines, then Zhou Enlai pointed to the threat to China from the USSR. It remains unclear whether he actually considered the Soviet danger real, or whether the reference to the threat from the north was a justification for the proposal to begin a search for mutual understanding with the United States. The “Soviet threat” began to push the PRC in the second half of the 1960s to search for ways to normalize relations with Washington.
2. The “Cultural Revolution” was accompanied by rampant violence against those who did not share the radical views of Mao Zedong and tried to criticize his policies. An atmosphere of fear, lawlessness and arbitrariness arose in the country. Detachments of “revolutionary youth”, following the instructions of the Communist Party, terrorized the population. It has become a “normal” practice of the Chinese Communist Party to refer intelligentsia to “re-education” to the villages. Repressions in the PRC did not reach the level of cruelty that was characteristic of the USSR in the 1930s, but they were similar to them. The Chinese side also used methods of “revolutionary influence” against foreign diplomats and members of their families.
Relations between the CPSU and the CPC were severed. Rough ideological polemics were combined with a sharp deterioration in relations at the interstate level. The Chinese official press and the leaders of the PRC continued to challenge the legality of the border-territorial demarcation between China and Russia, essentially demanding the transfer of part of the USSR territories to the PRC. On January 26, 1967, the PRC authorities organized a siege of the Soviet embassy in Beijing by detachments of the Chinese “revolutionary youth” - Jiaofans. The siege lasted 18 days. Working in China was becoming dangerous. In February 1967, the Soviet side was forced to evacuate from China the children and other family members of Soviet diplomats, whose safety on Chinese territory was difficult to guarantee. Border incidents began. Trying to influence the PRC, the Soviet side carried out
There were major military maneuvers in the Far East, but they did not produce the desired effect.
The issue of the border along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, which had the status of border arteries, became particularly acute, since they divided the state territories of the USSR and the PRC over a fairly long stretch. In accordance with the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century, the border was drawn not along the middle of the main fairway, as was customary in the international practice of demarcating border rivers, but along the side that was recognized as China, i.e. along the Chinese bank of the river. The PRC openly demanded that the border line along the border rivers be changed and brought into line with world standards. With this formulation of the issue, about 600 river islands turned out to be “disputed”.
From mid-1967, Soviet border guards began to patrol not only the river islands, but also the Chinese banks of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, on the grounds that the border line legally did not run along the rivers, but along their banks on the Chinese side. For their part, Chinese citizens increased pressure on the border from China and began to regularly land on the islands, violating the border regime. In March 1969, on one of them - Damansky Island - bloody armed clashes took place with many victims and facts of atrocities against wounded Soviet border guards and abuse of the bodies of the dead. Armed clashes also began along the Soviet-Chinese border in Central Asia. The Sino-Soviet war could become a reality. In the summer of 1969, some government agencies began to be evacuated from Beijing, and strategically important industrial enterprises from Manchuria. Scenarios for a Chinese attack on the Far Eastern regions of the USSR were analyzed in Moscow.
Moscow tried to convince its partners in the international communist movement to condemn the actions of the PRC and support Moscow's position. In addition, the USSR tried to gain support from other Asian countries and the United States. However, the latter opposed " collective security in Asia". During a visit to Asian countries in the summer of 1969, President R. Nixon repeatedly spoke negatively about this idea. On the part of the American president, this was a friendly gesture towards Beijing.
3. At the end of the summer of 1969, Western intelligence services drew attention to the fact that signals began to arrive indicating an increase in the USSR's readiness to consider the issue of launching a preemptive strike on China's nuclear facilities. In August 1969, it became known from American intelligence data that Soviet bombers stationed in Mongolia were practicing attacks on mock-ups resembling a Chinese uranium enrichment plant in the area of Lake Lop Nor. At the same time, it was recorded that Soviet diplomatic officials of not a very high level began to carefully and informally probe the question of a possible US reaction in the event of a Soviet preventive action against the nuclear facilities of the PRC. This kind of blow is called “nuclear castration” in the literature. American experts also drew attention to the redeployment of USSR Air Force units from the European part of the Soviet Union to Siberia in June 1969. On August 27, 1969, CIA Director Richard Helms gave a special briefing at which he informed reporters of the intelligence available to the United States. Although under J. Kennedy the American administration, as its former employees testify, itself considered the issue of delivering just such a blow to China, in the situation in 1969 the United States considered it necessary to restrain Moscow from its supposed dangerous intentions. The situation became even more tense.
On September 3, 1969, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Ho Chi Minh died in Hanoi. A high-ranking Soviet delegation headed by A.N. Kosygin went to his funeral. She stayed in Hanoi for four days. During her stay in Vietnam, on September 5, 1969, a press conference was held in Washington by US Deputy Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, who stated: “We cannot help but be deeply concerned about what the escalation of this [Soviet-Chinese] quarrel is causing massive damage to international peace and security." Although this wording did not allow us to consider the American statement as an expression of support! one of the parties to the conflict, Washington still indicated an interest in limiting it. Since the USSR was the stronger party in the dispute, the American warning was largely directed at it - and to that extent the US actually came to China's defense.
The US reaction as a whole had a sobering effect on both sides. The first step towards easing tensions was taken by the Soviet Union. On the way back to Moscow from Ho Chi Minh's funeral, the Soviet delegation several times on board the plane requested the consent of the Chinese side to hold a meeting with Chinese representatives during a possible stop in Beijing. After a number of attempts, the consent of the People's Republic of China was obtained. On September 11, 1969, A. N. Kosygin met with the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Znlai, at the Beijing airport. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to begin Soviet-Chinese negotiations on border issues in October 1969. The Chinese side renounced the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the disputed territories as a precondition for negotiations. A. N. Kosygin, according to statements from the Chinese side, not confirmed by the Soviet side, promised that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the border. Sino-Soviet relations remained hostile, but the climax of the confrontation had passed.
4. Back in July 1971, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Beijing in complete secrecy with a working colleague and agreed with the Chinese leadership on the basic conditions for the upcoming normalization of US-Chinese relations. In August 1971, the United States came up with the idea of transferring to the PRC China's seat in the UN Security Council, which until then had been occupied by Taiwan's delegate, while maintaining Taiwan's status as a UN member and the right to participate in its general assemblies. This proposal was not accepted. But in October 1971, the PRC was nevertheless admitted to the UN simultaneously with the “voluntary” withdrawal of Taiwan, which thus sought to avoid the exclusion procedure.
In February 1972, US President Richard Nixon arrived in Beijing on an official visit. Since the leading politicians of the world, including the leaders of all countries allied to the United States, learned about this visit only from newspapers, the visit of the American president to China was called the “Nixon shock” in the literature. The US president held talks with top Chinese leaders, including 79-year-old Mao Zedong.
The terms of US-Chinese normalization were enshrined in a communiqué signed on February 27, 1972 in Shanghai. From a general political point of view, the main thing in this document was an indication of the refusal of both powers to attempt to establish their hegemony in East Asia and the opposition of each of them to the attempts of any power to establish such hegemony. In other words, the United States confirmed its intention to support China in the event of an increase in the threat from the USSR, and China promised to continue its line of distancing from Moscow. It was about the United States abandoning “dual containment” of both the USSR and the PRC in favor of containing the Soviet Union alone, including through parallel actions with China.
The Shanghai Communiqué did not eliminate all the problems in US-Chinese relations. Diplomatic relations were not established between the two countries, as those existed between the United States and Taiwan. On this occasion, the communique stated that “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China.” But the American side pledged to evacuate military facilities from the island, stop diplomatic relations with Taipei in the future, denounce the US-Taiwan Treaty and support the PRC on the issue of transferring to it the right to represent China in the UN Security Council. Having conceded to Beijing on the main issues in principle, the American side reserved for itself the delay necessary to transfer relations with Taiwan to an unofficial channel. It was necessary to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, denounce the US-Taiwan security treaty of 1954 and obtain the consent of American legislators.
5. By increasing the activity of its diplomacy in Chinese, Soviet and other “difficult” areas, the American administration sought to compensate for the psychological and political losses that the Vietnam War entailed for the United States. The example of Washington, boldly breaking stereotypes, infected American allies - in Asia no less than in Europe.
Japan felt very hurt by the “Nixon shock”, since it began to strive to improve relations with China much earlier than the United States, but American politicians did not allow it to do this. Now that Washington was the first to normalize relations with China, doing what it denied Japan the right to do, Tokyo decided to act without looking back at the United States. The Japanese government tried to pursue a more independent course in foreign policy.
Economic successes by the early 1970s brought Japan among the world's economic leaders. Thanks to high (12-16%) growth rates in the 1960s, it became second in the world in terms of GNP, slightly ahead of even the Soviet Union. In November 1969, the Japanese government was able to obtain agreement from the United States to restore Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Archipelago (Okinawa), and in May 1972, Okinawa came under Japanese control, although American bases remained on the island. Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was awarded the Nobel Prize peace for resolving this diplomatic problem through negotiations.
In July 1972, the government of the country was headed by Kakuei Tanaka, a supporter of an active foreign policy line, the expression of which was the concept of “multipolar diplomacy” (takeku gaiko) put forward by him. It provided for the normalization of ties with China and the improvement of relations with the USSR.
On September 29, 1972, K. Tanaka arrived in the PRC on an official visit. In an effort to be half a step ahead of Washington, during the visit the Japanese side agreed not only to normalize relations with the PRC, but also to establish diplomatic relations. Japanese-Taiwanese official ties were severed. Japan recognized the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, and Taiwan as an integral part of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the Japanese side maintained economic and other ties with Taiwan, giving them an unofficial form.
Minimum knowledge
1. Soviet-Chinese contradictions aggravated as a result of a whole complex of problems, and they consisted, first of all, in a dispute over leadership in the world communist movement, different understanding the content of international relations (the PRC insisted on the continuation and development of the conflict with the West). The Soviet-Chinese confrontation not only weakened the bloc of communist powers, but also created a new source of conflict in the world.
2. The “Cultural Revolution” and mass repressions in the PRC led to a further escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The PRC began to challenge the belonging of a number of its Far Eastern territories to the USSR, and an armed incident occurred on Damansky Island. In response, the USSR tried to offer other Asian states a draft system of collective security in Asia, directed, in essence, against the PRC. This project did not receive the support of the communist movement and the international community as a whole.
3. By the summer of 1969, the threat of a large-scale war between the USSR and the PRC had seriously increased, as evidenced by the military preparations of both sides. The United States supported China in this confrontation in a very restrained manner. However, thanks to the diplomatic efforts of the USSR, it was possible to partially defuse tensions and soften the severity of contradictions with the PRC by September 1969.
4. In the second half of the 1960s, the United States sought to expand its ability to exert diplomatic pressure on the USSR and strengthen its position in East Asia. To do this, they went to normalize relations with the PRC, securing the PRC's distance from Moscow through the promise of diplomatic support in the event of a resumption of the Sino-Soviet conflict. However, further improvement of relations between the United States and China was hampered by the Taiwan issue.
5. The rapid economic development of Japan, its transformation into one of the largest economies in the world contributed to the intensification of the foreign policy of the “land of the rising sun”. One of the results of the new course was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, along with the preservation of full-fledged economic ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

The USSR and China are two powerful states. Each with its own bias built a new socialist way of life. Relations between the two countries have never been simple or smooth. There were periods of “eternal friendship,” military confrontation, and temporary calm. After the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the USSR established diplomatic relations with the new power on October 2 of the same year, thereby recognizing the new state.

