After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that big war inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finnish territory. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet- Finnish war 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Maynila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved him from starting a war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the initial days of the war, until approximately December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi), on December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), and on December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland) entered it. And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. While retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore a defense line did not require large number fortifications

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. In this moment Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active actions were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks began on the Mannerheim line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have much strength and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced them to start a war, during which blood was shed Soviet soldiers.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor performance of the command staff, but the bigger problem is coherence between the branches of the military. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This could not be done, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 are in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel are not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders – 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse composition - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not now analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all the necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, Finnish talvisota - Winter War, Swedish vinterkriget) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

On November 26, 1939, the USSR government sent a note of protest to the Finnish government regarding the artillery shelling, which, according to the Soviet side, was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was placed entirely on Finland. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland (with the second largest city of Vyborg). 430 thousand Finnish residents were forcibly resettled by Finland from the front-line areas inland and lost their property.

According to a number of historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland dates back to the Second World War. In Soviet historiography, this war was viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict, not part of the Second World War, just like the battles at Khalkhin Gol. The outbreak of hostilities led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR, as an aggressor, was expelled from the League of Nations.

Background

Events of 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the “whites”. After the victory in Finland, the Finnish “White” troops provided support to the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty was concluded. Some Finnish politicians, such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded the treaty as "too good a peace", believing that great powers would only compromise when absolutely necessary. K. Mannerheim, former activists and leaders of separatists in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a disgrace and a betrayal of compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Finnish: H. H. (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Mannerheim, in his “oath of the sword,” publicly spoke out for the conquest of Eastern Karelia, which was not previously part of the Principality of Finland.

Nevertheless, relations between Finland and the USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, were transferred to Finland in the Arctic, were not friendly, however openly hostile too.

In the late 1920s - early 1930s, the idea of ​​general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their weapons. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliament members have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, to save money, no military exercises have been held at all. The allocated money was barely enough to maintain the army. The parliament did not consider the cost of providing weapons. There were no tanks or military aircraft.

However, the Defense Council was created, which was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim on July 10, 1931. He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in the USSR, the situation there was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “The plague coming from the east could be contagious.” In a conversation that same year with Risto Ryti, then the governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, Mannerheim outlined his thoughts on the need to quickly create a military program and finance it. However, Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the benefit of providing the military department with such large sums if no war is expected?”

In August 1931, after inspecting the defensive structures of the Enckel Line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.

In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the Finnish budget of 1934, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was crossed out.

V. Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of parliament “...still believes that prerequisite preserving the independence of the country is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that this is worth all the costs of defense.”

Mannerheim described his efforts as “a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow pipe filled with resin.” It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future were met with a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his position.

Negotiations 1938-1939

Yartsev's negotiations in 1938-1939

The negotiations were started at the initiative of the USSR; initially they were conducted in secret, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain “free hands” in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view vision domestic policy, since the population of Finland had a generally negative attitude towards the USSR.

On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived in Helsinki, at the USSR Embassy in Finland. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side attack through Finland. That is why Finland’s attitude towards the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait on the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide it with military and economic assistance, since Finland itself is not able to repel the German landing. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner. The Finnish side's guarantees that Finland would not allow its territorial integrity to be violated and Soviet Russia to be invaded through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, obligatory in the event of a German attack, its participation in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Åland Islands and the placement of Soviet military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Hogland (Finnish: Suursaari). No territorial demands were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.

In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tyutyarsaari and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they were still practically impossible to defend or use to protect the Karelian Isthmus. However, negotiations were fruitless and ended on April 6, 1939.

On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany entered into a Non-Aggression Treaty. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-interference in the event of war. Germany began World War II by attacking Poland a week later, on September 1, 1939. USSR troops entered Polish territory on September 17.

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.

On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9.

For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.

At these negotiations, the proximity of the border to Leningrad was discussed for the first time. Joseph Stalin remarked: “We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it.”

The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked like this:

Finland moves the border 90 km from Leningrad.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja (Finnish) Russian.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytjarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed a territorial exchange in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that demands for military bases should be accepted and that there was no point in hoping for German help.

The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. Instead, a compromise option was proposed - the Soviet Union was offered the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoi Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland, and the territories closest to Leningrad in Terijoki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. The Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.

Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.

Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and from mid-September the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

The Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - while at the same time trying to achieve a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and Soviet consent to armament of the Åland Islands, the demilitarized status of which was regulated Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.

The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /IN. Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.

Negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side followed with a statement: “We civilians have made no progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers.”

However, Stalin made concessions the next day, offering to buy it instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to reaching an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.

On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “We will throw to hell every game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down all and every obstacle on the way to the goal.” " On the same day, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet received directives to prepare for military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin, at least outwardly, showed a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases. But the Finns refused to discuss it, and on November 13 they left for Helsinki.

There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered to confirm the correctness of its position.

On November 26, Pravda published an article “A buffoon at the post of Prime Minister,” which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign. On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the village of Maynila. The USSR leadership blamed Finland for this incident. In Soviet information agencies, a new one was added to the terms “White Guard”, “White Pole”, “White emigrant” widely used to name hostile elements - “White Finn”.

On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were given the order to go on the offensive.

Causes of the war

According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably be captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Leningrad City Council was also the border between the USSR and Finland.

“Did the Government and Party do the right thing by declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army.

Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

Speech by I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the commanding staff 04/17/1940"

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. The only constant in the demands was the following: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.

Already during the war, two concepts emerged that are still being debated: one, that the USSR pursued its stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second, that the true goal of the USSR was the Sovietization of Finland.

However, today there is a different division of concepts, namely: according to the principle of classifying a military conflict as a separate war or part of the Second World War, which, in turn, represents the USSR as a peace-loving country or as an aggressor and ally of Germany. Moreover, according to these concepts, the Sovietization of Finland was only a cover for the USSR’s preparation for a lightning invasion and the liberation of Europe from German occupation with the subsequent Sovietization of all of Europe and the part of African countries occupied by Germany.

M.I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war, both countries had claims against each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 1930s, the closure of Finnish schools, and so on. The USSR, in turn, knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to “return” Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland’s unilateral rapprochement with Western countries and, above all, with Germany, which Finland agreed to, in turn, because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhuvud said in Berlin in 1937 that “the enemy of Russia must always be the friend of Finland.” In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) it began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated that a forceful solution was being prepared.

According to A. Shubin, before the signing of the Soviet-German Pact, the USSR undoubtedly sought only to ensure the security of Leningrad. Helsinki’s assurances of its neutrality did not satisfy Stalin, since, firstly, he considered the Finnish government to be hostile and ready to join any external aggression against the USSR, and secondly (and this was confirmed by subsequent events), the neutrality of small countries itself did not guarantee that they could not be used as a springboard for attack (as a result of occupation). After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the demands of the USSR became stricter, and here the question arises of what Stalin was really striving for at this stage. Theoretically, presenting his demands in the fall of 1939, Stalin could plan to carry out in the coming year in Finland: a) Sovietization and inclusion in the USSR (as happened with other Baltic countries in 1940), or b) a radical social reorganization while maintaining formal signs of independence and political pluralism (as was done after the war in the Eastern European so-called “people's democracies”, or in) Stalin could only plan for now to strengthen his positions on the northern flank of a potential theater of military operations, without risking yet interfering in the internal affairs of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. M. Semiryaga believes that to determine the nature of the war against Finland, “it is not necessary to analyze the negotiations in the fall of 1939. To do this, you just need to know the general concept of the world communist movement of the Comintern and the Stalinist concept - great power claims to those regions that were previously part of the Russian Empire... And the goals were to annex all of Finland as a whole. And there is no point in talking about 35 kilometers to Leningrad, 25 kilometers to Leningrad...” Finnish historian O. Manninen believes that Stalin sought to deal with Finland according to the same scenario, which was ultimately implemented with the Baltic countries. “Stalin’s desire to “resolve issues peacefully” was the desire to peacefully create a socialist regime in Finland. And at the end of November, starting the war, he wanted to achieve the same thing through occupation. “The workers themselves had to decide whether to join the USSR or found their own socialist state.” However, O. Manninen notes, since these plans of Stalin were not formally recorded, this view will always remain in the status of an assumption and not a provable fact. There is also a version that, putting forward claims to border lands and a military base, Stalin, like Hitler in Czechoslovakia, sought to first disarm his neighbor, taking away his fortified territory, and then capture him.

An important argument in favor of the theory of Sovietization of Finland as the goal of the war is the fact that on the second day of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and, according to Ryti, refused any contact with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti.

We can assume with a great deal of confidence: if things at the front had gone according to the operational plan, then this “government” would have arrived in Helsinki with a specific political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners.” Kuusinen’s address to the soldiers of the Finnish People’s Army directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the building of the Presidential Palace in Helsinki.

However, in reality, this “government” was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov’s statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow, Assarsson, on March 4, 1940, that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then subsequent Soviet peace conditions will be even tougher and the USSR will then agree to a final agreement with the “government” of Kuusinen

M. I. Semiryaga. "Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1941-1945"

A number of other measures were also taken, in particular, among the Soviet documents on the eve of the war there are detailed instructions on the organization of the “Popular Front” in the occupied territories. M. Meltyukhov, on this basis, sees in Soviet actions a desire to Sovietize Finland through an intermediate stage of a left-wing “people's government”. S. Belyaev believes that the decision to Sovietize Finland is not evidence of the original plan to seize Finland, but was made only on the eve of the war due to the failure of attempts to agree on changing the border.

According to A. Shubin, Stalin’s position in the fall of 1939 was situational, and he maneuvered between a minimum program - ensuring the security of Leningrad, and a maximum program - establishing control over Finland. Stalin did not strive directly for the Sovietization of Finland, as well as the Baltic countries, at that moment, since he did not know how the war would end in the West (indeed, in the Baltics decisive steps towards Sovietization were taken only in June 1940, that is, immediately after how the defeat of France took place). Finland's resistance to Soviet demands forced him to resort to a tough military option at an unfavorable moment for him (in winter). Ultimately, he ensured that he at least completed the minimum program.

According to Yu. A. Zhdanov, back in the mid-1930s, Stalin in a private conversation announced a plan (“distant future”) to move the capital to Leningrad, noting its proximity to the border.

Strategic plans of the parties

USSR plan

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in three directions. The first of them was on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the Finnish defense line (which during the war was called the “Mannerheim Line”) in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga.

The second direction was central Karelia, adjacent to that part of Finland where its latitudinal extent was the smallest. It was planned here, in the Suomussalmi-Raate area, to cut the country's territory in two and enter the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia into the city of Oulu. The selected and well-equipped 44th Division was intended for the parade in the city.

Finally, in order to prevent counterattacks and possible landings of Finland's Western allies from the Barents Sea, it was planned to conduct military operations in Lapland.

The main direction was considered to be the direction to Vyborg - between Vuoksa and the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here, after successfully breaking through the defense line (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on a territory convenient for tanks to operate, which did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself in the most complete way. After breaking through the fortifications, it was planned to launch an attack on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. At the same time, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned. This would ensure a quick takeover of Norway in the future and stop supplies iron ore to Germany.

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect: “it was believed that the Finnish army was in war time will have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions.” In addition, the Soviet command did not have information about the line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, and by the beginning of the war they had only “sketchy intelligence information” about them. Thus, even at the height of the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, Meretskov doubted that the Finns had long-term structures, although he was reported about the existence of the Poppius (Sj4) and Millionaire (Sj5) pillboxes.

Finland plan

In the direction of the main attack correctly determined by Mannerheim, it was supposed to detain the enemy for as long as possible.

The Finnish defense plan north of Lake Ladoga was to stop the enemy on the line Kitelya (Pitkäranta area) - Lemetti (near Lake Syskujarvi). If necessary, the Russians were to be stopped further north at Lake Suoyarvi in ​​echelon positions. Before the war, a railway line from the Leningrad-Murmansk railway was built here and large reserves of ammunition and fuel were created. Therefore, the Finns were surprised when seven divisions were brought into battle on the northern shore of Ladoga, the number of which was increased to 10.

The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee rapid stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment on the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then carry out a counter-offensive in Karelia.

Armed forces of opponents

	Divisions, calculated	Private compound	Guns and mortars	Tanks	Aircraft
Finnish army
Red Army
Ratio

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below indicates how many days of the war the supplies available in warehouses lasted:

• cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns - for 2.5 months;
• shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - for 1 month;
• fuels and lubricants - for 2 months;
• aviation gasoline - for 1 month.

The Finnish military industry was represented by one state-owned cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiment, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineer companies, one communications company, one engineer company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one battery of anti-tank guns, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.

The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

Weapon	Finnish division	Soviet division
Rifles
Submachine guns
Automatic and semi-automatic rifles
7.62 mm machine guns
12.7 mm machine guns
Anti-aircraft machine guns (four-barreled)
Dyakonov rifle grenade launchers
Mortars 81−82 mm
Mortars 120 mm
Field artillery (37-45 mm caliber guns)
Field artillery (75-90 mm caliber guns)
Field artillery (105-152 mm caliber guns)
Armored vehicles

The Soviet division was twice as powerful as the Finnish division in terms of the total firepower of machine guns and mortars, and three times as powerful in artillery firepower. The Red Army did not have submachine guns in service, but this was partially compensated by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; They had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.

On the Karelian Isthmus, Finland’s line of defense was the “Mannerheim Line,” consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-earth firing points, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers that had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 long-term fire structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. In 1939, the most modern fortifications were created. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the state’s financial capabilities, and the people called them “millionaires” due to their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified with numerous artillery batteries on the shore and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to coordinate the fire of Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work: by the beginning of the war, Estonia had provided its territories for military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for partisan actions, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain, where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads and ice-covered lakes, where enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to accommodate aircraft from the Western Allies.

