After the collapse of the Soviet Union, hardly anyone seriously expected that Russia would be able to present the world with a new main battle tank in just a couple of years. Nevertheless, it happened, and for more than two decades the T-90 tank has been a star, a topic of heated discussion, both among experts and among amateurs.

Propaganda-oriented sources immediately rushed to declare it superior in all respects to its possible competitors. Skeptics declared the T-90 deliberately outdated. The actual absence of this combat vehicle among the troops and the promise of designers from competing factories to provide more advanced models () added fuel to the fire. Now that operating experience has been accumulated, it is already possible to draw conclusions about who was right.

Brief history of creation

Armored vehicle fleet Soviet troops in the eighties it was diverse. In service at the same time were: the first-born of the Soviet MBT T-64, a cheaper and more technologically advanced competitor to the T-72, a representative with a gas turbine engine, and its diesel “relative” T-80UD, and these are just the main ones.

In addition to them, the modernized “old men” T-55 and T-62 also remained in service.

The T-80 was considered the most modern and efficient - at the same time it turned out to be expensive and difficult to manufacture and operate. In 1988, work began to bring the reliable and trouble-free T-72 to the required efficiency.

In the spring of 1991, the experimental “Object 188” was recommended for adoption.

It was supposed to be called “T-72BU”, but it never made it into the Soviet army. It became the newest vehicle of the Russian army, and was christened T-90.

The name change is associated with the desire of Russian President B. Yeltsin to have a completely new tank. It is also possible that after the war with Iraq in 1991, the reputation of the T-72 was seriously tarnished, and the new designation could help sell the equipment for export.

Tank structure

The T-90 hull is welded from armor sheets, the turret of early models is cast. The length of the hull (without a gun) is 6.8 m. Later modifications had welded turrets. The frontal armor of the hull (upper part) is made of combined armor, installed at an angle of 680. The sides, 70-80 mm thick, are vertical, without slope. This is higher than most analogues (although it protects equally poorly from being hit by an armor-piercing projectile).

The sides are covered with rubber-fabric screens, partially with dynamic protection units. For additional protection, it is possible to install anti-cumulative grilles, which are widespread in last decade.

In the design of the T-90 turret, combined armor is used to protect the frontal projection, and partially the sides and roof.

The height reaches 2.2 meters, and the T-90 weighs about 46 tons.

The system was installed on the T-90 active protection"Curtain". If it is irradiated by a guidance laser, the Shtora notifies the crew about this and fires aerosol grenades. The resulting smoke screen not only camouflages the tank visually, but also scatters the laser beam.

The first dynamic protection that appeared on the T-90 was designated “Contact-5”. It did not protect against tandem charges and did not improve resistance against armor-piercing shells. The newest model of the Relikt defense complex, which the T-90AM received, reduces the armor penetration of enemy shells by 40% and protects against heavy ATGMs with a tandem charge. In addition, modernized blocks for the Contact system raise its efficiency to almost a “relic” level.

The dense layout has a negative impact on survivability - fuel tanks have to be placed in the fighting compartment. However, in later modifications they were isolated from the crew by steel bulkheads. The automatic loader remains vulnerable - it is located behind the weakly protected side directly under the crew. We can say that the commander and weapon operator are sitting on the shots.

Crew accommodation has remained unchanged since the introduction of the T-64. The driver's seat is located in the front center of the body. The gunner is located on the left half of the turret, and the tank commander is located to the right of the gun.

The T-90 inherited the power plant from the T-72.

This is a multi-fuel 12-cylinder diesel V-84MS with a volume of 38.8 liters and developing 840 hp. In the T-90A modification, the engine was replaced with an improved version of the B-92, based on the same block. Its power reaches 1000 hp. With. The transmission is 7-speed and includes separate planetary gearboxes. Hydraulic drives are used to facilitate control. The T-90 has a torsion bar suspension and hydraulic shock absorbers.

T-90 armament

The main caliber of the tank is the “traditional” 125mm Rapier cannon for Soviet and then Russian vehicles. The T-90 received its version 2A46M-5, the accuracy of which (compared to older versions) was increased by 15-20%. The gun stabilizer was two-plane.


The carousel-type automatic loader was inherited from the T-72, but can now be controlled from the commander’s seat. There are 22 shots placed in the “carousel”, the rest (up to 43 in total) are placed in stowages in the body. The crew either loads the gun itself with them, or can reload the automatic loader.

To destroy enemy armored vehicles, the T-90 uses armor-piercing sub-caliber projectiles, for example, 3BM46 with a uranium core. The effective range when firing such projectiles is up to 3000 m. The loading system of the T-90S tank has been redesigned and allows the use of the latest high elongation projectiles, such as 3BM60. To increase the effectiveness of hitting infantry in shelters, a fragmentation projectile with the possibility of detonation in the air and ready-made submunitions was developed.

An alternative to sub-caliber “blanks” can be the 3BK31 cumulative projectile, the triple warhead of which can overcome double dynamic protection.
The T-90 can launch guided missiles through its gun barrel. The laser-guided 9M119M Invar ATGM has a tandem cumulative warhead with armor penetration (normal) up to 700 mm. The ammunition can be supplemented with missiles with high-explosive and thermobaric charges. The missiles will allow you to hit a moving target at distances of up to 5000 m.

The cannon, as on previous tanks, is paired with a 7.62mm PKT machine gun.

Its ammunition capacity is eight 250-round cartridge belts, and its practical rate of fire is up to 250 rounds per minute. The first production vehicles had a remote-controlled large-caliber anti-aircraft gun. Later it was replaced with a similar one in appearance, but different in design.

Electronic equipment

The Irtysh fire control system was inherited from early tanks from its predecessor, the T-80. But the already modified T-90A tank received a new fire control system (FCS) 1A42. It includes an aiming and rangefinder guidance device (combining a laser rangefinder with a sight) and an automatic electronic ballistic computer 1B528-1.


The T01-K04 observation device makes it possible to fire not only from an anti-aircraft machine gun, but also from the main gun. At night, it can operate in both passive and active (with target illumination by an IR illuminator) mode.

In subsequent series the control system was modernized, and modifications of the AM(SM) tank received the latest system"Kalina". This multifunctional complex combines not only sights and computers - it integrates the tank into the electronic battalion control system, increasing the efficiency of interaction with other armored vehicles and infantry.

Thermal imagers of early machines were early models and were significantly inferior to similar foreign ones.

On later series (and some export versions), French-made thermal imagers were installed. For communication, the R-163-50U radio station operating in the VHF range is used. Commander models received, in addition, a shortwave radio with a range of up to 50 km.

Performance characteristics

The table shows the technical characteristics of the T-90A, as the most common model, and its closest analogues and competitors.

T-90ALeopard 2A6MChallenger 2
Length/Width, mm9530/3780 6670/3700 11570/3520
Combat weight, t46,5 68,5 62,5
Crew, man3 4 4
Main weapons, ammunition125mm smoothbore gun 2A46M-5, 43 rounds120mm smoothbore gun Rh-120, 42 rounds120 rifled gun L30E4, 52 rounds
Automatic loaderEat- -
Auxiliary weapons1 x 7.62 mm PKT machine gun, 1 x 12.7 mm KORD machine gun2 x 7.62 mm MG3 machine guns2 x 7.62 mm L94 and L37 machine guns
Guided weaponsReflex-M- -
SuspensionTorsion barTorsion barHydropneumatic
engine's type12-cylinder diesel V-92S212-cylinder diesel MB 87312-cylinder diesel CV-12
Power plant power, l. With.1000 1500 1200
Maximum speed, km/h70 72 56
Cruising range, km (on highway)550 550 400

According to the figures, the Russian tank is equal to its competitors in terms of speed and reserve. In terms of strategic mobility, it is superior due to its lower weight and dimensions, making it easier to transport. It is possible that a more advanced Leclerc automatic loader could give it some advantages in battle due to its high rate of fire.


It is also worth mentioning that the T-90’s loading system had to be modified to allow the use of new shells (of greater length), limiting the combat capabilities of early tanks.

The advantage of Russian tanks (not only the T-90) is the presence of a standard fragmentation projectile.

Most Western competitors consider a cumulative fragmentation projectile to be a “multipurpose” ammunition, while the British still use armor-piercing high-explosive ones. On the other hand, the Americans developed both grapeshot and concrete-piercing shells for the Abrams.

Guided weapons are still not widely used (one can only name the Israeli LAHAT missiles). At the same time, there are still no known cases when a tank had to use an ATGM in battle.

Modifications

The T-90 linear tanks were followed by a command version - the T-90K, equipped with an additional radio station and navigation system. Since 2004, deliveries of the T-90A with a more powerful engine, reinforced armor and improved thermal imagers began. In 2006, this tank also received a command version, the T-90AK, also with more powerful radio navigation equipment.


The “Breakthrough” project led to the appearance of seriously redesigned T-90 tanks. The T-90AM modification turret received a compartment to accommodate additional ammunition. Other changes include a steering wheel instead of control levers and a transmission that automatically changes gears.

And the T-90M version received a new 2A82 cannon and a different layout - the fuel tanks and ammunition were moved to increase survivability.

Separately, it is worth mentioning tanks created specifically for export. The T-90S and T-90SK were generally similar to the original T-90, but the Shtora system searchlights were not installed on them. The T-90SA and T-90SKA models were produced especially for Algeria. Modified for licensed assembly in India, the T-90 even received its own name “Bishma”.