In December 1949, Mao Zedong visits the Soviet Union. The Soviet government provides considerable assistance. Despite this, the country continued to fight against the “Cominternists” who allegedly promoted Moscow’s policies. The stage of “eternal friendship” did not stop even after the PRC entered into a military confrontation with the Kuomintang. Stalin doubted Mao's victory, instilling in the Chinese leadership the idea of creating two powers on the country's territory: communist and Kuomintang.

Similar examples could be observed in Germany, later in Korea, and in Vietnam. Having won, Mao received boundless friendship and a loyal ally in the USSR. In 1950, on February 14, the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded between the PRC and the USSR. Blind copying of the creation of the USSR development model began. It was an unequal diplomatic document showing the superiority of the Soviet Union over the PRC. In ideological terms, everything looked like the older brother helping the younger. Mao received invaluable support from Stalin even during his rise to power. This Treaty only officially confirmed close cooperation and mutual assistance.

The period of “eternal friendship” lasted not many 10 years. The results of such close contact resulted in profitable lending to China, the construction of 300 largest factories and their equipment, the transfer of Port Arthur and Far China, major trade deals, and the famous Chinese-Eastern Railway. Soviet specialists working in China had the opportunity to admire centuries-old.

The death of the Soviet leader and Khrushchev’s statement condemning the cult of personality caused a crack in the relations between the two once friendly states. Mao Zedong wanted to become the world leader of the proletariat. Stalin's personality cult was perceived as a provocation of the Soviet Union and a betrayal of the government to the ideas of Marxism. Stalin's portrait was hung on the front gate for one day as a tribute to the great ruler. The leaders of the CPC are increasingly calling on the USSR to adopt a tough policy with the West, without abandoning an armed conflict with the enemies of the communists.

Soviet leaders blamed the rulers of the PRC for the failure of the Great Leap Forward. The small dispute, according to the Chinese, did not violate great unity. But the awareness of the end of the great friendship was inherent in both states.

An open split, an official cessation of cooperation, occurred in 1960, when Khrushchev, angry at the increasing critical statements of the Chinese against him, ordered all technical specialists from the PRC to be summoned from the PRC within three days. Chinese production has stopped indefinitely. The wall of misunderstanding and unwillingness to compromise has become stronger. Twenty years of hostility between the socialist powers begins.

1962 - official Beijing expressed dissatisfaction with the peaceful solution to the Cuban missile crisis. The USSR took the side of India in the war with China.

1963 - exchange of letters expressing their positions, confirming the existence of differences in the development courses of the countries.

Moving from the status of friends to the status of enemies, the peak of enemy attacks occurred during the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976). The USSR Embassy in China was under real siege by demonstrators.

Skirmishes, but with military operations, took place on the border. In the Far East and southern Siberia, the state border ran along the Chinese bank, and not along the surface of the river, according to international relations. The border river Ussuri is changing its course, cutting off small islands of land from the land that were now considered Soviet. Relations between the countries were tense, and it was not possible to peacefully resolve conflicts on territorial grounds. In 1967, the number of clashes exceeded two thousand.

The largest conflict was in 1969 on Damansky Island, which claimed the lives of dozens of people. Both countries began to prepare for war. China is building bomb shelters, food warehouses, and massively purchasing weapons from the West. The USSR is strengthening its positions on the border with China and significantly increasing military spending. The construction of the BAM was also one of the stages of defensive actions. Diplomatic relations were not officially terminated, although all other relations were reduced to zero. The USSR government was more afraid of the Chinese than the West, since Western rulers were predictable, while Chinese rulers were unpredictable.

The death of Mao Zedong changed politics in the country. The USSR and China turned to face each other, slowly establishing contacts. On July 10, 1985, the Agreement on Payments and Trade for 1986-1990 was signed. It all started from the beginning: construction, reconstruction of facilities in China, exchange of specialists, trade contracts.

In 1989, after Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China, inter-party relations were restored. Devotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism was expressed in perpetuating the memory of the leaders of fraternal countries in mausoleums: in Moscow they revered the deceased Lenin, and for a long time they paid tribute to their main party member in.

The collapse of the USSR marked new round in relations between the two countries from official to good neighborly.

Americans, recalling the Cuban Missile Crisis, call it the most dangerous moment in the Cold War, when the world was on the brink of disaster. Despite some tense moments, Washington and Moscow managed to resolve the crisis, but only after the death of US Air Force pilot Major Rudolph Anderson Jr.

Seven years later, in March 1969, a unit of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers attacked a Soviet border post on Damansky Island, killing dozens and wounding many more. Because of this incident, Russia and China were on the brink of war, which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. But after two weeks of clashes, the conflict subsided.

What if the brief 1969 conflict between China and the Soviet Union had escalated into war?

Story

The incident on Damansky Island, where the ambush was set up and the main fighting took place, became lowest point in Soviet-Chinese relations. Even ten years earlier, Beijing and Moscow stood shoulder to shoulder as the main stronghold of the communist world. But fighting over issues of ideology, leadership and resources created sharp divisions between the allies, and this had global consequences. The split intensified territorial disputes that had existed since tsarist times. Along the long, poorly defined border there were many gray areas that were claimed by both China and the USSR.

Context

It's time for Americans to understand: China is not the USSR

Qiushi 05/10/2012

Why won't China become the next USSR?

U.S. News & World Report 06/22/2014

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After several minor incidents, clashes on Damansky increased tension to the maximum. The Soviets launched a counteroffensive but suffered heavy casualties, similar to the August incident in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The parties became convinced that the Chinese leadership was preparing for these clashes and leading them. Why would the Chinese provoke their much stronger neighbor? And what if the Soviets had responded more aggressively to Chinese provocations?

Immediately after this conflict, the USSR and China began preparing for war. The Red Army transferred its forces and assets to the Far East, and the PLA carried out full mobilization. In 1969, the Soviets had a huge technical advantage over China. But Beijing created the largest army in the world, and much of it was concentrated near the Sino-Soviet border. In contrast, the Red Army concentrated the bulk of its forces and resources in Eastern Europe, where they could prepare for conflict with NATO. Therefore, at the moment of the clash, the Chinese may well have had a superiority in conventional forces along most of the border.

However, Chinese superiority in manpower did not mean that the PLA would be able to carry out a prolonged invasion of Soviet territory. The Chinese did not have the logistics and airpower to capture and hold large swaths of Soviet territory. Moreover, the long Sino-Soviet border gave the Soviets plenty of opportunities to respond. Since a NATO offensive was unlikely, the Soviets could move significant forces and assets east from Europe to attack Xinjiang and other border areas.

The most important area of possible attack was Manchuria, where the Red Army launched a devastating and lightning-fast offensive at the end of World War II. Despite the large numerical superiority, the PLA in 1969 had no more hope of stopping such an offensive than the Kwantung Army in 1945. And the loss of Manchuria would be a colossal blow to China's economic power and political legitimacy. In any case, Soviet aviation would very quickly incapacitate the Chinese Air Force and subject cities, communications centers and military bases on Chinese territory to powerful air strikes.

After capturing Manchuria in 1945, the Soviets plundered Japanese industry and left. They could have played out the same scenario in 1969, but only if the Chinese leadership had looked reality in the eye. With the excesses of the Cultural Revolution very much in the past and rival factions still competing in ideological radicalism, Moscow would have difficulty finding a constructive partner for peace negotiations. The Soviet offensive, if developed, would be very similar to the Japanese offensive in 1937, although without the naval superiority of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In anticipation of such attacks, the PLA could withdraw into the interior, leaving behind scorched earth.

Nuclear weapon?

China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, theoretically giving Beijing a nuclear deterrent. However, the systems for delivering such charges to the target left much to be desired. Liquid-fuel rockets did not inspire much confidence in terms of reliability; they required several hours to prepare, and they could remain on the launch pad for a strictly limited time. Moreover, at that time, Chinese missiles did not have enough launch range to strike key Soviet targets located in European Russia. Chinese bomber aircraft, represented by a few Tu-4 (Soviet copy of the American B-29) and N-6 (copy of the Soviet Tu-16), did not have much chance of overcoming the modern air defense system of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, for their part, were close to achieving nuclear parity with the United States. The USSR had a modern and advanced arsenal of operational-tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, capable of easily destroying Chinese nuclear deterrent forces, military formations and big cities. Listening sensitively to world public opinion, the Soviet leadership would not have dared to launch a full-scale nuclear attack on China (American and Chinese propaganda in this case would have frolic with all its might). But limited strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities, as well as strikes with tactical weapons against deployed formations of Chinese troops, could seem quite reasonable and appropriate. Much would depend on how the Chinese reacted to defeats on the battlefield. If the Chinese leadership had decided to act in a "hit or miss" manner and use its nuclear forces to forestall a decisive and victorious Soviet move, it could well have received a preemptive strike from the Soviets. And since Moscow considered China to be completely insane, it could well have decided to destroy Chinese nuclear forces before they created problems for it.

US reaction

The United States responded to these clashes with caution and concern. The border conflict convinced Washington that the Sino-Soviet split remained intact. However, officials differed in their assessments of the likelihood of a larger conflict and its consequences. The Soviets, through various official and unofficial channels, tried to ascertain the US attitude towards China. Allegedly, the United States reacted negatively to a Soviet probe in 1969 in an attempt to propose joint strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities. But even if Washington did not want to burn China in a nuclear flame, it is unlikely to take any serious action to protect Beijing from Moscow's wrath.

Ten years earlier, Dwight Eisenhower laid out the biggest obstacles in the Soviet Union's war against China: what to do after victory. The Soviets had neither the ability nor the desire to rule another continent-sized territory, especially when there might be massive resistance from a disgruntled population. And the United States, courting the “legitimate” government in Formosa (Taiwan), would happily support various forces of resistance to the Soviet occupation. Had Beijing survived the war, the United States might well have let Chiang Kai-shek off the leash in an attempt to wrest some of its territory from mainland China and bring it under Western rule.

The most likely outcome of such a war could be a short-term success of China, after which the USSR would strike a quick and crushing retaliatory blow against it. Beijing would then fall into an even tighter embrace of the United States, and perhaps it was for this reason that the Soviets decided not to risk it.

Robert Farley is a frequent contributor to The National Interest. He is the author of The Battleship Book. Farley teaches at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His areas of expertise include military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs.

Content:

The beginning and development of the border confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in 1949-1969.

