home Diets and weight loss Russian map. Insurgent movement (separatists) in the USSR

Russian map. Insurgent movement (separatists) in the USSR

Separatism in the Soviet Union: who most wanted to secede

The Soviet principle “every nation has the right to self-determination” assumed the creation of a unitary multi-ethnic state.

However, some nations wanted to self-determinate in their own way, including by secession from the USSR.

Cut to the quick

The division of the state along national lines was new in world history. In practice, according to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, “the communist regime began to deliberately and deliberately create ethnolinguistic territorial “national administrative units” where they had not previously existed or where no one had seriously thought about them, for example, among the Muslims of Central Asia or the Belarusians "

One of the leaders of the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus Stepan Shaumyan warned Lenin: « Nations have become so intermingled with each other that there are no longer national territories within which national federal or autonomous regions could easily be established." However, the leader of the proletariat did not heed the warning and began to cut borders to the quick, even where it was impossible to draw them.

Having received a certain freedom, the heads of national-territorial entities began to think about greater autonomy, up to the acquisition of state sovereignty. In some regions of the country this resulted in aggravation of internal political and interethnic relations. Separatist sentiments flared up with particular force during the Great Patriotic War, first of all, this affected such multi-ethnic regions as the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Western Ukraine.

Echoes of separatism also swept across the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. There is information about uprisings of the Yakuts and Nenets, which were suppressed, including with the help of aviation. After the end of the war, until perestroika, the “independents” practically did not show themselves in any way, and only with the advent of glasnost, when the central authorities allowed certain freedoms to the regions, separatism went on the offensive.

Siberia

The history of Siberian separatism dates back to the 1860s, when independence-hungry Siberians published a proclamation declaring that “A special territory demands the independence of Siberia, and it must separate from Russia.” In December 1917, not wanting to strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks, supporters of Siberian autonomy - regionalists - held an emergency congress in Tomsk, at which they decided to create an independent government body - the Provisional Siberian Government (VSP). And in 1918, the VSP, which received broad powers, publishes “Declaration on state independence of Siberia” However, by the middle of 1918, the regionalists were losing their positions and leaving the political arena, despite the desperate calls of the radicals to take up arms against the Bolsheviks. Novosibirsk historian M.V. Shilovsky will note that this is what everything was leading to. According to him, regionalism failed to create an effective program of action; they did not propose any specific ways for the region to exit the current political and social crisis.

Caucasus

However, Napoleonic plans quickly narrowed to the idea of separating exclusively the Caucasus from Soviet Russia. However, this struggle had far-reaching consequences: continuing until the start of the war, it was transformed into the activities of pro-fascist gangs. According to the OGPU, from 1920 to 1941, 12 armed uprisings took place in Checheno-Ingushetia alone, in which from 500 to 5,000 militants took part. Three more major anti-Soviet protests were prevented thanks to the operational work of the Cheka. As a rule, the gangs were led by former party workers from local authorities.

For example, at the beginning of 1942, in Shatoi and Itum-Kale, the former prosecutor of Checheno-Ingushetia Mairbek Sheripov started a rebellion. Together with the troops of the collaborator Khasan Israilov, he organized a joint headquarters and a rebel government. In their appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus, the separatists called for welcoming German troops as guests, in return expecting to receive recognition of the independence of the Caucasus from the occupiers. By the end of 1944, the NKVD forces defeated almost 200 gangs that existed in the territories of Checheno-Ingushetia. Isolated clashes continued until 1957, when deported Chechens and the Ingush returned home.

Turkestan

In the early 1920s, the ideology of pan-Turkism also spread to Soviet Turkestan, stimulating such an anti-Soviet movement as the Basmachi movement. The leader of the Turkish nationalist organization “Teshkilyati Mahsus” Enver Pasha, who headed the Basmachi, seriously hoped to implement the “Turan strategy” under the leadership of Istanbul. However, his dreams of uniting Turkey, the Caucasus, Iran, Turkestan, the Volga region and Crimea into one state were not destined to come true. It was not possible to bring the idea of free Turkestan to life. Almost all pockets of Basmachiism were eliminated by 1932.

Baltics

The most serious resistance to the Soviet border guards was provided by the Lithuanian Liberation Army, which was led by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. This organization existed underground from the moment Lithuania joined the USSR, and now, taking advantage of the favorable moment, it set Lithuanians against pro-Moscow activists and representatives of the Soviet government. The fight against the separatists continued until 1956. It is interesting that in addition to conducting hostilities, Beria proposed evicting the families of the leaders of the anti-Soviet underground to the logging areas of the Perm and Sverdlovsk regions. However, this measure was not necessary.

Ukraine

In their geopolitical appetites, the OUN members were not inferior to the supporters of the “Great Turan”. Their dream was a “sovereign conciliar Ukrainian state,” which was supposed to stretch from the Carpathian Mountains to the Volga and from the foothills of the Caucasus to the upper reaches of the Dnieper. What failed with the Lithuanians, they did with the Ukrainian nationalists. Since 1947, active eviction of the leaders of the rebel groups, as well as members of their families, to remote areas of the country began. Over two years, more than 100 thousand people were displaced.

