New role Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in US strategy

The “Great Game” is a term coined in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to refer to the rivalry and colonial conquests of the British and Russian empires in Central and South Asia. The focus of events was Afghanistan. The term was remembered again in connection with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new Central Asian republics. Since then the situation has developed intensively. Today, geopolitics lovers are talking about a new Great Game or “Great Game 2.0, 3.0...”. In relation to the region, this means the same struggle for resources between global players - the USA, Russia and China - with the only difference that such geopolitical structures are simply “optics” - as old as the technologies from the time of the first Great Game.

The recent history of American-Russian relations in Afghanistan begins with the collapse of the USSR. Care Soviet troops in 1989 was not a departure in the full sense of the word. Support for Najibullah, and after the fall of his regime in 1993, sympathy for the Mujahideen group and the then ruling Islamic Party of Afghanistan with a predominance of the Tajik ethnic element. These kinds of stakes are almost inevitable in this country, where ethnic and even tribal origins are markers of political character. The party led by Rabbani and Massoud increasingly lost control, while other factions (for example, led by Hekmatyar) demanded much more than what was allocated to them within the framework of the transitional governments. The dispute resulted in a civil war, which gave birth to the Taliban.

If we remember who once financed and armed the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation, it becomes clear why the “ghost” of the United States was seen in all the troubles and conflicts of Afghanistan. This was the Russian optics of the Afghan problem. But the United States hasn't really cared about Afghanistan since 1989. The Cold War is over. Who was really bothered by this problem was Pakistan.

During the Soviet military presence, Islamabad became the main transit destination for financial, material and military assistance to the Mujahideen. The funds were colossal: the USA - USD 1 billion per year, Saudi Arabia - USD 800 million. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence became an almost profitable corporation, which was at the origins of the distribution of such “aid”. Having lost a donor, and also having had many problems with its former “wards,” Pakistan was faced with the task of intra-Afghan settlement.

The Taliban movement became a kind of “answer”. But here things were by no means simple. The movement, ethnically Pashtun, was supposed to help solve the Pakistani problem of Pashtunistan, about 50% of whose territory is part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. And there was no Afghan government that recognized the Pakistan-Afghan border as fair. If we talk about the demographic component, the titular group in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns, make up 47% of the population (16 million people), while in Pakistan the Pashtuns are an ethnic minority - 15% (30 million people). Considering that the Pashtun tribes are distinguished by belligerence, high mobility, pronounced tribal loyalty and almost complete ignorance state borders(for various reasons, including economic ones), then it will become clear why it is so important for Islamabad to have a reliable partner or even an ally in Kabul.

Pakistan's assistance and support to the Taliban movement was provided based on two considerations: ensuring Pakistani interests regarding the border issue and entering the market of the newly independent states of Central Asia.

Big Game 2.0

The vast majority of geopolitical projects have one significant flaw: the interests of medium-sized and small countries (subjects) are not included in the analysis of the present and design of the future. But, entering into an argument with lovers of geopolitics, I would like to say that global players, although they play an important role, do not completely determine the situation.

This was the case with the Taliban movement. The Taliban were building the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but internal resources were not enough to maintain the loyalty of all parties. The Taliban movement had more opponents in the region and in the world than supporters. Three states have recognized their legitimacy - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan. In 1996, the countries of Central Asia, together with Moscow, expressed their position on non-recognition of the Emirate. Although, it should be noted that there was no unity here either. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as a whole did not refuse further episodic cooperation, while for Moscow, the establishment of ties by the Taliban with the separatists of Chechnya excluded any possibility of recognition of their regime.

The terrible practice of using the norms of “Islamic law” by the Taliban has turned the entire international community against them. Even a demonstrative fight against drug trafficking did not help correct their image. Devastation, lack of external sources of financing, sanctions and prolonged drought and crop failure in 1999-2001. led to a humanitarian catastrophe. And the Taliban's alliance with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden personally led to a political disaster. The terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, the destruction of Buddha statues and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 - this is the chain of events that led to a massive US military invasion of Afghanistan and a military presence in Central Asian countries. Let me remind you that we are talking about two military bases in Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and Gansi (Kyrgyzstan). This fundamentally changed the military-strategic situation in the region.

The Russian political and military elite perceived all this with a mixed sense of anxiety and relief. It was quite difficult for Moscow to admit its helplessness in the face of advancing radical Islamism, which had seriously and permanently changed the political map of the region. At the turn of the century central Asia was shaking under the blows of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the civil war in Tajikistan had just ended. The forces and means were not enough to stop the infiltration of terrorist groups from Afghanistan. Russia was experiencing the 1998 default and its consequences, and the counterterrorism campaign in Chechnya in 2000.

China, in a certain sense taking advantage of the situation, announced the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the summer of 2001. The US invasion of Afghanistan balanced the situation, but threatened long-term consequences for the entire region (including Russian interests).

Big game 3.0

So, the “ghost” of the United States has materialized. A long and complex anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan began. If you follow the formal history, then it took place in several stages. The first was the establishment of control over the capital and part of the country (2001-2003), then the NATO military mission (2003-2014) and, from 2015, Operation Resolute Support, the purpose of which was to assist the Afghan government in establishing control over the country. If we talk about the true state of affairs, then control was never established, since the expansion of areas of responsibility to the south and east faced serious resistance. The Obama Administration's promise to end the military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged the Americans to end the NATO mission.

During all this time, Russian-American relations experienced ups and downs, although the Afghan issue was an example of cooperation between the countries. In particular, Russia received a substantial contract for the supply of fuel for military equipment. But as troops were withdrawn (and the transition period was defined from 2012 to 2014), relations became worse. The Ukrainian issue – Maidan, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the southeast of the country – in a short time reduced Russian-American relations to the state of the “second edition of the Cold War.”

In 2013, Xi Jinping presented his project to the world in Astana, then called the “Economic Belts of the Silk Road”, and now “One Belt – One Road” (OBOR). It has become clear that China views Central Asia as part of its new strategy. Meanwhile, the rise of another radical Islamist project has had a significant impact on Afghanistan.

In June 2014, the forced march of ISIS troops from Syria to Iraq amazed all experts. Such consequences civil war no one expected it in Syria, but when it became known that this group was created on Iraqi territory back in 2006, it became clear why their seizures were so impressive. The idea of ​​the Caliphate, implemented by ISIS, recruited more and more supporters into its ranks. Among them were not only citizens of Iraq, Syria, Jordan and other countries in the region, but also Western countries. Over time, it became known that among the militants of the Islamic State there are many people from the former USSR (Russia, South Caucasus, Central Asia). ISIS militants began to penetrate Afghanistan and recruit young people into their ranks, but in addition to this, individual groups also began to swear an oath of allegiance to the new emir Al-Baghdadi. Ferment began among the Taliban.

For Afghanistan, 2015 was the “X-hour”. NATO's military mission ended, but the transition of control over the country was carried out with problems. The shock was the Taliban invasion of Kunduz province on the border with Tajikistan and the capture of the provincial capital. This was not just an attack, but a real battle for the city and one of the four most important military pillars of NATO's presence in the north. The conflict between the Islamic State and the Taliban has given rise to the misleading impression that all global players have room for maneuver. According to rumors, there were attempts to conclude a tactical alliance with the Taliban against the Islamic State, which made it possible for the movement to obtain weapons, as well as participate in negotiations on a future Afghan settlement. By the fall of 2017, it became clear that the Taliban took advantage of the shift in attention to IS to strengthen their positions in the country.

It was relations with the Taliban that became a “stumbling block” between the United States and Russia. The US military accused the Russian side of supplying small arms Taliban, in response there was an accusation of transferring IS militants to Afghanistan. But in this “murky story,” one thing must be understood: the Taliban movement has been recognized as a force to be reckoned with in future negotiations on Afghanistan.

Big Game 4.0

A year ago, when Donald Trump entered the White House, representatives of the US expert community argued that the new president did not have a foreign policy strategy, but today we can well imagine this strategy.

By the summer of 2017, it became clear that US-Russian relations would not improve. In Washington, a scandal regarding the interference of Russian special services in the election process was gaining momentum. On August 2, Trump signed the Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions Enhancement Act, which explicitly named Russia as an enemy for the first time since the Cold War. The sanctions part of the law has not yet been implemented, including the secret list of people who will be subject to sanctions at the first stage. The White House has taken a break on this issue for now, but enforcement of the law is inevitable.

On August 21, 2017, a new strategy for Afghanistan was presented, which included five main positions: 1) increasing the military presence (the exact number is not specified); 2) the military makes decisions about conducting operations on the spot; 3) the ultimate goal is to force the Taliban into peace negotiations; 4) force Pakistan to stop harboring the heads of terrorist groups (Haqqani); 5) the goal is victory, not building a state.

According to unofficial data provided Washington Post, during the year from December 2016 to December 2017, the number of American military personnel doubled from 8.4 thousand to 15.2 thousand. It is planned to transfer 1000 more US military personnel by the spring of 2018 to create a new unit under the working name Support Brigade security agencies, which should directly help in the fight against the Taliban.

In December 2017, a new National Security Strategy was published, which actually outlined the main contours of US policy for the coming years. South and Central Asia in the regional context comes fourth after the Middle East. The essence of this area is that the strategic partnership with India is complemented by other partnerships, including with Pakistan, which is determined by many factors. One sentence identifies the main counterparty - China, which is regarded as a challenge to the sovereignty of South Asian and Central Asian nations in the light of increasing influence due to new initiative– OBOP. Separate attention is paid to the integration of Central and South Asia, and in the military sphere the importance of the region in terms of transit is emphasized (transfer of goods to Afghanistan, as in 2001). Moreover, it is clear from the text that the emphasis is on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

In mid-December, a meeting was also held between the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, at which the issue of building the China-Pakistan Development Corridor (CPDC), which includes Afghanistan, which is an integral part of the BRI, was discussed. At the same time, since the beginning of 2017, the American military has been spreading information about the appearance of Chinese military personnel in the country. Beijing does not deny such information, but emphasizes that the joint patrol of the Chinese-Afghan border (78 km section) was aimed at joint anti-terrorism exercises.

Thus, we can state the beginning of a new round of the so-called Great Game or Game 4.0. A significant difference of this game will be the inclusion of such states as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as its subjects. The Islamists and the Taliban have proven their viability, and, accordingly, they will also have to be taken into account.

To be continued

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The history of Central Asia is associated with two things - that the region was the scene of the 19th century clash of great powers known as the Great Game, and before that it was a central part a major trade route connecting China with Europe and known as the Silk Road.

But the modern understanding of the “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” is incorrect. These terms have become cliches, sometimes used in the most absurd ways. For example, at the beginning of this year in Astana - opposite the university where I teach - Mega Silk Way, the largest shopping mall in Central Asia. The center is home to many restaurants and designer boutiques. There are also aquariums with inhabitants of tropical seas, and even a dolphinarium. But this center is located about a thousand miles north of the supposed Silk Road route. Overall, this once historic term has become a ubiquitous brand.

While clichés can sometimes be useful, helping to quickly understand a phenomenon or simplifying a complex concept so that the uninitiated can grasp it, clichés regarding the Great Game and the Silk Road are much less innocent.