By the time the People's Republic of China was formed, the issue of the border line between the USSR and China was not raised at the official level. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, Mutual Assistance (1950), the Soviet-Chinese border, before the start of the revision of bilateral relations, was the border of good neighborliness, where active ties were maintained between the population of the border areas, lively trade was conducted, and cultural exchange was established. Cooperation agreements were concluded in a number of border areas, including the “Agreement on the procedure for navigation along the border rivers Amur, Ussuri, Argun, Sungacha, and Lake Khanka and on the establishment of a navigation situation on these waterways” (1951), on forestry , about joint fight against forest fires in border areas, etc. Within the framework of these agreements, the actually protected border line was not questioned.
In the early 50s. The USSR handed over topographic maps to the PRC indicating the entire border line. There were no comments from the Chinese side regarding the border line. During the years when Soviet-Chinese relations were on the rise, and China’s economic development and security largely depended on the USSR, border issues were not raised at the official level.
But already from the second half of the 50s. Difficulties began to appear in relations between the USSR and the PRC. In 1957 Under the motto of the Maoist campaign “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools compete,” there was dissatisfaction with the USSR’s policy towards China, including in the form of claims to certain areas under the jurisdiction of the USSR. An interesting fact is that, in general, the positions of circles whose opinions differed from the official policy of the CPC were subject to significant criticism, but their vision of the territorial border problem was not affected.
Another evidence of the existence of differences in the border issue was the so-called “cartographic aggression”, which was carried out already in the 50s. In maps, textbooks and atlases, the borders of China include territories under the actual jurisdiction of the USSR and other countries. In the “Atlas of the Provinces of the People's Republic of China,” which was published in Beijing in 1953, an area in the Pamirs and several areas in the eastern area, including two islands near Khabarovsk, were designated as Chinese territories.
In 1956-1959 cases of border violations by Chinese citizens are becoming more frequent, but then these issues were resolved successfully at the level of local authorities. The general tone of bilateral relations remained favorable.
In the mid-50s. The USSR invited China to resolve border issues. However, due to events in Poland and Hungary, this initiative was not developed.
Until 1960, the issue of the border was no longer raised at the interstate level. However, at the moment when the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border again appeared on the agenda, relations between the two countries were no longer so smooth. In the late 50s, early 60s. A number of prerequisites arise for the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China.
China's unilateral military-political actions, carried out without consultation with the USSR, put the Soviet Union, as an ally of the PRC, in a very difficult position. Such actions primarily include the provocation against India (1959) and the incident in the Taiwan Strait (1958). During the same period, China's desire to gain a leading place in the international communist and labor movement, as well as to get rid of the tutelage of the CPSU, intensified.
In addition, starting with the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), ideological differences began to grow between the two countries. Later, on their basis, the CPC accused the CPSU of revisionism and restoration of capitalist relations. The Chinese leadership reacted negatively to the condemnation of Stalin's personality cult. Personal enmity between Khrushchev N.S. and Mao Zedong also played a role in the deterioration of bilateral relations.
Some foreign authors note the Chinese leadership's dissatisfaction with Soviet influence in Manchuria and especially in Xinjiang.
Let us recall that one of the first results of the flaring conflict between the CPSU and the CPC was the unexpected withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China in 1960. Almost simultaneously, the first episode on the border occurred, which showed the existence of disagreements between the USSR and China on the issue of the border line and the ownership of those or other areas. We are talking about an incident in 1960 when Chinese herders were grazing livestock in territory under Soviet jurisdiction, in the area of the Buz-Aigyr pass in Kyrgyzstan. When the Soviet border guards arrived, the shepherds declared that they were on the territory of the People's Republic of China. It later turned out that they were acting on a directive from the authorities of their province.
On this occasion, the foreign ministries of China and the USSR sent each other several notes and made oral statements, in which for the first time since the founding of the PRC, a different understanding of the border line with the Soviet Union was revealed at the official, diplomatic level. The parties never came to an agreement, but in 1960, at a press conference in Kathmandu, Zhou Enlai, when asked about the presence of unidentified areas on the Soviet-Chinese border, answered the following: “There are minor discrepancies on the maps... it is very easy to resolve peacefully.”
However, in the autumn of 1960, systematic visits of Chinese citizens to the islands on the border rivers of the Far East, under Soviet control, began in order to conduct economic activity(mowing grass, collecting brushwood). They told the Soviet border guards that they were on Chinese territory. The reaction of Soviet border guards to incidents has changed. If previously they ignored the trades of Chinese peasants in a number of territories under Soviet jurisdiction, then, starting in 1960, they tried to suppress violations. It should be noted that during the demarcation of the border in the 80-90s. most of these islands, including o. Damansky, legally transferred to the PRC.
In the current situation, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to create an interdepartmental commission consisting of specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, whose task was to select and study treaty acts on the border with the PRC. The commission identified 13 areas where there were discrepancies in the maps of the parties and 12 where the distribution of islands was not carried out.
The border line itself was not clearly marked on the ground, because Of the 141 border signs, 40 were preserved in their original form, 77 were in a destroyed state, and 24 were missing altogether. It was also noted that the description of the boundary in treaty acts is often general in nature, and many treaty maps are drawn up on a small scale at a primitive level. In general, according to the conclusion of the commission, it was noted that the entire border line with the PRC, except for the section in the Pamirs south of the Uz-Bel pass, was determined by treaties. In the case of border negotiations, the commission proposed drawing the border not along the banks of rivers, but along the line of the middle of the main fairway on navigable rivers and along the line of the middle of the river on non-navigable rivers, and not as it was indicated by the red line on the map attached to the Beijing Treaty, according to which the border ran along the Chinese coast. Fortune telling with Tarot cards, available online at gadanieonlinetaro.ru, will help you find out your fate.
Systematic violations of the protected border line by Chinese citizens in the 1960s and demonstrative conduct of economic activities were probably intended to consolidate the so-called “status status” in practice. Moreover, the statistics of violations showed that from 1960 to 1964 their number grew rapidly, and in the second half of the 60s the incidents became more acute.
Thus, in 1960 the number of violations was about 100, in 1962 there were already about 5 thousand. In 1963, more than 100 thousand Chinese civilians and military personnel took part in illegally crossing the Soviet-Chinese border.
As the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated, the exchange of notes and oral statements continued, in which the parties constantly blamed each other. The Soviet side expressed its dissatisfaction with the violation of the border by Chinese citizens; Chinese documents, as a rule, stated that Soviet border guards did not allow economic activity to be carried out where it had been carried out previously or declared that a particular area belonged to the territory of the PRC. Despite the increase in the number of incidents at the borders, the matter did not reach wide publicity. Relations between the Soviet Union and China have not yet moved from polemics to open confrontation. This is evidenced by reviews of the Chinese and Soviet central press for 1962-1963.
In 1963, the parties agreed to hold consultations to clarify the border line. They began on February 25, 1964. Negotiations were held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The Soviet delegation was headed by Colonel General P.I. Zyryanov, commander of the country's border troops. The Chinese delegation was headed by acting. Head of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Zeng Yongquan. Negotiations continued until August 22 of the same year. During the meeting it was revealed different approaches parties to the border settlement problem.
The Chinese position in the negotiations boiled down to three points, which the Chinese side invariably insisted on:

Only contracts should serve as the basis for negotiations.
Negotiations must consider the entire border, and not just individual sections.
As a result of negotiations, a new agreement must be concluded with reference to existing agreements, which should be qualified as unequal.

The Soviet side had no fundamental objections to the first point. Moreover, against the backdrop of Chinese claims to have a large registry, this provision had some value. In confirmation of this, we cite the words of the head of the Soviet delegation, P.I. Zyryanov: “... we say that the current border has developed historically and is fixed by life itself, and border agreements are the basis - and this, in essence, is recognized by the Chinese side - for determining the passage Soviet-Chinese border line."
It should be noted that there was a certain subtext in this formulation. The fact is that, despite the results of the work of the interdepartmental commission, which spoke about the possibility of transferring certain areas to the PRC, there remained very vast areas (Pamir) that were not included in the treaties, but were developed by the Soviet Union and were under the jurisdiction of the USSR for a long time. The transfer of these areas to the PRC would be very sensitive for the Soviet Union politically and could receive an unwanted local resonance. Therefore, in the words of Zyryanov P.I. the emphasis was placed on the fact that “the border has developed historically and is fixed by life itself.”

