home Diets and weight loss Psychology of will. The relationship between volitional and motivational components in the personality structure of a law student

Psychology of will. The relationship between volitional and motivational components in the personality structure of a law student

Volitional regulation is not carried out for its own sake; there is always some kind of need hidden behind it. This may be the need of the individual himself to test himself as a strong-willed person, but most often behind the volitional regulation of an action there is a subjectively experienced need for this action. Thus, the study of volitional regulation leads to the problem of needs. The study of motivation for activity also forces us to analyze this problem.

The root cause of behavior, transformed into an experienced need, appears before the subject as a life task that creates readiness for search behavior. In the process of its objectification, the need turns into a motive of behavior, and the system of needs for objects, means and methods of satisfying it - into an attitude towards the world, on the basis of which goals, means and methods of action are chosen, the meaning of actions, readiness for a specific type of activity and motivation for her.

Understanding motive and as a specific driver of behavior, S.L. Rubinstein wrote that “a motive, as a conscious impulse for a certain action, is actually formed as a person takes into account, evaluates, weighs the circumstances in which he finds himself, and realizes the goal that confronts him: from the attitude towards them is born motive in its specific content necessary for real life action."

To date, psychology has collected a huge amount of experimentally and empirically confirmed data that an actually experienced motive, as a desire for something, does not directly motivate behavior (when there are no means of achieving the object of need or intermediate goals, when the subject does not master the methods of action, when there is a lack of physical strength, etc.). Hence those unpleasant emotional experiences when a significant motive, an actualized need cannot be satisfied. At the same time, almost everyone singles out the function of motivation as one of the most important functions of motive. The term “motive” itself is derived from the Latin push, set in motion.

The role of means in initiating actions is recognized in the works of many authors, since “outside the means, the goal turns out to be only an abstract aspiration,” and potential motives (dreams, ideals) only become real when they receive their means of implementation. If Living being does not have the means (sensory and motor), then the activity cannot begin. The role of motor means in motivation was emphasized by I.M. Sechenov, who wrote that the will does not have the power to force a person to do what he does not know how to do.

Thus, it can be argued that to initiate behavior it is not enough to have an actualized need, it is not enough to have the object of the need present - the presence of many external and internal factors is necessary for the behavior to begin and end successfully

Usually, quite rightly, they point to the regulatory role of cognitive and emotional processes in the implementation of activities. But these processes have a very real, although less noticeable role in building the impulse to action, i.e. in the process of motivation. As a necessary link, the process of building motivation is included in the motivation of any activity.

To extend the principles of the activity approach to motivation means to understand motivation as a special mental process or a special mental action with its own structure and function to form an impulse. This action of constructing an impulse can be collapsed or expanded in time, take into account many or few conditions, rely on many or a few mental processes, be conscious or performed involuntarily at an unconscious level.

The idea of voluntariness gradually gained its position in psychology, although for a long time the arbitrariness of behavior, observed as an everyday fact, was explained by the free will of man, which itself did not lend itself to deterministic explanation. Voluntary memory, attention, perception, and movement were highlighted, but motivation was still considered only in an involuntary form. Gradually, in Soviet psychology, the idea of the need and possibility of voluntary motivation was formed. Important indications of the need to highlight an arbitrary form of motivation can be found in the works of K. Marx. When studying motivation, it is usually assumed that the subject has an urgent need that arises regardless of his intentions, which must, through his motive, goals and actions, receive an object that satisfies it. But in reality, the opposite is often the case. Regardless of a person’s needs, society includes him in solving social problems, and a person, based on orientation in his motives, must find a motivational justification and motivation for his activities to achieve social goals or create a new motive in order to fit the goals of society into his motivation and thereby combine the needs society and personal needs.

And in this sense, S.L. is right. Rubinstein, who pointed out that “motives are determined by the tasks in which a person is involved, in any case, no less than these tasks are determined by motives.” and that “in their highest forms they are based on a person’s awareness of his moral duties, the tasks that social life sets for him.”

The development of voluntariness begins with submission to external demands emanating from society. Between the motive as the basis for action and the incentive to activity lies the meaning of the action, and the incentive function of the motive is realized only through the meaning. The voluntary formation of an impulse unfolds on the plane of consciousness, on the “internal intellectual plane.” It follows from this that the formation of the meaning of an action or its intentional change constitute one of the links of motivational action in its arbitrary conscious form.

When a goal is given to a person from the outside, the first operation in the motivational process is a search in memory for a motive that can meet the given goal and create the meaning of actions. If there is no such adequate motive, then the motivation is formed on the sole motive of avoiding punishment or an unpleasant situation, or another motive that is significant for a person is added to this motive, for example, through an imaginary situation where the motive and actions are real, but their connection exists only in the human mind. Behavior without an actual need is volitional behavior, where the meaning of an action given from the outside is formed through a motive arbitrarily chosen by the subject, through comprehension of the situation and the consequences of actions.

Thus, volitional behavior is often transitional behavior from a given action to an action with an adequate motive or, in other words, to an action with post-voluntary motivation, when voluntary motivation is automated, curtailed to the actualization of one or another motive.

Understanding volitional regulation as the regulation of actions or mental processes through an arbitrary form of motivation means that the motivation to action is provided not by a special education - will, not by special volitional motives, not by a special need to overcome obstacles, but by the work of a motivational mechanism common to any activity.

The psychological mechanism for voluntary change of impulse is a change in the meaning of the action. Volitional effort is determined by a situational change in the personal meaning of an action. A change in the motivation to action can also be accomplished through a subjective change in the probability of success of an action, which is achieved through new knowledge that increases confidence in one’s abilities, in success, in justice and the possibility of action.

Volitional regulation (in the version of self-determination) is the regulation of an action (or mental process) through a change in the meaning of the action, which provides the necessary incentive (inhibition) to it.

Volitional regulation is part of the voluntary regulation of human processes and actions, or, more precisely, one of the levels of voluntary regulation - the personal level.

In the traditions of the activity approach, the process of motivation can be described as a special internal action by building incentives.

The basis of the volitional regulation of the impulse to action is an arbitrary form of motivation, where a change in the impulse is achieved through a change in the meaning of the action.

According to V.A. Ivannikov, main psychological function will is to strengthen motivation and improve, on this basis, the conscious regulation of actions. The real mechanism for generating an additional incentive to action is a conscious change in the meaning of the action by the person performing it. The meaning of an action is usually associated with a struggle of motives and changes with certain, deliberate mental efforts.

motive motivation need initiation

The concept of will as a determinant of human behavior originated in Ancient Greece and was first explicitly formulated by Aristotle (384–324 BC). He introduced this concept as an explanatory one in order to distinguish actions performed on the basis of a reasonable decision of the subject (because it is necessary) from actions caused by his desires. At the same time, the philosopher understood that it is not knowledge itself that is the cause of rational behavior, but a certain force that causes action in accordance with reason. This force is born, according to Aristotle, in the rational part of the soul, thanks to the combination of a rational decision with aspiration (desire), which gives the decision a driving force. The aspiration (desire) itself is determined by the motivating force of the object of the aspiration. Thus, Aristotle’s will comes down to controlling, through reason, the motivating force of a person’s desire (object of aspiration): either by giving the original desire an additional incentive (aspiration) for an object, or by inhibiting the impulse, when the mind suggests that it is necessary to avoid the desire for this or that object.