Parade of sovereignties

At the end of perestroika, it was the places of separatist fault lines – the Baltic states and the Caucasus – that began to crack first. Gorbachev delayed too much in resolving the national issue. The plenum took place in September 1989, but the republican elites had already started. It is curious that the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to declare its independence - this is how it responded to the forceful suppression of the political opposition in Baku.

Before the August putsch, the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia took the path of independence. Kyrgyzstan was the last country to break away from the USSR on December 15, 1990. Echoes of the parade of sovereignties echoed in the Volga region. However, the activities of the nationalist party “Ittifak”, which campaigned for the independence of Tatarstan, were stopped in time.

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Republic of Zueva: how the Old Believers contacted the Nazis

The Zuev Republic was a form of Old Believer self-government in German-occupied territory.

The Zuevites fought off the partisans, the fascists, and the Estonian police, but then began to cooperate with the Reich.

Occupation of Belarus

P. Ilyinsky in his memoirs “ Three years under German occupation in Belarus” describes how Belarusians collaborated with the German government. Whether the occupation was always the way it was presented in Soviet history textbooks is a controversial question. Historian A. Kravtsov believes that “ that occupation was different. It happened that they went to the Germans for help. For bread, for shelter. Sometimes even for weapons. We have the right to call some of those collaborators. But do we have the right to condemn?" In Belarus, as in other regions of the USSR, various partisan formations emerged, speaking both for and against the Red Army.

Republic of Zueva

Describing the partisan movement in occupied Belarus, Ilyinsky talks about one of the newly formed republics during the war - the Zuev Republic. From the studies of D. Karov and M. Glazk back in Soviet time it became widely known about other republics - the democratic Republic of Rossono, consisting of Red Army deserters, and fought both against the Germans and the Red Army, as well as about the so-called Lokot self-government - a republic the size of Belgium, located in the Bryansk region and in parts of modern Kursk and Oryol region, with a population of 600 thousand people. However, much less has been written about the mysterious Republic of Zuev. Where did it come from and how long did it last?

Zuev's motives

In the book " Partisanism: myths and realities“V. Batshev describes that since Polotsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk were occupied by the Germans at the very beginning of the war, they needed their own people in the newly formed government of the occupied territories. The burgomaster in the village of Zaskorka near Polotsk was the Old Believer Mikhail Zuev, who had recently been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activities. He was loyal German occupiers- two of his sons were exiled by the NKVD to Siberia, and he had long had scores to settle with the Soviet authorities, so he met the Germans with great enthusiasm: “In the 1930s, he was imprisoned twice for anti-Soviet activities (5 and 3 years, respectively), and Only in 1940 did he return from the dungeons of the NKVD to his village. His two sons were also arrested by the NKVD for armed struggle against Soviet power. One son eventually died in the camp, the second managed to leave for Australia in the early 1960s.”

Ilyinsky says that at that time about three thousand Old Believers lived in the village, and it was located in swamps and forests, far from any road. According to D. Karov (who wrote the book “ Guerrilla movement in the USSR in 1941-1945"), under the leadership of Zuev and with the support of the German government, the Old Believers lived quite calmly, enjoying self-government, the return of private property and the opening Old Believer churches– but then something happened. Zuev's War In November 1941, seven partisans came to Zaskorka and asked for support. Among them was an NKVD worker known to Zuev, famous for his cruelty.

Having given the partisans shelter and food to disguise themselves, the village council soon secretly killed them and took away their weapons: “Zuev placed the new arrivals in one hut, supplied them with food, and he himself went to consult with the old people on what to do. At the council, the old people decided to kill all the partisans and hide their weapons.” When soon she came to the village a new group partisans, Zuev gave them food and asked them to leave their territory. When the partisans came again, Zuev sent Old Believers armed with rifles to meet them. At night, the partisans returned again - only to retreat, encountering unexpectedly powerful resistance from the awake and armed Zuevites.

After these attacks, Mikhail Zuev decided to organize special paramilitary units in his own and neighboring villages. They were armed with captured partisan weapons, organized vigils at night and repelled attacks. Until 1942, the Zuevites, according to Ilyinsky, repelled 15 partisan attacks. The most important problems began after - at the end of December, the Old Believers ran out of ammunition. Zuev had to go to the German commandant - and after the New Year, one of the German generals, taking advantage of the disagreements between the Old Believers and the Soviet government, decides to arm the Belarusian villages controlled by Zuev with fifty Russian rifles and cartridges.

Zuev was ordered not to say where he got the weapon from, and was denied machine guns, apparently for security reasons. Neighboring villages themselves sent their representatives to Zuev, asking for protection - this is how his “republic” expanded. Counteroffensive In 1942, Zuev and his troops launched a counteroffensive and drove out the partisans from the surrounding villages, and then included them in his republic. In the spring, he takes out four more machine guns (according to different versions - he buys them from the Hungarians, from the Germans, or gets them in battles with partisans) and introduces the most severe discipline: for serious offenses, they were shot based on the vote of the Old Believers.

