On April 27-28, 1978, the April Revolution (Saur Revolution) took place in Afghanistan. The reason for the uprising was the arrest of the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The regime of President Mohammed Daoud was overthrown, and the head of state and his family were killed. Pro-communist forces seized power. The country was declared the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The head of Afghanistan and its government was Nur Mohammed Taraki, his deputy was Babrak Karmal, and the first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs was Hafizullah Amin.

The new government began large-scale reforms aimed at modernizing the country. In Afghanistan they began to build a secular, socialist state, which was oriented towards the USSR. In particular, the feudal system of land tenure was destroyed in the state (the government expropriated land and real estate from 35-40 thousand large landowners); usury, which kept thousands of people in the position of slaves, was eliminated; universal suffrage was introduced, women were given equal rights with men, a secular system of local self-government was established, with support from government agencies the creation of secular public organizations(including youth and women's); there was a large-scale literacy campaign; a policy of secularization was pursued, limiting the influence of religion and the Muslim clergy in socio-political life. As a result, Afghanistan began to quickly transform from an archaic, semi-feudal state into a developed country.

It is clear that these and other reforms aroused resistance from the former dominant social groups- large landowners (feudal lords), moneylenders and part of the clergy. These processes were not to the taste of a number of Islamic states, where archaic norms also prevailed. In addition, the government made a number of mistakes. Thus, they did not take into account the fact that over several centuries of domination, religion not only began to determine the socio-political life of the country, but also became part of the national culture of the population. Therefore, sharp pressure on Islam offended the religious feelings of people and began to be viewed as a betrayal of the government and the PDPA. As a result, a civil war began in the country (1978-1979).

Another factor that weakened the DRA was the struggle for power within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan itself. In July 1978, Babrak Karmal was removed from his post and sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. The confrontation between Nur Muhammad Taraki and his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, led to Taraki being defeated, and all power passed to Amin. On October 2, 1979, on the orders of Amin, Taraki was killed. Amin was ambitious and cruel in achieving his goals. Terror was launched in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki and Karmal. The repression also affected the army, which was the main support of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which led to a decrease in its combat effectiveness, which was already low, and mass desertion.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that opponents of the PDPA outside the country launched violent activities against the Republic. Varied assistance to the rebels quickly expanded. A huge number of different organizations and movements of “the public concerned about the situation of the Afghan people” were created in Western and Islamic countries. They naturally began to provide “brotherly assistance” to the Afghan people suffering under the “yoke” of pro-communist forces. In principle, there is nothing new under the sun; now we are seeing a similar process in the Syrian conflict, when quite quickly various network structures created the “Syrian liberation army”, which fights the “bloody regime” of Bashar al-Assad through terror and destruction of the infrastructure of the Syrian state.

On the territory of Pakistan, centers of two main radical opposition organizations were created: the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) led by G. Hekmatyar and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOA) led by B. Rabbani. Other opposition movements also emerged in Pakistan: the Islamic Party of Khales (IP-K), which split from the IPA due to differences between Hekmatyar and Khales; “National Islamic Front of Afghanistan” (NIFA) S. Gilani, who advocated the restoration of the monarchy in Afghanistan; "Islamic Revolution Movement" (DIRA). All these parties were radically minded and were preparing for an armed struggle against the republican regime, creating combat units, organizing militant training bases and a supply system. The main efforts of opposition organizations were focused on working with the tribes, since they already had ready-made armed self-defense units. At the same time, a lot of work was carried out among the Islamic clergy, which was supposed to turn people against the DRA government. On Pakistani territory in the areas of Peshawar, Kohat, Quetta, Parachinar, Miramshah, near the DRA border, centers of counter-revolutionary parties, their militant training camps, warehouses with weapons, ammunition, ammunition, and transshipment bases appear. The Pakistani authorities did not oppose these activities, in fact becoming allies of the counter-revolutionary forces.

Great importance The growth of the forces of counter-revolutionary organizations was the emergence of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. It was they who became the main support base of the opposition, suppliers of “cannon fodder”. Opposition leaders concentrated in their hands the distribution humanitarian aid, which came from Western countries, having received an excellent tool for controlling refugees. Since the end of 1978, detachments and groups have been sent from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The scale of armed resistance to the DRA government began to constantly increase. At the beginning of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated sharply. An armed struggle against the government unfolded in the central provinces - Hazarajat, where Kabul's influence was traditionally weak. The Tajiks of Nuristan opposed the government. Groups arriving from Pakistan began recruiting opposition groups from the local population. Anti-government propaganda in the army intensified. The rebels began to commit sabotage against infrastructure facilities, power lines, telephone communications, and blocked roads. Terror was unleashed against citizens loyal to the government. In Afghanistan they began to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty about the future.