Actions and deeds carried out by the decision of the person himself were called arbitrary by Aristotle.. Essential for the Aristotelian understanding of the role of the volitional principle in the determination of behavior is the fact that the will not only initiates, but also selects voluntary actions, and also regulates their implementation. In addition, the philosopher attributed to the action of the volitional principle the ability of a person to control himself. At the same time, any volitional movement has, according to Aristotle, natural foundations.

The ancient Roman thinker and physician Galen (130–200 BC) spoke about voluntary and involuntary movements, classifying only muscle contractions as the latter internal organs(heart, stomach). He considered all other movements voluntary. They differ from involuntary (automatic) movements in that they always occur with the participation of mental pneuma, which includes perception, memory and reason and performs a control function in relation to the organs of movement.

R. Descartes understood will as the ability of the soul to form a desire and determine the impulse for any human action that cannot be explained on the basis of a reflex. Descartes believed that the task of the will is to fight passions that arise under the influence of things (while desires are generated directly by the soul). The will can slow down movements driven by passion. Reason, according to Descartes, is the will's own instrument. The will helps a person to follow certain rules, based on the judgments of reason about good and evil. Thus Descartes connects the will with human morality.

The English philosopher T. Hobbes, who lived at the same time as R. Descartes, also proceeded from the ideas of involuntary and voluntary regulation when explaining human behavior. In cases where either a feeling of desire for something or a feeling of disgust arises, it is necessary to make an unambiguous choice of one action or another. The last desire, arising in the act of deliberation and reflection, which is directly adjacent to action, was called will by T. Hobbes. The will is determined by motives and impulses, which, in turn, are themselves determined by needs, as well as knowledge about things and about possible ways with the help of which these needs are satisfied.

The same views on the problem of will were held by D. Hartley, who believed that will is nothing more than a desire or aversion strong enough to cause an action that is not initially or secondarily automatic. The identification of will with the desire dominant in consciousness is clearly visible in the views of other scientists of the past (D. Priestley; A. Collins; G. Spencer; W. Windelbandt, etc.). True, the ideas of each of them also have their own characteristics. D. Priestley, for example, spoke about the desire to act, since action does not always arise from the sight of the desired object. Valuable in his views is the position that human aspirations are determined by motives Therefore, the will always has a reason.

V. Wundt believed that mental causation receives its highest expression in an act of will.

E. Meiman also considered will from a motivational position. He considered the main sign of a volitional action to be the decision to perform an action that precedes it, when the action is preceded by a full-fledged mental act, the development of an idea of a goal, and obtaining consent to this goal. Achieving such consent for a specific action begins with the selection and consideration of goals, with an analysis of their value, and an analysis of the consequences of the action. Not by chance the real reason E. Maiman considered reflection to be all volitional actions, since it is through it that an understanding of the value and meaning of the goal is achieved.

K. Levin, having slightly changed the experimental plan of N. Ach, proved that learned forms of behavior (stimulus-reactive connections, skills, etc.) by themselves are not capable of determining the activity of the subject; This requires the action of a motivational factor. Thus, the dominant and coordinating role of motivational and volitional processes in relation to other mental processes was postulated. According to K. Lewin, a person’s behavior is controlled by a large number of “tense systems,” which are goals coming from the subject himself or given from the outside. Goals are not only a cognitive representation of a future state (cognitive aspect), but at the same time a dynamic expression of any individual needs (motivational aspect), although they are not completely reducible to these needs; therefore they are called quasi-needs. Objects or events that can serve to relieve tense systems - quasi-needs - have special incentive features, literally - the nature of the demand (“Aufforderungscharacter”) from the subject of a particular type of behavior. So, if we need to make a call, the pay phone “shows itself,” as it were, requiring certain actions from us (get a coin, remember the number, etc.). Volitional actions, according to Lewin, differ from actions governed by quasi-needs: volitional action attempts to control an emerging tendency of action - for example, providing a person with the opportunity to remain calm even if he is insulted. If several tense systems arise, then volitional action ensures, through the decision-making process, preference for one of them; if this fails to the full extent, erroneous actions or inhibition of the actual action occur. Noteworthy is the fact that the will continues to remain the “handmaiden” of motives (true needs - according to Lewin) and the conflict of intentions, which by its nature is volitional, is resolved through decision-making, i.e. in the sphere of motivation.

Having replaced the concept of “determining tendency” by N. Ach with the concept of “quasi-need,” K. Levin actually identified the problems of will and motivation: researchers of that time were more interested in the process of emergence of quasi-needs (intentions) and the situational factors influencing their implementation. According to K. Lewin, quasi-need is automatically translated into action as soon as favorable conditions for this occur. external conditions. Hence it is clear that the postulation and study of certain additional mental processes that control the implementation of intentions (processes that we now designate as volitional) was simply unnecessary. Along with the analysis of the process of goal-directed behavior, K. Lewin encounters interesting descriptions“varying degrees of dependence on quasi-needs” of subjects in the same experimental situation. For “active” types, intentional action proceeds as if on its own, without conscious control on the part of the subject; subjects indicate in self-reports that they acted involuntarily, “almost as if in a dream.” Subjects classified as the “thinking” type, on the contrary, reported mental contents that inhibited action, mostly associated with various unpleasant sensations during the experiment. The differential psychological aspect of the study of volitional processes did not, however, receive any development in the school of K. Lewin , who paid main attention to the development of the famous “field theory”.

A detailed study of personal and situational determinants of behavior in field theory, on the one hand, and K. Levin’s underestimation of the role of volitional processes themselves, on the other, resulted in the fact that, starting from the 40s. of our century, the concept of “will”, and indeed the studies of volitional processes themselves, are gradually “going out of fashion” and are being replaced by cognitively oriented studies of motivation, which are based on the “Expectation × Value” model [see. review by Heckhausen, 1986]. However, after a real boom in research on motivation, and above all on achievement motivation, in Western European psychology, under the influence of a number of experimental data, a critical understanding of the postulate is beginning to take shape that motivational processes based on assessing the expectation of success and the attractiveness of the goal directly determine behavior. Researchers have tried to clarify the Expectation × Value model by introducing new personal and situational variables that mediate the relationship between motive and behavioral manifestations (problem solving strategies, overall performance effectiveness, emotional background of activity, etc.).

Shapkin S. A. 1997. P. 14

Lewin (1926) disputed Ach's thesis about the possibility of strengthening the tendency of action through a subsequent act of will (or act of intention). He viewed tendencies of action as “quasi-needs” that are governed by “genuine” needs, so their strength is always proportionate to the strength of the corresponding genuine needs. Thus, Lewin turned the problem of will into a problem of motivation; he reduced the actual tendency of action to the resulting motivational tendency. At the same time, the volitional actualization of action in response to emerging obstacles that must be overcome in the implementation of intention also disappeared.

