Code name of the plan for the offensive operation of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don fronts during the Great Patriotic War, during which the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht was surrounded.

Situation at the beginning of the operation

By the time the operation began, it had already been going on for four months. Repeated attempts by the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - Colonel General) to take Stalingrad by storm were unsuccessful. The 62nd and 64th armies held strong defenses on the outskirts of the city. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the stretched rear and the approach of winter led to the fact that the German army found itself in a difficult situation. The Wehrmacht command intended to hold the occupied positions until the onset of spring, and then carry out a decisive offensive.

Operation plan and preparation for it

The first discussions of the plan for the offensive operation near Stalingrad took place at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in early September 1942. During them, it was decided that the offensive should solve two main tasks - to encircle and isolate the German group operating in the city area from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, and then defeat it.

The plan of the operation, codenamed “Uranus,” was distinguished by its breadth and boldness of concept. Troops of three fronts were involved in it - Stalingrad (commander - Colonel General), Southwestern (commander - Lieutenant General, from December 1942 Colonel General) and (commander - Lieutenant General, from January 1943 Colonel General ). The total offensive area was 400 square meters. The northern group of forces had to overcome German defense and fight 120-140 kilometers, and the southern one - 100 kilometers, after which both groups were supposed to meet, completing the encirclement of Paulus's army. When developing the operation, it was taken into account that German troops, in trying to take Stalingrad, had used up all their reserves - by mid-November it had only six reserve divisions scattered over a large section of the front. The German command tried to strengthen them, but was too late.

To prepare for the offensive, the fronts were strengthened. The Southwestern Front included two tank divisions, cavalry corps, a number of artillery and tank units and formations; Stalingrad includes mechanized and cavalry corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades; Donskoy includes three rifle divisions. All these forces were transferred as quickly as possible - from October 1 to November 18, 1942. In total, at the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops involved in it numbered about 1 million 135 thousand soldiers and commanders, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.9 thousand aircraft. In this way, a decisive superiority was created over the enemy in this sector of the front: in personnel by 2-2.5 times, and in artillery and tanks by 4-5 times.

General management of the operation from Headquarters was carried out by the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General (since January 1943 - Army General). Preparations for it were carried out with the participation of Army General and Colonel General of Artillery N. N. Voronov.

The Soviet command widely used methods of misinforming the enemy regarding the location and time of the attack. Thanks to the high-quality camouflage of troop movements, the enemy did not know until the very last moment what forces the Soviet troops had on the Stalingrad sector of the front. The construction of false objects was widely used - 17 bridges were built across the Don alone, 12 of which were false. All these measures led to the fact that the Wehrmacht command did not expect a counteroffensive at Stalingrad, thinking that the offensive operation would be undertaken in the Rzhev salient or in the Caucasus.

Progress of hostilities

The operation began on November 19, 1942. On this day, the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. Due to poor weather conditions, the command had to abandon air support and rely only on artillery. At 7:30, simultaneously in several areas, 3,500 guns and mortars began shelling enemy positions. The German troops, who did not expect the attack, suffered heavy losses. The first to attack were the 14th (commander - Guards Major General A. S. Gryaznov) and 47th (commander - Guard Colonel, from December 1942 Guards Major General F. A. Ostashenko) Guards, 119th ( commander - colonel, since January 1943, Major General M. M. Danilov) and 124th (commander - Major General A. I. Belov) rifle divisions. The enemy offered stubborn resistance - in the first four hours of the offensive, Soviet units advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The 1st (commander - Major General of Tank Forces M.E. Katukov) and 26th (commander - Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Rodin) tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough, which completed the task of breaking through the defense - enemy troops , most of which in this area were Romanian units, were partly pushed back, partly surrendered. By mid-day, the defense was finally broken through and further actions were being developed behind enemy lines. In an effort to push back the Soviet troops and restore the situation, the German command brought into action operational reserves - four divisions. However, they only managed to delay the advance of the Red Army units. The 63rd (commander - Colonel N.D. Kozin), 76th (commander - Colonel N.T. Tavartkiladze), 96th (commander - Major General I.M. Shepetov), ​​293 successfully operated in their sectors 1st (commander - Major General F.D. Lagutin) rifle divisions, 4th tank (commander - Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Kravchenko) and 3rd Guards Cavalry (commander - Major General I.A. . Pliev) housing. Mobile formations of the Southwestern Front rapidly moved south into the operational depth, destroying the enemy's reserves, headquarters and retreating formations. The Romanian troops suffered especially heavy losses here - two of their corps were completely destroyed, another one was surrounded.