The newest tank for export deliveries received the T-90SM index, and according to its data corresponds to the T-90AM tank. The T-90 chassis was used to build engineering equipment: artillery “self-propelled guns” and MLRS. The original “Fire Support Combat Vehicle”, which covers tanks in battle, deserves special mention.

Use in battles and traces in the history of tank building

There are statements about T-90s participating in the first campaign in Chechnya, but there is no documentary evidence of this. But his participation in the Syrian conflict is a fact. T-90 tanks of the Russian army are used in Syria.

For more than two years, only 2 tanks were lost, and 2 more were disabled.

A video has become famous showing a T-90 remaining intact after its turret was hit by a TOW missile. But a published photo of a T-90 with a torn off turret proves that the ammunition rack remains its vulnerable zone.


Perhaps it would be correct to say that the T-90 itself is “a mark in the history of tank building.” The trail left behind by the ideas first materialized in the T-64. The T-90 absorbed all the best from its predecessors - the reliability of the T-72, the technical “advancement” of the T-80.

The T-90 tank became the best and most powerful vehicle in this development ladder. And at the same time marked its completion, when it was fully developed. At the same time, in terms of its combat qualities, the T-90 continues to remain at a high level, and is not in danger of being removed from service soon.

It’s very easy to criticize the T-90, calling it “just a modernization of the T-72.” But both the Abrams and the Leopard are not new tanks at all, but modifications of “themselves” from 30 years ago.

Irony: if the tank had retained the T-72BU designation, no one would have claimed that the old vehicle was being passed off as a new one.

Of course, the T-90 was not intended for counter-guerrilla wars, but, firstly, none of its competitors (with the exception, perhaps) were also intended for these purposes. Secondly, in Syria the T-90 shows itself with dignity. And the continuity of the design ensured the possibility of producing the tank in difficult years for the country. Today it is among the best examples of tanks, and this is indisputable.

Video

The T-90S missile and gun tank was put into service in 1993. The T-90 missile and gun tanks are a new generation of Russian tanks, which includes original design developments and the best layout and design solutions of the T-72 and T-80 tanks. The T-90S tank was created on the basis of a thorough study and understanding of the tactics and strategy of using tanks in real conditions of modern combat, taking into account many years of experience in the military operation of T-72 type tanks in various countries around the world, as well as the results of many years of intensive testing in the most severe conditions. The T-90S tank retains a feature of domestic tank construction - the classic layout scheme, in which the main armament is located in a rotating turret, the power plant and transmission are in the rear of the hull, and the crew is separated: the tank commander and gunner are in the fighting compartment, the driver is in management department. Almost every component or system of the T-90S tank has a new quality.

The automated fire control system is designed to conduct effective targeted fire at long ranges with artillery shells and a guided projectile from a tank gun on the move and from a standstill at moving and stationary targets by the gunner and commander, day and night, as well as from a coaxial machine gun. Provides an increase in effective firing range and an increase in vision range at night, including through the installation of a television sight in the tank. A guided weapon complex with a laser-beam control channel allows firing a guided missile through the gun barrel from a standstill and on the move at stationary and moving targets at ranges from 100 to 5000 m. An optical-electronic suppression complex protects the tank from being hit by anti-tank guided projectiles with semi-automatic guidance systems with tracer feedback. A system for automatic all-round visibility, detection and protection of a tank from anti-tank shells with semi-automatic laser homing heads ensures interference with anti-tank weapon control systems with laser rangefinders and target designators. Closed anti-aircraft gun allows the commander to conduct targeted fire using remote control drives at air targets, and in a stabilized mode, at ground targets, while remaining under reliable armor protection. Built-in dynamic protection is effective against armor-piercing sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles. The combination of built-in dynamic protection and multi-layer armor gives the tank additional capabilities to survive in extreme combat conditions.

The main armament of the T-90S is a 125 mm smoothbore gun with increased accuracy and high ballistics. The use of an automatic loader made it possible to achieve a high rate of fire (up to 7-8 rounds per minute), which distinguishes the T-90S tank from most foreign tanks. The capabilities of the tank gun to combat ground-based armored and low-flying air targets have been expanded through the use of a guided weapon system, which makes it possible to destroy any most modern tank before it comes within range of effective firing from its gun.

The tank is traditionally equipped with a diesel engine, the main advantages of which compared to a gas turbine engine, especially in hot climates and sandy soils, are:

Slight power drop when high temperatures environment;
- high reliability in dusty conditions;
- 1.8-2 times lower fuel consumption.

The T-90S main tank can overcome water obstacles up to 5 m deep along the bottom with non-stop combat missions after overcoming the water obstacle. The vehicle has built-in equipment for self-digging, a device for attaching mine trawls and can be transported by all types of transport.

Performance characteristics
Combat weight, t 46.5
Crew 3
Multi-fuel diesel engine,
liquid cooling
power, kW (hp) 735 (1000)
specific power, kW(hp)/t 15.8 (21.5)
Weapons:

125 mm smoothbore gun 2A46M,
automatic loading
rate of fire, rds/min. up to 8
type of shot: armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative,
high explosive, guided missile
machine gun coaxial with a 7.62 mm PKTM cannon
anti-aircraft weapons 12.7 mm Kord machine gun
Ammunition, pcs.:
shots to the cannon
(including in the automatic loader) 43 (22)
cartridges 7.62/12.7 2000/300
9K119 Reflex guided weapon system
Maximum firing range, m 5000
Fire control system, daytime sight-rangefinder, device
built-in sight alignment control,
gunner's night sight
(electro-optical or thermal imaging)
Tank target identification range, m up to 3000 (thermal imaging channel)
Two-plane stabilizer
Sighting and observation
commander complex:
tank type target identification range, m:
at night 700-1200
during the day 4000-10000
Protection combined armor, built-in
dynamic protection, complex
active protection "Arena"
Smoke grenade launch systems, protection against weapons of mass destruction,
automatic software
Length with gun forward, mm 9530
Tower roof height, mm 2230
Speed, km/h:
average on dry dirt road 40-45
maximum 60
Cruising range on the highway, km 550
Fuel tank capacity, l 1200+400
Fordable
(with preliminary preparation), m 1.2 (1.8)
Overcoming water obstacle with OPVT, m up to 5
Means of communication:
VHF radio station R-163-50U
VHF receiver R-163-UP

The T-90 was also successful in the international arena - today it is the most commercially successful and best-selling Russian tank in the world. Currently, the T-90 is in export version in service with India, Algeria, Uganda, and Turkmenistan. As of 2012, the total production of T-90s was at least 1,335 tanks.

The history of the T-90 began under the USSR - in the mid-80s. Then, in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and in the Ministry of Defense Industry (MOD) of the USSR, a completely sensible idea prevailed about the need to develop a single Soviet army promising main tank. With its adoption, an extremely distinctive period of Soviet tank building was supposed to end, when factories were simultaneously producing two or three types of main tanks - T-64, T-72 and T-80. They were similar in combat characteristics, but differed significantly in design, which extremely complicated the process of their operation among the troops due to the de-standardization of the tank fleet. In accordance with the Government Decree “On measures to create a new tank” issued on February 7, 1986, the Kharkov T-80UD was to serve as the basis for it. It was an improved “eighty” with a compact two-stroke diesel engine 6TD instead of the expensive and power-hungry gas turbine GTD-1000. Gradually, the T-80UD would replace other types of tanks in the army.

It was assumed that the “highlight” of the promising vehicle would be only the computerized control system for units and subunits, which was then becoming fashionable, and brought down to a separate tank. However, while the promising tank was just a “pie in the sky”, the question arose of what to do with the “birds in the hand” - the numerous main tanks in the army, the combat characteristics of which no longer met the requirements of the time. This primarily applied to the T-72 early modifications. It is no secret that this tank was a variant of a combat vehicle for the mobilization period, and its design was simplified as much as possible for mass production and operation by poorly trained personnel.

This is partly why “seventy-twos” were widely supplied abroad to the Middle East and African countries, and licenses for their production were sold to the Warsaw Pact allies - Poland and Czechoslovakia. The main disadvantage of the T-72 was considered to be its primitive, albeit reliable 1A40 sighting system, which no longer provided the effective fire required from modern tanks. The fact is that although the 1A40 complex measured the range to the target and determined the lateral lead angles (for a moving target), however, the introduction of corrections to the aiming angle for: deviation of the ambient air temperature, charge temperature, atmospheric pressure from normal, as well as a drop in the initial velocity of the projectile as a result of wear of the gun barrel, it was necessary to enter only manually before firing. The instructions described the introduction of amendments as follows: “The tank commander, if information is available (!), determines the amendments using the nomograms located on the right side of the gun panel and transmits the resulting value to the gunner.” Those. almost “hand to eye”.

It was necessary to “pull up” the characteristics of the “seventy-two” to a level not lower than the T-80U and, first of all, increase the firepower. It must be said that similar events have already been carried out by the Soviet defense industry. In the early 80s, a similar program to improve fire efficiency and protection was implemented for the T-55 medium tanks. The result was a modification of the T-55AM, the combat effectiveness of which corresponded to the level of the early T-64 and T-72. To do this, a new sight, laser rangefinder, and ballistic computer were installed on the T-55AM, and some of the vehicles received the Bastion guided weapon system. On July 19, 1986, a Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, which entrusted the Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering (UKBTM) with work on the topic “Improving the T-72B”, or, more simply, bringing it to the level of the more advanced Soviet tanks T-80U and T-80UD.