These two terms now appear in countless books and articles about the region, and are often used to explain contemporary events. The competition between Russia, China and the United States for control in Central Asia has been called the “New Big game", analogous to the confrontation between Britain and Russia in the region in the 19th century. The Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative is also positioned as a successor to the ancient “Silk Road”. But all these are anachronisms that only confuse, and do not explain, what is happening in modern politics.

It is noteworthy that “The Great Game” and “Silk Road” are phrases of European origin that originated in the 19th century. These phrases do not have deep roots in the languages ​​or culture of the peoples of Central Asia. The "Great Game" was first mentioned in 1840 in a personal letter by Arthur Conolly, a captain in the Bengal Army of the British East India Company, in the context of the introduction of Central Asia to European civilization and Christianity. Conolly was executed by the Emir of Bukharan Nasrullah in 1842, but the phrase survived him and first appeared publicly in Sir John Kay's 1851 book History of the War in Afghanistan, and was then popularized by Kipling's 1901 work Kim. It became associated with adventure and desperate bravery in the service of the empire (Russian or British) in Central Asia, as well as with the confrontation between the two powers in the region.

But any use of the term “Great Game” when describing interstate relations in Central Asia is incorrect - it was incorrect in the 19th century, and it remains incorrect today. This phrase implies the presence of rules understandable to all parties, as well as clear strategic and economic goals, and a mixture of adventurism and cold calculation in achieving these goals. It also implies that the game could - or can now - only be played by great powers, and that Central Asia is just a huge chessboard. Central Asian rulers, states and peoples are also given the role of extras, a colorful background for the actions of the great powers.

But this was never true, even at the height of European colonialism in the 19th century. As Imperial Russian troops moved deeper into Central Asia, the British may have thought that the Russian side was motivated by a desire to encroach on British possessions in India. Meanwhile, the Russians were much more concerned about their relations with the Central Asian states and peoples.

Neither side could operate freely in the region: both faced significant logistical problems (for example, moving armies relied on camels provided by the local nomadic population) and, at least initially, had only a very limited knowledge of society, culture and politics in the region.

The British suffered two disastrous defeats in Afghanistan in 1841 and 1879, neither of which could be attributed to Russian intervention. These defeats were inflicted on them by the Afghans themselves. Emir Abdur Rahman (1881-1901), the ruthless architect of the modern Afghan state, used British subsidies and arms supplies to suppress internal resistance, but the British received very little in return. As Alexander Cooley showed in his research, a similar dynamic is taking place today: the five independent post-Soviet states cannot compete with Russia, China or the United States in terms of economic or military power, but, nevertheless, they force big powers to play by “local rules” - rules that are determined by local specifics, including the internal politics of the countries of the region and the nature of Central Asian society.

The Silk Road, at first glance, may seem less difficult case. It refers to the complex, centuries-old commercial and cultural relationships between Central Asia and the rest of the world. However, the term is also of European origin and is used to retrospectively impose a simplified vision of a more complex past. The term "Seidenstraße" ("Silk Road") was first used by the German explorer and geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877. But, as Daniel Waugh argues, Richthofen's use of the term was “very limited,” applying it “from time to time only in relation to the Han period, and only when speaking of the relationship between political expansion and trade on the one hand, and geographical knowledge on the other.” "

Richthofen was primarily interested in the relationship between Europe and China, rather than how trade and information exchange could potentially affect Central Asia. He believed that most such contacts had ceased by the 8th century AD.

Context

India is creating its own Silk Road

Forbes 07/01/2017

Northern corridor of the Silk Road

People's Daily 06/21/2017

Will the Silk Road be smooth?

Latvijas Avize 05/22/2017

Silk Road: EU-China project progresses

Financial Times 05/11/2017 The term only gained popularity in the 1930s, largely through the writings of Richthofen's student, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, who used it to lend a romantic and scientific aura to his successful exercises in self-promotion. This touch of cheap exoticism remains in the use of this term to this day.

As Khodadad Rezakhani said, “The Silk Road is not only a 19th-century term, but, in fact, a modern historiographical invention that makes it possible to combine different historical events and draw connections where there never were.”

In reality, the Silk Road was just a series of shorter trade routes that linked the Chinese capital (Xi'an/Chang'an) with various centers of trade in Central Asia, including Tashkent, Otrar and Samarkand. These centers, in turn, were connected to other points in India, Iran and the Middle East, and through them to Europe. None of the traders and almost none of the goods made the complete journey from China to Europe, and there was never just one “route”.

By focusing on the two ends of the road—China and the West—speakers tend to marginalize the areas in the middle, especially Central Asia, when in fact the West for most Chinese sources was Central Asia, not the modern European West.

Also, as Rezakhani notes, no one can say exactly where the route from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea. It also downplays the fact that silk was almost certainly not a major trade item (it had been produced in Western Asia since at least the 3rd century AD), and that Europe was not nearly a major player in the economy back then. ancient world such a prominent role as it is now. In addition, the cultural exchange along the supposed “Silk Road” was of a religious nature, and it did not follow the “Europe-China” route: Buddhism came to China from India (that is, it went from south to north, and not from west to East), and Nestorian Christianity, whose followers were driven out of Roman Syria as heretics, spread from the Sasanian Empire in Iran to India and Central Asia.

These historical reasons provide a sound scientific basis for abandoning the term "Silk Road" as a historical concept. And the modern abuse of this term gives even more justification. In the 2015 blockbuster Sword of the Dragon, Jackie Chan and his Chinese soldiers fight alongside Uyghurs and Indians to defend the Silk Road from an army of predatory Romans. From a historical point of view, the film is complete nonsense, but it has a very clear political message. The reference to the “Silk Road” has become a means of justifying any developments and political projects in Central Asia, where the ruthless exercise of political and economic power is dressed in attractive historical clothing. An excellent example of this is the large-scale Chinese project “One Belt, One Road”, the launch of which was first announced by Xi Jinping from the podium at Nazarbayev University in Astana.

The Chinese premier directly linked his initiative to the legacy of the ancient Silk Road and presented it as a project based on “equality and mutual benefit, mutual tolerance and borrowing knowledge from each other.” But the purpose of the Belt and Road Initiative is not the exchange of goods, services and ideas on equal terms. It is about creating new markets and routes for Chinese goods in Asia, partly due to falling demand for them in Europe and the United States. In other words, this project is not at all altruistic in nature.

Although in this respect the project is no different from many Western capitalist investments in developing countries, it has been criticized for its lack of consideration for labor rights, human rights and environmental damage. The project could also have a devastating impact on the sovereignty of states in the region. The darkest view is that the project will become a means of exporting deadly pollution environment created by China's industrial boom. An example is cement production in Tajikistan.

In China's own Central Asian territory of Xinjiang, infrastructure construction has clear political goals, including undermining Uyghur resistance to Chinese colonial rule and promoting Han settlement in the region.

Even if Chinese investment brings real benefits, positioning the Belt and Road Initiative as a “Silk Road” does nothing to help our understanding of the term.

The concept of a "catechism of clichés" was coined by the great Brian O'Nolan in his Irish Times column in the 1940s. For him, as for George Orwell, clichés were "petrified" or "mortified" phrases that people absorbed without subjecting them to The “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” are not the only clichés regularly applied to Central Asia, but they are undoubtedly the most persistent and the most pernicious.

While the term " Great game" is now perhaps really nothing more than a cliché - a dead phrase used by writers when nothing more suitable occurs to them - the "Silk Road" remains a powerful myth, widely used for modern purposes, a myth that is growing in popularity both in Central Asia and in China. These two terms are united by a disdain for Central Asia and an attitude towards it only as a stage for grandiose geopolitical projects. Moreover, these terms and the modern concepts behind them tend to ignore the capabilities and interests of the region's inhabitants, concentrating only on the great powers.

This can be a mistake from both a practical and moral point of view. In Kazakhstan last year, an initiative to increase the lease period for foreigners on land from 10 to 25 years was shelved after unprecedented mass protests. The initiative was seen by many as a measure aimed at Chinese investors, prompting a wave of often ugly Sinophobia. The point is not whether the protests were justified, but that even in authoritarian Central Asia, public opinion now matters. “Great Games” must adapt to “local rules,” which often have deep roots in Central Asian society and culture, and “Silk Roads” that fail to adapt to local realities are likely to become routes to nowhere.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

"When everyone dies, only then will it end

Big game. Not earlier".

Rudyard Kipling. "Kim" (1901)

In February 2002, US Secretary of State C. Powell, in his speech before the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives, stated that “the United States will acquire such long-term interests and a military presence in Central Asia that we have never dreamed of,” emphasizing, thus not only profoundly changing the American perception of Central Asia, but also unofficially confirming new US ambitions for the entire region.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the resulting massive military deployment led by the United States, the entire concept of a “new Great Game” was reconsidered. The term “new Great Game” is based on the already well-known concept of “Great Game”, which describes the rivalry between Russia and Great Britain for dominance in Central Asia in the 19th century. However, the term “new Great Game” seems even more multifaceted and describes a wider range of goals, objectives, means and risks in various areas, and therefore can definitely be characterized as “The Greatest Game”. Although The Greatest Game began as a cooperative effort among various players to counter a common terrorist threat, it now seems to have taken on a competitive overtone.

Washington's involvement in Central Asia was initially perceived as minor compared to core US security interests. The events of September 11, 2001 aroused unprecedented interest in the region, since, from an official point of view, the most active radical Islamic terrorist groups found refuge in it. The US became involved in regional

the issues are extremely deep, and have even become one of the main players in Central Asia. They have not only pushed the border of their national security interests far to the east, but also applied a new security strategy that resembles the myth of the American “new frontier” strategy.

While waging a war on terrorism and consistently emphasizing the importance of using force in this war - through, first of all, projecting military power into the region, the US administration's new policy towards Central Asia pursues contradictory goals.

The question may arise as to whether the new American national security policy will be able to ensure stability in Central Asia, or whether it may prompt other forces operating in the region to take retaliatory actions, and therefore provoke further destabilization of the situation both in individual states and in the region generally.

This article suggests that while the United States initially contributed to some stability in Central Asia, its actions since September 11, 2001 are not merely about addressing security concerns in the short term. First of all, US involvement in the problems of the region pursues long-term strategic goals, which could likely lead to destabilization of the situation by creating new security problems in the countries of Central Asia and in the region as a whole.

First, we show that U.S. policy in Central Asia has largely responded to the classic security and economic challenges that emerged after the Cold War as part of a focused strategy toward the region. Since September 11, 2001, the new US national security policy has undergone fundamental changes in its assessment of foreign and security policy priorities. Second, the article will show that current US policy in Central Asia has given impetus to the development of a more complete, comprehensive strategy, which, in turn, has paved the way for the start of the “Greatest Game”, which could not only change the balance of power, but and provoke geopolitical rivalries in the region.

The emergence of the “Eurasian dimension” of US foreign policy in the 1990s: from foreign policy concerns to vital national security interests

There is no doubt that US interests in Central Asia were influenced by its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Before considering how the US relationship with the region's major players, namely Russia and China, will evolve in the long term, it is worthwhile to carefully consider explore US policy and interests in Central Asia before the events of the fall of 2001, in order to prepare the ground for further analysis of what awaits the region in the future - in terms of stability and security.

We will demonstrate that the emergence of the “Eurasian dimension” of American foreign policy in the 1990s. paved the way for massive US strategic intervention in the affairs of the region, the trigger for which was the events of September 11. Thus, the massive introduction of US military power into the region extremely accelerated the development of processes that had been taking shape there over the previous decade.