It is clear that in these conditions, the Afghan leadership from March - April 1979 began to ask the USSR for help by military force. Kabul tried to drag the USSR into the war. Such requests were transmitted through the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan A. M. Puzanov, the KGB representative Lieutenant General B. S. Ivanov and the chief military adviser, Lieutenant General L. N. Gorelov. Also, such requests were transmitted through Soviet party members and statesmen. So, on April 14, 1979, Amin transmitted through Gorelov a request to provide the DRA with 15-20 Soviet helicopters with ammunition and crews for use in border and central regions against rebels and terrorists.

The situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate. Soviet representatives began to fear for the lives of our citizens and the property of the USSR in Afghanistan, as well as for the facilities built with the help Soviet Union. Fortunately, there were precedents. Thus, in March 1979, American Ambassador A. Dabbs was kidnapped in Kabul. The kidnappers, members of the Maoist group National Oppression, demanded the release of their comrades from prison. The government did not make concessions and organized an assault. In the shootout the ambassador received mortal wound. The United States has reduced almost all relations with Kabul to zero and recalled its employees. On March 15-20, a mutiny took place in Herat, and soldiers of the garrison took part in it. The rebellion was suppressed by government troops. During this event, two USSR citizens died. On March 21, a conspiracy was uncovered in the Jalalabad garrison.

Ambassador Puzanov and KGB representative Ivanov, in connection with a possible further aggravation of the situation, proposed to consider the issue of deploying Soviet troops to protect structures and important objects. In particular, it was proposed to station troops at the Bagram military airfield and Kabul airport. This made it possible to build up forces in the country, or to ensure the evacuation of Soviet citizens. It was also proposed to send military advisers to Afghanistan and create a single scientific center in the Kabul region for more effective learning new army DRA. Then there was a proposal to send a detachment of Soviet helicopters to Shindand to organize training for Afghan helicopter crews.

On June 14, Amin, through Gorelov, asked to send Soviet crews for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to Afghanistan to protect the government and airfields in Bagram and Shindand. On July 11, Taraki proposed stationing several Soviet special forces of up to a battalion each in Kabul so that they could respond if the situation in the Afghan capital escalated. On July 18-19, in conversations with B.N. Ponomarev, who visited Afghanistan, Taraki and Amin repeatedly raised the question of entering the Democratic Republic in the event emergency two Soviet divisions at the request of the Afghan government. The Soviet government rejected this proposal, as well as those previously voiced. Moscow believed that the Afghan government should resolve its internal problems on its own.

On July 20, during the suppression of a rebellion in the province of Paktia, two Soviet citizens were killed. July 21 Amin told the Soviet ambassador Taraki's wish - to provide the DRV with 8-10 Soviet helicopters with crews. It must be said that by mid-1979 the situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border had sharply worsened. The number of Afghan refugees has grown to 100 thousand people. Some of them were used to replenish the ranks of gangs. Amin again raises the issue of stationing Soviet units in Kabul in case of an emergency. On August 5, in Kabul, a rebellion broke out at the location of the 26th Parachute Regiment and Commando Battalion. On August 11, in the province of Paktika, as a result of a heavy battle with superior rebel forces, units of the 12th Infantry Division were defeated, some of the soldiers surrendered, and some deserted. On the same day, Amin informed Moscow about the need to send Soviet troops to Kabul as soon as possible. Soviet advisers, in order to somehow “pacify” the Afghan leadership, proposed to make a small concession - to send one special battalion and transport helicopters with Soviet crews to Kabul, and also to consider the issue of sending two more special battalions (one to be sent to guard the military airfield in Bagram, the other to Bala Hisar fortress on the outskirts of Kabul).

On August 20, Amin, in a conversation with Army General I. G. Pavlovsky, asked the USSR to send a force of paratroopers to Afghanistan and replace the crews anti-aircraft batteries, covering Kabul, for Soviet calculations. Amin said that in the Kabul area it is necessary to keep a large number of troops that could be used to fight the rebels if Moscow sent 1.5-2 thousand paratroopers to the Afghan capital.