On the Don Front, the main blow was delivered by the 65th Army (commander - Lieutenant General). By the end of the first day of the operation, it had advanced 4-5 kilometers, without being able to break through the defenses. However, the stubborn resistance of the enemy in this area could not save the situation - the gap created as a result of the breakthrough on the left flank of Paulus's army was rapidly growing. On November 20, 1942, units of the 26th Tank Corps stormed a strategically important junction highways Perelazovskoe. On the same day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were brought into action. The 57th (commander - major general) and 64th (commander - lieutenant general) armies simultaneously, after artillery preparation, struck enemy positions from two flanks. The enemy defenses were broken through in several sectors: the 57th Army by the forces of the 169th (commander - Colonel I.I. Melnikov) and 422nd (commander - Colonel I.K. Morozov) rifle divisions, and the 64th - by the forces of 36 1st Guards (commander - Major General M.I. Denisenko), 38th (commander - Colonel A.D. Korotkov) and 204th (commander - Colonel, since December 1942, Major General A.V. Skvortsov ) rifle divisions. The 13th Tank (commander - Colonel T.I. Tanaschishin), 4th Mechanized (commander - Major General V.T. Volsky) and 4th Cavalry (commander - Lieutenant General T.T.) were introduced into the resulting breakthroughs Shapkin) corps, which launched an offensive to the northwest and southwest. Unlike the attack in the north, the southern one was unexpected for the German command. Already on the second day of the operation, the enemy was forced to commit all of its remaining reserves. These measures could only delay the advance of the Red Army.

The command of the 6th Army and the Wehrmacht did not appreciate the scale of the threat to their Stalingrad group in time. It was only on the evening of November 20, 1942 that it became obvious to Paulus that the Soviet units were carrying out a major operation. Realizing that the threat of complete encirclement loomed over him, he transferred part of his reserves, but many of them failed to break through. Seeing this, Paulus suggested that the command break through to the southwest, leaving the Stalingrad lines, but Hitler did not agree to this. The offensive of the Soviet troops led to the fact that command post The 6th Army was under threat of attack, and Paulus transferred it deeper to the rear, to the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. Panic began to grow in the ranks of the German units, and especially among their allies - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians.

On November 23, 1942, the 26th Tank Corps liberated the city of Kalach. On the same day, near the Sovetsky farm, its units met with the 4th Mechanized Corps, which marked the unification of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts and the closure of the encirclement. It included about 330 thousand enemy soldiers and officers (22 divisions, 160 separate and auxiliary units). The next day, the defeat of the Romanian units in the area of ​​the village of Raspopinskaya was completed - about 30 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered. IN as soon as possible an encirclement front was created, protected both from attack from within and from attack from without - it was obvious that the enemy would soon try to break through it. On November 24, 1942, Paulus suggested that Hitler leave Stalingrad and break through to the southwest to join the main forces, but he again responded with a categorical refusal.

Over the next week, the Stalingrad and Don Front completed the encirclement, throwing back parts of the 6th Army and thereby reducing the front to 80 kilometers from west to east and to 40 from north to south. Having consolidated his battle formations, Paulus was able to organize an effective defense, including using those fortified lines on which Soviet troops held the defense throughout the summer-autumn of 1942. This significantly delayed the Soviet troops and delayed the defeat of the Stalingrad group.

The German command tried to organize a breakthrough with the forces of the shock army group "Goth" (commander - G. Goth), which was part of Army Group "Don" (commander -) and consisted of 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions. Manstein intended to carry it out in the area of ​​​​the city of Kotelnikovo. On December 12, 1942, the troops involved went on the offensive and pushed back the Soviet troops. However, on December 15, 1942, beyond the Aksai River, as a result of stubborn resistance by Soviet troops, this offensive was stopped. The enemy had 40 kilometers left to the front line with inside rings. On December 16, 1942, units of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive and over the next three days broke through his defenses. The Hotha group, which also included one Italian army, suffered heavy losses, its front completely crumbled. As a result of the counterattack, the outer line of the encirclement ring was moved away from the inner line by 200-250 kilometers, which finally deprived the 6th Army of any hope of breaking through in the near future.