Towards a targeted strategy in Central Asia

“From the point of view of US foreign policy, the post-Soviet states of Central Asia were like on the other side of the moon before the events of September 11, 2001.” Most experts on Central Asia believe that the United States initially had neither a common strategy nor significant interests in this region. Below we will show that, despite the apparent contradiction of this point of view, US policy has rapidly evolved into a strategy that we will call the “strategy of ordering.” This term refers to the US strategy aimed at “Westernizing” the states of Central Asia through the use of economic and military levers. The goal of the “streamlining strategy” is not only to extract benefits through the use of the region’s energy resources. First of all, this strategy is aimed at preventing the restoration of Russian influence in the region.

Before 1991, the Central Asian states were “backwater areas” in the sense that all five republics Soviet Union played virtually no role in the bilateral relations between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. Although Central Asia has always been at the intersection of mutually influencing countries and regions, such as Russia and Eurasia or the Middle East and South Asia, its geopolitical significance as a potential “buffer zone” or territory through which goods have been transited since ancient times (the “Silk Road”) has been minimized by the efforts of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. and the recognition by the United States of the new states of Central Asia, Washington began to develop diplomatic ties with the countries of the region by supporting their democratic initiatives, providing economic assistance and promoting a balanced security policy.

The Clinton administration began the development of stable relations with the five countries of Central Asia with diplomatic contacts and economic interaction. The basis for US assistance to these states was the Freedom Support Act, adopted on October 24, 1992. The Central Asian countries were initially considered by the American administration as potential members of the community of democratic states with market economies, and the US initially focused specifically on democratization and market reforms in them. To achieve this, the United States began to encourage cooperation between countries within the region, relying heavily on multilateral mechanisms, such as the Central Asian Economic Community and NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

In addition, the collapse of the USSR coincided with the discovery of new mineral reserves in the Caspian Sea, which could not help but attract many transnational oil companies, including the largest American ones, to the region. The then US Deputy Secretary of State S. Talbott justified the need to support democratic changes in his speech in 1997, which to this day contains formulations of vital US strategic interests in Central Asia. According to experts, “his speech clearly shows why access to regional oil and gas resources is the most pressing US interest in the region.” Before the signing of the largest oil supply contracts between the United States and Kazakhstan in 1993–1994. Central Asia was not perceived as a region of economic importance. Thus, the commercial interest of American oil companies in the exploitation of new fields gave rise to the specific interest of the US administration in ensuring the security of the region. However, in the period from 1992 to 1996, lack of coordination prevented the United States from acting effectively in this area, since work with various Central Asian countries was divided between separate ministries pursuing their own goals. According to F. Hill, “the implementation of a unified policy was practically impossible due to conflicts of departmental powers.” It was not until 1996 that the US National Security Council, one of the government bodies closest to the president, began to coordinate the previously independent actions of various departments, focusing on security threats stemming from the exploitation of the Caspian Sea oil fields in close proximity to Russia. Meanwhile, the economic and diplomatic isolation of Iran (a consequence of the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act as punishment for supporting international terrorism) has become the most important factor determining political decision-making in Central Asia. Consequently, it can be argued that already in 1996, when the US National Security Council participated in the process of searching for new energy suppliers and even established the priority of pipeline construction, the energy “economic basket” became a strategic tool, and not just economic assistance to Central Asian companies.

The development of permanent diplomatic relations between the United States and the five Central Asian states has also become a factor limiting the expansion of Russian influence in the region. Cooperation in the field of security, compliance with the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the United States in the region have become no less important than the development of democracy in the Central Asian states and their integration into the world community.

The need for security cooperation became apparent as early as 1991, when the George W. Bush administration was extremely keen to eliminate Kazakhstan's nuclear arsenal and prevent proliferation nuclear weapons in the region. Thus, it was Kazakhstan that became the first state in Central Asia that the United States focused on in pursuit of its security interests. However, significant changes have already been made to the Clinton administration's policy towards the states of the region, reflecting other strategic and economic characteristics of these countries. The United States remained interested in removing nuclear weapons from the territory of Kazakhstan, but at the same time, the Clinton administration also pursued economic interests, in particular those related to oil production in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

If we take into account the annual two percent growth in global energy consumption predicted by the US Department of Energy, as well as the political instability in the Middle East that lasted throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, it becomes clear why the need to find additional sources of oil supplies independent of OPEC , alternative energy sources and various ways of transporting energy resources has been elevated to the rank of priority area of ​​US foreign policy. According to current forecasts, the fields of the Caspian Sea can produce from three to four percent of global oil production, while Kazakhstan has the opportunity to become one of the five largest oil exporters by 2015.

The Clinton administration initially favored the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), whose facilities began transporting crude oil from Kazakhstan (Tengiz) and Russia to the Black Sea, thus respecting the interests of Moscow. But in 1998, the United States began a campaign to reduce Russian influence on Central Asian energy resources in the Caspian Basin by supporting pipelines running through the Caucasus (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), as well as through the territory of NATO member Turkey, but not passing through Russia .

In the 1990s. two (quite viable from a political and economic point of view) possibilities have emerged for transporting Caspian oil and gas to the east – through China and Afghanistan, which could also reduce future energy supplies and regional trade relations occurring on the North-South, Russia-Russia axis Iran. Thus, the main motive for the US actions was geo-economic: the development of Caspian energy resources would not only have a positive impact on US energy security, but would also create several commercial opportunities for American companies. Moreover, the creation of the Caspian Energy Coordinator position in the State Department, rather than in the Departments of Commerce or Energy, underscores the fact that geopolitical considerations are more important to the United States than commercial interests in this case. Finally, the Clinton administration's national security strategy officially names the need to create an environment of stability for energy exports as the cornerstone of US foreign policy. Even American officials, for example, the former commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, General E. Zinni, began to say that “access to energy determines the entire US policy in Central Asia.” However, despite this, it is impossible to analyze US actions in the region only from the point of view of the struggle for oil and gas reserves.

US military presence in Central Asia in the 1990s. demonstrated the importance of US national security interests in the region, which were not limited to providing humanitarian aid and support for reforms. In 1994, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a defense cooperation agreement, which was then expanded with another agreement in 1997. By mid-1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program, not only thus formalizing its relations with NATO, but also further isolating Russia from its former sphere of influence. In December 1995, the United States supported the creation of the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion ("Tsentrazbat"), formed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with the aim of ensuring peace and stability in Central Asia. According to S. Talbott, expanding military cooperation should reduce instability in the region and promote mutual security. However, military cooperation can also be seen as an attempt to reduce Russia's political and security influence. At the end of the 1990s. A large number of joint exercises were conducted both in Central Asia, mainly in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and in the United States. These exercises were conducted on a regular basis at the battalion or brigade level as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace (joint exercise Nugget and Osprey), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, or through bilateral cooperation agreements. They involved US armed forces (airborne troops, special forces or mountain troops), NATO forces and Central Asian states.

The passage of the Silk Road Strategy Act by the US Congress in May 1999 underscored the importance of US geostrategic and economic interests in Central Asia. Congress once again confirmed the US intention to counter the development of Islamic radicalism in the region by military means. US assistance to the Central Asian states in conducting anti-terrorist operations, including preventive measures, began two years before the events of September 11, 2001. This assistance was expanded after the invasion of Kyrgyzstan by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the summer of 1999. As a result, the Pentagon redistributed the areas of responsibility of various commands in the Caspian Sea region. Central Asia was transferred to the area of ​​responsibility of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) to strengthen and consolidate military cooperation with states in the region. In April 2000, the United States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan created the Central Asian Border Security Initiative (CASI) to combat the terrorist threat.

Most U.S. officials and experts on Central Asia deny that the United States has followed a single “Grand Strategy” for the region. However, it seems absolutely clear that already in 1998, the “Westernization” of security issues, as well as issues of oil production in the Caspian Sea (which already directly implies the revival of the energy “Silk Road”) showed that geopolitical factors and strategic considerations have a greater influence influence than purely economic logic. Moreover, this paper will show that the “ordering strategy” already existed in the 1990s. The United States, through the participation of American companies, was able to gain leverage over most oil and gas export routes from the Caspian Basin, as well as significant leverage over this “geopolitical chessboard vital to American supremacy and historical legacy.”

There is no doubt that the system of strategic relations between the United States and the states of Central Asia, which was gradually created in the 1990s, greatly helped to develop military cooperation and quickly increase the projection of military power in Central Asia immediately after the terrorist attacks in New York. York and Washington.

Official recognition by the American administration of its most important interests in Central Asia after September 11

“The US strategic interests in Central Asia are: security, including the fight against terrorism, drug distribution and trafficking; energy; and internal reforms. […] Our policy must include a commitment to deeper, longer, and better coordinated engagement on a broad range of issues,” said Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Anne Jones on October 29, 2003.

The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 changed the entire geostrategic situation in Central Asia, significantly increasing the importance of the region and leading to recognition of the deep trends that had developed there over the previous decade. Partly because of the strategic and access difficulties that American troops faced during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the importance of the Central Asian states has grown in the eyes of American officials to previously unimaginable levels.

Having formally declared its vital national interests in Central Asia, the United States decided to use unprecedented military power to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom, while significantly increasing financial and economic assistance to states in the region.

In October 2001, the US Department of Defense published the Four-Year Defense Policy Plan, which outlined the key principles underlying America's core security interests. The contents of this document explicitly substantiated the need to develop diplomatic, military, and economic ties between the United States and the countries of Central Asia. The document emphasized the importance of maintaining free access to key markets and strategic resources, and also noted that the increased likelihood of military clashes in Central Asia leads to characterize the region as an “arc of instability.” To prevent

"Afghanization" of Central Asia and the increase in the number of terrorist groups with international contacts that could threaten the stability of surrounding territories and attack the United States, American foreign policy focused primarily on addressing security issues rather than pursuing the Grand Strategy. The supposed revival of US interest in Central Asia and involvement in the region seemed to be driven by the need to fight the war in Afghanistan. As A. Cohen stated, “the US presence in Central Asia is a direct result of the September 11 attack on the United States.”

In December 2001, the US Senate decided to create a Special Subcommittee on Central Asian Issues, once again showing how seriously the US is concerned about what is happening in this region.

Immediately after the United States was faced with the need to quickly project military power into the region to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda, American officials turned to the Central Asian states for help. Because of the geography of the region, these states have proven to be very important to both short-term and long-term U.S. national security interests. The proximity of the Central Asian states to the Afghan theater of operations has increased their strategic importance within the new security paradigm that emerged after 9/11. Although their response was initially quite cautious, eventually, for financial and strategic reasons, all five Central Asian states agreed to share intelligence information and allowed access to their airspace.

Uzbekistan was the first to allow American troops access to its territory. Its strategic location and robust air transport infrastructure are capable of supporting operations not only in Afghanistan, but also anywhere in Central Asia and parts of South Asia. For this reason, along with maneuvers already taking place throughout the region, American military strategists began to look for opportunities to use military airfields former USSR. Based on the results of assessments of the current condition of the runways and other equipment, the two largest bases of the Uzbek Air Force - Kakaydy and Karchi-Khanabad - were officially recognized as the most suitable for basing heavy and super-heavy transport aircraft and handling large flows of cargo. Khanabad was also selected as a "jump airfield" for US Special Forces and the Tenth Mountain Division. Unconfirmed reports indicate that five other former Soviet military sites were also unofficially used by the US Army. Tajikistan, which has a 1,200-kilometer border with Afghanistan, also proved extremely useful in Operation Enduring Freedom.

