Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
1st rank cruiser "Askold"
Laid down in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Entered service in 1902. In 1903 he left for Far East. One of the most actively operating ships. In July 1904, he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to escape the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became part of the Siberian Flotilla and was stationed in Vladivostok. During WWII he participated in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of allied land and naval forces against the Ottoman Empire, the goal of which was a breakthrough to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). After which he went to Toulon, where he was undergoing repairs (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon the cruiser went to Murmansk, where it became part of the Arctic Ocean fleet. In 1918, in the Kola Bay, it was captured by the British and became part of the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". In 1922 it was bought by Soviet Russia. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. Also in 1922, "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation, Askold fought alongside the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one that the Varyag team switched to.
before launching
hull "Askold" (left) in the water
at the outfitting wall - installation of the bow pipe, 1901
the cruiser has almost taken on its final form, winter 1901
drydocking in the Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901
sea trials, 1901
additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany
acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, there is a state (tricolor) flag on the flagpole, and not a naval (Andreevsky) flag
in the Kiel Canal, 1902
Great Kronstadt raid, 1902
already part of the Baltic Fleet, 1902
Dalian Bay, 1903
Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard combat paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive
on a combat course, 1904
during the Dardanelles operation, 1915
in Toulon, 1916
as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917
note from the magazine "Niva", 1915
drawing and axonometric projection, "Modelist-Constructor" magazine. An axonometric view of anti-mine networks shows them in combat position
"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing
painting of the cruiser "Askold" during service on Pacific Ocean
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901 and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libau and further to the Far East, it was equipped with a Guards crew.
In the Battle of Tsushima he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship of the Borodino EBR. Due to the loss of speed, he found himself under fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. A fire broke out on board. Water entering through the holes worsened the situation and at 18:50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew died. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, captain 1st rank, crew commander of the Imperator Alexander III"Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov said 2:
You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory! I'm afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us: they have a more serviceable fleet and they are real sailors. I guarantee one thing - we will all die, but we will not give up.
The squadron reached Tsushima Strait without loss, she died there. But the honor remained untarnished. N. M. Bukhvostov and his crew died all together. Your coffin is an armadillo. Your grave is the cold depths of the ocean. And faithful sailors family of origin- your centuries-old protection... 1
squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
before launching, 1901
during outfitting work at the Baltic Shipyard
transition from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt
in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903
at the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904
August 1904
on the Revel roadstead, September 1904
view of the starboard side, a crane with a steam boat is given away
at one of the stops during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EDB "Navarin", EDB "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"
The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of its class with full sail weapons in the Russian Navy
The last Russian cruiser with full sails. Development of the project "Memory of Azov". The subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Gromoboy" - became the development of this project (initially it was planned to build them according to the same project as the "Rurik"). The main task is to conduct combat operations and raiding operations on British and German communications. The peculiarity of the ship was that when loading additional coal reserves, it could travel from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional coal loading at a 10-knot speed.
Construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down in May 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In the battle on August 1, 1904 near Fr. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 crew members, 139 were killed and 229 were injured.
on a voyage, view of the deck from the top of the foremast
painting the side in preparation for the show 
on a hike
"Rurik" in black paint
"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896
in the eastern basin of Port Arthur
in the dock of Vladivostok 
Port Arthur
cruiser on a voyage, Far East
the cruiser's stem - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "nose figures" of sailing ships
squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched May 25, 1895. Entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was scuttled by its crew. The last ship of the Poltava class.
near Galerny Island before being transferred for completion to Kronstadt, 1898
"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901
on the right (near the wall) is the Sevastopol EDB. A crane carries a faulty 12-inch gun from the Tsesarevich, Port Arthur, 1904
EDB "Sevastopol" on the march
"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" near the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903
ventilation deflector torn by a shell, 1904
in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsesarevich", in the distance in the background - "Askold"
in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik
after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904
sailors leave for the land front. after this, the Sevastopol EDB will be sunk in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color postcard
Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"
Laid down at Burmeister og Wein, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official laying took place on September 24, 1900. On May 26, 1901 it was launched.
Entered service in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903, arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the port of Dalniy on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team abandoned the ship, which remained afloat for another two days and only sank after a repeated explosion at a minefield.
still under the Danish flag, sea trials, 1902
1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before moving to Kronstadt.
"Boyarin" in the Far East, 1903 
in the Denmark Strait, 1903
in Toulon
Port Arthur, 1904
Armored cruiser II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard
1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, a cadet of the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps, graduated in 1910. It is completely engraved on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are a memory to all those who remained with their crew, with their ship, until the last. Such as N. M. Bukhvostov, S. O. Makarov and many others...
Sleep, northern knight, sleep, honest Father,
Taken untimely by death, -
Not laurels of victory - crown of thorns
You accepted with a fearless squad.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold depths of the ocean
And faithful sailors' family
Your age-old protection.
Shared laurels, from now on with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry with rain
And the shroud will be spread with a thick cover
There are thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
The thunder will be given to him with a roar.
Let me remind you that Admiral Makarov died along with the Petropavlovsk nuclear submarine, which was blown up by a mine in Vladivostok. The Russian battle painter Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin (author of the paintings “The Apotheosis of War”, “Before the Attack at Plevna”, “Napoleon on the Borodino Heights”, “Skobelev at Plevna”, etc.) also died along with the ship.
2 - who regularly follows the TV project "Living History" of the TV channel "Channel 5 - St. Petersburg", could have heard this quote in one of the parts of the film about the Russian fleet "Yablochko". True, Sergei Shnurov shortened it - he removed the words regarding the loss of ships during the voyage.
Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet
A detachment of cruisers on the roadstead in Vladivostok
Total information
Number of members
Military conflicts
Story
The decision to create
The formation of a detachment of cruisers based in Vladivostok as an independently operating formation was envisaged back in March 1901. In addition to the cruisers “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik”, the detachment at various times also included other cruisers (“Admiral Nakhimov”, “Varyag”, “Askold”).
The decision in 1901-1903 to create a detachment of cruisers into an independent detachment was motivated by the following:
- Armored cruisers are not battleships and are built specifically for cruising warfare. The effect of their action on a wide theater should be much greater than as part of a squadron.
- By distracting 6 Japanese armored cruisers, the detachment will weaken the superiority of the main forces of the Japanese fleet over the Russian one.
- Raiding along the enemy's coast, thereby disrupting the supply of enemy troops in the continental theater of operations.
This was also the task that was assigned to the detachment.
The correctness of this allocation of the best cruisers into a separate detachment was confirmed by the experience of the Russian-Japanese War.
Formation
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich"
The final composition of the Pacific Squadron was announced at a meeting in Port Arthur on April 17, 1903. As a result of this meeting, naval forces in the Far East were distributed as follows:
1. “Combat squadron” based in Port Arthur (I and II squads of battleships, detachments of long-range and short-range reconnaissance ships (cruisers), 1st squadron of destroyers) and a defensive detachment.
2. A separate cruising detachment and a defensive detachment based in Vladivostok.
In addition, groups of auxiliary vessels (transports) were formed based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.
The separate cruising detachment in Vladivostok was to include the armored cruisers "Russia" (flag of the 1st junior flagship of the squadron), "Gromoboy" and "Rurik", the armored cruiser "Bogatyr" and the Voluntary Fleet steamships "Moscow" and "Kherson". In addition to the designated ships, the Vladivostok detachment included: gunboats “Koreets”, “Mandzhur”, “Beaver” and “Sivuch”, mine transport “Aleut”, military transports “Kamchadal” and “Yakut”, destroyers No. 201, 202 and 209 , as well as six destroyers.
In July-August, 6 more numbered destroyers transferred by the cruisers Boyarin and Rurik arrived in Vladivostok, but the gunboats and the 20-knot steamship Moskva never made it to Vladivostok. At the same time, “Kherson” (renamed “Lena”), due to defects in the boilers, was unable to develop a full 19.5 knot speed, which was reflected in the failure better side on the initial plans for the use of the detachment.
Armored cruiser "Russia"
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on May 20, 1895. Launched April 30, 1896. Entered service on September 13, 1897. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. The flagship of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.
Displacement 12580 tons. Armament - 4 - 203/45, 22 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47/43, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 5 NTA. Speed - 19.74 knots, cruising range 7740 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 811 sailors.
Armored cruiser "Gromoboy"
Laid down on July 14, 1897 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Launched April 26, 1889. Entered service in October 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.
Displacement 12455 tons. Dimensions: 146.6/144.2/140.6x20.9x7.9 m. Initial armament - 4 - 203/45, 16 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47 mm, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 4 PTA. Speed 20.1 knots; cruising range 8100 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 846 sailors.
Armored cruiser "Rurik"
Unofficial construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down on May 19, 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service on October 16, 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.
Displacement 11930 t. Dimensions: 132.6x20.4x8.3 m. Armament - 4 - 203/35, 16 - 152/35, 6 - 120/45, 6 - 47/43, 10 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des ., 6 NTA. Speed 18.84 knots; cruising range 7790 miles. Crew of 27 officers and 692 sailors
Armored cruiser "Bogatyr"
Laid down in December 1898 in Stettin (Germany) on the shipyard of the Vulcan company. Launched on January 17, 1901. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. On May 2, 1904, in the fog, he jumped onto the coastal rocks at Cape Bruce in the Amur Bay and, having received a hole in the hull, lay down on the ground. On June 18, 1904, she was refloated and docked for repairs, where she remained until the end of the war.
Displacement 6650 t. Dimensions: 134.1x16.6x6.3 m. Armament 12 - 152/45, 12 - 75/50, 8 - 47 mm, 2 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm (des), 2 NTA, 2 PTA. Test speed up to 23.55 knots; cruising range 4900 miles. Crew: 23 officers and 550 sailors.
During design and construction, all of these cruisers were designed for raider operations on the enemy’s ocean lines of communication. Because of this, in order to increase their cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect protection for deck artillery.
Squad names
The order to form the detachment was signed on June 7, 1903. In which it was given its first name: “Detachment of Cruisers of the Pacific Ocean Squadron.”
After the start of the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the squadron was given the rights of fleet commander. As a result, on February 25, 1904, the detachment was transformed into a “Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.”
On May 12, 1904, the structure of the fleet was changed and the detachment received a new name: “Separate detachment of cruisers of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet.”
On December 20, 1904, after the death of the remnants of the squadron in Port Arthur, the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers was given a new name “Cruiser Detachment in the Pacific Ocean”.
Fighting
First campaign (January 27 - February 1, 1904)
On the night of January 26-27, 1904, an order was received from the command, which read: “The detachment should begin military operations and inflict the most sensitive blow and damage to Japan’s communications with Korea.” The ships were prepared for combat operations in advance and went to sea on the same day. But the campaign was not particularly successful, despite the absence of serious enemy forces. During the voyage, only one steamer IJN Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) was sunk and another one was shelled. A storm at sea forced us to return to our home port.
Second campaign (February 11 - 14, 1904)
The next trip to sea took place on February 11, 1904. The area of the second campaign was the coast from the border with Korea to the port of Genzan. But this campaign was even less effective - apart from small coastal vessels, the cruisers did not meet anyone.
Third campaign (February 24 - March 1, 1904)
Having gone to sea on February 24, the detachment again headed to the shores of Korea, to the ports and bays located in the Korean Gulf and to the north of it, as well as to the approaches to them from the coast of Japan, in particular, from the ports of Wakasa Bay.
Based on the results of a very superficial inspection of a number of bays on the Korean coast, the commander of the detachment, Reizenstein, reported the following information to the governor: “Two-time cruising gave the right to assume that the presence of our detachment here will not prevent the Japanese from conducting operations in the Sea of Japan; they are not conducting them here. Troops to Genzan they do not transport, there is no trade or transportation of goods along the Korean coast; having walked along the entire coast of Korea, seeing all the bays clearly, not a single signal station was seen, which also confirms the absence of operations."
Bombardment of Vladivostok by Japanese cruisers (March 6, 1904)
But even such small successes of the detachment were enough to alarm the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against the detachment. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored and two armored cruisers entered the Ussuri Gulf on March 6, 1904 and shelled Vladivostok. Immediately after the shelling of the city began, a detachment of Vladivostok cruisers began to weigh anchor, but leaving the bay was complicated by ice conditions and minefields. Upon entering the Ussuri Gulf, the ships saw only the smoke of the Japanese squadron on the horizon, so they did not pursue it and returned to the roadstead. The shelling resulted in the death of one woman and the injury of five sailors.
Inactivity (March 1 – April 9, 1904)
Among the first measures taken by S.O. Makarov to increase the combat effectiveness and intensify the actions of the fleet, the order of February 24 was the appointment of Rear Admiral K.P. as head of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. Jessena. And Jessen was given a new task for the detachment: to actively prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Korea.
But Jessen, for a number of reasons, could not begin to carry out orders:
- It took time to master units that were new to him and to train them appropriately for combat.
- It was necessary to choose the direction in which the cruiser detachment should strike. This required reliable information about the intentions and actions of the Japanese fleet.
However, the information about the enemy that the Russian command had during this period was very contradictory.
Fourth campaign (April 10 - 14, 1904)
But due to ice conditions, the detachment was able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. The detachment headed to the Korean coast to attack the port of Genzan. But Jessen did not know that on April 9, Admiral Kamimura sent his squadron to Vladivostok, after entering the same Genzan to replenish water and coal supplies. The reports note that there was thick fog at sea. On the morning of April 12, the detachment, entering Genzana Bay, sank the steamer IJN Goyo-Maru, which was stationed in the roadstead, and then in the afternoon they sank the coaster IJN Haginura-Maru. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22:20, the IJN Kinsu-Maru transport appeared on the way of the Vladivostok detachment. He was also sunk. After this, the detachment commander, having numerous prisoners from sunken ships on board the cruisers, decided to return to Vladivostok.
Second approach of Kamimura's squadron to Vladivostok (April 16, 1904)
Admiral H. Kamimura
On April 15, 1904, the Japanese squadron approached Shkota Island, where it remained for some time, producing signals, then went south. On April 16, the destroyers IJN Sirakumo, IJN Asasivo, IJN Akatsuki and IJN Asagiri laid three mine banks at the entrance to Ussuri Bay. Russian cruisers did not go to sea for fear of running into mines. Eight Russian destroyers were sent to monitor the Japanese ships. The trawling of Japanese mines was very poorly organized. Because of this, on July 4, destroyer No. 208 hit a mine in the Ussuri Gulf and sank.
Accident of the cruiser "Bogatyr" (May 2, 1904)
On May 2, 1904, the cruiser Bogatyr hit rocks at Cape Bruce in Slavyanka Bay. Soon the cruiser was removed from the rocks and docked for repairs. But due to a poorly equipped port and a lack of materials for repairs, the cruiser remained in dock until the end of the war.
Fifth campaign (May 30 - June 7, 1904)
The next time the cruisers went to sea and headed for the eastern passage of the Korean Strait only on May 30. On June 1, the detachment went to about. Tsushima, where Japan's main communications routes were located and where Admiral Kamimura's base was located in Ozaki Bay. On the same day, the steamships IJN Idzuma-Maru and IJN Hitachi-Maru were sunk by the Thunderbolt. IJN Hitachi-Maru carried 1,095 Japanese Army soldiers and officers, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers, which were intended to bombard Port Arthur. Another IJN transport, Sado-Maru (with 1,350 soldiers and officers, was stopped by warning shots from the Rurik. The Japanese officers refused to surrender and the Russians had no choice but to sink the transport, which was done. A detachment of cruisers went into the Sea of Japan. Kamimura, who was at the base, received a report about the Russian detachment and went out to search for it. But to no avail. On June 3, Russian cruisers inspected the English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with smuggled cargo to Japan.
On June 6, Russian cruisers returned from a successful raid in Vladivostok. Kamimura also returned to his base.
Sixth campaign (June 15 - 20, 1904)
On June 15, the detachment again went to Genzan. In order to achieve great success in the campaign, the auxiliary cruiser Lena and eight numbered destroyers joined the detachment. On June 17, the detachment entered Genzan and sank the schooner IJN Seiho-Maru and the coastal steamer IJN Koun-Maru in the roadstead, losing one destroyer due to the accident. After this, the Lena and the destroyers went to Vladivostok, and the cruisers to the Korean Strait. But having met Kamimura’s squadron in the Tsushima area, the detachment did not accept the battle and retreated. On June 19, on the way to their native shores, the English steamer Cheltenham, which was transporting timber for the Fuzan - Seoul - Chemulpo railway, was detained and delivered to Vladivostok. On June 20, the detachment entered the port of Vladivostok.
Seventh campaign (July 4-19, 1904)
The active actions of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers under the command of Jessen forced the Japanese government to send the bulk of transports with troops and military cargo to Korea and Manchuria through the Yellow Sea. Because of this, an order was received from Alekseev to proceed to the east coast of Japan for active operations on the routes of communication with America.