In the winter of 1942-1943, Zuev repelled serious attacks by partisans, and they began to stay away from his republic. He also drove out the Estonian police from his region, who were looking for partisans and wanted to live in his village on this basis: “Zuev answered the Estonian officer that there were no partisans in the area. And therefore, the police have nothing to do here. While the matter was limited to words, the Estonian insisted, but as soon as Zuev’s own detachment approached the house and Mikhail Evseevich decisively declared that he would use force if the police did not leave, the Estonians obeyed and left.” Zuev supplied Polotsk with resources - game, firewood, hay, and was very convenient for the German government, since he regularly paid the food tax. They didn’t even look into the Republic of Zuev and had no influence on internal self-government.

The end of the Old Believers Republic

Soon german army retreated to the west. Zuev retreated after them: as historian B. Sokolov writes, “Zuev with part of his people went to the West. Other Old Believers remained and began partisan warfare against the Red Army. For this purpose, the Germans supplied them with weapons and food. Partisan groups stayed in the forests near Polotsk until 1947.” Ilyinsky writes that all the people cried when leaving their native villages, carried the most valuable things on carts, and saved ancient books and supplies.

The German commandant, leaving the encircled Polotsk, decided to make his way to Zuev in order to leave the encirclement with him - only his people knew the forest like the back of their hand. With the help of Zuev, the German troops and the Old Believers traveling with them (from one to two thousand - information varies) managed to reach Poland, and from there to East Prussia. Some people actually remained in their native lands and began to fight with the Red Army. The few hundred remaining are taken to the camps, while the Old Believers who left with the Germans leave for South America from Hamburg in 1946 (some of them later, in the sixties, moved to the USA - where Ilyinsky, the author of the memoirs, also lived).

In Prussia, Zuev's group broke up. He himself went to A. Vlasov and began to fight in the Russian Liberation Army. Further, his traces are lost - according to various sources, Zuev either went to France, and from there he left for Brazil in 1949, or surrendered to the British in 1944. No one knows what happened to him next. There is no reliable information left about him, and there is not even a photograph of the ruler of the Old Believers republic. Thus ended the century of the Republic of Zuev.

The division of the state along national lines was new in world history. In practice, according to British historian Eric Hobsbawm, “the communist regime began to consciously and deliberately create ethnolinguistic territorial “national administrative units” where they had not previously existed or where no one had seriously thought about them, for example among the Muslims of Central Asia or the Belarusians.” .
One of the leaders of the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, Stepan Shaumyan, warned Lenin: “Nations have become so mixed up with each other that there are no longer national territories within which national federal or autonomous regions could easily be established.” However, the leader of the proletariat did not heed the warning and began to cut borders to the quick, even where it was impossible to draw them.
Having received a certain freedom, the heads of national-territorial entities began to think about greater autonomy, up to the acquisition of state sovereignty. In some regions of the country this resulted in aggravation of internal political and interethnic relations.
Separatist sentiment flared up with particular force during the Great Patriotic War, primarily affecting such multi-ethnic regions as the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. Echoes of separatism also swept through the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. There is information about uprisings of the Yakuts and Nenets, which were suppressed, including with the help of aviation.
After the end of the war, until perestroika, the “independents” practically did not show themselves in any way, and only with the advent of glasnost, when the central authorities allowed certain freedoms to the regions, separatism went on the offensive.

Siberia

The history of Siberian separatism dates back to the 1860s, when Siberians yearning for independence published a proclamation in which they declared: “ A special territory requires the independence of Siberia, and it must separate from Russia».
In December 1917, not wanting to strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks, supporters of Siberian autonomy - regionalists - held an emergency congress in Tomsk, at which they decided to create an independent government body - the Provisional Siberian Government (VSP). And in 1918, the VSP, which received broad powers, issued the “Declaration on the State Independence of Siberia.”
However, by the middle of 1918, the regionalists were losing their positions and leaving the political arena, despite the desperate calls of the radicals to take up arms against the Bolsheviks. Novosibirsk historian M.V. Shilovsky notes that this is what everything was leading to. According to him, regionalism failed to create an effective program of action; they did not propose any specific ways for the region to exit the current political and social crisis.

Caucasus

With the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus, active armed resistance began in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia, one of the organizers of which was the grandson of Imam Shamil, Said Bey. According to historians, this rebellion largely revived the goals and objectives of the Caucasian War of the 19th century.
In addition to the Caucasian component itself, the liberation struggle contributed to the maturation of the ideology of pan-Turkism, which substantiates the unity of all Turkic peoples and the need for their unity in the so-called “Great Turan” state, stretching from the Balkans to Siberia.
However, Napoleonic plans quickly narrowed to the idea of separating exclusively the Caucasus from Soviet Russia. However, this struggle had far-reaching consequences: continuing until the start of the war, it was transformed into the activities of pro-fascist gangs.
According to the OGPU, from 1920 to 1941, 12 armed uprisings took place in Checheno-Ingushetia alone, in which from 500 to 5,000 militants took part. Three more major anti-Soviet protests were prevented thanks to the operational work of the Cheka.
As a rule, the gangs were led by former party workers from local authorities. For example, at the beginning of 1942, in Shatoi and Itum-Kale, the former prosecutor of Checheno-Ingushetia Mairbek Sheripov started a rebellion. Together with the troops of the collaborator Khasan Israilov, he organized a joint headquarters and a rebel government. In their appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus, the separatists called for welcoming German troops as guests, in return expecting to receive recognition of the independence of the Caucasus from the occupiers.
By the end of 1944, the NKVD forces defeated almost 200 gangs that existed in the territories of Checheno-Ingushetia. Isolated clashes continued until 1957, when deported Chechens and Ingush returned home.