Soviet border guards are preparing to drive out Chinese intruders. January 1969

The Chinese reacted quite sharply to tactics of this kind. They expressed bewilderment at how the historical border line was determined: “What do you mean by a historically formed border line? Do you mean the line that developed in the 16th or 19th century, or the line that developed a minute before your speech?” The head of the Chinese delegation, Zeng Yongquan, commented on it as follows: “In those areas where you have not crossed the border line defined by the treaties, you apparently will not object to acting in accordance with the treaties, but in those areas where you have crossed the boundary line defined by the treaties border line, you will insist that the issue be resolved in accordance with the “actually protected line.” In his own words, the “actually protected, historically established border line” appeared when there were not much more than 200 PRC border guards on the border between China and the USSR and the Soviet side sent troops wherever they pleased.
At the same time, the Chinese side emphasized that, while abandoning the “big register,” it must return back what was “captured” by Russia and the Soviet Union in addition to it. It sounded like this: “You should know that we do not require you to give up 1,540 thousand sq. km of Chinese territory seized by Tsarist Russia. We have shown maximum generosity and good will. Apart from this territory seized from China, you will not be able to to seize another inch of Chinese territory."
The Chinese side, moreover, insisted on recognizing the Russian-Chinese treaties that defined the border as unequal. It was indicated that these agreements were concluded during a period of China’s weakness and as a result more than 1,500 thousand square meters were rejected. km. Chinese territory in favor of Russia, including 1 million square meters. km. in Primorye and Amur region and 0.5 million sq. km. in Central Asia. Thus, according to the Aigun Treaty, 600 thousand square meters passed to Russia. km., according to Beijing 400 thousand sq. m. km., along Chuguchaksky more than 440 thousand square meters. km., in St. Petersburg more than 70 thousand sq. m. km. The Chinese side also insisted that in the 1920s. Soviet Russia renounced all unequal treaties, and since the border treaties with Russia were viewed in the PRC as unequal, the Chinese delegation more than once stated that it had the right to recognize their insignificance.
At the same time, it was stipulated that recognition of the treaties as unequal would not lead to new territorial claims. However, Soviet experts saw a trap in such a proposal. The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized that although the treaties are unequal in nature, given the nature of relations between socialist states, China will not demand the return of these lands, but is only seeking recognition of the “unequal rights” of the Russian-Chinese treaties. The problem was that China could in the future declare the Soviet Union a non-socialist state, which happened after some time, and therefore recognize the treaties as void and, thus, raise the question of ownership of 1,500 thousand square meters. km.
On the issue of the “inequality” of Russian-Chinese treaties, both delegations were repeatedly drawn into unjustified polemics, which took a lot of time and did not bring practical results. It is natural that in the end the Soviet side rejected this point.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were ready to recognize the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century as the basis for negotiations. But at the same time, they argued that the Soviet Union did not comply with these agreements and was “biting into” Chinese territory.
The Chinese side insisted that the Soviet Union recognize the disputed areas and demanded that troops, including border troops, be withdrawn from there after their designation. The total area of the “disputed areas” was approximately 40 thousand square meters. km., incl. 28 thousand sq. km. in the Pamirs. The total length of the “disputed” sections of the border line exceeded half the length of the border between the USSR and China and mainly ran along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Representatives of the USSR argued that we could only talk about clarifying the border line (demarcation) in some areas and did not recognize the existence of “disputed areas.”
During the negotiations, it was possible to reach a certain compromise on the eastern section of the border, 4,200 km long, but with the exception of the issue of two islands (Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Tarabarov). In April 1964, the parties exchanged topographic maps indicating their understanding of the border line and created a working group, after which they began to directly consider the border line. As a result of studying Chinese maps and comparing them with Soviet ones, it was found that there are discrepancies in drawing the border line on these maps in 22 areas, of which 17 are located on the western part of the Soviet-Chinese border (now the Central Asian republics of the former USSR) and 5 areas on eastern part of the border. These areas approximately coincided with the areas that the interdepartmental commission indicated in its note in 1960. Chinese maps indicated 3 more areas that did not appear in the commission’s materials, including a fairly large area in the area of the Bedel Pass (Kyrgyzstan), as well as islands near Khabarovsk. The greatest discrepancies were identified in the Pamir section.
Based on the results of the review of the maps in Moscow, it was concluded that it was possible to hold negotiations not on individual sections, as previously assumed, but along the entire border, as the Chinese delegation insisted. This approach became possible because along most of the length of the border line there were no vital differences in the border. Along the longest line that required clarification—the river border in the Far East—the parties had the same understanding that the border had to run along the main fairway. In this regard, the delegation was given additional instructions to confirm the border line in areas where the parties understand it equally. As part of this approach, the parties were able to come to an understanding on the entire eastern section of the border, with the exception of the issue of the Kazakevichev channel.
When the Soviet delegation proposed to record the results of clarifying the border in the eastern section, leaving the issue of the Kazakevichev Channel for later, the Chinese side agreed to this option. However, the Soviet leadership showed integrity in this matter. Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev insisted on the position of “either all or nothing.”
Mao’s statement, made during negotiations in the open press on a territorial register of 1.5 million square meters, also did not help achieve agreement. km.
As a result of the consultations, no agreements were reached. After their end, which never continued, border incidents resumed. Since October 1964 to March 1965 the Soviet-Chinese border was violated 36 times with the participation of 150 Chinese civilians and military personnel, and in 15 days of April 1965. the border was violated 12 times involving more than 500 Chinese civilians and military personnel. Number of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border in 1967 noted approximately 2 thousand times. At the height of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, Chinese border guards and Red Guard detachments rammed Soviet patrol ships, tried to seize patrols, and started fights with Soviet border guards.
According to some Chinese data, from October 15, 1964 to March 15, 1969, the number of border conflicts amounted to 4,189 cases. At the same time, border violations on the Chinese side were, as a rule, provocative and well-organized. Chinese leaders openly spoke about the possibility of military action. The Chinese press continued to criticize the Soviet leadership. The entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was attacked, which was defined as a policy of revisionism, hegemonism and social-imperialism, and was placed on a par with American imperialism. Any actions of the USSR in the international arena, covered in the Chinese press, were subjected to a series of harsh attacks and were considered hostile to the PRC.
Tensions also intensified because a number of islands on the Ussuri River, located on the Chinese side of the main channel, were under the actual control of Soviet border troops, and the Chinese side, asserting their belonging to the PRC, indicated its presence on them by demonstrably conducting economic activities and the presence of its own people there. border patrols. The Soviet side quite often motivated its presence on the Chinese side of the fairway by the presence of a “red line” on the map of the Beijing Boundary Treaty of 1860, where it marked the line of the border and river sections and ran along the Chinese bank. In addition, until a formal agreement was reached and delimitation was made, the USSR continued to extend its jurisdiction to the “historically established and actually protected” border line
In general, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two states acquired a character rarely encountered before in the practice of international relations. Provocations against the USSR occurred not only on the border. There were illegal detentions of Soviet ships civil courts"Svirsk" and "Komsomolets of Ukraine", provocations of Chinese citizens on Red Square and at the American embassy in Moscow, as well as at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
In comparison with the 50s, two significant features of the situation on the border in the 60s. became, firstly, military construction, and secondly, continuous incidents.
The peak of confrontation was 1969. Beginning on March 2, clashes took place between Soviet border guards and Chinese military personnel on the Ussuri River on Damansky Island (Zhenbaodao). Before this, clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards also took place, however, they rarely went beyond hand-to-hand combat and did not lead to casualties. But during the fighting on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 people were injured. From the Chinese side, approximately 300 people took part in this action. There was the use of artillery and mortars, as well as heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Chinese military also suffered heavy losses. The fighting continued on March 14-15. Only after the Soviet side used the Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which covered Chinese territory over 20 square meters. km. in depth and caused serious losses to the Chinese armed forces clashes on the island. Damansky stopped. To the notes of protest and the Statement of the Soviet government, the leadership of the PRC responded in the usual style, that the USSR must recognize the unequal nature of the treaties defining the border between the USSR and the PRC and called the USSR an aggressor that “encroached” on Chinese territory. Participants in the fighting on the Chinese side were viewed as heroes in their homeland.
It should be noted that formally the Chinese side had good reasons to claim Fr. Damansky (Zhenbaodao) and a number of other islands, because they were on the Chinese side of the main fairway, which, according to international law, is accepted as the border line on border rivers. However, the Chinese side knew that this and other islands had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR for many years. The Chinese side also knew that the Soviet Union, in principle, did not object to the transfer of these islands to China. As further negotiations showed, the issue of ownership of the islands was resolved, and in the conditions of confrontation, the actions of the PRC in relation to these islands were aimed at aggravating the situation and could be considered provocative, which indicates that the initiator of the bloodshed was the Chinese side.
Regarding events on the island. Damansky there is a version that they were deliberately provoked by the Chinese armed forces on the orders of Lin Biao, in order to strengthen his position at the 1st Congress and increase the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.
On March 29, the Soviet government made a statement in a harsh tone, in which it proposed resuming negotiations that began in 1964. In this document, the PRC leadership was asked to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications, and to resolve differences that had arisen in a calm atmosphere. In conclusion, it was noted that “attempts to talk with the Soviet Union, with Soviet people language of arms, will meet a firm rebuff." At the IX Congress of the CPC, in his speech, Marshal Lin Biao said that the proposals of the Soviet government of March 29 would be considered and a response would be given. At the same time, it was said that "Our Party and Government (CPC ) have always advocated and are in favor of resolving these issues through diplomatic channels through negotiations, in order to resolve them on a fair and rational basis." On April 11, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs again sent a note to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it was proposed to resume consultations between plenipotentiary representatives of the governments of the PRC and USSR "in ... the very near future." The response was received in May 1969. It again contained allegations that Damansky Island (Zhenbao Dao) is Chinese territory, and the incidents in Ussuri were deliberately provoked by the Soviet side. It was confirmed that the PRC opposes the use military force, and it was proposed to agree on the place and date of negotiations through diplomatic channels. These Soviet and Chinese statements indicated that both sides were trying to present themselves as victims of aggression and absolve themselves of responsibility for the bloodshed.
Despite the formal readiness to resume the negotiation process and reduce the level of tension, incidents at the border did not stop until the end of the summer of 1969, and speeches at party meetings and in the press of both countries sounded increasingly harsh. During July and the first half of August, there were more than 488 cases of border violations and armed incidents involving 2.5 thousand Chinese citizens. On July 8, Chinese border guards attacked Soviet rivermen on the island. Goldinsky. On August 13, in the Kazakh SSR in the Semipalatinsk region in the area of Lake Zhalanashkol, the largest armed incident since the March events occurred with casualties on both sides. Only after this the parties managed to agree on a meeting at a sufficiently high level.
On September 11, 1969, the head of the Soviet government, A.N. Kosygin, visited the PRC and met with the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. The result of the “meeting at the airport” was an agreement on further negotiations on the border, starting from October 19, 1969, as well as on the implementation of a number of measures in order to normalize the situation on the border. During the conversation, which lasted 3.5 hours, issues were also discussed about the exchange of ambassadors (instead of chargé d'affaires), the intensification of trade relations and the normalization of interstate relations.
The heads of government also agreed that any threat of the use of force should be excluded during the negotiations.
As a result, Soviet border guards were instructed to guard the borders on rivers up to the middle of the fairway. They were also charged with maintaining normal relations with the border troops and the PRC authorities; consider all border issues through consultations in a spirit of goodwill and taking into account the mutual interests of the population of the border areas of both countries in the field of economic activities.
Despite the fact that the situation on the border has stabilized, no significant progress has been achieved in relations between the two states, and border settlement issues remain open.

CHAPTER 1. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA IN THE XX CENTURY

1945-1953

Sino-Russian relations are under close attention of the world community, since the structure of world relations largely depends on the “weight” and “quality” of these relations. Studying the history of relations between Russia and China has always been and will remain one of the most important topics of scientific research.

The official establishment of Soviet-Chinese relations can be dated back to 1945, when both countries experienced the horrors of the Great Patriotic War, China fell under the dependence of Japan, and the USSR suffered from the German occupation of the western territories of the country.

On February 11, 1945, a conference was held in Yalta at which an agreement was adopted, which stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of China 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany. This agreement was kept secret and was published only a year later. The agreement included the following terms:

1. maintaining the status quo of Outer Mongolia (MPR);

2. restoration of rights belonging to Russia violated by the Portsmouth Peace of 1905, namely:

a) internationalization of the commercial port of Dalny, ensuring the priority interests of the Soviet Union and restoration of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR;

b) joint operation with China of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Southern Eastern Railway, which provide access to the Far East, on the basis of organizing a mixed Soviet-Chinese society, ensuring the priority interests of the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that China retains full sovereignty in Manchuria.

The agreement also stated that "The Heads of Government of the Three Great Powers agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unconditionally satisfied after the victory over Japan." The Soviet government expressed its readiness to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Chinese government to assist China with its armed forces in the fight against Japan.

On April 5, 1945, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov told the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow about the denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941. But the Kuomintang government of China did not satisfy this act of the USSR government. It feared that the Soviet Union would wage war on Chinese territory occupied by the Japanese invaders, and that the defeat of the Japanese militarists would further enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Chinese people.

This fear of the Kuomintang ruling circles was noted by foreign observers. American journalist Rosinger, who was in China at that time, writes: “Soviet-Chinese relations remained formally correct, but Russophobia was widespread among official Chongqing circles. In 1944, no event alarmed the Chinese government more than the Soviet advance against the German armies in the west. Chongqing was afraid of the influence of a strong Soviet Union on politics in China and the possibility of Russian troops entering the war in the Far East."

Rosinger points out that the Kuomintang spread tall tales about the Soviet Union, claiming that it might "attempt to take over Manchuria after Japan's defeat or gain special positions in northwestern Xinjiang."