It also provided air corridors and stationed US military units on its territory after receiving appropriate permission from Russia. Dushanbe Airport was initially chosen for these purposes, but four other Tajik air bases were also reportedly used by both US forces and other Coalition members. In December 2001, the United States signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan on the use of Manas International Airport, located near Bishkek. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have also granted the United States critical access rights to their airspace and limited access to their airfields.

In response to the unprecedented granting of these access rights, and taking into account increased national security interests and US involvement in the region, the George W. Bush administration decided to significantly increase the volume of assistance to the Central Asian states through the provision of “carefully targeted” financial assistance. In September 2000, the United States expected that financial assistance to all five Central Asian states would amount to about $110.5 million in fiscal year 2002. Already in 2001, this figure more than doubled and amounted to $230 million, and in 2002 it increased to $594 million. On March 14, 2002, the George W. Bush administration launched the Millennium Challenge Account initiative, aimed at increasing financial assistance to developing countries by 50% over the next three fiscal years. Aid to Central Asian states is expected to increase by 39%. Moreover, the US Agency for International Development has allocated another $22.2 million to develop the new Central Asia Community Investment Program (CAIP).

Before the events of September 11, 2001, US actions in Central Asia were aimed mainly at countering the security challenges that arose as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the development of Caspian energy resources. As has already been shown, in the late 1990s. A new “streamlining strategy” has emerged, aimed at achieving various strategic goals by providing foreign financial assistance, developing regional energy resources and conducting military cooperation programs. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC exacerbated and formalized profound changes in the United States' understanding of its national security priorities and strategic interests. The security vacuum in Central Asia posed a serious threat to US national security and needed to be countered.

The War on Terror has caused global geopolitical changes in Central Asia. Regional powers began to interact with the United States, and they, in turn, began to try to take the place of the main guarantor of the region’s security, which previously belonged to Russia. The United States is becoming almost a “regional” power, as it is turning Central Asia into a quasi-protectorate, where destabilizing processes that cause concern are likely to develop.

The Greatest Game in Central Asia: From Cooperation to Competition

The US military presence in Central Asia is a direct result of al-Qaeda's attack on the US. The rapid introduction of troops into the region has undoubtedly brought stability in the short to medium term and also contributed to the security of the region. However, it was not aimed at stabilization as such, but at countering a direct and obvious threat to US national security. Some analysts also believe that the American invasion gave the Central Asian states a chance to "start over".

It can be argued that the proposed long-term US military presence in the region may be counterproductive. The US desire to dominate Central Asia could lead to two challenges related to local political realities and regional security. They could lead to long-term tensions within the region and regional geopolitical instability.

Challenge one: provoking regional destabilization

Due to the fact that the states of Central Asia were not so long ago part of the USSR, today they are governed by secular regimes. Additionally, these countries boast one of the most educated and moderate Sunni Muslim populations in the world. However, one of the main characteristics of the current Central Asian regimes is a strong tradition of authoritarianism, elite corruption, and disrespect for the law and human rights. Moreover, the Central Asian states, with the exception of Kazakhstan, are among the poorest states in the world, which means they represent fertile ground for the development of radical Muslim movements. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US administration has decided to combat the causes of Islamic terrorism by providing economic assistance to the countries of Central Asia. But despite the significant increase in volume, this assistance still covers only a portion of the urgent needs of the states in the region. One could even say that Washington’s assistance to these countries is intended only to persuade them to carry out actions that are in the sphere of American interests, and the allocation of financial assistance is not aimed at a real solution to most of the political and economic problems of the region. Geopolitical reasons and the predominantly military nature of the US presence oblige Washington to deal with almost everything that happens in the region. American officials are even in dialogue with regional authorities regarding human rights violations in Central Asia. Critics usually claim that the Bush administration follows the practice of “double standards”, since it is ready to ignore facts of this kind in exchange for unconditional support for its policies. Thus, the US policy in the field of assistance to the Central Asian states in the context of the existence of serious shortcomings in the regional political system can contribute to the development of destabilizing processes, which in turn can lead to instability in various areas.

Although the reason for this is understandable, US assistance to Central Asian states is still too focused on providing military assistance to the detriment of other areas of assistance. In FY 2002, a total of $564.4 million was allocated for assistance programs to the Central Asian states, of which $187.5 million was intended for security and law enforcement purposes and $138.7 million for unspecified “humanitarian” purposes. help." Only $73.6 million was allocated to programs to develop democracy and $52.8 million to support market reforms. These funds are not enough to address Washington's stabilization goals in the region, which are exacerbated by extreme poverty and explosive population growth.

The population of Central Asia does not at all consider terrorism to be an important domestic problem, while drug trafficking, food delivery and health care are of much greater concern. Since foreign assistance was doubled in response to the events of September 11, 2001, no economic progress, nor strengthening democracy. On the contrary, human rights and democracy are considered to be in decline. By focusing cooperation with the countries of the region exclusively on anti-terrorist actions using force and “humanitarian assistance”, it is hardly possible to ensure their integration into Western society and transform them into liberal democracies. Institutional and democratic reforms are most likely to be initiated through economic development and market transformation. The shortcomings of the Central Asian states cannot be effectively overcome only by ensuring their security or increasing their military power. Moreover, there is no doubt that the region's authoritarian states hope that US protection will deflect accusations of human rights violations and failure to become truly democratic states. The increasing US military presence may create the perception that Washington is supporting local corrupt elites. Thus, the current US policy of assistance to the Central Asian states may not only increase the vulnerability of troops stationed in them, but also exacerbate public discontent, provoke riots and increase support for radical Islamist movements.

The US military presence not only indirectly supports authoritarian regimes, but also provides an appreciative audience for extremist ideological groups. With the growing dissatisfaction of the masses, the attractiveness of Islamic radicalism as an alternative to a dismal reality is growing all the time. Although the most radical Islamist movements have been formally destroyed, thousands of former members of terrorist groups are likely to be scattered throughout Central Asia, and the more aggressive local authorities pursue a policy of suppression, the more potential followers of such movements there are. In other words, if there is no way for the opposition to develop within a secular society, and the state’s economy continues to be in decline, radical Islamist groups will continue to form and develop. Thus, the United States should not only increase financial assistance provided through a mechanism like the Marshall Plan, that is, a coordinated system of measures aimed at economic development, but also begin to promote the values ​​of freedom and democracy, that is, begin a “war of ideas” against radical Islamism . Dissatisfaction with the presence of US troops and the authority these troops wield in some Central Asian countries also reflects concerns among Central Asian governments about the impact that the US military presence has on the regional balance of power.

President George W. Bush's mention of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in a speech delivered at a joint meeting of both houses of Congress on September 20, 2001, was obviously a nod to Uzbekistan, made in the hope of gaining its support in the military campaign against the Taliban and Al- Qaeda." Thanks to the gullibility of its people and long-term military cooperation, Uzbekistan has de facto become a key member of the anti-terrorist coalition. Therefore, it was this state that received the lion's share of the funds allocated to the countries of Central Asia after September 11 (for example, 41% of all funds allocated in 2002, or 161.8 out of 394.1 million dollars). Uzbekistan gradually slipped out of Russia’s sphere of influence and was able to establish itself (with American help and assistance) as a prominent autonomous player capable of influencing the development of political processes in the region. President of Uzbekistan I. Karimov was clearly trying to obtain economic assistance and security guarantees from the United States not only to combat the flourishing Islamist movements, but also to realize his own ambitions and realize his intention to become a regional hegemon in Central Asia. By creating favorites instead of pursuing a more balanced and fair policy regarding assistance to the Central Asian states, the United States risks exacerbating existing contradictions and creating the basis for regional conflicts, for example, over issues of water supply, drug trafficking, national minorities and territorial disputes.

It is also likely that the balance of power in the region will shift due to the exacerbation of already serious tensions between the Central Asian countries. A long-term American presence in Uzbekistan is a “double-edged sword.” It could either force the United States to become the de facto guarantor of the integrity of Uzbekistan, or have a destabilizing effect, deepening public doubts about the true intentions of the US presence in Central Asia, which in turn could weaken support from Moscow and Beijing for Washington’s regional anti-terrorism efforts.

The US approach to ensuring stability in Central Asia, based on calculations of the balance of power and the concept of national interests, may be quite effective in the short term, but is likely to prove counterproductive over time. It can be argued that the new “Big Game” is quite different from the original in terms of the composition of the participants. Indeed, many non-state actors have emerged, such as radical Islamist terrorist groups or Western oil companies. In addition, regional states use the United States to their advantage, trying to strengthen their own influence in the region at its expense. The winnings in the new “Great Game” are also much more significant. If you win, you can receive unprecedented financial benefits, ensure your own energy security through access to new energy sources, achieve the reign of Islam throughout the region, achieve state independence or even its superiority over other countries in the region.

Therefore, it can be argued that the new “Great Game” is also a zero-sum game in which geopolitical and strategic dominance in the region is played out, but this time it involves a much larger number of players. This is where the concept of The Greatest Game comes from.

Challenge two: US policy in Central Asia provokes superpower rivalry

The unprecedented US military presence in Central Asia in terms of the number of troops and deployed equipment illustrates the degree of US involvement in the most geopolitically critical region. The very fact of the presence of US Air Force bases is not only an unprecedented case, but also has serious strategic significance. US interests are pursuing a variety of strategic goals that mark the beginning of a profound change in the political landscape of the region.

More than three years after the deployment of US military forces in Central Asia, which has no parallel in the history of the United States, it remains difficult to assess its results and impact on the regional geopolitical situation in the medium and long term. However, it can be argued that until Washington has explicitly revealed its ultimate goals and clarified its exit strategy from the region, the very presence of US military forces in Central Asia could have unpredictable political costs and could likely exacerbate geopolitical tensions. rivalry between the main players present in the region - Russia, China and the United States.

The creation of American military bases in the region was justified by the temporary need to conduct military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

However, as it became clear after the end of hostilities, the presence of the American military turned out to be constant and disproportionately large in order to achieve the previously designated goals.

The continued presence of US military forces in Europe, the Balkans, Japan, South Korea and Persian Gulf clearly shows that where they are once placed they are likely to remain. The successful completion of the counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan coincided with the beginning of the process of building Afghan statehood and the possible involvement of NATO represented by “ International forces on maintaining security-IV.” Statements made by officials up to this point emphasized that the United States did not plan a permanent military presence in the region. Therefore, the end of hostilities in Afghanistan should have entailed a reduction in the American presence in Central Asia, led to a gradual withdrawal of troops, and resulted in a return to the geopolitical concepts that determined the degree of US military involvement in the region before September 11. However, given the significant amount of money invested in improving various facilities to create forward-deployed military capabilities, the United States will likely try to remain in the region longer in case of future combat deployments. In addition, the location of American troops in Central Asia does not meet the previously stated goal of destroying the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In early 2002, senior US officials, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Wolfowitz, began to reveal their plans, albeit in a very vague and random manner: “US military bases in Central Asia may have more political than military significance […] and be warning […] that [the United States] has the opportunity to return and will return to the region.”