Turkestan

Baltics

Separatist forces awoke in the Baltic states during its liberation from Nazi troops. In the summer of 1944, following the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, NKVD formations entered the territory of Lithuania. Their task was to clear the front line from the Wehrmacht soldiers, Nazi collaborators, deserters, looters and anti-Soviet elements who remained there.
The most serious resistance to the Soviet border guards was provided by the Lithuanian Liberation Army, which was led by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. This organization existed underground from the moment Lithuania joined the USSR, and now, taking advantage of the favorable moment, it set Lithuanians against pro-Moscow activists and representatives of the Soviet government.
The fight against the separatists continued until 1956. It is interesting that in addition to conducting hostilities, Beria proposed evicting the families of the leaders of the anti-Soviet underground to the logging areas of the Perm and Sverdlovsk regions. However, this measure was not necessary.

Ukraine

Ukrainian separatism intensified literally immediately after Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia became part of the Ukrainian SSR. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) specialized in the fight against the Soviets, declaring its main goal as “the national liberation of the Ukrainian people and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.”
In their geopolitical appetites, the OUN members were not inferior to the supporters of the “Great Turan”. Their dream was a “sovereign conciliar Ukrainian state,” which was supposed to stretch from the Carpathian Mountains to the Volga and from the foothills of the Caucasus to the upper reaches of the Dnieper.
What failed with the Lithuanians, they did with the Ukrainian nationalists. Since 1947, the active allocation of leaders of rebel groups, as well as members of their families, to remote areas of the country began. Over two years, more than 100 thousand people were displaced.

Parade of sovereignties

At the end of perestroika, it was the places of separatist fault lines - the Baltic states and the Caucasus - that began to crack first. Gorbachev delayed too much in resolving the national issue. The plenum took place in September 1989, but the republican elites had already started. It is curious that the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to declare its independence - this is how it responded to the forceful suppression of the political opposition in Baku.
Before the August putsch, the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia took the path of independence. Kyrgyzstan was the last country to break away from the USSR on December 15, 1990. Echoes of the parade of sovereignties echoed in the Volga region. However, the activities of the nationalist party “Ittifak”, which campaigned for the independence of Tatarstan, were stopped in time.

The Caucasus and the Baltic States became different in temperament in 1989-1990

the first poles of national tension in the vast political

space of restructuring. As is typical for any empires (ideological

empire into which the Soviet Union turned from colonial Russian into

in this sense was no exception), the outskirts “awakened” earlier than the Center.

While Gorbachev was busy stirring up his calls to restructure

Russian province and hardware hinterland, the republican elites took

fast start.

The popular fronts that arose in the Baltic states began as a “great initiative”

spread throughout the entire territory of the USSR, capturing after the Caucasus

Moldova, Central Asia, and reached Ukraine, where in December 1989 a

Congress of Rukh. Since initially their leaders declared themselves to be convinced

supporters and “legitimate sons” of perestroika, Gorbachev to a large extent

under the influence of A. Yakovlev, who returned from his Baltic trip with

a reassuring diagnosis - “active restructuring processes are underway” -

treated them complacently and even encouragingly. "Popular fronts are not

opposition to the CPSU,” he said at the Politburo. - You just have to go in them

work so as not to be thrown into a camp hostile to the CPSU. We need to act

confidently cut off extremists, but do not identify the majority with them,

which is 90 percent. Where will they go? They'll go crazy! Behind us -

However, as the “front-line soldiers” began to get a taste for more than one

only political struggle, but also won positions from the state

authorities, and therefore Moscow, the tone of his statements began to change.

Especially after, having won the leading

positions in the republican parliaments, representatives of the “fronts” began

the same Balts were advancing in the same direction. Soon with his decision about

Georgia joined them in the right to veto union laws.

By 1989, the national issue had moved into the category of major

political priorities. Gorbachev, completely absorbed in the storms,

played out in the newborn Union Parliament and the political ice break

in Eastern Europe, reacted to the cracking of the outer shell of the Union with

a clear lag. At first he decided to get away with transferring to an earlier

term of the Plenum of the Central Committee national question, which everyone never got around to.

It was held in September 1989, but the decisions it made are no longer widely known.

interested and, most importantly, could not influence almost anything. And although formally

the question of a new union treaty was raised at the Plenum, only next

in the spring, Gorbachev spoke about the need to speed up its development in order to

"neutralize the desire of the republics to leave the USSR." He saw the future Union

diverse, allowing “to hold some by the collar, others on a short,

third on a long leash." He himself actively joined this process

only in the spring of 1991, when the Union had only a few years left to live

And yet the main thing that he looked through during this period were those that were not included

to the taste of the Republican separatists, and the awakening and, of course,

the idea of a Russian

sovereignty. In principle, the Soviet Union could survive the rise

national and regional separatism and even the “falling away” of individual bad

“pieces” that have taken root, but not betrayal of the union idea on the part of Russia.