By January 1943, the position of the Stalingrad group had completely deteriorated. On January 8, the Soviet command presented Paulus with an ultimatum to surrender, but Hitler categorically prohibited surrender. Then the Soviet troops launched an offensive operation to completely defeat the 6th Army (code name - Operation “Ring”), as a result of which Stalingrad was liberated, and the enemy soldiers and officers who were still alive by that time, led by Paulus himself, surrendered to captivity.

Results of the operation

As a result of Operation Uranus, German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, and Croatian units suffered a severe defeat. Their irretrievable losses amounted to more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers. During the fighting, more than 155 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were killed, and more than 300 thousand people were wounded. This operation demonstrated to the whole world the operational and tactical skill of the Red Army command and had a huge political effect - in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the occupied territories, the victory on the Volga caused a general upsurge. In Germany, the defeat of the Stalingrad group was met with three days of mourning. In Italy, Hungary and Romania, which lost a significant part of their armed forces, the defeat became one of the reasons for the internal political crisis, which subsequently resulted in the overthrow of the leaders of these states and their withdrawal from the alliance with Hitler.

Germany Commanders Georgy Zhukov
Alexander Vasilevsky Friedrich Paulus
Hermann Got

Operation Uranus- code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - November 30, 1942). Counter-offensive of troops of three fronts: Southwestern (general), Stalingrad (general A.I. Eremenko) and Don (general K.K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying an enemy group of troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Stalingrad.

Military situation before the operation

By the end of the defensive period Battle of Stalingrad The 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barricades plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 62nd Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general offensive of the Nazi troops was stopped. On November 10, they went on the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of areas in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the Nazi troops became more complicated. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched over 2,300 km, the flanks of the strike groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not able to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the fascist German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until spring, and then go on the offensive again.

Balance of forces on the fronts

Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aircraft and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the “History of the Second World War,” was as follows:

Operation plan

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and General base in September they began to develop a counteroffensive plan. November 13 strategic counteroffensive plan under code name“Uranus” was approved by Headquarters under the chairmanship of J.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N.F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of delivering deep strikes from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas (offensive depth of about 120 km); The strike group of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes area to a depth of 100 km. Strike groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces at Stalingrad. At the same time, with part of the forces, these same fronts ensured the creation of an external front of encirclement. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th Air Armies, carried out two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky area along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided: to direct the main attacks against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy’s defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups use terrain favorable to the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough sectors, by weakening the secondary sectors, create a 2.8 - 3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy in the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy achieved in the concentration of forces, strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

Progress of the operation

October 1942, fighting in the area of ​​the Red October plant

Start of the offensive

The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began on the morning of November 19 after powerful artillery bombardment. Troops of the 5th Tank Army broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army. German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps brought into the battle, the advanced units of which reached the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike group of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Tank Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of ​​the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group between the Volga and Don rivers. The 6th and the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of 330 thousand people. By this time, most of the external front of the encirclement had been created, the distance of which from the internal one was 40-100 km.

The Soviet command estimated the size of the group that was to be encircled in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80 - 90 thousand. The original version had a more modest scale. Underestimation had no effect significant influence to a rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a large underestimation with a brilliant final result is not the only example in military history. As similar example You can cite the Battle of Novi. Long availability huge cauldron, which attracted all the forces and attention of the enemy and sharply limited possible options His actions on the entire southern wing allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly develop the success of the encirclement and inflict huge new losses on the enemy.

January 1943

Notes

see also

Literature

  • Zhukov G.K. Battle of Stalingrad. TSB article. 3rd ed.
  • Samsonov A. M. Battle of Stalingrad

Military situation before the operation

Operation plan

By directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the Southwestern Front was created as part of the 5th Tank, 21st and 1st Guards Armies, deployed at the turn of the river. Don on the Verkhniy Mamon - Kletskaya front. The newly created front is reinforced by cavalry, rifle and tank troops, as well as artillery of the RGK (reserve of the Main Command) and special forces from the Headquarters reserve to carry out offensive operations in cooperation with the armies of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. The main idea of ​​"Uran" is the encirclement and defeat of the German-Romanian troops operating in the Don Bend and in the Stalingrad direction. The immediate task of the Southwestern Front is the defeat of the 4th Romanian Army, reaching the rear of the German group at Stalingrad and encircling them with the aim of subsequent destruction. All preparations for the operation took place in the strictest secrecy.