Heckhausen H. 2003. P. 312

Domestic psychologists also connected will with motivation. And here it is impossible not to mention I.M. Sechenov’s ideas on the issue under consideration. Firstly, the scientist highlighted the moral component of the will, which can be seen as his postulation of the participation in volitional acts of the moral component of the motive (“will is the active side of the mind and moral sense, governing movement in the name of both, and often contrary to even the sense of self-preservation”, – he wrote). Secondly, I.M. Sechenov emphasized that a person will not just show willpower, this requires a good reason, a motive. “We do not know impersonal, cold will,” the scientist argued [ibid., p. 181].

G.I. Chelpanov identified three elements in a volitional act: desire, desire and effort. He connected volitional action with the struggle of motives, endowing the will with the function of choice (making a decision about action). K. N. Kornilov emphasized that the basis of volitional actions is always a motive. Another major Russian psychologist N. N. Lange discussed in his works about human drives, desires and desires in connection with the question of will and volitional acts. In particular, he gave his understanding of the difference between drives and desires, believing that the latter are drives that turn into actions and are accompanied by a feeling of activity of these actions. For N. N. Lange, wanting is an active will.

L. S. Vygotsky identified two separate processes in volitional action: the first corresponds to a decision, the closure of a new brain connection, the creation of a special functional apparatus; the second - executive - consists in the work of the created apparatus, in acting according to instructions, in executing a decision. L. S. Vygotsky, like J. Piaget, included in the structure act of will the operation of introducing an auxiliary motive to enhance the impulse to action - necessary, but weakly related to a person’s personal desire. L. S. Vygotsky argued that free will is not freedom from motives. A person’s free choice from two available possibilities is determined not from the outside, but from the inside, by the person himself. Vygotsky formulated the position that a change in the meaning of an action also changes the motivation for it (an idea later developed by A. N. Leontiev in the concept of “meaning-forming motives” and V. A. Ivannikov in his view of will as “voluntary motivation”).

An understanding of the motivational process as a volitional one can be found in S. L. Rubinstein. The entire first part of his chapter on will - “The Nature of Will” - is nothing more than an exposition various aspects teachings about motivation.

S. L. Rubinstein believed that “the rudiments of will are already contained in needs as in the initial motivations of a person to action” [ibid., p. 588]. But if we recognize the correctness of such an understanding of the will (or, according to the definition of S. L. Rubinstein, volitional component mental process, in this case - needs) as dynamic tension, motivation, aspiration, then instincts should be considered as volitional actions: after all, they also contain both a sensory experience of need and a desire to satisfy the need. However, then the specificity of will disappears as a voluntary method of regulation, as opposed to an involuntary one. It is not for nothing that S. N. Chkhartishvili separated behavior prompted by needs from volitional behavior, calling the first impulsive. In addition, the need impulse in a person only gives an impetus to the deployment of the first component of the volitional act, i.e. motivation, but does not lead directly to action. S. L. Rubinstein himself wrote about this: “Being in its original origins connected with needs, a person’s volitional action never, however, follows directly from them. Volitional action is always mediated by more or less complex work of consciousness - awareness of the impulses to action as motives and its result as a goal.” And one more thing: “...In volitional action, the impulses themselves do not act directly in the form of a blind impulse, but indirectly through a conscious goal.” So S. L. Rubinstein’s position about the rudiments of will, already contained in needs, can be understood only by accepting the point of view that will is voluntary motivation and that the deployment of motivation as the beginning of an voluntary act begins with the emergence of a need impulse.

In fact, he writes about this understanding of will in another work: ““Will,” in fact, is directly formed only by the highest, upper or apical layer of these tendencies - desires determined by ideological content, acting as a conscious goal.”

A negative attitude towards will... turned out to be the most insidious for the author (S.L. Rubinstein - E.I.). The artificial division of the unified regulation of behavior into incentive and executive has left no place for human will in the actions themselves. It is not clear why, in this case, people associate the test of their will not with desires and aspirations, but primarily with overcoming the difficulties of fulfillment.

Selivanov V.I. 1992. P. 170

The connection between motivation and will was also studied by other Moscow psychologists (K. M. Gurevich; L. I. Bozhovich; A. N. Leontiev; V. A. Ivannikov). For example, A. N. Leontiev studied the development of voluntary behavior in connection with the development and differentiation of the motivational sphere. A voluntary action, according to A. N. Leontyev, is characterized by the fact that the content of the motive and the goal in it do not coincide. Many scientists have considered and continue to consider the mechanism of motivation as volitional. Noting this, B.V. Zeigarnik and her co-authors wrote: “The problem of mastering one’s behavior (at the level of mastering one’s own motivation) ... is traditionally posed in psychology as a problem of will. Volitional behavior is considered by various authors as a process of producing new motivational formations that contribute to the development of behavior in the chosen direction" [Zeigarnik, Kholmogorova, Mazur, 1989, p. 122–123].

Despite the fact that the connection between motivation and will is a generally accepted fact, this, however, does not mean that such a connection is understood by all scientists in the same way. There are at least three directions in considering this issue.

The first of these directions is practically identifies motivation and will, thereby essentially denying the latter (this approach is typical of American psychology; it is no coincidence that the very concept of “will” is absent in Western psychological dictionaries). At the same time, supporters of this direction refer to the fact that if a person has desire(motive), then no psychological mechanism is required, additional to the motive, which would cause human activity to achieve the goal; desire itself organizes this activity.

Modern bourgeois psychology claims to explain all the most complex phenomena of the human psyche without referring to the concept of will. As D. Miller, Y. Galanter and K. Pribram write, “in our days, the category of will has disappeared from psychological theories, merging with a broader theory of motivation.” This “fusion” proved detrimental to the development of positive research into the human will. Similar trends occur in Soviet psychology.

Some of our psychologists are afraid of the very term “will” like fire, preferring such vague and broad concepts as “voluntary processes” and “activity”, although each of them is well aware that activity and voluntariness are different: at the level of habit or emotional impulse, when the subject is not required to mobilize intentional efforts, and at the level of conscious-volitional tension associated with the need to intentionally overcome the difficulties encountered.

Selivanov V.I. 1992. P. 190

However, even D. Locke believed that it was wrong to identify the will and desires (needs) of a person. Connecting will with the mechanisms of generating actions, the philosopher, along with motivation, identified a special ability that allows actions to be carried out, and he called this ability will. The will, overcoming displeasure, can act, according to D. Locke, against desire, forming in a person a desire or volition.

P.V. Simonov did not reduce will to motive either, who rightly believed that it is impossible to consider will to be dominant in this moment need. Will is not just a dominant need, he wrote, but some special mechanism, additional to one of the competing motivations.

Reducing the will to a motive that encourages activity is unlawful, if only because the obstacles encountered on the way to achieving a goal cause the so-called “overcoming reaction,” which, as a rule, is part of any volitional effort. In addition, the specificity of volitional manifestation is not determined by one or another primary impulse associated with any need. Moreover, the realization of one of many impulses is possible only because other impulses are often suppressed by an effort of will.

