home Medicines from A to Z On the question of whether nuclear weapons exist. The Great Nuclear Game in the 21st Century: Disarmament or War? Where did North Korea's nuclear weapons come from?

On the question of whether nuclear weapons exist. The Great Nuclear Game in the 21st Century: Disarmament or War? Where did North Korea's nuclear weapons come from?

Q. Was it used? nuclear weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Were these really nuclear bombs?
A. Nuclear bombs.
Q. Have nuclear weapons been used since World War II? Precisely as a weapon, not a test.
A. It was used, the Guardians say, like, somewhere in Vietnam...
Q. Is it true that there were saucer fights in Vietnam?
A. There were.
Q. Why were there saucer battles in Vietnam, but not, say, in Afghanistan?
A. Something to do with the Grays and the transfer of technology from them, which was taking place at that time. The Americans at that time began to use their technology.
Q. Do Russia or the United States currently have combat-ready nuclear weapons?
A. Hmm... The Guardians say no.

Q. No nuclear weapons? What happened to him?
A. Seized. It is stored somewhere in one place, both ours and the American one.
Q. And who took him there?
O. They don’t say...
Q. What about atomic suitcases?
O. Bluff.
Q. That is, neither Russia, nor the United States, nor any organizations or terrorists have access to combat-ready nuclear weapons?
A. Corporations have access. Terrorists... no, not really.
Q. Were nuclear weapons used in Fukushima to create the wave?
A. No, it was not used.
Q. Does Russia have more powerful weapon than nuclear, for example, ultra (hyper) sound, plasma, tectonic weapons, etc.?
A. Yes, hypersonic and something related to radio frequencies.
Q. What about the USA?
ABOUT.HAARP. I don’t see anything special, they have a lot of conventional weapons, we have more powerful ones.
V. The Moscow heat of 2010 isHAARP?
Oh yeah.
Q. Why didn’t Russia respond, since we have better weapons?
A. There are certain agreements. These were tests and both sides were interested.
Q. Is there any connection with installation testing in Saudi Arabia at the same time when abnormal rains occurred there?
A. Yes, there was a joint effect.
Q. Was the 1988 earthquake in Armenia the result of the use of tectonic weapons?
O. No, somehow it’s not right... There’s some kind of overlap there natural process and something else... it felt like there was an underground explosion. The guardians say it was a nuclear underground explosion carried out by ours. Well, in general, it turns out that tectonic weapons were experimented with the possibility of provoking tremors with an explosion.

Q. Is it true that the main reason for the extraction of all minerals is the creation of cavities to fill them with water and form a reserve drinking water beneath the surface of the planet?
A. Not all, but some - yes, for this too. About 10-15 percent somewhere. Such places are evenly distributed over the surface.

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While political scientists are debating the future of the post-federal space, the last redoubt of the Eurasian empire - Mr. Putin's subjects are glimmering with the hope that the collapse of Russia will never happen, this simply cannot happen. The logic is ironclad. And, as an argument, the “nuclear shield” ominously lodged itself in their subconscious. We can say that the “nuclear argument” is the last bastion of psychological stability and confidence in the existence of a powerful (albeit tottering from its knees) state - the patron and protector of the orphaned and wretched.

And God forbid you destroy the nuclear myth of the Soviets! The Eurasians will instantly turn into the guys from G. Danelia’s film “Kin-dza-dza!”, who have lost their tsaks. In the psychology of the originals, the last hope of capturing the Chatlan planet Plyuk will die. All points of stability and hope for the future, everything that one could (was) be proud of will turn into nothing.

In order not to inflict mental trauma on the ideological builders of developed Eurasianism, I advise them not to read further!

According to the site"Internet versus TV Screen" Russian rulers are not taken seriously in the “decaying” West.

Nuclear charges, unlike conventional bombs and shells, cannot be put into storage and forgotten until they are needed. The reason is a process constantly occurring inside nuclear charges, as a result of which the isotopic composition of the charge changes, and it quickly degrades.

The guaranteed life of a nuclear charge in a Russian ballistic missile is 10 years, and then the warhead must be sent to a factory, since the plutonium in it must be changed. Nuclear weapons are an expensive pleasure, requiring the maintenance of an entire industry for constant maintenance and replacement of charges. Alexander Kuzmuk, Ukraine's Minister of Defense from 1996 to 2001, said in an interview that Ukraine had 1,740 nuclear weapons, Kuzmuk - "however, the service life of those nuclear weapons expired before 1997." Therefore, Ukraine’s acceptance of nuclear-free status was nothing more than a beautiful gesture ( http://www.proua.com/digest/2008/08/18/121502.html)

Why "before 1997"? Because Gorbachev stopped the production of new nuclear charges, and the last old Soviet charges expired in the 90s. “Both Russia and the United States have practically not produced either weapons-grade uranium or weapons-grade plutonium for more than 10 years. Around 1990, all this has been stopped” (V.I. Rybachenkov, Advisor to the Department for Security and Disarmament Issues of the Russian Foreign Ministry, http://www.armscontrol.ru/course/lectures/rybachenkov1.htm ). Regarding the United States, the adviser is “misleading the public,” but the fact that under Gorbachev in the USSR the production of weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium was completely curtailed is precisely true.

To avoid the temptation to make new nuclear charges for ballistic missiles, the Americans concluded a “very profitable” deal with the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (for 20 years!). The Americans bought weapons-grade uranium from Russian old warheads (and then promised to buy plutonium), and in return Russian reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium were shut down. "Minatom of Russia: main milestones in the development of the nuclear industry": "1994 - The Government of the Russian Federation made a decision to stop the production of weapons-grade plutonium." ( http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/viewPrintVersion?id=1360&idChannel=343 )

In Russia, not only has the service life of old Soviet nuclear charges for missile warheads expired “until 1997,” but there is also no plutonium to make new ones. They cannot be made from old Soviet plutonium, since its isotopic composition, like the plutonium in warheads, has irreversibly changed. And in order to obtain new weapons-grade plutonium and produce new nuclear charges for missiles, it takes not just time - there are no specialists, the equipment is not in working order. In Russia, even the technology for making barrels for tank guns has been lost; after the first few shots, the flight of the next shells on a new Russian tank is hardly predictable. The reasons are the same - the specialists have grown old or dispersed from non-working production facilities, and the equipment is either dilapidated, or stolen, or sold for scrap. It is likely that much more complex technologies for producing weapons-grade plutonium and creating nuclear charges from it have long been lost, and it will take not a year or two to restore them, but at best 10 years. And will the Americans allow the Russian Federation to restart reactors to produce highly enriched weapons-grade plutonium? Russia has set up a unique experiment to destroy the technosphere of a modern technogenic society; under today’s regime, the technosphere is melting right before our eyes, society is losing technology, infrastructure, and most importantly, people who are capable of working as non-sellers. The Russian Federation quite naturally transformed from a country possessing nuclear weapons into a country potentially capable of possessing them; its status changed from a real superpower to the status of a potential superpower, and this fundamentally changes Russian relations with other countries.