Indeed, the Kuomintang press tried to mobilize public opinion against the USSR by spreading slander about mythical Soviet “claims.” Rosinger emphasizes: “If the Chinese government were bound by a strong united front with the Communists and other political elements, if the management of the economic and military organization was carried out as effectively as wartime conditions would allow, if it established democratic or semi-democratic government, then it the military participation of the Soviet Union would be welcomed and its prestige among the Chinese people would be invulnerable. Unfortunately, there is another situation. Chongqing is an ineffective, reactionary, undemocratic politician, its authority among the people has fallen over Lately..." At the same time, Rosinger admitted that "Moscow has not shown with a single word or action that it wants to seize Manchuria."

The evolution of Kuomintang leaders from actively provoking the Soviet-Japanese war to fear of the possibility of the USSR entering the war against Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany is evidence that they were irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet Union, opponents of a genuine Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

However, the defeat of Nazi Germany and the growth of the international authority of the USSR very acutely raised the question of changing the position towards the USSR for the Kuomintang government. Chinese communist party, Democratic League, National Salvation Association and many other organizations, speaking as a united front, demanded democratic changes in the country and improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. An important milestone in the struggle of the broad masses of China for democracy and for Soviet-Chinese friendship was the VII CPC congress, held in April 1945

Touching upon the issue of Soviet-Chinese relations in his report at the congress, Mao Zedong noted that the ruling circles of China, while formally maintaining diplomatic relations with the USSR, in fact took a position hostile to the Soviet Union. Pointing out that the Soviet government was the first to abandon unequal treaties and conclude new, equal treaties with China, that it supported the liberation struggle of the Chinese people during the years of the first revolutionary civil war and the first came to the aid of the Chinese people in their struggle against the Japanese invaders, Mao Zedong, on behalf of the Chinese people, expressed gratitude to the people and government of the USSR for this help and demanded that the Kuomintang government abandon its hostile attitude towards the USSR and immediately improve Sino-Soviet relations.

The 7th Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out the need to eliminate the dictatorship of large landowners and the bourgeoisie, the anti-people's state system, and set the party and the entire Chinese people the task of fighting for people's democracy and establishing friendly relations between China and the USSR.

It became increasingly difficult for the Kuomintang government to maneuver. It understood that the Soviet Union would join the war against Japan and, therefore, would have its say in resolving Far Eastern problems. This circumstance played main role the fact that the ruling circles of China began to seek stabilization of Soviet-Chinese relations. Nevertheless, the Kuomintang government was reluctant to do this. When a group of moderate Kuomintang members submitted a proposal to the VI Kuomintang Congress to improve Soviet-Chinese relations, the congress, under pressure from the reactionary delegates, limited itself to only a statement that the establishment of long-term friendly relations with the USSR was extremely necessary. But the broadest circles of the Chinese people persistently demanded a real improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance, which was supposed to provide for joint military actions against Japan, mutual assistance, refusal of both sides to strengthen the Soviet-Chinese border, China, the USSR, England and the USA must jointly guarantee Korea's independence.

Negotiations between the governments of the USSR and China began on June 30, 1945. For this purpose, a Chinese delegation led by Song Ziwen arrived in Moscow. On July 14, due to the start of the Potsdam Conference, negotiations were interrupted. A week after their resumption, on August 14, the signing of a treaty of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China, agreements on the Chinese Changchun railway, about Port Arthur and Dalny.

The main purpose of the treaty was to strengthen friendly relations between the USSR and China through alliance and broad cooperation, the main goal of which should be to prevent a revival of Japanese aggression. The treaty established that both countries would provide each other with all necessary military and other assistance and support in the war against the Japanese militarists, and would also not enter into separate negotiations with Japan and would not conclude an armistice or peace treaty with the current Japanese government without mutual consent. nor with any other government or authority created in Japan that will not abandon all aggressive intentions. The treaty excluded the possibility of any party participating in an alliance or coalition directed against the other contracting party. Both sides agreed to work together in close and friendly cooperation after the advent of peace and to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. The USSR and China also agreed to provide each other with all possible economic assistance in the post-war period in order to facilitate and accelerate the reconstruction of both countries and in order to contribute to the well-being of the world. The treaty was subject to ratification as soon as possible short term. He was imprisoned for 30 years. If one year before the expiration of the term, neither party declared its desire to denounce, the contract would remain in force for an unlimited time, and in this case, each of the contracting parties could terminate it by notifying the other party one year in advance.

According to the agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, the former Chinese Eastern Railway and the former Southern Moscow Railway became the common property of the USSR and China. The joint operation of the Chinese Railways was to be carried out under a single management under Chinese sovereignty, as a commercial transport enterprise. Responsibility for protecting the road and maintaining order rested with the Chinese government. For this purpose, it created the railway police.

During the war with Japan, the KChZD could be used to transport Soviet troops. The government of the USSR was given the right to transport military property by road in transit without customs inspection in sealed wagons. Their protection was to be carried out by the railway police, and the USSR had the right to appoint its own armed escort. Goods transported by road in transit from one Soviet station to another, as well as from Soviet territory to Dalny and Port Arthur or vice versa, were not to be subject to duties or any other taxes or fees by the Chinese government. However, upon arrival in China, these goods were subject to customs inspection. The road had to pay taxes to the Chinese government, just like state roads.

The agreement was concluded for 30 years. After this period, the KChZD was subject to gratuitous transfer to the full ownership of China.

The Port Arthur Agreement provided for the port to be turned into a naval base open to warships and merchant ships only from China and the USSR. On issues of joint use of the naval base, a Sino-Soviet military commission was established, consisting of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives. The chairman of the commission was to be appointed by the Soviet side, and the deputy by the Chinese. The defense of the base was entrusted to the government of the USSR, which could create the necessary military structures there.

The agreement established that civil administration in the area of the naval base belonged to China. The USSR government had the right to maintain its military, naval and air forces in the area of this base and determine their deployment. The duration of the agreement was determined to be 30 years. After this period, the Port Arthur naval base was to be transferred to Chinese ownership.

According to the agreement, Dalny was declared a free port, open to trade and shipping of all countries. The Chinese government agreed to allocate piers and storage facilities to the port for lease to the USSR. The administration in Dalny remained with China. In the event of a war with Japan, the regime of the Port Arthur naval base was supposed to extend to Dalny. The Dalniy Agreement provided for the exemption from customs duties of goods traveling from abroad to the USSR through the port of Dalniy, and goods traveling from the USSR through the port of Dalniy for export. These goods had to be transported in sealed wagons. The term of the agreement was set at 30 years.

On August 24, 1945, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and agreements were ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China.

The significance of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the USSR and China is enormous. It created the preconditions for friendly cooperation and mutual assistance between the two countries.

The treaty and agreements created a strong guarantee of peace and security in the Far East. For the Soviet Union, the significance of the treaty and agreements was that they could put an end to tension on the Far Eastern borders, which was maintained by the fact that forces hostile to the USSR were concentrated along these borders. The treaty created the conditions for China's true independence. It provided not only military assistance to the Soviet Union in the event of Japanese aggression, but also economic assistance in order to facilitate and accelerate the recovery of China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty guaranteed concrete and effective forms of friendship and alliance between the two peoples.

1.2 Soviet-Chinese relations in 1950-1989.

After Stalin's death, changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy, including in relations with China. Since the mid-50s, the Soviet Union began to take steps to weaken the Cold War. It was stated that the USSR would firmly follow the principles of peaceful coexistence, that the third world war can be prevented. In 1954, the Soviet delegation led by N.S. Khrushchev visited China. Khrushchev met and negotiated with Mao Zedong. The USSR transferred the Port Arthur naval base to China. Relations with China were still good then. But already in the second half of the 50s they began to deteriorate.

A long and painful period of disagreement between the USSR and China began. There were heated disputes in which both sides blamed each other for all the problems and failures. In fact, in the early 60s, relations between the Soviet Union and China were on the verge of breaking down.

Since 1957, a cooling has become noticeable in relations between the USSR and the PRC. Ideological and theoretical differences between the leaders of both countries and contradictions in views on the path to building socialism have intensified. The Chinese leadership sought to speed up the industrialization of the PRC, counting on continued massive economic assistance from the USSR. The Soviet side did not consider it possible to help China and regarded the line of accelerating the industrialization of the PRC as erroneous. Contrary to the opinion of Moscow, in 1958 China adopted a policy of implementing a “great leap” in economic development. Without publicizing their disagreements with China, the Soviet leadership began to take a more critical view of many aspects of the PRC's domestic and foreign policy, viewing some of its specific manifestations as adventuristic and dangerous to the interests of the USSR.

The PRC considered Taiwan part of Chinese territory and sought to annex the island. The Kuomintang government in Taiwan considered itself the central government of the Republic of China. The United States and all Western powers, with the exception of Great Britain, did not recognize the Chinese government and maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. On December 2, 1954, the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan, according to which Washington pledged to assist in the defense of Taiwan. It is important that, according to the treaty, US obligations extended to Taiwan proper.

The Soviet Union generally tried to keep China in line with its policy and did not interfere with Sino-American contacts, which was consistent with the USSR's line of easing tensions in relations with the United States. In the mid-50s, Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation reached its apogee, within the framework of which China was provided with assistance in modernizing its economy, political and administrative system, and personnel training. In October 1957, the USSR took a very serious step by concluding an agreement to assist China in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Soviet side pledged to transfer nuclear weapons production technology to China. This decision sharply accelerated China's move towards acquiring nuclear status, which was also partly provoked by Washington's plans to promote the creation nuclear potential Europe, as well as the assistance that the United States began to provide to Japan in the 50s, South Korea and the island of Taiwan itself in the peaceful use of the atom. It should be noted that the leadership of the PRC after the 20th Congress was wary of changes in the foreign policy of the USSR and considered the line of compromise on issues of arms control and détente to be inconsistent with the interests of the PRC and contrary to the ideals of the world revolution.

During the Sino-American negotiations in Geneva, the Chinese side's task was to achieve diplomatic recognition of the PRC by the United States. In exchange, Beijing was ready to declare a renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. But the United States was not ready to recognize the PRC; they were interested in private issues, mainly the release of American pilots who had been in Chinese captivity (since the Korean War). Negotiations continued without success until the summer of 1958. Perhaps trying to put pressure on the United States, on August 23, 1958, China began shelling the islands located in the Taiwan Strait, accompanied by air bombing of Kuomintang positions.

The Soviet Union was not aware of the Chinese action in advance, although in early August 1958 N.S. Khrushchev visited Beijing for a short visit. In a crisis situation, the USSR actually refused to support China. At the height of the events, USSR Foreign Minister A.A. was sent to Beijing on a secret mission. Gromyko, who informed Mao Zedong that Moscow would not provide assistance to the PRC in the event of an armed conflict with the United States.