Finland began building its navy with coastal defense ironclads (sometimes incorrectly called "battleships"), equipped for maneuvering and fighting in skerries. Their main dimensions: displacement - 4000 tons, speed - 15.5 knots, armament - 4x254 mm, 8x105 mm. The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Cause of war and breakdown of relations

The official reason for the war was the Maynila Incident: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note stating that “On November 26, at 15:45, our troops located on the Karelian Isthmus near the border of Finland, near the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon from Finnish territory by artillery fire. A total of seven gun shots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two command personnel were wounded. Soviet troops, having strict orders not to succumb to provocation, refrained from returning fire.". The note was drawn up in moderate terms and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops 20-25 km from the border in order to avoid a repetition of incidents. Meanwhile, Finnish border guards hastily conducted an investigation into the incident, especially since border posts witnessed the shelling. In a response note, the Finns stated that the shelling was recorded by Finnish posts, the shots were fired from the Soviet side, according to the observations and estimates of the Finns, from a distance of about 1.5-2 km to the southeast of the place where the shells fell, that on the border the Finns only have border guards troops and no guns, especially long-range ones, but that Helsinki is ready to begin negotiations on the mutual withdrawal of troops and begin a joint investigation of the incident. The USSR's response note read: “The denial on the part of the Finnish government of the fact of the outrageous artillery shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops, which resulted in casualties, cannot be explained otherwise than by a desire to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling.<…>The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw troops who carried out a villainous attack on Soviet troops, and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, formally based on the principle of equality of arms, exposes the hostile desire of the Finnish government to keep Leningrad under threat.”. The USSR announced its withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland, citing the fact that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad created a threat to the city and was a violation of the pact.

On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen (Finnish) Aarno Yrjo-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note. It stated that, in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which rests with the Finnish government, the USSR government recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a break in diplomatic relations. On the same day, the Finns noted an attack on their border guards at Petsamo.

On the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations on the part of the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District at 8 o’clock in the morning on November 30 crossed the border of Finland on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas”. That same day, Soviet aircraft bombed and machine-gunned Helsinki; At the same time, as a result of the pilots' error, mainly residential working areas were damaged. In response to protests from European diplomats, Molotov stated that Soviet planes were dropping bread on Helsinki for the starving population (after which Soviet bombs began to be called “Molotov bread baskets” in Finland). However, there was no official declaration of war.

In Soviet propaganda and then historiography, responsibility for the outbreak of the war was placed on Finland and Western countries: “ The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939 they managed to provoke Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR».

Mannerheim, who as commander-in-chief had the most reliable information about the incident near Maynila, reports:

...And now the provocation that I had been expecting since mid-October happened. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border... ...We did not have to wait long for the implementation of Molotov’s words spoken at Moscow negotiations: “Now it will be the soldiers’ turn to talk.” On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation now known as “Shots at Maynila”... During the 1941-1944 war, Russian prisoners described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized...

N. S. Khrushchev says that in late autumn (meaning November 26) he dined in Stalin’s apartment with Molotov and Kuusinen. There was a conversation between the latter about the implementation of the decision that had already been made - presenting Finland with an ultimatum; At the same time, Stalin announced that Kuusinen would lead the new Karelo-Finnish SSR with the annexation of the “liberated” Finnish regions. Stalin believed “that after Finland is presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature and if it rejects them, military action will have to begin”, noting: “this thing starts today”. Khrushchev himself believed (in agreement with Stalin's sentiments, as he claims) that "It's enough to tell them loudly<финнам>, if they don’t hear, then fire the cannon once, and the Finns will raise their hands up and agree with the demands.”. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.I. Kulik (artilleryman) was sent to Leningrad in advance to organize a provocation. Khrushchev, Molotov and Kuusinen sat with Stalin for a long time, waiting for the Finns to answer; everyone was sure that Finland would be scared and agree to Soviet conditions.

It should be noted that internal Soviet propaganda did not advertise the Maynila incident, which served as a frankly formal reason: it emphasized that the Soviet Union was making a liberation campaign in Finland to help Finnish workers and peasants overthrow the oppression of the capitalists. A striking example is the song “Accept us, Suomi-beauty”:

We come to help you deal with it,
Pay with interest for the shame.
Welcome us, Suomi - beauty,
In a necklace of clear lakes!

At the same time, the mention in the text of “a low sun autumn"gives rise to the assumption that the text was written ahead of time in anticipation of an earlier start of the war.

War

After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began evacuating the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered between November 29 and December 4.

The beginning of the battles

The first stage of the war is usually considered to be the period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing in the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.

The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Army of the Isthmus (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman. For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi. Until the end of December, attempts at a breakthrough continued, but were unsuccessful.

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen. Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.

The advance of the 9th and 14th Armies was opposed by the Northern Finland Task Force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy’s defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The forces of the 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Some researchers and memoirists try to explain Soviet failures also by the weather: severe frosts (up to −40 °C) and deep snow - up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +1 to −23.4 °C. Then, until the New Year, the temperature did not drop below −23 °C. Frosts down to −40 °C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Significant problems for the Soviet troops were caused by Finland's use of mine-explosive devices, including homemade ones, which were installed not only on the front line, but also in the rear of the Red Army, along troop routes. On January 10, 1940, in the report of the authorized People's Commissariat of Defense, Army Commander II Rank Kovalev, to the People's Commissariat of Defense, it was noted that, along with enemy snipers, the main losses to the infantry were caused by mines. Later, at a meeting of the commanding staff of the Red Army to collect experience in combat operations against Finland on April 14, 1940, the chief of engineers of the North-Western Front, brigade commander A.F. Khrenov, noted that in the front action zone (130 km) the total length of the minefields was 386 km, with In this case, mines were used in combination with non-explosive engineering obstacles.

An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use by the Finns against Soviet tanks Molotov cocktails, later nicknamed “Molotov cocktails.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Terijoki government

On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the village of Terijoki (now the city of Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.

On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.

The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the agreement, neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”

In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.

It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, was no longer governing the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government”, which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government”. The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.

Finnish People's Army

On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (made of khaki cloth and similar to the Finnish uniform of 1927; claims that it was a captured uniform Polish army, are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).

This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. The Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks prepared a draft instruction “Where to begin the political and organizational work of communists (note: the word “ communists“crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create a popular front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.

Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, the roads were mined. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.

When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Foreign military assistance to Finland

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. In total, over 11 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, including 8 thousand from Sweden (“Swedish Volunteer Corps (English) Russian”), 1 thousand from Norway, 600 from Denmark, 400 from Hungary (“Detachment Sisu"), 300 from the USA, as well as citizens of Great Britain, Estonia and a number of other countries. A Finnish source puts the figure at 12 thousand foreigners who arrived in Finland to take part in the war.

• Among those who fought on the side of Finland were Russian White emigrants: in January 1940, B. Bazhanov and several other Russian White emigrants from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) arrived in Finland; after a meeting on January 15, 1940 with Mannerheim, they received permission to form anti-Soviet armed detachments from captured Red Army soldiers. Subsequently, several small “Russian People’s Detachments” were created from the prisoners under the command of six White emigrant officers from the EMRO. Only one of these detachments - 30 former prisoners of war under the command of "Staff Captain K." for ten days he was on the front line and managed to take part in the hostilities.
• Jewish refugees who arrived from a number of European countries joined the Finnish army.

Great Britain supplied Finland with 75 aircraft (24 Blenheim bombers, 30 Gladiator fighters, 11 Hurricane fighters and 11 Lysander reconnaissance aircraft), 114 field guns, 200 anti-tank guns, 124 automatic small arms, 185 thousand artillery pieces shells, 17,700 aerial bombs, 10 thousand anti-tank mines and 70 Boyce anti-tank rifles model 1937.

France decided to supply Finland with 179 aircraft (transfer 49 fighters free of charge and sell another 130 aircraft of various types), but in fact during the war 30 M.S.406C1 fighters were transferred free of charge and six more Caudron C.714 arrived after the end of hostilities and in the war did not participate; Finland also received 160 field guns, 500 machine guns, 795 thousand artillery shells, 200 thousand hand grenades, 20 million rounds of ammunition, 400 sea mines and several thousand sets of ammunition. Also, France became the first country to officially allow the registration of volunteers to participate in the Finnish war.

Sweden supplied Finland with 29 aircraft, 112 field guns, 85 anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns, 500 automatic small arms, 80 thousand rifles, 30 thousand artillery shells, 50 million rounds of ammunition, as well as other military equipment and raw materials. In addition, the Swedish government allowed the country's "Finland's Cause - Our Cause" campaign to collect donations for Finland, and the Swedish Bank provided a loan to Finland.

The Danish government sold Finland about 30 pieces of 20-mm anti-tank guns and shells for them (at the same time, in order to avoid accusations of violating neutrality, the order was called “Swedish”); sent a medical convoy and skilled workers to Finland, and also authorized a campaign to raise funds for Finland.

Italy sent 35 Fiat G.50 fighters to Finland, but five aircraft were destroyed during their transportation and development by personnel. The Italians also transferred to Finland 94.5 thousand Mannlicher-Carcano rifles mod. 1938, 1500 Beretta pistols mod. 1915 and 60 Beretta M1934 pistols.

The Union of South Africa donated 22 Gloster Gauntlet II fighters to Finland.

A representative of the US government made a statement that the entry of American citizens into the Finnish army does not contradict the US neutrality law, a group of American pilots was sent to Helsinki, and in January 1940 the US Congress approved the sale of 10 thousand rifles to Finland. Also, the United States sold Finland 44 Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters, but they arrived too late and did not have time to take part in hostilities.

Belgium supplied Finland with 171 MP.28-II submachine guns, and in February 1940 - 56 P-08 Parabellum pistols.

Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano in his diary mentions assistance to Finland from the Third Reich: in December 1939, the Finnish envoy to Italy reported that Germany “unofficially” sent to Finland a batch of captured weapons captured during the Polish campaign. In addition, on December 21, 1939, Germany entered into an agreement with Sweden in which it promised to supply Sweden with the same amount of weapons as it would transfer to Finland from its own reserves. The agreement caused an increase in the volume of military assistance from Sweden to Finland.

In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles and other weapons, as well as 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland.

Fighting in December - January

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and supply of the Red Army troops, poor preparedness of the command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Units of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.

To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 m.

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. Formations of the 8th and 9th armies operating along roads in continuous forest areas, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used guerrilla warfare tactics: small autonomous squads of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in dark time days, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were set up. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi became widely known in Finland and abroad. The village of Suomussalmi was occupied on December 7 by the forces of the Soviet 163rd Infantry Division of the 9th Army, which was given the responsible task of striking Oulu, reaching the Gulf of Bothnia and, as a result, cutting Finland in half. However, the division was subsequently surrounded by (smaller) Finnish forces and cut off from supplies. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help her, which, however, was blocked on the road to Suomussalmi, in a defile between two lakes near the village of Raate by the forces of two companies of the 27th Finnish regiment (350 people). Without waiting for its approach, the 163rd Division at the end of December, under constant attacks from the Finns, was forced to break out of the encirclement, losing 30% of its personnel and most of its equipment and heavy weapons. After which the Finns transferred the released forces to encircle and liquidate the 44th Division, which by January 8 was completely destroyed in the battle on the Raat Road. Almost the entire division was killed or captured, and only a small part of the military personnel managed to escape from the encirclement, abandoning all equipment and convoys (the Finns received 37 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 350 machine guns, 97 guns (including 17 howitzers), several thousand rifles, 160 vehicles , all radio stations). The Finns won this double victory with forces several times smaller than the enemy (11 thousand, according to other sources - 17 thousand) people with 11 guns versus 45-55 thousand with 335 guns, more than 100 tanks and 50 armored vehicles. The command of both divisions was placed under tribunal. The commander and commissar of the 163rd division were removed from command, one regimental commander was shot; Before the formation of their division, the command of the 44th division (brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov) was shot.

The victory at Suomussalmi had enormous moral significance for the Finns; Strategically, it buried plans for a breakthrough to the Gulf of Bothnia, which were extremely dangerous for the Finns, and so paralyzed Soviet troops in this area that they did not take active action until the very end of the war.

At the same time, south of Suomussalmi, in the Kuhmo area, the Soviet 54th Infantry Division was surrounded. The winner of Suomussalmi, Colonel Hjalmar Siilsavuo, was promoted to major general, but he was never able to liquidate the division, which remained surrounded until the end of the war. The 168th Rifle Division, which was advancing on Sortavala, was surrounded at Lake Ladoga and was also surrounded until the end of the war. There, in South Lemetti, at the end of December and beginning of January, the 18th Infantry Division of General Kondrashov, along with the 34th Tank Brigade of Brigade Commander Kondratyev, was surrounded. Already at the end of the war, on February 28, they tried to break out of the encirclement, but upon exiting they were defeated in the so-called “valley of death” near the city of Pitkäranta, where one of the two exiting columns was completely destroyed. As a result, out of 15,000 people, 1,237 people left the encirclement, half of them wounded and frostbitten. Brigade commander Kondratyev shot himself, Kondrashov managed to get out, but was soon shot, and the division was disbanded due to the loss of the banner. The number of deaths in the “valley of death” was 10% of total number died in the entire Soviet-Finnish war. These episodes were vivid manifestations of the Finnish tactics, called mottitaktiikka, the tactics of motti - “pincers” (literally motti - a pile of firewood that is placed in the forest in groups, but at a certain distance from each other). Taking advantage of their advantage in mobility, detachments of Finnish skiers blocked roads clogged with sprawling Soviet columns, cut off the advancing groups and then wore them down with unexpected attacks from all sides, trying to destroy them. At the same time, the surrounded groups, unable, unlike the Finns, to fight off roads, usually huddled together and occupied a passive all-round defense, making no attempt to actively resist the attacks of the Finnish partisan detachments. Their complete destruction was made difficult for the Finns only by the lack of mortars and heavy weapons in general.