The start of work on this resolution coincided with a change in the management of UKBTM - chief designer V.N. Venediktov, who headed the design bureau for almost two decades after L.N. Kartsev, retired, and V.I. was appointed in his place. Potkin. To increase the firepower of the T-72B, it was necessary to equip it with a modern, effective fire control system (FCS). To speed up work, reduce the cost of modernization and increase the degree of unification of domestic tanks, UKBTM designers decided to use the 1A45 Irtysh fire control system, already tested on the T-80U and T-80UD tanks, for the modernized “seventy-two”. It was modified to function together with the automatic loader of the T-72 tank (the loading mechanism of the T-80 was significantly different from the automatic loader of the T-72, in the first the shells were placed horizontally and the charges vertically, in the second - both were horizontal). The modified fire control system was designated 1A45T.

In January 1989, a prototype version of the modernized T-72, which received the internal designation “Object 188,” entered the state testing stage. In various official documents and in external correspondence, the vehicle was referred to first as the T-72BM (modernized), and later as the T-72BU (improved) - in all likelihood, the word “modernized” sounded too simple to the UVZ management. In the USSR, testing new military equipment was taken very seriously. So, in the 70s, to test various types of tanks, runs of up to 10 thousand km were organized in various regions of the USSR. Tankers and designers jokingly called them “star runs.” It was no longer possible to organize such a large-scale event during Gorbachev’s perestroika, but nevertheless, four prototypes of the “Object 188” were tested for about a year in various climatic conditions, including at the Uralvagonzavod testing grounds in Siberia, as well as in the Moscow, Kemerovo and Dzhambul regions. The vehicles, modified based on the test results, were once again driven through testing grounds, and at the end, to determine the level of security, one vehicle was shot.

According to the recollections of A. Bakhmetov, a participant in these tests, at first a landmine corresponding to the most powerful anti-tank mines of foreign countries was placed under one of the tracks, but after the explosion the vehicle was brought back into working order by the crew within the required time, then the tank was subjected to brutal shell fire at “ weak points. The tank successfully passed tests, and on March 27, 1991, by a joint decision of the USSR Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Defense, the “Object 188” was recommended for adoption by the Soviet Army. However, just six months later, neither the Soviet Army nor the Soviet Union itself disappeared, and the prospects for mass production of the improved T-72B became very vague. However, despite the difficult economic situation, the management of Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM managed to push through the decision to accept the improved T-72 for service already Russian Army. During this struggle for production, in order to emphasize the “Russian” origin of the tank and disassociate itself from the era of the “stagnant” USSR, the idea arose to change the name of the tank from the trivial improved-modernization T-72BU to something more sonorous and original. Initially, the name T-88 was proposed (obviously, by analogy with the object index 188). But fate decreed otherwise.

On October 5, 1992, by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 759-58, “Object 188” was adopted by the Russian Army, but under the name T-90. According to one version, the President of Russia personally ordered that the tank be given this name. The same decree allowed the sale abroad of the export modification of the T-90S. T-90MS commander's workplace: 1 - video viewing device; 2 - multifunctional panel; 3 - all-round viewing prisms; 4 - internal communication and switching equipment; 5 - controls and indications for matching the commander’s sight with prism instruments; 6 - commander's sight control panel; 7 - control panel for the backup sight; 8 - commander's console; 9 - air conditioner cooling unit; 10 - automatic loader loading panel Serial production of the T-90 began at Uralvagonzavod in November of the same year, but, unlike Soviet times, when tanks were produced in the hundreds, the annual production volumes of the T-90 were only in the dozens. The T-90 was the first Russian tank in technological terms. It was necessary to restore production cooperation, destroyed after the collapse of the USSR, within the framework of the Russian defense industry alone. In total, from 1992 to 1998 (when production of the T-90 was suspended), about 120 vehicles were built. And the point here is not that Uralvagonzavod was unable to launch large-scale production, but that the Russian military did not have enough funds to purchase weapons in these troubled times. The first T-90s were sent to a unit stationed closer to the manufacturing plant - the 821st Taganrog Red Banner Order of Suvorov motorized rifle division of the Siberian Military District, where they were formed into a tank regiment. Later, T-90s also ended up in the 5th Guards Don Tank Division in Buryatia (up to a battalion).

What was the T-90 model of 1992? The tank retained the classic layout of the T-72B with the placement of the control compartment in the frontal part, the fighting compartment in the middle and the engine-transmission compartment in the rear. Compared to the T-72B, the protection was strengthened and an automated fire control complex was installed; the hull and turret were adapted to install a new built-in dynamic protection (EDP). Thanks to the use of an automatic gun loader (A3), the T-90 crew consisted of three people - a driver, a gunner and a commander. The hulls of the T-90 and T-72B were almost identical. But the upper frontal part of the T-90 receives built-in dynamic protection. The turret remained cast with combined armor in the frontal part (at heading angles up to 35 degrees). It also had dynamic protection (DZ) - seven blocks and one container were installed in the frontal part, in addition, 20 blocks were installed on the roof of the tower. Exact data on the effectiveness of the T-90's armor remains classified. However, numerous assessments by both domestic and foreign experts can be found in the public domain. The armor resistance of the frontal projection of the hull and turret against shelling by armor-piercing finned sabot projectiles (BOPS) is assessed in general, taking into account the built-in dynamic protection, as equivalent to 900-950 mm of rolled armor steel (without taking into account the built-in EPS: turret 700 mm; hull - 650 mm) .

The armor resistance of the hull and turret against shelling by cumulative projectiles (CS), taking into account dynamic protection, is estimated at 1350-1450 mm (excluding built-in armor protection: turret - 850 mm; hull -750 mm). Additional protection against damage from T-90 anti-tank guided missiles is provided by the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression complex. The T-90 became the first production tank on which it was installed. The Shtora-1 complex includes an optical-electronic suppression station (SOEP) and a curtain installation system (SPS).

Additional protection against damage from T-90 anti-tank guided missiles is provided by the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression complex. The T-90 became the first production tank on which it was installed. The Shtora-1 complex includes an optical-electronic suppression station (SOEP) and a curtain installation system (SPS). The main idea of ​​​​the complex’s operation is to generate a signal from the EPDS, similar to the signal from the tracers of Western ATGMs, which entails disruption of their guidance, and also reduces the likelihood of hitting the target with weapons that use laser target illumination. The curtain system achieves the same result by setting a smoke screen.

When irradiation of a tank by laser radiation is detected, the system for setting the curtains determines the direction of irradiation and notifies the crew, after which an aerosol grenade is fired automatically or at the direction of the tank commander, which, when exploded, creates an aerosol cloud that weakens and partially reflects the laser radiation, thereby disrupting the operation of the missile guidance systems. In addition, the aerosol cloud acts as a smoke screen, camouflaging the tank. It should be noted that some experts believe that the installation scheme for jamming searchlights of the Shtora-1 complex on the T-90 was implemented extremely poorly - because of them, a large area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe tower projection in the most threatening sectors of fire was left without dynamic protection units.

The main armament of the T-90 is the 125-mm smoothbore gun 2A46M-2, which is a modification of the 2A46M-1 gun (installed on the T-80U) for the T-72 autoloader. The gun's ammunition, in addition to armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation projectiles (HEF), also includes 9M119 guided missiles. Thanks to the electromechanical automatic loader, the T-90's combat rate of fire is 6-8 rounds/min. The mechanized circular rotation arrangement includes 22 separate loading shots: the shells are placed horizontally on the bottom of the fighting compartment, under the powder charges. The minimum charging cycle is 6.5-7 seconds, the maximum is 15 seconds. The automatic loader is replenished by the crew in 15-20 minutes.

The 1A45T “Irtysh” fire control system includes the 1A42 fire control system (FCS) and the 9K119 “Reflex” guided weapon system (KW), the TPN-4-4E “Buran-PA” gunner’s night sight and the PNK-4S commander’s sighting and observation system with day/night sight TKN-4S "Agat-S". The 1A42 fire control system includes a 1G46 rangefinder sight, a 1V528-1 electronic ballistic computer and a 2E42-4 stabilizer. The control system available on the T-90 allows you to introduce amendments to the firing parameters, taking into account the tank’s speed, range and angular velocity of the target, temperature, air pressure and wind speed (determined by the DVE-BS sensor), charge temperature, angle of inclination of the gun trunnions and wear of the barrel bore, The 1G46 gunner's day sight has a line of sight stabilized in two planes, a built-in laser rangefinder and a guided missile control channel. The 1B528-1 ballistic computer automatically takes into account signals coming from the following sensors: tank speed, angular speed of the target, roll angle of the gun trunnion axis, transverse component of wind speed, range to the target, heading angle. Additionally, for the calculation, the following parameters are manually entered: ambient air temperature, charge temperature, barrel bore wear, ambient air pressure, etc. Unlike the control system of all Soviet tanks, on the T-90 the ballistic computer performs the functions of a firing permission unit, i.e., when the axis of the barrel bore deviates from the direction given to it more than the threshold, a shot does not occur.