The situation in Afghanistan became even more complicated after the coup d'etat, when Amin seized full power, and Taraki was arrested and killed. The Soviet leadership was dissatisfied with this event, but in order to keep the situation under control, it recognized Amin as the leader of Afghanistan. Under Amin, repression in Afghanistan was intensified; he chose violence as the main method of combating opponents. Hiding behind socialist slogans, Amin set a course for establishing an authoritarian dictatorship in the country, turning the party into an appendage of the regime. At first, Amin continued to persecute the feudal lords and eliminated all opponents in the party, supporters of Taraki. Then literally everyone who expressed dissatisfaction and could be potentially dangerous to the regime of personal power was subjected to repression. At the same time, terror became widespread, which led to a sharp increase in the flight of people to Pakistan and Iran. The social base of the opposition has increased even more. Many prominent party members and participants in the 1978 revolution were forced to flee the country. At the same time, Amin tried to shift part of the responsibility onto the USSR, stating that the steps of the Afghan leadership were being taken allegedly at the direction of Moscow. At the same time, Amin continued to ask for Soviet troops to be sent to Afghanistan. In October and November, Amin requested that a Soviet battalion be sent to Kabul to act as his personal guard.

It is also necessary to take into account the influence on the leadership of the USSR of such factors as the growth of assistance to the Afghan opposition from the United States, Pakistan and a number of Arab states. There was a threat of Afghanistan leaving the sphere of influence of the USSR and establishing a hostile regime there. On the southern borders of Afghanistan, the Pakistani army periodically held military demonstrations. With political and military-material support from the West and a number of Muslim countries, by the end of 1979 the rebels had increased the number of their formations to 40 thousand bayonets and deployed fighting in 12 of the country's 27 provinces. Almost all of it was under the control of the opposition. countryside, about 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. In December 1979 Due to purges and repressions among army command personnel, the combat effectiveness and organization of the armed forces were at a minimum level.

On December 2, Amin, at a meeting with the new Soviet chief military adviser, Colonel General S. Magometov, asked to temporarily send a Soviet reinforced regiment to Badakhshan. December 3 during new meeting With Magometov, the head of Afghanistan proposed sending Soviet police units to the DRA.

The leadership of the USSR decides to save the “people's” power

The Soviet leadership was faced with a problem: what to do next? Taking into account Moscow’s strategic interests in the region, it was decided not to break with Kabul and act in accordance with the situation in the country, although the removal of Taraki was perceived as a counter-revolution. At the same time, Moscow was concerned about the information that since the fall of 1979, Amin began to study the possibilities of reorienting Afghanistan towards the United States and China. Amin's terror in the country also caused concern, which could lead to the complete destruction of progressive, patriotic and democratic forces in the country. Amin's regime could critically weaken the progressive forces of Afghanistan and lead to the victory of reactionary, conservative forces associated with Muslim countries and the USA. Concerns were also raised by the statements of Islamic radicals who promised that in the event of victory in Afghanistan, the struggle “under the green banner of jihad” would be transferred to Soviet territory. Central Asia. Representatives of the PDPA - Karmal, Vatanjar, Gulyabzoy, Sarvari, Kavyani and others - created underground structures in the country and began to prepare a new coup.

Moscow also took into account the international situation that developed in the late 1970s. The development of the process of “détente” between the USSR and the USA slowed down at this time. The government of D. Carter unilaterally froze the deadline for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. NATO began to consider increasing military budgets annually until the end of the 20th century. The US created a "quick reaction force". In December 1979, the NATO Council approved a program for the production and deployment in Europe of a number of new American systems nuclear weapons. Washington continued its policy of rapprochement with China, playing the “Chinese card” against the Soviet Union. The American military presence in the zone was strengthened Persian Gulf.

As a result, after much hesitation, the decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. From the point of view of the Great Game, this was a completely justified decision. Moscow could not allow conservative forces, which were oriented towards the geopolitical opponents of the Soviet Union, to gain the upper hand in Afghanistan. However, it was necessary not only to send troops to defend the people's republic, but also to change the Amin regime. At this time, Babrak Karmal, who arrived from Czechoslovakia, lived in Moscow. Taking into account the fact that he was very popular among members of the PDPA, the decision was made in his favor.