On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in Interposelok, Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goimae, Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma, Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.

On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.

On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops, according to which, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front were to go on the offensive.

On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.

Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa region were not successful, the main attack was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.

During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.

On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam, and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.

By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.

At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.

England and France: plans for military operations against the USSR

Great Britain provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other hand, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, “we would have to fight one way or another.” The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, approached Halifax on December 1, 1939, asking for permission to ship war materials to Finland, provided they were not re-exported to Nazi Germany (with which Britain was at war). The head of the Northern Department, Laurence Collier, believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while opposing, however, the proposed Finland used the Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Thomas Snow (English) Thomas Snow), the British representative in Helsinki, continued to support the idea of ​​​​an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he had expressed before the war.

Amid government disagreements, the British Army began supplying weapons, including artillery and tanks, in December 1939 (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).

When Finland requested the supply of bombers for attacks on Moscow and Leningrad, as well as for the destruction of the railway to Murmansk, last idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Department of the North: helping the Finns destroy the road would allow Britain to “avoid carrying out the same operation later, independently and in less favorable conditions.” Maclean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with Maclean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Gerrard, plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, then emerging in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasement of the aggressors was wrong; Now the enemy, unlike his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not on ideological, but on humanitarian grounds.

Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in “circles close to the government” there was a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that at a conscious level the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to exchange one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely linked.

From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense due to the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany through a blockade. Soviet supplies of raw materials meant that the German economy continued to grow, and the French began to realize that after some time, as a result of this growth, winning the war against Germany would become impossible. In such a situation, although moving the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, inaction was an even worse alternative. The Chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, ordered the planning of an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.

Great Britain did not support some French plans: for example, an attack on oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also moving closer to opening a second front against the USSR.

On 5 February 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill attended but did not speak), it was decided to seek Norwegian and Swedish consent to a British-led operation in which an expeditionary force would land in Norway and move east.

French plans, as Finland's situation worsened, became more and more one-sided.

On March 2, 1940, Daladier announced his readiness to send 50,000 French soldiers and 100 bombers to Finland for the war against the USSR. The British government was not informed in advance of Daladier's statement, but agreed to send 50 British bombers to Finland. A coordination meeting was scheduled for March 12, 1940, but due to the end of the war the plans remained unrealized.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.

Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13.

According to J. Roberts, Stalin's conclusion of peace on relatively moderate terms could have been caused by the awareness of the fact that an attempt to forcefully Sovietize Finland would have encountered massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the German side.

For participation in the Finnish war, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 412 military personnel, over 50 thousand were awarded orders and medals.

Results of the war

All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, " the war ended after 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom set for Finland turned out to be correct».

The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).

In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build a railway on its territory connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.

On October 11, 1940, the Agreement between the USSR and Finland on the Åland Islands was signed in Moscow, according to which the USSR had the right to place its consulate on the islands, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone.

For starting the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the mass protests of the international community over the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aircraft, including the use of incendiary bombs. US President Roosevelt also joined the protests.

US President Roosevelt declared a “moral embargo” on the Soviet Union in December. On March 29, 1940, Molotov stated in the Supreme Council that Soviet imports from the United States had even increased compared to the previous year, despite the obstacles put in place by the American authorities. In particular, the Soviet side complained about obstacles to Soviet engineers gaining access to aircraft factories. In addition, under various trade agreements in the period 1939-1941. The Soviet Union received 6,430 machine tools from Germany worth 85.4 million marks, which compensated for the decrease in equipment supplies from the United States.

Another negative result for the USSR was the formation among the leadership of a number of countries of the idea of ​​​​the weakness of the Red Army. Information about the course, circumstances and results (a significant excess of Soviet losses over Finnish ones) of the Winter War strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany. At the beginning of January 1940, the German envoy in Helsinki Blucher presented a memorandum to the Foreign Ministry with the following assessments: despite superiority in manpower and equipment, the Red Army suffered one defeat after another, left thousands of people in captivity, lost hundreds of guns, tanks, aircraft and decisively failed to conquer the territory. In this regard, German ideas about Bolshevik Russia should be reconsidered. The Germans proceeded from false premises when they believed that Russia was a first-class military factor. But in reality, the Red Army has so many shortcomings that it cannot cope even with a small country. Russia in reality does not pose a threat to such a great power as Germany, the rear in the East is safe, and therefore it will be possible to speak with the gentlemen in the Kremlin in a completely different language than it was in August - September 1939. For his part, Hitler, based on the results Winter War, called the USSR a colossus with feet of clay.

W. Churchill testifies that "failure of Soviet troops" caused in public opinion in England "contempt"; “In British circles many congratulated themselves on the fact that we were not very zealous in trying to win the Soviets to our side<во время переговоров лета 1939 г.>, and were proud of their foresight. People too hastily concluded that the purge destroyed the Russian army and that all this confirmed the organic rottenness and decline of the Russian state and social system.”.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter, in wooded and swampy areas, experience in breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics. In clashes with Finnish troops equipped with a Suomi submachine gun, it was found important submachine guns, previously removed from service: the production of PPD was hastily restored and technical specifications were given for the creation of a new submachine gun system, which resulted in the appearance of the PPSh.

Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which it made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to test out possible changes. Relations were initially cool, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently organized a meeting with Hermann Goering, the second man in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström at the end of the 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “ Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest" Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.

The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; in addition, they could in a certain way influence the leadership of the Reich regarding plans for an attack on the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis powers was called the "Continuation War" in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
2. Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
3. Part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas (the Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland).
4. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
5. Rent of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for 30 years.

In total, as a result of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand km² of Finnish territories. Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War, and in 1944 they again ceded to the USSR (see Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944)).

Finnish losses

Military

According to 1991 data:

• killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people);
• wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people);
• prisoners - 1000 people.

Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. brief information about each of the victims on the Finnish side was published in a number of Finnish publications.

Modern information about the circumstances of the death of Finnish military personnel:

• 16,725 killed in action, remains evacuated;
• 3,433 killed in action, remains not evacuated;
• 3671 died in hospitals from wounds;
• 715 died from non-combat causes (including diseases);
• 28 died in captivity;
• 1,727 missing and declared dead;
• The cause of death for 363 military personnel is unknown.

In total, 26,662 Finnish military personnel were killed.

Civil

According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombings of Finnish cities (including Helsinki), 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

Losses of foreign volunteers

During the war, the Swedish Volunteer Corps lost 33 people killed and 185 wounded and frostbite (with frostbite making up the vast majority - about 140 people).

Two Danes were killed - pilots who fought in the LLv-24 fighter air group, and one Italian who fought as part of the LLv-26.

USSR losses

Monument to those who fell in the Soviet-Finnish war (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy)

The first official figures for Soviet casualties in the war were published at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.

According to reports from the troops on March 15, 1940:

• wounded, sick, frostbitten - 248,090;
• killed and died during the sanitary evacuation stages - 65,384;
• died in hospitals - 15,921;
• missing - 14,043;
• total irrecoverable losses - 95,348.

Name lists

According to the lists of names compiled in 1949-1951 by the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Ground Forces, the losses of the Red Army in the war were as follows:

• died and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages - 71,214;
• died in hospitals from wounds and illnesses - 16,292;
• missing - 39,369.

In total, according to these lists, irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 military personnel.

Other loss estimates

In the period from 1990 to 1995, new, often contradictory data about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies appeared in Russian historical literature and in journal publications, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and a decrease in Finnish ones from 1990 to 1995. So, for example, in the articles of M. I. Semiryagi (1989) the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A. M. Noskov, a year later - 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P. A Aptekar in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, then, according to P. A. Aptekar, their number is more than double the results of the study by Semiryagi and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people. According to data from Soviet military archives and hospitals, sanitary losses amounted to (by name) 264,908 people. It is estimated that about 22 percent of the losses were due to frostbite.

Losses in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. based on the two-volume “History of Russia. XX century":

	USSR	Finland
1. Killed, died from wounds	about 150,000
2. Missing people
3. Prisoners of war	about 6000 (5465 returned)	From 825 to 1000 (about 600 returned)
4. Wounded, shell-shocked, frostbitten, burned
5. Airplanes (in pieces)
6. Tanks (in pieces)	650 destroyed, about 1800 knocked out, about 1500 out of action due to technical reasons
7. Losses at sea	submarine "S-2"	auxiliary patrol ship, tugboat on Ladoga

"Karelian Question"

After the war, local Finnish authorities and provincial organizations of the Karelian Union, created to protect the rights and interests of the evacuated residents of Karelia, tried to find a solution to the issue of returning lost territories. During the Cold War, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen repeatedly negotiated with the Soviet leadership, but these negotiations were unsuccessful. The Finnish side did not openly demand the return of these territories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of transferring territories to Finland was raised again.

In matters relating to the return of ceded territories, the Karelian Union acts together with and through the foreign policy leadership of Finland. In accordance with the “Karelia” program adopted in 2005 at the congress of the Karelian Union, the Karelian Union seeks to ensure that the political leadership of Finland actively monitors the situation in Russia and begins negotiations with Russia on the issue of the return of the ceded territories of Karelia as soon as a real basis arises and both sides will be ready for this.

Propaganda during the war

At the beginning of the war, the tone of the Soviet press was bravura - the Red Army looked ideal and victorious, while the Finns were portrayed as a frivolous enemy. On December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda will write:

You can’t help but admire the valiant soldiers of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles, brilliant automatic light machine guns. The armies of two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peace-loving, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists force to rattle their sabers. And the weapon, let’s be honest, is old and worn. There is not enough gunpowder for more.

However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the “Mannerheim Line”, difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, was stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov’s report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable “Mannerheim Line”, similar to the “Maginot Line” and the “Siegfried Line”, begins to live. which have not yet been crushed by any army. Later Anastas Mikoyan wrote: “ Stalin, an intelligent, capable man, in order to justify the failures during the war with Finland, invented the reason that we “suddenly” discovered a well-equipped Mannerheim line. A special film was released showing these structures to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win a victory.».

If Finnish propaganda portrayed the war as the defense of the homeland from cruel and merciless invaders, combining communist terrorism with traditional Russian great power (for example, in the song “No, Molotov!” the head of the Soviet government is compared with the tsarist governor-general of Finland Nikolai Bobrikov, known for his Russification policy and fight against autonomy), then Soviet Agitprop presented the war as a struggle against the oppressors of the Finnish people for the sake of the latter’s freedom. The term White Finns, used to designate the enemy, was intended to emphasize not the interstate or interethnic, but the class nature of the confrontation. “Your homeland has been taken away more than once - we are coming to return it”, says the song "Receive us, Suomi beauty", in an attempt to fend off accusations of taking over Finland. The order for LenVO troops dated November 29, signed by Meretskov and Zhdanov, states:

We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of landowners and capitalists.

We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the government of Kajander-Erkno, which oppresses the Finnish people and provoked a war with the USSR.
We respect the freedom and independence of Finland, gained by the Finnish people as a result of the October Revolution.

Mannerheim Line - alternative

Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify the long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the “incredibly strongly fortified” “Mannerheim Line” was firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the glorification of the line by the Finnish side literally - in song Mannerheimin linjalla(“On the Mannerheim Line”). The Belgian General Badu, a technical adviser on the construction of fortifications, a participant in the construction of the Maginot Line, stated:

Nowhere in the world natural conditions were not as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. At this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous “Mannerheim Line” was built from wood and granite, and where necessary from concrete. The anti-tank obstacles made in granite give the Mannerheim Line its greatest strength. Even twenty-five ton tanks cannot overcome them. Using explosions, the Finns built machine-gun and artillery nests in the granite, which were resistant to the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.

According to the Russian historian A. Isaev, “in reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of long-term Finnish structures were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete structures in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three bunkers of the “million-dollar” type had two levels, another three bunkers had three levels. Let me emphasize, precisely the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located on different levels relative to the surface, casemates slightly buried in the ground with embrasures and completely buried, connecting their galleries with the barracks. There were negligibly few buildings with what could be called floors.” It was much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov Line, not to mention the Maginot Line with multi-story caponiers equipped with their own power plants, kitchens, rest rooms and all amenities, with underground galleries connecting pillboxes, and even underground narrow-gauge railways. Along with the famous gouges made of granite boulders, the Finns used gouges made of low-quality concrete, designed for outdated Renault tanks and which turned out to be weak against the guns of new Soviet technology. In fact, the Mannerheim Line consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located along the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other, and rarely had cannon armament.

As O. Mannien notes, the Finns had enough resources to build only 101 concrete bunkers (from low-quality concrete), and they used less concrete than the building of the Helsinki Opera House; the rest of the fortifications of the Mannerheim line were wood and earthen (for comparison: the Maginot line had 5,800 concrete fortifications, including multi-story bunkers).

Mannerheim himself wrote:

... Even during the war, the Russians floated the myth of the “Mannerheim Line.” It was argued that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus relied on an unusually strong defensive rampart built with the latest technology, which can be compared with the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The Russian breakthrough was “a feat unparalleled in the history of all wars”... All this is nonsense; in reality, the state of things looks completely different... There was a defensive line, of course, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the “Mannerheim Line”. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures.

- Mannerheim, K. G. Memoirs. - M.: VAGRIUS, 1999. - P. 319-320. - ISBN 5-264-00049-2.

Perpetuation of memory

Monuments

• “Cross of Sorrow” is a memorial to Soviet and Finnish soldiers who fell in the Soviet-Finnish War. Opened June 27, 2000. Located in the Pitkyaranta region of the Republic of Karelia.
• The Kollasjärvi Memorial is a memorial to fallen Soviet and Finnish soldiers. Located in the Suoyarvi region of the Republic of Karelia.