Meanwhile, it was precisely this seemingly unthinkable prospect that became

real outlines, becoming first psychological and only then

political reflection of the resentment of millions of Russians for being enrolled in

"occupiers" in the country, which they considered from time immemorial to be their Fatherland, and in

"colonizers" inside an empire where they felt nothing at all

a privileged nation. And he was the first to express this feeling of resentment towards

It is not the politician who is treating the Russians unfairly, but the writer Valentin Rasputin.

Speaking at the First Congress of People's Deputies in June 1989, he unexpectedly

threw in the faces of the representatives of the republics: “Maybe Russia should secede from

Union, if you blame her for all your troubles and if her underdevelopment and

clumsiness weighs down your progressive aspirations?"* Then these words

many, including Gorbachev, perceived it as a forgivable manifestation of emotions

creative person, far from politics. Divide the traditional age-old

Russia and the Soviet Union, which became its legal heir after 1717 and,

essentially just a new reincarnation seemed simply impossible.

But less than a year had passed, as it turned out that in the situation of the beginning of the collapse

former multinational state his “titular nation” is Russians,

having sensed both within the country and on the world stage a threat to their inheritance

great power status, begin to transform from an “imperial nation” into

ethnic, "national". Having become accustomed to the position of the undisputed "senior"

brother", towards whom the "younger brothers" in the Soviet family behave

themselves respectfully and fearfully, the Russians could not help but react painfully to

"costs" of true equality, and especially those that are offensive and undeserved, according to

in the opinion of many, attempts to settle historical scores with Russia from the outside

nationals This aggressive, accumulated in the Russian people's environment

the potential of wounded national pride was quickly enough

in demand by politicians of various orientations, and above all Gorbachev’s

competitors.

From the Russian, more precisely, the Russian card is almost against him

at the same time, although with different sides, two main opponents entered at once -

E. Ligachev and B. Yeltsin. At the same time, one accused him of conniving

nationalists, collapses the Union and thereby destroys the historical heritage

Russian people, throwing away the gains of several generations of Soviet

people, provided for by their selfless labor and paid for by hardships and

victims. The other, on the contrary, is that the Secretary General-President is not enough

decisively breaks with the past and clings to archaic structures

centralized union state with the sole purpose of strengthening its

personal power.

Ligachev’s “army” was made up of the party nomenklatura, who were convinced that

that further progress along the path of Gorbachev’s political reform, depriving it

power and cover of the state security shield, will leave one on one with

the population she was used to commanding, but with whom she had forgotten how

talk. She had every reason to fear his vengeful wrath.

Yeltsin’s “militia” included those awakened by the trumpets of perestroika, but not

attracted by Gorbachev to the process of redistribution of power in the country

Soviet "raznochintsy" - journalists, employees of scientific institutes,

junior scientists who later became famous in ministerial positions

employees, teachers of political economy, historical mathematics and other social scientists, and

also simply active and proactive representatives of the creative intelligentsia

and semi-legal businesses, which for various reasons were barred from entering

nomenclature. The main advantages of this “light cavalry” of the Democrats over

the party "warriors" clad in hardware armor were professional

education, the ability to survive in any environment, brought up by a difficult

Soviet reality, and, not least, age. Besides, in

Unlike party functionaries, they had practically nothing to lose,

They could have acquired, perhaps without knowing it, everything.

In addition to the syndrome of national resentment and humiliation in one’s own home,

gathered people around Yeltsin, who raised the flag of the defender of Russian

interests, the philistine belief that, having gotten rid of the “freeloaders” in the person of

union republics, which are not only protected, but also “fed and watered” by Russia,

in 3-4 years she herself will be able to become one of the most developed, prosperous

nations of the world. These promises given to them right and left, combined with

skillfully exploited image of an almost repressed party member

"dissident" and fighter against apparatus privileges allowed him by the spring of 1990

year to become the most popular political figure in the country.

Gorbachev finally discovered the political

potential of the "Russian question". True to his method of sliding forward on two

skiing", he timed it to coincide with the Plenum of the Central Committee on national policy

the decision to create a Russian Bureau in the Central Committee, which he himself headed,

hoping that in Once again, having split into two, like Janus, can with his own hands

neutralize new threats. Following Yeltsin and Ligachev, he too, in his own way

used the “Russian card”: he introduced the same

V. Rasputin, who threatened Russia with withdrawal from Soviet Union. However,

remaining the President of the union state, who saw his main mission in

its preservation, he could not be as successful as in the political sphere

reforms, simultaneously playing the role of Pope and Luther: on the one hand,

to protect and protect the integrity of the country, and on the other hand, to provoke the Russian

nationalism (even in this nomenclatural form) in populist, that is,

destructive purposes for the Union, as its opponents did.