Why did they stand on ceremony with the Russian Federation until recently, and did not slam it down in the late 90s? After the expiration of the warranty period, nuclear charges are still capable of exploding for some time. Even if these explosions are not of the power for which they were previously designed, but if several blocks in New York are destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people are killed, then the American government will have to explain itself. Therefore, the US Department of Energy American government allocated the most powerful supercomputers, officially announcing that scientists would model degradation processes in nuclear charges, the only thing they “forgot” to tell the media was that they were going to simulate degradation processes not in American charges, but in Russian ones. The game was worth the candle and no money was spared for this purpose; the American elite wanted to know exactly when not a single Russian nuclear warhead was guaranteed to explode. Scientists provided the answer, and when the estimated time approached, American policy towards Erefia had changed as fundamentally as Russian nuclear status. The Kremlin rulers were simply sent to three letters.

In the spring of 2006, joint articles by Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press appeared (in Foreign Affairs and International Security) about the possibility of delivering a disarming strike on Russian nuclear forces. Lieber and Press started an open discussion - in a democratic country everything needs to be discussed first (although decisions are made by other people and even before the discussion). In Moscow, only a tiny handful of leavened patriots sensed evil and became worried; the elite didn’t even blink; the American plans coincided with its plans (after leaving the completely ruined “this country,” they weren’t going to leave her “weapons of retaliation”? Of course not). But then the situation Russian elite“suddenly” things became more complicated. At the beginning of 2007, the influential newspaper Washington Post published an article in which it was recommended not to flirt with the Russian ruling elite anymore, since there is no real power behind it, but to put the crooks in their place. At this point, Putin himself lost his mind, and he launched the “Munich Speech” about a multipolar world. And at the beginning of 2008, Congress instructed Condoleezza Rice to compile a list of leading Russian corrupt officials. Who honestly made a lot of money in Russia? Nobody. The final fog cleared, and the Kremlin elite acutely sensed the impending end.

In his post, President Medvedev announced grandiose plans in the military sphere - “The serial construction of warships is planned, primarily nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and multi-purpose submarines. An aerospace defense system will be created.” To which Condoleezza Rice calmly responded in an interview with Reuters: “The balance of power in terms of nuclear deterrence will not change from these actions.” Why would he change? What will Medvedev load onto ships and cruise missiles? There are no usable nuclear warheads. Russian missiles have only false targets, no real targets. Building a missile defense system against missiles like "Satan" is madness; you miss once, and goodbye to a dozen large cities. But against radioactive scrap metal, which is now on Russian missiles instead of warheads (most likely, it was also removed, since old weapons-grade plutonium gets very hot - it’s hot like an iron), you can create a missile defense system against it, if the missile defense system misses, then there’s nothing particularly terrible will happen, although it will be unpleasant to then disinfect a hectare of your territory. The missile defense system is designed to catch radioactive scrap metal when the Russian Federation is finally disarmed. The elite do not like the missile defense system, not because it is around Russia, but because the elite is not allowed to leave Russia; it has been turned into a hostage of its own games.

But what about Russian generals? They fell into mysticism. As once upon a time with the collapse of the Third Reich, and today with the expected imminent end of the Energy Superpower, the military has the same belief in secret superweapons, this is the agony of the ability to think soberly. The generals started talking about some warheads maneuvering in space (from a technical point of view - complete nonsense), about hypersonic super-high-altitude cruise missiles, about installations sending short, super-powerful electromagnetic pulses. Generals love their homeland, but money even more. Enriched uranium was sold at a price 25 times lower than its value, since it was stolen, stolen from its own people, and they did not take the market price for the stolen goods, but sold them for next to nothing, part of the money for the sale of warheads and cutting of Satan missiles went to the generals. The generals were given orderlies like orderlies in Tsarist Russia, they were given a luxurious pension, and in Chechnya you could play toy soldiers to your heart's content, get drunk and send boys who had not been shot at to slaughter, and you wouldn't get anything for it (at least one general was tried for the storming of Grozny?). The son of every general could also become a general; there were more generals in Russia per capita than anywhere else in the world.

Details about the state of strategic weapons were told in the Duma at closed meetings in order to hide the truth from the population. The media discussed exclusively the condition of nuclear weapons carriers, but kept silent about the main thing, the condition of the nuclear weapons themselves. The lies were beneficial to the Americans, as they allowed them to continue to wave the picture of a dangerous Russian bear in front of their own electorate. The lies suited the oligarchs, since they were planning to leave “this country” in the near future. And the generals are silent, so what can they say now? That they stole the people's nuclear shield, sawed it up and sold it to the enemy?

For 30 years, the balance of nuclear deterrence was determined by treaties between the USSR and the United States; the United States no longer proposes to start a new treaty process, there is nothing to agree on. Putin rushed to urgently legalize the border with China, and China began publishing textbooks, where almost all of Siberia and Far East- territories seized by Russia from China. The EU invited Russia to sign the Energy Charter, according to which the EU will produce oil and gas on the territory of the Russian Federation, transport it to itself, and the Russians are offered a reward - a fig. EU officials frankly explained that Russia has three options - to lie under the EU, to lie under the US, or to become Chinese cheap labor, that's all the choice. The main players are aware of what is happening and are not shy.

After Russia turned from a real superpower into a potential one, the situation around the bank accounts of the Russian elite began to heat up sharply. The UN has adopted a convention on corruption, and the West is not joking today; it is going to use it against our kleptocracy. So the West decided to repay our traitors for their betrayal. Throwing a dagger - is it a crime, is it immoral? Not at all.

The conversation between Russian rulers and the West turned into “mine is yours, don’t understand”, both sides are talking about completely different things, Moscow to them - “You promised us!”, and those to the Russians - “So you have nothing else but a cheap bluff!” (The Russian Federation’s sending of a Tu-160 to Venezuela did not cause a new Caribbean crisis, as it was perceived by the “probable enemy” solely as a clownery).

Russian richest Natural resources cannot belong to a weak, unpopulated power. The United States has decided to stop buying old weapons-grade uranium from the Russian Federation. Although it is very profitable for Americans to buy it at a price many times lower than its market value, it is more important to land the Russian generals on their tailbone before discussing the terms of surrender.