The PNK-4S commander's sighting and observation system consists of a TKN-4S commander's combined sight and a gun position sensor. The TKN-4S combined day-night commander trailer is stabilized in the vertical plane and has three channels: a single day channel, a multiple day channel with a magnification magnification of 8x, and a night channel with a magnification magnification of 5.4x. The 9K119 "Reflex" guided weapon system provides firing at stationary and moving targets at speeds of up to 70 km/h (according to the manufacturer - even helicopters) at ranges of up to 5000 m, at a tank speed of up to 30 km/h, while Firing from the KUV 9K120 mounted on the T-72B could only be done from a standing position. In general, the presence of guided weapons provides the T-90 with a greater effective target engagement range than tanks equipped only with artillery weapons, for which, even with the most modern sighting systems, effective shooting at “tank” type targets at a distance of more than 2500 m is already seriously difficult.

The TPN-4-49 "Buran-PA" gunner's night sight operates in passive mode in natural night illumination of 0.0005 lux and above, while its electro-optical converter amplifies the reflected light of the stars and the moon. When illumination is less than 0.0005 lux, the sight operates in active mode, i.e. when illuminating the area with infrared rays. The T-90 uses infrared emitters of the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression system as an infrared illuminator. The T-90 is equipped with a closed anti-aircraft machine gun mount (ZPU) with remote electromechanical control, from which the commander does not need to leave the vehicle to fire. Similar remote-controlled launchers have been installed on the T-64 since the 70s, and later on the T-80, but all previously produced modifications of the T-72 had an open manually controlled launcher, to fire from which the commander had to stick out of his waist up to his waist. hatch. The T-90 of the 1992 model was equipped with a multi-fuel diesel engine V-84MS with a power of 840 hp, developed by the Chelyabinsk Design Bureau "Transdiesel".

The previous version of the B-84, installed on the T-72B, revealed a drawback during operation - overheating and burnout of the exhaust manifolds. Therefore, bellows were installed on the exhaust manifolds of the B-84MS, mixing exhaust gases with atmospheric air, which improved the thermal operating conditions of the manifolds and, in addition, reduced the visibility of the tank in the infrared range. The disadvantages of the engine include the significant time it takes to replace it - a team of qualified technicians needs 6 hours to do this (according to other sources, it takes even longer), while on the American M1A1 Abrams it takes only 2 hours.

With the V-84MS engine, the specific power of the T-90 is 18 hp/t, which by modern standards is considered insufficient; back in Soviet times, a requirement for its minimum value was voiced - at least 20 hp/t. The mechanical planetary transmission remains almost the same as on the T-72B; it provides 7 forward gears and one reverse gear. The machine is turned by engaging a low gear in the gearbox on the side of the lagging track. Due to this outdated turning pattern, the maneuverability of the T-90 is lower than that of foreign tanks. Another disadvantage of the T-90 transmission is the low reverse speed - 4.8 km/h. On modern Western tanks, which use hydrostatic turning mechanisms with digital automatic control systems, the reversing speed reaches 30 km/h. The chassis also remained virtually unchanged, with the exception that the track rollers were widened by 10 mm - according to the designers, this improved the load distribution on the track.

Back in Soviet times, UKBTM received the task of developing, on the basis of Object 188, its command version, which was supposed to provide control of subordinate units during combat operations both day and night, as well as communication with higher commanders. The tank received the name T-90K (commander's) and was equipped with special equipment - a short-wave radio station P-163-50K ("Ar6alet-50K"), tank navigation equipment TNA-4-3, a telescopic antenna mast, a PAB-2M artillery compass and an AB electrical unit -1-P with a power of 1 kW, which serves to provide power to the equipment during parking, with the tank engine turned off. With an 11-meter mast antenna, the shortwave radio station R-163-50K provides stable communication at a range of up to 350 km. Despite the fact that a significant number of additional units of the fire control system and communications equipment had to be installed on the command vehicle, the combat characteristics of the T-90K were maintained at the level of the linear T-90.

Almost simultaneously with the basic “Object 188”, its export version, the “Object 188C”, was also developed, mainly characterized by lower security and differences in configuration. Outwardly, they were practically no different. Although permission to export the T-90S was received simultaneously with the adoption of the basic vehicle in 1992, the vehicle was not able to immediately break through beyond Russia. At that time, officials from Rosvooruzhenie relied on the more advanced and expensive gas turbine T-80U, which, in their opinion, was more attractive for export. The military was of the same opinion. Even in 1996, when the T-90 was officially chosen as the tank for re-equipping units of the Russian Army, the then head of the GABTU, Colonel General A.A. Galkin spoke out against the T-90, considering the T-80U to be a more promising vehicle. True, only Cyprus and South Korea managed to sell T-80U tanks abroad, and then the latter to pay off the Russian debt to this country.

Contract worth $172 million for the purchase of 41 T-80U/UK for weapons National Guard Cyprus was signed in April 1996. Delivery of the tanks began in the summer of that year and ended in June 1997. In 1996, Russia officially announced the export of 33 T-80U tanks to South Korea. For these supplies, Russian debt in the amount of $210 million was written off. According to other sources, by 2007 South Korea already had 80 such tanks. In both cases, these were not newly produced vehicles, but vehicles from the Armed Forces. The T-90S was first exported abroad only in 1997, when it was presented at the YuEX-97 arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi. In the meantime, the search for foreign customers was ongoing, the export T-90C was slowly being improved. First of all, the characteristics of the night sighting system were improved. Even during the ground operation to liberate Kuwait - “Desert Sword”, in 1991, American and British tank crews, taking advantage of a significant advantage in target detection range in conditions of limited visibility, which provided them with the use of modern thermal imaging night vision systems, in a series of night battles 25 -February 26 inflicted heavy losses on Iraqi troops. Since the movement of Iraqi tanks during the day was practically impossible due to the air supremacy of allied aviation, tank battles, as a rule, took place at night.

Thermal imaging sights also turned out to be useful during the day, since visibility was often limited due to smoke from burning oil fields, damaged equipment, dust squalls or rain. Compared to the old second-generation infrared sights installed on the T-72 and T-90 tanks of the 1992 model, thermal imagers were devoid of many shortcomings. In particular, their work did not deteriorate in bad weather conditions, the sight was not “blind” from the flashes of shots, it did not need external illumination, which would unmask the tank (large infrared illumination spotlights disappeared from Western tanks in the late 70s). It is not surprising that foreign customers, when purchasing armored vehicles, paid great attention to the availability and quality of thermal imaging sights. But since Russia did not have its own production of thermal imaging sighting systems, the demonstration samples of the T-90S had to be equipped with Belarusian sights from the Peleng company, which used the French Catherine-FS thermal camera. Another direction for improving the T-90 turned out to be forced. When in Russia in the second half of the 90s, due to lack of demand, large-scale production of tank turret casting at ZSO (the Sergo Ordzhonikidze plant in Chelyabinsk) “died” due to lack of demand, and tank turrets cast in small batches turned out to be extremely expensive, designers had to look for a way out . Fortunately, there was a “backlog” from the times of the USSR, when the design of a tank turret for the T-72, welded from rolled armor plates, was worked out. With the same strength and protection as cast, it had less weight, in addition, the internal volume increased slightly and projectile resistance increased. The grimace of the Soviet planned economy was that the welded tower was not put into production earlier because they did not want to disrupt the established production of cast towers. Now the welded tower has been given the green light. The first welded turrets for the T-90 were manufactured in 1998 and successfully passed full-scale shelling tests at the training ground. Since 2002, all produced T-90S have already received a welded turret. A similar story happened in Ukraine. With the closure of the production of cast towers at the Mariupol plant, which equipped the T-80UD, in Kharkov at the plant named after. Malyshev also switched to a welded tower. As a result, 175 T-80UD tanks, out of 320 delivered to Pakistan under the contract signed between this country and Ukraine in 1996, were equipped with welded turrets.

Deliveries of the T-80UD to Pakistan greatly contributed to the export success of the T-90S. Pakistan's longtime rival India could not remain indifferent to its restless neighbor receiving a new tank division, this violated military parity in the region. On the other hand, there was no longer any hope of meeting the deadlines for the development program of India’s own Arjun tank. Therefore, given the significant number of Soviet T-72M and T-72M1 tanks available in India, the Indians naturally showed interest in the T-90. Preliminary negotiations, consultations and approvals lasted for more than two years, until in April 1999 an agreement was reached to test three T-90S in India. All three tanks were different from each other. Thermal imaging sights were different - “Nocturne” or “Essa”, only one tank had the “Shtora” system installed, two tanks had cast turrets, and the third had a welded one.

From May 8 to August, the T-90S underwent a test program in the Thar Desert, in extreme conditions - during the day the heat here reached 50 degrees Celsius. The vehicles traveled 2,000 km across this hot desert and then fired 150 rounds. The Indian military was satisfied with the test results, and a long process of agreeing on the terms of the contract began. In the east they love and know how to bargain, so the final signing of the contract took place only after almost a year and a half - on February 15, 2001 in Delhi. Under its terms, Russia undertook to supply India with 310 T-90S tanks, which was enough to rearm the tank division (by this time Pakistan has already received all 320 T-80UD tanks). Of these, 124 were assembled in Russia and delivered to the customer in finished form, and 186 tanks were to be assembled from assembly units in India itself at the state-owned HVF (Heavy Vehicles Factory) plant in the city of Avadi (Tamil Nadu). The total value of the contract was $800 million, and deliveries under it were fully completed in 2003.