At Amin’s suggestion, in December 1979, two battalions were transferred from the USSR to strengthen the security of the residence of the head of state and the airfield in Bagram. Among the Soviet soldiers, Karmal also arrived, and until the end of the month he was among the Soviet soldiers in Bagram. Gradually, the leadership of the USSR came to the conclusion that without Soviet troops it would be impossible to create conditions for removing Amin from power.

At the beginning of December 1979, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, informed a narrow circle of trusted persons that a decision could be made in the near future to use the army in Afghanistan. The objections of the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov were not taken into account. On December 12, 1979, at the proposal of the Politburo commission of the CPSU Central Committee, which included Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko and Ponomarev, L. I. Brezhnev decided to provide military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan “by introducing a contingent of Soviet troops into its territory.” The leadership of the General Staff, headed by its chief N.V. Ogarkov, his first deputy Army General S.F. Akhromeev and the head of the Main Operations Directorate, Army General V.I. Varennikov, as well as the Commander-in-Chief Ground forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General I. G. Pavlovsky opposed this decision. They believed that the appearance of Soviet troops in Afghanistan would lead to increased insurgency in the country, which will be directed primarily against Soviet soldiers. Their opinion was not taken into account.

Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council There was no USSR or other government document on the deployment of troops. All orders were given verbally. Only in June 1980 the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee approved this decision. Initially, it was proposed that Soviet troops would only help local residents defend themselves from invading gangs from outside and provide humanitarian assistance. The troops were to be garrisoned in large populated areas, without being drawn into serious military conflicts. Thus, the presence of Soviet troops was supposed to stabilize the internal situation in the country and prevent interference external forces in the affairs of Afghanistan.

On December 24, 1979, at a meeting of the top leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Defense Minister Ustinov stated that a decision had been made to satisfy the request of the Afghan leadership to send Soviet troops into this country “in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring states..." On the same day, a directive was sent to the troops, which determined specific tasks for entry and deployment on the territory of Afghanistan.

Afghan war - civil war in Afghanistan 1979-2001, in which in 1979 - 1989. Soviet troops participated.

Crisis of the pro-Soviet regime

The crisis of the semi-feudal state in Afghanistan led to increasing political turmoil in the 1970s. The pro-communist coup of 1978 and radical anti-feudal reforms destabilized the situation in the country. Repressions against all those dissatisfied with the regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) met with armed resistance from the population of the country. The resistance movement began to grow, acting under the banner of Islam. The repression and the outbreak of war caused a flow of refugees to neighboring Pakistan. By the mid-1980s, their number reached more than 3 million people. Tens of thousands of them returned to Afghanistan with weapons supplied by NATO countries seeking to overthrow the PDPA regime.

The resistance to the communists was led by supporters Islamic State. The partisans were called fighters for the faith - Mujahideen.

Amin became the President of Afghanistan. In Moscow, Amin was seen as an unpredictable leader who could shift his focus to the United States or China to bring about an end to the war. Then a hostile state would arise at the borders of the USSR. To prevent this threat, the leaders of the Soviet Union decided to overthrow Amin, replace him with a more moderate leader Babarak Karmal, and at the same time a decision was made to introduce a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

After the entry of Soviet troops

April Revolution

In April 1978, a coup took place in Afghanistan, later called. Afghan communists came to power - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Events developed spontaneously. The impetus for the unrest was the April 17 assassination of a prominent PDPA figure, Mir Akbar Khaibar. Thousands of people took to the streets, demanding punishment for the killers and the resignation of the government. To stop the unrest, President Mohammed Daoud ordered the arrest of all PDPA leaders. The response to this was a military coup on April 27, during which Daoud was killed. The officers who overthrew him released the leaders of the PDPA from prison and transferred power to them. One of the leaders of the party, Hafizullah Amin, speaking from the armor of a tank immediately after the coup, with an impressive gesture showed the crowd his not yet removed

Thus, unexpectedly not only for the Soviet Union, but partly also for itself, the PDPA found itself in power. The government was headed by the writer Noor Mohammed Taraki, who carried out radical reforms: a ban on the activities of all political parties, land reform with confiscation of land, new marriage legislation. All this caused discontent among various segments of the population, who interpreted the reforms as an attack on sacred traditions and Islamic values. Already in June 1978, a split occurred in the party, which resulted in repression and persecution not only of the conspirators and their leader B. Karmal, but also of all those who disagree with the regime, primarily the clergy, which N. Taraki branded as “an obstacle to the progressive development of the country "