In October 2003, Russian President V.V. Putin personally presided over the opening ceremony of a new Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan, located just a few kilometers from the US Air Force base at Manas. The fact of the opening of the first Russian military base on foreign territory since the collapse of the USSR in this very place may indicate increased geopolitical competition in the region, and may also be regarded as an attempt to balance the growing influence of the United States in Central Asia.

The expansion of the American presence in the region entails increased geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the two largest neighboring powers that share long common borders with the states of Central Asia. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that Central Asia will be able to enjoy real stability in the near future, since neighboring powers still view the region as their own “strategic backyard” and therefore assess the US military buildup as a manifestation of an aggressive policy towards them.

While it can be argued that American and Russian interests in the region are “not entirely compatible or incompatible,” Washington is clearly, if unofficially, perceived as Moscow's successor as the region's security guarantor. A prolonged American presence would undermine Russia's sense of special rights in the region and force Moscow to view it as an intrusion into its traditional sphere of interest, its "near abroad."

Russia's interests indeed strongly coincided with those of the United States after the events of September 11 and mainly lay in the area of ​​security. Russia became the first country to support the United States in its war on terrorism, and Moscow also shared Washington's views on the dangers of radical Islamic terrorism. Here we can say that the new factor in the “Greatest Game” is the presence in it of cooperation along with competition. This new anti-terrorism strategic partnership also gave Russia the opportunity to re-enter the club of superpowers. Despite the assurances of mutual friendship made by both sides during the celebration of the tricentenary of St. Petersburg in June 2003, the US presence in Central Asia still remains one of the main irritants in the difficult relations between Washington and Moscow. It is clear that in the absence of a clear timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Central Asia, Moscow will begin to believe that Washington is using the war on terrorism as an opportunity to expand its sphere of military influence into Russia’s border regions. Moreover, the United States has to take into account the fact that Russian politicians and senior military officials disagree on how to respond to the changing geopolitical situation that has occurred in Central Asia and make various political statements in order to butter up Russia . Some Russian politicians and military officials have reportedly stated that they view the US presence as an obstacle to achieving the strategic goal of regional dominance. Ultimately, it can be argued that once stability is restored in Afghanistan, the creation of a southern oil export route, lobbied for by the US oil companies Unocal and Delta Oil, will further isolate Russia.

As a result of the above, during 2002 and 2003. Russia has demonstrated deep differences with the United States on a range of international issues and has even developed relations with the countries of the “axis of evil.” Moreover, Moscow has redoubled its efforts to counterbalance the American military presence, mainly through the projection of its own military power, but also by supporting international organizations involved in Central Asian security issues and concluding bilateral agreements with countries in the region. These events do not so much emphasize the success of the development of multilateralism in Central Asia as they are consequences of Moscow’s attempts to counteract Washington’s presence in the region. Thus, by the end of 2003, the nature of the “Great Game” between Russia and the United States had changed, cooperation was replaced by competition.

So, the constantly growing US military presence in Central Asia can lead not only to a deterioration in Russian-American relations, but also provoke an open competition for influence in the region that is disadvantageous to both sides.

The buildup of American military power in the region is of concern not only to Russia, but also to China, which is also accustomed to viewing Central Asia as its fiefdom. Although Beijing initially did not object to the US invasion of Afghanistan, and even somewhat supported this invasion, today it has serious reasons to worry about the continued American presence in the region - after all, it can be seen as the beginning of a process of encircling and containing China. The appearance of US forces near China's strategically important western continental border and simultaneous military deployment in the area of ​​its eastern maritime boundaries, as well as in South and East Asia, it looks as if the United States is taking premeditated actions to geostrategically encircle the PRC. The emergence of a new possible threat on its western borders, not far from the energy-rich province of Xinjiang, not only provokes Beijing to reconsider its security concepts, but also this moment aimed mainly at repelling threats from the east, but also undermines the “ideological security” of the Chinese ruling regime. Therefore, China will most likely begin to increase the size and equipment of its armed forces and spread its economic influence throughout Central Asia, thus paving the way for destabilization in the region.

Conclusion

The post-September 11, 2001, US-led global war on terrorism has reduced the threat posed by radical Islamist terrorist movements to the Central Asian region and led to some stability in the short term. Moreover, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia has greatly increased. Washington began to play a key role in ensuring the security of the countries of the region, and then began to point out to them the need for reforms aimed at maintaining peace and effective economic development. However, in the absence of genuine understanding between the United States and major countries with interests in the region, the prospects for long-term stability in Central Asia remain dim.

The protracted US military presence in the region is viewed by Russia and China as overt US expansion into their spheres of influence, and may also be interpreted by these two states as a strategic threat to their national security interests. Thus, US actions in Central Asia have the potential to be counterproductive and could provoke rivalries that undermine the security and prosperity of any country in the region. By eliminating the threat to Central Asia emanating from Afghanistan, Washington can destabilize the region, provoking both friction between states with interests in the region and internal conflicts within them. Cooperation in the fight against terrorism may give way to competition in the “Great Game” for influence in the region.

The United States must in every possible way prevent the excessive strengthening of any of the players and avoid unilateral actions that are likely to lead to strengthening suspicions in the Central Asian states about the true motives of the American invasion. Washington also needs to continue to encourage regional states to support its anti-terrorism campaign.

However, the main problem facing Washington is not the need to destroy terrorists in Central Asia, but the management of the Pax Americana it has created. Perhaps the US has already spread its influence over too many territories. The United States must do more than simply withdraw troops from Central Asia. They should also begin to promote intraregional security cooperation by providing a balance of financial and technical assistance to local intergovernmental organizations, while relying on interregional initiatives such as NATO's Partnership for Peace or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Notes

Translation – V.G. Fedchenko. PIR Center, 2004. The views of the author of this article may not coincide with the views of the Geneva Center for Security Policy or the French government.

Cited in: Loeb Vernon. Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia. Washington Post. 2002, February 9.

The term “Central Asia” in this article refers to the five republics of the former USSR in the form in which they were created in 1924. I.V. Stalin, who arbitrarily drew their borders, and which, as is now believed, constitute Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. However, the tradition of defining Central Asia as a group of these five countries is of dubious value. For effective development of political decisions and high-quality strategic analysis, it is necessary to have a holistic vision of the entire region, which, from a strategic point of view, is not at all closed within its borders. Therefore, generally speaking, it would be more correct to think of it as “Greater Central Asia” or “Inner Asia”. See: Hooson David. Inner Asia: a geographical perspective. Caucasus and Central Asia Newsletter. 2002, Summer.

The concept of a “new Great Game” has become an integral part of the literature on Central Asia and is applied, explicitly or implicitly, in academic studies, journals and official communications. This concept is recognized all over the world, but it differs very seriously from the original concept of the “Great Game”. See on this subject: Menon Raja. The New Great Game in Central Asia. Survival. 2003. Vol.45, No.2, Summer. P.187-204. Cm. See also: Edwards Matthew. The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder. Central

This concept was coined in the 1830s. to describe Russian-British rivalry in Afghanistan, but was not widely used until the beginning of the 20th century, when it became popular thanks to R. Kipling’s novel “Kim.”

The term "new Great Game" describes today's great power competition for influence over Central Asia's energy resources and pipeline options. But despite the fact that most experts reduce the meaning of this term to simple “energy imperialism”, considering the problem exclusively from the point of view of oil reserves (see, for example: Kleveman Lutz. The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003. P. 304), the “new Great Game” must also be considered from a geostrategic point of view.

The myth of the “American New Frontier Strategy” usually involves territorial expansion. However, after the “New Space Frontier” of the 1960s. the term also carries much more strategic concepts.

Maynes, Charles William. America Discovers Central Asia. Foreign Affairs. 2003. Vol. 82, No.2, March-April. P. 120-132.

Luong, Pauline Jones and Erika Weinthal. New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia. Foreign Affairs. 2002. Vol.81, No.2, March-April. P.61.

Talbott Strobe. A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia . Address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 21 July 1997.

Blank Stephen. The United States and Central Asia. In: Central Asian Security, the New International Context. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. P.130.

Hill Fiona. Une strategie incertaine: la politique des Etats-Unis dans le Caucase et en Asie centrale. Politique Etrangere. 2001. Fevrier, No.1. P. 95–108.

In December 1993, US Vice President A. Gore and Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement, according to which 104 SS-18 missiles and their launchers. See: Wishnick Elizabeth. Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 2002, October. P.3.

In fact, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that global oil demand will grow 56% by 2020 to reach 119.6 million barrels per day. US dependence on imported oil is likely to increase from the current 57% to 64% of all oil consumed by 2020.

See: Cordesman, Anthony H. The U.S. Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia, and Iran. W.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2000, April 27. See also US Department of Energy (DOE) reports for 1998: http://www.eia.doe.gov.emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html According to DOE and EIA estimates, Kazakhstan's confirmed reserves range from 10 to 17.6 billion barrels of oil and from 53 to 83 trillion. cubic feet of natural gas. According to the same estimates, Turkmenistan also has between 98 and 115 trillion. cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. In 2000, the Kashagan gas field, one of the largest in the world, was explored in Kazakhstan. Although Uzbekistan will remain the largest regional producer of natural gas for some time, its export potential may turn out to be insignificant by

2005–2010 due to the high level of domestic consumption due to the largest population compared to other countries in the region.

This process reached its climax in November 1999, when President B. Clinton personally signed the Agreement on the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, bypassing Russia. This circumstance clearly demonstrates the relationship between business interests and issues of national security and defense. See: Nichol Jim. Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for the U.S. Interests. Issue Brief for U.S. Congress. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service. 2003, April. P.14.

The Kazakh oil field Tengiz began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco in 1993, later joined by U.S. Mobil and Lukoil. We can also mention the pressure exerted by the American company Unocal to open the southern oil export route from Turkmenistan to India, through Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, DC: White House. 1999, December. See also the law: The Silk Road Strategy Act. 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1–5.

Zinny Anthony. Avoid a Military Showdown with Iraq. Middle East Quarterly. 1998. Vol.5, No.3, Fall. P. 64.

Butler Kenley. U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian States. Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2001, September 17.

According to Professor K. Kelleher, who was directly involved in the creation of Tsentrazbat, Russia’s influence in the region has decreased significantly. Interview, January 15, 2004. If Tsentrazbat were part of the Partnership for Peace program, it would not be an exclusively NATO program. See: Bronson B. R. NATO’s Mixed Signal in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Survival. 2001. Vol.42, No.3, Autumn. P. 132.

See: Geopolitique du Tadjikistan, le nouveau Grand jeu en Asie centrale. Ellipses, 2000. P. 104.

USMC Brigadier General M.R. Berndt, the joint training exercise director for the U.S. Atlantic Command, said of the Tsentrazbat maneuvers that "the goal is pre-training, and if we were ever ordered to do a mission like this, we would know in advance who we would encounter." See: Butler Kenley. Op.cit.

Vassort-Rousset, Brigitte. The U.S. Silk Road Strategy: American Geostrategy For Central Asia. ARES. 2003. No.50, January.

Facon Isabelle. Entre interets politiques et enjeux de securite: les dilemmas de la Russie en Asie centrale. Les Cahiers de Mars. 2003. No. 177.

For example, F. Hill argues that the United States was only able to succeed in dividing the region, but still failed to completely subordinate it to its influence. Hill, Fiona. Op. cit.