So what did Indians get for their money? As a result of persistent demands, they received not just an export T-90S in its original 1992 configuration, but a vehicle that combined (in their opinion) all the best of the three models proposed for testing. It is interesting that this “Indian” T-90S was significantly superior to the T-90 of the 1992 model, supplied by Uralvagonzavod for the Russian Army. On Indian tanks, instead of the Buran-PA night sight, which was installed on Russian vehicles, a more advanced thermal imaging gunner's sight, Essa, jointly produced in France and Belarus, was installed. The commander received the PNK-4S "Agat-S" sighting and observation system. The Indians abandoned the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression complex, and in place of its illuminators in the front part of the turret, additional trapezoidal containers of the Kontakt-5 dynamic protection complex were mounted, as a result of which the turret’s security increased compared to Russian tanks. Interestingly, the Indians also demanded that anti-nuclear defense be strengthened. At their request, the thickness of the anti-neutron lining was almost doubled, despite the fact that the anti-nuclear protection of the Russian T-90s was already considered quite powerful. Considering that the eternal enemies - India and Pakistan - are both members of the nuclear club, such a requirement suggests that the Indian military does not rule out the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a likely armed conflict with Pakistan. All Indian T-90S (except for the first forty vehicles) were equipped with welded turrets, a reinforced chassis, as well as a 1000-horsepower V-92S2 diesel engine (recall that the Russian T-90 at that time had a B-84 diesel engine with a power of 840 hp ).

In 2000, inspired by the emerging success in India, the Russians entered the T-90S to participate in an international tender for the purchase of tanks held by Malaysia. For testing, a T-90S copy, modernized after testing in India, with an air conditioner installed, was delivered to Kuala Lumpur airport. Together with the T-90S, the Polish RT-91 Twardy tank (which is a modernization of the Soviet T-72M), the Ukrainian T-84 and the Swedish light tank CV90 120. Tests took place from June 19 to August 21, with local military personnel mainly interested in the mobility and operational reliability of tanks in difficult local conditions. The vehicles were asked to travel about 2,800 km through the jungle, mountainous terrain, through wetlands and water obstacles. During this “race” in the very center of the jungle, the T-90, not without the “help” of a Malaysian driver (the tests were carried out by mixed Russian-Malaysian crews), was pulled off a washed-out clay road into a ditch, from where it could only be retrieved with effort, according to one version , two Hyundai excavators, and according to another, the T-90S was evacuated using a 50-ton Japanese KATO crane, paying 5 thousand dollars for this. But despite all the odds, the T-90S successfully reached the finish line.

True, the results of the Malaysian competition were quite unexpected. Despite the fact that during testing the Polish RT-91M was significantly inferior to both the Russian T-90S and Ukrainian T-84 in most key indicators, in April 2002 the Malaysian government announced its decision to purchase 48 PT-91MZ tanks and six ARVs. WZT-4" in Poland. The total contract amount was $370 million. Russian experts claim that one Polish tank cost Malaysia approximately $4 million, or 1.2 million more than the Russian T-90S that participated in this tender. According to one version, this decision was explained by a policy of diversification - Malaysia purchased Su-30MK fighters from Russia, and the contract for tanks was given to Poland; according to another, it was due to banal corruption."

The failure in the Malaysian tender was more than compensated for by a large contract for the supply of 185 T-90 tanks to Algeria. Taking as a basis the design of the T-90S tank from 1999, supplied to India, UKBTM modified it in accordance with the requirements of the new buyer. The result was a version of the tank with the installation of an air conditioning system (given the hot climate of Algeria), as well as with an improved laser detection system, which received the factory index “Object 188CA” (“A” - Algerian) and the designation T-90CA. A prototype of the T-90SA successfully passed rigorous tests in the Algerian desert in 2005, and in January of the following year a contract was signed between Rosoboronexport and the Algerian side. Deliveries for it were fully completed in 2008, however, there was a scandal.

According to press reports, the Algerians made complaints about the configuration of the vehicles - allegedly some of the equipment installed on them was not new, but already used. In 2006, the leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya Muammar Gaddafi almost purchased the T-90S, but the cost of the T-90S was considered too high, and the Libyan military had to be content with purchasing modernized T-72s. In the same 2006, the Indian government, probably deciding that “there are never enough tanks,” signed a contract for the licensed production of 1000 T-90SA tanks worth $2.5 billion (to be built by 2019), and a few months later There is also an additional contract for the supply of 330 T-90SA tanks during 2007-2008, with the assembly of part of this batch of tanks in India. The ordered tanks featured a modernized chassis, an improved fire control system with an Essa thermal imager, and Indian Kanchan dynamic armor. The tank was named "Bhishma" in honor of the legendary hero of the ancient Indian epic. The matter did not stop there, and in 2007 another contract was signed for the supply of 347 T-90SA worth $1.2 billion, in the form of 124 finished tanks and 223 tank kits for licensed production. The first ten T-90SA tanks, already made in India, entered service with the 73rd Regiment of the Indian Ground Forces in the summer of 2009. In total, India intends to increase the number of T-90s in its troops to 2000 by 2020. In 2008, Indian Defense Minister D. Singh called the T-90 “the second deterrent after nuclear weapons” in the conflict with Pakistan.

But let's return to Russia. Here, in 2004, the next stage in the history of the T-90 development began. After a many-year break, the Russian Ministry of Defense ordered 14 tanks from Uralvagonzavod (as mentioned above, there has been no production of the T-90 for Russia since 1998). However, apparently, the Russian military, due to limited funding, was so unaccustomed to ordering weapons and out of touch with the realities of production that they ordered the “Object 188” of the 1992 model, which, naturally, over the past 12 years has already become significantly outdated and inferior even to export T- 90C supplied to India. Although the Customer was eventually convinced to make changes to the design of the tank that had already been mastered by the plant, the matter was complicated by the fact that they were not ordered by the military department, and therefore were not tested or accepted. Therefore, in order to “legalize” new design solutions, we had to receive technical specifications from the Customer for ready-made components, coordinate the stages of ongoing development work, etc. and so on. The tank, modernized in 2004 for the Russian Army, received the internal factory designation “Object 188A1” and had a number of important improvements compared to the “Object 188” of the 1992 model,

First of all, instead of the 840-horsepower V-84 engine, a 1000-horsepower V-92S2 diesel engine was installed (it was also possible to install a 1200-horsepower V-99 diesel engine). The previous cast turret was replaced with a reinforced welded one with frontal parts measuring up to 950 mm, which significantly increased its resistance against BOPS/KS. The tank was armed with a modernized 125-mm 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun. This gun had half the thickness of the muzzle part of the pipe (0.4 mm instead of 0.8 mm), the cradle neck was extended by 160 mm with two play-selecting devices. In addition, both guides of the cradle were made as a prism. All this made it possible to reduce the average dispersion of projectiles by 15%. The gun stabilizer was replaced, which doubled the aiming speed and improved the accuracy of firing on the move. The T01-K05 Buran-M thermal imager was used as a night sight. Based on an analysis of the experience of fighting in Chechnya and other regional conflicts, a set of measures was implemented to strengthen the local protection of those vulnerable to fire RPG elements tank, in particular, the protection of fuel tanks has been improved. An upgraded Shtora optical-electronic countermeasures complex has also been installed. In this form, the improved vehicle was put into service in 2005 under the army name T-90A. In 2004 and 2005, the military ordered and received 14 and 18 T-90A tanks (two of them with a cast turret in the commander's version). Most of the first T-90A entered service with the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Order of the October Revolution Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division named after. Kalinin, stationed near Moscow.

Starting in 2006, a more modern second-generation Essa thermal imager with a Catherine FC matrix, integrated with the main sight and its rangefinder channel, began to be installed on all T-90As under construction, this made it possible to increase the night vision range from 1800 to 4000 m. In 2006 In 2007 and 2007, 31 tanks were produced, and in 2008 and 2009, production volume doubled - 62 vehicles were built per year. Thus, from 2004 to 2009 inclusive, 30 T-90A (with Buran-M), 180 T-90A (with Essa), 2 command T-90K (with Buran-M) and six command T-90AK (with Essa), or a total of 218 tanks. In 2010, purchases were increased to 63 T-90A tanks per year, but this was the “last push” - the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that from 2011 it would stop purchasing T-90A tanks for the Russian Army. This decision was somewhat unexpected; after all, the T-90 tank had a good reputation in Russia, and by 2010 it had become the best-selling of the newly built tanks on the world market - the volume of export deliveries of T-90S was about 1000 units .