Museums

• School Museum “Unknown War” - opened on November 20, 2013 at the municipal educational institution “Secondary School No. 34” in the city of Petrozavodsk.
• The “Military Museum of the Karelian Isthmus” was opened in Vyborg by historian Bair Irincheev.

Fiction about war

• Finnish wartime song “No, Molotov!” (mp3, with Russian translation)
• “Receive us, Suomi beauty” (mp3, with Finnish translation)
• The song "Talvisota" by Swedish power metal band Sabaton

• “Song about battalion commander Ugryumov” - a song about captain Nikolai Ugryumov, the first Hero of the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Finnish war
• Alexander Tvardovsky.“Two Lines” (1943) - a poem dedicated to the memory of Soviet soldiers who died during the war
• N. Tikhonov, “Savolaksky huntsman” - poem
• Alexander Gorodnitsky, “Finnish Border” - song.
• film “Frontline Girlfriends” (USSR, 1941)
• film “Behind Enemy Lines” (USSR, 1941)
• film “Mashenka” (USSR, 1942)
• film “Talvisota” (Finland, 1989).
• film “Angel's Chapel” (Russia, 2009).
• film “Military Intelligence: Northern Front (TV series)” (Russia, 2012).
• Computer game "Blitzkrieg"
• Computer game “Talvisota: Ice Hell”.
• Computer game "Squad Battles: Winter War".

Documentaries

• "The Living and the Dead." Documentary film about the “Winter War” directed by V. A. Fonarev
• “Mannerheim Line” (USSR, 1940)
• “Winter War” (Russia, Viktor Pravdyuk, 2014)

Introduction

The first Soviet-Finnish war - fighting between White Finnish and Soviet troops during the war officially announced on May 15, 1918. the government of Finland war with the Russian Federation after the defeat of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic. The First Soviet-Finnish War was part of the Russian Civil War and Foreign Military Intervention in northern Russia. However, even before this, during the Civil War in Finland, White Finnish troops pursued the enemy and in a number of places entered Eastern Karelia (see North Karelian state), carrying out military operations that were not always of a partisan nature (see Olonets campaign, Olonets government).

It ended on October 14, 1920 with the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty, which recorded a number of territorial concessions on the part of Soviet Russia.

1. Background

The October Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd marked the beginning of the Bolshevik seizure of power in all major cities of Russia. At the same time, centers of unification of anti-Bolshevik forces emerged throughout the country. A civil war began in Russia.

The fall of the Russian autocracy and the October Revolution of 1917 allowed the Finnish Senate to declare independence on December 6, 1917. On December 18 (31), 1917, the independence of the Republic of Finland was recognized by the Council of People's Commissars. Finland, in turn, recognized the Bolshevik government. At the same time, unrest intensified in the country and the struggle between “reds” and “whites” intensified, which by January 1918 escalated into a civil war. White Finnish detachments controlled the northern and central parts of the country, while the southern part with most of the large cities, where the de-Bolshevik units of the former Russian Imperial Army were concentrated, was occupied by detachments of the Finnish Red Guard.

By the spring of 1919, the Bolshevik government found itself in a difficult situation. The Supreme Ruler of Russia, Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin, were approaching Moscow from the northeast and south. In the Northern region and Estonia, Russian military volunteer units were completing their formation, the goal of which was red Petrograd.

2. Reasons

The Bolsheviks' rise to power caused widespread discontent in rural areas throughout Russia. The peasants were deprived of all political and economic rights, they were banned from trading grain and they began to take it by force. The regions of Karelia, which had never even known serfdom, learned what food detachments and committees were. Since most of the local peasantry fell under the definition of a kulak “saboteur,” cruel measures of requisitioning grain and livestock were applied to them. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, when huge territories were torn away from Russia, showed the weakness of Soviet power and caused discontent among various segments of the population.

Uprisings broke out, such as the Yaroslavl, Izhevsk-Votkinsk, Tambov uprisings, even independent territories were proclaimed. In the case of Ingria, the North Karelian state, Rebolskaya volost, Porayarvi, the rebels hoped for help from neighboring Finland, with which they had a common language and historical ties. On the wave of success in Finland, White hoped for more. Soviet Russia was surrounded by white armies and could not resist Germany. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia were also examples of a successful fight against Bolshevism relying on foreign support. The idea of ​​Greater Finland became widespread. According to the Finnish researcher Toivo Nigård, General Mannerheim had the opportunity to go down in history as a liberator from the Bolsheviks, if not all of Russia, then certainly Petrograd. Therefore, events can be divided into two stages. First: international struggle against the Bolsheviks, everywhere, in the hope of victory white movement in Russia as a whole. And the second stage, when it became clear that Soviet power would survive, and one could only hope for tactical successes on the ground, relying on the national movement and foreign assistance. The concepts of occupation and liberation during this historical period are extremely relative and vague. In Soviet historiography, it was customary to consider only the territorial and military aspects of the war. But at the same time, 30,000 migrants who went to Finland show the attitude of the population towards Sovietization.

On February 23, 1918, while at Antrea station (now Kamennogorsk), addressing the troops, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, delivered his speech, the “oath of the sword,” in which he stated that “he will not sheathe the sword,... before the last warrior and hooligan of Lenin is expelled from both Finland and East Karelia." However, there was no official declaration of war from Finland. General Manerheim’s desire to become the savior of “old Russia” was viewed negatively in Finland. At a minimum, they demanded the support of Western countries and guarantees that white Russia recognizes Finnish independence. , the white movement was unable to create a united front, which sharply reduced the chances of success. Other leaders of the white movement refused to recognize Finnish independence. And for more active actions, without risk to their country, allies were needed.

On February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the line Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - White Sea.

By the beginning of March, a plan for organizing “national uprisings in Eastern Karelia” was developed at Mannerheim’s headquarters and special Finnish instructors were allocated - career military personnel - to create hotbeds of uprising.

On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria). Russian garrisons were withdrawn from Finland. The Red Finns were defeated and fled to Karelia.

On March 6, the commander of the Northern Military District (Finnish: Pohjolan sotilaspiiri), senior lieutenant of the rangers Kurt Wallenius, suggested that Mannerheim launch an offensive in Eastern Karelia.

On March 6-7, an official statement by the head of the Finnish state, regent Per Evind Svinhufvud, appeared that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on “moderate Brest conditions,” that is, if Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway went to Finland and the entire Kola Peninsula.

On March 7-8, German Emperor Wilhelm II responded to an appeal from the Finnish government that Germany would not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and would not support Finland’s military actions if it moved them beyond its borders.

On March 7, the Finnish Prime Minister declares claims to Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and on March 15, Finnish General Mannerheim approves the “Wallenius Plan”, which provides for the seizure of part of the former territory of the Russian Empire up to the line Petsamo (Pechenga) - Kola Peninsula - White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga.

By mid-May 1918, the White Finns controlled the entire territory of the former Grand Duchy of Finland and began military operations to conquer Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula.

The landing of German troops in Finland and their occupation of Helsingfors caused serious concern among the Entente countries that were at war with Germany. Beginning in March 1918, in agreement with the Bolshevik government, Entente troops landed in Murmansk to protect Murmansk and the railway from a possible offensive by German-Finnish troops. From the Red Finns who retreated to the east, the British formed the Murmansk Legion, led by Oskari Tokoi, to act against the White Finns associated with the Germans.

In November 1918, Germany capitulated and began withdrawing its troops from the territories of the former Russian Empire that fell under German occupation as a result of the fighting of the First World War and the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, including from the territories of the Baltic countries. Taking advantage of this, Soviet Russia immediately attacked these outlying states.

On December 30, 1918, Finnish troops under the command of General Wetzer landed in Estonia, where they assisted the Estonian government in the fight against the Bolshevik troops.

In January 1919, the Finns occupied Porosozerna volost.

On April 21-22, the Olonets Volunteer Army from the territory of Finland launched a massive offensive in Eastern Karelia in the Olonets direction.

On April 21, volunteers occupied Vidlitsa, on April 23 - Tuloksa, in the evening of the same day - the city of Olonets, on April 24 they occupied Veshkelitsa, on April 25 they approached Pryazha, penetrated Sulazhgora and began to threaten Petrozavodsk directly. At the same time, Petrozavodsk was threatened from the north by British, Canadian and White Guard troops. At the end of April, the Red Army managed to hold back the advance of volunteers towards Petrozavodsk.

In May, White Guard troops in Estonia began military operations, threatening Petrograd.

In May and June, on the eastern and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Red Army detachments held back the advance of Finnish volunteers. In May-June 1919, Finnish volunteers advanced on the Lodeynoye Pole area and crossed the Svir.

At the end of June 1919, the Red Army began a counteroffensive in the Vidlitsa direction and on July 8, 1919 in the Olonets sector of the Karelian front. Finnish volunteers were driven back beyond the border line.

On May 18, 1920, units of the Red Army liquidated the North Karelian state with its capital in the village of Ukhta (Arkhangelsk province), which received financial and military assistance from the Finnish government. Only in July 1920 were the Finns able to be driven out of most of eastern Karelia. Finnish troops remained only in the Rebolsk and Porosozersk volosts of Eastern Karelia.

In 1920, according to the Tartu Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia made significant territorial concessions - independent Finland received Western Karelia up to the Sestra River, the Pechenga region in the Arctic, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula.

Bibliography:

Civil war in Finland and German intervention in 1918. Chronos

Toivo Nygård. Itä-Karjalasta Suomeen 1917-1922 tulleet pakolaiset, Suomen Sukututkimusseura www.genealogia.fi. Luetta 8.11. 2006 (fin.)

Text of the order from 1918 in the Finnish Wikisource.

“Pskov Province” No. 7(428)

“Suomi kautta aikojen” 1992. s.40 ISBN 951-8933-60-X

1. (fin.) SUOMI 2.3.-8.3.1918

   Pokhlebkin V.V. - Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts: Vol. II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the 1st half of the 20th century. Directory. M., 1999. P. 140.

   Mannerheim - Russian general, Finnish marshal

The Soviet-Finnish war, everything seems to be clear with it, the USSR is the aggressor, Finland is the victim, but there is a different point of view on this issue.
Yu.I. Mukhin "Crusade to the East" (http://lib.rus.ec/b/162956/read#t32)
Chapter 5. War as a cure for stupidity

I think that on the issue of NATO expansion to the East we are behaving the way our opponents want - we are resisting it. Is it necessary? These doubts came to my mind when I thought about the Soviet-Finnish war - the stupidest war of our century.
Defense of Leningrad

Leningrad is extremely vulnerable from a military point of view. Even without aviation, the capture of Leningrad is not an option for a strong enemy fleet. big problem. For the main calibers of artillery of enemy battleships, Kronstadt is not a great obstacle, and when the Leningrad ports are captured, the supply of troops by sea turns the Leningrad region into an area from which the enemy army can easily strike at the heart of Russia.

Therefore, the main idea of ​​​​the defense of St. Petersburg among the tsars was to prevent the enemy fleet from approaching the St. Petersburg approaches. For this purpose, the Gulf of Finland and all approaches to it were blocked with minefields during the First World War. But the mines can be removed. Therefore, the main task of the Baltic Fleet was to prevent the breakthrough of minefields - its ships were supposed to sink enemy ships when trying to remove mines.

However, it was easier for the king. If you look at the map of the Russian Empire, you will see that the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland is Finland, which was then part of the Russian Empire, and the southern coast is the imperial Baltic states. The Baltic Fleet was at home everywhere; its coastal batteries stood on both sides of the bay, covering the minefields from enemy minesweepers and preventing enemy ships from passing these batteries to St. Petersburg.

Even the day before the announcement of World War I, Vice Admiral Essen, commander of the Baltic Fleet, placed more than three thousand mines on the Tallinn-Helsinki line (Central Position), then their number was increased to 8 thousand, with 25 coastal batteries defending the position from the Finnish and Estonian coasts, on which there were 60 only 305 mm the most powerful weapons, firing shells weighing half a ton. Therefore, throughout the entire war the Germans made virtually no serious attempts to break through to Petrograd.

But in the USSR after the Revolution, nothing remained of this. Almost the entire southern coast belonged to Estonia, and from the Finnish border it was possible to fire at Leningrad from field guns. Sea mines, of course, they could have been installed, but not protected from the shore, they would have been instantly removed. The situation of both Leningrad and the USSR was tragic in its defenselessness.

And Hitler in Mein Kampf did not hide the fact that the Third Reich would be built on the territories of the USSR. Therefore, when Germany annexed Austria on March 12, 1938, it was the first call for the USSR. And already in April 1938, the Finnish government secretly received the first Soviet proposals. The USSR asked Finland to guarantee that it would resist the Germans if they attacked Finland, for which the Soviet Union offered its troops, navy and weapons. The Finns refused.

The USSR was looking for options. By the fall, he no longer offered a direct agreement, did not offer troops, but only asked for an agreement on the protection of the shores of Finland by the Baltic Fleet if Finland was attacked by the Germans. The Finns again refused and did not even try to continue negotiations. Meanwhile, England and France had already betrayed Czechoslovakia and the USSR in Munich. The USSR's ally, France, refused to defend Czechoslovakia; the second ally, Czechoslovakia itself, surrendered the Sudetenland to the Germans without firing a single shot. It became clear that for the West, all agreements on military alliances are nothing more than a piece of paper. To defend Leningrad, something more realistic was required; we had to rely only on our own strength.

In October 1938, the USSR offered the Finns assistance in building a military base on the Finnish island of Gogland in the Gulf of Finland and the right, if Finland could not cope with the defense of this island, to defend it jointly. The Finns refused.

The Soviet Union asked Finland to lease four small islands in the Gulf of Finland for 30 years. The Finns refused.