Djalili Mohammad-Reza and Thierry Kellner. Les Etats-Unis et l'Asie Centrale apres le 11 September 2001. Revue Francaise de Geopolitique. Geopolitique des Etats-Unis, Ellipses. 2003. No.1. P. 243.

Brzezinski Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard. NY: Harper Collins Publishers, Basic Books. 1997.

State's Jones Tests on U.S. Policy Towards Central Asia. U.S. Department of State, Testimony for House Subcommittee. 2003, October 29.

Hill, Fiona. The United States and Russia in Central Asia. The Aspen Institute Congressional Program, The Brookings Institution. 2002, August 15.

Cohen, Ariel. Radical Islam and U.S. Interests in Central Asia. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives. 2003, October 29.

Aktash Chirchik, Denau, Kagayty and Tuzel. See: Butler, Kenley. Central Asian Military Bases. Monterey Institute of International Studies, NIS Nonproliferation Program. 2001, October 11. See also: Schmitt, Eric and Dao James. U.S. Is Building Up Its Military Bases in Afghan Region. New York Times. 2002, January 9.

Tajikistan is a member of the Treaty on collective security countries of the CIS (also known as the “Tashkent Treaty,” although Uzbekistan withdrew from it), and its southern borders are protected by the six-thousand-strong Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division, as well as an approximately twenty-thousand-strong contingent of border troops. See: Butler, Kenley. Ibid.

Farhar Khujand, Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab. See: Loeb Vernon, Susan B. Glasser. Tajikistan Allows U.S. to Assess 3 Air Bases. Washington Post. 2001, November 3; Gordon Michael R., C.J. Chivers. A Nation Challenged: U.S. May Gain Use of More Air Bases to Strike Taliban. New York Times. 2001, November 5.

Unlike agreements with the previous two states, this agreement does not stipulate the type of aircraft and the range of missions that allied air forces can carry out from Manas airfield. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the United States could, although only theoretically, conduct only humanitarian and search and rescue operations. See: Oliker Olga and Thomas S. Szayana. Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Implications for the U.S. Army. Rand Arroyo Center, 2003. P. 269.

Although Kazakhstan is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and carries out bilateral and multilateral activities jointly with the United States and NATO, Astana carefully maintains a balance in its relations with both Russia and the United States, as well as with the People's Republic of China. Turkmenistan's officially declared neutral status will most likely prevent it from offering more than assistance in conducting humanitarian missions. See: Bisenova A. Kazakhstan tries to balance disparate interests. Eurasia Insight. 2001, October 9; Kaiser R.

For example, the United States promised to triple foreign aid to Uzbekistan and increase it to $160 million, provided that “democratic changes in society” take place in this country. See: United States – Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation framework. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet. 2002, March 12.

Promoting Long-term Stability in Central Asia: U.S. Government Assistance One Year After 9/11. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheet. 2002, November 27.

Central Asia: Community Action Investment Program. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet. 2002, July 11.

It was also argued that Washington took on the bulk of the security task in Central Asia because existing regional organizations could not deal effectively with Islamic terrorism. However, several intergovernmental organizations in Asia have been willing to modify their structure to deal with new transnational threats. See: Wishnick Elizabeth. Op.cit. P. 17.

Olcott, Martha Brill. Taking Stock of Central Asia. Journal of International Affairs. 2003. Vol.56, No.2. Spring. P. 3.

Almost all the heads of Central Asian states during the USSR occupied high positions in the CPSU, with the exception of the President of Tajikistan E. Rakhmonov.

President of the Eurasia Foundation Charles Maines argues that “in Central Asia there is almost no soil for the development of democracy, even in its folklore the heroes are Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. The region values ​​intrigue and military superiority rather than compromise and concessions. Decades of Soviet rule only strengthened these authoritarian traditions.” See: Maynes Charles William. America discovers Central Asia. Foreign Affairs. 2003, March-April. P. 131.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRWO), Central Asian states are responsible for "abuse of prisoners, torture in prisons, tight controls over the media, and persistent bans on independent political parties and social movements." See: Human Rights Watch World Report 2001. New York, 2002. P. 370-378.

Which is all the more surprising considering that the Central Asian states own a large amount of mineral resources, including rich mineral deposits. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are among the 20 countries in the world with the largest proven natural gas reserves. See: Cordesman Anthony. The US Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia and Iran. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2000, April 7. P. 8. In March 2001, the EIA stated that it estimates that Uzbekistan alone has $1 trillion in oil and natural gas reserves.

Rasizade Alec. Washington and the Great Game in Central Asia. Contemporary Review. 2002, May. According to the US State Department's 2002 Religious Freedom Report, more than 7,000 people are imprisoned on religious and political charges in Uzbekistan. See: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002. However, it must be remembered that all bilateral declarations between the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan commit the United States to promoting the development of civil society in the Central Asian states.

U.S. Assistance to Central Asia. U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheets. 2002. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/c5738.htm). At the same time, the US State Department admits that “internal conditions in the Central Asian states are not conducive to long-term stability. Regional security is threatened by a lack of economic prospects, disappointment in political processes, social degradation, isolation and conflicts within the region.” See: U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheet. 2002, November 27. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15560).

Kyrgyzstan receives the most assistance in carrying out market reforms, although it is already a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

More than two-thirds of Tajik residents live on less than two dollars a day. Half of the residents of Kyrgyzstan and a third of the residents of Uzbekistan live below the poverty line. See: Maynes Charles. Op.cit. P.123.

Tabyshalieva A. Human rights and Democratization in Central Asia after September 11. Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies. 2002, No.3; Khamidov A. Regional experts call on U.S. to strengthen civil society. Eurasia Insight. 2002, October 2.

With the exception of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which in 1998 became the 133rd country to receive the status of a full member of the WTO. Despite this, Kyrgyzstan is still considered a country that does not meet all the principles of Western democracy.

Public opinion polls conducted in Central Asia from the fall of 2001 to the spring of 2002 by the US State Department showed that there was "significant public dissatisfaction with the US military presence in the region." Wishnick Elizabeth. Op.cit. P. 31. During his visit to Central Asia in the spring of 2002, US Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld noted “excellent cooperation with the five Central Asian states in the fight against terrorism,” the involvement of these states in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, their own “efforts to destroy terrorist organizations” that threaten national security. But, as Peter K. Forster noted, D. Rumsfeld “did not mention the situation with the observance of human rights or with the development of democratic values ​​in these states.” See: Forster Peter K. Balancing American Involvement In Uzbekistan. Connections. 2003. Vol. II, No. 1, March. P. 48.

Although the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan suffered serious damage during Operation Enduring Freedom, the movement remained underground in the Fergana Valley. This valley is located in eastern Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan. Its population is about 10 million people. It is one of the most densely populated and fertile regions of Central Asia, although the unemployment rate there is around 80%. As the political and cultural center of Islam in Central Asia, as well as the main source of food and water for the entire region, the Fergana Valley has always been the base area in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan operated and gained supporters. See: Cornell Svante E. and Regine A. Spector. Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists. Washington Quarterly. 2002, Winter. P. 193-206.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) is beginning to threaten not only stability in Central Asia, but also American interests in the region. Created in 1953 in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it aims to create a unified Islamic superstate, a caliphate in Central Asia, to be governed by Sharia law. Although the Islamic Liberation Party does not advocate the violent overthrow of existing regimes, it has declared jihad against the United States. Hizb ut-Tahrir is using the economic downturn in the region, and in particular in the Ferghana Valley, to promote its goals and recruit new members. Cohen Ariel. Op. cit.; Makarenko Tamara, The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism. Jane's Intelligence Review. 2002, February 1.

US President George W. Bush personally recognized the need to work on this problem in the National Security Strategy, where he called on the United States to “wage a war of ideas in order to win the battle against international terrorism.” See: National Security Strategy of the United States of America. White House. 2002, September 20. P. 6.

This refers to the fact that public opinion reflects the preferences expressed by the media. In fact, Uzbekistan's government-controlled media were largely supportive of the US military presence, while media attitudes were skeptical in Kyrgyzstan and negative in Kazakhstan. On the current situation with the media and the development of democracy, see: Olcott Martha Brill. Op.cit. P. 9

See data in: U.S. Assistance to Central Asia. U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheets. 2002. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/c5738.htm); Senior U.S. Diplomat Hails Improved Relations with Uzbekistan. Associated Press. 2002, June 14; Khan Natalya. The Afghanistan Campaign: Implications for Uzbekistan. Caucasus and Central Asia Newsletter. 2002, Issue 2, Summer. P. 10.

Hence the decision made on April 25, 1999, to join GUUAM, which included Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, as a counterweight to the Moscow-controlled CIS. Uzbekistan “temporarily” withdrew from GUUAM in June 2002 due to a “lack of progress” on security issues. See: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 111, Part I, June 14 and 26, 2002. http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/06/2-tca/tca-260602-asp

Oliker Olga and Thomas S. Szayana. Op.cit. Summary, p. 25

“President Islam Karimov developed an ideology based on reverence for the past, including the cult of Emir Timur (Tamerlane), in whose honor a monument was erected in the center of Tashkent. Tamerlane's empire occupied most of modern Central Asia, reaching Russia in the west, China and India in the east. This is an outright cult of military power and territorial expansion.” Cohen Ariel. U.S Foreign policy Interests and Human rights in Central Asia. Heritage Foundation. 2001, July 18.

On this topic, see Luong, Pauline Jones and Erika Weinthal. Op.cit. P. 69.

It should be mentioned that Uzbekistan ranks third among the countries of Central Asia in terms of territory and first in number of inhabitants. Its population is about 25 million people. Moreover, Uzbeks are a significant minority in neighboring countries and in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. It is the fact that a large number of Uzbeks live outside Uzbekistan that can serve as the basis for President Islam Karimov’s constant claims to dominance in the region. Miletitch Alexandre. Au center de la peripherie: enjeux actuels et a venir de l’Asie centrale. Armees d'Aujourd'hui. 2002, no. 273, Septembre. P. 31

O. Oliker and T.S. Zayan argue that the development of close relations between Uzbekistan and the United States is fraught with the creation of leverage on Washington by Tashkent, which could lead to the involvement of the United States in hostilities aimed at protecting Uzbekistan and the regime ruling there. Oliker Olga and Thomas S. Szayana. Op.cit. P.356. In the report “US Strategy in Central Asia” by the American Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, M. Sweeney also emphasizes that “a strategic alliance with Uzbekistan undermines US security interests in the region.” Quote by: Blua, Antoine. Central Asia: Report Calls on U.S. to Rethink its Regional Approach. Eurasia Insight. 2004, 22 February. (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022204-pr.shtml).

The term “The Greatest Game” was first used by retired French colonel R. Cagnat, who wrote a dissertation on Central Asia and lives in Bishkek. However, Colonel R. Kanha's dissertation is almost entirely devoted to the geo-economic rivalry between superpowers with interests in the region. Cagnat Rene. Asie Centrale: le Tres Grand Jeu. Revue de la Defense Nationale. 2002, May. P. 27-38.

The author was unable to find a single clear official estimate of the number of American soldiers, as well as combat and transport aircraft in the five Central Asian states. Estimates of the number of soldiers permanently stationed in the Central Asian states range between four and ten thousand, depending on the source.

There is no doubt that Iran is another major regional power that is likely working to undermine American strategic interests in Central Asia. In addition, Tehran views the expansion of American presence in the region as the main threat posed by American military power. Taking into account the unprecedented diplomatic successes of the United States and European countries in the nuclear field in late 2003, it can also be argued that Iran is unlikely to become further involved in geostrategic competition in Central Asia.