Second direction does not identify motivation and will, although it does not deny the presence of a close connection between them. As P.I. Ivanov believed, volitional (voluntary) actions, in contrast to involuntary ones, are performed based on. However, there is no complete unanimity among supporters of this direction. For some researchers will is part of motivation, characteristics and mechanism of motivation (L. S. Vygotsky, L. I. Bozhovich). So, for example, L. I. Bozhovich saw the essence of volitional behavior in the ability to subordinate it to consciously set goals (pre-adopted intentions) even contrary to immediate impulses, when a person overcomes his personal desires for the sake of unattractive for him at the moment, but socially significant goals (social values). L. I. Bozhovich considered will as the highest mental function in the motivational sphere, arising as a result of the development of human needs mediated by the intellect. Like L. S. Vygotsky, Bozhovich understood will as a type of voluntary motivation.

V. A. Ivannikov wondered what was common in the following concepts, with the help of which the phenomenon of will or volitional behavior is described and explained: action without an actual need; action when there is a conflict of motives; action taking into account its consequences and moral considerations; action due to social necessity; arbitrarily chosen action, free from the current situation; restraining your desires; overcoming obstacles, etc. V. A. Ivannikov gave the following answer: all these concepts include the moment changing motives by changing the meaning of an action. He also believed that people begin to talk about will when a lack of motivation for a given action is discovered (in a similar way, J. Beckmann and J. Piaget considered will as an amplifier of motivation that is insufficient in strength). According to Ivannikov, the difficulties that arise are overcome very simply: to do this, a weaker motive must be replaced (or added to it) with a stronger one. Thus, a performance at a competition may be more successful for an athlete if he dedicates it to a loved one. In this case, the old motive “borrows” energy from a new, more significant motive.

As a result, it turns out that, on the one hand, V.A. Ivannikov adhered to the understanding of will from a motivational position, and on the other hand, apparently, he joined the supporters of the understanding of will as volitional regulation associated with overcoming difficulties.

In another work, he again repeated that the volitional regulation of the impulse to action is based on an arbitrary form of motivation. In particular, Ivannikov writes that “Will is... voluntary motivation.”

The views of V. A. Ivannikov were fairly criticized by V. K. Kalin. The latter notes that at first V.A. Ivannikov narrowed the problem of voluntary motivation to the question of incentives, and then reduced it to a conscious change in motive, which is considered only in terms of incentive reasons. Both will and voluntary motivation for V. A. Ivannikov are a conscious form of motivating reasons for action - and nothing more. He did not include volitional qualities, and therefore volitional efforts, in the concept of will, proposing instead to highlight such real moments of human activity that “do not yet have their own explanation and require the use of a concept similar to the intuitively distinguished concept of will.” Thus, V.K. Kalin concludes that the main drawback of V.A. Ivannikov’s ideas about will is that his consideration of will only as a type of voluntary motivation does not allow him to cover all volitional manifestations, in particular, a person’s control over his own mental processes when performing actions and carrying out activities.

E. O. Smirnova criticizes the concept of V. A. Ivannikov from other positions. She notes that if we understand will only as mastery of one’s impulse, then it will be possible to speak about the beginning of the formation of will in childhood only when the child becomes able to manage his motives and create new personal meanings (i.e., rethink the basis of his actions and actions). ). However, it is known, E. O. Smirnova emphasizes, that children under 7–8 years of age are not able to adequately understand their motives (much less independently change the meaning of their actions). Even L. S. Vygotsky, following K. Levin, noted that children, unlike adults, are not capable of forming “any” intentions and can only act in the direction of the strongest immediate impulses and that a preschooler does only what he wants. And V. A. Ivannikov himself showed that in children under 6 years of age, the introduction of additional motives does not significantly increase the volitional component of actions. It should follow from this that before this age it is difficult to talk about the presence of will in children.

In reality, both life observations and Scientific research show that already 3-year-old children show perseverance and stubbornness. A number of authors preschool age considers it an intensive period of will development (V.K. Kotyrlo; A.N. Leontiev; N.I. Nepomnyashchaya; D.B. Elkonin).

Thus, many data speak in favor of the fact that there is no reason to reduce the will to voluntary motivation.

For another group of researchers motivation is one of the aspects of volitional behavior, volitional motivation (K. N. Kornilov; L. S. Vygotsky; V. N. Myasishchev; P. A. Rudik).

In accordance with this understanding, motivation is always voluntary and cannot be contrasted with involuntary motivation, but involuntary (unconditional and conditioned reflex) determination behavior. It follows from this that determination and motivation are, although mutually dependent (in the sense that the second is a variety of the first), but not identical concepts. External or internal stimulus (for example, sharp pain) can also cause an involuntary reaction in a person, but voluntary actions arise only due to the presence of a motive.

From the understanding of motive as the beginning responsible for a person’s voluntary activity, according to supporters of this point of view, one of the structural features of this activity follows: predicting the result and the consequences of its achievement. Voluntary activity always takes place against the background of more or less clear expectations of the expected result of the activity or its possible consequences. Another thing is that the result obtained does not always meet expectations.

Finally, the third direction generally questions the connection between will and motivation.