Progress of the operation

  • Thursday of the year, 7 o'clock in the morning - the beginning of Operation Uranus. Thick fog and snow. Due to bad weather, air support is not available.

Southwestern Front

  • 7.30 – 8.48 – artillery preparation on the forward positions of the Romanian troops.
  • 8.50 – start of attack on forward positions by ground infantry and tank formations. A large number of survivors due to bad weather, firing positions greatly hampered the advance of troops.
  • 12.00 – the offensive advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The commander of the 5th Tank Army, Lieutenant General P. L. Romanenko, takes a great risk by ordering the 1st and 26th Tank Corps to enter the battle.
  • 16.00 - the enemy defenses between the Tsutskan and Tsaritsa rivers are broken through by the 5th Tank Army. By this time, the advancing troops had already gone 16 km deep. Two tank corps of the Southwestern Front began moving east to the city of Kalach-on-Don, where, according to the plan, they were supposed to meet the troops of the Stalingrad Front.
  • On the night of the 26th Tank Corps captured the village of Ostrov and reached the crossing of the Don. By evening the crossing was captured and the corps moved on. There were only a few kilometers left to our destination.

Stalingrad Front

  • 1942 at 10.00 - artillery preparation began, after which the infantry units went on the offensive. By the afternoon, the enemy defenses had been broken through in several places. Then motorized formations went into battle, cutting off the retreat of German troops in the Chervlenaya area.
  • In the morning, the 4th mechanized corps captured Tinguty station. Thus cutting off the railway connection with the 6th and 4th German armies. The 4th Cavalry Corps finally cut off the escape route, completing a 70-kilometer march and recapturing the village of Abganerovo from the enemy.

Compound

  • at 16.00 - having defeated the 24th and 16th German tank divisions, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts united in the area of ​​Kalach - Sovetsky farm. The ring closed. The entire 6th and part of the 4th tank armies were surrounded, that is, about 330 thousand German and Romanian soldiers.

"Thunderclap" (German: "Donnerkeil")

  • fascist German troops attempted to withdraw the 6th Panzer Army from encirclement, under the code name “Thunderstrike”. Hastily arriving German units under the command of the Field Marshal struck the least protected, but quite long section of the ring in the Kotelnikovsky area. The blow was taken by the 51st Guards Army of General Trufanov, which heroically held its positions for a week until the approach of the 2nd Guards Army of the general. Manstein's troops managed to advance 40 km with huge losses. But, being only 6 hours ahead of the Nazis, the 2nd Army gave the enemy a tough rebuff in the area of ​​the Myshkova River.
  • The Red Army began its offensive against Manstein's defeated troops. Operation Thunderbolt was a complete failure.

Start: November 19 End: February 2 Result: capture of the encircled Axis group

Sides:

Powers
to the start of the operation

187 thousand Human
2.2 thousand guns and mortars
400 tanks
454 aircraft ( +200 myself. YES and 60 myself. air defense)

Total 1.14 million Human .

to the start of the operation

270 thousand Human
3 thousand guns and mortars
500 tanks
1200 airplane

Total > 1 million Human.
Losses
1 million 143 thousand people (irretrievable and sanitary losses), 524 thousand units. shooter weapons 4341 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2777 aircraft, 15.7 thousand guns and mortars1.5 million total

Stalingrad offensive operation- strategic operation of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. The goal is to defeat the enemy group operating in the Stalingrad direction (the main forces of Army Group B) and create conditions for the defeat of the entire southern wing of the Nazi troops. . Code name - "Uranus".

Conducted by troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts (from January 1, 1943, renamed the Southern Front) from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The development of the operation was carried out by the General Staff and the Supreme Command Headquarters. The main contribution to the preparation of the offensive was made by Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky.

Operation Uranus underwent major changes compared to the original plan, which envisaged the encirclement and liquidation of 80-90 thousand enemy groups. The encircled group, numbering about 300 thousand people or more, suspended the offensive of the troops of the Don Front, and therefore the Soviet command was required to develop and introduce an additional operation into Operation Uranus - “Ring”, as well as take measures to neutralize enemy actions on the external front of the encirclement in December 1942.