As the commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, General T. Franks, said at a conference in Tashkent, “we have no long-term plans for a presence either in Uzbekistan or in any other country in Central Asia.” Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 2002, January 24; According to US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs E. Jones, “The United States does not want to have its bases in this region.” See: U.S. Wants Engagement, Not Bases, in Central Asia. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, 2002, February 22; Central Command spokesman Lt. Col. M. Compton said, “To date, the U.S. military is not constructing any permanent structures in its area of ​​responsibility.” See: Jontz Sandra. U.S. military looking at long-term options in Central Asia. Stars and Stripes. 2002, March 1; According to US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs B.L. Pascoe, “the United States has no intention of building large long-term bases in the region.” See: U.S. Intensifying Efforts in Central Asia. CDI Russia Weekly. 2002, September 24; During his visit to Uzbekistan in February 2004, US Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld made it clear that the United States intends to organize so-called “operating sites” in Asia and explained that they “will not be permanent in the sense , in which there is a permanent military base, but will become a place where the United States and coalition countries can periodically receive support." See: Blank S. U.S. Strategic Priorities Shifting in Central Asia. Eurasia Insight. 2004, 25 March.(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032504a-pr.shtml)

Colonel B. Montgomery, commander of the 376th Air Force Expeditionary Wing engineers, technicians and designers at Manas International Airport, Kyrgyzstan, said, "Frankly, our long-term presence here will continue after the end of hostilities." See: Loeb Vernon. Op.cit. However, it must be taken into account that the nature of such a presence can vary significantly - for example, it can be reduced to the simple presence of technicians and maintenance personnel maintaining certain buildings and installations in a mothballed state.

Cited in: Loeb Vernon. Op. cit.

However, President V.V. Putin carefully clarified that he sees no reason for rivalry or contradiction, since the two air bases have completely different purposes. In addition, V.V. Putin told Interfax that “the Manas base is temporary, while the new Russian base earned money on a permanent basis.” Utyaganova Maria. Opening of Russian Airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. 2003, November 5.

Olcott, Martha Brill. The Situation on the Ground: Security Risks and Opportunities in Central Asia. 2003, November 19. Seminar held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.(http://www.ceip.org/files/events/OlcottSitonground.asp)

Having geopolitical interests in Central Asia, Russia feels obligated to promote the development of states in the region. Some experts, for example Kh. Salukvadze, argue that “Russia is a hostage to its own colonial history.” Salukvadze Khatuna. The US on the Silk Road of expansion to Eurasia? Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. 2002, March 13. (http://www.cacianalyst.org)

According to Charles Fairbanks, a specialist on Central Asia at the Johns Hopkins Institute, “Russia is extremely scared of us being there.” See: Buzbee, Sally. United States has expanded influence likely to remain in Central Asia. Associated Press. 2002, March 12.(http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020312-attack01.htm); former Speaker of the State Duma G.N. Seleznev also stated: “I would not approve of the appearance of permanent US military bases in Central Asia.” Yankees are coming and the Russians are Upset. Economist. 2002, January 17; At the end of 2003, Russian Defense Minister S. B. Ivanov said that Moscow would accept the existence of American bases in Central Asia only for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, and no longer. Blank S. Op. cit.

Russia's own territory is also threatened by terrorism and drug supplies coming from Afghanistan through Central Asia. It must be remembered that, starting from 2000, V.V. Putin is promoting the idea of ​​jointly countering global terrorism with the United States and European countries.

Jafalian Annie. Russie, Etats-Unis, Asie centrale: la nouvelle version du grand jeu. Annuaire militaire et strategique. 2002. P. 55-70.

Kazio Taras. The U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership: Permanent Fixture or Temporary Marriage of Convenience? Central Asian Insight. 2001, December 4; The Russian President undoubtedly expected serious concessions in exchange for his support, mainly on the issue of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. See: Blank, Stephen. Putin's Twelve-Step Program. Washington Quarterly. 2001. Vol.25, No.1. P. 147.

Maynes Charles William., Op.cit. P.129. S. Blank also argues that “traditionally anti-American elites in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs are undermining the post-9/11 cooperation with the United States.” Blank Stephen. Scramble for Central Asian Bases. Asian Times. 2003, December 1.

Deputy Secretary of State Anne Jones said: "We want the Russian side to understand that we are not trying to compete with them in Central Asia and we are not trying to take their place there." See: Jones Elizabeth. Op.cit.

In addition, Russian officials will likely be concerned about the proximity of US forces to Russian sensitive facilities in Central Asia that are known to be part of military, nuclear or space infrastructure, such as early warning systems for missile attacks or high-tech communications and communications systems. observations. Martin, Patrick. U.S. bases pave the way for long-term intervention in Central Asia. World Socialist Web Site. 2002, January 11. (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jan2002/base-j11-prn.shtml)

Some experts argue that the United States is thus pursuing its “grand strategy,” which is expressed in the desire to gain control of the “strategic energy ellipse” - an area stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia. Kemp G. and Harkavy R. Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle-East. W.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Institution Press. 1997. P.109-153.

On this subject see: Peimani Hooman. American military presence in Central Asia antagonizes Russia. Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. 2002, October 23.(http://www.cacianalyst.org)

For example, a vivid reminder to the outside world Russia's intention to continue to play a significant role in ensuring the security of the region was signaled by the largest military exercises in Russian history, held in the northern part of the Caspian Sea in August 2002 by Chufrin Gennady. The Changing Security Model in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Connections. 2003. Vol. II, No.1, March. P.6; J. Nichol officially stated to the US Congress that “Russia has apparently changed its policy of reducing its military presence in Central Asia to increasing its military presence in Tajikistan.” In mid-June 2002, Russia also signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to extend the lease of part of its military infrastructure for fifteen years. Nichol Jim. Central Asia’s New States: Political developments and Implications for the U.S. Interests. Congressional Research Service Issue Brief. 2003, April. P.5.

Seriously concerned about its ability to control security issues in Central Asia, Russia (like China, which follows the same pattern) began to strengthen its position in 2002 and 2003. by providing support to international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In June 2001, the Shanghai Five, named after the June 1996 Shanghai summit attended by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China and Tajikistan, became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In response to the expansion of the SCO's field of activity, Uzbekistan also joined it. Initially, the existence of the SCO could be regarded as an attempt to balance the growing economic interests of the United States in the region. After September 11, the SCO turned out to be ineffective in terms of countering terrorists, although an anti-terrorist unit was created in Bishkek. But on January 2, 2002, at a meeting in Beijing, a new Russian-Chinese strategy was announced. In accordance with it, the SCO should be transformed from a forum discussing disarmament and trade issues into a regional security structure capable of conducting joint anti-terrorist operations. On August 12, 2003, such an operation was carried out in Kazakhstan and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. See: Ahrari, Ehsan. Copycatting the U.S. war on terrorism. Asian Times. 2003, December 1; Kyrgyzstan and China begin Joint Anti-terrorism Exercises. Associated Press. 2002, October 10. The CSTO member countries decided to give the Treaty a more formal institutional framework. In May 2002, the CSTO became a full-fledged organization, which included Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In June 2002, the first exercises of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) of the CSTO took place in Kyrgyzstan. In October 2003, a new Russian military base was established in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has reportedly made several concessions to Moscow in addition to providing a military base in Kant. For example, Russian became the official language in Kyrgyzstan, and trade turnover with this country increased by 49% in 2002. It was also decided to transform the 201st Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan into a military base to strengthen the Russian military presence in the region. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) was reportedly instructed to facilitate a change of power in Tajikistan in 2002. Blank S. Op.cit. In the energy field, Russia strengthened its ties with Kazakhstan in 2002 by concluding a 15-year bilateral agreement, according to which 15 million tons of oil were to be exported via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, and another 2.5 million tons via the pipeline. to Novorossiysk. However, Kazakhstan has always preferred to pursue a truly balanced strategy in relations with Moscow and Washington, as well as with China. Gvosdev N. Pipelines and grand strategy. Perihelion. European Rome Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC). 2002. Vol.1, August. (http://www.erpic.org/pipelinesandgrandstrategy.html)

Beijing, however, has largely left regional security issues to Moscow, preferring to establish trade ties throughout Central Asia, primarily through the SCO.

Beijing probably initially believed that US preoccupation with building an anti-terrorism coalition would reduce Washington's focus on China as a potential source of strategic threat. US President George W. Bush even spoke of “friendly and constructive relations.” But the war on terrorism launched by the United States primarily helped Beijing achieve success in ensuring its national security.

China is extremely concerned about the activities of radical Islamic terrorists in Xinjiang province and is actively fighting them. Uyghur Islamic movements and parties are fighting violently for the independence of Xinjiang, and because they are believed to be trained and equipped by undead members of al-Qaeda, Chinese authorities initially welcomed the US invasion of Central Asia.

Geopolitics expert Fukyu Gao argues that “US invasion of Central Asia not only prevents China from expanding its influence, but also limits China from the West and East, effectively containing a rising China. Gao Fuqiu. The real purpose of the American march into Central Asia. Liaoang. 2002, May 10. (http://www.uscc.gov/works.htm); According to Tajik radio, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiahuan said: “It is impossible to endlessly expand the scope of the anti-terrorist operation, which, moreover, must be carried out under the auspices of the UN.” Quote by: Basken, Paul. China, Russia Voice Concern Over U.S. Bases in Central Asia. Bloomberg News. 2002, January 11.

Not to mention the unspoken military and security ties that exist between the United States and Taiwan.

With the official status of a “strategic rival,” China is doomed to become the next “super-antagonist” of the United States. See: Bacevich Andrew J. Steppes to Empire. National Interest. 2002, Summer. P.51.

The U.S. Air Force base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, is only 200 miles from China's westernmost province of Xinjiang, which can be easily reached by U.S. fighter-bombers.

According to M. Jalili and T. Kellner, the inculcation of democratic values ​​in Central Asia is of very serious political concern to the Chinese authorities. See Djalili M. and T. Kellner. Op. cit. P. 261.

Beijing began modernizing its naval forces, as well as improving its power projection capabilities, after 9/11. Once US forces arrived in the region, China conducted massive military exercises in Xinjiang province "to demonstrate its military might." Rashid Ahmed. Jihad, The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. London: Yale University Press, 2002. P.205. In 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted joint exercises near their common border. Blua Antoine. Central Asia: Report Calls on U.S. To Rethink Its Regional Approach. Eurasia Insight. 2004, February 22. http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022204-pr.shtml. The US military presence in Central Asia has also helped the development of Chinese diplomacy in the region. First, it paved the way for the development of regional security mechanisms such as the SCO. Secondly, it gave impetus to the development of multilateral economic cooperation, for example, through the creation in June 2002 of the “Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Central Asia.” Cm.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Libery Central Asia Report. 2002, June 6.

“Nuclear Control” No. 1(75), Volume 11, spring 2005

– josser

Is the “Great Game” coming back to life in Central Asia? This is supported by many experts and journalists who write about this region and its significance for the whole world. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the five Central Asian republics, this has been a dominant theme in much of the analysis on the region.