In foreign policy, Afghanistan begins to focus on the USSR and strengthens ties in a number of areas: Afghan students are sent to study in the USSR, a number of industrial facilities are being built in Afghanistan, and military-technical cooperation is expanding. At the same time, most countries in the region perceived the revolution in Kabul as a threat. Saudi Arabia regarded it as a “threat to Islam and the integrity of the Islamic world” and “communist expansion.” The United States initially reacted negatively to the events in Kabul, but continued diplomatic and even economic relations. However, after the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979 and the assassination of the American ambassador, the United States seeks to regain influence in the region and ceases all relations with Afghanistan, focusing on the USSR. Since that time, the United States began to provide assistance to the opposition along with Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan.

Intra-party struggle. Amin's rise to power

A few months later, a sharp struggle broke out within the ruling party. In August 1979, a confrontation broke out between two party leaders - Taraki and Amin. During a meeting in Moscow at highest level, Taraki was warned about a conspiracy being prepared against him, to which he asked for direct military assistance from the Soviet Union, but received a reasoned refusal. Upon Taraki's return to Afghanistan, there was an unsuccessful attempt on Amin's life, during which he was killed by his personal adjutant. After this, Taraki was removed from his post, expelled from the party and taken into custody. Soon the former prime minister died - according to the official report, “after a serious long-term illness.” According to other accounts, he was killed by suffocation with pillows. New mass repressions began against his supporters and other dissidents. All these events, especially the death of Taraki, caused discontent in Moscow. The mass “cleansings” and executions that began in Afghanistan among the party community caused condemnation. At the same time, the ill-conceived agrarian reform brought only negative results; discontent was brewing in the army, which led to armed uprisings and cases of mass desertion and defection to the opposition.

Opposition illegal parties and organizations also began to appear in different parts of the country. In Peshawar (Pakistan), with the patronage of the country's authorities, a number of parties were formed, including those with a pronounced Islamic orientation. Through the efforts of these parties, military camps were created in 1978 to train rebels for the purpose of fighting in Afghanistan. For many years, these camps would become a kind of base where the rebels could freely hide from Soviet and Afghan forces, replenish supplies and weapons, reorganize and launch attacks again. In addition, it was quite easy to get reinforcements from the ranks of the numerous refugees who flooded Afghanistan. As a result, by the end of 1979, large-scale hostilities broke out in the country, with armed clashes already taking place in 18 of the 26 provinces of Afghanistan. The critical situation in the country forced H. Amin to repeatedly seek military assistance from the Soviet Union.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

The attitude towards the ruling regime in the Soviet leadership was ambiguous; radical reforms, accompanied by mass repressions, pushed many away from power. The proximity of China also alarmed the USSR, due to the struggle between countries for leadership in the socialist movement. In response to requests from the “legitimate government of Afghanistan”, and referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right of states to self-defense against “external aggression”, December 25, 1979 The USSR launched an armed invasion of Afghanistan. The decision on this issue was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - D. Ustinov, A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov and K. Chernenko. A plan has also matured to eliminate the independent and authoritarian-prone Amin as a protege of the USSR. On December 27, there was an assault on the Taj Beg presidential palace, prepared by the KGB and the GRU, during which H. Amin was killed by a grenade explosion. After this, Soviet troops began to occupy all the most important points of the capital, meeting resistance in the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Most of the barracks containing Afghan forces were blocked off. They also took the Puli-Charkhi prison, from which they freed opponents of the regime who were awaiting imminent execution. Among them was Taraki's widow. Thus ended the hundred-day reign of H. Amin.

Babraka Karmal, who fled to Czechoslovakia in 1978 and then found refuge in the USSR, became Moscow’s protégé. At 19 o'clock from Dushanbe, on the frequencies of Kabul radio, his appeal to the people was heard, in which he announced the overthrow of Amin and proclaimed himself Secretary General parties. At night, Kabul Radio broadcast: “The revolutionary court sentenced the traitor Hafizullah Amin to death. The sentence has been carried out." The fighting in the city, which began around 6 p.m., subsided by the morning of December 28. It seemed military operation successfully completed. At the same time, the presence of Soviet troops and their participation in the coup was kept silent. B. Karmal tried to normalize the situation in Afghan society: about 10 thousand party members were released from prison, in 1980 he raised a new national flag over the presidential palace, returning its traditional colors - black, red and green - instead of the entirely red one established by Taraki and Amin in October 1978, the rights of believers and the clergy were confirmed, and private property was secured. In 1981, measures were taken to adjust the land reform; the government promised to compensate for the confiscated land.