Then the USSR asked to exchange them for its territory. At this stage, the former brave (Order of St. George) general of the Russian army, and by that time the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, learned about the negotiations. He immediately proposed to the Finnish government to exchange not only the requested islands, but also the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, which the Soviet side did not even remember at that time. This shows how understandable the Soviet Union's requests were from a military point of view and how stupid the subsequent statements were that the USSR allegedly wanted to “capture Finland.”

Finnish Marshal Mannerheim fought the entire Second World War on the side of the Axis countries, and it was they and their accomplices who were tried by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. Mannerheim escaped trial, but this did not make his guilt any less. In addition, no matter how you look at it, Mannerheim in 1939-1944. lost two wars, which is also not the best recommendation for a marshal. Therefore, in his memoirs, Mannerheim dodges as best he can in order to obscure these two points and present the events of those times in a light favorable to the Finns. From this point of view, it would be beneficial for him to forget something in history and claim that in 1939 the war between Finland and the USSR began because the USSR wanted to capture and enslave the Finns. But let’s give Mannerheim his due - in this case he did not want to appear foolish and regarding the flaring up conflict he writes:

“On March 5, 1939, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, through the Ambassador of Finland in Moscow, Yurie Koskinen, proposed starting new negotiations. This time, the Soviet Union demanded a 30-year lease on the islands of the Gulf of Finland, Gogland, Lavansaari, Seskar and both Tyutyar-saari islands. The goal of the Soviet Union was not to build fortifications on these islands, but to use them as observation points on the way to Leningrad. Acceptance of these proposals would mean improving relations between our countries and would be beneficial for us economic cooperation.

In a response sent on March 8, the Finnish government stated that it could not talk about transferring the islands to another state, since they are an inseparable part of the territory, the inviolability of which the Soviet Union itself recognized and approved in the Tartu Peace Treaty, when these islands were declared neutral territory . The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, it was felt, expected such a response and directly offered to transfer to Finland part of the territory of Eastern Karelia, lying north of Lake Ladoga, as compensation. This proposal was rejected on March 13. To this Litvinov noted that he did not consider the answer final.

For further negotiations, the Soviet government sent its ambassador in Rome, Stein, who had previously held a diplomatic position at the USSR Embassy in Finland, to Helsinki, and on March 11 he contacted Foreign Minister Erkko. Guided by previous motives, Stein argued that the security of Leningrad in the event of an attack on it from the Gulf of Finland depended on the transfer of these islands to the use of the Soviet Union, and believed that the best solution would be an agreement on their lease. Such a decision would guarantee the preservation of Finnish neutrality. The Soviet government is also prepared to exchange the islands for an area of ​​183 square kilometers located near our eastern border. Finland's written commitment to oppose any violation of its neutrality was considered meaningless unless it was accompanied by practical measures. The Finnish government continued to maintain its negative position.

I thought that we should agree with the Russians in one way or another if by doing so we would improve relations with our powerful neighbor. I spoke with Foreign Minister Erkko about Stein's proposal, but I was unable to persuade him. I also visited President and Prime Minister Cajander to express my views in person. I noticed that the islands are of no importance for Finland, and since they are neutralized, we have no opportunity to protect them. Finland's authority, in my opinion, will also not suffer if we agree to an exchange. For the Russians, these islands, which block access to their naval base, are of great importance, and therefore we should try to take advantage of the rare trump cards that we have at our disposal.

My point of view was not understood. They answered me, in particular, that a government that decided to propose anything similar would immediately be forced to resign, and that not a single politician would be ready to oppose public opinion in this way. To this I replied that if there really is no person who would risk his popularity among the people in the name of such a vital matter for the state, then I offer myself at the disposal of the government, because I am confident that people will understand my honest intentions. I went even further, noting that it would be beneficial for Finland to come up with a proposal to withdraw the border line from Leningrad and receive good compensation for this. Even when Vyborg-Skalyani rejoined Finland in 1811, many were of the opinion that the border was too close to St. Petersburg. Minister of State Rehbinder, in particular, thought so, and, as I often heard at home, my grandfather’s father, State Councilor S.E. Mannerheim, took the same point of view.

I seriously warned that Ambassador Stein should not leave for Moscow empty-handed. However, this is what happened. On April 6, he left Helsinki without completing the task assigned to him.

Parliament was not informed of the purpose of Stein's visit. One can only regret the short-sighted concealment of this fact.”

First, we note that Mannerheim considered it necessary to dissociate himself from the pre-war policy of the Finnish clique, which caused the war, and this is not accidental: as you will see below, all of Finland’s neighbors, the Scandinavian countries, dissociated themselves from this policy. When Mannerheim wrote his memoirs, all this was still fresh in his memory; it was still impossible to imagine the USSR as an unprincipled aggressor, as is done today. I do not believe that Mannerheim knew so little about these negotiations, but his apparent removal from the then government is remarkable.

Then, before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, Finland was never a sovereign state, that is, it never had its own territory. Finnish tribes inhabited either the territory of Sweden or the territory of Russia. The territory that Finland had in 1939 is the product of an agreement between the post-revolutionary Finns and Lenin. (Moreover, the Bolsheviks at that time had no concern for the future security of Russia; they “liberated” all the peoples of Russia in order to reduce the number of their enemies in the camp of the counter-revolution. They even “liberated” Ukraine, de facto recognizing the rebellion on its territory as legal.) And the fact that the treaty agreed upon, but may be changed by agreement. Finland could not change its territory at the request of Sweden or Germany - it did not agree with them and was not located on their former territories. But the Finnish government was obliged to conclude a new, mutually beneficial agreement with Russia, since there was nothing illegal about it. After all, it was not for nothing that Mannerheim offered himself as responsible for the exchange of territories - this would have brought him nothing but glory, since the territory of Finland was increasing at the suggestion of the USSR.

This is also confirmed by the fact that the Finnish government carefully concealed the essence of the USSR’s requests not only from the Finnish people, whom it allegedly feared in this matter, but also from the legislative branch. And this suggests that the Finnish government’s arguments were so far-fetched that they could not be discussed not only in the press, but also in parliamentary commissions. The USSR's demands were reasonable and fair.

It is interesting that at first the USSR did not even mention the transfer of the Karelian Isthmus to it, although the absurdity of such a close border was visible to the Finns themselves even a century and a half ago. But such a location of the border was unacceptable only in the case where the neighboring state was hostile. And the Grand Duchy of Finland, although it had its own currency and even its own standard time, was still part of the Russian Empire - why should the kings be afraid of the fact that the border of the principality lies 20 versts from the capital? The USSR was not afraid of this border as long as they considered the Finns neutral and not involved in any aggressive plans against the USSR.

But as soon as the Finns refused the USSR its absolutely legitimate requests to protect Leningrad, the question could not help but arise, why are they doing this? Why, hiding from the people and Parliament, are they trying to weaken the USSR in its future conflict with Germany? After all, no matter who wins the approaching war between the USSR and Germany, if Finland remains neutral, it will not benefit from it. Consequently, Finland did not intend to remain neutral in a future war and, which logically resulted from the behavior of the Finnish government: by weakening the defense of Leningrad, Finland planned to attack the USSR at a convenient moment. Now, naturally, the question of the Finnish border in the suburbs of Leningrad could not help but arise.

In March 1939, Germany completely occupied Czechoslovakia, and under these conditions, the Soviet Union formulated Finland’s final proposals: to lease to it for 30 years a plot of land on Cape Hanko (at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland) and to profitably exchange the Finnish territory of the Karelian Isthmus (up to defensive "Mannerheim Line") over a much larger territory of the USSR. Moreover, it was Cape Hanko that remained the main request. And this can be seen in the negotiations.

When the Finns seemed to agree to move the border on the Karelian Isthmus not by the requested 20-70 km, but only by 10 and exchange this territory for Soviet territory, they received in response: “the proposal is not acceptable, but is subject to re-examination”, - and in the language of diplomats , undecided main question, such a response is consent. But on the issue of the military base at Cape Hanko, the Soviet side, for obvious reasons, was principled and looked for conceivable and unimaginable options. It is characteristic that even if Molotov negotiated with Germany, Stalin personally spoke with the Finnish delegation. What did he not offer! We will not talk about the economic side, about the amount of compensation, about prices in mutual trade. When the Finns said that they could not tolerate a foreign base on their territory, he proposed to dig a canal across Cape Hanko and make the base an island, offered to buy a piece of land on the cape and thereby make the territory Soviet, and having received a refusal and interrupting negotiations, it would seem, completely, a few days later he returned to them again and offered the Finns to buy several small uninhabited islands off Cape Hanko, which the Finnish delegation, not very strong in geography, had not even heard of.

The magazine "Rodina" for December 1995 provides a map of the latest territorial proposals of the USSR to Finland. Judging by the absurd smallness of the territory asked from the Finns and the vastness of the Soviet territory offered in return, one can already see how important this damned Cape Hanko was for the USSR.

When you read the description of the negotiations at that time, it becomes indisputable that the Finns were clearly looking for war and would never agree to any requests from the USSR. That is, if, say, the USSR agreed to the Finns’ proposal to move the border by 10 km and only, then the next step the Finns would take back this agreement. When parties want to reach an agreement, they look for options and benefits. Let's say the USSR offered to pay for the resettlement of Finns from the Karelian Isthmus. But the Finnish side was not interested in how much he would pay. The Finns seemed to agree to the exchange, but they were not interested in where the USSR would give them land, or how profitable this territory would be for them - they did not bargain. And this obviously proves that the Finns conducted negotiations as a matter of form, without intending to actually reach an agreement. They negotiated from a position of strength and with the clear intention of starting a war. The reader may be surprised - where did Finland get its strength against the USSR?!
Brain fog

The fact is that we almost always make a mistake - we look at the events of those days with today's eyes. Today we know what the USSR was, we know that it almost alone withstood the onslaught of all of Europe and won. But who knew this then - in 1939?

Let's go back to that time and look at Russia through the eyes of those people. By the beginning of World War II, Russia had been unable to win a single war for more than 100 years. The landing of the British and French near Sevastopol in 1854 forced Russia to surrender. The Balkan War, formally won, was carried out so weakly and ineptly that they tried not to consider it even when training Russian officers. The war was lost to Japan, a small country. In 1914, the Russian army was almost twice as large as the Austro-German army and was unable to do anything. In 1920, newly fledgling Poland seized a huge piece of territory from the USSR. Why Poland! In 1918, the White Finns crushed Soviet power in Finland with brutal mercilessness. And if during the battles there were only 4.5 thousand killed on both sides, then after the battles the White Finns shot 8,000 prisoners and 12,000 died of starvation in their concentration camps. All Russian Bolsheviks were mercilessly killed on Finnish territory. And Soviet Russia was not even able to lift a finger to help them. After all, Hitler’s definition of the USSR as a “colossus with feet of clay” did not come from a vacuum.

All Finnish intelligence was conducted through the then Soviet dissidents and their interest in corresponding distortion of reality was certainly not taken into account. The Finnish secret police, for example, reported to the government on the eve of the war that in the USSR 75% of the population hated the regime. But this meant that all you had to do was enter the USSR, and the population itself would destroy the Bolsheviks and greet the “liberating army” with bread and salt. The Finnish General Staff, based on an analysis of Blucher’s incomprehensible actions on Khasan, reported that the Red Army was not only unable to attack, but also to defend. Given such weakness of the enemy, it would have been a sin not to take advantage of it, and the Finnish government had no doubt that, one on one, Finland was capable of waging a war with the USSR for at least six months and winning. And it was confident that in such a long period of time it would be able to win over any of the great countries as allies.

And there were such countries. Moreover, they were obvious. Since September 3, 1939, the British and French empires have been at war with Germany. There were no battles on land - the Germans, French and British sat in the trenches opposite each other and did not shoot until May 1940. Only the navy and aviation showed some activity.

The relative safety of the British Isles could only be ensured if the British fleet was able to ensure the safety of maritime transport. And this security was clearly threatened by the German fleet. If you look at a map of Europe, you will see that the Germans had the same problems as the USSR with the defense of Leningrad. For the Germans, the North Sea was something similar to the Gulf of Finland for the USSR. Their fleet could more or less safely enter the Atlantic only if Norway was neutral or friendly. But if the British had drawn Norway into the war on their side, the exit from the North Sea would have been blocked by air and naval bases on both sides: from the British Isles and from Norway. The Norwegians stubbornly did not want to enter the war, and the British prepared an attack on Norway in early April 1940 with the aim of capturing it. (It must be said that, unlike the Soviet-Finnish war, no one blames the British for this.) However, the Germans were literally hours ahead of the British and on April 9, 1940, they were the first to land in Norway, capturing it and establishing themselves in it. But we got ahead of ourselves - at a time when the Soviet-Finnish war had already ended.

And long before that, even before the start of the war, at the end of August 1939, two German raiders left for the Atlantic and Indian oceans: the “pocket” battleships Graf Spee and Deutschland. The second managed to return to Germany, but the Spee, having sunk several dozen British merchant ships, received minor damage in the battle on December 7, 1939, and the crew was forced to scuttle it off Montevideo on December 17, 1939. The reason is that the Germans, after minor lost such an expensive ship, it was obvious to the British: “If Germany had access to those repair services that Great Britain acquired in advance in all strategic points of the globe, the Graf Spee would be able to replenish its ammunition and quickly repair minor damage that could lead to serious consequences in the event of a storm. But German ships were deprived of such an opportunity in distant seas,” writes British historian Len Deighton. He is wrong, in 1939 Germany had one such base in distant seas - in the Barents Sea they could use the ice-free port of Murmansk, since they had a friendship treaty with the USSR.

Therefore, it is obvious that the British and French in 1939-1941. were interested in seizing the Kola Peninsula from the USSR. Naturally, they did not dare to do this themselves. But if someone did this for them, they would certainly help such a state, even if this caused a declaration of war on the distant, and therefore safe, USSR. So Finland’s calculations that it would be helped in the war with the USSR were justified and real.