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Meanwhile, Russia has stopped producing weapons-grade plutonium . NTV reported how the last reactor of this type existing in Russia was closed in Zheleznogorsk. He produced plutonium last half century. Especially for its service, the closed city of Krasnoyarsk-26 was created in the USSR, later renamed Zheleznogorsk.

The Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine was a unique nuclear enterprise that had no analogues in the world. Its production workshops were located deep underground.

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But even if Russia’s nuclear shield had somehow miraculously survived and nuclear plutonium production had not been curtailed, the Russian Federation would still be hopelessly behind its closest competitors in technical terms. Eg,American nuclear potential has long surpassed Russian nuclear fake by a third . According to Gazeta.Ru , the United States is one third larger than Russia in the number of deployed long-range ballistic missiles, their launchers and nuclear warheads.

Russia's nuclear potential turned out to be below the level of the Treaty on the Reduction of Offensive Arms, which entered into force in February 2011. Experts doubt that the Russian Federation will be able to raise its potential to this ceiling over the next 10 years.

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Already by 2015, Russia could theoretically be swatted like a fly . As St. Petersburg writes: Military parity , maintaining in the required quantitative and qualitative condition the fleet of Russia's strategic nuclear triad - ICBMs, strategic missile submarines and heavy bombers - in the foreseeable future will become a task beyond the capabilities of the country. A number of conceptual errors in the development of the strategic arsenal made in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods led to the fact that after a certain period of time Russia risks being left with weapons that cannot guarantee the security of the country.

The mobility of strategic weapons as a panacea for their invulnerability played a bad joke on General Staff USSR Armed Forces. First of all, the very concept of creating ICBMs on self-propelled automobile and railway chassis was erroneous. By creating such highly complex systems weapons like mobile ground weapons missile systems(PGRK) RT-2PM "Topol" (NATO code SS-25) and combat railway missile systems (BZHRK) RS-22 "Molodets" (SS-24), the country incurred enormous additional costs for the creation of these strategic groupings. The American Minuteman and MX series ICBMs, similar in their combat capabilities, were placed in highly protected silo launchers, where they were ready for immediate use in an emergency.

What will Russia be left with by 2015? As is known, the RS-22 BZHRK has already been withdrawn from the Strategic Missile Forces and destroyed. A certain number of silo ICBMs of the RS-20 (R-36MUTTH) and RS-19 (UR-100NUTTH, NATO code SS-19) types are in service, but their life cycle is already at the end. These missiles have not been produced for a long time, and the endless “extensions” of their presence in the Strategic Missile Forces can only cause a bitter smile. Only Topol and Topol-M remain the real combat system.

In 1994-2002, the number of ICBMs of this type was maintained at 360 PU. And then, naturally, the collapse began. The launchers and missiles were getting old and needed to be removed from the Strategic Missile Forces. The deployment of stationary and mobile Topol-M missiles to replace them was catastrophically late. Thus, by 2006, only 252 Topol ICBM launchers remained in service, down from the highest number of 369 in 1993. In exchange, by 2006, only 42 stationary and the first three mobile Topol-Ms entered service with the Strategic Missile Forces. 117 were written off, 45 were received. In 2007, according to Military Parity estimates, approximately 225 “Soviet”-made Topols remained in service, and at the beginning of 2008, according to the website www.russianforces.org, there were only 213 of them units.

According to the calculations of American experts, in the next five to seven years the entire fleet of mobile Topols deployed in 1984-1993 should be written off. And what in return? Russia plans to put into service 120 Topol-M ICBMs by 2015, including 69 in a mobile version. Again, the Russian Federation remains in the red - more than 100 old missiles will not be replaced by anything.

Thus, by about 2015 Strategic Missile Forces of Russia will have approximately 76 stationary and 69 mobile Topol-M. In total there will be approximately 145 of them. Note - monoblock ones. As for the new multi-charged RS-24 type, there is no data on their deployment. It is worth noting that the planned deployment of such a number of Topol-Ms is based on the figures of the State Armaments Program (GAP) until 2015, which was never fully implemented. The RF Ministry of Defense cannot in any way fix the cost of certain types of weapons, including strategic ones, as a result of which defense companies inflate their costs to sky-high levels. Recently, the Chief of the General Staff, General Yu. Baluevsky, spoke about this in an interview with the Vesti-24 channel. And the reason for this is the fact that the defense budget of the Russian Federation is a completely opaque item of government spending, which leads to this kind of financial somersault.

Let's summarize. By 2015, Russia will have 145 ICBMs in service, of which almost half will be mobile. This is a completely unnecessary waste of resources. A monopolist in the development of strategic missiles, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering still holds the Russian Federation hostage to an absolutely outdated “mobility concept.” Even the Americans advise the Chinese not to follow the “Soviet” path, clearly understanding the futility of such a solution. And one feels that the overseas experts are not laughing, but advising the case. At one time, they were smart enough to abandon mobile MX and Midgetmen. But the Russians persist. If you read military forums, the rocket scientists themselves call “Topol” “matches” for their low combat capabilities, and their mobility even gave rise to a joke: “Why are “Topoli” mobile? “And therefore, to increase the flight range.”

As you know, the United States has adopted a program to modernize the B-2 stealth strategic bombers, as a result of which the Americans will be equipped with the latest radar with active phased array, which has fantastic capabilities for detecting small-sized mobile ground targets, and will be able to take on board up to 80 guided bombs with a guidance system GPS. That is, in one flight, the “invisible” aircraft will be able to destroy up to several dozen mobile targets, along the combat route of which destroyed missile launchers, radar stations and aircraft hangars will lie in ruins. Truly, the saying in a slightly modified form would be appropriate here - “How Mamai flew by.”

The situation with the naval component of the strategic triad is even sadder. Currently, according to the same overseas website, the Russian Navy has 12 strategic nuclear missile carriers - six type 667BDRM (Delta-IV) and six type 667BDR (Delta-III). They carry 162 missiles with 606 nuclear warheads. It would seem like a good arsenal. But this is only at first and cursory glance. Submarines can be destroyed from air and space in an instant. By 2015, the state of the naval component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces also raises many questions.

But what about military aviation? This is where things get really bad. Worse than in the Strategic Missile Forces, and even worse than in the SSBN. According to Western estimates, at the beginning of 2008, the Russian Air Force Long-Range Aviation operated 78 heavy bombers, including 14 Tu-160 (Blackjack) and 64 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), which could theoretically launch 872 long-range cruise missiles.

This type of Russian strategic triad is only suitable for demonstration flights over the World Ocean. It is absolutely unsuitable for combat response to a surprise attack. All bombers will be destroyed in the blink of an eye by the latest means of aerospace attack. When strategic bomber flights resumed, the American press and even official representative The White House openly mocked the prehistoric appearance of the Russian Tu-95MS, considering them to be absolute “mothballs”, taken out of nowhere. Indeed, in our time, keeping in service a turboprop bomber whose engine blades have an effective dispersion area (ESR) the size of a football field is nonsense. The Tu-95 has no chance of crossing the airspace of even a third-rate country.