This was a turning point in China's relations with the Soviet Union. What Moscow learned from the crisis is that Beijing is willing to take risks nuclear war and the security of the USSR for the sake of the goal of unification with Taiwan, which, from the point of view of the USSR, was not vital. The Chinese leadership believed that Moscow did not intend to support the PRC in carrying out what the Chinese communists considered their primary national task.

The degradation of strategic cooperation between the two countries has begun. On October 8, 1958, Beijing rejected N.S.’s proposals made in early August 1958. Khrushchev's proposals for the construction of a Soviet submarine base and a tracking radar station. In response, Moscow began to consider the feasibility of cooperation with China in the field of nuclear energy.

Another cause of disagreement during this period was the Sino-Indian border conflict. On August 29, 1959, Chinese troops violated the Indian border in the Longju and Ladakh regions. Disagreements over the border escalated into military clashes. The reason for them was the issue of Tibet, where anti-Chinese and pro-Indian protests took place. In Moscow, friendship with India was considered no less important than with China, because it opened the way for the USSR to many Third World countries. The conflict with China could push the Indians towards the Americans, so the Soviet government took a position of neutrality, counting on a friendly resolution to the conflict. India could not count on anything else under the conditions of the alliance between Moscow and Beijing. The Chinese felt deceived. In turn, Soviet leaders began to suspect that the Chinese were creating obstacles to their diplomacy. From now on, disagreements between the two governments no longer ceased.

The situation worsened on October 2, 1959, when Khrushchev arrived in Beijing from Camp David, where he met with US President D. Eisenhower.

The Soviet leader suspected that the clash on the Sino-Indian border was staged to thwart his efforts to reconcile with the United States. Khrushchev was interested in the question: “Why is it necessary to kill people on the border with India?” Mao, in turn, argued that the conflict was started by India. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs, former General Chen Yi, entered the dispute, Khrushchev lost his temper. Chen Yi noted that he is not afraid of rage Soviet leader. Nikita Sergeevich warned the general that he “should not give a damn” - even from the height of his position. Mao really did not like the fact that the USSR looked down on China. He called this an unacceptable attitude. In addition, he accused the Soviet Union of forgetting communist principles. “We... can only call you opportunists,” he told Khrushchev. Khrushchev, always lacking in tact, began the meeting by outlining the US demand that China release six Americans convicted of espionage. Mao liked it. China accused the USSR of refusing to help it become a nuclear power and selling out to “American imperialism.” The USSR declared that Mao was ready to provoke a world war.

In the summer of 1960, Moscow unexpectedly recalled Soviet experts and specialists who had helped China build its industrial base, interrupting many projects. Supplies of raw materials, equipment and spare parts were also reduced or delayed. Later, the Soviet Union demanded the return of loans granted to China since 1950. A confrontation between the two countries began.

Held from November 10 to December 3, 1957 in Moscow international Conference, in which representatives of 81 communist parties took part, showed the decline in the authority of the Soviet Union in the communist world. Parties in a number of countries (Albania, North Korea, Indonesia) went over to the side of China.

In February-March 1963, the Chinese press published four articles exposing Khrushchev’s “capitulation”, as well as the “unequal treaties” imposed by Tsarist Russia on China. The articles were followed by a 25-point note sent to the Soviet embassy in Beijing in June 1963. This was a comprehensive and provocative indictment document directed against all the main tenets of Soviet policy. The USSR responded to it extremely harshly. Chinese diplomats were expelled from the country for anti-Soviet propaganda. After these incidents, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (February 1964) approved the report of Suslov, who accused Beijing of imperialist aspirations hidden behind its policy of helping peoples fighting against colonialism. For its part, the Chinese leadership insisted in an increasingly categorical manner on its territorial claims. In 1968, the confrontation became even more complicated due to China's strong condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In the mid-60s, the so-called “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” began in China, which led to the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship in the country, a sharp increase in the role of the army in all spheres of social life, and the general militarization of the country. Militant anti-Sovietism, adopted by the then Chinese leadership as one of the pillars of the state’s domestic and foreign policy, extremely aggravated Soviet-Chinese relations. All official party and state events in China were held under the slogan: “The Soviet Union is our mortal enemy.” Chinese representatives, acting on orders from Beijing, committed anti-Soviet riots in Moscow, Hanoi, Paris, Baghdad, Algeria and many other cities. Acts of gross violence were committed against the crews of detained Soviet ships.

However, the main object of confrontation by the Beijing leadership was the Soviet-Chinese border. The artificially created border problem began to inflate under falsehoods about “the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union,” “about the threat from the North,” “about the USSR’s desire to seize Chinese lands.”

It should be noted that until 1960, no disputes arose between the two neighboring states over the border. The Soviet-Chinese border was formed historically; it was defined by a number of treaties and various agreements signed by authorized representatives of both countries. But since the mid-60s. The provocative activities of the Chinese side on the Soviet border intensified significantly. Since the end of March 1965, attempts to seize certain areas of Soviet territory have become more frequent. Chinese military personnel and civilians began to defiantly violate the border. Moreover, border violations became increasingly provocative. So, on April 11, 1965, about two hundred Chinese, under the cover of the military, plowed a section of Soviet territory. Having encountered a barrier of Soviet border guards on their way, the Chinese military personnel tried to break through it, committing violent and insulting actions.

The Chinese authorities artificially heated up the situation by concentrating military units and numerous units of the so-called “labor army” in the areas bordering the USSR. They launched the construction of large militarized state farms, which are essentially military settlements. The creation of “cadre detachments” of people’s militia intensified, which were involved in guarding the border, and were also used to maintain “ state of emergency» in settlements adjacent to the border.

As for the position of the Soviet leadership, it invariably adhered to the opinion that there was no territorial problem between the two neighboring countries, that the Soviet-Chinese border had a solid contractual basis and any revision of it was unacceptable.

The escalation of the provocative activities of the Chinese side was manifested in the expansion of the scale of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border. In 1967, their number more than doubled compared to the previous year.

The scale and frequency of border clashes clearly demonstrated the desire of the Beijing leadership to unleash major conflicts on the border. In particular, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhen frankly stated this in February 1967: “A rupture in relations is possible, war is possible.” In March of the same year, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in one of his public speeches, noted that in addition to the big war, “there are border wars,” that “the border war between China and the USSR will begin earlier than the war with the United States.”

The apogee of Beijing's anti-Soviet course was the large-scale armed provocations on the Soviet border in March 1969, which, according to Mao Zedong, should have aroused hatred of the Chinese population towards the USSR for many years.

On March 2 and 15, 1969, Chinese military personnel violated the Soviet-Chinese border on the Ussuri River - in the area of Damansky Island. An armed clash occurred here, during which Chinese troops had to withdraw from the border.

On March 2, the Soviet government sent a note to the Chinese government, in which it expressed a strong protest against the armed invasion of Soviet territory and demanded an immediate investigation and the most severe punishment of those responsible for organizing the provocation. The Soviet side insisted on taking measures that would exclude any violation of the Soviet-Chinese border, while emphasizing that in relations with the Chinese people it was guided by a sense of friendship and intended to pursue this line longer.

However, the Chinese side ignored these proposals, preparing a new armed provocation on the border, which was carried out on March 15, 1969. A motorized rifle formation was deployed in the Damansky area with all the means of fire support it was entitled to, as well as a number of other military units. Moreover, measures were taken to misinform the enemy. When the Chinese were forced out of the island, all approaches to it from the Chinese side were mined, and the adjacent section of the border on the Soviet side was blocked by units of the Soviet Army.

After this conflict, China complained against the Soviet Union to the UN.

The situation around Damansky was finally resolved by a summit meeting between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC in September 1969 in Beijing. The signed agreement maintained the status quo of the border and excluded the use of weapons in resolving controversial issues.

Further developments of events developed in such a way that in the early 90s, after work was carried out to demarcate the Soviet-Chinese border, part of the islands on the Ussuri River, including Damansky, were transferred to China.

In March 1982, in a speech in Tashkent on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Soviet power in Uzbekistan, L.I. Brezhnev put forward the idea of confidence-building measures on the Soviet-Chinese border. The Chinese side agreed. Since October 1982, interrupted since 1980, Soviet-Chinese negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers resumed.

In 1984, preparations began for the conclusion of a long-term Soviet-Chinese agreement on foreign trade for 1986-1990.

By the time M.S. came to power. Gorbachev, relations between the USSR and the PRC were the best in all previous decades, starting from the 60s. M.S. Gorbachev led the way towards a full-scale normalization of relations with the PRC, considering it an integral part of integrating the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union into the new structure of relations between leading world leaders.

In December 1988, at negotiations between the foreign ministers of the PRC and the USSR, agreement was recorded between the Soviet and Chinese positions regarding the need to eliminate the foreign military presence in Cambodia.

At the same time, the USSR announced a reduction in the size of the Soviet army. All Soviet troops were withdrawn from the Mongolian People's Republic. The structure of military districts was reorganized so that they were oriented toward containing the American-Japanese, rather than the Chinese, threat.

These events prepared the way for the visit of M.S. Gorbachev to Beijing (May 1989), during which Soviet-Chinese interstate relations and ties between the CPSU and the CPC were normalized. Subsequently, in April 1990, during the visit of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, to Moscow, a series of agreements on cooperation in the fields of economics, trade, science, technology and culture were signed.

Conclusions for Chapter 1.

The first chapter examined the dynamics of Soviet-Chinese relations in 1945-1989.

Reasons for the Soviet-Chinese rapprochement in 1945-1953:

1) China needed help in the fight against Japan, and the Soviet-Chinese rapprochement helped prevent Japanese aggression;

2) the USSR needed to strengthen the Soviet-Chinese border;

3) The USSR and China sought to assert the independence of Korea;

4) joint operation of the CER was necessary during the war for the transportation of Soviet troops;

5) military and economic assistance in order to facilitate and accelerate the recovery of China and Russia in the post-war period.

Cooperation between both countries was expressed in the economic, military, and also political spheres. In 1945-1949 Soviet-Chinese relations developed in a peaceful, stable, fair and rational international political and economic order, where regional economic cooperation organizations play an increasing role. Broad international cooperation is becoming an urgent requirement of the era and an imperative of historical development.

The USSR and China from the policy of cooperation in the late 50s. move on to harsh confrontation. Causes:

1) at this time, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” was taking place in China, which led to the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship in the country, a sharp increase in the role of the army in all spheres of life of Chinese society, which led to anti-Soviet riots in some countries;

2) the main object of deterioration in relations between the USSR and China was the Soviet-Chinese border;

3) exacerbation of ideological and theoretical differences between the leaders of both countries, contradictions in views on the path to building socialism;

4) The USSR was against implementing a “great leap” in China’s economic development, believing that it was dangerous for its interests;

5) the Sino-Indian conflict, in the resolution of which the USSR took a position of neutrality;

6) personal confrontation between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev.

In the 60-80s. Soviet-Chinese conflicts occur. Firstly, the conflict on Damansky Island; secondly, the conflict over Taiwan. Thirdly, there were disagreements between the USSR and China over the Sino-Indian conflict and over the situation in Afghanistan and Cambodia.