In the 30s of the 19th century, an officer of the 6th Regiment of the Bengal Native Light Horse, Captain Arthur Conolly, created the concept of the “Great Game”. Later, in 1901, English writer Rudyard Kipling immortalized the term in his novel Kim. At its core, the Great Game was simply a struggle for power, control of territory, and political dominance that took place in the 19th century between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia. This imperial contest of maneuver and intrigue came to an end in 1907, when both states were forced to focus their resources on more serious threats. The British had to prepare and take measures to contain the rise of assertive Germany in Europe, and the Russians had their hands tied by a fierce struggle with the Japanese in Manchuria.

Today, the US invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of military bases in Central Asia, as well as Chinese economic expansion in the region, have convinced experts that a new “Great Game” is already underway. German journalist Lutz Klevemann writes that “the Great Game is raging in the region.” Quoting Bill Richardson, former Secretary of Energy and US Ambassador to the UN during the Clinton years, Clevenman points out that the US is involved in Central Asian affairs not only to defeat al-Qaeda, but also to “diversify [its] sources of oil and gas, [and] prevent strategic encroachment by those who do not share [their] values.” Johns Hopkins University professor Niklas Svanstrom comes to the same conclusion in his article “China and Central Asia: New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” proves that the US and China are locked in a geo-economic rivalry over the natural resources of Central Asia. According to him, “the situation in Central Asia seems to be developing in the direction new version Big Game".

Contrary to popular belief, China's goal in Central Asia is not to play games with other regional powers, but to gain the support of "countries in the region in suppressing the anti-Beijing movement of Uyghur nationalists" and to create conditions for Chinese firms to invest in energy resources of Central Asia. Nature has generously endowed the Central Asian states with oil and natural gas reserves, and China, as a dynamic economic power and the second largest consumer of energy, is clearly interested in increasing its presence in the region. China's efforts to build highways, improve infrastructure and improve railway lines indicate the country's growing involvement in Central Asia. As China's ties to the Central Asian republics develop, "its relationships with major powers, namely the United States and Russia, could suffer," says regional expert Kevin Shives.

For now, such a turn in strategy would be premature for China. China is currently facing many internal problems. For example, he has to deal with Tibet, Xinjiang and other semi-autonomous regions with separatist sentiments and aspirations for independence. China's highest priorities in Central Asia should be ensuring security, maintaining regional stability, pacifying Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and strengthening economic ties in the region.

To meet the needs of its 1.4 billion people, China must continuously search for resources around the world. Chinese corporations and state-owned companies are involved in the economic life of five Central Asian republics with huge reserves of natural gas and oil: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Given China's keen interest in security issues as well as its energy needs, its engagement with Central Asian countries will expand dramatically in the long term. Central Asian states also welcome China's growing expansion as they try to break Russia's monopoly over transport routes. Even after the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, China continued to work on building a new Silk Road to connect Central Asia and the rest of the world with its northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The return of the Middle Kingdom to Central Asia should, in all likelihood, bring about changes in the geopolitical configuration of the region - hopefully for the better.

When they talk about Central Asia as the site of the “Great Game” of world powers or a transit point connecting China with the West of the “Silk Road”, the countries of the region are considered only as pawns on a chessboard.

This point of view is refuted by the past and present of the region. But the concepts of the “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” also carry very real risks, Nazarbayev University professor Alexander Morrison expresses confidence in his article on eurasianet.org.

Just a cliché?

The history of Central Asia is synonymous with two things - that the region was the scene of the 19th century great power clash known as the Great Game, and before that, for two millennia, it was the centerpiece of a major trade route connecting China to Europe, known as the Great Game. Silk Road".

But the modern understanding of the “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” is incorrect. These terms have become clichés that are sometimes used in the most absurd ways. For example, at the beginning of this year in Astana, opposite the university where I teach, Mega Silk Way, the largest shopping center in Central Asia, opened. The center is home to many restaurants and designer boutiques. There are also aquariums with inhabitants of tropical seas and even a dolphinarium. But it is located about a thousand miles north of the supposed Silk Road route. In general, this

the once historical term has become a ubiquitous brand

While clichés can sometimes be useful, helping to quickly understand a phenomenon or simplifying a complex concept so that the uninitiated can grasp it, clichés regarding the Great Game and the Silk Road are much less innocent.

These two terms now appear in countless books and articles about the region and are often used to explain contemporary events. The competition between Russia, China and the United States for control in Central Asia has been called the “New Great Game”, similar to the confrontation between Britain and Russia in the region in the 19th century. The Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative is also positioned as a successor to the ancient “Silk Road”. But all these are anachronisms that only confuse and do not explain what is happening in modern politics.

Was there a "Great Game"?

It is noteworthy that “The Great Game” and “Silk Road” are phrases of European origin that originated in the 19th century. These phrases do not have deep roots in the languages ​​or culture of the peoples of Central Asia.

The "Great Game" was first mentioned in 1840 in a personal letter by Arthur Conolly, a captain in the Bengal Army of the British East India Company, in the context of the introduction of Central Asia to European civilization and Christianity. Conolly was executed by the Emir of Bukharan Nasrullah in 1842, but the phrase survived him and first appeared publicly in Sir John Kay's 1851 book History of the War in Afghanistan, and was then popularized by Kipling's 1901 work Kim. It became associated with adventure and desperate bravery in the service of the empire (Russian or British) in Central Asia, as well as with the confrontation between the two powers in the region.

any use of the term “Great Game” when describing interstate relations in Central Asia is incorrect - it was incorrect in the 19th century, it remains incorrect today

This phrase implies the presence of rules that are understandable to all parties, as well as clear strategic and economic goals, a mixture of adventurism and cold calculation in achieving these goals. It also implies that only great powers could, or can now, participate in the game, and Central Asia is just a huge chessboard.

Central Asian rulers, states and peoples are also given the role of extras, a colorful background for the actions of the great powers

But this was never true, even at the height of European colonialism in the 19th century. As Imperial Russian troops moved deeper into Central Asia, the British may have thought that the Russian side was motivated by a desire to encroach on British possessions in India. Meanwhile, the Russians were much more concerned about their relations with the Central Asian states and peoples.

Neither side could operate freely in the region: both faced significant logistical problems (for example, the movement of armies was carried out by camels provided by the local nomadic population) and at least initially had only a very limited knowledge of the society, culture and politics of the region .

The British suffered two catastrophic defeats in Afghanistan in 1841 and 1879, and in neither case could they be attributed to Russian intervention. These defeats were inflicted on them by the Afghans themselves. Emir Abdur Rahman (1881-1901), the ruthless architect of the modern Afghan state, used British subsidies and arms supplies to suppress internal resistance, but the British received very little in return.

As Alexander Cooley has shown in his research, a similar dynamic is at work today: the five independent post-Soviet states cannot compete with Russia, China or the United States in terms of economic or military power, but nevertheless they force the big powers to play by “local rules.” – rules that are determined by local specifics, including the internal politics of the countries of the region and the nature of Central Asian society.

Cheap exotics

The Silk Road, at first glance, may seem like a less complex case. It refers to the complex, centuries-old commercial and cultural relationships between Central Asia and the rest of the world. However, the term is also of European origin and is used to retrospectively impose a simplified vision of a more complex past. The term "Seidenstraße" ("Silk Road") was first used by the German explorer and geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877. But, as Daniel Waugh argues, Richthofen's use of the term was “very limited,” applying it “from time to time only in relation to the Han period, and only when speaking of the relationship between political expansion and trade, on the one hand, and geographical knowledge, on the one hand.” another".

Richthofen was primarily interested in the relationship between Europe and China, rather than how trade and information exchange could potentially affect Central Asia. He believed that most such contacts had ceased by the 8th century AD.

The term only gained popularity in the 1930s, largely through the writings of Richthofen's student, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, who used it to lend a romantic and scientific aura to his successful exercises in self-promotion. This touch of cheap exoticism remains in the use of this term to this day.

As Khodadad Rezakhani said,

“The Silk Road is not only a term from the 19th century, but in fact a modern historiographical invention,

which allows us to combine different historical events and draw connections where there were never any.”

In reality, the Silk Road was only a series of shorter trade routes that linked the Chinese capital (Xi'an/Chang'an) with various centers of trade in Central Asia, including Tashkent, Otrar and Samarkand. These centers in turn were connected to other points in India, Iran and the Middle East, and through them to Europe. None of the traders and almost none of the goods made the complete journey from China to Europe, and there was never just one “route”.

By focusing on the two ends of the road—China and the West—speakers tend to marginalize the areas in the middle, especially Central Asia, when in fact the West for most Chinese sources was Central Asia, not the modern European West.

Why is the passion for the “Silk Road” dangerous?

Also, as Rezakhani notes, no one can say exactly where the supposed route from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea was. It also downplays the fact that silk was almost certainly not a major trade item (it had been produced in Western Asia since at least the 3rd century AD), and that Europe was not then nearly as prominent in the economy of the ancient world. like now. In addition, the cultural exchange along the supposed “Silk Road” was of a religious nature and it did not follow the “Europe-China” route: Buddhism came to China from India (that is, it went from south to north, and not from west to east) , and Nestorian Christianity, whose followers were driven out of Roman Syria as heretics, spread from the Sasanian Empire in Iran to India and Central Asia.

These historical reasons provide a sound scientific basis for abandoning the term "Silk Road" as a historical concept. And the modern abuse of this term gives even more justification. In the 2015 blockbuster Sword of the Dragon, Jackie Chan and his Chinese soldiers fight alongside Uyghurs and Indians to defend the Silk Road from an army of predatory Romans. From a historical point of view, the film is complete nonsense, but it has a very clear political message.

when the ruthless exercise of political and economic power is dressed in attractive historical clothing. An excellent example of this is the large-scale Chinese project “One Belt - One Road”, the launch of which was first announced by Xi Jinping from the rostrum at Nazarbayev University in Astana.

The Chinese premier directly linked his initiative to the legacy of the ancient Silk Road and presented it as a project based on “equality and mutual benefit, mutual tolerance and borrowing knowledge from each other.” But the purpose of the Belt and Road Initiative is not the exchange of goods, services and ideas on equal terms. It is about creating new markets and routes for Chinese goods in Asia, partly due to falling demand for them in Europe and the United States. In other words, this project is not at all altruistic in nature.

In this respect, the project is no different from many Western investments in developing countries. Even if Chinese investment brings real benefits, framing the Belt and Road Initiative as a “Silk Road” does nothing to help our understanding of the term.

"Big Games" versus "Local Rules"

The concept of a "catechism of clichés" was coined by the great Brian O'Nolan in his Irish Times column in the 1940s. For him, as for George Orwell, clichés were “petrified” or “mortified” phrases that people accepted without questioning them. The “Great Game” and the “Silk Road” are not the only clichés regularly applied to Central Asia, but they are undoubtedly the most persistent and the most pernicious.

While the term "Great Game" is now perhaps nothing more than a cliché - a dead phrase used by writers when nothing better comes to mind - the "Silk Road" remains a powerful myth, widely used for modern purposes. a myth that is growing in popularity both in Central Asia and China.

These two terms are united by disdain for Central Asia and an attitude towards it only as a stage for grandiose geopolitical projects

Moreover, these terms and the modern concepts behind them tend to ignore the capabilities and interests of the region's inhabitants, concentrating only on the great powers.

“Great Games” must adapt to “local rules,” which often have deep roots in Central Asian society and culture, and “Silk Roads” that fail to adapt to local realities are likely to become roads to nowhere.