As for the Tu-160, the gigantic dimensions of this aircraft turn each of its flights into some semblance of the launch of the American space shuttle Space Shuttle. It is no coincidence that almost every aircraft of this type has its own honorary name as a warship of the navy. A bomber weighing 275 tons takes on board 150 tons of fuel. Preparing an aircraft for flight, refueling and mounting weapons takes several hours, and during this process a swarm of special maintenance vehicles stands near the aircraft. Of course, at hour X these planes will become easy prey for American vultures.

What does Russia have as a result?

Sad, frankly speaking, conclusions for imperial hopes.

The grouping of stationary and mobile Topol-Ms, which in 2015 will form the almost exclusive backbone of the Strategic Missile Forces, in its combat capabilities will practically remain at the level of light ICBMs of the mid-70s of the last century. The insufficient throwable mass of 1-1.5 tons will not allow the implementation of powerful combat equipment for these missiles, including multi-charged individually targetable warheads. Of course, in theory it is possible to supply three low-yield nuclear warheads of 200 kt each, but even this solution can reduce the flight range of an ICBM, which today barely reaches 10,000 km.

Equipping these ICBMs with some hypersonic maneuvering warheads that are “capable of overcoming any missile defense system” will make Americans think that Russia views the United States as its main adversary. Against this background, the Chinese, with their much larger strategic programs, will seem to Pentagon hawks to be America's true friends. However, the cunning Chinese are trying to achieve this without advertising, unlike Russia, their weapons programs. The Kremlins are trying to rattle weapons that are not even available. Stupid strategy. And funny.

The ideology of deploying the maritime component of the triad has been destroyed. The SSBNs, which in their geometric dimensions and displacement are practically not inferior to the American Ohio, will carry small missiles with the formidable name “Bulava”. The insufficient range of these missiles forces them to be based in the Pacific Fleet right next to the United States. It is no secret that a powerful multi-level missile defense system is being deployed in this region, including ship-based ones with Standard SM-3 interceptor missiles, and not only American ones, but including Japanese and South Korean ships equipped with the AEGIS combat information and control system and vertical missile launch systems . Add to this component the GBI missile defense base in Alaska with the maritime platforms of the SBX multifunctional missile defense radar floating off its coast. These weapon systems can crack like nuts surviving the first strike of a Bulava missile. And it is in this area, which is also teeming with anti-submarine defense systems, that the Russian Borei and Bulava ships will set sail. Needless to say, a “wise” decision.

There is nothing to add about strategic aviation.

What to do? The eternal Russian question. It is too late to drink Borjomi when the liver has decomposed. It's time to stop rattling weapons that don't exist.

As you can see, the systemic crisis of Putin’s vertical has put an end to our entire Russian Federation – the defense industry and the nuclear shield. “Nuclear Sword” has turned into a fake, which can only be used to scare Georgia or the militants of Chechnya. However, it is not a fact that even these small but proud nations will tremble before the pile of Russian scrap metal that Russia inherited from the militaristic Soviet Union.

The aggravation of the international situation and nuclear weapons tests in North Korea have returned the topic of danger to the agenda nuclear war. How likely is a nuclear conflict today and is there any reason to fear it in the future?

What is happening to the role of nuclear weapons in the world today?

Despite last news from the Korean Peninsula, I would not say that the role of nuclear weapons in the world is increasing. Over the past ten years, no new owner of nuclear weapons has appeared in the world, nor even a country that would be suspected of being interested in such weapons. For most countries with nuclear forces, they have long been included in their strategy national security, where, as a rule, they play the role of a deterrent.

The nuclear deterrence system between Russia and the United States has existed for more than sixty years. There are clear, established rules of the game. Some experts believe that the situation is now beginning to change, including under the influence of new technologies, but, in my opinion, the system of strategic stability based on parity has not undergone a qualitative change.

For other countries of the nuclear five, nuclear weapons play a less prominent role. The arsenals of France and Great Britain were significantly reduced, and are primarily important as an indicator of status. As long as NATO exists and the United States covers Europe with its nuclear umbrella, this state of affairs is unlikely to change.

The arsenals of France and Great Britain have been significantly reduced, and, first of all, are important as an indicator of status

There is less information about China, since Beijing does not disclose information about its nuclear forces. There is a feeling that, unlike other official nuclear powers, China is increasing its capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. But, again, this is more likely part of a general trend towards bringing the country up to the level of a great power, as they understand it, than a new emphasis on the importance of nuclear weapons.

In addition to the official nuclear states, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a number of other countries have nuclear arsenals, and the dynamics here are different.

In the case of Israel, everything is stable; for the last 50 years it has not recognized or denied the presence of nuclear weapons, although everyone, in general, knows that the country has them. Since there is no immediate threat to the existence of the state, there is no point in brandishing a nuclear bomb.

Finally, India and Pakistan, unfortunately, continue to develop their nuclear arsenals. This is not surprising, Delhi is trying to catch up with Beijing, and Islamabad is chasing Delhi. Given that both countries view nuclear weapons as a viable battlefield weapon and have fought each other multiple times, the risk of escalation is quite high. But again, the situation has not changed much since 1998.

What about North Korea?

After Pyongyang embarked on the path of creating nuclear weapons, with the goal, in many respects, of achieving guarantees for the preservation of the existing state system, it is maintaining this course. First of all, North Korea, of course, restrains the United States. Nuclear tests have shown that the country has a certain number of nuclear warheads, and missile tests have demonstrated that Pyongyang can reach the nearest American bases. But this is still a rather limited form of deterrence, and the DPRK leadership wants to achieve guaranteed deterrence, when any attacking party (including the United States) will be confident that if something happens, North Korean missiles will reach it. Recent ballistic missile launches and a nuclear test show that North Korea is moving in this direction faster than expected.

Pyongyang will continue to have a nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future.

As practice has shown, existing system sanctions against the DPRK could not and will not be able to solve this situation. Pyongyang will continue to have a nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future, so the main goal now should be to reduce tensions and prevent escalation of the conflict. It is necessary to decide on realistic goals that the world community can achieve, for example, freezing the DPRK's nuclear program, stopping nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and begin negotiations with Pyongyang, being ready to offer security guarantees and the lifting of some sanctions in return. True, this cannot be done without the United States, and, unfortunately, it does not seem that Washington is ready for such a dialogue.

Is there now a possibility of the emergence of new nuclear states?