The position of the military was explained by the then Russian Minister of Defense A. Serdyukov, who said that the military decided to refuse to purchase T-90 tanks because of their high cost. In addition, according to Serdyukov, the army currently does not experience a shortage of heavy armored vehicles - in the Armed Forces Russian Federation there are more than 10 thousand tanks, and, according to him, the Ministry of Defense no longer wants to purchase old designs. Here, it is necessary to clarify that over the past years, the Russian Ministry of Defense has already curtailed several tank projects. Thus, in the spring of 2010, it was announced that funding for the UKBTM project to create the newest Russian T-95 tank was stopped, also due to its high cost. Previously, the work of the Omsk Design Bureau of Transport Engineering on the Black Eagle tank (modification T-80U) was stopped. So far, the Ministry of Defense has not abandoned only one tank project - after harsh statements addressed to tank builders, the department announced the creation of a fundamentally new tank based on the Armata universal tracked platform,

The project was officially approved in March 2012. It is being developed by UKBTM. The fundamental difference between the "Armata" and the T-90 should be the so-called carriage layout - the turret will house a remote-controlled gun along with ammunition. The crew will be housed in an armored capsule. Tankers will receive information about the situation on the battlefield from thermal imaging, television and laser sensors on the monitor screen. It is expected that delivery of the first main battle tanks on this platform to the troops will begin in 2015. In the future, the new Armata should replace all T-72 and T-80. But let's return to the T-90. Indeed, its cost grew from year to year: in 2004 it was 36 million rubles, at the end of 2006 - 42 million rubles, and at the beginning of 2007 - the T-90A (“Object 188A1”) cost 56 million . rub. In 2010, the purchase price of the T-90 under contracts for the supply of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 70 million rubles, and in 2011 the cost of the new T-90 increased noticeably and reached 118 million rubles. During 2011, other high-ranking military officials also criticized the T-90. In March, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General A. Postnikov, said that the T-90 cannot withstand competition with NATO and Chinese equipment and at the same time is so expensive that instead of one machine for 118 million rubles you can buy as many as three higher quality German Leopards "(However, Postnikov did not specify from whom exactly he was going to buy three Leopards for 118 million rubles, since in 2011 the average cost of just one Leopard 2A6 was 6 million dollars, or about 172 million rubles ). Also, according to him, the T-90 does not represent anything new and “is in fact the 17th modification of the Soviet T-72, produced since 1973.” In September, the head of the Russian General Staff, Army General N. Makarov, for his part, attacked the T-90. He stated that the tank only partially meets the requirements of the Ministry of Defense and has a lot of shortcomings. According to the general, by and large, the designers succeeded only with the turret (probably referring to the T-90MS turret).

In addition to the financial and technical side, the refusal to purchase the T-90 was obviously associated with changed views on methods of conducting armed struggle. The evolution of modern weapons has led to the massive use of drones, robotic combat systems, smart missiles, etc. Accordingly, there is an opinion in the Russian General Staff that the time of tanks has generally passed and that tank formations in the structure of the army of the future have no prospects, although not all experts are sure that wars will very soon become “contactless.” It must be said that the discussion about the place and role of main battle tanks in modern armies is also ongoing in the United States. Previously, the United States planned to completely abandon the use of armored units by 2030, switching first to the Stryker brigade combat teams, and then to the new concept of “Future Combat Systems”. Based on the fact that the future US army will primarily be of an “expeditionary” nature, a number of US military personnel believe that there will be no need for a large number of heavy armored vehicles.

The T-90AM Proryv tank and its export version T-90SM are the latest modification of the T-90A. Work to improve it began in 2004. For the first time, a prototype of the T-90AM tank was presented at the beginning of September 2011 in Nizhny Tagil at the Staratel military training ground. The display of new military equipment was held as part of the XIII international exhibition REA-2011.

Enhancement Details

The T-90AM, the characteristics of which are now available only in general terms, was created on the basis of the T-90 tank. The developer of the new product was Uralvagonzavod. The main object of modernization of the vehicle turned out to be the old turret, which was replaced with the latest combat module with an improved Kalina fire control system, which has a combat integrated information and control system for the tactical level. In addition, the T-90AM (photos are presented in the article) is equipped with a modernized 2A46M-5 cannon, a new automatic loader and a remote-controlled T05BV-1 UDP. They also replaced the Kontakt-V with the Relikt remote sensing device.

The developers paid special attention to increasing the commander’s ability to control fire and search for targets equally effectively regardless of the time of day. For the first time, the Russian T-90AM tank was equipped with steering wheel controls and an automatic gear shift system. It makes it possible to switch to manual mode as soon as the need arises.

The T-90AM vehicle has ammunition with two stowage groups - one outside and the other inside. In this case, 22 shots are located in the lower part of the hull, in the AZ, and the rest, as well as the charges for them, are in a special armored box, which is located at the stern of the turret. Specialists took care of improving the maneuverability and mobility of the T-90AM (SM) tank. For this purpose, the latest combined night vision devices were installed, as well as a television camera for rear view of the area.

The new T-90AM Proryv tank weighs 48 tons, which is one and a half tons more than the base model, but at the same time significantly less than its German or American counterparts. This machine is equipped with a V-93 monoblock power unit with a power of 1130 hp. pp., developed on the basis of the V-92S2F2. It was also decided to replace the anti-neutron cap with a more reliable anti-fragmentation fire-resistant material like Kivlar and improve the fire extinguishing system.

Summing up the results of the modernization, we can say that the mobility and security of the T-90AM tank have noticeably improved, while the dimensions have remained virtually unchanged, so it still remains in the class of combat vehicles up to 50 tons.

Comparison of military equipment

It is no secret that many are concerned about the effectiveness of the latest Russian tanks compared to foreign analogues. For example, let's take the American M1 Abrams. But in order to compare two combat vehicles, you should know that situations where they come face to face on the battlefield practically do not exist in our time.

IN modern conditions combat operations, in order to survive, the tank crew will have to fight with a variety of enemies, ranging from infantry equipped with anti-tank missiles to airplanes and helicopters. But despite this, experts are constantly trying to compare the same class with each other. At the same time, some of them believe that a theoretical comparison of tanks is impossible in principle, since even real combat operations will not give a final answer to the question of who is better. Here it will be necessary to take into account a lot of other criteria, such as tactics of use, vehicle maintenance, level of crew training, interaction of various military units, etc. All this can have a much greater impact higher value than the technical characteristics of the tanks themselves.

Comparison of T-90 and Abrams

Before you begin to compare the technical characteristics of these combat vehicles, it is necessary to take into account that the T-90 tank was developed 20 years ago, and since then it has been modernized several times. Naturally, each new model was significantly different from the previous one, both structurally and in terms of combat effectiveness. The same thing happened with the Abrams tank, which entered service with the American army in 1980. Therefore, it makes sense to compare all their parameters too meticulously only for specific modifications that were released in the same period of time.

Technical characteristics and other parameters of the Russian T-90AM tank against the M1A2 Abrams are still almost impossible to compare due to the highest level of secrecy surrounding this military equipment. It is only known that the armor of the turrets in their front part is made in a similar way - packages of so-called reflective sheets are installed in the pockets on the frontal armor.

Use of equipment in combat conditions

The American Abrams tank was already used in the Iraqi military operation Desert Storm. As for the Russian vehicle, its participation in hostilities has not yet been documented. Although some experts suggest that the T-90 tank was already tested during the First and Second Chechen Companies in both Chechnya and Dagestan. Others claim that these cars appeared in August 2008 in the territory South Ossetia during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

For example, some media outlets then reported that the T-90 was seen during the withdrawal Russian troops from Gori (Georgia). But so far there is no direct evidence of this fact. In addition, the T-90 tank, the characteristics of which will be compared with the American Abrams below, is similar in appearance to the T-72B, which has the Kontakt dynamic protection, which could have caused the error in its identification.

For now, it is impossible to determine exactly how the T-90AM tank will perform in real combat conditions, since it has not yet been used anywhere.

Design comparison

It should be noted that the United States and the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, have always had completely different approaches to the design of military equipment. It is clearly visible that the American M1 tank is much larger in size than the T-90. It was possible to achieve a reduction in the dimensions of the vehicle by eliminating the loader, who needs approximately 1.7 m from the height of the fighting compartment to perform his duties. The result of this was the removal of the restriction on reducing the level of the tank. In addition, a more dense layout made it possible to create a reliably protected vehicle with a relatively low weight and low silhouette, as well as a small cross-sectional and longitudinal sectional area.

The result of such transformations is the fact that the reserved volume of the Abrams is 19, and the T-90 is 11 cubic meters. But a denser layout also has its downsides. They are some cramped tank crew and the difficulty of interchangeability of each other if necessary.

Protection comparison

Many may think that if the Abrams is much heavier, then the armor on it is thicker, and therefore more reliable. This is not entirely true. Reducing the armored internal volume helped reduce the weight of the armor on the T-90 tank, which provided the required level of external protection. Due to the fact that the dimensions of the frontal projection of the Russian vehicle are only 5 m², and that of the Abrams - 6, it becomes less vulnerable, since the likelihood of such a hit in this particular part of the equipment is very high.

The Russian tank is equipped with “reflective sheets” made of steel, and the Abrams, starting with a certain modification, is equipped with this material. This material has a high density (19.03 g/cm³), therefore, with a relatively small plate thickness, it ensured literally explosive destruction cumulative jet.

The T-90 tank, in addition to the traditional one, also has a complex of dynamic protection. This is not the case on most modifications of the Abrams. "Kontakt-5" is a dynamic protection for Russian tanks that works against both armor-piercing sabot charges and cumulative weapons. This complex delivers a strong lateral impulse, which allows you to destroy or at least destabilize the BPOS core before the impact on the main armor begins.