On July 7, 1904, a detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait and turned south. On July 9, the cruiser was inspected by the English steamer Arabiya; it was carrying contraband cargo; the ship was sent to Vladivostok. On July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here the English steamer Night Commender was inspected, carrying smuggled cargo, and sunk due to the lack of opportunity to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners were sunk, the German steamer Tea, which was traveling with smuggling, and the English steamer Kalhas was also captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. After this, the cruisers headed back to Vladivostok. On July 19, the cruisers arrived in Vladivostok.
The actions of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, excited the whole world. The world stock exchange reacted very actively to the actions of our cruisers; the price of freight increased greatly, but even high price could not stop some companies from refusing to operate flights to the shores of Japan.
Eighth campaign (July 30 - August 4). Battle in the Korean Strait (August 1, 1904)
On July 29, a telegram came from Admiral Alekseev to Vladivostok (which did not yet know about the results of the tragic battle on July 28), stating the order for the cruisers to immediately proceed to the Korean Strait. The purpose of this campaign for the detachment was to meet with Vitgeft’s squadron and provide assistance to him. But the telegram did not indicate which will go the way Vitgeft's detachment, as well as the exact time of his departure to sea is also unknown. Therefore, it was reported that the meeting was expected to take place north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were prohibited from entering south of the Fuzan parallel. According to the instructions, when meeting with Kamimura, the cruisers should retreat to Vladivostok, taking the Japanese with them. The cruiser should not be distracted by any other tasks during the cruise.
Early in the morning of July 30, "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" left Vladivostok. On the morning of August 1, in the southern part of the Korea Strait, as was written in the order, a detachment of cruisers stopped to wait for Vitgeft's squadron.
Cruiser IJN Iwate
When it began to get light, at 4:50 a.m., signalmen from the Rossiya spotted four ships that were sailing parallel to the detachment. The cruisers IJN Izumo, IJN Tokiwa, IJN Azuma and IJN Iwate were soon identified. Enemy ships cut off the detachment's path to retreat to Vladivostok. The fight was inevitable.
The battle began at 5:20 am. The Japanese cruisers were the first to open fire. Soon retaliatory salvos followed from "Russia" and "Gromoboya". Immediately there were strong explosions at IJN Iwate and at IJN Azuma. The beginning of the battle was left to the Russian cruisers. As it became known later, a heavy shell hit IJN Iwate, destroying three 152 mm and one 75 mm guns.
But soon the Japanese artillerymen took aim and began hitting Russian ships, killing and wounded appeared. Around the fourteenth minute of the battle, a fire started on the Rurik. The fire disabled the cruiser, but not for long. The fire was soon put out. About 40 minutes after the start of the battle, the light cruiser IJN Naniwa approached the Japanese to help. The Russian cruisers changed course and headed northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, took a parallel course.
About an hour after the start of the battle, “Rurik” suffered the fate that experts predicted immediately upon entering service: a Japanese shell, hitting the unprotected tiller compartment, disabled the steering. And the cruiser raised a signal: “The steering wheel does not work.” The cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboy" turned around to help the damaged "Rurik". But they could not fix the damage on the Rurik.
Seeing that there was no way to help the damaged cruiser, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment decided to break through to Vladivostok. Kamimura, with his detachment, pursued the Russian cruisers, but the light cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho remained to fight the immobilized Rurik.
The battle ended at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy ships ceased fire and turned back.
Kamimura’s decision was influenced by the following factors: casualties among personnel; shortage of shells and damage to ships. In addition, he did not know about the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea and had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or start a battle with the Russian squadron that had broken through from Port Arthur.
Cruiser "Rurik"
"Rurik" continued to fight the Japanese cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho, but soon all its guns were knocked out, almost the entire command staff was killed or wounded. The cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Trusov, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Khlodovsky died from their wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; almost half of the entire crew was out of action.
When Kamimura's cruisers, who had returned from the chase, began to approach the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, in order to prevent the ship from being captured, decided to scuttle it by opening the seams.
According to data from Japanese cruisers, at half past ten o'clock the cruiser "Rurik" completely disappeared under water. Outdated and poorly armored, it fought for five hours against superior enemy ships. The behavior of his team was heroic.
According to Japanese official figures, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. But according to other sources, on IJN Iwate alone, one shell killed 40 people and wounded 37. The flagship IJN Izuma had up to 20 holes; the cruiser IJN Azuma received 10 shells, IJN Tokiwa - several shells.
Last actions (August 1904 - November 1905)
The battle in the Korea Strait was actually the detachment's last active combat action. Due to the weak capacity of the repair base of the Vladivostok port, the repair of serious damage on the Rossiya and Gromoboe took a long time.
On October 13, 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy, immediately after repairs, ran into rocks while moving to Posyet Bay and spent the entire winter in the dock undergoing repairs.
In the spring of 1905, the detachment made a small raid on Hokkaido and sank the schooners IJN Yaya-Maru, IJN Senrio-Maru, IJN Koyo-Maru and IJN Hokuzey-Maru.
In the summer of 1905, in view of the real threat of the war spreading to the Russian mainland (Sakhalin was captured by the Japanese in July 1905) and the creation of a unified regional defense command headed by the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General G.N. Kazbek subordinated the detachment of cruisers to the head of the Separate detachment of ships assigned to protect the waters of the Ussuri region (led by the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve).
On November 11, 1905, in accordance with the instructions of the General Naval Staff (dated October 11), a detachment of cruisers set out for the European part of Russia. On March 30, 1906, upon arrival in Libau, the detachment's headquarters ended the campaign, and the detachment itself was disbanded.
Conclusion
The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers did not fully live up to the hopes that the Admiralty had placed on it. But still, during the entire raid, the detachment sunk 3 Japanese transports, 5 Japanese steamers, 1 English steamer, 1 German steamer and 14 sailing schooners. In addition, 4 foreign ships were captured (2 of which were later released) and 1 Japanese schooner.
But the experience of raiding enemy communications during the Russo-Japanese War was the basis for the German action plan for their raiders (auxiliary cruisers) at the very beginning of the First World War.
Attack of Japanese destroyers of the Russian squadron.
On the night of February 8 to 9 (January 26 to 27), 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. The squadron battleships Tsesarevich, Retvizan and the cruiser Pallada received heavy damage from the explosions of Japanese torpedoes and ran aground to avoid sinking. Japanese destroyers were damaged by return fire from the artillery of the Russian squadron IJN Akatsuki And IJN Shirakumo. Thus began the Russo-Japanese War.
On the same day, Japanese troops began landing troops in the area of the port of Chemulpo. While trying to leave the port and head to Port Arthur, the gunboat Koreets was attacked by Japanese destroyers, forcing it to return.
On February 9 (January 27), 1904, the battle of Chemulpo took place. As a result, due to the impossibility of a breakthrough, the cruiser “Varyag” was scuttled by their crews and the gunboat “Koreets” was blown up.
On the same day, February 9 (January 27), 1904, Admiral Jessen headed out to sea at the head of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers to begin military operations to disrupt transport links between Japan and Korea.
On February 11 (January 29), 1904, near Port Arthur, near the San Shan-tao Islands, the Russian cruiser Boyarin was blown up by a Japanese mine.
On February 24 (February 11), 1904, the Japanese fleet tried to close the exit from Port Arthur by sinking 5 ships loaded with stone. The attempt was unsuccessful.
On February 25 (February 12), 1904, two Russian destroyers “Besstrashny” and “Impressive”, while going out for reconnaissance, came across 4 Japanese cruisers. The first managed to escape, but the second was driven into Blue Bay, where it was sunk by order of Captain M. Podushkin.
March 2 (February 18), 1904, by order of the Marine General Staff The Mediterranean squadron of Admiral A. Virenius (battleship Oslyabya, cruisers Aurora and Dmitry Donskoy and 7 destroyers), heading to Port Arthur, was recalled to the Baltic Sea.
On March 6 (February 22), 1904, a Japanese squadron shelled Vladivostok. The damage was minor. The fortress was placed in a state of siege.
On March 8 (February 24), 1904, the new commander of the Russian Pacific squadron, Vice Admiral S. Makarov, arrived in Port Arthur, replacing Admiral O. Stark in this post.
On March 10 (February 26), 1904, in the Yellow Sea, while returning from reconnaissance in Port Arthur, he was sunk by four Japanese destroyers ( IJN Usugumo , IJN Shinonome , IJN Akebono , IJN Sazanami) Russian destroyer "Steregushchy", and "Resolute" managed to return to port.
Russian fleet in Port Arthur.
On March 27 (March 14), 1904, the second Japanese attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor by flooding fire ships was thwarted.
April 4 (March 22), 1904 Japanese battleships IJN Fuji And IJN Yashima Port Arthur was bombarded with fire from Golubina Bay. In total, they fired 200 shots and main caliber guns. But the effect was minimal.
On April 12 (March 30), 1904, the Russian destroyer Strashny was sunk by Japanese destroyers.
On April 13 (March 31), 1904, the battleship Petropavlovsk was blown up by a mine and sank with almost its entire crew while going to sea. Among the dead was Admiral S. O. Makarov. Also on this day, the battleship Pobeda was damaged by a mine explosion and was out of commission for several weeks.
April 15 (April 2), 1904 Japanese cruisers IJN Kasuga And IJN Nisshin fired at the inner roadstead of Port Arthur with throwing fire.
On April 25 (April 12), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers sank a Japanese steamer off the coast of Korea IJN Goyo-Maru, coaster IJN Haginura-Maru and Japanese military transport IJN Kinsu-Maru, after which he headed to Vladivostok.
May 2 (April 19), 1904 by the Japanese, with the support of gunboats IJN Akagi And IJN Chōkai, destroyers of the 9th, 14th and 16th destroyer flotillas, a third and final attempt was made to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor, this time using 10 transports ( IJN Mikasha-Maru, IJN Sakura-Maru, IJN Totomi-Maru, IJN Otaru-Maru, IJN Sagami-Maru, IJN Aikoku-Maru, IJN Omi-Maru, IJN Asagao-Maru, IJN Iedo-Maru, IJN Kokura-Maru, IJN Fuzan-Maru) As a result, they managed to partially block the passage and temporarily make it impossible for large Russian ships to exit. This facilitated the unhindered landing of the Japanese 2nd Army in Manchuria.
On May 5 (April 22), 1904, the 2nd Japanese Army under the command of General Yasukata Oku, numbering about 38.5 thousand people, began landing on the Liaodong Peninsula, about 100 kilometers from Port Arthur.
On May 12 (April 29), 1904, four Japanese destroyers of the 2nd flotilla of Admiral I. Miyako began sweeping Russian mines in Kerr Bay. While performing its assigned task, destroyer No. 48 hit a mine and sank. On the same day, Japanese troops finally cut off Port Arthur from Manchuria. The siege of Port Arthur began.
Death IJN Hatsuse on Russian mines.
On May 15 (May 2), 1904, two Japanese battleships were blown up and sank at a minefield laid the day before by the minelayer Amur. IJN Yashima And IJN Hatsuse .
Also on this day, a collision of Japanese cruisers occurred near Elliot Island. IJN Kasuga And IJN Yoshino, in which the second sank from the damage received. And off the southeastern coast of Kanglu Island, the advice note ran aground IJN Tatsuta .
On May 16 (May 3), 1904, two Japanese gunboats collided during an amphibious operation southeast of the city of Yingkou. The boat sank as a result of the collision IJN Oshima .
On May 17 (May 4), 1904, a Japanese destroyer was hit by a mine and sank IJN Akatsuki .
On May 27 (May 14), 1904, not far from the city of Dalniy, the Russian destroyer Attentive hit rocks and was blown up by its crew. On the same day, Japanese advice note IJN Miyako hit a Russian mine and sank in Kerr Bay.
On June 12 (May 30), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers entered the Korea Strait to disrupt Japan's sea communications.
On June 15 (June 2), 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy sank two Japanese transports: IJN Izuma-Maru And IJN Hitachi-Maru, and the cruiser "Rurik" sank a Japanese transport with two torpedoes IJN Sado-Maru. In total, the three transports carried 2,445 Japanese soldiers and officers, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers.
On June 23 (June 10), 1904, the Pacific squadron of Rear Admiral V. Vitgoft made the first attempt to break through to Vladivostok. But when the Japanese fleet of Admiral H. Togo was discovered, she returned to Port Arthur without engaging in battle. At night of the same day, Japanese destroyers launched an unsuccessful attack on the Russian squadron.
On June 28 (June 15), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers of Admiral Jessen again went to sea to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications.
On July 17 (July 4), 1904, near Skrypleva Island, the Russian destroyer No. 208 was blown up and sank in a Japanese minefield.
On July 18 (July 5), 1904, the Russian minelayer Yenisei hit a mine in Talienwan Bay and the Japanese cruiser sank IJN Kaimon .
On July 20 (July 7), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait.
On July 22 (July 9), 1904, the detachment was detained with smuggled cargo and sent to Vladivostok with a prize crew of the English steamer Arabia.
On July 23 (July 10), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here an English steamer with smuggled cargo was searched and sunk Night Commander. Also on this day, several Japanese schooners and a German steamer were sunk Tea, traveling with smuggled cargo to Japan. And the English steamer captured later Kalhas, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. The cruisers of the detachment also headed to their port.
On July 25 (July 12), 1904, a squadron of Japanese destroyers approached the mouth of the Liaohe River from the sea. The crew of the Russian gunboat "Sivuch", due to the impossibility of a breakthrough, after landing on the shore, blew up their ship.
On August 7 (July 25), 1904, Japanese troops fired at Port Arthur and its harbors for the first time from land. As a result of the shelling, the battleship Tsesarevich was damaged, and the squadron commander, Rear Admiral V. Vitgeft, was slightly wounded. The battleship Retvizan was also damaged.
On August 8 (July 26), 1904, a detachment of ships consisting of the cruiser Novik, the gunboat Beaver and 15 destroyers took part in Tahe Bay in shelling of the advancing Japanese troops, causing heavy losses.
Battle in the Yellow Sea.
On August 10 (July 28), 1904, during an attempt to break through the Russian squadron from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, a battle took place in the Yellow Sea. During the battle, Rear Admiral V. Vitgeft was killed, and the Russian squadron, having lost control, disintegrated. 5 Russian battleships, the cruiser Bayan and 2 destroyers began to retreat to Port Arthur in disarray. Only the battleship Tsesarevich, the cruisers Novik, Askold, Diana and 6 destroyers broke through the Japanese blockade. The battleship "Tsarevich", the cruiser "Novik" and 3 destroyers headed to Qingdao, the cruiser "Askold" and the destroyer "Grozovoy" - to Shanghai, the cruiser "Diana" - to Saigon.
On August 11 (July 29), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment set out to meet the Russian squadron, which was supposed to break out from Port Arthur. The battleship "Tsesarevich", the cruiser "Novik", the destroyers "Besshumny", "Besposhchadny" and "Besstrashny" arrived in Qingdao. The cruiser Novik, having loaded 250 tons of coal into bunkers, set out to sea with the goal of breaking through to Vladivostok. On the same day, the Russian destroyer Resolute was interned by the Chinese authorities in Chifoo. Also on August 11, the team scuttled the damaged destroyer Burny.
On August 12 (July 30), 1904, the previously interned destroyer Resolute was captured in Chifoo by two Japanese destroyers.
On August 13 (July 31), 1904, the damaged Russian cruiser Askold was interned and disarmed in Shanghai.
August 14 (August 1), 1904, four Japanese cruisers ( IJN Izumo , IJN Tokiwa , IJN Azuma And IJN Iwate) intercepted three Russian cruisers (Russia, Rurik and Gromoboy) heading towards the First Pacific Squadron. A battle took place between them, which went down in history as the Battle of the Korea Strait. As a result of the battle, the Rurik was sunk, and the other two Russian cruisers returned to Vladivostok with damage.
On August 15 (August 2), 1904, in Qingdao, German authorities interned the Russian battleship Tsarevich.
On August 16 (August 3), 1904, the damaged cruisers Gromoboy and Rossiya returned to Vladivostok. In Port Arthur, the proposal of the Japanese general M. Nogi to surrender the fortress was rejected. On the same day, in the Pacific Ocean, the Russian cruiser Novik stopped and inspected an English steamer Celtic.
On August 20 (August 7), 1904, a battle took place near Sakhalin Island between the Russian cruiser Novik and Japanese IJN Tsushima And IJN Chitose. As a result of the battle "Novik" and IJN Tsushima received serious damage. Due to the impossibility of repairs and the danger of the ship being captured by the enemy, the commander of the Novik, M. Schultz, decided to scuttle the ship.
On August 24 (August 11), 1904, the Russian cruiser Diana was interned by the French authorities in Saigon.
September 7 (August 25), 1904 from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok by railway The submarine "Forel" was sent.
On October 1 (September 18), 1904, a Japanese gunboat was blown up by a Russian mine and sank near Iron Island. IJN Heiyen.
On October 15 (October 2), 1904, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky left Libau for the Far East.
On November 3 (October 21), a Japanese destroyer was blown up by a mine placed by the Russian destroyer Skory and sank near Cape Lun-Wan-Tan IJN Hayatori .