So far, the nuclear non-proliferation system has been working quite effectively. Since the NPT came into force in 1970, only three states have developed nuclear weapons. We can say that this is more than we would like, but all the main contenders have already achieved their goal, and there is no one else in line for nuclear weapons.

The question remains of Iran; at no point did it possess nuclear weapons, but it was increasing its technical capabilities in this area. Now the problem is closed by an agreement between Tehran and the six international mediators (JCPOA), including the United States, Europeans, China and Russia. Despite the coming to power of Donald Trump, who is negatively disposed towards the deal, the status quo remains; informal pressure from other parties to the agreement and his own cabinet do not allow the US President to make sudden movements. Of course, I cannot predict the behavior of Donald Trump, but I would like to hope that the agreement will stand, since it meets the interests of all participants.

And I am already silent about the fact that if the United States destroys the agreement with Iran, the agreement with the DPRK will have to be forgotten.

But there are non-nuclear countries that have everything necessary to create their own arsenal?

To launch a realistic military nuclear program, several conditions must be met.

Firstly, this is a technical opportunity: developed industry, large resources. There is the concept of a “threshold state” - a country that can quickly make nuclear weapons if such a decision is made. Such countries include, for example, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil. Typically, such countries have the technology and know-how due to their peaceful nuclear program.

If the United States destroys the agreement with Iran, the agreement with the DPRK will have to be forgotten

The second condition is a strong need for nuclear weapons, which is based on the fact that the state does not feel secure. To produce nuclear weapons, many sacrifices must be made, including the risk of being isolated and under powerful international sanctions. On this moment None of the threshold countries have an existential need to engage in nuclear deterrence - they are either covered by the US nuclear umbrella or are located in quiet regions, like Brazil. If there are no extraordinary changes in global security, they will not have such a need; here I primarily mean the development of the situation around the DPRK.

How does the international community ensure that countries do not develop nuclear weapons?

This task is entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensures that there is no diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military activities. The organization's experts know where nuclear materials are located in a particular country and regularly monitor their quantity and location.

Then, each state ensures that its nuclear materials and facilities are protected as much as possible from theft or sabotage. There is also UNSCR 1540, which aims to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. The 1540 Committee was recently extended for another 10 years. This committee collects reports from states on how they are meeting their obligations under the resolution to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. This is also what special people through Interpol do.

What do you mean by nuclear materials?

Now I'm talking about fissile materials: uranium and plutonium. Moreover, even in completely peaceful activities, quite dangerous things are sometimes used. So, initially, many research reactors used highly enriched uranium; it was convenient, but no one thought about safety. At some point, this issue arose, and the countries that supplied nuclear materials decided to take them back and modify the reactors for low-enriched uranium, which is much less dangerous from a non-proliferation point of view. This process continues today.

The traditional American rule “let’s do what’s convenient for us, and let the rest adjust” led to Russia refusing to dispose of its plutonium

It's even worse with radiological materials. Nuclear bomb They cannot be made from them, but they can be added to ordinary explosives to create a “dirty bomb” that contaminates the area with radiation. Radiological materials are used in many industries, ranging from hospitals to... agriculture. There is no international regulation for this area - only an advisory code of conduct regarding radioactive sources. Therefore, if a terrorist attack is possible, it will most likely come from these sources.

What is the debated issue regarding the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium used in warheads?

There was a corresponding agreement with the United States, according to which the countries planned to dispose of unnecessary weapons-grade plutonium by making fuel from it and burning it in fast neutron reactors. The Americans spent a long time building a special plant, but it turned out to be very expensive. As a result, they proposed not to burn the plutonium, but to mix it with nuclear waste and bury it underground. It is unlikely that this was due to the desire to create secret stockpiles of weapons - the agreement dealt with 34 tons of plutonium, this is only a third of what the United States has. But the traditional American rule “let’s do what’s convenient for us, and let the rest adjust,” together with the general tension in relations, led to Russia’s response, too, refusing to dispose of its plutonium.

Has the crisis in relations between Russia and the United States greatly affected the nuclear safety system?

If we talk about control over nuclear materials, then the crisis, of course, could not but affect it. At the IAEA site, our interaction seems to continue, but, of course, most joint programs with the United States have now been discontinued. The first part of the initiatives was curtailed by the United States after the Ukrainian crisis, and then we ourselves began to withdraw from the agreements - in particular, on the disposal of plutonium. All this is not fatal, but very sad.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the situation was perceived in the context that we are no longer enemies with America, and we can calmly think about how to effectively use our weapons. It’s difficult to talk about trust now; it seems that the arms control system is bursting at the seams. A process with clear rules and procedures is beginning to change. How dangerous is the situation?

There is pressure on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and, to a certain extent, on the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (New START).

The American administration is trying not to comment on these issues, apparently not wanting another irritant in bilateral relations. IN last time there was a substantive conversation about the INF Treaty last fall, back under Obama. Since then, the media and Congress have been saying that Russia has violated everything and should withdraw from the agreements. Trump doesn't make such accusations, but he doesn't do anything to dispel them either. I hope that the issue of strategic stability will be raised again in the near future, because before the midterm elections, Trump is unlikely to be ready to trade his popularity for this.

Now we have an agreement with the United States on the mutual limitation of nuclear weapons - we know how many missiles, bombers, and warheads each other has. But all this can end quickly. The START treaty expires in 2021, but there are no negotiations on an extension and there are no guarantees that the parties will reach an agreement.

Do you think a military escalation of the conflict between nuclear powers to a dangerous threshold is possible?

Honestly, I hope not. Both sides cannot fail to understand the danger of such escalation in the current situation.

If we remember the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, then our countries did not perceive each other as a real threat. It was important for the Bush administration to create protection against “axis of evil” missiles; Russia did not appear on this list. We replied that we would take retaliatory action, and that was the end of it. Now we would not just speak out, but would immediately deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad or make some other drastic gesture. Although the leadership in Moscow and Washington is absolutely not interested in such an outcome.

Issues of limiting nuclear escalation are primarily political

Moreover, the issues of limiting nuclear escalation are predominantly political. Remember the famous initiative of the 90s to “de-target” Russian and American ballistic missiles at each other to avoid the consequences of an accidental launch? It's still active. But when I asked one of the senior US Air Force officers in charge of nuclear forces how long the retargeting would take, he replied - a few seconds, if the order came.

We again see each other as potential adversaries - this is a great danger for the whole world. At the same time, with all the power of nuclear weapons, they really cannot be used - they just lie in the mines, and you spend a lot of money on them. We need a military force that can be used to, say, peacekeeping activities, or to fight terrorism, and not to destroy humanity.

Some experts believe that American weapons could prevent Russian missiles from taking off.