Soviet newspapers now called Hafizullah Amin a “CIA agent” and wrote about the “bloody clique of Amin and his henchmen.” In the West, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan caused violent protests, since Amin was the head of state recognized in the world, and his murder was perceived as an act of direct aggression. On January 14, 1980, the UN General Assembly demanded the withdrawal of “foreign troops” from Afghanistan. 104 states voted for this decision. More than 50 countries decided to boycott the Summer Olympics held in Moscow.

Civil War in Afghanistan

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan itself, armed resistance to Soviet troops began to intensify. It was, of course, not Amin’s supporters who fought against them, but opponents of the revolutionary government in general. Many were outraged by the unexpected arrests of the most different people- from mullahs to traders. But the authority is even stronger new government undermined by land reform. The government tried to take land from tribal leaders. Villagers took up arms in defense of their usual way of life. At first, the Soviet press claimed that there were no battles in Afghanistan, and that peace and tranquility reigned there. However, the war did not subside, and when this became clear, the USSR admitted that “bandits were rampaging” in the republic. Supporters of B. Karmal dubbed them “dushmans” (enemies). Meanwhile, the struggle unfolded according to all the rules of guerrilla warfare. To destroy the rebels, Soviet troops began to attack villages that served as their support. As a result, over 5 million Afghans - about a third of the country's population - moved to Iran and Pakistan. The rebels controlled large parts of Afghanistan. All of them were united by the slogan of jihad - the holy Islamic war. They called themselves “Mujahideen” - fighters for the faith. Otherwise, the rebel groups' programs varied widely. Some spoke out under the slogans of revolutionary Islam, others supported King Zahir Shah, who was overthrown in 1973. The diversity of rebel groups also reflected the diversity of peoples and tribes in Afghanistan.

The “limited contingent” of Soviet troops (40th Army) was not ready for a long war with partisans, which covered more and more regions of the country. Soviet troops captured Mujahideen bases and suffered heavy losses while storming the passes. But the partisans went to Pakistan and Iran along mountain paths, replenished their ranks, and returned again. It was impossible to block all mountain roads. The PDPA army fought against its compatriots reluctantly. The army had a problem with conscripts (most of them were from Kabul, the rest of the regions were not actually subordinate to the central authorities) and with the unity of command, torn apart by internal contradictions. If earlier the Soviet people, or “Shuravi” as they were called, were treated friendly in Afghanistan, now the majority of the population is hostile. Leaders of the Islamic opposition called on Afghans to start jihad not only against the Kabul regime, but also against the “Soviet aggressor.” In 1985, most of the opposition parties based in Peshawar merged. Assistance from the United States and Saudi Arabia increased year by year. Thousands of Arab mercenaries are heading to Afghanistan. The opposition has created its own military-political structure in most of Afghanistan - local authorities called emirates or Islamic committees, fronts and armed formations.

The war in Afghanistan became one of the most difficult foreign policy crises that the USSR faced in the 80s. Moscow was forced to increase military power its “limited contingent”, the number of which during this period reached 120 thousand people. This caused a corresponding reaction from the United States and its allies, who methodically expanded the scale of military and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan opposition. However, none of the opposing sides in Afghanistan was able to achieve a decisive turning point. A deadlock situation has arisen. For both the Soviet leadership and its Afghan ally, it became increasingly obvious that other forms and means of breaking the deadlock should be sought besides the military path. In 1982, on the initiative of Moscow, Afghan-Pakistani negotiations began in Geneva on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem under the auspices of the UN and with the participation of the USSR and the USA. However, in subsequent years The White house, hiding behind peace-loving declarations, in fact slowed down the negotiation process. After coming to power, the opinion prevailed in the Soviet leadership about the urgent need to withdraw troops. B. Karmal objected to this. Under pressure from Moscow, Kabul was required to change the political system in Afghanistan in order to expand its social support, but B. Karmal was not going to share power and in 1986 he was removed from all posts.