It must be said that the British know how to keep secrets about their vile role in the Second World War - just like the Hess case, which is discussed in more detail in the Appendix to this book. But it was not possible to keep the secret about Finland’s incitement against the USSR. The archives of Britain were available, and the Soviet historian describes the Anglo-French fuss as follows:

“On January 24, 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented the memorandum “The Main Strategy of the War” to the War Cabinet.

“In my opinion,” Ironside emphasized, “we can provide effective assistance to Finland only if we attack Russia from as many directions as possible and, most importantly, strike Baku, an oil production area, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia". Ironside, expressing the opinion of certain circles of the British government and command, was aware that such actions would inevitably lead the Western allies to war with the USSR, but in the current situation he considered it completely justified.

... Around the same time, the French general staff also assessed the situation. On January 31, General M. Gamelin, expressing the point of view of the French General Staff, confidently stated that in 1940 Germany would not attack Western countries, and proposed to the British government a plan for landing an expeditionary force in Petsamo in order, together with Finland, to launch active military operations against the Soviet Union. Union. According to the French command, the Scandinavian countries are not yet “ripe” for independent action on the side of Finland. The landing of an expeditionary force would strengthen their resolve and encourage them in the fight against the Soviet Union.

The British government was, in principle, ready to go to war with the USSR. “Events seem to lead to the fact,” Chamberlain said on January 29 at a cabinet meeting, “that the allies will openly engage in hostilities against Russia.” However, when assessing the maturity of the Scandinavian countries, the British expressed fear that the participation of Anglo-French troops on the side of Finland would scare away the Scandinavians from fighting the USSR, then Norway and Sweden would again “crawl into the shell of a policy of neutrality.”

On February 5, the English prime minister went to Paris to discuss with the French at the Supreme Military Council a specific plan for joint intervention in Northern Europe.

At the council, Chamberlain put forward a plan to land an expeditionary force in Norway and Sweden, which, in his opinion, would expand the Finnish-Soviet military conflict and at the same time block the supply of Swedish ore to Germany. However, the first task was the main one. “Preventing the defeat of Finland by Russia this spring is extremely important,” the resolution of the British War Cabinet emphasized, “and this can only be done by significant forces of well-trained troops sent from Norway and Sweden or through these countries.” Daladier joined Chamberlain's opinion. In addition to the French contingents, it was decided to send the 5th, 44th and 45th British infantry divisions, formed specifically for sending to France, to the Scandinavian theater and Finland.

On February 13, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed its representatives in the Allied Joint Military Committee to prepare a directive on the basis of which the headquarters planning authorities could prepare a plan of action for the Anglo-French troops in Northern Finland, the “Petsama Operation,” which provided for the landing of more than 100 thousand Anglo-French troops. troops in Norway and Sweden.

When considering this plan on February 15, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, General Ironside, emphasized that the troops that would operate in Northern Finland must have a line of communication. If they land at Petsamo, they will be forced to turn either east, capturing Murmansk and the Murmansk railway, or west, opening their way through Narvik.

As a result of the discussion, it was decided to assist Finland by landing troops in Petsamo or its environs with the aim of cutting the Murmansk railway, and subsequently capturing Murmansk in order to turn it into a base for the operation.

The first section of the plan, which set out the political factors that might influence the course of the operation, stated that a landing in the Petsamo area would inevitably bring the Allied forces into direct and immediate conflict with the Russian armed forces, and therefore it should be assumed that the war with Russia will be a natural result, since the invasion of Russian territory will be a necessary component of the upcoming operation.

...Two weeks later, a meeting of the Allied Supreme Military Council took place in London. Chamberlain opened it with the words: “Of recent events, the most important is the collapse of Finland... This collapse has had a great influence on the general situation and must be frankly regarded as a blow to the Allied cause.” The unexpected outcome of the campaign in the north, according to Chamberlain, caused a terrible depression in neutral countries and among the allies themselves."

And British historian Leah Deighton explains why the British failed to keep secret their plans to attack the USSR after Finland:

“The French Air Force allocated five squadrons of Martin Maryland bombers, which were to fly from bases in northeastern Syria and strike Batumi and Grozny. In a purely Gallic touch, code names were used to designate targets: Berlioz, Cesar Frank and Debussy. The RAF was to deploy four squadrons of Bristol Blenheim bombers and a squadron of antediluvian single-engine Vickers Wellesleys based at Mosul airfield in Iraq.

To prepare for the night raid, aerial photography of the targets had to be carried out. On March 30, 1940, a civilian Lockheed 14 Super-Electra with passenger aviation markings took off from RAF Habbaniya airfield in Iraq. The crew was dressed in civilian clothes and carried false documents. These were pilots from the 224th Squadron of the Royal Air Force, which was armed with Lockheed Hudson aircraft, the military version of the Electra. The British had no trouble photographing Baku, but when scouts went to photograph oil piers in the Batumi area on April 5, Soviet anti-aircraft gunners were ready for the meeting. Elektra returned with only three-quarters of its potential targets on the negatives. All images were forwarded to the General Headquarters of the forces in the Middle East in Cairo to create flight maps with target designations.

...Just before the capitulation of France German officer 9th tank division, inspecting the captured headquarters train, discovered a plan for an air attack. The documents, carelessly typed, lay in a folder on which was handwritten: “ATTAQUE AER1 ENNEDU PETROLE DU CAUCASE.” Liaison effectue au G. Q. C. Aerien le avril 1940“.

A large stamp with the words "TRES SECRET" made these documents even more tantalizing. As did the lack of a date. The Germans cheerfully published all these documents along with the Anglo-French plan to invade Norway under the pretext of helping the Finns. It was a magnificent propaganda move, and now, looking Looking at these yellowed pages, one wonders whether the leaders of Western countries were in their right minds when they approved such crazy adventures."

Having such potential allies behind them, the Finns were filled with optimism, and Finland’s usual plans for war with a neighbor in relation to the USSR were exclusively offensive. (Finland abandoned these plans only a week after the start of the war, when it actually tried to attack.) According to these plans, the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” repelled an attack from the south, and the Finnish army advanced along the entire front east into Karelia. The border of the new Finland was supposed to be pushed back and run along the line Neva - the southern shore of Ladoga - the eastern shore of Lake Onega - the White Sea.

Strictly speaking, this is incomprehensible to the mind: how could Finland, with its 3.5 million population, have plans to seize the territory of the USSR with its 170 million?! Nevertheless, the work of a commission of Russian-Finnish historians in Finnish archives leads to precisely this conclusion. From the operational plans of the Finnish army, preserved in the Military Archives of Finland, it follows that “it was planned immediately after the attack of the USSR to go on the offensive and occupy a number of territories, primarily in Soviet Karelia... the command of the Finnish army finally abandoned these plans only a week after the start of the “winter war“, since the Red Army grouping in this direction turned out to be unexpectedly powerful.” Finland was going to establish a new border with the USSR along “the Neva, the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, Svir, Lake Onega and further to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean (including the Kola Peninsula).” Like this!

At the same time, the area of ​​Finland doubled, and the land border with the USSR was reduced by more than half. The border would run entirely along deep rivers and sea-like lakes. It must be said that the goal of the war set by the Finns, if it were achievable, does not raise doubts about its reasonableness.

Even if there were no Finnish documents on this matter, these offensive plans could be guessed. Look at the map again. The Finns strengthened with the “Mannerheim Line” a small piece (about 100 km) of the border with the USSR on the Karelian Isthmus - exactly in the place where, according to plans, their permanent border should have passed. What about the thousand kilometers of the rest of the border? Why didn't the Finns strengthen it? After all, if the USSR wanted to capture Finland, the Red Army would have marched there from the east, from Karelia. The Mannerheim Line is simply meaningless if Finland really intended to defend and not attack. But, in turn, with Finland’s offensive plans, the construction of defensive lines on the border with Karelia became pointless - why spend money on it if Karelia goes to Finland and fortifications will have to be built, or rather, completed, on the new border! On the border that was to be conquered in 1939.

Yes, from the point of view of the Finnish state, the plan to move the border to an advantageous point and double the Finnish territory was reasonable. But, I repeat, it was based on self-deception: the criminal actions of the “fifth column” in the USSR, expressed in the treacherous behavior of Marshal Blucher in the battles with the Japanese on Lake Khasan, were accepted as the Red Army’s inability to fight at all. They probably did not believe the reports of the Soviet press about the victories at Khalkhin Gol, but they believed the political intelligence, which claimed that 75% of Soviet citizens hated the Soviet regime. In addition, the moment of interest of England and France in the victory of Finland could not be missed. The opportunity was so tempting that the Finns went straight to starting a war.

Moreover, the Finnish government looks no more stupid than Hitler. In 1941, Hitler vigorously attacked the USSR, and already on April 12, 1942, he issued an idiotic tirade to explain the failure of the blitzkrieg: “The entire war with Finland in 1940 - as well as the entry of the Russians into Poland with outdated tanks and weapons and dressed inappropriately.” uniformed soldiers is nothing more than a grandiose campaign of disinformation, since Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.” According to Hitler, it turns out that Stalin deliberately pretended to be weak so as not to frighten Hitler before attacking the USSR. That is, in 1941, Hitler passed off his desire to see the USSR weak as reality.

I repeat, in those years, Finland’s aggressiveness was obvious. After all, if the USSR, having started the war, decided to capture Finland, then the rest of the Scandinavian countries stood in line. They should have been scared, they should have gone to war immediately. But... When the USSR began to be expelled from the League of Nations, of the 52 states that were part of the League, 12 did not send their representatives to the conference at all, and 11 did not vote for expulsion. And among these 11 are Sweden, Norway and Denmark. That is, Finland did not seem like an innocent girl to these countries, and the USSR did not look like an aggressor.

Mannerheim is extremely angry about this circumstance, but he cannot oppose anything to it, except for an extremely stupid reference to Uruguay and Colombia: “However, it immediately became clear again that Finland cannot expect active help from the Scandinavian countries. While countries such as Uruguay, Argentina and Colombia decisively took our side at the Assembly of the League of Nations, Sweden, Norway and Denmark declared that they would not take part in any sanctions against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Scandinavian countries abstained from voting on the issue of expelling the aggressor from the League of Nations.”

Finland's aggressive plans are confirmed directly. In 1941, the Finns, together with the Germans, attacked the USSR. We began to energetically try to bring Finland out of the war peacefully. At the request of the USSR, England and the USA became mediators. The Soviet Union proposed returning to Finland the territories occupied in the winter war of 1939-1940 and also making territorial concessions. The Anglo-Americans insisted, threatening Finland with war. But the Finns did not give in, and in a response note to the United States on November 11, 1941, Finland stated: “Finland seeks to neutralize and occupy the enemy’s offensive positions, including those lying beyond the 1939 borders. It would have been imperative for Finland and in the interests of the effectiveness of its defense to take such measures already in 1939 during the first phase of the war, if only its forces were sufficient for this.” You can read about this for yourself in the selection of documents from the Rodina magazine I mentioned. They are all the more convincing because the entire magazine is designed in a purely anti-Soviet spirit.

I would not call everything written above stupidity; in this case, the Finnish government based its decisions on clearly erroneous data. His stupidity lies elsewhere.

Having lived with Russia and in Russia for so many years, the Finns did not understand it, did not understand that from it they could receive a thousand times more benefits, and the maximum possible protection, if only they were friendly to it.

They did not understand that there are no countries in the West that would really help such a small country as Finland in the matter of war. After all, by that time the Finns had already seen how the West, having despised the then NATO - the Eastern Pact - threw Czechoslovakia to the mercy of the Germans.
In Finland, everyone was ready and the Finns were impatient

In the fall of 1939, the USSR concluded assistance agreements with the Baltic countries. Their status did not change. They remained bourgeois and independent, but Soviet military bases were located on their territory. The southern coast of the Gulf of Finland has become more or less protected. As a reciprocal gesture, the Soviet Union transferred a large piece of its territory to bourgeois Lithuania, along with the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, then Vilna.

The problem of the northern shore of the bay remained. Stalin invited the Finnish delegation to negotiations, intending to conduct them personally. Molotov made the invitation on October 5. The Finns immediately began rattling their weapons and embarked on the warpath. On October 6, Finnish troops began to advance to their starting lines. On October 10, the evacuation of residents from border towns began; on October 11, when the Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, the mobilization of reservists was announced. Until November 13, for more than a month, Stalin tried to persuade the Finns to provide the USSR with a base on Hanko. Useless. Except that during this time the Finnish side demonstratively evacuated the population from the border areas, from Helsinki and increased the size of the army to 500 thousand people. “However, now the starting situation was completely different - I wanted to shout that the first round was ours. We were able to transfer both the covering troops and the field army to the front on time and in excellent condition. We received enough time - 4-6 weeks - for combat training of troops, familiarizing them with the terrain, to continue the construction of field fortifications, preparation of destructive work, as well as for laying mines and organizing minefields,” Mannerheim rejoices in his memoirs.

Even large countries, such as the USSR, allow no more than 15 days for their mobilization. And Finland, as we see, not only completely mobilized, but was also idle for a month and a half.

In this regard, I would like to draw attention to a trivial episode that preceded the war. Four days before the start of the war between the USSR and Finland, on November 26, 1939, the Finns fired artillery into the territory of the USSR, and 3 Red Army soldiers were killed and 6 wounded in the Soviet garrison of the village of Mainila. Today, naturally, Russian and Finnish historians have “established” that either these shots did not occur at all, or the Soviet Union itself fired at its troops in order to obtain a pretext for war. I will not dispute these statements, since after half a century of anti-Stalin hysteria, the majority of the population believes in such nonsense unconditionally. But I must pay attention to the fact that the incident in Mainila was in no way a pretext for war, since already on November 27, the Soviet government stated in its note: “The Soviet government does not intend to inflate this outrageous act of attack by units of the Finnish army, it may be bad controlled by the Finnish command. But it would like such outrageous facts not to occur in the future.” That's all. That is, in the scale of losses in the ensuing battles, this incident could easily be forgotten. From the point of view of losses in peacetime, this event could also be forgotten, since before World War II there was never peacetime on the borders of the USSR: from February 1921 to February 1941, the USSR border guards lost only 2,443 people killed in clashes on the border.