The encirclement of the enemy group occurred from November 19 to 23 as a result of Soviet troops flank counter attacks: by the Southwestern Front with the active support of the right wing of the Don Front from the Serafimovich area from the bridgehead on the Don on November 19 and the Stalingrad Front from the Sarpinskie Lakes area on November 20 in the general direction of Kalach-Sovetsky. During the 5-day encirclement, the 3rd Romanian Army and the 48th German Tank Corps were defeated; the German 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian 4th Army suffered significant losses; The 6th Field Army lost 73 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, including 39 thousand prisoners. As a result of the offensive, one of the largest groupings in the history of war was surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the 6th and parts of the 4th tank armies with a total number of up to 330,000 people.

By the end of November, Soviet troops had created an external encirclement front and halved the area occupied by the encircled enemy. Further offensive was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who thickened the battle formations by reducing the front and organized defense in positions prepared by Soviet troops in the summer of 1942.

On December 12, 1942, in order to release the encircled group from the Kotelnikovsky area, the Goth army group launched an offensive. Taking advantage of the great numerical superiority over the 51st Army, in particular, over the 4th Mechanized Corps, which took the main blow, with heavy fighting, by December 19, it advanced 40 km to the line of the Aksai River and was 80 km from the Stalingrad pocket . However, by December 19, the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army had already been deployed at the turn of the Myshkova River, sent by the Supreme High Command Staff to defeat the Goth group. This meant the failure of the unblocking strike. Until December 23, the Goth group, without encountering strong resistance from the deliberately retreating troops of the 4th Mechanized Corps, advanced to the line of the Myshkova River, 35–40 km from the encircled troops. On August 24, the 2nd Guards Army, in cooperation with the 51st Army, launched a counteroffensive. By December 31, the Goth group was completely defeated and thrown back 200-250 km.

From December 16 to 31, troops of the Southwestern Front, during Operation Little Saturn, defeated the 8th Italian Army and the Hollidt task force in the Middle Don, which were preparing to begin the relief of the encircled group together with the Goth group.

From January 10 to February 2, 1943, troops of the Don Front carried out Operation Ring to dissect and destroy the encircled group. As a result of this operation, the northern and southern enemy groups, separated from each other, capitulated on January 28 and February 2, 1943, respectively. 91,545 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, including 24 generals led by Field Marshal General F. Paulus. Another 16,800 were captured before Operation Ring began. Total captured in the Stalingrad offensive operation German soldiers and officers - 232,000. In addition, up to 30,000 Romanian (from the 3rd Romanian Army) and about 60,000 Italian (from the 8th Italian Army) soldiers and officers were captured.

Operation Uranus ended in a crushing defeat of the Nazi troops, whose total losses for the first time during the Great Patriotic War significantly exceeded the losses of the Red Army, and irretrievable losses exceeded the irretrievable losses of the Red Army by more than 2 times. The defeat of the Nazi troops, carried out by Soviet troops, without significant superiority in forces, was a triumph of Soviet military art and marked a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Operation Uranus created the preconditions for the successful conduct of Operation Little Saturn and the defeat of Italian and German troops in the Middle Don with the goal of defeating the entire Army Group B. During the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansky operation from January 13 to 27, the 2nd Hungarian and the remnants of the 8th Italian army were defeated. Over 120 thousand people were destroyed and captured. Even further north, the remnants of the Hungarian troops and the main forces of the 2nd fell into the Voronezh-Kastornensky cauldron German army(9 divisions from the 3rd army corps). From January 24 to February 2, they were defeated, over 100 thousand German soldiers died or were captured. The defeat and mass surrender began even before the group was completely surrounded. The remnants of several divisions (totaling about 20 thousand people) went for a breakthrough, but only a few thousand managed to escape from the encirclement by mid-February. Thus, the entire Army Group B was defeated.