On November 5 (October 23), 1904, in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur, after being hit by a Japanese shell, the ammunition of the Russian battleship Poltava detonated. As a result of this, the ship sank.
On November 6 (October 24), 1904, a Japanese gunboat hit a rock in the fog and sank near Port Arthur IJN Atago .
On November 28 (November 15), 1904, the submarine Dolphin was sent from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok by rail.
On December 6 (November 23), 1904, Japanese artillery, installed on the previously captured height No. 206, began a massive shelling of Russian ships stationed in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur. By the end of the day, they sunk the battleship Retvizan and suffered heavy damage to the battleship Peresvet. To remain intact, the battleship Sevastopol, the gunboat Brave and destroyers were taken out from under Japanese fire to the outer roadstead.
On December 7 (November 24), 1904, due to the impossibility of repairs after damage received from Japanese shelling, the battleship Peresvet was sunk by its crew in the western basin of Port Arthur harbor.
On December 8 (November 25), 1904, Japanese artillery sunk Russian ships in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur - the battleship Pobeda and the cruiser Pallada.
On December 9 (November 26), 1904, Japanese heavy artillery sank the cruiser Bayan, the minelayer Amur and the gunboat Gilyak.
December 25 (December 12), 1904 IJN Takasago During a patrol, she hit a mine laid by the Russian destroyer "Angry" and sank in the Yellow Sea between Port Arthur and Chieffo.
On December 26 (December 13), 1904, in the Port Arthur roadstead, the gunboat Beaver was sunk by Japanese artillery fire.
Submarines of the Siberian flotilla in Vladivostok.
On December 31 (December 18), 1904, the first four Kasatka-class submarines arrived in Vladivostok from St. Petersburg by rail.
On January 1, 1905 (December 19, 1904), in Port Arthur, by order of the crew command, the battleships Poltava and Peresvet, half-sunk in the internal roadstead, were blown up, and the battleship Sevastopol was sunk in the outer roadstead.
On January 2, 1905 (December 20, 1904), the commander of the defense of Port Arthur, General A. Stessel, gave the order to surrender the fortress. The siege of Port Arthur is over.
On the same day, before the surrender of the fortress, the clippers “Dzhigit” and “Robber” were sunk. The 1st Pacific Squadron was completely destroyed.
On January 5, 1905 (December 23, 1904), the submarine "Dolphin" arrived from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok by rail.
January 14 (January 1), 1905, by order of the commander of the Vladivostok port from the Forel submarines.
On March 20 (March 7), 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhdestvensky passed the Strait of Malacca and entered the Pacific Ocean.
On March 26 (March 13), 1905, the submarine “Dolphin” left Vladivostok for a combat position on Askold Island.
On March 29 (March 16), 1905, the submarine "Dolphin" returned to Vladivostok from combat duty near Askold Island.
On April 11 (March 29), 1905, torpedoes were delivered to Russian submarines in Vladivostok.
On April 13 (March 31), 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in Indochina.
On April 22 (April 9), 1905, the submarine “Kasatka” set out on a combat mission from Vladivostok to the shores of Korea.
On May 7 (April 24), 1905, the cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy left Vladivostok to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications.
On May 9 (April 26), 1905, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific squadron of Rear Admiral N. Nebogatov and the 2nd Pacific squadron of Vice Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky united in Cam Ranh Bay.
On May 11 (April 28), 1905, the cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy returned to Vladivostok. During the raid they sank four Japanese transport ships.
On May 12 (April 29), 1905, three submarines - "Dolphin", "Kasatka" and "Som" - were sent to Preobrazheniya Bay to intercept the Japanese detachment. At 10 o'clock in the morning, near Vladivostok, near Cape Povorotny, the first battle involving a submarine took place. "Som" attacked the Japanese destroyers, but the attack ended in vain.
On May 14 (May 1), 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron under Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky left for Vladivostok from Indochina.
On May 18 (May 5), 1905, the submarine Dolphin sank near the quay wall in Vladivostok due to an explosion of gasoline vapors.
On May 29 (May 16), 1905, the battleship Dmitry Donskoy was scuttled by his crew in the Sea of Japan near the island of Dazhelet.
On May 30 (May 17), 1905, the Russian cruiser Izumrud landed on rocks near Cape Orekhov in St. Vladimir Bay and was blown up by its crew.
On June 3 (May 21), 1905, in the Philippines in Manila, American authorities interned the Russian cruiser Zhemchug.
On June 9 (May 27), 1905, the Russian cruiser Aurora was interned by the American authorities in the Philippines in Manila.
On June 29 (June 16), 1905, in Port Arthur, Japanese rescuers raised the Russian battleship Peresvet from the bottom.
On July 7 (June 24), 1905, Japanese troops began the Sakhalin landing operation to land troops of 14 thousand people. While Russian troops numbered only 7.2 thousand people on the island.
On July 8 (July 25), 1905, in Port Arthur, Japanese rescuers raised the sunken Russian battleship Poltava.
On July 29 (July 16), 1905, the Japanese Sakhalin War ended landing operation surrender of Russian troops.
On August 14 (August 1), 1905, in the Tatar Strait, the Keta submarine launched an unsuccessful attack on two Japanese destroyers.
On August 22 (August 9), 1905, negotiations began in Portsmouth between Japan and Russia through the mediation of the United States.
September 5 (August 23) in the USA in Portsmouth between Empire of Japan And Russian Empire a peace treaty was signed. According to the agreement, Japan received the Liaodong Peninsula, part of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Port Arthur to the city of Changchun and South Sakhalin, Russia recognized the predominant interests of Japan in Korea and agreed to the conclusion of a Russian-Japanese fishing convention. Russia and Japan pledged to withdraw their troops from Manchuria. Japan's demand for reparations was rejected.
The Russo-Japanese War is one of the darkest pages in Russian fleet. This is probably why it still attracts the attention of military historians and simply people interested military history Russia. Yes, it included not only victories, but also the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese Imperial Fleet, a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70-80s of the 20th century. So why did this happen? Why did the very modest Japanese fleet manage to completely defeat its superior Russian fleet without significant losses? Although “on paper” it should have turned out exactly the opposite? These questions will be discussed in this article. The reader is waiting for a lot of bare figures and facts. Without any tales about “outdated and weak battleships”, “ short range shooting", " large area booking Japanese ships" and others, others, others beautiful fairy tales. That allegedly they did not allow such “geniuses of naval thought” as Z.P. Rozhestvensky and V.K. Vitgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technology or the people who were entrusted with this technology? The military always first of all blames the unfit, in their opinion, for their failures. military equipment. The people who created this technology, on the contrary, point to the unprofessionalism and unsuitability of the military. This is how it has always been, and this is how it will continue to be. Let us analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.
Fleet compositions
Before moving on to listing the military equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In that era when artillery was the god of war, all types of naval weapon systems could be counted on one hand:
- Classic artillery pieces various calibers and purposes. At that time, they had already reached a fully mature level of development and in their design were not much different from modern artillery systems, although they were less powerful.
- Torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and lethality.
- Mines. At that time, this marine species was already fully developed and effective means fight against enemy ships.
- Aviation. It was in its infancy at that time. Actually, it can be called aviation with great stretch, because... it was just balloons that were used only for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment over long distances.
In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:
1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period were battleships. During their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbette battleship, turret battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka pre-dreadnought), dreadnought, super-dreadnought and finally, battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. During the period described, squadron battleships, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement from 4,000 tons to 16,000 tons, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo weapons. At the same time, they could reach a speed of 14-18 knots. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable the fleet was.
2. Also to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000 tons, also have good protection, although not as powerful as that of battleships. The artillery armament was also weaker, but such ships could reach a speed of 18-22 knots. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was the battleships and armored cruisers who had the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops with fire in coastal operations.
3. Auxiliary tasks of reconnaissance, patrol, interception, combat against small enemy ships and its transport and landing fleet fell on armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks. These are ships with a displacement of 4000-6000 tons, had light armor and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach a speed of 20-25 knots and had a long cruising range. An example - the famous 1st rank cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of this type of warship.
4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of some of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyers, Further destroyers, basic destroyers(destroyers), further torpedo boats And submarines. Destroyers are small ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small guns. They reached speeds of 25-30 knots and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, due to their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.
The 1st rank cruiser "Aurora" took a direct part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The 123-meter-long ship is still in decent technical condition, although it is no longer underway.
5. Also in the fleets of that time there could be balloon carriers, minelayers And transport ships. Balloon carriers, the predecessors of aircraft carriers, were designed to host reconnaissance balloons and were equipped with hangars for storing them. Minelayers were used to lay mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons or other goods. They could have several small guns or no weapons at all. Their sizes could vary widely.
After short excursion In the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, we will move on to comparing the forces of both sides.
Russian Imperial Fleet (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan he was a formidable force. Since there is no way to list the entire combat personnel with all auxiliary ships and support vessels in the format of this article, we will dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:
Table 1
Alexander-II | ||
Nikolai-I | Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Navarin | Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Sisoy the Great | ||
Sevastopol | ||
Poltava | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Petropavlovsk | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Admiral Ushakov | ||
Admiral Sevyanin | Coastal defense battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Admiral Apraksin | Coastal defense battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Table 1Oslyabya | Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Peresvet | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Victory | Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Retvizan | ||
Tsesarevich | Squadron battleship. Newest. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Prince Suvorov | ||
Alexander-III | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Borodino | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Eagle | Squadron battleship. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Rus | Balloon carrier. Newest. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Catherine-II | ||
Sinop | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Chesma | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
St. George the Victorious | Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Twelve Apostles | II-class battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Three Saints | Squadron battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Rostislav | II-class battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky | ||
Panteleimon | Squadron battleship. Newest. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Admiral Nakhimov | Armored cruiser. Old. Baltic Fleet. |
|
Rurik | Armored cruiser. Old. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Memory of Azov | Armored cruiser. Old. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Russia | ||
Thunderbolt | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Accordion | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Pallas | Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet. |
|
Admiral Makarov | Armored cruiser. New. Black Sea Fleet. |
|
Peter the Great | Artillery training vessel. Old 1st class battleship. Baltic Fleet. |
The main striking power of the Russian fleet lay precisely in these 38 ships. In total they had 88 guns of 305mm caliber, 26 guns of 254mm caliber, 8 – 229mm and 28 guns of 203mm caliber. Smaller-caliber guns even then belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained important combat significance at that stage of the development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Forel", "Sturgeon" and "Som" and others ships. Subsequently, submarines (submarines) became one of the main classes of warships of the fleet.
The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. Its power can be felt literally in its appearance - even today it looks quite modern. The ship was built according to latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of the 2nd World War: a high side of an optimal, seaworthy shape, developed tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and elements of the control system at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in twin tower gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large aiming angles. The very complex, multi-row differentiated armor was very powerful. The ship could see far on the horizon and could operate effectively and conduct targeted fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was waiting for 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines and 4 7.62mm Maxim machine guns. All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet were installed on it. The control system of this ship was also first-class.
The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian Navy at the start of the war with Japan is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates, it was about ~300 ships of various classes. To destroy such a large armored force, even today it would require the involvement of very serious naval missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not a cardboard-plastic Sheffield and it will not burn and sink after being hit by a single Exocet anti-ship missile. It would also not be a strong exaggeration to say that that fleet was more powerful than, say, the Patriotic Navy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War10. For a predominantly agricultural country like Tsarist Russia, creating such a large ocean-going fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest squadron battleship "Tsesarevich". The strike core of the Baltic Fleet were four Borodino-class battleships. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type, Slava.
"Eagle" is one of the ships of the "Borodino" series. It was an improved model of the “Tsarevich”. The outlines of its hull are somewhat reminiscent of the hulls of today's URO frigates built using Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype in a new hull 121 meters long, improved armor, an improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype, at the time of construction it was considered one of the most powerful and advanced warships of its time.
Imperial Japanese Navy(IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet at the Battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly increase its combat capabilities. When building its fleet, Japan relied on British assistance. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a group of six squadron battleships with similar characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old I-class battleships: “Chin-Yen” and “Fuso”, of which “Chin-Yen” was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of attack warships was small, some of the large-caliber guns were placed on light armored cruisers such as Matsushima and Takasago, which were poorly suited for this purpose. List of warships Japanese Navy, which carried more or less large calibers on board, it turns out like this:
table 2
Mikasa | Squadron battleship. Newest. Japanese fleet. |
|
Shikishima | ||
Asahi | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Hatsuse | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Fuji | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Yashima | Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Chin-Yen | 1st class battleship. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Fuso | Casemate battleship. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Asama | ||
Tokiwa | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Azuma | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Yakumo | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Izumo | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Iwate | Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet. |
|
Matsushima | ||
Itsukushima | Cruiser of the 1st rank. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Hashidate | Cruiser of the 1st rank. Old. Japanese fleet. |
|
Takasago | ||
Chitose | Cruiser of the 1st rank. New. Japanese fleet. |
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Kasagi | Cruiser of the 1st rank. New. Japanese fleet. |
Thus, the Japanese fleet, along with battleships and light cruisers that were absolutely unsuitable for confrontation, could oppose the might of the Russian fleet: 3 guns of 320mm caliber, 28 of 305mm caliber, 4 – 240mm guns and 30 – 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that in terms of heavy weapons, the potential of the Japanese fleet was at least three times inferior to the Russian one. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the others did not leave them any decent chance of survival under fire even from the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian attack ships, 35, that is, 92%, could be considered to one degree or another suitable for a general battle. The flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the battleship Mikasa.
Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Structurally, it repeated the British models: low side, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, turret gun mounts of only the main caliber. Relatively low-powered medium-caliber guns were located in on-board casemate installations low above the water. The ship was more optimized for combat on flat water rather than for movement. In the same time big sizes its hulls made all its characteristics very decent. Its displacement is 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian Navy is the squadron battleship Retvizan.
The entire Japanese fleet consisted of about 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships were concentrated like a fist in one theater of operations. Of the ~300 warships of the Russian fleet, about 100 took direct part in the war with Japan, that is, about 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two Italian-built armored cruisers: Nissin and Kassuga.
Results: Without delving at this stage into all the nuances of manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, choosing commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply laconically noting that “at some stage something went wrong” , we can say that all this gigantic armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre way. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. Data on the losses of the Japanese fleet are shown in Table 3. They only cause a bitter smile.
Table 3
Losses of the Japanese fleet in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Battleships (ESB) Light cruisersI-rank (KRL) Light cruisersII-rank (KRL) Gunboats (KL) Destroyers (DES) Troop transports (TR) Torpedo boats (TK) |
Total 24 combat and auxiliary ships. Of these, 13 ships were sunk by mines (54%), 6 ships by artillery (25%), 0 ships by torpedoes (0%), and 1 ship by the combined action of artillery and torpedoes (<1%) и от навигационных происшествий потери составили 4 корабля (17%). Затоплено и брошено экипажами в результате полученных повреждений 0 кораблей (0%). Сдано в плен так же 0 кораблей (0%). Тот факт, что более половины всех безвозвратно потерянных Японией кораблей флота было уничтожено минами – оружием по своему характеру пассивно - оборонительно типа, говорит о крайней пассивности и бездействии ударного Российского флота в период БД на море. Все боевые действия на море свелись к двум крупным сражениям, нескольким приличным боям и локальным боестолкновениям отдельных крупных кораблей и легких сил. Такое ощущение, что даже в бою, наши корабли воевали как будто из под палки, нехотя, без инициативно и всячески стараясь уклониться от сражения. В дальнейшем этому будет приведено не одно подтверждение, как будут и рассмотрены все случае отдельных «вспышек» прояснения сознания и боевого духа. Такая тактика наших высших адмиралов привела к потерям, с которыми можно ознакомиться в таблице 4.
Table 4
Losses of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Battleships (ESB)
Coastal defense battleships (BRBO)
Armored cruisers (ARC)
Armored cruisersI-th rank (KRL)
CruisersII-rank (KRL)
Gunboats (KL)
Minelayers (MZ)
Destroyers (DES)
Troop transports (VT) and auxiliary ships.
Torpedo boats (TK)
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The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy exceeded the losses of the US Navy during the four years of the Pacific War of 1941-1945. Sad list of 64 lost ships distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire, the Japanese did not manage to sink a single Russian ship with torpedoes alone - 0 (0%), the combined action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed 3 ships (5%), 6 were killed by mines ships (9%). Abandoned/sunk/exploded by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire/torpedoes/mines/simply hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), 5 ships were captured by the enemy (8%), lost as a result of navigational damage 3 ships (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, lies with very specific people. These are admirals: Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark. It was in their hands that all the power and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were made or not made were concentrated. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be blamed for a lack of courage/will/spirit, but he cannot be blamed for lack of professionalism or lack of knowledge of his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov generally proved himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his business perfectly and was confident in his weapon. Admiral O.A. Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for one reason or another he was unable to prove himself. We will consider the contribution to increasing the combat effectiveness of the fleet of some of these people below.
Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848. He died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (he was the flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron during the repair of the Tsesarevich). The cause of death from one single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of Petropavlovsk. It was booked primarily as a citadel, similar to the British and Japanese EDBs. When a mine exploded in the bow of the ship, a sequential detonation of the torpedo ammunition occurred, then the barrage mines stored in the bow, and finally, the entire ammunition of the 1st main caliber gun mount. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. A fatal coincidence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.
However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn that situation upside down. His “Holiness,” “Adjutant General” Z.P. Rozhestvensky simply cannot be guilty of anything. It’s all the fault of the outdated and, in their opinion, worthless equipment, as well as the illiterate crews of these “floating galoshes” who know nothing about war. To justify this position, many myths were invented, designed to “shift the needle” of blame for the shameful defeat on civilian specialists, factories, MTC, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:
Half-myth No. 1: Overload of Russian battleships. Because of this, they say, they died “so quickly.” Here it is necessary to understand the difference. Civilian specialists create military equipment and carry out current/medium/overhaul repairs, while military specialists operate it, fight with it, and carry out various maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish between construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload is the fault of civilians. Operational overload is the fault of the military. Regarding construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was widespread and therefore it could even be called “normal.” Indeed, the Borodino-class battleships were designed to have a displacement of 13,516 tons, but in reality they contained 14,150 tons of iron. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow us to calculate all the loads absolutely accurately. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship "Mikasa" was even greater - 785 tons, and yet none of the Japanese military complained about the deterioration of stability or other performance characteristics of the "Mikasa". Operational overload – exceeding the ship's carrying capacity. During the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, all battleships were so filled with coal, water, provisions and other supplies that the displacement of Borodino-class battleships, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17,000 tons! What fighting qualities are there with such a “weight”! No measures were taken to correct the situation even before the battle, as a result of which the displacement of the Borodino-class attack ships before the Battle of Tsushima was unacceptably large - 15,275 tons. The proposal of the "Eagle" officers to prepare the ships for battle before the general battle, coupled with their radical unloading, was rejected for idiotic reasons: "The "Eagle" officers love to play war too much." This is the fault of the military, namely Z.P. Rozhestvensky.
Myth No. 2: Low speed of Russian ships. This myth has a simple explanation. Speed is needed for active actions. Those who do not take any active actions do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called “to the fullest.” The Russians used it only when their ships, for one reason or another (usually damage), were deprived of the “guardianship” of the commander (and it was too late) and just to escape, and not to overtake. In addition, the maximum speed of a ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on its specific technical condition, and on the combat damage it received. The maximum squadron speed of the Japanese squadron was 15 knots, at most 15.5 knots and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRB 1 "Fuji" (for technical reasons it could not develop more than 15.5 knots). The squadron speed of the 1st Pacific Squadron was 14.5-15 knots. The EBR "Sevastopol" did not produce more than 15kt due to a bent propeller blade. The squadron speed of the 2nd Pacific Squadron has not been tested in practice, but theoretically it could have been about 15-15.5 knots because there was no ship in the squadron slower than 15.5 kts (“Nikolai-I” - 15.5 kts, “Navarin” - 15.8 kts, “Sisoy the Great” - 15.6 kts, 2nd type BRBO “Ushakov” all issued 16 kts). During the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, the heavily damaged Orel, the Sevyanin and Apraksin ballistic missile carriers, as well as the II-rank cruiser Izumrud easily supported speed 13-14kt. Conclusion: The squadron speed of Russian attack ships, if at all, was lower than the Japanese, it was not by much. The fact that Z.P. Rozhestvensky trudged along in battle at a speed of 9 knots (only 17 km/h - slower than a river pleasure boat), dragging transports behind him, is his fault, not the low speed capabilities of his warships.
Myth No. 3. Russian ships were inferior in range to Japanese ones. There were figures about the Japanese firing range at 82 cables and even 100(!) cables. The myth is explained in the same way as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery 100%. Of course, there could be no talk of any targeted shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But the Japanese did sometimes shoot at long distances. Domestic ships almost always only fired back and stopped firing as soon as the enemy stopped firing. All without initiative and sluggishly (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot at long distances, three conditions must be met:
1. Artillery must have the technical ability to fire at such distances, in other words, be sufficiently long-range. Civilian specialists are responsible for this.
2. The fire control system of warships must provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. Civilian specialists are also responsible for this.
3. Artillerymen of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting shooting at such distances. Have good command of the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is already responsible for this.
Unfortunately, it was the military that turned out to be the “weak link” here. Regarding technical issues. Only one Japanese ship could fire at 100 kbt - the Italian-built armored cruiser Kassuga. And only from one single 254mm cannon. Its 203mm cannon, like its twin brother the Nissin, fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main caliber artillery was of two types. The 305mm/L42.5 EBR guns “Fuji” and “Yashima” at a maximum angle of +13.5° could fire at a maximum of 77 kbt. The slightly more powerful 305mm/L42.5 guns of Mikasa, Asahi, Hatsuse and Shikishima had a lower maximum elevation angle - +12.5° and fired at maximum 74kbt. Maximum firing range of 203mm main caliber guns of Japanese armored cruisers such as Asama, Yakumo, etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm medium-caliber gun mounts on Russian ships. Russian experts paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet to the issue of ensuring at least the technical ability to fire at the maximum possible distances. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships was +15°, +25° and even +35°. The squadron battleship Pobeda was considered the longest-range in the entire Russian fleet. It was equipped with more modern 254mm/L45 guns, which differed from the previous 10-inch guns in increased weight, strength and barrel rigidity. As a result, its 225-kilogram main-caliber projectiles, with an initial speed increased to 777 m/s, flew at 113 kbt. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, “Oslyab” and “Peresvet,” as well as the ballistic missile launcher “Admiral Apraksin,” fired at 91 kbt. All “12-inch” battleships with 305mm/L40 guns fired at 80kbt at an angle of +15°. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" fired at 63 kbt. The firing range of the old squadron battleships was shorter: the Navarin had 54 kbt, the Nikolai-I had 51 kbt for 229mm/L35 and 49 kbt for 305mm/L30 guns.
As for the fire control system, its 4x optics and rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm even then made it possible to conduct more or less effective fire at a distance of up to ~60 kbt (10-12 km). Russian battleships of new and latest types received the latest fire control system “mod.1899”. Its structure can be judged from the description of the squadron battleship "Eagle":
SUAO mod.1899. The set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of modern central guidance systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one per side.
Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - central aiming sights (VCN) had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x. The search for the target and pointing the weapon at it was carried out by the VP operator. When pointing the VCN at a target, the elevation angle of the target relative to the center plane of the ship was determined on a scale, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8 turret guns and batteries of the ship’s 75 mm guns. After this, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the gun was aligned with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called “arrow alignment” principle) and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification factor - 3x-4x and a field of view angle changing in accordance with it - 6 - 8 degrees. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this purpose, there were two rangefinder stations in the conning tower - one per side. They were equipped with horizontal base rangefinders “Barr and Studd” with a base of 1200 mm.
The rangefinder measured the distance and, using the rangefinder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To monitor the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. Sighting posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left sides (a pair on each side), which is why the Eagle's conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye.” Having data on his own speed and course, direction and strength of wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target - the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, made the necessary calculations manually (on paper) and calculated the necessary corrections for the leads for VN and GN. I also chose the type of gun and the type of shells needed to hit a given target. After this, the senior artillery officer transmitted guidance data to the control unit, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master indicator devices, which transmitted data through 47 cable cores to receiving devices in the AC and 75 mm batteries. The entire system operated at voltage Uр=23V through a 105/23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on vertical and horizontal guidance angles and the type of projectiles used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected guns installed the guns at specified angles (corrected the initial installation according to the VCN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer, who was in the conning tower at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, positioned the handle of the fire indicator device in the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Shot”, “Attack” or “Short alarm”, in accordance with which The guns opened fire. This centralized fire control mode was the most effective. In the event of the failure of the senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm artillery guns and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, the direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, and the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the gun or battery. This fire mode was less effective. In the event of complete destruction of fire control devices, conning tower personnel and data transmission circuits, all guns switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of target and targeting it was carried out by calculating a specific gun using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. The torpedo tubes were aimed using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm torpedo tubes or by turning the entire hull of the vessel for the bow and stern 381mm torpedo tubes. This fire control system ensured high efficiency in the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and made it possible to simultaneously “drive” two targets - one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and gunners of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron have poorly mastered this system. For external communications, the ship had a Slyabi-Arco radio station. It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the bow superstructure and provided communications at a distance of 180-200 km.
The third point remains. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet certainly lagged behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and practiced shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too complex for ordinary sailors to understand their operation (much less integrate them into a system), fire control and fire control methods were developed, if not the most ideal, but at least the most effective from the point of view of those specific conditions. shooting. One of them is the so-called. "the art of massive fire." Its essence is that without any use of the fire control system (measuring the distance only once), they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After this, they wait for the target to be covered. All fire adjustments are carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer - further to the target). Despite the enormous consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics bore fruit at that time. Moreover, the Japanese targets (that is, our ships) contributed in the best possible way to its success. At the same time, this method of “massive fire” was never used by anyone again. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our artillerymen, they worked according to instructions. And they tried to master the work of the control system. Not everyone succeeded. If the lower ranks of the artillery were somehow still able to master their subject, then almost no effort was made to this by the higher ranks. As for the firing range, the command of the 1st Pacific Squadron, although belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as a modern fire control system. And it seems that we began to develop measures adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still blissfully unaware of the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare practice shootings were carried out at a distance of no further than 20 kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese without any long-range shooting practice at all. The exception is the 3rd Pacific Squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (joined the 2nd Pacific Squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his gunners well to fire from the widest possible ranges. As luck would have it, Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov’s squadron consisted only of outdated or small ships. However, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was essentially the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still firing charges of black powder, achieved hits at distances of up to 50 cables, i.e. at the maximum possible range for your artillery! In all likelihood, it was its 305mm and 229mm shells that caused heavy damage to the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battle. Thus, the cruiser “Varyag” was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training did not affect the crews of the newest attack ships; otherwise, even with such a “brilliant” commander as Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably have been crushed by the power of the Borodintsev.
Semi myth #4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They allegedly did not penetrate armor well and practically did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model, weighing 331.7 kg. The “10-inch” ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the 1892 model, weighing 225.2 kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing ones. Their comparative characteristics are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Artillery system | Projectile | Weight | Explosive charge | starting speed | Thickness of armor penetrated at point-blank range Kruppovskaya | Thickness of pierced armor with 60kbt Kruppovskaya |
Russian 305mm/L40 | Armor-piercing | 331.7kg | 5.3 kg pyroxylin | 792m/s | 381mm/0 ° | 99mm/0 ° |
Japanese 305mm/L42.5 | Armor-piercing | 385.6kg | 11.9 kg picric acid | 762m/s | 368mm/0 ° | 104mm/0 ° |
Russian 254mm/L45 | Armor-piercing | 225.2kg | 8.3 kg pyroxylin | 693m/s | 343mm/0 ° | 84mm/0 ° |
As can be seen from Table 5, all shells are quite worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships, with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, were nevertheless almost as good as them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, Table 5 shows that the characteristics of both Russian and Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited by distance<20-30 кабельтовых. На больших расстояниях шансов пробить защиту ЖВЧ любого броненосца практически не было. Эти данные подтвердила и реальная практика. Несмотря на все усилия русских и японских артиллеристов за время сражений так ни разу и не удалось пробить Крупповскую броневую плиту толще чем 152мм. Так же стоит отметить, что для 305мм/L35 орудий «Наварина» существовали и более тяжелые 305мм снаряды массой 455кг. Но они почему то не были включены в боекомплект этого корабля. Использование таких «чемоданов» в современных артустановках с орудиями 305мм/L40 у новых кораблей – вопрос требующий дальнейших исследований, так как доподлинно не известно, были ли приспособлены лотки МЗ 9 у новейших «Бородинцев» и «Цесаревича» к приему таких более длинных снарядов. Потому на расстояниях свыше 30 кабельтовых имело смысл переходить на осколочные и фугасные снаряды. Их сравнительные характеристики приведены в таблице 6.
Table 6
Artillery system | Projectile | Weight | Explosive charge | starting speed |
Russian 305mm/L40 | Fragmentation | 331.7kg | 15.6 kg pyroxylin | 792m/s |
Russian 305mm/L40 | High Explosive | 331.7kg | 25kg pyroxylin | 792m/s |
Japanese 305mm/L42.5 | High Explosive | 385.6kg | 48.5 kg picric acid | 762m/s |
At first glance, it seems that Japanese high-explosive shells are completely superior to Russian ones3. This is partly true. Especially if we add to our shells the humidity of pyroxylin increased from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. Firstly, the fuses on Japanese high-explosive shells were set to instantaneous action at the slightest touch. This led to a number of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of the Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, for any armored vehicle, it is the explosion inside its armored body that is most dangerous. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion from outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but will only spoil the “cosmetics”. Therefore, for combating armored targets, armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with delayed-action fuses are primarily good. Japanese NOT-shells were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the Borodintsy, which were armored from head to toe, albeit overloaded. The Japanese themselves understood this very well, which is why, along with landmines, they actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth about the bad shells of Russian ships is, of course, not a myth in the full sense of the word - it is partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but its significance should not be exaggerated beyond measure either. The opponents’ shells were not so ideal either.
Myth #5. Small armor area of Russian ships. At that time, there were two main armoring schemes for heavy ships in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme, and the French one, which was widespread. According to the first, the ship’s high-resistance cores are covered with the thickest possible armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection or lack it at all. It was according to this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series, domestic designers, taking the best of both schemes as a basis, brought the armor of these ships to perfection. The protection of the Tsarevich and the Borodino series turned out to be so powerful, so modern that, in principle, it corresponded to the battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. This provided reliable protection for these ships even from dreadnought “suitcases”. The battle between Slava and the powerful German dreadnoughts König and Kronprinz Wilhelm in 1917 clearly proved this. Despite receiving seven 305mm shells (each weighing 405.5 kg), three of which hit the underwater part of the hull below the waist, the battleship Slava did not receive serious damage. And if it weren’t for the watertight door that was not closed due to someone’s carelessness (and if it weren’t for the revolution), then we could have continued to fight. The armor scheme of the battleship "Eagle" is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 8
The most heavily protected area in the center of the ship at the waterline, approximately 60m long and about 0.8m high, has protection of: 194mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 314mm Krupp armor4. This was more than enough to withstand any armor-piercing shells of the time. At the same time, all high-velocity units, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by fairly powerful armor. And the total armor thickness of all armored decks ranged from 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - not bad figures even for huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvizan, Sisoy the Great, etc. projects. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of the Mikasa were clad in Harvey armor. The projectile resistance of Harvey's armor correlates with Krupp's armor as 0.8 to 1, that is, Harvey's armor was inferior in projectile resistance to Krupp's (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Only the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa had truly powerful armor. In addition, we should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower in comparison with squadron battleships.
Half-myth No. 6: Large sizes of sighting slits and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slits on the battleship “Tsesarevich” and the “Borodino” series was a huge 380mm. This was a necessary measure because the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the control system of these ships, incl. DS, VP and ring sights of onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure normal visibility of all this optics, it was necessary to make slits of this width. The desire of the designers to place the entire control system under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the control system had not yet developed so much and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still made it possible to arrange them in the ballistic missile system - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.
Secondly, the typical combat distances of that time: 30-60 kbt meant that in addition to rare single hits from large-caliber shells, the ship was simultaneously under a hail of small and medium caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. It is obvious that bulky and poorly protected control towers, sighting guidance posts and other elements of the control system, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly harmless shells in the very first minutes of the battle. However, with regard to protection from shells, the conning towers of domestic ships were designed well.
They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor of the wheelhouse and anti-fragmentation visors. As a result, the penetration of shells into the conning tower was practically eliminated, which was confirmed in real combat practice. Despite the enormous number of hits suffered by Russian battleships, virtually no cases of shells penetrating into ballistic missiles have been recorded. However, the command staff nevertheless suffered greatly from shrapnel, while being inside the conning towers. But this is primarily due to the gigantic number of hits and the high characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells. But, as you know, everything is learned by comparison. The famous Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “Inspection slits in Japanese ships were made in such a way that even a small fragment could not penetrate through them into the conning tower...” With all due respect to Alexey Silych, you need to understand that that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only evaluate the perfection of the design of the conning towers of Japanese ships purely visually. A photograph will help you estimate the size of the sighting slits of Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not be Japanese if they had not decided on a very original step from the point of view of straightforward European logic - the commanders of the Japanese attack ships, Vice Admiral Togo and Rear Admiral Kamimura, chose not to “get into” the conning towers of their ships at all! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle exposing his chest, covered with epaulettes and medals, to all the winds (and shells) on the upper navigation bridge of the Mikasa. That is, completely openly... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm fragmentation shell that exploded right above the bridge killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Except…. EXCEPT…. Of course, Vice Admiral Heihachiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura also spent the entire battle on the combat top of the mainmast and also remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals survived and did not even receive serious injuries testifies only to the extreme luck that accompanied them and the evil fate that haunted Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, the very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells also had an impact.