According to Russian manufacturers, the frontal armor of the T-90A tank can easily withstand hits from the BOPS most commonly used in the West. For this purpose, a special experimental demonstration was carried out. The T-90 tank, whose characteristics were tested back in 1995 at the Kubinka training ground, was fired upon by another vehicle. 6 Russian cumulative shells were fired at it from a distance of about 200 m. As a result of the shelling, it turned out that the frontal armor successfully passed the tests, and the tank was able to independently reach the observation deck.

In turn, American officials stated that the frontal armor of their M1A1 vehicle also successfully withstood the fire that the Iraqi military fired at them from T-72 tanks. True, these were outdated BOPS, removed from service in the early 70s. last century.

Comparison of weapons and ammunition

As you know, the main weapon of this military equipment is a cannon. The Russian vehicle has a 125 mm 2A46M/2A46M5 smoothbore tank gun. The Abrams is armed with the standard NATO 120mm M256 cannon. As you can see, there is some difference in caliber, but despite this, both guns have similar characteristics. However, it is worth noting that the effectiveness of tank fire directly depends on the ammunition used.

The Russian T-90 Proryv tank can also probably fire using four types of ammunition: high-explosive fragmentation, armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative rounds and guided missiles. The Abrams has a standard set consisting of only two types of ammunition: cumulative and armor-piercing sub-caliber.

To combat enemy equipment, they mainly use the somewhat outdated BOPS ZBM-44 and ZBM-32, which have cores made of tungsten and uranium alloys. Not long ago, more advanced shells were developed that could withstand the frontal armor of the best Western tanks. Among them is the ZBM-48 “Lead”.

The main ammunition of the Abrams is considered to be the M829A3 round with an armor-piercing sabot projectile, which was put into service in 2003.

Comparison of power plants

It must be said right away that both cars are fundamentally different. The T-90A and T-90SA tanks have a 1000-horsepower diesel engine, while the Abrams has a 1500-horsepower engine made in one unit with a hydromechanical automatic transmission. The specific engine power of the T-90 and Abrams is 21 and 24 hp, respectively. s./t. The Russian car has a significantly greater range (550 km) than the American one (350 km). This was achieved due to the increased efficiency of the diesel engine compared to the more insatiable gas turbine.

The T-90 power plant has another very important advantage - it is high reliability and unpretentiousness. Take, for example, the testing of cars in the Indian Thar desert, where not a single engine failure was recorded. As for the American M1A1 tanks that participated in Operation Desert Storm, in the three days that they were moving through the sands, 16 out of 58 units failed. And all this happened due to damage to the engines. If we compare the labor intensity of maintenance of the engines of these machines, then to replace it, teams of qualified technicians will need: the Russian one - 6, and the American one - only 2 hours.

The disadvantage of the transmission of Russian cars is the rather low reverse speed - only 4.8 km/h, while for American vehicles it reaches 30 km/h due to the installation of a hydrostatic transmission on them. The fact is that mass-produced T-90 tanks are equipped with a mechanical transmission based on an already outdated design of the turning mechanism, where its responsibilities are assigned to stepped onboard gearboxes. The Abrams is equipped with a hydrostatic transmission, as well as turning mechanisms with a digital automatic control system.

Overall rating

Based on the available data on the technical and other characteristics of the T-90 and Abrams tanks, we can conclude that the main advantages of the Russian vehicle compared to the American one are:

  • good protection, including the dynamic system “Contact”, as well as the KOEP “Shtora-1”;
  • availability of firing at a target with guided missiles at a distance of up to 5 thousand m;
  • a larger number of types of ammunition, which include HE shells (including those with ready-made striking parts and remote detonation);
  • excellent rate of fire, which is maintained throughout the battle, ensured by the use of A3;
  • decent depth for overcoming water obstacles, good range and excellent mobility;
  • unpretentiousness and high reliability during operation.

Abrams also has its merits. This:

  • durable protection;
  • automation of battle management tools, which provides an influx of various data in real time;
  • reliable isolation of the crew from the location of the ammunition;
  • good maneuverability;
  • high level of power density.

Expert opinion

In 2012, an article by V. Stepanov, who is a Doctor of Technical Sciences and General Director of OJSC VNIItransmash, was published in the press. It talked about the analysis of methods for comparative assessment of the technical characteristics of tanks. And, first of all, here were estimates of the military-technical level (MTL) of the best combat vehicles, including the Russian T-90A and T-90MS, as well as M1A2 and M1A2 SEP.

VTU was calculated based on several indicators: security, operational capability, firepower and mobility. Then all of the above vehicles with a certain reference tank. He chose the T-90A, which means that its VTU = 1.0. The data of the American M1A2 and M1A2 SEP vehicles were estimated at 1.0 and 1.32, respectively. The VTU indicator of the new T-90MS Tagil tank was determined as 1.42. The calculations performed may have a slight error of no more than 10%. From this we can conclude that there is a real closeness between the levels of the best foreign analogues with the Russian T-90A and its modernized model - the T-90AM tank.

Modern battle tanks Russia and the world photos, videos, pictures watch online. This article gives an idea of ​​the modern tank fleet. It is based on the principle of classification used in the most authoritative reference book to date, but in a slightly modified and improved form. And if the latter in its original form can still be found in the armies of a number of countries, then others have already become museum pieces. And just for 10 years! The authors considered it unfair to follow in the footsteps of the Jane’s reference book and not consider this combat vehicle (very interesting in design and fiercely discussed in its time), which formed the basis of the tank fleet of the last quarter of the 20th century.

Films about tanks where there is still no alternative to this type of weapon for the ground forces. The tank was and will probably remain for a long time modern weapons thanks to the ability to combine such seemingly contradictory qualities as high mobility, powerful weapons and reliable crew protection. These unique qualities of tanks continue to be constantly improved, and the experience and technology accumulated over decades predetermine new frontiers in combat properties and achievements of the military-technical level. In the eternal confrontation between “projectile and armor”, as practice shows, protection against projectiles is increasingly being improved, acquiring new qualities: activity, multi-layeredness, self-defense. At the same time, the projectile becomes more accurate and powerful.

Russian tanks are specific in that they allow you to destroy the enemy from a safe distance, have the ability to make quick maneuvers on off-road, contaminated terrain, can “walk” through territory occupied by the enemy, seize a decisive bridgehead, cause panic in the rear and suppress the enemy with fire and tracks . The war of 1939-1945 became the most ordeal for all humanity, since almost all countries of the world were involved in it. It was a clash of the titans - the most unique period that theorists debated in the early 1930s and during which tanks were used in large numbers by almost all belligerents. At this time, a “lice test” and a deep reform of the first theories of the use of tank forces took place. And it is the Soviet tank forces that are most affected by all this.

Tanks in battle have become a symbol of the past war, the backbone of the Soviet armored forces? Who created them and under what conditions? How did the USSR, which had lost most of its European territories and had difficulty recruiting tanks for the defense of Moscow, was able to release powerful tank formations onto the battlefields already in 1943? This book is intended to answer these questions, telling about the development of Soviet tanks “during the testing days ", from 1937 to the beginning of 1943. When writing the book, materials from Russian archives and private collections of tank builders were used. There was a period in our history that remained in my memory with some kind of depressing feeling. It began with the return of our first military advisers from Spain, and stopped only at the beginning of forty-three,” said the former general designer Self-propelled gun L. Gorlitsky, - some kind of pre-storm condition was felt.

Tanks of the Second World War It was M. Koshkin, almost underground (but, of course, with the support of “the wisest of the wise leaders of all nations”), who was able to create the tank that a few years later would shock the German tank generals. And not only that, he not only created it, the designer managed to prove to these military fools that it was his T-34 that they needed, and not just another wheeled-tracked "motor vehicle." The author is in slightly different positions, which formed in him after meeting the pre-war documents of the RGVA and RGEA. Therefore, working on this segment of the history of the Soviet tank, the author will inevitably contradict something “generally accepted.” This work describes the history of Soviet tank building in the most difficult years - from the beginning of a radical restructuring of the entire activity of design bureaus and people's commissariats in general, during the frantic race to equip new tank formations of the Red Army, transfer industry to wartime rails and evacuation.

Tanks Wikipedia, the author would like to express his special gratitude to M. Kolomiets for his assistance in selecting and processing materials, and also thank A. Solyankin, I. Zheltov and M. Pavlov, the authors of the reference publication “Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905 - 1941” , since this book helped to understand the fate of some projects that was previously unclear. I would also like to remember with gratitude those conversations with Lev Izraelevich Gorlitsky, the former chief designer of UZTM, which helped to take a fresh look at the entire history of the Soviet tank during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. For some reason today it is common for us to talk about 1937-1938. only from the point of view of repression, but few people remember that it was during this period that those tanks were born that became legends of the wartime...” From the memoirs of L.I. Gorlinky.

Soviet tanks, a detailed assessment of them at that time was heard from many lips. Many old people recalled that it was from the events in Spain that it became clear to everyone that the war was getting closer and closer to the threshold and it was Hitler who would have to fight. In 1937, mass purges and repressions began in the USSR, and against the backdrop of these difficult events, the Soviet tank began to transform from “mechanized cavalry” (in which one of its combat qualities was emphasized at the expense of others) into a balanced combat vehicle, simultaneously possessing powerful weapons, sufficient to suppress most targets, good maneuverability and mobility with armor protection capable of maintaining its combat effectiveness when fired upon by the most massive anti-tank weapons of a potential enemy.