Since the beginning of the 80s. Relations between China and the USSR are normalizing. The reasons for the normalization of relations were as follows:

1) change of leadership in the USSR government (Brezhnev and Mao had good friendly relations);

2) China and the USSR had a common idea of the formation of socialism;

3) border conflicts were resolved;

4) the need for cooperation in the fields of economics, trade and technology.

CHAPTER 2. RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR

2.1. Economic cooperation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in mid-December 1992, B.N. visited Beijing. Yeltsin. 24 documents related to political and economic relations were signed, and a Joint Statement on Mutual Relations between the PRC and the Russian Federation was published.

Another package of documents was signed during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Russia in September 1994. Among them are the Declaration on the Long-Term Development of Bilateral Relations, the Protocol on Trade and economic cooperation and an agreement on customs cooperation.

During this visit, Jiang Zemin described the state of Russian-Chinese relations as a “constructive partnership.” When constructive partnership relations were being established, the Russian side explained that both states were completely independent. The Chinese side made it even more clear: these relations will exist on the 5 principles of peaceful coexistence, the countries will not be antagonists, they will not enter into an alliance, becoming good neighbors, good partners and friends, cooperating for the sake of common interests and common prosperity.

In April 1996, Yeltsin again paid a visit to the PRC, during which a Joint Statement (Beijing Declaration) was signed, which already spoke of “a strategic partnership based on equality, mutual trust and mutual coordination.”

Russia and China are considering modern world as developing towards multipolarity. Russia and China are building their interaction in the international arena on the basis of the joint Declaration on a multipolar world and the formation of a new international order, signed at the highest level in April 1997.

An important step towards ensuring broad public support for the course of good neighborliness and strategic partnership between Russia and China was the creation of the Russian-Chinese Committee of Friendship, Peace and Development, the first meeting of which in Beijing was timed to coincide with the state visit of the Russian President to the PRC in November 1997.

China is Russia's third (after Germany and the USA) trading partner among non-CIS countries, Russia is China's eighth partner in terms of trade turnover.

In 1998, the volume of Russian-Chinese trade decreased by 10% and amounted to $5.4 billion, including exports from Russia in the amount of $3.6 billion and imports from China - $1.8 billion. The basis of Russian exports to China are machinery and equipment, non-ferrous metals, wood and cellulose, chemical fertilizers and other chemical goods. 70% of Russian imports come from purchases of leather goods, clothing, shoes, meat, as well as machinery and equipment.

However, Russian-Chinese trade has a very imperfect structure. Russia supplies mainly raw materials, and China supplies second-class consumer goods. There are too few high-tech goods in our trade turnover.

The unsettled legal framework of the so-called folk trade has led to the fact that a significant part of the trade turnover has gone into the shadow, or “gray” zone.

The Chinese move small quantities of consumer goods across the border through the tourist channel and independently sell them on Russian consumer markets. The proceeds received are not recorded anywhere and are almost not subject to taxes and customs duties. In this regard, Russia bears financial losses. In addition, in the conditions of “people's trade” it is impossible to exercise proper quality control and protect the legal rights of consumers in the event of claims on their part.

To improve the health of “people's trade”, it is necessary that its participants strictly observe the jointly adopted rules.

Unhealthy developments in bilateral trade can negatively affect not only economic, but also political ties between the two states. They can undermine mutual trust and sympathy between the two peoples.

In July 2000, the new President of Russia V.V. Putin confirmed that China is Russia’s strategic partner, the shared positions in the international arena, and the countries’ desire to maintain and strengthen a multipolar world.

An indicator of a new level of bilateral relations was signed by Russian President V.V. Putin and the Chairman of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin in Moscow in mid-July 2001, the Russian-Chinese Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation.

The agreement, like Russian-Chinese cooperation in general, has two aspects: international and bilateral. The almost complete coincidence of the two countries’ views on international problems is the most important driver of bilateral relations. Leaders in Beijing and Moscow have repeatedly stated that the Russian-Chinese rapprochement is not directed against third countries, including the United States, and this is true in the sense that the United States and the West are not viewed as enemies by either China or Russia. On the contrary, both sides are extremely interested in economic and political cooperation with the West. It is the most important factor in the development of both countries and, therefore, fully corresponds to their strategic goals. However, it is also likely that the Russian-Chinese rapprochement is to a certain extent stimulated by a number of negative trends in international development that were noted by Washington.

First of all, this is the desire to belittle the role of the UN and its bodies, NATO’s attempts to take over the functions of the Security Council, NATO expansion and others.

The trend towards stabilization of economic growth was consolidated during the visit of the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhu Rongji, to St. Petersburg in September 2001. From the Chinese point of view, the problem of bilateral trade is the increase in Chinese imports over exports. But Russia is also not satisfied that the basis of its exports are weapons and raw materials.

Armament is 15-20%. This is no coincidence, because in this area China can purchase from Russia goods of a level that is closed to it in the West.

For Russia, trade with China is very important because it solves important social problems: it provides jobs and wages to tens of thousands of workers, defense of enterprises, and allows the development of technological potential concentrated in the defense sector in conditions where the state’s own funds are not enough.

Russia would also like to sell civilian products to China, in which China shows much less interest, preferring to purchase Western models, despite the higher price. In addition, both in Russia and abroad they have ambivalent attitudes towards the sale of advanced Russian weapons to China. There are a variety of concerns on this score, and from this point of view, diversification of Russian exports would be of great importance.

In this regard, some documents signed at the meeting of heads of government are extremely important. Firstly, a subcommittee on communications and information technology, which is developing cooperation in this area.

Secondly, and most importantly, a contract was signed for the PRC to purchase five Russian civil aircraft TU-204-120. This deal marks the breakthrough of the Russian civil aircraft industry into the Chinese market.

China has the greatest impact on world economic relations with its growing needs for energy resources. Energy is the most promising area of cooperation between our countries. Therefore, China currently needs Russia. Russia is developing its foreign trade, primarily through oil and gas, supplying them mainly to Europe and America. The Asia-Pacific region consumes a third of traded oil. China has become its second largest consumer in the world after the United States, pushing Japan to 3rd place. Russia has made the decision to build the Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline system. Transneft and the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a protocol on preparations for laying the Chinese branch of this pipeline. The implementation of the project will significantly increase the supply of Russian oil to China.

Cooperation in the gas sector is also fruitful. Gazprom and the China Petroleum Corporation signed agreements on the construction of two gas pipelines.

An agreement was reached to develop a feasibility study for the supply of Russian electricity to China.

A strategic partnership in energy will allow Russia and China to realize their natural advantages, such as geographical proximity and economic complementarity.

At the invitation of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, Chairman of the People's Republic of China Hu Jintao paid a state visit to the Russian Federation from May 26 to 28, 2003.

The heads of the two governments discussed the development of bilateral relations over the past decade, their current state and prospects. They emphasized their unity in the fact that no matter what changes occur in the world, deepening relations of good neighborliness, friendship, mutually beneficial cooperation, partnership and strategic interaction between Russia and China will remain a priority strategic direction of the foreign policy of the two countries. The parties stated that they are ready to take the baton from previous generations and carry it into the future, making joint efforts to reveal new prospects for the development of Russian-Chinese relations.

To this end, the heads of state of Russia and China stated the following:

“Over the past decade, Russian-Chinese relations have passed the historical path of relations between friendly states, relations of constructive partnership and moved into the stage of partnership relations and strategic interaction.

The Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China of July 16, 2001 concentrated on a number of achievements in the development of bilateral relations over last years, laid a solid legal foundation for the steady and sustainable development of relations between the two states in the new century.

Russia and China stand for a multipolar, fair and democratic world order based on generally accepted principles of international law.”

The successful development of Chinese-Russian relations brings not only real benefits to the peoples of both countries, but also makes a major contribution to the protection of peace, stability, and promotes development and prosperity in the region and in the world as a whole.

2.2. Military-political cooperation.

Among the regional structures created in an effort to translate the idea of multipolarity into real life forms, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization occupies a special place.

Having appeared in 2001, the SCO quickly gained weight and turned into an influential regional organization. The “SCO factor” is a significant element of stability in the vast Eurasian space. This is the reality of modern regional and global politics.

Initially formed to resolve border issues on the basis of agreements on confidence-building in the military field and on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area, the Shanghai Five - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - has grown into a very dynamic and influential international organization. Since 2001, Uzbekistan has been its member.

The SCO is an open organization of partners focused on maintaining peace and stability in the region and developing broad international cooperation. In the center of Eurasia, an association is being built that includes two global world units - China and Russia, which entered the 21st century as strategic partners, and embraces countries with enormous complementary potential.

Using the successful experience accumulated by the members of the organization in resolving difficult and dramatic issues of a political and military nature, the mutual trust experienced during the formation years of the organization, the tradition of intercivilizational respect, dialogue and the search for common paths of development, the SCO members also count on common strategic achievements in this region in the most various areas.

Of decisive importance for the process of unification of states in the SCO is the existence of external threats and challenges to the well-being, stability and security of the states of the region, primarily in the face of the escalation of terrorism and extremism, as well as economic problems in a world experiencing globalization processes. According to this, the main goals And tasks SCO:

Strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between member states;

Development of multidisciplinary cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability in the region, promote the construction of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order;

Joint counteraction to terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, the fight against illegal drug and weapons trafficking, other types of transnational criminal activities, as well as illegal migration;

Encouraging effective regional cooperation in political, trade, economic, defense, law enforcement, cultural, scientific and technical, educational, energy, transport and other areas of common interest;

Promoting comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership in order to steadily increase the level and improve the living conditions of the peoples of the Member States;

Coordination of approaches to integration into the world economy;

Promoting the provision of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of member states and their national legislation;

Maintaining and developing relations with other states and international organizations;

Cooperation in prevention international conflicts and their peaceful settlement.

The SCO member states adhere to the following principles :

Mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of state borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and threat of force in international relations, renunciation of unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas;

Equality of all member states, search for common points of view based on mutual understanding and respect for the opinions of each of them;

The gradual implementation of joint actions in areas of common interest;

Peaceful resolution of disagreements between member states;

The SCO is not directed against other states and international organizations;

Preventing any illegal actions directed against the interests of the SCO;

Conscientious fulfillment of obligations assumed within the SCO.

Like any other organization, the SCO has its own organizational structure :

1. Council of Heads of State is the highest body of the SCO. It determines priorities and develops the main directions of the Organization’s activities, resolves fundamental issues of its internal structure and functioning, interaction with other states and international organizations, and also considers the most pressing international problems.

2. Council of Heads of Government(Prime Ministers) adopts the budget of the Organization, considers and resolves major issues related to specific areas of development of interaction within the Organization.

3. Council of Foreign Ministers considers issues of the current activities of the Organization, preparation for the meeting of the Council of Heads of State and consultations within the Organization on international problems. The Council may, if necessary, make statements on behalf of the SCO.

4. Meetings of heads of ministries or departments. In accordance with the decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government, heads of line ministries or departments of member states regularly hold meetings to consider specific issues of developing interaction in relevant areas within the SCO.