The concept of will as a determinant of human behavior originated in Ancient Greece and was first explicitly formulated by Aristotle (384-324 BC). He introduced this concept as an explanatory one in order to distinguish actions performed on the basis of a reasonable decision of the subject (because it is necessary) from actions caused by his desires. At the same time, the philosopher understood that it is not knowledge itself that is the cause of rational behavior, but a certain force that causes action in accordance with reason. This force is born, according to Aristotle, in the rational part of the soul, thanks to the combination of a rational decision with aspiration (desire), which gives the decision a driving force. The aspiration (desire) itself is determined by the motivating force of the object of the aspiration. Thus, Aristotle’s will was reduced to controlling, through reason, the motivating force of a person’s desire (object of aspiration): either by giving the original desire an additional incentive (aspiration) for an object, or by inhibiting the impulse, when the mind suggests that it is necessary to avoid the desire for one or another object.
Actions and deeds carried out by the decision of the person himself were called arbitrary by Aristotle. Essential for the Aristotelian understanding of the role of the volitional principle in the determination of behavior is the fact that the will not only initiates, but also selects voluntary actions, and also regulates their implementation. In addition, he attributed to the action of the volitional principle the ability of a person to control himself. At the same time, any volitional movement has, according to Aristotle, natural foundations.
The ancient Roman thinker and physician Galen (130-200) spoke about voluntary and involuntary movements, classifying the latter only as muscle contractions of internal organs (heart, stomach). He considered all other movements voluntary. They differ from involuntary (automatic) movements in that they always occur with the participation of mental pneuma, which includes perception, memory and reason and performs a control function in relation to the organs of movement.
Rene Descartes understood will as the ability of the soul to form a desire and determine the impulse for any human action that cannot be explained on the basis of a reflex. Descartes believed that the task of the will is to fight passions that arise under the influence of things (while desires are generated directly by the soul). The will can slow down movements driven by passion. Reason, according to Descartes, is the will's own instrument. The will helps a person to follow certain rules, based on the judgments of the mind about good and evil. Thus, Descartes connects the will with human morality.
The English philosopher T. Hobbes, who lived at the same time as R. Descartes, also proceeded from the ideas of involuntary and voluntary regulation when explaining human behavior. In cases where either a feeling of desire for something or a feeling of disgust arises, it is necessary to make an unambiguous choice of one action or another. The last desire, arising in the act of deliberation and reflection, which is directly adjacent to action, was called will by T. Hobbes. The will is determined by motives and impulses, which, in turn, are themselves determined by needs, as well as by knowledge about things and about the possible ways in which these needs can be satisfied.
The same views on the problem of will were held by D. Hartley, who believed that will is nothing more than a desire or aversion strong enough to cause an action that is not initially or secondarily automatic. The identification of will with the desire dominant in consciousness is clearly visible in the views of other scientists of the past (D. Priestley, 1968; A. Collins, 1967; G. Spencer, 1897; V. Windelbandt, 1904, etc.). True, the ideas of each of them also have their own characteristics. D. Priestley, for example, speaks of the desire to act, since action does not always arise from the sight of the desired object. Valuable in his views is the position that human aspirations are determined by motives Therefore, the will always has a reason.
W. Wundt (1912) believed that mental causation receives its highest expression in an act of will.
E. Maiman (1917) also considers will from a motivational position. He considers the main sign of a volitional action to be the decision to perform an action that precedes it, when the action is preceded by a full-fledged mental act, the development of an idea of a goal, and obtaining consent to this goal. Achieving such consent for a specific action begins with the selection and consideration of goals, with an analysis of their value, and an analysis of the consequences of the action. It is no coincidence that E. Maiman considers reflection to be the true cause of all volitional actions, since it is through it that an understanding of the value and significance of the goal is achieved.
Domestic psychologists also connected will with motivation. In this regard, one cannot fail to mention the ideas of I.M. Sechenov on the issue under consideration. Firstly, the scientist highlighted the moral component of the will, which can be seen as his postulation of the participation in volitional acts of the moral component of the motive (“Will is the active side of the mind and moral sense, governing movement in the name of both, and often contrary to even the sense of self-preservation”, - he wrote). Secondly, I.M. Sechenov emphasized that a person will not just show willpower; this requires a good reason, a motive. “We do not know impersonal, cold will,” wrote I.M. Sechenov.
G.I. Chelpanov (1897, 1926) identified three elements in a volitional act: desire, aspiration and effort. He connected volitional action with the struggle of motives, endowing the will with the function of choice (making a decision about action). K.N. Kornilov (1948, 1957) emphasized that volitional actions are always based on motive. Another major Russian psychologist, N.N., also discussed human drives, desires and desires in connection with the question of will and volitional acts in his works. Lange (1883). In particular, he gave his understanding of the difference between drives and desires, believing that the latter are drives that turn into actions and are accompanied by a feeling of activity of these actions. For him, wanting is an active will.
L.S. Vygotsky identifies two separate processes in volitional action: the first corresponds to a decision, the closure of a new brain connection, the creation of a special functional apparatus; the second - executive - consists in the work of the created apparatus, in acting according to instructions, in executing a decision. L.S. Vygotsky, like J. Piaget (1969), includes in the structure of a volitional act the operation of introducing an auxiliary motive to enhance the impulse to action - necessary, but weakly related to a person’s personal desire. L.S. Vygotsky argued that free will is not freedom from motives. A person’s free choice from two available possibilities is determined not from the outside, but from the inside, by the person himself. Vygotsky formulated the position that a change in the meaning of an action also changes the motivation for it (an idea later developed by A. N. Leontyev in the concept of “meaning-forming motives” and V. A. Ivannikov in his view of will as “voluntary motivation”).
An understanding of the motivational process as a volitional one can be found in S. L. Rubinstein (1946). The entire first part of his chapter on will - “The Nature of Will” - is nothing more than a presentation of various aspects of the doctrine of motivation.
S.L. Rubinstein believed that “the rudiments of will are already contained in needs as in the initial motivations of a person to action” (1946, p. 588). But if we recognize the correctness of such an understanding of the will (or, according to the definition of S. L. Rubinstein, volitional component mental process, in this case - needs) as dynamic tension, motivation, aspiration, then instincts should be considered as volitional actions: after all, they also contain both a sensory experience of need and a desire to satisfy the need. But then the specificity of will disappears as a voluntary method of regulation, as opposed to an involuntary one. In addition, the need impulse in a person only gives an impetus to the development of the first component of the volitional act, i.e. motivation, but does not lead directly to action. S. L. Rubinstein himself writes about this: “Being in its original origins connected with needs, a person’s volitional action never, however, follows directly from them. Volitional action is always mediated by a more or less complex work of consciousness - awareness of the impulses to action as motives and its result as a goal." And one more thing: “...In volitional action the impulses themselves do not act directly in the form of a blind impulse, but indirectly through a conscious goal” (ibid., p. 589). So the position of S.L. Rubinstein about the rudiments of will, already contained in needs, can be understood only by accepting the point of view that will is voluntary motivation and that the development of motivation as the beginning of an voluntary act begins with the emergence of a need impulse.
The connection between motivation and will is also considered by other Moscow psychologists (K.M. Gurevich, 1940; L.I. Bozhovich, 1969; A.N. Leontiev, 1981; V.A. Ivannikov, 1991). For example, A.N. Leontiev considered the development of voluntary behavior in connection with the development and differentiation of the motivational sphere. Arbitrary action, according to A.N. Leontiev, is characterized by the fact that the content of the motive and the goal in it do not coincide.