Najibullah's rise to power

In June 1987, the first, so far symbolic, steps towards establishing peace were taken. The new Kabul government led by a program of “national reconciliation”, which included a ceasefire, an invitation to the opposition to dialogue and the formation of a coalition government. Efforts were made to revive the multi-party system. In April 1988, multi-party elections were held with numerous violations; part of the opposition boycotted them. However, the multi-party system proclaimed by President Najibullah turned out to be a missed chance for the regime - not a single opposition figure entered either parliament or the government. At the same time, steps were taken to win over independent field commanders, they were provided with material assistance, weapons were transferred, and partly this bore fruit. On April 14, 1988 in Geneva, representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA in the presence Secretary General The UN signed an agreement on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged not to interfere in each other's affairs, and the United States pledged not to support the armed struggle against the Najibullah regime. The Soviet Union committed to withdrawing troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. On this day, the direct participation of the USSR in the Afghan War ceased. He lost 14,453 people killed; 417 military personnel went missing and were captured.

The USSR continued to provide support to the Najibullah regime, but after the collapse of the country in 1991, all assistance ceased, and in April 1992, the Najibullah regime fell. Armed Mujahideen detachments entered Kabul. However, the struggle in the country did not stop there - interethnic clashes began in Kabul and other cities of the country between Mujahideen groups, which were later called a “civil war.” In 1996, the Taliban came to power in Kabul.

The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked a crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet military personnel, the appearance of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, aggravated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military expenditures exorbitant for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The true causes of the war lay in the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, and the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth due to the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

In the region, from the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which in abundance began to spread everywhere. The political divide in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow mistakenly imagined, but along religious lines.

The introduction of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States, as the arena of some kind of “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow’s misunderstanding of its national interests, incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in one’s own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, political myopia.

In Afghanistan, the inadequacy of the goals and methods of the Soviet foreign policy the real state of affairs in the world.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by increased instability in the Middle East, which was a consequence of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. 1979 turned out to be a particularly stormy year: the leader Arab world Egypt concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes a storm of indignation in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is looking for a reason to armed conflict and finds it in the war with Iran; Syria led by Assad (the elder) is provoking civil war in Lebanon, which Iran is being drawn into; Libya, under the leadership of Gaddafi, sponsors various terrorist groups; The center-left government in Turkey resigns.

The situation in peripheral Afghanistan is also becoming radicalized. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a “client” of the USSR in anticipation of financial, economic and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. For all the decades that have passed since then, one cannot find in Soviet history mentioning Afghanistan in a negative context. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West tacitly recognized this fact and was never interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from monarchy to republic in 1973 as a result palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April “revolution” of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. The leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many of the participants in the coup were well known in Moscow - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) closely communicated and worked with them.

It seemed that Moscow had lost nothing from the regime change. However, the “socialists” repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures caused resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the “socialists” steadily narrowed. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began sending groups of their military personnel in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as supporting the opposition with weapons. China has shown activity. At the same time, the historical and previously existing contradictions between the leaders of the “socialists” intensified.

As a result, just a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more of the 34 provinces remained under its control.

March 18, 1979 Taraki in a long telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin explains the current situation and persistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. In every word of Taraki one can see despair, a consciousness of hopelessness. He returns every question from the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send in troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin is perplexed as to why you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin’s naive, ideologically driven proposals to rely on the “workers,” Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet prime minister proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls the several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told almost the same thing to the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his Politburo colleagues about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly common-sense considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean a war with the population. It seems that there is a reason to review or at least adjust the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, etc. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin proposed to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send in troops. Then the question had to be answered: what to do in the event of the imminent fall of the regime, which is what the regime itself warns about? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of wait-and-see and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

Three groups are gradually being identified in the Politburo: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The sick Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on the problems that need to be solved. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making relevant decisions.

Throughout the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increased pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help with troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, was heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin occurs in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power and removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since then, Moscow has set itself the goal of eliminating Amin, whom it does not trust, bringing “its” man, Karmal, to power and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these in themselves reasonable actions, but carried out without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are viewed as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to remove Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, issues of a special operation by Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, the cover for which should be a second, parallel and subordinate operation to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with Amin’s support among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin, were replaced with new ones.

By December 1, the work on the issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note to this effect. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the deployment of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, his boss actively resisted him General Staff Marshal N. Ogarkov. It came to the point of his open clashes and wrangling in raised voices with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the area, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and great losses, that these actions will weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border or crossing the border either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was removed and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. Troops gradually began to be brought in - more and more.