An intense struggle over who, in Eventually, will be able to take possession

"Russian bridgehead" - the main strategic position from which

excellent opportunities opened up for shelling the allied center and “views of

Kremlin," unfolded at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR around

candidacies for the Chairman of the Supreme Council. Of the two favorites - Ivan

Polozkov and Boris Yeltsin - Gorbachev made an open bet on the first not

because he was truly his creature: he rightly saw in this

an orthodox party apparatchik is a lesser potential threat to himself than in

the rapidly gaining popularity of the “converted Russian” Yeltsin.

But Gorbachev lost this battle for a version that suited him more (so,

By the way, it happened more than once when, succumbing to natural temptation, he chose

a deceptively “easy” path, such as, for example, later with one’s own election

majority). His unusual, not provided for by the protocol, did not help either.

coming to a meeting of the Congress of Russian Deputies to inspire

supporters of the party candidacy. The subsequent election of Boris Yeltsin

brought the latter a double victory, because it happened despite open pressure

President of the USSR.

Together with Gorbachev, the election of his protege to the post of Russian

E. Ligachev also lost the speakership. Apparently, therefore, on the eve of the XXVIII Congress

The CPSU, secretly headed by him and already in fact an autonomous part of the party, is not

having captured the parliamentary bridgehead, she decided to throw away conventions in relations

with its own secretary general. Thus, at the peasant congress, the “curator” of the rural

economy Ligachev openly called the president a traitor who ruined

country and the socialist community, and promised to fight to the end. And in

In June 1990, a congress was held that was anti-Gorbachev in spirit and ideological platform

Russian Communist Party, at which I. Polozkov was elected its first secretary.

Participated in his work Mikhail Sergeevich listened to rudeness, "could not bear

only rudeness, but complete wildness... answered questions - provocative,

stupid, malicious... - confused, verbose, chaotic, sometimes unable to express

what he wanted, or, as always, afraid of certainty, deliberately lost his way,

so that it is not clear,” recalls A. Chernyaev.

number of positions Gorbachev was not sorry to part with purely

symbolic and little-known post of chairman of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee

CPSU. But the trouble was the beginning: he had to part with the rest in

over the next year and a half...

Despite the fact that there was always a sparkle in their relationship, in the summer of 1990

Gorbachev and Yeltsin, having stepped over the incident with Polozkov, proved that they

true politicians, that is, people for whom personal likes and dislikes

retreat before state interests. It was then between them

a short “summer romance” began, the reason for which was

"500 days" program. The fact that both Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who are actually both

could not please that part of their environment that pulled each of the leaders into

your side. The government took the initiative for the funeral program

N. Ryzhkova - the Prime Minister and his deputy L. Abalkin threatened if it was adopted

were going to cut down significantly, and now headed by A. Lukyanov, the union

parliament.

According to the People's Deputy of the USSR, Academician Yu. Ryzhov, “Gorbachev’s

this moment was obviously pressed very hard, and maybe even staged

ultimatum." He is one of the five co-chairs of the interregional parliamentary

group, (MDG) - said that he received a call from a person “from the authorities” who knew

him at the Moscow Aviation Institute, and suggested meeting

confidentially near the Sokol metro station. During a five-minute meeting, he, without entering

in detail, “strongly advised” to leave Moscow in September and

generally “disappear from view” for a while. Then, says the academician, I don’t

attached importance to this “comradely advice” and remembered it only one day

September morning, when a friend called and said that he was heading to the center of Moscow

armored personnel carriers are moving. Later there was an explanation of what was happening

planned deployment of troops pulled up to the capital for "cleaning

potatoes." Does this mean that the August coup could have turned out to be September?

One way or another, faced with sharp opposition to the “500 days” program and

his tactical "engagement" with the Russian leader, he retreated, instructing

academician A. Aganbegyan to reflect the main

elements of the Shatalin-Yavlinsky document and the considerations of Ryzhkov-Abalkin.

As has happened in the past, compromise, instead of satisfying everyone, does not

satisfied no one, and most importantly, gave Yeltsin a reason to declare in October that

Gorbachev “changed the previous agreement” that “his behavior is considered

as a betrayal," and from now on Russia is free from obligations and will

develop your own options economic reform. In his speech at the Supreme

Council of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin announced that the republic would have to choose from three

options: secede from the Union, demand from the Center the creation of a coalition

government or the introduction of a card system, since the program,

presented by Gorbachev to the Union Parliament is impossible to implement. It was

official declaration of war. The hypothetical margin was upset and never

having reached the marriage ceremony, and with it the chances disappeared (if they existed at all)

for a “soft” reform of the Union with the complicity or at least without active

opposition from the Russian leadership.

At an emergency meeting of the Presidential Council, Gorbachev gave free rein

emotions, deciding to immediately appear on television: “This cannot be allowed to happen.