The specificity of the approach of Georgian psychologists is that they consider will as one of the motivating mechanisms, along with an actually experienced need. Thus, according to D.N. Uznadze (1966), the mechanisms of will are such that the source of activity or behavior is not the impulse of an actual need, but something completely different, sometimes even contradictory to the need. The Georgian scientist associates the motivation for any action with the presence of an attitude towards action (intention). This attitude, which arises at the moment of decision-making and underlies volitional behavior, is created due to the presence in the mind of an imaginary or conceivable situation. Behind volitional attitudes are hidden human needs, which, although not directly experienced at the moment, lie at the basis of making a decision about action, and the processes of imagination and thinking also participate in the development of such a decision.
Many scientists have considered and continue to consider the mechanism of motivation as volitional. Noting this, B.V. Zeigarnik and co-authors (1989) write: “The problem of mastering one’s behavior (at the level of mastering one’s own motivation)... is traditionally posed in psychology as a problem of will... Volitional behavior is considered by various authors as a process of producing new motivational formations that contribute to the development of behavior in the chosen direction" (pp. 122-123).
Despite the fact that the connection between motivation and will is a generally accepted fact, this, however, does not mean that such a connection is viewed by all scientists in the same way. There are at least three directions in considering this issue.
The first of these directions practically identifies motivation and will., thereby essentially denying the latter (this approach is typical of American psychology; it is no coincidence that the very concept of “will” is absent in Western psychological dictionaries). At the same time, supporters of this direction refer to the fact that if a person has a strong desire (motive), then no psychological mechanism is required, additional to the motive, which would cause the person’s activity to achieve the goal; desire itself organizes this activity.
However, even J. Locke believed that it was wrong to identify the will and desires of a person. Connecting will with the mechanisms for generating actions, he, along with motivation, identifies a special ability that allows actions to be carried out, and he calls this ability will. The will, overcoming displeasure, can act, according to J. Locke, against desire, forming in a person a desire or volition.
P.V. does not reduce will to motive either. Simonov, who rightly believes that it is impossible to consider the dominant need at the moment as will. Will is not just a dominant need, he writes, but some special mechanism, additional to one of the competing motivations.
Reducing the will to a motive that encourages activity is unlawful, if only because the obstacles encountered on the way to achieving a goal cause the so-called “overcoming reaction,” which, as a rule, is part of any volitional effort. In addition, the specificity of volitional manifestation cannot be determined by one or another primary impulse associated with any need. Moreover, the realization of one of many impulses is possible only because other impulses are often suppressed by an effort of will.
The second direction does not identify motivation and will, although it does not deny the presence of a close connection between them. As P.I. believes Ivanov (1967), volitional (voluntary) actions, unlike involuntary ones, are performed based on motives. However, there is no complete unanimity among supporters of this direction. For some researchers, will is part of motivation, a characteristic and mechanism for implementing motivation (L.S. Vygotsky, L.I. Bozhovich). So, for example, L.I. Bozhovich sees the essence of volitional behavior in the ability to subordinate it to consciously set goals (pre-adopted intentions) even against immediate impulses, when a person overcomes his personal desires for the sake of unattractive goals for him at the moment, but socially significant goals (social values). She views will as the highest mental function in the motivational sphere, arising as a result of the development of human needs mediated by the intellect. Like L. S. Vygotsky, Bozhovich understands will as a type of voluntary motivation.
V.A. Ivannikov (1985) asks what is common in the following concepts, with the help of which the phenomenon of will or volitional behavior is described and explained: action without an actual need; action when there is a conflict of motives; action taking into account its consequences and moral considerations; action due to social necessity; arbitrarily chosen action, free from the current situation; restraining your desires; overcoming obstacles, etc. V. A. Ivannikov gives the following answer: all these concepts include the moment changing motives by changing the meaning of an action. He also believes that people begin to talk about will when a lack of motivation for a given action is discovered (in a similar way, J. Beckmann (1987) and J. Piaget (1969) consider will as an amplifier of insufficient motivation). As a result, it turns out that, on the one hand, V. A. Ivannikov adheres to the understanding of will from a motivational position, and on the other hand, apparently, he joins supporters of the understanding of will as volitional regulation associated with overcoming difficulties.
In another work, he again repeats that the volitional regulation of the impulse to action is based on an arbitrary form of motivation, when he writes that “Will is ... arbitrary motivation” (1986, p. 27).
The views of V. A. Ivannikov were fairly criticized by V. K. Kalin (1989). The latter notes that at first V.A. Ivannikov narrowed the problem of voluntary motivation to the question of incentives, and then reduced it to a conscious change in motive, which is considered only in terms of incentive reasons. Both will and voluntary motivation for V. A. Ivannikov are a conscious form of motivating reasons for action - and nothing more. He does not include volitional qualities, and therefore volitional efforts, in the concept of will, proposing instead to highlight such real moments of human activity that “do not yet have their own explanation and require the use of a concept similar to the intuitively distinguished concept of will” (1985, p. 49 ). Thus, concludes V.K. Kalin, the main drawback of V.A. Ivannikov’s ideas about will is that his consideration of will only as a type of voluntary motivation does not allow him to cover all volitional manifestations, in particular, a person’s control of his mental processes when performing actions and implementation of activities.
E.O. Smirnova (1990) criticizes the concept of V. A. Ivannikov from other positions. She notes that if we understand will only as mastery of one’s impulse, then it will be possible to speak about the beginning of the formation of will in childhood only when the child becomes able to manage his motives and create new personal meanings (i.e., rethink the basis of his actions and deeds). ). However, it is known, notes E. O. Smirnova, that children under 7-8 years old cannot adequately understand their motives (much less independently change the meaning of their actions). L. S. Vygotsky, following K. Levin, noted that children, unlike adults, are not capable of forming “any” intentions and can act only in the direction of the strongest immediate impulses, and that a preschooler can only do what he wants . And V. A. Ivannikov himself showed that in children under 6 years of age, the introduction of additional motives does not significantly increase the volitional component of actions. It should follow from this that before this age it is difficult to talk about the presence of will in children.
In reality, both life observations and scientific research show that already 3-year-old children show perseverance and stubbornness. A number of authors consider preschool age to be an intensive period of will development (V.K. Kotyrlo, 1971, 1974; A.N. Leontyev, 1981; N.I. Nepomnyashchaya, 1965; D.B. Elkonin, 1965).
Thus, many data speak in favor of the fact that there is no reason to reduce the will to voluntary motivation.
For another group of researchers motivation is one of the aspects of volitional behavior, volitional motivation (K.N. Kornilov, 1957; L.S. Vygotsky, 1983; V.N. Myasishchev, 1930; P.A. Rudik, 1967).
In accordance with this understanding, motivation is always voluntary and cannot be contrasted with involuntary motivation, but involuntary (unconditionally and conditioned reflex) determination of behavior. It follows from this that determination and motivation are, although mutually dependent (in the sense that the second is a variety of the first), but not identical concepts. An external or internal stimulus (for example, sharp pain) can also cause an involuntary reaction in a person, but voluntary actions arise only due to the presence of a motive.
From the understanding of motive as the beginning responsible for a person’s voluntary activity, according to supporters of this point of view, one of the structural features of this activity follows: predicting the result and the consequences of its achievement. Voluntary activity always takes place against the background of more or less clear expectations of the expected result of the activity or its possible consequences. Another thing is that the result obtained does not always meet expectations.
Finally, the third direction generally questions the connection between will and motivation. Sh.N. Chkhartishvili (1958) shares the opinion of D.N. Uznadze that volitional behavior is not associated with the satisfaction of an actual experienced need. The will is intended to serve as an incentive mechanism for behavior that satisfies external social requirements that are accepted by the subject (“I must”). As a result of this, Sh.H. Chkhartishvili does not consider will to be part of a single motivational process, but views it as a special mental formation or ability of the individual.
Thus, the problem of will is not reduced only to the problem of motivation, but, according to a number of authors, it also has independent significance.