But what’s interesting is that it’s not only anti-Soviet historians who dwell on this case. Mannerheim, who already had something to write about, devotes a disproportionate amount of space to this provocation, and it is obvious that he is lying. For example, when he forgets that he needs to justify himself in this provocation and writes: “The unification of the main part of the covering troops (1st and 2nd brigades) into a new division subordinate directly to the army commander also did not imply a passive position. Back on November 3, I instructed Lieutenant General Esterman to create such a grouping of troops that would ensure the most effective defense of the border zone. This was repeated in an order dated November 11, in which he once again drew his attention to how important it is to defend, with large forces, the positions built between the border and the main line of defense.”

Here we must remember that the Finns built the most powerful fortifications (“Mannerheim Line”) not on the border itself, but in the depths of their territory - at a distance of 20 to 70 km. But they, as you read from Mannerheim, were not going to surrender this space without a fight, and long before the war they brought large forces into it with the task of brutal defense. And such defense, of course, is impossible without artillery.

But when Mannerheim returned several times to bombard Soviet territory on November 26, evidence that this could not have happened comes from the claim that there was no artillery at all in the territory between the border and the “Mannerheim Line.”

“The situation was undoubtedly troubling. Any day the Russians could organize a provocation that would give them a formal reason to attack Finland. I gave orders on land, on water and in the air to carefully avoid any activity which the Russians might use as a pretext for provocation, and ordered all batteries to be withdrawn to such a distance that they could not open fire across the border. To monitor the execution of the order, I sent an artillery inspector to the isthmus.”

“And now the provocation that I had been expecting since mid-October has happened. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nenonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border.”

After all, this is an obvious lie: Mannerheim could not simultaneously assign the troops the task of defending the forefield with “large forces” and at the same time take away the artillery from the troops, and even send the commander (“inspector”) of the artillery of the Finnish army to the border! What should he do there if the artillery is withdrawn? Another point: the Soviet Union announced the shelling of its territory on November 27 and before that, in theory, no one could have known about it, including Mannerheim. Then why did Mannerheim “personally visit” the scene of events on the day of the shelling - November 26?

This clumsy lie about an incident that, it would seem, is not worth a damn, leads to the idea that the Finns really fired at Soviet territory, provoking the USSR to war. And if you think about it, there is nothing surprising in this. By December 1939, the Finns had already been ready for war for the second month, but the USSR did not start it and did not start it, trying to resolve the issues through negotiations. But the Finns themselves could not start a war, otherwise even Uruguay and Colombia would not have voted for them in the League of Nations. We had to provoke the USSR in such a simple way.
Treatment of stupidity

What can you do? War is war. And on November 30, the Leningrad Military District began to tame the obstinate Finland. The matter was not without difficulties. It was winter, the terrain was very difficult, the defense was prepared, the Red Army was poorly trained. But most importantly, Finns are not Poles. They fought fiercely and stubbornly. It goes without saying that Marshal Mannerheim asked the Finnish government to yield to the USSR and not bring matters to war, but when it began, he led the troops skillfully and decisively. Only by March 1940, when the Finnish infantry had lost 3/4 of its strength, did the Finns ask for peace. Well, the world is the same. They began to create a military base on Hanko; instead of the territory up to the “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus, they took the entire isthmus with the city of Vipuri, now Vyborg. The border was moved almost all the way into Finland. Stalin was not going to forgive the Finns for the killed Soviet soldiers.

A couple of words should also be said about the goals of the war, since the entire “world community” is sure that the USSR wanted to conquer Finland, but it didn’t work out. This idea passes not only without discussion, but also without real evidence. Meanwhile, just look at the map of Finland and try to plan a war to capture it yourself. I am sure that even a fool would not have attempted to capture it across the Karelian Isthmus, since it was in this place that the Finns had three-line fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line”. But along the thousand kilometers of the rest of the border with the USSR, the Finns had nothing. In addition, in winter time this area was passable. Surely anyone, even an amateur, will plan for the entry of troops into Finland through unprotected sections of the border and its dismemberment into parts, deprivation of communications with Sweden and access to the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. If the goal is to capture Finland, there is no other way to act.

But in reality the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. proceeded like this. According to Soviet pre-war ideas, a rifle division should have an offensive zone with a defense breakthrough of 2.5-3 km, and in defense - no more than 20 km. And on the unprotected section of the Soviet-Finnish border from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea (900 km in a straight line) 9 rifle divisions were deployed against the Finnish troops, i.e., one Soviet division accounted for 100 km of front, and this is the front that the division and cannot defend. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that parts of these divisions were surrounded by the Finns during the war. But on the Karelian Isthmus against the “Mannerheim Line”, with a length of 140 km along with lakes, the 28th, 10th, 34th, 50th, 19th, 23rd, 15th and 3rd Rifle Corps, 10th Tank Corps operated (from south to north) , as well as separate tank brigades and units of the RGK, i.e. at least 30 divisions.

From the way the Soviet command positioned its troops, it is quite obvious that it did not intend to conquer and occupy Finland; the goal of the war was to deprive the Finns of the “Mannerheim Line” - a defensive belt that the Finns considered impregnable. Without these fortifications, even the Finns should have realized that with a hostile attitude towards the USSR, no fortifications would save it.

It must be said that the Finns did not understand this hint the first time, and in 1941 Finland again started a war with the USSR and this time chose a worthy ally - Hitler. In 1941, I remind you, we asked her to come to her senses. Useless. Great Finland from the Baltic to the White Sea did not allow the Finns to live in peace, and the new border along the White Sea-Baltic Canal system fascinated them like a rabbit boa constrictor. Mannerheim writes: “In accordance with the plan, the military actions of our troops in the following months were divided into three main stages: first the liberation of Ladoga Karelia, then the return of the Karelian Isthmus, and then advancement deep into the territory of Eastern Karelia.

The directive for an offensive north of Ladoga was approved on June 28. Our troops, stationed approximately on the line between Kitee and Ilomantsi, initially included two army corps (6th Army Corps under the command of Major General Talvela and 7th Army Corps under the command of Major General Hägglund), which included only five divisions , as well as “Group O” under the command of Major General Oinonen (cavalry brigade, 1st and 2nd brigades of rangers, as well as one partisan battalion) - were brought together into one unit of 100,000 people, which was called the Karelian Army. The chief of the general staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was appointed to command it; and Lieutenant General Hanell was transferred to his place in the General Staff.

The last paragraph of the order indicated that the final frontier of the operation would be the Svir River and Lake Onega.

In fact, the Finns in this case personify the Russian proverb “the beaten one is itching.” You can even respect them for their exceptional tenacity - after all, they tried to swallow Karelia with their last breath, so to speak, sticking out their tongues up to their waists. “Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, which did not happen in any country, not even in Germany,” admits Mannerheim.

In 1943, the USSR again offered peace to Finland. In response, the Prime Minister of Finland concluded a personal pact with Hitler that he would not leave the war until Germany was completely victorious. In 1944, our troops went deep into Finland, breaking through the newly rebuilt “Mannerheim Line” without much trouble. Things smelled like frying. The Prime Minister resigned with his personal commitment to the Fuhrer, and Baron Karl Mannerheim was appointed in his place. He concluded a truce. During the peace negotiations, Molotov forced the Finns to disarm the Germans on their territory and planed Finland from all sides. I didn’t particularly set my sights on the swamps, I took what was better. This was the training the USSR foreign ministers had at that time. In the north he took the Petsamo region with its nickel reserves, the Vyborg region and so on. The only thing - instead of; 600 million dollars of indemnity in five years was reduced to 300 million in six years.

Well, isn't it stupid? They offered Finland to peacefully increase its territory. But no - almost six years of war, the greatest military tension, killed, crippled. In the name of what? So that Finland becomes smaller than before the war?

Let's imagine that the Finns were our allies and fought the Germans, say, in Norway. After all, they showed themselves to be excellent soldiers, and the tsar rewarded Mannerheim not without merit.

In 1945, Stalin, despite protests from the United States and England, transferred vast territories of Germany to Poland. Both Churchill and Roosevelt considered Poland unworthy, protested and, as it now turns out, were right. Stalin was mistaken when he believed that the Poles were cured of meanness. But if Finland had participated in the war on our side, then it is possible that Stalin, simultaneously with the transfer of German lands to Poland, would have moved Belarus to the west and our border, giving the Kaliningrad region a more reliable support. Then why not assume that he would transfer Karelia to Finland, as Hitler’s ally and victor?

Stupid, extremely stupid war. Its only positive aspect is that Finland’s brain began to become enlightened.
And it was unbearable!

In the winter of 1999-2000, the entire “democratic public” of Russia celebrated its 60th anniversary; Finnish victory over Stalin's Soviet Union! in the war in the winter of 1939-1940.

There were difficulties. Not everyone in the country is an idiot, and some people remember that in March 1940, Finland surrendered, not the USSR.

True, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, ended his order to the Finnish troops on the actual surrender of March 13, 1940 with the words: “We have the proud consciousness that we have a historical mission, which we will still fulfill - to defend Western civilization, it has been since ancient times was our inherited share; but we also know that we will repay our debt to the West to the last coin.” You cannot envy “Western civilization”: as soon as there are scoundrels in the world, they immediately begin to defend it. If you remember, Hitler attacked the USSR precisely for this purpose.

I don’t know how it is with the West, but Mannerheim really paid off Finland’s debt to the USSR down to the last coin - Stalin saw to it. So judge, how can we celebrate Finland’s victory over the USSR with such facts? How stupid the Moscow Limita is, but even she can guess that she is fattening up by exporting nickel to the West from those mines that were legally mined in this “lost” war.

What should the bastard counterfeiters do? We have to force out a version exclusively for Russian goats that the USSR lost the war because its combat losses were several times higher than those of the Finnish army. It’s a pathetic idea, but it also needs to be confirmed somehow.

The situation matured, and in 1996 M.I. Semiryaga clarified that in the war of 1939-1940. There were 70 thousand Soviet killed and missing, and another 176 thousand wounded and frostbitten. No, says A.M. Nosov, I think better: there were 90 thousand killed and missing, and 200 thousand wounded. It would seem that everyone was counted, but it’s not enough, guys, it’s not enough, here we need apothecary precision. And by 1995, the Russian historian P. Aptekar calculated quite accurately - it turns out that there were only 131,476 people killed and missing. But he didn’t even count the wounded—hundreds of thousands, apparently. As a result, Kommersant-Vlast of March 30, 1999 already boldly estimates the losses of the USSR in that war at half a million, i.e. the count is already in the millions! That's right, why feel sorry for them, Stalin's scoops?

What about the Finnish losses? The Finnish historian T. Vihavainen “counted them accurately” - 23 thousand. In connection with which P. Aptekar joyfully counts and even highlights in bold: “It turns out that even if we assume that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to 130 thousand people, then For every Finnish soldier and officer killed, five of our compatriots were killed and frozen to death.”

Well, how can we call this ratio if not a great victory for Finland in that war? The “democratic public” can safely celebrate this victory.

True, the question arises: why then did Finland surrender with such low losses? By November 1939, the Finns mobilized 500 thousand people into the army and shutskor (fascist military units). And according to Finnish data, their total losses (including wounded) were 80 thousand people, or 16%.

Let's compare. From June 22 to December 31, 1941, the Germans on the Soviet front lost 25.96% of all ground forces in the East; after a year of war, these losses reached 40.62%. But the Germans continued to advance until mid-1943. And why did the Finns, with their 16%, suddenly no longer want to go to the shores of the White Sea?

After all, the Finns had only “to stand for a day and hold out for the night.” The Allies had already begun transferring squadrons to bomb Baku, and ships with troops had already left England to help Finland. Mannerheim recalls: “Information about assistance from Western countries, requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived on March 7. They were prepared by the Chief of the British General Staff, General Ironside, and looked like this:

The first echelon, which will include the Anglo-French division, will be transported by sea to Narvik on March 15. Its composition:

– Two and a half brigades of French Alpine riflemen – 8500 people;

– Two battalions of the “foreign legion” – 2000 people;

– One battalion of Poles – 1000 people;

– 1st British Guards Brigade – 3500 people;

– 1st British ski battalion – 500 people.

Total: 15,500 people.

The listed troops are selected units. At the same time, 3 service battalions will be sent out.

The second echelon would consist of three British divisions, each numbering 14,000 men. The total number of combat troops will increase to 57,500 people.

According to calculations, the first echelon should arrive in Finland at the end of March, and the troops of the second echelon will follow it as soon as railway capacity allows.”

So why didn’t they wait a couple of weeks, why did they surrender if the bourgeois army was close, and the spring thaw had already begun?

Finnish historian I. Hakala writes that by March 1940 Mannerheim simply had no troops left. Where did they go? And the historian Hakala gives the following phrase: “According to experts, the infantry lost approximately 3/4 of its strength (already 64,000 people in mid-March). Since the infantry at that time consisted of 150,000 people, its losses were already 40 percent.”

No, gentlemen, in Soviet schools they didn’t teach how to count: 40% is not 3/4. And Finland did not have 150 thousand infantry. The fleet was small, there were almost no aviation and tank troops (even today the Finnish Air Force and Navy, together with border guards - 5.2 thousand people), 700 artillery guns - a maximum of 30 thousand people. Whatever one may say, apart from the infantry there were no more than 100 thousand troops. Consequently, 400 thousand fall on the infantry. And infantry losses of 3/4 mean losses of 300 thousand people, of which 80 thousand should be killed.