The conning tower of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slits is also quite decent, although smaller than those of our ships. In addition, this cabin does not have “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so penetration of shells falling at an angle is in principle possible. Admiral Togo stood two floors above throughout the battle...
As for the size of the embrasures... The dimensions of the embrasures in the turrets of the Japanese main battery gun mounts were smaller than those of the Russians, but the vertical pumping angle of their guns was also smaller, this should not be forgotten. In addition, the AU GK turrets of Russian battleships were streamlined and protected by 254mm thick Krupp armor, which made them invulnerable to any shells of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese main guns of the Fuji and Yashima EBR main guns were much more modestly armored - only 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to AP shells from Russian ships. The Japanese battleship Fuji, which ours actually penetrated through the 152mm armor of the 12” gun mount (thus confirming my logical conclusions), almost exploded because... After this, a fire started and the charges in the tower and supply pipe had already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a broken pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil fate. But all this applies only to large (main) caliber artillery. The level of any type of protection for the 152mm turret gun mounts of the newest Russian battleships was two orders of magnitude higher than the protection of medium-caliber guns and their crews on Japanese ships. This photo doesn’t really need any comments, but still:
Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You don’t need to have a wild imagination to imagine what would happen to the crews of all these guns if even one more or less decent shell exploded here... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their “embrasures” also seems to hint... A good gate. On the Russian Borodino-class battleships, 75mm anti-mine guns were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor on their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin turret guns of the newest Russian battleships. They somehow forgot that all the medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as on the Mikas, was completely destroyed just 20 minutes after the start of the battle.
The obvious conclusion is that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (with all their shortcomings), and not super invulnerable conning towers, ultra-small embrasures or anything else. And most importantly, the Japanese samurai fought, and did not weakly fight back like ours. There is a good phrase from the film “Antikiller”. In this case, of course, it is exaggerated, but it reflects the essence quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work...” Comparative characteristics of the most basic types of attack ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are given in Table 7.
Table 7
TTX | Eagle | Poltava | Oslyabya | Mikasa | Fuji | Asama |
Type | EDB | EDB | EDB | EDB | EDB | KRB23 |
Displacement etc. |
13516 |
11500 |
12674 |
15352 |
12320 |
9900 |
Engine power hp |
15800 |
11255 |
15051 |
16000 |
14000 |
18200 |
Travel speed knots / km/h |
17,8 / 33 |
16,3 / 30,2 |
18,6 / 34,4 |
18,5 / 34,3 |
18,3 / 33,9 |
22,1 / 40,9 |
Large caliber artillery | Obukhov
| Obukhov
| Obukhov
| Amstrong
| Amstrong
| Amstrong
|
Muzzle energy MJ |
106,1 |
106,1 |
55 |
112,1 |
105,1 |
34,9 |
Drives
| A3
| A
| A
| A
| A
| A
|
Firing range kbt/km |
80/14,8 |
80/14,8 |
91/16,8 |
74/13,7 |
77/14,3 |
60/11,18 |
Thickness of pierced armor from 50 kbt normal mm |
129/0°
|
129/0°
|
109/0°
|
140/0°
|
n.d. |
56/0°
|
Fire rate
|
90 |
90 |
90 |
75 |
150 |
3011 |
Medium caliber artillery | Kane 6-2x152mm
| Kane
| Kane 11-152mm
| Amstrong 14-152mm
| Amstrong 10-152mm
| Amstrong 14-152mm
|
Muzzle energy MJ |
13,3 |
13,3 |
13,3 |
10,4 |
10,4 |
10,4 |
Drives
| A
| M-PA5
| M6
| M
| M
| M
|
Firing range kbt/km |
61/11,3 |
61/11,3 |
61/11,3 |
49/9,1 |
49/9,1 55/10,210 |
49/9,1 55/10,2 |
Thickness of pierced armor from 30 kbt normal mm |
43/0°
|
43/0°
|
43/0°
|
35/0°
|
35/0°
|
35/0°
|
Fire rate
|
12 |
10-12 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
Torpedo weapons |
4-381mm | 4-381mm
|
5-381mm |
4-457mm |
5-457mm |
5-457mm |
Torpedo launch range km
|
0,9 | 0,9
|
0,9 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Rangefinder stations DS
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
| F2A/2
PC
|
Central aiming sights VCN | 2 pcs on sighting posts VP1 4 inside BR |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Bearing guidance | Semi-automatic - central according to the VCN15 tracking system |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Local |
Range guidance | Local instrument | Local instrument | Local instrument | Local instrument |
Local |
Local |
Calculation of lead angles VN and GN | Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
| Manual
|
Transfer of data of lead angles VN and GN to the control unit |
| For transmitting and receiving devices of the control system | For transmitting and receiving devices of the control system | |||
Transfer of DS and bearing data to the control unit | Machine. according to the tracking system VCN and auto. long range input in the SLA from DS16 |
| Machine. long range input In the MSA from DS | |||
Defense of the citadel and HDV mm | 194/0°+40/30°
|
368/0°=368
| 229/0°+51/30°
| 229/0°+76/45°
|
457/0°=457
| 178/0°+51/30°
|
End protection mm | 145/0°+40/30°
|
76/45°=107
|
83/30°=166
| 102/0°+51/45°
|
No |
89/0°=89
|
Deck protection mm
| 51+40=91
|
51
|
51
| 51
|
64
|
51
|
PTZ mm | 40/0°
| Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom | Double bottom |
Protection AU24 GK mm | 254 tower
| 254 tower
| 229 tower
| 254 tower
| 152
tower
| 152 tower
|
Protection AU SK mm | 152 tower
| 127 tower
|
- |
- |
- |
- |
Protection of the side and casemate guns mm | 51-76
| 75
| 102-127
| 152
| 102-152
| 127-152
|
Note:
|
||||||
Having analyzed all the myths and facts listed, we gradually come to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, they also had sins. The main ones are weak OFS 5 and weak torpedo weapons. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only by battleships of the Poltava class.
The rest made do with more modest ones, 381mm caliber. But there is a difference - either approaching the “wounded animal” at 2-3 km, or at 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened the Americans quite a bit with their huge Long Lances (which did not help the Japanese in other respects). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame for this? The main responsibility for such a defeat lies with:
1. Admirals Z.P.Rozhestvensky, V.K.Vitgeft, O.V.Stark.
2. The evil fate that has been pursuing our fleet throughout this war.
Let's look at these two main causes of defeat. Point one. Were these three people really clinical idiots who, with their own hands, strangled all the foundations of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and vessels entrusted to them? They really strangled all the bases, but they still weren’t idiots. These were people of a kind of ability that were in demand in the then royal fleet. The fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that victory could only be achieved by demonstrating the latest weapons to the enemy, did not need warriors. And they needed business executives. So that the ships would clearly keep in formation, not be delayed, they would always shine with new paint, the borders on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned over with the bright side up for the visit of “His Majesty”. All three were perfectly suited to carrying out such activities. Well, it’s worth admitting that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving long distances). Logistics, to some extent, became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. The Japanese fleet entered the battle fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of difficult voyage, immediately entered the battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet decreases by N% for every 1000 km away from its home base has been known for quite some time.
As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war - what could we do then? The author of these lines had to read many “alternative” versions of the Battle of Tsushima. They all started with the same thing: “But if only - (Makarov was in command / the battleships were not overloaded / the shells exploded well / Your version), then OOO………” What followed, perhaps quite logical, but completely delusional from the historical perspective point of view of reasoning. Historical processes have enormous inertia and by changing just one fact of history, it is simply unrealistic to radically change the entire subsequent chain of events. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and fateful decisions in historical retrospect many years BEFORE a significant date in order to change the very logical chain that preceded it. This simply does not make any sense, as is clear to any schoolchild. The most “tasty” alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1st Pacific Squadron. But it is practically impossible to calculate what would be reliably in this case. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1st Pacific squadron, which is inactive and operating in cooperation with ground forces, we will dwell in detail on the 2nd squadron of Z.P. Rozhestvensky. What could she count on as she exhausted herself into the Tsushima Strait on the evening of May 13, 1905, when the ship's radio stations had already detected the presence of the enemy fleet over the horizon? So let’s try to calculate what the 2nd Pacific Squadron could have done if... No, no - don’t be alarmed. If only she had just been lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he would not have replaced himself with another, equally gifted figure, but would have simply fallen seriously ill and spent the entire battle in the ship's first-aid post, without interfering with anyone's fight. Calculations show that in this case it would have been impossible to win anyway. The maximum that the 2nd Pacific Squadron could hope for in this case was to reduce the game to a draw.
So. A virtual reality. Morning of May 14th. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhdestvensky is in serious condition in his cabin. Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist do not know about this and therefore are not even a little worried. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship “Prince Suvorov”. And so:
“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed a steamer on the right, quickly approaching us. Having approached forty cable lengths, he laid down on a course parallel to us. But he walked like this for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning darkness. It had a speed of at least sixteen knots. They could not identify him, but his behavior immediately aroused suspicion - undoubtedly, he was a Japanese intelligence officer. It would be necessary to immediately send two fast cruisers after him. Whether they sank it or not, they would at least clarify an extremely important question: are we discovered by the enemy or are we still in the dark? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious ship.
"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells undershot or overshot, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov was jubilant. When the senior artilleryman Nozikov approached him, he, trying to drown out the hubbub of the chickens that had not yet calmed down, spoke solemnly:
- But we cleverly butchered him! How asked the streaker! He rushed away from us at full speed.”
In place of the previously sunk cruiser Izumi, there was another similar cruiser. After he turned to the right and, having increased his speed, began to move away, already having a trim on the bow and serious damage, the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh", squeezing out all 16-17 knots from his old worn-out vehicles, caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and there was nothing to stand around stupidly watching as he ran away. 32nd place. The destroyers were also lucky:
“About eleven o’clock a second destroyer appeared ahead on the right, intending to cross the course of the Loud.” Kern ordered to develop the full speed. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle ahead with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something daring to get out of a difficult situation. And Commander Kern went for it. The miner's specialty suggested to the commander that the time had come to discharge the two surviving mine vehicles on the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. By his order, both mines were prepared for firing. “Loud” made a sharp turn and rushed towards the enemy walking behind. As we later learned, it was a Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between Shiranui and Loud was quickly closing. The team realized that the decisive moment had arrived. The gunners increased their fire. But at these moments the main role was given to the miners, who stood ready at their devices. Suddenly, near them, with a flash of short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on a dusty road. Something heavy separated from the fire and smoke and flew overboard. Senior Officer Paskin was pushed by the air into the casing near the rear chimney. Having recovered, he rushed to the scene of the explosion. The miners Abramov and Telegin lay dead near the apparatus, and all that remained of the mine conductor Bezdenezhnykh was his cap, thrown to the railing post. Lieutenant Paskin assigned miners Tsepelev, Bogoryadtsev and Ryadzievsky to the devices. The enemy was already approaching the beam. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander ordered to release the mine from apparatus No. 1. But it barely moved out and, touching the side with its tail, fell into the water like a log.
- She drowned, you vile one! – the sharp-eyed signalman Skorodumov screamed on the bridge and cursed loudly. The commander, who was closely monitoring the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and, either in response to him or to clarify for himself what had happened, muttered through his teeth: “The gunpowder did not ignite well - it was damp.” The second mine, fired in pursuit of the enemy, went correctly to the target. They were already waiting for an explosion, but she, having reached the surface of the sea almost to the very stern, suddenly turned to the side, thrown back by the seething currents from the propellers. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of “Loud.”
“Gromky” was lucky and the torpedo turned out to be serviceable. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set sail for the Yasukuni Shrine.
“The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his vehicles were secured in a marching manner.”
The destroyer Gromky launched a second torpedo at the second Japanese destroyer, but it managed to dodge and an artillery duel began. The excellent training of Kern's crew left him no chance. The Japanese destroyer received fatal damage, lost speed and sank after some time. The destroyer "Gromky" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel and safely reaching Vladivostok. 32nd and 33rd places are occupied by Japanese destroyers. A day earlier, the duel between the armored giants continued. The Oslyabya, Suvorov and Alexander III had already been lost (the last two were still afloat and were still firing). Later, the crew of the destroyer “Buiny” staged lynching, throwing Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky overboard with the wording “Missing in action.” The commander of the destroyer N.N. Kolomeytsev did not support the idea, but treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Heihachiro Togo stood on the upper navigation bridge along with his entire staff. A Russian 305mm fragmentation shell hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From everyone on the upper navigation bridge, including and Admiral Heihachiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to smack of mild hysteria, which usually happened to them as soon as something began to go against their plan.
The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately dropped so much that the battleship Borodino had enough of its remaining power and survivability to “drag” the battle until dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the pursuit. After the onset of silence, the battleship "Borodino", controlled only by sailors and having vehicles in full working order, without unnecessary complexes, increased its speed to the maximum possible 17-18 kts (it was of no use in battle anyway), heading N/O-23 °. The Eagle, which received the same amount, tried to keep up with him, but due to the armor plate on the bow at the waterline turned “against the grain,” the speed did not rise above 16.5 knots. The remaining ships with the flagship "Nicholas-I" trailed behind at a speed of about 14 knots. The cruiser "Emerald" walked with them in complete darkness without searchlights. The news of the death of Admiral Togo and his entire staff had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while Tokyo decided what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleships Borodino, Orel, Nikolai-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy " As a result, with the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji and Chin-Yen, six assorted cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly break through to Vladivostok, preserving such ships as “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Nikolai-I”, “Apraksin”, “Sevyanin”, “Izumrud” and “Gromky”. Purely in terms of the number of ships sunk and destroyed, this is, of course, still a loss, but not so shameful, which promised peace on more favorable terms with the preservation of the Kuril Islands for Russia. Both admirals, Russian and Japanese, die in this virtual reality. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep-seated crisis processes that at that time had already engulfed all of Tsarist Russia could count on something more, for example, the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. You might be lucky - once every 1000 years. The absurd death of S.O. Makarov showed that the war “didn’t work out” from the very beginning.
Lessons from war
Lesson #1. It is impossible to defeat the enemy with just the presence of even the most modern weapons. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and master all the techniques of its use perfectly. How are things going with combat training in our fleet today? I'd like to think it's better than 1904. Probably better.
Lesson #2. Military equipment is a very complex mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or at least limit its functionality. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, such “broken cogs” were over-moistened pyroxylin in the shells, low power of the OFS and overloading of ships beyond the norm with all sorts of nonsense. What is the technical condition of the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken cogs” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complex than even the most modern ships of the Borodino type and there are significantly more “cogs” in them.
Lesson #3. The ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and survivability with relatively compact sizes and forgave admirals and commanders such mistakes that no modern ship will ever forgive. In other words, with the same “command style” today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude even more terrible and fleeting than what took place in the Battle of Tsushima. In order not to be unfounded, you can look at the photographs that explain everything.
Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121.2m) after the Battle of Tsushima. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during an inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 are 305mm shells (386kg), 2 are 254mm shells (226.5kg), 9 are 203mm shells (113.4kg), 39 are 152mm shells (45.4kg) and 21 are 76mm (~6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is a hefty 5.3 tons. It contains explosives ranging from half a ton to a ton. The ship survived and retained about 10-15% of its original combat potential.
The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit by an AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missile weighing 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard-plastic boat completely burned out and sank. If the reader thinks that our Project 956E is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.
It is difficult to say how the construction of such ships that do not carry even a shadow of armor can be explained. They even have aluminum and magnesium body steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval warfare is no longer the determining factor.
The battleship "Eagle" in a creatively redesigned version, with closed dynamic protection armor "Relikt", with six AK-130 mounts instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm main battery gun barrels, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radar, with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35kt), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with nuclear warheads in new TA, with universal air defense systems and anti-aircraft defense systems it would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. These “Eagles” can be built in large numbers and in large numbers. At the same time, such a naval tank will be able to withstand a hit from 2-5 missiles of the P-700 complex, after which it will be restored at the factory. Expensive? How many Sheffields do you need to build so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save you from modern powerful anti-ship ammunition, but it gives the ship's hull the strength of a tank and prevents it from falling apart after being hit by just one missile. These are, perhaps, the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and sailors from that long-ago war.
Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the “big brothers”, but was 3-4 times smaller in displacement.
3. Given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of the new generation, which were first used in the Battle of Tsushima. High-explosive fragmentation shells of previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific Squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike carried out by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded on our side.
4. Data are given for “Suvorov”, “Eagle” and “Slava”. "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 323mm Krupp armor normal.