1.3. Will as voluntary motivation

Actions and deeds carried out by the decision of the person himself were called arbitrary by Aristotle. Essential for the Aristotelian understanding of the role of the volitional principle in the determination of behavior is the fact that the will not only initiates, but also selects voluntary actions, and also regulates their implementation. In addition, the philosopher attributed to the action of the volitional principle the ability of a person to control himself. At the same time, any volitional movement has, according to Aristotle, natural foundations.

The ancient Roman thinker and physician Galen (130–200 BC) spoke about voluntary and involuntary movements, referring to the latter only muscle contractions of internal organs (heart, stomach). He considered all other movements voluntary. They differ from involuntary (automatic) movements in that they always occur with the participation of mental pneuma, which includes perception, memory and reason and performs a control function in relation to the organs of movement.

R. Descartes understood will as the ability of the soul to form a desire and determine the impulse for any human action that cannot be explained on the basis of a reflex. Descartes believed that the task of the will is to fight passions that arise under the influence of things (while desires are generated directly by the soul). The will can slow down movements driven by passion. Reason, according to Descartes, is the will's own instrument. The will helps a person to follow certain rules, based on the judgments of the mind about good and evil. Thus Descartes connects the will with human morality.

The English philosopher T. Hobbes, who lived at the same time as R. Descartes, also proceeded from the ideas of involuntary and voluntary regulation when explaining human behavior. In cases where either a feeling of desire for something or a feeling of disgust arises, it is necessary to make an unambiguous choice of one action or another. The last desire, arising in the act of deliberation and reflection, which is directly adjacent to action, was called will by T. Hobbes. The will is determined by motives and impulses, which, in turn, are themselves determined by needs, as well as by knowledge about things and about the possible ways in which these needs are satisfied.

V. Wundt believed that mental causation receives its highest expression in an act of will.

E. Meiman also considered will from a motivational position. He considered the main sign of a volitional action to be the decision to perform an action that precedes it, when the action is preceded by a full-fledged mental act, the development of an idea of a goal, and obtaining consent to this goal. Achieving such consent for a specific action begins with the selection and consideration of goals, with an analysis of their value, and an analysis of the consequences of the action. It is no coincidence that E. Maiman considered reflection to be the true cause of all volitional actions, since it is through it that an understanding of the value and meaning of a goal is achieved.

K. Levin, slightly changing the experimental plan of N. Ach, proved that learned forms of behavior (stimulus-reactive connections, skills, etc.) by themselves are not capable of determining the activity of the subject; This requires the action of a motivational factor. Thus, the dominant and coordinating role of motivational and volitional processes in relation to other mental processes was postulated. According to K. Lewin, a person’s behavior is controlled by a large number of “tense systems,” which are goals coming from the subject himself or given from the outside. Goals are not only a cognitive representation of a future state (cognitive aspect), but at the same time a dynamic expression of any needs of the individual (motivational aspect), although they are not completely reducible to these needs; therefore they are called quasi-needs. Objects or events that can serve to relieve tense systems - quasi-needs - have special incentive features, literally - the nature of the demand (“Aufforderungscharacter”) from the subject of a particular type of behavior. So, if we need to make a call, the pay phone “shows itself,” as it were, requiring certain actions from us (get a coin, remember the number, etc.). Volitional actions, according to Lewin, differ from actions governed by quasi-needs: volitional action attempts to control the emerging tendency of action - for example, provides a person with the opportunity to remain calm, even if he is insulted. If several tense systems arise, then volitional action ensures, through the decision-making process, preference for one of them; if this fails to the full extent, erroneous actions or inhibition of the actual action occur. Noteworthy is the fact that the will continues to remain the “handmaiden” of motives (true needs - according to Lewin) and the conflict of intentions, which by its nature is volitional, is resolved through decision-making, i.e. in the sphere of motivation.

Having replaced the concept of “determining tendency” by N. Ach with the concept of “quasi-need,” K. Levin actually identified the problems of will and motivation: researchers of that time were more interested in the process of emergence of quasi-needs (intentions) and the situational factors influencing their implementation. According to K. Lewin, quasi-need is automatically translated into action as soon as favorable external conditions arise for this. Hence it is clear that the postulation and study of certain additional mental processes that control the implementation of intentions (processes that we now designate as volitional) was simply unnecessary. Along with the analysis of the process of goal-directed behavior, K. Lewin contains interesting descriptions of “various degrees of dependence on quasi-needs” of subjects in the same experimental situation. For “active” types, intentional action proceeds as if on its own, without conscious control on the part of the subject; subjects indicate in self-reports that they acted involuntarily, “almost as if in a dream.” Subjects classified as the “thinking” type, on the contrary, reported action-inhibiting mental contents, mostly associated with a variety of unpleasant sensations during the experiment. The differential psychological aspect of the study of volitional processes did not, however, receive any development in the school of K. Lewin, who paid main attention to the development of the famous “field theory”.

A detailed study of personal and situational determinants of behavior in field theory, on the one hand, and K. Levin’s underestimation of the role of volitional processes themselves, on the other, resulted in the fact that, starting from the 40s. of our century, the concept of “will”, and indeed the study of volitional processes themselves, are gradually “going out of fashion” and are being replaced by cognitively oriented studies of motivation, which are based on the “Expectation? Value" [see review by Heckhausen, 1986]. However, after a real boom in studies of motivation, and above all - achievement motivation, in Western European psychology, under the influence of a number of experimental data, a critical understanding of the postulate is beginning to take shape that motivational processes based on assessing the expectation of success and the attractiveness of the goal directly determine behavior. Researchers have tried to refine the “Expectation? Value”, introducing new personal and situational variables that mediate the connection between motive and behavioral manifestations (problem solving strategies, overall performance efficiency, emotional background of activity, etc.).

Shapkin S. A. 1997. P. 14

Heckhausen H. 2003. P. 312

Domestic psychologists also connected will with motivation. And here it is impossible not to mention I.M. Sechenov’s ideas on the issue under consideration. Firstly, the scientist highlighted the moral component of the will, which can be seen as his postulation of the participation in volitional acts of the moral component of the motive (“will is the active side of the mind and moral sense, controlling movement in the name of both, and often contrary to even the sense of self-preservation”, - he wrote). Secondly, I.M. Sechenov emphasized that a person will not just show willpower, this requires a good reason, a motive. “We don’t know impersonal, cold will,” the scientist argued [ibid., p. 181].

L. S. Vygotsky identified two separate processes in volitional action: the first corresponds to a decision, the closure of a new brain connection, the creation of a special functional apparatus; the second - executive - consists in the work of the created apparatus, in acting according to instructions, in executing a decision. L. S. Vygotsky, like J. Piaget, included in the structure of a volitional act the operation of introducing an auxiliary motive to enhance the impulse to action - necessary, but weakly related to a person’s personal desire. L. S. Vygotsky argued that free will is not freedom from motives. A person’s free choice from two available possibilities is determined not from the outside, but from the inside, by the person himself. Vygotsky formulated the position that a change in the meaning of an action also changes the motivation for it (an idea later developed by A. N. Leontiev in the concept of “meaning-forming motives” and V. A. Ivannikov in his view of will as “voluntary motivation”).

An understanding of the motivational process as a volitional one can be found in S. L. Rubinstein. The entire first part of his chapter on will - “The Nature of Will” - is nothing more than a presentation of various aspects of the doctrine of motivation.

Selivanov V. I. 1992. P. 170

The connection between motivation and will was also studied by other Moscow psychologists (K. M. Gurevich; L. I. Bozhovich; A. N. Leontiev; V. A. Ivannikov). For example, A. N. Leontiev studied the development of voluntary behavior in connection with the development and differentiation of the motivational sphere. A voluntary action, according to A. N. Leontyev, is characterized by the fact that the content of the motive and the goal in it do not coincide. Many scientists have considered and continue to consider the mechanism of motivation as volitional. Noting this, B.V. Zeigarnik and her co-authors wrote: “The problem of mastering one’s behavior (at the level of mastering one’s own motivation) ... is traditionally posed in psychology as a problem of will. Volitional behavior is considered by various authors as a process of production of new motivational formations that contribute to the development of behavior in the chosen direction" [Zeigarnik, Kholmogorova, Mazur, 1989, p. 122–123].

The first of these directions is practically identifies motivation and will, thereby essentially denying the latter (this approach is characteristic of American psychology; it is no coincidence that the very concept of “will” is absent in Western psychological dictionaries). At the same time, supporters of this direction refer to the fact that if a person has a strong desire (motive), then no psychological mechanism is required, additional to the motive, which would cause the person’s activity to achieve the goal; desire itself organizes this activity.