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Afghan casualties

On June 7, 1988, in his speech at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, the President of Afghanistan M. Najibullah said that “from the beginning of hostilities in 1978 to the present” (that is, until June 7, 1988), 243.9 thousand people have died in the country. military personnel of government forces, security agencies, government officials and civilians, including 208.2 thousand men, 35.7 thousand women and 20.7 thousand children under 10 years of age; Another 77 thousand people were injured, including 17.1 thousand women and 900 children under the age of 10 years.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to a researcher of the Afghan war from the United States, Professor M. Kramer: “During nine years of war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

Ahmad Shah Massoud, in his letter to the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Yu. Vorontsov dated September 2, 1989, wrote that the Soviet Union’s support for the PDPA led to the death of more than 1.5 million Afghans, and 5 million people became refugees.

According to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, between 1980 and 1990, the total mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan was 614,000 people. Moreover, during this period there was a decrease in the mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan compared to previous and subsequent periods.

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was a flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 suffered losses in military equipment, in particular, 362 tanks, 804 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 120 aircraft, 169 helicopters were lost.

USSR losses

Total - 13,835 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper on August 17, 1989. Subsequently, the total figure increased slightly. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

• Soviet Army - 14,427
• KGB - 576 (including 514 border troops)
• Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick.

According to Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not take into account military personnel who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.

In a study conducted by officers of the General Staff under the leadership of prof. Valentin Runova, provides an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in battle, those who died from wounds and illnesses, and those killed as a result of accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

By official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 military personnel were captured and went missing (of which 130 were released before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan). The Geneva Agreements of 1988 did not stipulate the conditions for the release of Soviet prisoners. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiations for the release of Soviet prisoners continued through the mediation of the DRA and Pakistani governments:

• Thus, on November 28, 1989, on the territory of Pakistan, in the city of Peshawar, two Soviet soldiers, Andrei Lopukh and Valery Prokopchuk, were handed over to representatives of the USSR, in exchange for their release the DRA government released 8 previously arrested militants (5 Afghans, 2 Saudi citizens and 1 Palestinian ) and 25 Pakistani citizens detained in Afghanistan

The fate of those captured was different, but an indispensable condition for preserving life was their adoption of Islam. At one time, the uprising in the Pakistani Badaber camp, near Peshewar, received wide resonance, where on April 26, 1985, a group of Soviet and Afghan captured soldiers tried to free themselves by force, but died in an unequal battle. In 1983, in the United States, through the efforts of Russian emigrants, the Committee for the Rescue of Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan was created. Representatives of the Committee managed to meet with the leaders of the Afghan opposition and convince them to release some Soviet prisoners of war, mainly those who expressed a desire to remain in the West (about 30 people, according to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Of these, three people, after the statement by the USSR Prosecutor General that former prisoners would not be subject to criminal prosecution, returned to the Soviet Union. There are known cases when soviet soldiers voluntarily went over to the side of the Mujahideen and then participated in hostilities against the Soviet Army.

In March 1992, the Russian-American Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing Persons was created, during which the United States provided Russia with information about the fate of 163 Russian citizens missing in Afghanistan.

Number of dead Soviet generals According to press publications, the number of deaths is usually four; in some cases, the figure is 5 dead in Afghanistan.

Losses in equipment, according to widespread official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (helicopter losses were only 40- th Army, excluding helicopters of the border troops and the Central Asian Military District). At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc. It should be noted that the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments, General Lieutenant V.S. Korolev gives other, higher figures for losses in equipment. In particular, according to his data, Soviet troops in 1980-1989, 385 tanks and 2,530 units of armored personnel carriers, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and infantry fighting vehicles were irretrievably lost (rounded figures).

Read more: List of USSR Air Force aircraft losses in the Afghan War

Read more: List of losses of Soviet helicopters in the Afghan War

Costs and expenses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. Ryzhkov formed a group of economists who, together with specialists from various ministries and departments, were supposed to calculate the cost of this war for the Soviet Union. The results of the work of this commission are unknown. According to General Boris Gromov, “Probably, even incomplete statistics turned out to be so stunning that they did not dare to make them public. Obviously, today no one is able to name an exact figure that could characterize the expenses of the Soviet Union for the maintenance of the Afghan revolution.”

Losses of other states

Pakistan Air Force lost 1 combat aircraft in air combat. Also, according to the Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

The Iranian Air Force lost 2 combat helicopters in air battles.