Notes

  1. Isaev A.V. Stalingrad. There is no land for us beyond the Volga. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008.
  2. http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av8/14.html
  3. http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_9 Quote error Invalid tag : The name "" is defined multiple times for different contents
  4. http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av8/15.html
  5. http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_campaign_in_USSR_(1941-1943)
  6. The classification has been removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. research / G. F. Krivosheev, V. M. Andronikov, P. D. Burikov. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1993. P. 178-182, 369-370. ISBN 5-203-01400-0
  7. http://www.victory.mil.ru/war/oper/120.html
  8. Samsonov A. M. “Battle of Stalingrad”
  9. Military encyclopedic Dictionary. "Military Publishing House" 1986, 2nd ed. Page 768
  10. « The Headquarters entrusted the leadership of the preparation of the operation on the ground for the Southwestern and Don Fronts to G.K. Zhukov, and for the Stalingrad Front to the Chief of the General Staff» Samsonov A. M. “Battle of Stalingrad” M.: “Science” 3rd edition. page 338. Note. During the life of J.V. Stalin, the main merit in the development of the Stalingrad offensive operation was attributed to him (to verify this, it is enough to compare, say, the corresponding chapters of textbooks: “History of the USSR” (edited by Nechkina M.V.), M.: Uchpedgiz , 1949, and for example “History of the USSR” (edited by Shestakov A.V.), M.: Uchpedgiz, 1962.). Also in the early 60s. the version that “walked through the pages of history” was that the “idea of ​​encirclement” was born on October 6 at the command of the Stalingrad Front, i.e. A. I. Eremenko and N. S. Khrushchev himself (member of the Military Council of the front). This is refuted by A.M. Vasilevsky, pointing out that on October 6, at the command post of the Stalingrad Front, he conveyed to the front command the plan for the upcoming counteroffensive (see Military Historical Journal, 1965, No. 10, Art. 20). G. K. Zhukov notes that development and planning strategic operation, which “Uran” was, was within the competence of the SVGK and the General Staff and, in principle, could not be carried out by the front command.
  11. "Stalingrad. History lessons." M.: Progress publishing house. 1976. p. 279 (data from F. Paulus).
  12. Beevor E. “Stalingrad”.: Smolensk - Rusich. 1999
  13. Irreversible losses of the Red Army amounted to 155 thousand people, sanitary losses - 303 thousand people. The irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in the Stalingrad cauldron alone are about 300 thousand people; irretrievable losses only by prisoners of the Wehrmacht and allies in the Stalingrad offensive operation - over 300,000 people; total according to Soviet data - over 800 thousand people.

Operation Uranus- code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). Counter-offensive of troops of three fronts: Southwestern (general N.F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (general A.I. Eremenko) and Don (general K.K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy group of troops in the area city ​​of Stalingrad.

Military situation before the operation

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barricades plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general advance of German troops was stopped. On November 10, they went on the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of areas in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the German troops became more complicated. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched over 2,300 km, the flanks of the strike groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not able to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until the spring of 1943, and then go on the offensive again.

Balance of forces on the fronts

Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aircraft and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the “History of the Second World War, 1939-1945” was as follows:

Operation plan

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff began developing a counteroffensive plan in September. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed “Uranus,” was approved by Headquarters under the chairmanship of J.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N.F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of delivering deep attacks from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas (offensive depth of about 120 km); The strike group of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. Strike groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. At the same time, with part of the forces, these same fronts ensured the creation of an external front of encirclement. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th Air Armies, carried out two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky area along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided: to direct the main attacks against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy’s defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups use terrain favorable to the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough sectors, by weakening the secondary sectors, create a 2.8 - 3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy in the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy achieved in the concentration of forces, strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

Progress of the operation

Start of the offensive

The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began on the morning of November 19 after powerful artillery bombardment. Troops of the 5th Tank Army broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army. German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps brought into the battle, the advanced units of which reached the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike group of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Tank Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of ​​the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group between the Volga and Don rivers. The 6th and the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of 330 thousand people. By this time, most of the external front of the encirclement had been created, the distance of which from the internal one was 40-100 km.

On November 24, the troops of the Southwestern Front, having defeated the Romanian troops surrounded in the Raspopinskaya area, took 30 thousand prisoners and a lot of equipment. On November 24 - 30, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, waging fierce battles with the encircled enemy troops, reduced the area they occupied by half, trapping it in an area of ​​70-80 km from west to east and 30-40 km from north to south.

In the first half of December, the actions of these fronts to eliminate the encircled enemy developed slowly, since due to the reduction of the front in the cauldron, it condensed its battle formations and organized defense in equipped positions occupied by the Red Army in the summer of 1942. A significant (more than 3-fold) underestimation of the number of encircled German troops played a significant role in slowing down the offensive.

On November 24, Hitler, having rejected the proposal of the commander of the 6th Army F. Paulus to break through in a south-eastern direction, ordered Stalingrad to be held while awaiting outside help. The German troops operating against the outer front of the encirclement were united at the end of November into Army Group Don (commanded by Field Marshal E. Manstein), which included the encircled group.