Selivanov V. I. 1992. P. 190

P. V. Simonov did not reduce will to motive either, who rightly believed that it is impossible to consider the dominant need at a given moment as will. Will is not just a dominant need, he wrote, but some special mechanism, additional to one of the competing motivations.

Second direction does not identify motivation and will, although it does not deny the presence of a close connection between them. As P.I. Ivanov believed, volitional (voluntary) actions, in contrast to involuntary ones, are performed based on the. However, there is no complete unanimity among supporters of this direction. For some researchers will is part of motivation, characteristics and mechanism of motivation (L. S. Vygotsky, L. I. Bozhovich). So, for example, L. I. Bozhovich saw the essence of volitional behavior in the ability to subordinate it to consciously set goals (pre-adopted intentions) even contrary to immediate impulses, when a person overcomes his personal desires for the sake of unattractive for him at the moment, but socially significant goals (social values). L. I. Bozhovich considered will as the highest mental function in the motivational sphere, arising as a result of the development of human needs mediated by the intellect. Like L. S. Vygotsky, Bozhovich understood will as a type of voluntary motivation.

V. A. Ivannikov wondered what was common in the following concepts, with the help of which the phenomenon of will or volitional behavior is described and explained: action without an actual need; action when there is a conflict of motives; action taking into account its consequences and moral considerations; action due to social necessity; arbitrarily chosen action, free from the current situation; restraining your desires; overcoming obstacles, etc. V. A. Ivannikov gave the following answer: all these concepts include the moment changing motives by changing the meaning of the action. He also believed that people begin to talk about will when a lack of motivation for a given action is discovered (in a similar way, J. Beckmann and J. Piaget considered will as an amplifier of motivation that is insufficient in strength). According to Ivannikov, the difficulties that arise are overcome very simply: to do this, a weaker motive must be replaced (or added to it) with a stronger one. Thus, a performance at a competition may be more successful for an athlete if he dedicates it to a loved one. In this case, the old motive “borrows” energy from a new, more significant motive.

The views of V. A. Ivannikov were fairly criticized by V. K. Kalin. The latter notes that at first V.A. Ivannikov narrowed the problem of voluntary motivation to the question of incentives, and then reduced it to a conscious change in motive, which is considered only in terms of incentive reasons. Both will and voluntary motivation for V. A. Ivannikov are a conscious form of motivating reasons for action - and nothing more. He did not include volitional qualities, and therefore volitional efforts, in the concept of will, proposing instead to highlight such real moments of human activity that “do not yet have their own explanation and require the use of a concept similar to the intuitively distinguished concept of will.” Thus, V.K. Kalin concludes that the main drawback of V.A. Ivannikov’s ideas about will is that his consideration of will only as a type of voluntary motivation does not allow him to cover all volitional manifestations, in particular, a person’s control of his mental processes when performing actions and implementation of activities.

In reality, both life observations and scientific research show that already 3-year-old children show perseverance and stubbornness. A number of authors consider preschool age to be an intensive period of will development (V.K. Kotyrlo; A.N. Leontyev; N.I. Nepomnyashchaya; D.B. Elkonin).

Thus, many data speak in favor of the fact that there is no reason to reduce the will to voluntary motivation.

For another group of researchers motivation is one of the aspects of volitional behavior, volitional impulse (K. N. Kornilov; L. S. Vygotsky; V. N. Myasishchev; P. A. Rudik).

In accordance with this understanding, motivation is always voluntary and cannot be contrasted with involuntary motivation, and involuntary (unconditioned and conditioned reflex) determination behavior. It follows from this that determination and motivation are, although mutually dependent (in the sense that the second is a variety of the first), but not identical concepts. An external or internal stimulus (for example, sharp pain) can also cause an involuntary reaction in a person, but voluntary actions arise only due to the presence of a motive.

Finally, the third direction generally questions the connection between will and motivation.

Will is a person’s conscious regulation of his behavior, associated with overcoming internal and external obstacles, which has a number of characteristics: the presence of efforts and a well-thought-out plan for performing a particular act of will; increased attention to such behavioral action; lack of direct pleasure received in the process and as a result of its execution; a state of optimal mobilization of the individual, concentration in the right direction.

Motivation is a set of psychological reasons that explain human behavior: its beginning, direction and activity.

Activity is the main path, the only effective way to be a person; a person, through his activity, continues himself in other people. A produced object is, on the one hand, an object of activity, and on the other, a means by which a person asserts himself in the world, because this object is produced for other people.

54. Theories of will.

Understanding will as a real factor of behavior has its own history. At the same time, two aspects can be distinguished in views on the nature of this mental phenomenon: philosophical-ethical and natural-scientific.

Ancient philosophers considered purposeful or conscious human behavior from the perspective of its compliance with generally accepted norms. In the ancient world, the ideal of the sage was primarily recognized, therefore ancient philosophers believed that the rules of human behavior should correspond to the rational principles of nature and life, the rules of logic. Thus, according to Aristotle, the nature of the will is expressed in the formation of a logical conclusion.

During the Middle Ages, the problem of will did not actually exist as an independent problem. Man was considered by medieval philosophers as an exclusively passive principle, as a “field” on which external forces meet. The concept of will during the Middle Ages was more associated with certain higher powers.

It can be assumed that the problem of will as an independent scientific problem arose simultaneously with the formulation of the problem of personality. This happened during the Renaissance, when a person’s right to creativity and even to make mistakes began to be recognized. For example, the opinion began to prevail that only by deviating from the norm, standing out from the general mass of people, could a person become an individual. At the same time, freedom of will was considered to be the main value of the individual. During the Renaissance, free will generally began to be elevated to the rank of absolute.

Subsequently, the absolutization of free will led to the emergence of the worldview of existentialism - the “philosophy of existence.” Existentialism (M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, J. P. Sartre, A. Camus, etc.) considers freedom as absolutely free will, not conditioned by any external social circumstances. The starting point of this concept is an abstract person, taken outside of social connections and relationships, outside the socio-cultural environment. A person is free and cannot be responsible for anything. For him, any norm acts as a suppression of his free will.

One of the first natural scientific interpretations of will belongs to I.P. Pavlov, who viewed it as an “instinct of freedom,” as a manifestation of the activity of a living organism when it encounters obstacles that limit this activity. According to I.P. Pavlov, will as an “instinct of freedom” is no less a stimulus for behavior than the instincts of hunger and danger. Will in the interpretation of I.P. Pavlova is reflexive in nature, i.e. it manifests itself in the form of a response to an influencing stimulus. This interpretation has found the widest distribution among representatives of behaviorism and received support in reactology (K.N. Kornilov) and reflexology (V.M. Bekhterev).

However, in last decades Another concept is gaining strength and is finding an increasing number of supporters, according to which human behavior is understood as initially active, and the person himself is viewed as endowed with the ability to consciously choose a form of behavior.

Diagnostics and diseases. Medicines from A to Z

Psychology of will. The relationship between volitional and motivational components in the personality structure of a law student

54. Theories of will.