5. OFS – high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel “Tsushima” by A.S. Novikov-Priboy. Memories of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Among them, only one old Chinese “Chin-Yen” was an armadillo. The remaining three were light armored cruisers of the Matsushima class. Each of them carried one heavy and low-velocity 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not even withstand Russian cruisers of the 1st rank, not to mention battleships. However, in the battleship-less fishiness of the Japanese fleet, these were quite “lobsters” and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrapping. During the Battle of Tsushima, they were ordered to shoot at the shock Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Eagle armor, without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the “semi-heavy” cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis from the heavy artillery of the USSR Navy, as of June 22, 1941, there were only 36 305mm caliber guns (on the modernized Tsarist Marat-class battleships) and 40 B-1-P 180mm caliber guns (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and the modernized "Red Caucasus"). At the same time, the inclusion of formally light cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis in the list is a clear stretch “for the sake of numbers,” as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. That would not be completely embarrassing. As of June 22, 1941, the USSR Navy did not have any aircraft carriers.
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Content:
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..3 pages.
Chapter 1 Composition of the Pacific squadron……………………………..…..8 p.
1.1. Deployment and command staff of the Pacific Ocean squadron………..…..9 p.
1.2. Comparative characteristics of the Japanese and Russian fleets using the example of cruisers and battleships………………………………………………………..……...……..13 pp.
Chapter 2 Description of the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese War………………………………………….20 pp.
2.1. The ratio of enemy naval forces on the eve of the first naval battles………………………………………………………..…21 pp.
2.2. Beginning of naval battles: Chemulpo. The feat of “Varyag”……….…..22 p.
2.3. Blockade and defense of Port Arthur……………………………………...22 p.
2.4. The beginning of the Japanese Army's ground offensive in Manchuria. The first successes of the Russian fleet……………………………………………………......25 pp.
2.5. The death of the Russian fleet at Tsushima…………………………………26 p.
Chapter 3 Results of the Russo-Japanese War…………………………………...34 pp.
3.1. The reasons for Russia's defeat in the war……………………………..…..35 pp.
3.2. Analysis of the actions of the Russian fleet and its role in the military defeat..35 pp.
Conclusion………………………………………………………….……....37 p.
References……………………………………………………......41 pp.
Applications…………………………………………………………………………………44 pages.
Introduction
Relevance. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had political and economic prerequisites. Encountering resistance from China, Japan inflicted a crushing defeat on China during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed following the war, recorded China's renunciation of all rights to Korea and the transfer of a number of territories to Japan, including the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria. These achievements of Japan sharply increased its power and influence, which did not meet the interests of the European powers, so Germany, Russia and France achieved a change in these conditions: the triple intervention undertaken with the participation of Russia led to Japan’s abandonment of the Liaodong Peninsula, and then to its transfer in 1898 year of Russia for rental use. Japan considered itself offended and began a victorious war. The well-known historical fact of Russia's defeat is not in doubt among any of his contemporaries. It is believed that the mediocrity of Russian generals and the backwardness of weapons could not overcome the courage of Russian soldiers and officers, but the feat of the Varyag sailors. Defeat was a foregone conclusion. This position was formed in the recent past, which had ideologically determined attitudes about the “rotten tsarist regime.” The works of V.I. Lenin provide an analysis of two major defeats of the Russian armies and navy in the war of 1904-1905. (the fall of Port Arthur and the Tsushima defeat). V.I. Lenin mercilessly criticizes the command, generals, officers and the entire management apparatus of the tsarist armed forces. “The generals and commanders,” wrote Vladimir Ilyich, “turned out to be mediocrities and nonentities. The entire history of the 1904 campaign was, according to the authoritative testimony of one English military observer (in the Times), “a criminal disregard for the elementary principles of naval and land strategy.” The civil and military bureaucracy turned out to be just as parasitious and corrupt as during the days of serfdom.” In Lenin’s analysis of the two historical events mentioned, one can find significant differences in the assessment of the degree of training of the units of the naval armed forces of Tsarist Russia that took part in the first period of the war (Port Arthur and 1904), and the second Pacific squadron, which was defeated at Tsushima. “It is believed that Russia’s material loss in the fleet alone amounts to three hundred million rubles,” wrote V. I. Lenin. “But even more important is the loss of tens of thousands of the best naval crew, the loss of an entire land army.” About Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, V.I. Lenin writes: “The crew was assembled from the forest and from the pine trees, the final preparations of the military ships for sailing were hastily completed, the number of these ships was increased by adding “old chests” to the new and strong battleships.” The Great Armada, just as huge, just as cumbersome, absurd, powerless, monstrous, like the entire Russian Empire...” - that’s what he called the second Russian Pacific squadron. . But even now these derogatory assessments of our defeats are known to every high school student. But is this so certain? The Japanese army and navy also had the advantage of experience in conducting combat operations in this area - during the successful war with China in 1890. The supply of ammunition and manpower to the theater of operations was difficult - the only viable route was the CER - the Chinese-Eastern Railway, which had a capacity of only 9 trains per day. Our failures throughout the war become clear - in conditions of a threefold advantage of the enemy in manpower of 300 thousand against the Russians of 100 thousand, dispersed in the Irkutsk-Vladivostok-Port Arthur triangle. But we cannot speak in Leninist terms about our defeat. Russia has never lost a war like this, leading modern historians say. By August 1905, the Russians had 500,000 soldiers armed with machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, and the first airplanes against 300,000 thousand Japanese, already exhausted by the “Pyrrhic victory” at Mukden. The Japanese were the first to cry out for peace. And the Russian delegation at the peace negotiations in Portsmund had a strict order from Emperor Nicholas II: “Not a ruble of reparations, not a meter of Russian land.” The agreement on August 22, 1905 allocated half of Sakhalin to Japan. By this time, the tax burden in Japan had increased by 80%, in Russia by 2%. In May 1905, a meeting of the military council was held, where Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich reported that, in his opinion, for final victory it was necessary: a billion rubles of expenses, about 200 thousand losses and a year of military operations. After reflection, Nicholas II decided to enter into negotiations with the mediation of American President Roosevelt to conclude peace (which Japan had already proposed twice) from a position of strength, since Russia, unlike Japan, could wage war for a long time. Thus, the tsar agreed to peace, which to this day is regarded as an unconditional defeat in the Russian-Japanese war.
However, this study concerns only a particular aspect of this war - the actions of the Russian fleet. Neither in numbers nor in combat effectiveness could Russian ships compete with Japan. A very important advantage of Japan was its developed infrastructure - the ports had convenient access to the sea, in contrast to the only developed military base in Russia - Port Arthur, which had very difficult access to the sea due to a shallow fairway, so this base was blocked from the very beginning of the war actions. Vladivostok, and even more so the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, were separated from the theater of military operations by thousands of kilometers, which still had to be overcome through numerous minefields, Japanese squadrons and earth-based artillery batteries. Military intelligence was well aware of all the movements of the Russians, while our intelligence was often content with fragmentary and unreliable information. This is the general picture of the events that took place from the point of view of modern historians. The actions of the Russian fleet are quite well known. However, specific aspects may be lost against the background of the overall picture of hostilities. It is precisely this description of the naval battles of the war that seems relevant based on the general picture of the war.
Object of study: Russian-Japanese War of 1905
Subject of research: the Russian fleet in this war
The purpose of this work is to describe the actions of the Russian navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, based on the general picture of defensive and offensive operations of the entire Russian army.
Tasks:
1. Analyze the composition of the Pacific squadron before the start of the war, its quantitative and qualitative characteristics.
2. Study the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese war
3. Summarize the Russo-Japanese War from the point of view of the participation of the Russian fleet
Elaboration in scientific literature: In the works of Alferov N. Bokhanov A.N. , Witte Oldenburg S.S. analyzed the general situation of Russia 1904-1905 during the reign of Nicholas II. In the works of Bykov P. D. Kuropatkin A. N., Levitsky N. A., . , Tsarkov A. ., Shishov A. V.; the general course of military operations. Egoriev V.E. , Zolotarev V. A., Kozlov I. A., Klado N. V., Koktsinsky I. M., Nesoleny S. V. describe individual actions of the Russian fleet. Based on these and other sources, the author tried to reconstruct the participation of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
Scientific and methodological basis of the study: analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction; general scientific methods of scientific knowledge applied at the theoretical level of knowledge, comparative historical method
Structure: course work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of references from 35 sources.
CHAPTER 1
COMPOSITION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN SQUADRON
By the beginning of the war, the Japanese fleet had an almost twofold advantage in ships and their technical superiority over the Russian military Pacific Fleet - we do not take into account the campaign and death of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima.
By 1904, Russian naval forces in the Far East consisted of the Pacific Squadron of the Baltic Fleet (detachments of battleships, reconnaissance cruisers and destroyers in Port Arthur and a detachment of cruisers in Vladivostok) and the Siberian Flotilla (2nd rank cruisers "Robber" and "Zabiyaka", auxiliary cruisers "Angara" and "Lena", gunboats "Bobr", "Sivuch", "Mandzhur", "Koreets" and "Gilyak", 2 mine cruisers, 12 destroyers of the "Falcon" type and destroyers Nos. 201, 202, 208-211). With the beginning of the war, all the ships became part of the Pacific Fleet, the command of which was appointed by Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov. On April 17, 1904, by order of the Maritime Department, the squadron located in the waters of the Far East became known as the “First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet”, and the ships being prepared to strengthen it in the Baltic were formed into the “Second Squadron of the Pacific Ocean”. The commanders were appointed: the fleet instead of the deceased S.S. Makarov - Vice Admiral N.I. Skrydlov, the "First Squadron" - Vice Admiral P.A. Bezobrazov (both were unable to arrive in Port Arthur), the "Second Squadron" " - Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky. After the latter left for the Far East on 10/2/1904, on 11/22/1904 it was decided to equip the “Third Squadron of the Pacific Fleet” from the squadron battleships “Slava”, “Emperor Alexander II”, “Emperor Nikolai G”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral Ushakov” , "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin", cruisers of the 1st rank "Memory of Azov", "Vladimir Monomakh", 9 mine cruisers under construction and 8 destroyers of the "Falcon" class. In fact, instead of it, a "Separate detachment of ships" was sent the squadron battleship "Emperor Nikolai G", three coastal defense battleships and the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" under the command of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. He set out on a campaign on February 3, 1905, joining the 2nd Pacific Squadron on April 26, 1905, off the coast of Vietnam.
1.1. Deployment and command staff of the Pacific squadron
Squadron headquarters:
Squadron leader: Vice Admiral O.V. Stark (flag on "Petropavlovsk") Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov 02.24-31.03 (fleet commander), Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky 03.31-2.04 and 07.28-24.08 , Admiral General E.I. Alekseev 3.04-22.04, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft (v.i.d.) 04.22-28.07, captain of the first rank, from 29.08 Rear Admiral R.N. Viren 08.24-20.12)
Chief of Staff: Captain First Rank A.A. Eberhard
Senior flag officer: Lieutenant G.V. Dukelsky
Flag officers: Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev, Lieutenant S.V. Sheremetyev, midshipman I.M. Smirnov
Flagship miner: Lieutenant V.S. Denisov
Flagship artilleryman: lieutenant (2nd rank) A.K. Myakishev
Flagship navigator: sub A.A. Korobitsyn
Subsequently, the composition of the headquarters changed several times, and listing all ranks within the framework of this directory is not possible.
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky (flag on "Peresvet")
Flag officer: Lieutenant M.M. Stavraki
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral M.P. Molas (detachment of cruisers, flag on the Bayan)
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral M.F. Loschinsky (base security)
In Port Arthur:
Battleship "Petropavlovsk" - captain of the first rank N.M. Yakovlev
Battleship "Tsesarevich" - captain of the first rank I.K. Grigorovich (captain of the first rank N.M. Ivanov 2nd from 12.05, captain of the second rank D.P. Shumov 27.3-1 1.5 and 29.7-2.08)
Battleship "Retvizan" - captain of the first rank E.N. Shchensnovich
"Battleship "Peresvet" - captain of the first rank V.A. Boysman (captain of the second rank A. Dmitriev 2nd from 29.07)
Battleship "Victory" - cap. 1 rub. V.M. Steamed (captain of the first rank V.S. Sarnavsky 9-14.06)
Battleship "Poltava" - captain of the first rank I.P. Uspensky
Battleship "Sevastopol" - cap. 1 rub. N.K. Chernyshev (captain of the second rank, from 2.07 captain of the first rank I.O. Essen
from 17.03)
Cruiser 1st rank "Bayan" - captain of the first rank R.N. Viren (captain of the second rank F.N. Ivanov 6th from 24.08)
Cruiser 1st rank "Pallada" - captain of the first rank P.V. Kossovich (first rank captain V.S. Sarnavsky from 3.02,
captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th 9-14.06)
Cruiser 1st rank "Diana" - captain of the first rank V.K. Zalessky
(captain of the first rank N.M. Ivanov 2nd 02/15-11/05, captain of the second rank A.A. Lieven 1 1/05-27/08)
Cruiser 1st rank "Askold" - captain first rank K.A. Grammatchikov
Cruiser 2nd rank "Boyarin" - captain of the second rank V.F. Sarychev
Cruiser 2nd rank "Novik" - captain of the second rank N.O. Essen (captain of the second rank M.F. Shultz from 1 8.03)
Cruiser 2nd rank "Zabiyaka" - captain of the second rank A.V. Lebedev (captain of the second rank Davydov 1 -1 4.03, captain of the second rank Nazarevsky from 14.03)
Gunboat "Gremyashchy - captain of the second rank M.I. Nikolsky (captain of the second rank A.K. Tsvingman from 1 9.05)
Gunboat "Brave" - captain of the second rank Davydov (captain of the second rank A.V. Lebedev 1.03-22.05, captain of the second rank A.M. Lazarev from 22.05)
Gunboat "Gilyak" - captain of the second rank A.V. Alekseev (captain of the second rank N.V. Stronsky 4th from 18.04)
Gunboat "Beaver" - captain of the second rank M.V. Bubnov (captain of the second rank A.A. Liven 10.03-1 1.05, captain of the second rank V.V. Sheltinga from 1 1.05)
Mine transport "Yenisei" - captain of the second rank V.A. Stepanov
Mine transport "Amur" - captain of the second rank Bernatovich (captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th 18.03-24.07, captain of the second rank E.N. Odintsov from 24.08)
Mine cruiser "Vsadnik" - captain of the second rank N.V. Stronsky 4th (captain of the second rank A.M. Lazarev 1 7.04-2 1.05, captain of the second rank L.P. Opatsky from 22.05)
Mine cruiser "Gaydamak" - captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th (lieutenant, then captain of the second rank V.V. Kolyubakin from 18.03)
The first detachment of destroyers - chief captain of the first rank N.A. Matusevich until 27.02 (captain of the second rank F.R. Skorupo acting, captain of the second rank E.P. Eliseev from 25.03, Lt. A.S. Maksimov acting )
Destroyer "Battle" - captain of the second rank E.P. Eliseev (Lieutenant A.M. Kosinsky 2nd 10.06-18.07, Lieutenant S.L. Khmelev from 18.07)
Destroyer "Bditelny" - Lieutenant S.L. Khmelev (Lieutenant A.M. Kosinsky 2nd 18.07-1.11, Lieutenant V.I. Lepko from 1.11)
Destroyer "Besposhchadny" - Lieutenant V.M. Lukin (captain of the second rank F.V. Rimsky-Korsakov 25.03-1 6.07, Lieutenant D.S. Mikhailov 2-Y1 6.07-2.08)
Destroyer "Besstrashny" - captain of the second rank G.V. Zimmerman (Lieutenant I.I. Skorokhodov 5.02-14.03, Lieutenant P.L. Trukhachev from 14.03)
Destroyer "Silent" - captain of the second rank F.R. Skorupo (Lieutenant A.S. Maksimov from 23.03)
Destroyer "Attentive" - captain of the second rank A.M. Simon (Lieutenant I.V. Stetsenko 2nd from 5.02).
Destroyer "Impressive" - Lieutenant M.S. Podushkin
Destroyer "Hardy" - Lieutenant P.A. Richter (until 7.05 and 10.06-11.08) Lieutenant A.I. Nepenin 10.05-10.06)
Destroyer "Vlastny" - Lieutenant V.N. Kartsev (before 12.06 and 12.09-20.12), Lieutenant D.N. Verderevsky 12-22.06, Lieutenant Mikhailov 2nd 22.06-1 3.07, Lieutenant A.A. Kovalevsky 1 3.07- 7.00, Lieutenant V.D. Tyrkov 2nd 7-12.09)
Destroyer "Grozovoy" - Lieutenant V.V. Sheltinga (Lieutenant V.M. Lukin 8-12.05, Lieutenant A.A. Brovtsyn 12.05-3.08)
Destroyer "Boiky" - captain of the second rank A.M. Simon (second-rank captain A.K. Tswingman 1 4.02-1 9.05, Lieutenant I.I. Podyapolsky 19.05-1.11, Lieutenant G.O. Gadd 1-7.1 1, Lieutenant M.A. Behrens 7.1 1-20.12)
Destroyer "Burny" - captain of the second rank Pogorelsky (Lieutenant I.I. Podyapolsky 8-1 8.03, Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev 18.03-3.04, Lieutenant N.D. Tyrkov 3rd 3.04-29.07)
1.2. Comparative characteristics of the Japanese and Russian fleets using the example of cruisers and battleships
By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, cruisers, powerful, modern, and fast, became the main combat force of the Russian fleet. They were called upon to cut off the supply of island Japan, which was heavily dependent on mainland supplies of raw materials, food, goods, trade, etc. Despite the significant failures of the Russian fleet in the war, it was the cruisers that inflicted the greatest damage on Imperial Japan at sea. Therefore, it would be appropriate to compare the combat effectiveness of the cruisers of Russia and Japan - or, more precisely, the cruisers of the USA and England, which cost Japan the most modern warships on their military lines.