But this is a calculation, and how can you confirm it if the “democrats” have all the archives, and they do whatever they want with them? All that remains is to wait.

And the wait will be worth it. Apparently, also for the anniversary of the Soviet-Finnish war, historian V.P. Galitsky. in 1999 he published a small book “Finnish prisoners of war in NKVD camps.” He tells how it was for them, the poor ones. Well, along the way, having rummaged through our and Finnish archives, he, without thinking, cites the losses of the parties not only in prisoners, but also in general, and not only our inflated ones, but also, apparently, genuine Finnish ones. They are as follows: total losses of the USSR - 285 thousand people, Finland - 250 thousand. Killed and missing: the USSR - 90 thousand people, Finland - 95 thousand people.

Now this looks like the truth! With such losses, it becomes clear why the Finns surrendered without waiting for steamships with Poles and British to sail to them. It was unbearable!

To the seventieth anniversary of the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940

Secrets of birth

The Soviet-Finnish wars were unlucky with historiography. The first two Soviet-Finnish wars (May 15, 1918-October 14, 1920 and November 6, 1921-March 21, 1922) were practically erased from the history of Soviet-Finnish relations. The fourth war (June 25, 1941 - September 19, 1944) remained in the shadow of the greatest tragedy of the Siege of Leningrad and more strategically important events on other fronts of the Great Patriotic War. And the most famous third, also called the “Winter War”, “Finnish”, “Third Soviet-Finnish”, “Finnish Campaign of 1939-1940”, “Soviet-Finnish Armed Conflict of 1939-1940”, and, at the suggestion Alexander Tvardovsky’s “That Unfamous War” has become overgrown with a significant number of myths and legends, closely related both to the myth-making around the “Stalin era” and to the personal ideological predilections of historians.

Meanwhile, a historical event does not arise suddenly; it has prerequisites, consequences, and internal logic, forming a continuous chain where everything is closely interconnected. Add to this that any event does not occur in a vacuum, but is surrounded by a conflict of interests, the struggle of states, intelligence services, corporations, parties, ideas, and is influenced by many external factors - and you get the difficult task of describing a relatively reliable picture of the event. Do not get involved in the intricacies of events - you will turn out to be something like Edward Radzinsky. To delve too deep will result in a multi-volume study, in the middle of which you forgot where you started, and at the end - why you actually wrote.

Therefore, in this article I will try to briefly outline the main milestones of the third Soviet-Finnish war, without dwelling on well-known details, but only trying to understand the internal logic of the event, connecting it with the processes that were taking place in the world at that time and in the USSR.

Divorce and maiden name

The Baltic states have always been a point of geopolitical tension for Russia. The confrontation for dominance in this region between Russia, Sweden, Poland and Germany has such a long history that describing it is almost hopeless, just like looking for an answer to our favorite question “who is to blame?”

Yes all. And no one. The logic of the development of states required expansion towards the Baltic, practical politics never bothered with questions about the “primacy of universal human values”, everyone was eager to capture the most important strategic positions. And as a result, from 1809 to 1917, Finland was part of the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland.

Moreover, with such broad autonomy in internal self-government that it would be more logical to talk about a union of the two states. Suffice it to say that Finland had its own currency, its own electoral legislation (In 1906, an election law was adopted that gave women the right to vote. Finland became the first country in Europe where women received the right to vote), and a number of other “preferences and liberties” completely knocking Finland out of the definition of “Russia is a prison of nations.” In relation to Finland, the principles voiced by Alexander I were strictly observed, who said: “Finland is not a province. Finland is a state."

It is also important that the activities of the security department on the territory of Finland were extremely limited, which made the Grand Duchy a real paradise for revolutionaries of all stripes. Suffice it to recall Konni (Konrad Victor) Zilliacus (Finnish: Konni Zilliacus, December 18, 1855 - June 19, 1924, Helsinki), Finnish politician, writer, revolutionary, organizer and leader of the Finnish Active Resistance Party, and part-time Japanese spy, not particularly this fact and concealed.

Acting completely legally, Zilliacus organized a channel for the delivery of weapons and illegal literature to Russia (the famous steamship John Grafton, filled to the brim with weapons for revolutionaries in Russia, was his work). In addition, through his supervisor, Colonel Motojiro Akashi, he gave money to the revolutionaries (including for holding a conference in Geneva in 1905). The political views of Zilliacus the Pope were described in the most exhaustive terms by his son, Zilliacus Jr.: “From childhood, I brought two ideas that were firmly entrenched in my head: first, that someday there will be a revolution in Russia, and it will be something great and good, which All liberal and civilized people are waiting. Second, that the Russians are a backward, barbaric and semi-Asian nation from which the rest of the world has nothing to learn politically, although the revolution should liberate the Finns and Poles and allow Russia to begin to catch up with the West.”

An empire in which such Zilliacus operate without much concealment cannot last long, February 1917 broke out.

By her own February revolution served as a powerful detonator for the separatist aspirations of the outskirts and autonomies. But there was still a chance - the Finns, contrary to the calls of the nationalists, were in no hurry to secede from the Empire. And here something incomprehensible and, for me personally, mysterious happens. The Diet of Finland resumes its work, which on July 18, 1917 passes a law restoring the autonomous rights of Finland (significantly curtailed after 1905), and Finland is considered as part of Russia. However, this law is rejected by the Russian Provisional Government (which included many figures closely associated with the Finns during the period of the struggle against the autocracy), Russian troops disperse the Seimas and occupy its building. The road has been cleared for Finnish nationalists, a campaign against “Russian imperialism” is being carried out at lightning speed (with the full support of German intelligence and Swedish industrialists), which has consolidated Finnish society. And on December 6, 1917, Finland proclaims its independence. The divorce has occurred. But the property has not yet been divided.

Wars of succession

In Finnish historical literature, military actions in 1918-1920. against the RSFSR were qualified not as an armed uprising against another, foreign, state, but as a “struggle for Eastern Karelia”, as a national, historical internal Finnish task, allegedly lying outside the sphere of international relations and outside the laws of international law.

In Soviet historical literature, the assessment was given more specifically and, although it was clearly class-based, it was limited in time and space: “the White Finnish adventure in Karelia in 1919.” However, the essence of these wars was precisely the struggle for the territorial inheritance of the Russian Empire.

Having learned all the necessary lessons from the collapse Russian army The Provisional Government, Army Lieutenant General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, who became Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army in January 1918, acted decisively and brutally in the fight against the Finnish Bolsheviks.

The civil war in Finland lasted 108 days, claimed 35 thousand lives, after which internal confusion and vacillation in Finland ceased for a long time. But having gotten rid of the internal enemy, the government remembered that it had long-standing territorial claims against Russia. It was about “the return of the primordial Finnish lands, torn away by Russia” (and how could it be otherwise, precisely the primordial and precisely torn away ones). Nothing personal, healthy cynicism, the usual practice of interstate relations - “it’s a sin not to pinch a weak neighbor.” Since February, Finnish troops began penetrating into Russian territory - into Eastern Karelia. The main directions of the movement were the cities of Ukhta and Kem, yes, exactly the famous “Kemskaya volost”, which became a household name after the film “Ivan Vasilyevich changes his profession”.

On February 23, 1918, exactly on the day of the creation of the Red Army, Mannerheim officially declared that “he will not sheathe his sword until Eastern Karelia is liberated from the Bolsheviks.” And on February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany so that, as a country fighting against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was supposed to run along the line Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - White Sea.

However, Finland’s demands were not limited to this; already on March 6, Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhufvud stated that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on “moderate Brest conditions”, that is, if Eastern Karelia and part of the Murmansk railway went to Finland roads and the entire Kola Peninsula.

What was considered “moderate” in this case remained a mystery; in everyday terms, the Finns demanded an increase in their own territory by almost 40%. And then a very unpleasant event occurred for naive Finnish politicians. Germany, represented by Kaiser Wilhelm II, quite calmly stated that “Germany will not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and will not support Finland’s military actions if it moves them beyond its borders.”

This was stated by the Germany that “set up” the Finnish army, putting together the schutzkor into combat units. This was stated by Germany, which created the Finnish huntsmen, the elite of the Finnish army.

This was stated by Germany, whose representative and chief military adviser in Finland, von der Goltz, assured the Finns of full support for their actions against Russia.

For Mannerheim similar situation was a slap in the face. It became obvious that the young Finnish state was simply used as a threat in negotiations with Russia, and then discarded as unnecessary.

Moreover, throughout 1918, Germany practically stopped the Finnish threat to Soviet Russia:

On July 12, 1918, the Finnish General Staff prepared a project for moving the Finnish border with Russia on the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for generous compensation with the territory of Eastern Karelia. The project was signed by Major General Karl F. Wilkmann (Vilkamaa), approved by the German commander General Ludendorff.

On July 19, 1918, Ludendorff proposed to State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs P. Ginze that Finland cede to Russia part of the Karelian Isthmus beyond Eastern Karelia and the Murmansk region; The German command hoped to expel the British from the North with joint Finnish-German forces, since the Russians alone could not do this.

Mannerheim remembered this lesson for the rest of his life and did not fail to repay Germany during the seven-month Lapland War (September 1944 - April 1945).

However, the temptation to acquire a hefty territorial bite turned out to be stronger than the insults; Russia was too weakened, and the Finns took a risk.

The fighting continued until October 14, 1920, when the forces of the parties were completely exhausted, and a fragile balance was established at the front. One more fresh division would have been enough for either side - and the scales would have tipped towards victory for the country possessing such a division. But it was not found.

The result of this war was the Tartu Peace Treaty, which secured for Finland the annexation of Western Karelia to the Sestra River, the Pechenga region, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Middle Peninsula.

However, under the terms of the agreement, Russia defended the right to free transit of goods to Norway through the Pechenga region.

The final point in Finland’s struggle for the inheritance of the Russian Empire was set by the second Soviet-Finnish war on November 6, 1921-March 21, 1922, when an attempt by a Finnish-Karelian contingent of 5 to 6 thousand bayonets to annex part of eastern Karelia (demilitarized under the terms of the Tartu Treaty) was harshly repelled reinforced units of the Red Army. The contingent itself, having suffered serious losses (according to some sources - up to 15% of personnel), was partially scattered and partially expelled to Finland.

Birth of a conflict

The period 1918 - 1920 was probably the most unique period in modern history. If there were a book of records for precisely those years that became bifurcation points in the history of mankind, then the 18-20s of the 20th century would certainly be recorded in them as the years in which the origins of the absolute majority of conflicts of the 20th century were created (and some of them last and to the present day, hitting states and peoples with “shots from the past”).

And the two Soviet-Finnish wars, and the Treaty of Tartu, and the Moscow Agreement of 1922 (following the results of the second war) did not resolve a single contradiction between the USSR and Finland. Moreover, these events gave rise to the preconditions for a new, tougher confrontation.

“But a sediment remains,” says a well-known joke. What is it like, the residue of two Soviet-Finnish wars?

Let's start with the main thing. The current configuration of the state border did not satisfy either side. 32 kilometers to the second capital, to a sacred symbol (“the cradle of the revolution”), to the center of a strategically important industrial area - this is an unacceptable situation for any state. The military-geographical vulnerability of Almaty in the recent past became the reason for the transfer of the capital of Kazakhstan to Astana. But here this option was not suitable by definition. In Russia, the 20s were a period of fierce struggle for power between various party groups. And while the positions of the “internationalists” (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, etc.) were quite strong, no one really bothered with the vulnerability of Leningrad, what can it survive until the world revolution, and then the World Republic of Soviets, and the question of strategic positions is lost meaning. But as soon as the statists won, the attitude towards the issue of the security of Leningrad, the security of the Russian North, acquired a completely different significance.

On the other hand, the Finns were not satisfied with the results of the wars. They believed (and quite rightly) that the reason for the failures in the wars was the contradictory policies of the Finnish governments. I did not make a reservation - namely governments, because in three years, during two wars, there were five (!) of these governments in Finland. And all with different orientations (political, of course):

	Current Policies	Orientation
May - December 1918	Regent P.E. Svinhufvud Prime Minister Yu.K. Laasikivi Minister of Foreign Affairs O.E. Stenroot	Germany
	Regent K.G. Mannerheim Prime Minister L.Yu. Ingman
April - July 1919	Regent K.G. Mannerheim Prime Minister C. Castrén Foreign Minister K. Enkel	Course towards war with Russia in a coalition with anti-Bolshevik forces (including within Russia)
July 1919 - April 1920	President K.Yu. Stolberg Prime Minister Yu.Kh. Vennola	For securing annexation without war
April 1920 - April 1921	President K.Yu. Stolberg Premier R. Erich Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Hoolsti	The struggle within the government of two tendencies: war and peace

In addition, following the results of two wars, three theses were fixed in the consciousness of Finnish society:

1. The USSR is a consistent enemy and the main threat to the security of Finland.

2. Peaceful coexistence with the “Bolshevik barbarians” is impossible.

3. Finland’s historical mission is to fight for the return of “original Finnish territories” and counter the “Bolshevik threat” in the Baltic region.

From this it logically followed that it was Finland that had the task of organizing and leading the “anti-Bolshevik struggle” and countering “communist expansion.” Finland’s claims, to use modern terminology, to the role of a regional superpower followed from this (albeit not so logically).

Only two states of the then Europe - Poland and Finland (excluding the USSR, these are separate topic) so clearly proclaimed the primacy of ideology (with a slight touch of messianism) in their foreign policy. Only two states of the then Europe - Poland and Finland - were ready to defend their principles to the end, that is, to the point of armed conflict with the USSR. And it was they who became active participants in that “European Kama Sutra”, a tangle of intelligence intrigues, diplomatic maneuvers, political bargaining, corporate competitive wars, which led to the tragedy of World War II. But that is another story…