Developments

In the areas of Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin, the Wehrmacht created two strike groups. On December 12, the Goth strike force, according to Soviet data, which had 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions, 125 thousand people, 650 tanks, which, however, is not confirmed by German sources, went on the offensive from Kotelnikovsky along railway to Stalingrad, without waiting for the concentration of the Tormosinsk group in order to relieve the encircled troops. Using, according to the Soviet version, which is not confirmed by German sources, a significant superiority in forces over the 51st Army, the enemy pushed it beyond the river. Aksai, where his advance was stopped on December 15. On December 19, the enemy resumed the offensive, but was stopped by troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies on the river. Myshkova, 40 km from the encircled troops. On December 16, the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front began on Morozovsk and Kantemirovka in order to defeat the enemy in the Middle Don region and reach the rear of the Tormosinsk group. During three days of fierce fighting, the enemy's defenses were broken through in five directions. By December 31, the Italian 8th Army and the German Task Force Hollidt were completely defeated. During the counteroffensive on December 24-31, the 2nd Guards Army inflicted a complete defeat on the Goth group, which suffered heavy losses, including 5,200 prisoners, and threw it back to Zimovniki, pushing back the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km. 57th, 64th I and the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front were transferred to the Don Front to eliminate the encircled troops. On January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Southern Front and received the task of attacking in the Rostov direction. By the beginning of January, the situation of the encircled troops worsened. The space they occupied was shelled by artillery, inventories were exhausted.

Elimination of German resistance

On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command presented the command of the encircled troops with an ultimatum to surrender, but, on Hitler’s orders, it rejected it. On January 10, the liquidation of the Stalingrad pocket by the forces of the Don Front began (Operation “Ring”). At this time, the number of surrounded troops was still approx. 250 thousand, the number of troops of the Don Front was 212 thousand. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but Soviet troops moved forward and on January 26 cut the group into two parts - the southern one in the city center and the northern one in the area of ​​​​the tractor plant and the Barricades plant. On January 31, the southern group was liquidated, its remnants, led by Paulus, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group was finished. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

Results of the operation

During the Stalingrad offensive operation, two German armies were destroyed, two Romanian and one Italian armies were defeated. 32 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, 16 divisions were defeated. The enemy lost more than 800 thousand people. The losses of Soviet troops amounted to 485 thousand people, including irrevocable ones - 155. The conditions for conducting an outstanding operation were created by Soviet troops during the Stalingrad defensive operation starting in September 1942. “Before the Battle of Stalingrad, history had not known a battle when such a large group of troops was surrounded and completely destroyed. The defeat of the enemy on the Volga marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole, the expulsion of enemy troops from Soviet territory began.” - G. K. Zhukov. It should be noted that, of course, it is difficult to talk about the complete defeat of the encircled group - after all, a significant part of it was evacuated by air. The encircled group, which made no attempt to break through the internal front of the encirclement, was completely destroyed, down to the last unit. Significant amount the wounded (from the diary of F. Paulus - 42 thousand) were evacuated from the cauldron by air, but Paulus does not say how many of the wounded managed to reach " big land" It should be noted, however, that the word “evacuation” itself implies removal to the rear, that is, if Paulus used this word correctly, then he meant that all 42 thousand people reached the “mainland.”

additional information

Only during Operation Ring, according to Soviet data, 10.01. - 02.02. 1943 91,545 were captured and over 140 thousand (up to 147,200) enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. According to various sources, from 30 to 42 thousand wounded were taken out of the cauldron by air. He lost 16,800 people in prisoners alone before the start of Operation Ring.

The Soviet command estimated the size of the group that was to be encircled in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80 - 90 thousand. The initial version had a more modest scale. The underestimation did not have a significant impact on the rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but it greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a major underestimation with a brilliant final result is not the only example in military history. A similar example is the Battle of Novi. The continued presence of a huge cauldron, which attracted all the forces and attention of the enemy and sharply limited the possible options for his actions on the entire southern wing, allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly develop the success of the encirclement and inflict new huge losses on the enemy.

Memory

At the site of the junction of the troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts (the modern village of Pyatimorsk), the monument “Union of Fronts” was erected in 1955. Author E. V. Vuchetich, architects L. Polyakov and L. Dyatlov.