5. Council of National Coordinators is the SCO body that coordinates and manages the current activities of the Organization. It carries out the necessary preparations for meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government and the Council of Foreign Ministers. National focal points are appointed by each Member State in accordance with its internal rules and procedures.

6. Secretariat is a permanent administrative body of the SCO. It provides organizational and technical support for events held within the SCO and prepares proposals for the annual budget of the Organization. The Secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary, who is approved by the Council of Heads of State on the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Executive Secretary is appointed from among the citizens of the Member States on a rotational basis, in order of the Russian alphabet of the names of the Member States, for a period of 3 years without the right of extension for the next term. Deputy Executive Secretaries are approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the recommendation of the Council of National Coordinators. They cannot be representatives of the state from which the Executive Secretary is appointed. Officials of the Secretariat are recruited from among citizens of Member States on a quota basis. In the performance of their official duties, the Executive Secretary, his deputies and other officials of the Secretariat shall not seek or receive instructions from any Member State or government, organization or individual. They must refrain from any actions that could affect their position as international officials responsible only to the SCO. The location of the SCO Secretariat is Beijing.

7. The regional anti-terrorist structure of the member states of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of June 15, 2001, located in the city of Bishkek, is a permanent body of the SCO.

The Shanghai Five, which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, was created as a mechanism for regional cooperation primarily in border areas. With Uzbekistan joining the SCO, this organization became closed, and many researchers believe that the problem of trust has been solved here. Until now, the emphasis has been on the military-political component. After the summit in Shanghai (June 15, 2006), there was talk of creating a new policy, where attention would be paid to other forms of cooperation - from trade, economic and scientific-technical to cultural and environmental.

The agreement reached on the establishment of an anti-terrorism center in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, represents moral support for the governments of Central Asian states in our time. However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's anti-terrorism center can do more than simply coordinate information among the six member states. Weaker states must unite into blocs in order to assert themselves and defend their interests in the international arena. An example of this is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Summarizing the experience of the past, the heads of participating states believe that the formation of the SCO marks the beginning of the transition of cooperation between participating states to a new stage of development and meets the trends of the modern era and the fundamental interests of the peoples of all participating states.

From August 9 to 17, 2007, the largest Russian-Chinese military exercises within the SCO took place. Other member countries of this association also took part in them: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These exercises are declared as anti-terrorism and are called “Peace Mission 2007”.

These exercises are of a large-scale military-political nature, which goes beyond the scope of the elementary struggle against one or another terrorist gang that has penetrated the territory of the Central Asian states. Such exercises establish large-scale geopolitical cooperation, the main objective of which is to erect a barrier to the penetration of American influence and military presence into the region. As is known, this penetration has extremely destructive consequences for the countries it affects, for example Iraq and Afghanistan. Now the military-political cooperation between Russia and China within the SCO will stand in the way of American penetration.

“Russian-Chinese exercises are a historical event. The SCO member countries claim that this organization is not a military alliance, that it is aimed at fighting terrorism. But, nevertheless, these military exercises somewhat exceed such a task. They indicate that relations between SCO member states are much more advanced in the military field.”

The SCO is actually a collective security organization and aims to ensure stability in Central Asia. Strengthening military cooperation within the SCO should have a positive impact on the situation in Central Asia, since it will strengthen cooperation, including in the military field.

2.3. Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation.

In recent years, the Russian media have constantly reported on the so-called successes of the Putin regime in improving the well-being of the people. Indeed, after Putin came to power, Russian gross national income (GNP) began to grow, and for almost 7 years GNP growth has been at the level of 6% per year. A remarkable result, since no Western country had such an increase. However, the standard of living that was in the USSR has not yet been achieved. The conditions of the Chinese were incomparable to those that Russia had by the end of the 80s, when market reforms began. According to one Soviet professor who was invited to China after the Communist victory there, the Chinese began to adopt the scientific experience of the USSR from the very beginning. Many Soviet scientists were sent on request to Beijing and other universities and gave special courses of lectures there. In addition to lecturing, Soviet professors conducted scientific seminars, as a result of which many works were published in leading Chinese and Soviet scientific journals. Courses of lectures by Soviet professors were published in the form of textbooks. The organization of science in China was similar to the USSR. During the Cultural Revolution, professors and students were sent to the countryside for retraining. After the Cultural Revolution, China began sending university graduates to other countries. Deng Xiao Ping stated that if 1/10 returned, it would be a huge success. In 1985, a large group of Chinese graduates were sent to top universities in the United States.

Unlike Russia, the Chinese have clear state plans for scientific and technological development. These are the “Program for the medium-term and long-term development of science and technology for 1990-2020”, “Plan 863”, the “Torch” program - the development and commercialization of high-tech technologies based on modern production, and many others.

In 1987, China launched the Torch program, aimed at stimulating the commercialization of scientific and technological achievements. In 1991, the “State Program for Scientific and Technical Development for the Medium and Long Time” was published. By 1996, 10 major scientific and technological programs and projects had been implemented in China.

In order to strengthen contacts in the field of problem research in China with world research, the Natural Science Foundation of China has developed 5 areas of international exchange within the framework of international research based on cooperation, and a Special Fund has been created for “Temporary work and lecturing for students studying abroad.”

Since 1998, the Chinese Academy of Sciences has launched a large-scale program called the “Knowledge and Innovation Program.” Its idea was to reduce the number of research institutes within the Academy of Sciences from 123 to 80, but also to give the remaining institutes more money.

The state in China not only understands that science needs to be developed, but also clearly knows how to do it. In Russia, in fact, there are no priority scientific development programs. Without a clear state policy in the field of science and education, Russia will not move anywhere.

Chinese philosophy, religion, and culture developed over thousands of years and left a deep imprint on the way of life and thinking of the great people.

Chinese culture is humanitarian: the development of technology was not an end in itself for it, but served the highest moral principles. But at the same time, Chinese thought does not tolerate abstract abstractions; it is always aimed at improving life.

In July 2005, Chairman Hu Jintao and President Vladimir Putin officially announced in Moscow that China and Russia would host each other's "national years" in 2006 and 2007. This was a great event in the history of Chinese-Russian relations, having important and far-reaching historical significance for maintaining good neighborliness and friendship between China and Russia, for comprehensively deepening mutually beneficial cooperation, for the development and prosperity of the two countries.

“National Years” is a systemic project that affects many areas - political, economic, scientific and technical, military, humanitarian and others. For its successful implementation, high-level organizing committees were created in China and Russia. They are widely represented by heads of central departments, as well as local administrations of the two countries, representatives of parliaments, directors of large enterprises and heads of various public associations.

As a result of careful preparation carried out by the organizing committees of the two countries, thanks to the joint efforts of all interested parties, the “Year of Russia” in China was a great success. Over 200 events were held as part of the Year of Russia. They were of unprecedented scope and brought fruitful results.

The “Year of Russia” in China fully met the expectations placed on it. Relations of partnership and strategic interaction between the two countries have received further development. The degree of frankness in direct contacts has increased, and the level of mutual trust has increased.

At the end of 2006, Chairman Hu Jintao and President Vladimir Putin announced the beginning of the “Year of China” in Russia. The events within this year formed the basis of Chinese-Russian relations in 2007. The corresponding organizing committees created in both countries held about 200 different events. More than ten of them took place at the state level. In March, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Russia; the heads of the two states took part in the opening ceremony of the “Year of China” and other events. During this visit, the "China National Exhibition" was held, which widely showcased China's development achievements. The exhibition also featured products from famous Chinese brands.

As part of the “Chinese Culture Festival,” Russians were shown throughout the year the best examples of traditional Chinese culture, dating back several millennia.

At the end of the year, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Wen Jiabao paid a visit to Russia and held a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. They took part in the events marking the closing of the “Year of China” and put the finishing touches on the Chinese-Russian “national years” program. In addition to major state-level projects, the parties carried out a series of actions in the political, trade, economic, cultural, scientific, technical and military fields, as well as in the media.

Thanks to the joint efforts of the organizing committees and the interested participation of representatives of various circles of the two countries, the “Year of China” in Russia was a great success and became a powerful incentive for the development of partnership relations and strategic interaction between the PRC and the Russian Federation.

China and Russia are each other's largest neighbors and main strategic partners. It is very important to ensure the confident progressive development of Chinese-Russian relations, to create an atmosphere in which the countries would be friends from generation to generation and would not be at enmity. This is extremely important for both parties. This creates a favorable external environment. This is the common choice of two countries and peoples.

Conclusions for Chapter 2.

The second chapter examines Russian-Chinese relations after the collapse of the USSR, areas of cooperation between the two countries: economic, military-political, cultural and scientific-technical.

Today, both China and Russia are making efforts to grow their national power, develop their economies and improve the lives of their people. The comprehensive deepening of business cooperation between China and Russia in trade, economic, energy and other fields helps the two countries mutually enrich themselves, adopt each other’s best in order to develop faster and more successfully. The PRC and the Russian Federation occupy identical positions on important international and regional issues and are in a similar position in terms of strategic security. Strengthening strategic cooperation helps both sides more effectively assert their own national interests and contributes to the promotion of peace and development both globally and in the region.

The agreement between the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation and the China National Petroleum Corporation on the organization of cooperation projects in the field of oil and gas is intended to ensure the implementation of long-term plans for the construction of gas pipelines to China. The Chinese side has shown interest in receiving gas from Russian fields on Sakhalin Island. China's oil and gas needs are growing rapidly.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the most famous and most successful international organization created in modern times.

The main priority for the SCO is to counter the “three evils” - the threat of terrorism, extremism and separatism. The danger of drug trafficking is acute. The organization was created to unite the efforts of six states to jointly respond to situations that threaten peace, stability and security in the region. The effectiveness of the SCO in achieving this goal will be a real contribution to ensuring global peace and countering the challenges that are relevant to the entire international community.

Military and military-technical cooperation between Russia and China is developing dynamically and progressively. Interaction between Russia and China, both within the SCO and on a bilateral basis, is a feature of Russian-Chinese relations in all areas of cooperation.

The activities of the SCO are attracting increased interest from the international community. The Temporary Scheme of Relations between the SCO and other international organizations and states, signed in November 2002, made it possible to establish contacts between the SCO and the UN and ASEAN. As a result of the Moscow summit meeting (May 2003), a political declaration was adopted, which recorded specific agreements on the development of cooperation within the organization, as well as general approaches to current international problems.

The holding of “national years” in China and Russia indicates that Chinese-Russian relations are at a high level. This is a reflection of the political will of the leaders of the two countries aimed at developing friendship between China and Russia. “National Years” provided the greatest opportunities for the development of cooperation between China and Russia in all areas.

Myasnikov V.S. The Qing Empire and Russia in the 17th – early 20th centuries. – M.: 1982.-p.327

Mironin S. Science of China and Russia. – M.: 1999.-p.123

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

Crisis in relations with China. The five most acute conflicts between the USSR and China

Context

It's time for Americans to understand: China is not the USSR

Why won't China become the next USSR?

If China falls apart like the USSR