Of course, weapons are constantly improving, but no military man will ever tell you with sufficient confidence that the United States can destroy Russian missiles before takeoff. The same is true for American missiles. Even taking into account the deployed missile defense system, this is hardly possible. In addition to the silo installations, the location of which is known, it would be necessary to destroy all submarines, which are much more difficult to detect, all aircraft with nuclear weapons in the air, all mobile systems moving around the country.

Both Russia and the United States have deployed over 1,500 nuclear warheads on various carriers; these weapons carry a huge destructive force. Even if only 10-20 intercontinental ballistic missiles reach the target, this means 20-30 cities destroyed. And this is not counting tactical nuclear weapons, which will not reach the United States, but will reach, for example, American bases in European countries or in Turkey. Therefore, I do not think that the US has any sense of superiority in this regard, the balance is quite stable.

Are there any new initiatives related to limiting nuclear weapons?

In New York at the end of the month, about 130 countries are due to sign a UN convention banning nuclear weapons. Their desire to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again is understandable: both the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and nuclear tests, and even Fukushima, show us the destructiveness of such a scenario for humanity. But, in the end, not a single nuclear-weapon state will take part in the convention, which is likely to come into force. That is, states that do not have nuclear weapons will sign an agreement among themselves. This is unlikely to really solve any of the existing problems.

In the Middle East, the key issue is nuclear program Israel

If the development of this treaty was an attempt to put pressure on nuclear-weapon states in order to speed up the disarmament process, then I would rate it as unsuccessful. More like a position nuclear countries with regard to dialogue and international control over disarmament has become more stringent. You need to understand that everything known cases refusal of states to possess nuclear weapons (the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear forces from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the disarmament of South Africa) turned out to be possible when countries decided that this was in accordance with their national interests and will not affect security. To discuss disarmament without taking these factors into account is to engage in self-deception.

What might an effective international security system look like in 2035?

If we do not want the system to be in permanent crisis, then, firstly, cooperation between Russia and the United States must continue and strengthen. Secondly, it is important to include the PRC in this dialogue so that the country moves towards greater transparency.

In the Middle East, the key issue is Israel's nuclear program. But as long as Tel Aviv does not acknowledge its existence, it is very difficult to discuss it. By and large, today Israel feels quite secure: the Arab states against which the nuclear arsenal was created no longer threaten it, and nuclear weapons will not help in the fight against terrorists. Therefore, the Israeli government must recognize that the regime of uncertainty, like nuclear weapons themselves, is a relic of the Cold War, and the possibility of changing the status quo can at least be discussed.

It is necessary to continue strengthening the nonproliferation regime to avoid the emergence of new nuclear countries

A very important step is working with other countries outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Currently, no systematic relations have been established with them. It is necessary to modernize the system for discussing nuclear weapons issues and include (formally or informally) these countries in it.

Finally, we need to continue strengthening the nonproliferation regime to avoid the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states. Export control, IAEA guarantees, and international cooperation in this area must be developed. Many countries have recently switched to disarmament, but this is not a reason to forget about non-proliferation.

Andrey Baklitsky

Researcher at the Center global problems And international organizations YES MFA of the Russian Federation.

In 2008-2009 studied at the University of Seville (Spain). Graduate of the International Summer school on security issues 2011.

In 2011-2013 - Head of the PIR Center Internet project, since 2013 - Director of PIR Center information projects. In 2014-2017 — Director of the “Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation” program. Participant in the sessions of the preparatory committee for the 2013-2014 NPT Review Conference. and the NPT Review Conference 2015. Editor of the PIR Center White Paper “Ten Steps to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East”, editor of the report “Iran in the Regional and Global Context”. Area of scientific interests: international security, greater Middle East, nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation.

The article is from last year, I think the situation is even worse now. In principle, I have long suspected this, but there are serious calculations here. The article is not from a Ukrainian site, if anything.

Russia's nuclear bluff for internal use

Russian rulers are not taken seriously in the West. Not considered by the West and nuclear threat Russia has very serious reasons for this. The myth of the “nuclear shield” is firmly entrenched only in the minds of Russian TV viewers, misinformed by pro-Kremlin TV liars.

The guaranteed life of a nuclear charge in a Russian ballistic missile is 10 years, and then the warhead must be sent to a factory, since the plutonium in it must be changed. Nuclear weapons are an expensive pleasure, requiring the maintenance of an entire industry for constant maintenance and replacement of charges. Alexander Kuzmuk, Ukraine's defense minister from 1996 to 2001, said in an interview that Ukraine had 1,740 nuclear weapons, Kuzmuk said, “but those nuclear weapons expired before 1997.” Therefore, Ukraine’s acceptance of nuclear-free status was nothing more than a beautiful gesture

Why “before 1997”? Because Gorbachev stopped the production of new nuclear charges, and the last old Soviet charges expired in the 90s. “Both Russia and the United States have practically not produced either weapons-grade uranium or weapons-grade plutonium for more than 10 years. Somewhere since 1990, all this has been stopped" ( IN AND. Rybachenkov, Advisor to the Department for Security and Disarmament Issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation). Regarding the United States, the adviser is “misleading the public,” but the fact that under Gorbachev in the USSR the production of weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium was completely curtailed is precisely true.

To avoid the temptation to make new nuclear charges for ballistic missiles, the Americans concluded a “very profitable” deal with the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (for 20 years!). The Americans bought weapons-grade uranium from Russian old warheads (and then promised to buy plutonium), and in return Russian reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium were shut down. “Minatom of Russia: main milestones in the development of the nuclear industry”: “1994 - The Government of the Russian Federation made a decision to stop the production of weapons-grade plutonium.”

In Russia, not only did the old Soviet nuclear warheads for missile warheads expire “before 1997,” but they also don’t have the plutonium to make new ones. They cannot be made from old Soviet plutonium, since its isotopic composition, like the plutonium in warheads, has irreversibly changed. And in order to obtain new weapons-grade plutonium and produce new nuclear charges for missiles, it takes not just time - there are no specialists, the equipment is not in working order. In Russia, even the technology for manufacturing tank gun barrels has been lost; after the first few shots, the flight of the next shells from a new Russian tank is hardly predictable. The reasons are the same - specialists have grown old or dispersed from idle production facilities, and the equipment is either dilapidated or stolen.

It is likely that much more complex technologies for producing weapons-grade plutonium and creating nuclear charges from it have been lost, and it will take not a year or two to restore them, but at best 10 years. And will the Americans allow the Russian Federation to restart reactors to produce highly enriched weapons-grade plutonium? Russia has set up a unique experiment to destroy the technosphere of a modern technogenic society; under today’s regime, the technosphere is melting before our eyes, society is losing technology, infrastructure, and most importantly, people who are capable of working not as salesmen or security guards. The Russian Federation quite naturally transformed from a country possessing nuclear weapons into a country potentially capable of possessing them; its status changed from a real superpower to the status of a potential superpower, and this fundamentally changes Russian relations with other countries.