This paranoid man is striving to become president, and those around him are egging him on. If I remain silent,

what will the people say?" His own circle, in turn, was divided into

two camps. A. Lukyanov, V. Kryuchkov and N. Ryzhkov “incited” their president

don't let Yeltsin down. E. Shevardnadze, V. Medvedev, V. Osipyan, to whom

then the assistants joined in and tried to persuade me not to give in to emotions and not

lose self-control. Eventually cooling down, he came to the conclusion that “we must

rise above this provocation." The television "bang" was ordered to be done

A. Lukyanov.

Convinced a few days later that the Russian leader was bluffing and his

a barely disguised threat to “raise the people” to strikes and demonstrations

against the Union center was not realized, Gorbachev decided once again

offer him a peace settlement, instructing Boldin to organize their unofficial

meeting. According to Gorbachev himself, although it was “difficult,” it was still

allowed tensions to ease. V. Boldin, who was present at the meeting

two leaders, believes that it took place too late and nothing will happen

could improve their relationship: “Yeltsin was not able to step over

accumulated grievances and wounded pride."

Raising the banner of the anti-union uprising, Russia led the "parade"

sovereignties", captivating by its example not only other union republics,

but also some of its own autonomy. The calculation was obvious: “we’ll deal with

union power, and then we will see." Hidden in the heads of the members

Yeltsin's entourage, looking at the Kremlin, sounded the phrase, carelessly

thrown by Mikhail Sergeevich: “Where will they go?!”

Until it came to a complete break with the Russian leadership, Gorbachev

could react relatively calmly, if not mockingly, to the epidemic

declarations of sovereignty, which followed Russia after June 1990

performed by Ukraine, Belarus, North Ossetia, Armenia, Turkmenistan,

Tajikistan, Komi, Karelia, Gagauz Republic, Udmurtia, Yakutia,

Transnistria, South Ossetia and Irkutsk region. However, by October

the “sovereigns” who had acquired a taste began, in addition to purely declarative political

statements to make decisions that could not leave the union indifferent

those who died defending Kazan from the troops of Ivan the Terrible could be leniently

ignore that statement Popular Front Moldova about the need

the annexation of the republic to Romania or introduced by the Supreme Council

Kazakhstan ban on conducting nuclear test explosions at the test site in

Semipalatinsk, represented a direct challenge to the authority and powers

head of state.

As a matter of fact, by doing this, the new government in the republics

only imitated the Russian one, which, with its decisions, seemed to be trying

using the method of arbitrary seizure to “cut off” additional political

territory, taking it away from the Center. There was an impression that in Yeltsin's

headquarters announced a competition for populist steps that would create

Gorbachev's political problems made it possible to bypass him with "democratic"

flank. This is how improvisations on the theme of farming in the Russian village were born,

announcement of the resumption of Christmas celebrations and a promise to find a way out

protracted dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands.

The USSR Council adopted a law confirming the priority of union laws over

Republican and local. And on the same day, either teasingly or

Provoking the Center, the Russian parliament voted for the law,

establishing on the territory of the RSFSR the priority of republican

legislation before the Union.

A stalemate arose in which Gorbachev could either

come to terms with the audacity of the republics he set free and capitulate, or

hit the table with his fist and remind his subjects that “he is still a king.”

This could be done either by trying to return to the recent

General Secretary's past, which some party conservatives were pushing for

from his entourage, or with a powerful breakthrough forward, regain his political

initiative. Of two mutually exclusive options, Gorbachev chose... both. But

since it was difficult to combine them, he began to act like a driver

of a car stuck in the mud: he backed up and then accelerated to overcome

let.

Trapped in the ring of centers of republican unrest, squeezed between

government and the Supreme Council, enraged by his flirtation with

Yeltsin, on the one hand, and those who began openly persecuting him for “conservatism”

radical democrats, on the other hand, besieged by worsening economic

problems and haunted by the specter of an approaching cold and probably

hungry winter, Gorbachev decided to “overwinter” in the “dugout of the strong

states."

The final impetus that prompted him to make this decision was the November

demonstrative obstruction on the part of deputies of the Supreme Council. Discussion

"went wild." In criticizing the “weak power” of the president and his demands

After resignations, the antipodes - the orthodox and the radical - began to come closer together. And again, as already

It was noted that this sense of danger mobilized and energized Gorbachev.

Whether responding to the panic reaction of members of the Politburo, who claimed that

he was presented with an ultimatum, either due to “friendly pressure” from the leaders of a number of

union republics, and most likely, reacting to a close to open rebellion

atmosphere in the meeting room of the Supreme Council, he appeared the next morning before

parliamentarians in the war paint of a “strong leader”.

In an unusually short twenty-minute speech, he

points out the program of the upcoming “military campaign” under the general motto

strengthening the executive vertical. The government was transformed into

Cabinet working under the direct supervision of the President of the USSR

ministers, the Federation Council, which unites republican secretaries, increased

its status, and the Presidential Council, which irritated the parliamentary majority

by the number of “liberals” warmed up in it, led by A. Yakovlev, dissolved

and gave way to the “formidable” Security Council. It is this “iconic”

a step that symbolized Gorbachev's readiness to break with his

democratic confessors and go under the wing of statist guards, with

The parliamentary group "Union" applauded with enthusiasm, which the day before had demanded

his resignation.