TABLE 1 Elements of Russian cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment
Japan, ordering ships from Europe and blindly following British shipbuilding models at that time, chose a very successful version of the cruiser, which was a response to the “Russian colossi”.
It is interesting to note how Brassey (1899) praised the new Japanese cruisers at that time: “The Japanese Asama and those of the same type are excellent ships. Their hull is well protected... There is not a single cruiser in the world that is so well armored. They have very powerful artillery, well located.”
Indeed, from the point of view of the “response” to the construction of Russian cruisers, the Japanese (or rather, the British for their Japanese students) could hardly have done better. Six Japanese cruisers ("Asama", "Tokiwa", "Iwate", "Izumo", "Yakumo", "Azuma"), almost identical in their elements (Table 2), had superiority over their Russian rivals, who were part of the Vladivostok detachment, several advantages:
1) Much better armor, in particular artillery protection.
2) The arrangement of 203-mm guns in pairs in the turrets, which made it possible to concentrate twice as many guns of this caliber on board,
3) Smaller displacement (9,300-9,700 m instead of 11-12 thousand for Russian cruisers), and therefore smaller sizes and smaller affected areas.
4) Some superiority in speed (20-21 knots instead of 18.0-19.8).
The superiority of Russian cruisers was determined only by their greater cruising range. It is impossible to deny the importance of this operational-tactical element for a cruiser in general and, in particular, for one that is intended for operations on ocean communications. But given the changed situation, this quality of Russian cruisers could hardly compensate for the above-mentioned shortcomings in other elements.
The Vladivostok cruisers had the same shortcomings as most ships of the Russian fleet, resulting from the low level of productive forces of Tsarist Russia, the backwardness of shipbuilding technology, led by a bureaucratic, detached from the fleet, insufficiently studied the experience of advanced foreign countries, corrupt apparatus of the Navy Ministry. The unfavorable location of the artillery, its insufficient armor protection, low speed and, as it turned out later, unusable artillery shells - all this gave significant advantages to the enemy - Japanese armored cruisers, built according to the latest English models abroad, taking into account the shortcomings of Russian cruisers. Despite the general commonality of type (“Rurik”, “Russia” and “Gromoboy”) and a number of positive qualities of these ships, they had shortcomings characteristic of the entire composition of the Russian fleet, characterized by the term “museum of samples” current at that time. This led to the need during operations to match the oldest slow-moving ship, the Rurik. The Bogatyr accident deprived the formation of Vladivostok cruisers of a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft at the beginning of the active period of their activity. If the second Pacific squadron was truly ingloriously defeated by the Togolese fleet near Tsushima, then more positive examples can be found in the actions of the formations and ships of the Port Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons. The ships were distinguished by the same backwardness in technology, organized and controlled by the same bureaucratic, uneducated, corrupt maritime ministry of the doomed Russian feudal-bourgeois empire. However, with all this, some Port Arthur ships (minelayer "Amur", battleship "Retvizan", etc.) and Vladivostok cruisers achieved a number of successes - in this war of 1904 - 1905, characterized by almost complete defeats. Despite all the shortcomings and mistakes, the Vladivostok cruisers over the course of a number of months in 1904 dealt significant blows to the Japanese transport fleet and Japanese maritime trade. These blows were painfully perceived by the Japanese economy, Japanese “public opinion” and stock exchange circles far beyond Japan. Confirmed by a number of foreign sources, the sinking of siege artillery carried by Japanese troop transports could not help but help slow down the actions of the enemy besieging Port Arthur. The successes of Russian cruisers over a certain period of time led to the undermining of the authority of Kamimura's Japanese cruiser squadron in Japan. The task of diverting part of the Japanese naval forces from the Port Arthur direction by Vladivostok cruisers was nevertheless completed. In certain decades of 1904, Kamimura's cruisers were diverted to the northern part of the Sea of Japan. During the entire period of active activity of the detachment, the armored cruisers Kamimura and the light cruisers Uriu were forced to be based separately from the Japanese fleet, not near the Kwantung Peninsula (like the entire fleet), but in the Tsushima Strait
If Yegoryev’s position (remember, this is 1939) for ideological reasons was forced to take into account the opinion of Lenin V.I. (he has many articles about “mediocre admirals and generals of the tsarist army who lost the Battle of Tsushima and a number of land battles”), then the opinion of the modern author Nesoleny S.V. not limited by censorship restrictions. However, he also characterizes Russian cruisers very positively: “The situation was even worse with armored cruisers. There were only 4 of them versus 8 for the Japanese and, in addition, the Russian cruisers were inferior to the Japanese in a number of important elements. Bayan's artillery was two times inferior to any of the armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet. When ordering the Bayan in France from the Forges and Chantiers company according to the design of the prominent French shipbuilder M. Lagan, the Marine Technical Committee included joint operations with squadron battleships in the task of this cruiser. But weak artillery armament did not allow the Bayan to be used in squadron combat as effectively as the Japanese used their armored cruisers. At the same time, during military operations, Bayan will show higher efficiency than Russian armored cruisers (although its cost was higher than that of the best armored cruisers Askold (the total cost with weapons and ammunition is 5 million rubles in gold) and “Bogatyr” (5.5 million rubles) - “Bayan” (without weapons cost almost 6.3 million rubles).
“Gromoboy”, “Russia” and “Rurik” were created primarily for cruising operations with the aim of disrupting maritime trade, but were not suitable for squadron combat. They were inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers in armor (including artillery protection), speed and broadside strength: their 203 mm guns were located in side mounts so that only two out of four guns could fire on one side. Japanese cruisers had 203 mm guns located in turrets and all four guns could fire on any side. Only on the cruiser Gromoboy did they try to take into account the requirements of squadron combat to some extent, and for this purpose, two bow 8-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns were placed in armored casemates. In a heavy battle on August 1, 1904, this allowed the cruiser to confidently withstand the fire of Japanese tower cruisers."
If cruisers operated far from naval bases, mainly in the ocean, then battleships took part in hostilities on the inland seas between Japan, Korea and China, in the Yellow, Japanese, and Okhotsk seas.
Therefore, our comparison of the two opposing navies will be incomplete unless we compare the battleships of Russia and Japan.
“The Japanese squadron battleships were the same type of ships of the latest construction, while the Russian squadron battleships, built according to various shipbuilding programs with a time interval of up to seven years, belonged to four different types of ships that had different tactical and technical characteristics.
Most of the Russian ships were inferior in their tactical and technical characteristics to the Japanese. Three Russian battleships - Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol and Poltava - were already outdated ships. By the beginning of hostilities, ships of the Poltava type could no longer compete on an equal footing with the newest Japanese battleships of the Mikasa type. Jane's famous reference book for 1904 correlated their fighting strength as 0.8 to 1.0 in favor of the latter20. In addition, the Sevastopol vehicles, manufactured by the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, were distinguished by low quality manufacturing and assembly. Even during official tests in 1900, Sevastopol was unable to reach the contract speed (16 knots), and by the beginning of hostilities it was difficult to reach 14. The unreliable power plant was the main drawback of this ship, which seriously reduced its combat effectiveness.
The two squadron battleships Peresvet and Pobeda were significantly weaker than any battleship, as they had 254 mm main-caliber artillery and insufficient armor. The battleships "Peresvet" and "Pobeda", the same type as the "Oslyabya", were more suitable for the type of strong armored cruisers, but for cruisers their speed was low. And only the two newest battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan”, both built abroad, were not inferior in their tactical and technical data to the best Japanese battleships. The diversity of Russian ships made it difficult to use them, especially to control them in battle, which reduced the combat power of the squadron. The Russian battleships that were part of the First Pacific Squadron were built according to three (!) shipbuilding programs.
In addition to all of the above, it should be noted that there is one more significant drawback that affected the combat readiness of Russian ships, namely, the imperfection of Russian shells.”
Thus, neither in numbers nor in combat effectiveness, Russian ships could compete with Japan in this war.
.
Chapter 2
Description of the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese War
A sudden, without an official declaration of war, attack by the Japanese fleet on the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur on the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, led to the disabling of several of the strongest ships of the Russian squadron and ensured the unhindered landing of Japanese troops in Korea in February 1904. In May 1904, taking advantage of the inaction of the Russian command, the Japanese landed their troops on the Kwantung Peninsula and cut off the railway connection between Port Arthur and Russia. The siege of Port Arthur was begun by Japanese troops by the beginning of August 1904, and on December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905) the garrison of the fortress was forced to surrender. The remains of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur were sunk by Japanese siege artillery or blown up by their own crew.
In February 1905, the Japanese forced the Russian army to retreat in the general battle of Mukden, and on May 14 (27), 1905 - May 15 (28), 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima they defeated the Russian squadron transferred to the Far East from the Baltic. The reasons for the failures of the Russian armies and navy and their specific defeats were due to many factors, but the main ones were the incompleteness of military-strategic preparation, the colossal distance of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the country and the army, and the extremely limited communication networks. In addition, starting from January 1905, a revolutionary situation arose and developed in Russia.
The war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on August 23 (September 5), 1905, which recorded Russia’s cession to Japan of the southern part of Sakhalin and its lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway.
Here is a brief description of the most important events of this war. What are the actions of our fleet?
2.1. Ratio of enemy naval forces
on the eve of the first naval battles
The main theater of military operations was the Yellow Sea, in which the Japanese United Fleet under the command of Admiral Heihachiro Togo blocked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. In the Sea of Japan, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers was opposed by the 3rd Japanese squadron, whose task was to counter raider attacks by Russian cruisers on Japanese communications.
The balance of forces of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Yellow and Seas of Japan, by type of ship
Theaters of war Yellow Sea
Japanese Sea
Types of ships Russian squadron in Port Arthur Japanese United Fleet (1st and 2nd squadrons) Vladivostok cruiser detachment
Japanese 3rd Squadron
Squadron battleships
7 6 0 0
Armored cruisers
1 6 3 0
Large armored cruisers (over 4000 tons)
4 4 1 4
Small armored cruisers
2 4 0 7
Mine cruisers and minelayers 4 2 0 0
Seaworthy gunboats
7 2 3 7
Destroyers
22 19 0 0
Destroyers
0 16 17 12
The core of the Japanese United Fleet - including 6 squadron battleships and 5 armored cruisers - was built in Great Britain between 1896 and 1901. These ships were superior to their Russian counterparts in many respects, such as speed, range, armor coefficient, etc. In particular, Japanese naval artillery was superior to Russian in terms of projectile weight (of the same caliber) and technical rate of fire, as a result of which the broadside (total weight fired shells) of the Japanese United Fleet during the battle in the Yellow Sea was about 12,418 kg versus 9,111 kg for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur, that is, it was 1.36 times more. In addition to the 6 squadron battleships of the “first line”, the Japanese Navy had 2 more older battleships (“Chin-Yen”, German-built, a trophy of the Sino-Japanese War, and “Fuso” British-built).
It is also worth noting the qualitative difference in the shells used by the Russian and Japanese fleets - the content of explosives in Russian shells of the main calibers (12", 8", 6") was 4-6 times lower. At the same time, the melinite used in Japanese shells was The explosion power was approximately 1.2 times higher than the pyroxylin used in Russian ones.
In the very first battle on January 27, 1904, near Port Arthur, the powerful destructive effect of Japanese heavy high-explosive shells on unarmored or lightly armored structures, which did not depend on the firing range, was clearly demonstrated, as well as the significant armor-piercing ability of Russian light armor-piercing shells at short distances (up to 20 cables) . The Japanese made the necessary conclusions and in subsequent battles, having superior speed, tried to maintain a firing position 35-45 cables away from the Russian squadron.
However, the powerful but unstable shimosa collected its “tribute” - the destruction from the explosions of its own shells in the gun barrels when fired caused almost more damage to the Japanese than hits from Russian armor-piercing shells. It is worth mentioning the appearance in Vladivostok by April 1905 of the first 7 submarines, which, although they did not achieve significant military successes, were still an important deterrent that significantly limited the actions of the Japanese fleet in the area of Vladivostok and the Amur Estuary during the war.
At the end of 1903, Russia sent the battleship Tsarevich and the armored cruiser Bayan, which had just been built in Toulon, to the Far East; followed by the battleship Oslyabya and several cruisers and destroyers. Russia’s strong trump card was the ability to equip and transfer from Europe another squadron, approximately equal in number to that which was in the Pacific at the beginning of the war. It should be noted that the beginning of the war caught a fairly large detachment of Admiral A. A. Virenius halfway to the Far East, moving to reinforce the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. This set strict time limits for the Japanese, both for the beginning of the war (before the arrival of Virenius’s detachment) and for the destruction of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur (before the arrival of help from Europe). The ideal option for the Japanese was the blockade of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur with its subsequent death after the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese troops besieging it.
The Suez Canal was too shallow for the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were closed to the passage of Russian warships from a fairly powerful Black Sea squadron. The only route for meaningful support for the Pacific fleet was from the Baltic around Europe and Africa.
2.2. Beginning of naval battles: Chemulpo. Feat of "Varyag"
On the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, before the official declaration of war, 8 Japanese destroyers conducted a torpedo attack on the ships of the Russian fleet stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of the attack, two of the best Russian battleships (Tsesarevich and Retvizan) and the armored cruiser Pallada were disabled for several months.
On January 27 (February 9), 1904, a Japanese squadron consisting of 6 cruisers and 8 destroyers forced the armored cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" located in the Korean port of Chemulpo into battle. After a 50-minute battle, the Varyag, which received heavy damage, was scuttled, and the Koreets was blown up.
2.3. Blockade and defense of Port Arthur
On the morning of February 24, the Japanese attempted to scuttle 5 old transports at the entrance to Port Arthur harbor in order to trap the Russian squadron inside. The plan was foiled by the Retvizan, which was still in the outer roadstead of the harbor.
On March 2, Virenius’s detachment received an order to return to the Baltic, despite the protests of S. O. Makarov, who believed that he should continue further to the Far East.
On March 8, 1904, Admiral Makarov and the famous shipbuilder N.E. Kuteynikov arrived in Port Arthur, along with several wagons of spare parts and equipment for repairs. Makarov immediately took energetic measures to restore the combat effectiveness of the Russian squadron, which led to an increase in military spirit in the fleet.
On March 27, the Japanese again tried to block the exit from Port Arthur harbor, this time using 4 old vehicles filled with stones and cement. The transports, however, were sunk too far from the harbor entrance.
On March 31, while going to sea, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit 3 mines and sank within two minutes. 635 sailors and officers were killed. These included Admiral Makarov and the famous battle painter Vereshchagin. The battleship Pobeda was blown up and out of commission for several weeks.
On May 3, the Japanese made a third and final attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor, this time using 8 transports. As a result, the Russian fleet was blocked for several days in the harbor of Port Arthur, which cleared the way for the landing of the 2nd Japanese Army in Manchuria.
Of the entire Russian fleet, only the Vladivostok cruiser detachment (“Russia”, “Gromoboy”, “Rurik”) retained freedom of action and during the first 6 months of the war several times went on the offensive against the Japanese fleet, penetrating the Pacific Ocean and being off the Japanese coast, then , leaving again for the Korea Strait. The detachment sank several Japanese transports with troops and guns, including on May 31, Vladivostok cruisers intercepted the Japanese transport Hi-tatsi Maru (6175 brt), on board which were 18,280-mm mortars for the siege of Port Arthur, which made it possible to tighten the siege of Port Arthur for several months.
2.4. The beginning of the Japanese Army's ground offensive in Manchuria. The first successes of the Russian fleet
On April 18 (May 1), the 1st Japanese Army, numbering about 45 thousand people, crossed the Yalu River and in a battle on the Yalu River defeated the eastern detachment of the Russian Manchurian Army under the command of M. I. Zasulich, numbering about 18 thousand people. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria began. Landing of the 2nd Japanese Army on the Liaodong Peninsula. Photo from Japanese archives On April 22 (May 5), the 2nd Japanese Army under the command of General Yasukata Oku, numbering about 38.5 thousand people, began landing on the Liaodong Peninsula, about 100 kilometers from Port Arthur. The landing was carried out by 80 Japanese transports and continued until April 30 (May 13). The Russian units, numbering about 17 thousand people, under the command of General Stessel, as well as the Russian squadron in Port Arthur under the command of Vitgeft, did not take active actions to counter the Japanese landing.
If the 2nd Japanese Army landed without losses, then the Japanese fleet, which supported the landing operation, suffered very significant losses.