Therefore, the American government allocated the most powerful supercomputers to the American Department of Energy, officially announcing that for scientists to simulate degradation processes in nuclear charges, the only thing they “forgot” to tell the media was that they were going to simulate degradation processes not in American charges, but in Russian ones. The game was worth the candle and no money was spared for this purpose; the American elite wanted to know exactly when it was guaranteed that not a single Russian nuclear warhead would explode. Scientists gave the answer, and when the estimated time approached, American policy towards Russia began to gradually change as fundamentally as Russian nuclear status.

But then the position of the Russian elite “suddenly” began to become more complicated. At the beginning of 2007, the influential newspaper Washington Post published an article in which it was recommended not to flirt with the Russian ruling elite anymore, since there is no real power behind it, but to put the crooks in their place. At this point, Putin himself lost his mind, and he launched the “Munich Speech” about a multipolar world. And at the beginning of 2008, Congress instructed Condoleezza Rice to compile a list of leading Russian corrupt officials. Who in Russia earned big money honestly? Nobody. The final fog cleared, and the Kremlin elite acutely sensed the impending end.

Even during Medvedev’s “presidency,” the Russian authorities announced grandiose plans in the military sphere: “The serial construction of warships is planned, primarily nuclear submarine cruisers with cruise missiles and multi-purpose submarines. An aerospace defense system will be created.” To which Condoleezza Rice calmly responded in an interview with Reuters: “The balance of power in terms of nuclear deterrence will not change from these actions.” Why would he change? What will Medvedev load onto ships and cruise missiles?

There are no usable nuclear warheads. Russian missiles have only false targets, no real targets. Building a missile defense system against missiles like “Satan” is madness, miss once and goodbye to a dozen major cities. But against radioactive scrap metal, which is now on Russian missiles instead of warheads (most likely, it was removed, since old weapons-grade plutonium gets very hot - it’s hot like an iron), you can create a missile defense system against it, if the missile defense system misses, then there’s nothing particularly terrible will happen, although it will be unpleasant to then disinfect a hectare of your territory. The missile defense system is designed to catch radioactive scrap metal when the Russian Federation is finally disarmed.

What about Russian generals? They fell into mysticism. As once upon a time with the collapse of the Third Reich, and today with the expected imminent end of the Energy Superpower, the military has the same belief in secret superweapons, this is the agony of the ability to think soberly. The generals started talking about some warheads maneuvering in space (from a technical point of view - complete nonsense), about hypersonic super-altitude cruise missiles, about installations sending short, super-powerful electromagnetic pulses.

Generals love their homeland, but money even more. Enriched uranium was sold at a price 25 times lower than its value, since it was stolen, stolen from its people, and they did not take the market price for the stolen goods, but sold them for next to nothing, part of the money for the sale of warheads and cutting of Satan missiles went to the generals. The generals were given orderlies like orderlies in Tsarist Russia, they were given a luxurious pension, and in Chechnya you could play toy soldiers to your heart's content, get drunk and send boys who had not been shot at to slaughter, and you wouldn't get anything for it (at least one general was tried for the storming of Grozny?). The son of every general could also become a general; there were more generals in Russia per capita than anywhere else in the world.

For 30 years, the balance of nuclear deterrence was determined by treaties between the USSR and the United States; the United States no longer proposes to start a new treaty process, there is nothing to agree on. Putin urgently ran to legitimize the border with China, and China began to publish textbooks in which almost all of Siberia and the Far East are territories seized by Russia from China. The EU invited Russia to sign the Energy Charter, according to which the EU will produce oil and gas on the territory of the Russian Federation, transport it to itself, and the Russians are offered a reward - a fig. EU officials frankly explained that Russia has three options - to lie under the EU, to lie under the US, or to become Chinese cheap labor, that's all the choice. The main players are aware of what is happening and are not shy.

The conversation between the Russian rulers and the West turned into “mine is yours, don’t understand”, both sides are talking about completely different things, Moscow to them - “You promised us!”, and those to the Russians - “So you have nothing else but a cheap bluff!” (The Russian Federation’s sending of a Tu-160 to Venezuela did not cause a new Caribbean crisis, as it was perceived by the “probable enemy” solely as a clownery).

Russia's richest natural resources cannot belong to a weak, deserted power. The United States has decided to stop buying old weapons-grade uranium from the Russian Federation. Although it is very profitable for Americans to buy it at a price many times lower than its market value, landing Russian generals is more important.

Meanwhile, Russia stopped producing weapons-grade plutonium. NTV reported, how the last reactor of this type existing in Russia was closed in Zheleznogorsk. It has been producing plutonium for the last half century. Especially for its service, the closed city of Krasnoyarsk-26 was created in the USSR, later renamed Zheleznogorsk.

The Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine was a unique nuclear enterprise that had no analogues in the world. Its production workshops were located deep underground.

But even if Russia’s nuclear shield had somehow miraculously survived and the production of nuclear plutonium had not been curtailed, then in technical terms the Russian Federation would still be hopelessly behind its closest competitors. For example, the American nuclear potential has long been one third greater than the Russian nuclear fake. According to Gazeta.Ru, the United States is one third larger than Russia in the number of deployed long-range ballistic missiles, their launchers and nuclear warheads.

Already by 2015, Russia could theoretically be swatted like a fly. As St. Petersburg writes: Military parity, maintaining in the required quantitative and qualitative condition the fleet of Russia's strategic nuclear triad - ICBMs, strategic missile submarines and heavy bombers - in the foreseeable future will become a task beyond the capabilities of the country. A number of conceptual errors in the development of the strategic arsenal made in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods led to the fact that after a certain period of time Russia risks being left with weapons that cannot guarantee the security of the country.

The mobility of strategic weapons as a panacea for their invulnerability played a bad joke on the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. First of all, the very concept of creating ICBMs on self-propelled automobile and railway chassis was erroneous. By creating such complex weapons systems as the RT-2PM Topol (NATO code SS-25) mobile ground-based missile systems (GGRK) and the RS-22 Molodets (SS-24) combat railway missile systems (BZHRK), the country incurred enormous additional costs to create these strategic groupings. The American Minuteman and MX series ICBMs, similar in their combat capabilities, were placed in highly protected silo launchers, where they were ready for immediate use in an emergency.