“We will have to get better,” said Mikhail Sergeevich in his circle,

leaving the meeting. He explained this tilt towards conservatives before

only to myself that the country was not ready to maintain the pace taken

reforms, the democrats showed themselves to be “irresponsible critics”,

because of which the center of society’s moods and expectations began to shift to the right.

Accordingly, the one who was responsible for

maintaining social balance - to the centrist Gorbachev. Nevertheless,

despite all his efforts (as well as his political adviser

G. Shakhnazarov) clothe new course in terms of the new philosophy of centrism,

rhetorically reconciling reforms and stability, the “political class” listened

half-listened to him. The nomenklatura, as always, was interested not in words, but in personnel

decisions: who will leave and who will be appointed.

The first personnel victim of the “new course” was the Minister of Internal Affairs

V. Bakatin, whom the conservative opposition has long accused of

softness and connivance with the “nationalists”. During the "very emotional

conversation" Gorbachev explained to him that the time had come to leave. Second, spectacularly

slamming the door, declaring at the Congress of People's Deputies to hooting

colonels from the "Union" group about the "impending dictatorship", left

E. Shevardnadze. Finally, after New Year removed from the Constitution

mention of the Presidential Council, without official position or work

A. Yakovlev, E. Primakov, S. Shatalin, V. Medvedev remained. N. Petrakov, whose

the position of economic assistant was not mentioned in the Constitution,

I decided not to wait for the “black mark” and submitted my resignation myself. Next up

there were new appointments and new names that would become notorious in

August 1991. The year 91 itself was approaching, the last one historical century

Soviet Union and political biography its first President.

Very often you hear from Georgian and Molavian politicians accusations of separtism by the authorities of the Republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic with their subsequent convictions. Is there anything to condemn here?

IN Explanatory dictionary S.I. Ozhegova and N.Yu. Shvedova: “Separatism is the desire for isolation, separation.” It seems like a bad concept. But what happens in the case of the above-mentioned republics? Let's look at our recent history.

In 1989-1991 many republics started talking about their state sovereignty. The Baltic states started this, then Georgia, and then other republics followed. The then President of the USSR Gorbachev also contributed to this, in order to weaken the authorities of the RSFSR, he pushed through the USSR Parliament the law of April 26, 1990, which raised the status of autonomies to the status of union republics (this applied to the RSFSR, GSSR, Armenian, Tajik and Uzbek SSR, which had autonomous entities) He made a demarche to the leadership of the RSFSR and adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR on June 12, 1990. And the “parade of sovereignties” began. The state sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR, Moldova SSR, and Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed. North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Republic of Gagauzia was created in the south of Moldova. And so on. Even before 1990, the Baltic authorities and the Georgian authorities spoke about their independence from the USSR. So we took place with the separatism of all allied and autonomous republics. But they did not condemn it and did not reproach themselves for it.

In some republics, in particular, the Baltic states, Georgia, and Moldova, it was not sparatism that arose, but what we will call national separatism, which spoke not only of secession, but also of the priority of the titular nationality over others. Slogans “Georgia is for Georgians!”, “All non-Georgians from Georgia are Georgian people,” “Abkhazians are macaques!”, “Suitcase-station-Russia!” and so on. The center watched this quite calmly. Having carried out actions on April 9, 1989 in Tbilisi, on January 13, 1991 in Vilnius, the allied authorities immediately distanced themselves from this and blamed the army and the KGB of the USSR for everything. And the national-separatists raised their voices higher, feeling at the same time the support of the authorities of the RSFSR, “For our and your freedom!” With such slogans, rallies were held in Moscow in 1990-1991, supporting the independence of these republics. In the end, these forces (Landsbergis, Gorubnovs, Snegur, Gamsakhurdia) came to power in the union republics and actually became fascist. You don’t have to look far for an example - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, where annual marches of SS veterans take place and the concept of “non-citizens” exists. But both the Russian authorities and some of its citizens had a hand in this, supporting national separatism in the fight against the Center in 1989-1991.

All this boomeranged across the Georgian SSR and the Moldavian SSR, but with a completely different slant. The authorities of the Georgian SSR, having abolished all Soviet-era laws, completely forgot about their autonomies. so the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the 20s was not an autonomous republic, but a union republic and was part of the Trans-SFSR, i.e. was not part of Georgia. In 1990, seeing growing national separatism in the republics, the authorities of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria declared their state sovereignty, and then took part in the all-Union referendum on March 17, 1991, in which Georgia and Moldova did not take part. Are we dealing with separatism? Yes. But unlike the authorities of the GSSR and the USSR, it differs in the following: it does not proclaim the priority of one indigenous nation over another and does not call for packing its bags. Mostly Russians, Moldovans and Ukrainians live in the PMR; in Abkhazia there are Russians, Armenians, and Georgians there, but they exist. There were Georgians in South Ossetia, but after the war on August 8, 2008, there were none left. so there is no smell of fascism or the idea of national superiority here.

Thus, many of the reproaches of the authorities of Georgia and Moldova towards their former republics are a direct consequence of their far-sighted and wise policy of national separatism during the collapse of the USSR. They wanted to be independent and sovereign, and they got it. Why don't others have the right to this? Or am I wrong?