On May 2 (15), 2 Japanese battleships, the 12,320-ton Yashima and the 15,300-ton Hatsuse, were sunk after hitting a minefield laid by the Russian mine transport Amur. In total, during the period from May 12 to 17, the Japanese fleet lost 7 ships (2 battleships, a light cruiser, a gunboat, a notice, a fighter and a destroyer), and 2 more ships (including the armored cruiser Kasuga) went for repairs in Sasebo.
But after the surrender of Port Arthur and the defeat at Mukden, the Russians were only separated from the end of this war by the Tragedy of Tsushima
2.5. The death of the Russian fleet at Tsushima
May 14 (27) - May 15 (28), 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet almost completely destroyed the Russian squadron transferred to the Far East from the Baltic under the command of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky. Of its 17 ships of rank 1, 11 were killed, 2 were interned, and 4 fell into enemy hands. Of the 2nd rank cruisers, two were killed, one was disarmed, and only one (the yacht Almaz) reached Vladivostok, where only two of nine destroyers also arrived. Of the 14,334 Russian sailors who took part in the battle, 5,015 people, including 209 officers and 75 conductors, were killed, drowned or died from wounds, and 803 people were wounded. Many wounded, including the squadron commander (a total of 6,106 officers and lower ranks) were captured.
The Tsushima naval battle, which took place on May 14-15, 1905 near Tsushima Island in the eastern part of the Korea Strait, became the most tragic disaster in the history of the Russian navy, and the heaviest defeat for Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. The ratio of Russian and Japanese losses following the Tsushima battle is simply terrifying: the Japanese had only 117 people killed then, but the Russians had 5,045 killed and 6,016 captured, that is, the loss ratio was 1:95 (!), and taking into account the destruction 28 ships, including 7 battleships, the Russian fleet virtually ceased to exist after Tsushima.
What are the reasons for such a terrible defeat? Let's name a few of them.
1. Technical unpreparedness. Outdated, but in case of timely modernization (especially artillery), quite combat-ready battleships “Emperor Alexander II”, “Emperor Nicholas I”, “Navarin”, “Sisoy the Great” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” were in the Baltic. Most of the ships were recently transferred from Port Arthur, just for modernization and repair, but the replacement of artillery was never carried out on any ship, and the hasty repair of the Navarina's mechanisms even worsened its pre-repair characteristics. All this subsequently turned the listed ships into floating targets for Tsushima. This was a serious miscalculation of the fleet leadership, the Navy Ministry and Russian diplomacy. Thus, having a significantly superior Japanese fleet and an obvious threat of war, the Russian fleet (as well as the army) in the Far East was not ready when it began. In the reserve of the Baltic Fleet, there were three more coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type. These lightly armored ships had powerful artillery and, although they were not designed for linear combat, could provide significant assistance to the troops defending Port Arthur (as confirmed by the active use by the Japanese of the old Chinese battleship). The Borodino-class battleships were in a state of completion (the first one had already entered service). This, the largest series of battleships in the history of the Russian fleet (5, “Slava” was completed after the war), was supposed to form the backbone of a new, modern fleet. However, as a result of inconsistency in the government (or successful actions of British agents), their commissioning was postponed from 1903 to 1904-1905, and Russian diplomacy was unable to delay negotiations until this point. The weakness of the armor of Russian ships and the superiority of Japanese artillery also played a role. Here is a comparison table:
2. Combat unpreparedness. A direct participant in the Battle of Tsushima, who served on the battleship "Eagle", A.S. Novikov-Priboy wrote the book “Tsushima” and in this book he describes in great detail all the events that preceded the battle, the battle itself, and what happened to the Russian sailors in Japanese captivity. Particularly interesting are the small details that make up the overall picture, explaining why the Tsushima disaster simply could not help but happen. The situation in the Russian fleet at the beginning of the 20th century was such that it would have been simply surprising if Russia had won at Tsushima.
The Japanese victory at Tsushima is not at all explained by their numerical superiority - the forces of the parties were equal, and in terms of battleships the Russians even had a significant superiority over the Japanese!
The Japanese victory cannot be explained by the qualitative superiority of their naval artillery shells - although "shimoza", that is, high-explosive shells filled with melinite, produced more fragments during the explosion and a stronger blast wave, Russian shells certainly surpassed them in armor penetration.
The problem was different - Russian shells, as a rule, did not hit the target! For the simple reason that Russian commissars (naval gunners) simply did not know how to shoot accurately!
When the Russian squadron (in fact, it was the entire Baltic Fleet in full force) under the command of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky sailed to the Far East to help the besieged Port Arthur, the fleet command simply did not bother to train
A.S. Novikov-Priboy in his book “Tsushima” describes the daily life of the fleet, and most of the time was spent not on combat training, but on... cleaning. The command, more than anything else, was concerned that everything on the ships would shine and sparkle.
In philosophical terms, there is a predominance of form over content.
A.S. Novikov-Priboi in his book “Tsushima” gives an example of how back in 1902, the Baltic Fleet (commanded by the same Admiral Rozhdestvensky) staged demonstration shooting in the presence of Emperor Nicholas II and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who came to visit - the target shields were fixed like this it was weak that they fell from the air wave caused by the shells flying past, and the distinguished guests, seeing how the shields were falling one after another, thought that all the targets were definitely hit. Nicholas II was so shocked by such “unsurpassed accuracy” that Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was enlisted in the retinue of His Imperial Majesty by the highest decree.
Yes, Russian admirals knew how to curry favor with their superiors, and in the matter of showing off and deception they were ahead of the rest. But they never got around to preparing their fleet for a real war.
Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky remembered that he needed to learn to shoot for real only when the Russian squadron approached the island of Madagascar! We conducted training shooting, and according to their results, not a single shell hit the target! And this is in ideal conditions, during exercises, without any opposition from the enemy!
After this, it’s generally surprising how, during the Battle of Tsushima, the Russians sometimes managed to hit Japanese ships; perhaps these were purely accidental hits.
In the Russian fleet of the early 20th century, there were problems not only with the combat training of the “lower ranks”, but also with the tactical and strategic thinking of the admirals. For some reason, the Russian admirals of that time adhered to linear tactics, the inconsistency of which was proven back in the 18th century by the English admiral G. Nelson and the Russian admiral F.F. Ushakov.
If, with linear tactics, the ships of the opposing sides line up opposite each other in two lines, and each ship begins to shoot at the enemy ship that is opposite it, then Admiral F.F. Ushakov, for example, used completely new naval combat tactics.
Its essence was to go around the enemy squadron from the front, and with all your might simultaneously begin shelling the ship in front (usually the flagship), and after it, due to the concentration of all efforts on one target, is destroyed in the shortest possible time, attack with all your might the next ship, and so on. Roughly speaking, Ushakov acted on the “all against one” principle, shooting enemy ships one by one. Therefore, he never lost a single battle in his entire life.
In the squadron Z.P. Rozhdestvensky sailed the battleship "Admiral Ushakov", but for some reason the Russian admirals completely forgot about Ushakov's tactics, which became one of the reasons for the Tsushima tragedy, a real disaster for the Russian fleet.
But the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, knew very well about Ushakov’s tactics, and he defeated the Russian fleet during the Battle of Tsushima precisely according to Ushakov’s method - the Japanese ships bypassed the Russian squadron in front, and with a consistent concentration of fire they shot one ship after another.
3. Psychological unpreparedness. One cannot help but mention the oppressive moral situation that developed in the Russian fleet on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima. A.S. Novikov-Priboy in his book “Tsushima” writes that scuffles (literally - a natural beating in the face) were the most common, everyday occurrence in the navy. Non-commissioned officers beat sailors, officers beat both sailors and non-commissioned officers. As A.S. says in Tsushima. Novikov-Priboy, “my non-commissioned officer rank gave me a decent advantage over ordinary sailors: if I hit one of them, in the worst case, I would be put in a punishment cell for several days; if a private did this to me, he risked going to prison However, there was nothing to be proud of here. The officer had an even greater advantage over me: if he beats me, even for nothing, then he won’t even be reprimanded; but if I hit him, even if justly, then he threatens me the death penalty". Admiral Z.P. himself distinguished himself most in beating sailors. Rozhdestvensky. The entire book by A.S. Novikov-Priboya "Tsushima" is riddled with descriptions of the massacre committed by Admiral Rozhdestvensky: either he knocked a sailor down with one blow and knocked out four teeth at once, then his blows to the ear burst the eardrums and the sailors went deaf, then he hit the sailor on the head with binoculars, and binoculars split into pieces, etc. What kind of relationship could the sailors have with the officers and admirals beating them, what kind of “combat partnership” can we talk about here?
As we can see, the Russian fleet, sailing to the Far East, and meeting the Japanese near the island of Tsushima, was a rather curious sight: admirals and officers who did not know the basics of naval tactics; gunners who cannot hit the target; sailors with knocked out teeth and burst eardrums.
Could such a fleet defeat anyone?
What brief conclusions can we draw based on the material presented in this chapter? The feat of the "Varyag" and the successful actions of Russian cruisers to blockade Japan of supplies from the mainland, individual daring raids of destroyers that sank several large warships and transports could not turn the general course of the war. The only naval base of the Russian army, Port Arthur, fell after a heroic defense, and Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s Baltic Fleet was completely destroyed during Russia’s largest defeat in naval operations - the Tsushima tragedy. Neither the Vladivostok squadron nor the Black Sea squadron could significantly help in these battles - the Dardanelles were blocked, and the path from Vladivostok was both long and dangerous. Japan, on the other hand, had excellent naval bases, multiple superiority during major combat operations, and excellent reconnaissance. So on March 31, while going to sea, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit 3 mines and sank within two minutes. 635 sailors and officers were killed. But the Japanese did not lose a single ship or a single person. The number of those killed included Admiral Makarov and the famous battle painter Vereshchagin - the Japanese knew about the movements of the most dangerous admiral for them and did everything to destroy him. Their mines were raised in front of the Petropavlovsk's bow, and its fate was sealed.
However, critics of the Russian army and navy, when listing our defeats, forget about two wars of the 20th century - World War 2 and Vietnam of 1966-1976. In these wars, the United States could take into account the experience of our defeats. But Pearl Harbor and Vietnam show how difficult it is to fight far from your main bases. In the first case, the Americans were defeated at their own naval base...
. Chapter 3
Results of the Russo-Japanese War
Strengths of the parties
300,000 soldiers 500,000 soldiers
Russian military losses:
killed: 47,387;
wounded, shell-shocked: 173,425;
died from wounds: 11,425;
died from disease: 27,192;
total permanent losses: 86,004, killed: 32,904;
wounded, shell-shocked: 146,032;
died from wounds: 6,614;
died from disease: 11,170;
captured: 74,369;
total deadweight loss: 50,688
The Japanese army lost killed, according to various sources, from 49 thousand (B. Ts. Urlanis) to 80 thousand (Doctor of Historical Sciences I. Rostunov), while the Russian from 32 thousand (Urlanis) to 50 thousand (Rostunov) or 52,501 people (G. F. Krivosheev). Russian losses in battles on land were half that of the Japanese. In addition, 17,297 Russian and 38,617 Japanese soldiers and officers died from wounds and illnesses (Urlanis). The incidence in both armies was about 25 people. per 1000 per month, however, the mortality rate in Japanese medical institutions was 2.44 times higher than the Russian figure.
In his memoirs, Witte admitted: “It was not Russia that was defeated by the Japanese, not the Russian army, but our order, or more correctly, our boyish management of a population of 140 million in recent years.”
3.1. Reasons for Russia's defeat in the war
General Kuropatkin, Commander-in-Chief of the Manzhchurian Army, in the opinion of many, the main culprit of our defeat in the Russian-Japanese War, in his memoirs names the following among our reasons for defeat:
1. The small role of our fleet during the war with Japan.
2. The weakness of the Siberian Railway and the East China Railway.
3. Lack of diplomatic preparation for the free use of our armed forces to fight Japan.
4. Late mobilization of reinforcements assigned to the Far East.
5. Disadvantages of “private mobilizations”.
6. Transfer to the reserve from the districts of European Russia during the war
7. Untimely staffing of the active army with officers and lower ranks.
8. Weakening during the war the disciplinary rights of commanders to impose punishments on lower ranks.
9. Slowdown in the advancement of those who distinguished themselves in the war.
10. Our shortcomings in technical terms.
3.2. Analysis of the actions of the Russian fleet and its role in military defeat
As we can see, the land general puts the mistakes of the Russian fleet in the first place. The general's notes in Russia caused such a negative resonance that they were published in Germany - in 1908 and 1911. So what exactly is the fault of the domestic naval forces in this war, according to the general? He believes that in many ways we underestimated Japan's military power and missed its militaristic plans and preparations. He writes: “If our fleet had been successful over the Japanese, then military operations on the mainland would have been unnecessary. But even without victory over the Japanese fleet, until the Japanese acquired complete supremacy at sea, they would have been forced to leave significant forces to guard their coasts and, most importantly, could not risk landing on the Liaodong Peninsula; forced to move through Korea, they would give us time to concentrate. With an unexpected night attack on our fleet in Port Arthur, before the declaration of war, Japan gained a temporary advantage in the armored fleet and widely used this advantage, gaining supremacy at sea. Our fleet, especially after the death of adm. Makarov, during the most important period of concentration of Japanese troops, did not offer any resistance to the Japanese. When they landed, even near Port Arthur, we did not even make attempts to interfere with these operations. The consequences of this situation turned out to be very painful... Having gained supremacy at sea, Japan could move its entire army against our ground forces, without worrying about protecting its shores... This, contrary to our calculations, gave Japan the opportunity to field superior forces against us in the first period... Having become the mistress of the seas, Japan had the opportunity deliver by sea to the armies all the supplies they need."
Kuropatkin’s criticism would be fair if, when speaking about the remoteness of the theater of main combat operations from the main forces of Russia, he took into account not only the difficulties for the ground forces, but also spoke about the fleet...
Conclusion
The Russian fleet played an important role in the defense of Port Arthur, stopping Japanese military supplies, and carried out a number of successful operations. But in general, he was plagued by failures associated both with technical backwardness in comparison with the latest Japanese ships, and with failures in strategy - the defeat at Tsushima clearly reveals both of these factors. The distance from the main naval bases is another factor in our defeats at sea.
During the armed struggle in the land and sea theaters, Japan achieved major successes. But this required enormous strain on her material and moral resources. The economy and finances were depleted. Dissatisfaction with the war grew among broad sections of the population.
Despite the fact that the war, as S. Yu Witte put it, ended in a “decent” peace, ego could not obscure the fact of the defeat suffered by Russia.
But Japan managed to end the war on time. “If the negotiations had broken down and hostilities had resumed,” writes the American historian H. Barton, “then Japan would not have had the troops to achieve an early victory.” The war placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the working masses. It cost the peoples of both states great sacrifices. Russia lost about 270 thousand people, including more than 50 thousand killed. Japanese losses were estimated at 270 thousand people, including more than 86 thousand killed.
The noted phenomena did not go unnoticed by foreign observers. Thus, the English military observer Norrigaard, who was with the Japanese army during the siege of Port Arthur, testified to the turning point in the patriotic mood that had occurred in Japan since the spring of 1905. According to him, reservists from the main districts in Japan (Yokohama, Kobe and Osaka) expressed to him a desire to end the war as quickly as possible. He also mentions that one of the Japanese army regiments, recruited from these districts, refused to go on the attack.
The country's international position has worsened. The United States of America, which played a large role in starting the war, was concerned about Japan's successes. Its strengthening was not in their interests. Therefore, they wanted both warring parties to reconcile as quickly as possible. England took a similar position. Bound by an alliance with Japan, she nevertheless began to refuse her financial support.
Japan found itself in an almost hopeless situation. Further continuation of the war turned out to be impossible. There was only one thing left to do - to look for a way to make peace with Russia. Immediately after the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese ambassador to the United States was instructed to contact President Theodore Roosevelt with a request for mediation. Roosevelt agreed. The American ambassador in St. Petersburg received instructions to persuade Russia to negotiate.
Russia was in a different position than Japan. She had enough strength and resources to win the war even after the Tsushima disaster. Military resources were enormous. However, the tsarist government was also interested in concluding peace as quickly as possible. The decisive factor was the desire to free one’s hands in the Far East in order to fight the revolution that had begun. May 24 (June 6), 1905. A special meeting in Tsarskoe Selo called for an immediate end to the war. The next day, Nicholas II informed the US ambassador that Russia was ready to begin negotiations with Japan.
On July 27 (August 9), 1905, a peace conference opened in Portsmouth (USA). The Japanese delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Komura, the Russian delegation by Chairman of the Council of Ministers S. Yu. Witte. The negotiations ended on August 23 (September 5) with the signing of a peace treaty. The Russian delegation was forced to agree with the claims of the Japanese side: to renounce the lease of Kwantung in favor of Japan and cede to it the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel. Only after the Second World War, as a result of the defeat of militaristic Japan, was our country able to restore its legal rights to the original Russian territories - the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.
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