Thus, by approximately 2015 year Strategic Missile Forces Russia will have approximately 76 stationary and 69 mobile Topol-M. In total there will be approximately 145 of them. Note - monoblock ones. As for the new multi-charged RS-24 type, there is no data on their deployment. It is worth noting that the planned deployment of such a number of Topol-Ms is based on the figures of the State Armaments Program (GAP) until 2015, which was never fully implemented. The RF Ministry of Defense cannot in any way fix the cost of certain types of weapons, including strategic ones, as a result of which defense companies inflate their costs to sky-high levels. Chief of the General Staff General Yu. Baluevsky spoke about this in an interview with the Vesti-24 channel. And the reason for this is the fact that Russia’s defense budget is a completely opaque item of government spending, which leads to this kind of financial somersault.

What about military aviation? This is where things get really bad. Worse than in the Strategic Missile Forces, and even worse than in the SSBN. According to Western estimates, at the beginning of 2008, the Russian Air Force Long-Range Aviation operated 78 heavy bombers, including 14 Tu-160 (Blackjack) and 64 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), which could theoretically launch 872 long-range cruise missiles.

This type of Russian strategic triad is only suitable for demonstration flights over the World Ocean. It is absolutely unsuitable for combat response to a surprise attack. All bombers will be destroyed in the blink of an eye by the latest means of aerospace attack. When flights of strategic bombers were resumed, the American press and even official representatives of the White House openly mocked the prehistoric appearance of the Russian Tu-95MS, considering them to be absolute “mothballs”, taken out of nowhere. Indeed, in our time, keeping in service a turboprop bomber whose engine blades have an effective dispersion area (ESR) the size of a football field is nonsense. The Tu-95 has no chance of crossing the airspace of even a third-rate country.

What does Russia have as a result?

Sad, frankly speaking, conclusions for imperial hopes.

The ideology of deploying the maritime component of the triad has been destroyed. The SSBNs, which in their total geometric dimensions and displacement are practically not inferior to the American Ohio, will carry small missiles with the formidable name “Bulava”. The insufficient range of these missiles forces them to be based in the Pacific Fleet right next to the United States.

It is no secret that a powerful multi-level missile defense system is being deployed in this region, including ship-based ones with Standard SM-3 interceptor missiles, and not only American ones, but including Japanese and South Korean ships equipped with the AEGIS combat information and control system and vertical missile launch systems . Add to this component the GBI missile defense base in Alaska with the maritime platforms of the SBX multifunctional missile defense radar floating off its coast. These weapon systems can crack like nuts surviving the first strike of a Bulava missile. And it is in this area, which is also teeming with anti-submarine defense systems, that the Russian Borei and Bulava ships will set sail. Needless to say, a “wise” decision.

There is nothing to add about strategic aviation.

As you can see, the systemic crisis of Putin’s vertical has put an end to our entire Russian Federation – the defense industry and the nuclear shield. “Nuclear Sword” has turned into a fake, which can only be used to scare Georgia or the militants of Chechnya. However, it is not a fact that even these small nations will tremble before the pile of Russian scrap metal that Russia inherited from the militaristic Soviet Union.

Despite the comforting statements of the Russian military leadership, the Russian Federation simply has nothing to defend itself against NATO forces. The date is already known when the Americans will create a full-scale missile defense system, we're talking about about 2015.

The American military cruisers Lake Erie are equipped with the Aegis missile defense system; this missile defense system is capable of tracking and destroying not only intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also nuclear submarines and even orbital satellites moving at a speed of 8 kilometers per second. This super-weapon will block Russia's imaginary and almost rusty nuclear potential by 100%.

The Aegis anti-missile system was developed on the basis of a conventional air defense system with the same name. American designers simply increased the power of the radar's electromagnetic radiation and upgraded it to new software. And due to this, the radar system of the Aegis complex was able to track intercontinental ballistic missiles at a huge distance - 320 km.

The main armament of the Aegis system is the latest-generation heavy-duty Standard-3 missile, which is capable of destroying targets in outer space and at a range of up to 500 km.

In order for Standard-3 to hit targets outside the atmosphere, the developers equipped its body with four stages or blocks with fuel liquid. The first two blocks of the rocket accelerate it within the atmosphere, the third launches the rocket into outer space, and the fourth part of the rocket is a kinetic projectile, which hits the target.

American destroyers with the latest Aegis missile defense system are located not only in the Atlantic Ocean, they periodically enter the Black and Barents Seas. This means one thing - each of them can shoot down ballistic missile Russian nuclear submarine right at the initial stage of flight, even if the launch is made from Russian territorial waters. This is despite the fact that 40% of Russia's nuclear potential is based on nuclear submarines.

The Aegis complex can disable Russian missiles already at the acceleration stage, which may be related to the Americans’ refusal of any negotiations on missile defense. That is, the Pentagon became confident that the United States now has such power and such potential that it is able to prevent nuclear strike from Russia.

By 2015, NATO forces will have 400 cruisers and destroyers equipped with Aegis interceptors and Standard-3 interceptors, each of these interceptors capable of destroying any Russian intercontinental ballistic missile. And this despite the fact that Russia only has about 80 new intercontinental missiles, the rest were released in the Soviet Union.

The Satan and Topol missiles, which are on duty in the Russian missile forces, are already 30 years old. During this time, the flammable mixture with which they are filled has lost its quality, and the metal casing of the missiles has corroded - this means that in the event of a military conflict, many of them simply will not take off. And this will be better than them taking off, but due to their unpredictability they will strike at their own territory

In an old Soviet joke, children brag about who has which toys. Vanya talked about the teddy bear, Tanya boasted about the new Barbie doll, and the drunkard’s son, listening to them with envy, suddenly burst into a tirade: “And I.. Yes, my.. Yes, I’m giving you all a damn!”

This is exactly how Putin’s kneeling electorate behaves today. The nanoleader has nothing more to offer to society, the President of the Russian Federation cannot explain to the Russians why he pays tribute to Kadyrov, and the terrorist attacks in the Caucasus do not subside, why his Skolkovo project failed, why the Russians screwed up with the Superjet-100 project, and much more. etc. Siberian cranes and Aladdin's amphoras are not impressive. The victories with Colorado scarves are also running out of steam and some kind of boost is required. And here, such happiness - Crimea!

P.S. If you think that this is some kind of propaganda article, then there is more information. In particular, the article: http://censor.net, here is an excerpt from it:

“We have forty Satan missiles with an expiring warranty period, and Topol is not serious at all,” a Moscow professor about Russia’s “nuclear shield.” There is practically no “Russian nuclear shield” anymore. Such a terrible secret for compatriots was revealed in his report by Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Natural and Technosphere Safety and Risk Management of the Russian State Technological University Petr Belov.

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

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