It was recommended that large tanks be supplemented with only special tanks - amphibious tanks, chemical tanks. The brigade now had 4 separate battalions of 54 tanks each and was strengthened by moving from three-tank platoons to five-tank ones. In addition, D. Pavlov justified the refusal to form three additional mechanized corps in addition to the four existing mechanized corps in 1938, believing that these formations were immobile and difficult to control, and most importantly, they required a different rear organization. The tactical and technical requirements for promising tanks, as expected, were adjusted. In particular, in a letter dated December 23 to the head of the design bureau of plant No. 185 named after. CM. Kirov, the new boss demanded that the armor of the new tanks be strengthened so that at a distance of 600-800 meters (effective range).

The newest tanks in the world, when designing new tanks, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of increasing the level of armor protection during modernization by at least one stage...” This problem could be solved in two ways: Firstly, by increasing the thickness of the armor plates and, secondly, by “using increased armor resistance." It is not difficult to guess that the second way was considered more promising, since the use of specially strengthened armor plates, or even two-layer armor, could, while maintaining the same thickness (and the mass of the tank as a whole), increase its durability by 1.2-1.5 It was this path (the use of especially hardened armor) that was chosen at that moment to create new types of tanks.

Tanks of the USSR at the dawn of tank production, armor was most widely used, the properties of which were identical in all areas. Such armor was called homogeneous (homogeneous), and from the very beginning of armor making, craftsmen sought to create just such armor, because homogeneity ensured stability of characteristics and simplified processing. However, at the end of the 19th century, it was noticed that when the surface of an armor plate was saturated (to a depth of several tenths to several millimeters) with carbon and silicon, its surface strength increased sharply, while the rest of the plate remained viscous. This is how heterogeneous (non-uniform) armor came into use.

For military tanks, the use of heterogeneous armor was very important, since an increase in the hardness of the entire thickness of the armor plate led to a decrease in its elasticity and (as a consequence) to an increase in fragility. Thus, the most durable armor, all other things being equal, turned out to be very fragile and often chipped even from the explosions of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Therefore, at the dawn of armor production, when producing homogeneous sheets, the task of the metallurgist was to achieve the maximum possible hardness of the armor, but at the same time not to lose its elasticity. Surface-hardened armor with carbon and silicon saturation was called cemented (cemented) and was considered at that time a panacea for many ills. But cementation is a complex, harmful process (for example, treating a hot plate with a jet of illuminating gas) and relatively expensive, and therefore its development in a series required large expenses and improved production standards.

Wartime tanks, even in operation, these hulls were less successful than homogeneous ones, since for no apparent reason cracks formed in them (mainly in loaded seams), and it was very difficult to put patches on holes in cemented slabs during repairs. But it was still expected that a tank protected by 15-20 mm cemented armor would be equivalent in level of protection to the same one, but covered with 22-30 mm sheets, without a significant increase in weight.
Also, by the mid-1930s, tank building had learned to harden the surface of relatively thin armor plates by uneven hardening, known from late XIX century in shipbuilding as the "Krupp method". Surface hardening led to a significant increase in the hardness of the front side of the sheet, leaving the main thickness of the armor viscous.

How tanks fire video up to half the thickness of the slab, which was, of course, worse than cementation, since while the hardness of the surface layer was higher than with cementation, the elasticity of the hull sheets was significantly reduced. So the “Krupp method” in tank building made it possible to increase the strength of armor even slightly more than cementation. But the hardening technology that was used for thick naval armor was no longer suitable for relatively thin tank armor. Before the war, this method was almost not used in our serial tank building due to technological difficulties and relatively high cost.

Combat use of tanks The most proven tank gun was the 45-mm tank gun model 1932/34. (20K), and before the event in Spain it was believed that its power was quite sufficient to perform most tank tasks. But the battles in Spain showed that a 45-mm gun can only satisfy the task of fighting enemy tanks, since even shelling of manpower in the mountains and forests turned out to be ineffective, and it was only possible to disable a dug-in enemy firing point in the event of a direct hit . Firing at shelters and bunkers was ineffective due to the low high-explosive effect of a projectile weighing only about two kg.

Types of tanks photos so that even one shell hit can reliably disable anti-tank gun or machine gun; and thirdly, to increase the penetrating effect of a tank gun on the armor of a potential enemy, since using the example of French tanks (which already had an armor thickness of about 40-42 mm), it became clear that the armor protection of foreign combat vehicles tends to be significantly strengthened. There was a sure way for this - increasing the caliber of tank guns and simultaneously increasing the length of their barrel, since a long gun of a larger caliber fires heavier projectiles with a higher initial velocity over a greater distance without correcting the aiming.

The best tanks in the world had a large-caliber cannon, and also had big sizes breech, significantly more weight and increased recoil response. And this required an increase in the mass of the entire tank as a whole. In addition, placing large-sized rounds in a closed tank volume led to a decrease in transportable ammunition.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that at the beginning of 1938 it suddenly turned out that an order for the design of a new, more powerful tank gun there is simply no one. P. Syachintov and his entire design team were repressed, as well as the core of the Bolshevik design bureau under the leadership of G. Magdesiev. Only the group of S. Makhanov remained in the wild, who, since the beginning of 1935, had been trying to develop his new 76.2-mm semi-automatic single gun L-10, and the staff of Plant No. 8 was slowly finishing the “forty-five”.

Photos of tanks with names The number of developments is large, but mass production in the period 1933-1937. not a single one has been accepted..." In fact, none of the five air-cooled tank diesel engines, work on which was carried out in 1933-1937 in the engine department of plant No. 185, was brought to series. Moreover, despite the decisions the highest levels about the transition in tank building exclusively to diesel engines, this process was constrained by a number of factors. Of course, diesel had significant efficiency. It consumed less fuel per unit of power per hour. Diesel fuel was less susceptible to fire, since the flash point of its vapor was very high.

New tanks video, even the most advanced of them, the MT-5 tank engine, required a reorganization of engine production for serial production, which was expressed in the construction of new workshops, the supply of advanced foreign equipment (they did not yet have their own machines of the required accuracy), financial investments and strengthening of personnel. It was planned that in 1939 this diesel would produce 180 hp. will go to production tanks and artillery tractors, but due to investigative work to determine the causes of tank engine failures, which lasted from April to November 1938, these plans were not implemented. The development of a slightly increased six-cylinder gasoline engine No. 745 with a power of 130-150 hp was also started.

Brands of tanks had specific indicators that suited tank builders quite well. The tanks were tested using a new technique, specially developed at the insistence of the new head of the ABTU D. Pavlov in relation to combat service in war time. The basis of the tests was a run of 3-4 days (at least 10-12 hours of daily non-stop movement) with a one-day break for technical inspection and restoration work. Moreover, repairs were allowed to be carried out only by field workshops without the involvement of factory specialists. This was followed by a “platform” with obstacles, “swimming” in water with an additional load that simulated an infantry landing, after which the tank was sent for inspection.

Super tanks online, after improvement work, seemed to remove all claims from the tanks. And the general progress of the tests confirmed the fundamental correctness of the main design changes - an increase in displacement by 450-600 kg, the use of the GAZ-M1 engine, as well as the Komsomolets transmission and suspension. But during testing, numerous minor defects again appeared in the tanks. Chief designer N. Astrov was removed from work and was under arrest and investigation for several months. In addition, the tank received new tower improved protection. The modified layout made it possible to place on the tank more ammunition for a machine gun and two small fire extinguishers (previously there were no fire extinguishers on small tanks of the Red Army).

US tanks as part of modernization work, on one production model of the tank in 1938-1939. The torsion bar suspension developed by the designer of the design bureau of plant No. 185 V. Kulikov was tested. It was distinguished by the design of a composite short coaxial torsion bar (long monotorsion bars could not be used coaxially). However, such a short torsion bar did not show good enough results in tests, and therefore the torsion bar suspension did not immediately pave the way for itself in the course of further work. Obstacles to be overcome: climbs of at least 40 degrees, vertical wall 0.7 m, covered ditch 2-2.5 m."

YouTube about tanks, work on the production of prototypes of the D-180 and D-200 engines for reconnaissance tanks is not being carried out, jeopardizing the production of prototypes." Justifying his choice, N. Astrov said that the wheeled-tracked non-floating reconnaissance aircraft (factory designation 101 or 10-1), as well as the amphibious tank variant (factory designation 102 or 10-2), are a compromise solution, since it is not possible to fully satisfy the ABTU requirements. Option 101 was a tank weighing 7.5 tons with a hull according to the type of hull, but with vertical side sheets of cemented armor 10-13 mm thick, since: “The inclined sides, causing serious weighting of the suspension and hull, require a significant (up to 300 mm) widening of the hull, not to mention the complication of the tank.

Video reviews of tanks in which the tank’s power unit was planned to be based on the 250-horsepower MG-31F aircraft engine, which was being developed by industry for agricultural aircraft and gyroplanes. 1st grade gasoline was placed in the tank under the floor of the fighting compartment and in additional onboard gas tanks. The armament fully corresponded to the task and consisted of coaxial machine guns DK 12.7 mm caliber and DT (in the second version of the project even ShKAS is listed) 7.62 mm caliber. The combat weight of the tank with torsion bar suspension was 5.2 tons, with spring suspension - 5.26 tons. Tests took place from July 9 to August 21 according to the methodology approved in 1938, with special attention being paid to tanks.