Defense of Crimea 1941 - 1942

For the defense of Crimea and the main naval base in Sevastopol, on August 15, the 51st Army was created as part of the Southern Front, consisting of the 9th Rifle Corps and the 48th Cavalry Division under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsova. This army had the task of preventing the enemy from invading Crimea both from the north, through the Perekop and Chongar isthmuses, and from the sea approaches.

Against the Southern Front, whose commander was Lieutenant General D.I. Ryabyshev, member of the Military Council of the front - Army Commissar 1st Rank A.I. Zaporozhets, and the chief of staff was Major General A.I. Antonov, the enemy went on the offensive on September 9. He managed to break through the front of the 9th Army and by the evening of September 12 reached the Perekop Isthmus, and on September 16 - to the Chongar Bridge and the Arabat Strelka. Thus, the enemy came close to the Crimean Peninsula, but his attempt to immediately break through the Perekop Isthmus was repulsed by the troops of the 51st Separate Army.

The troops of the Southern Front, commanded from October 5 by Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, at the end of September, on their own initiative, they tried to organize an offensive in Northern Tavria with the aim of reaching the Crimean isthmus and establishing direct communication with Crimea. But the Supreme Command Headquarters indicated to the front command that their efforts were untimely and that in the current situation it was advisable to improve their defensive positions. At the same time, the troops of the 51st Separate Army were ordered to hold the Crimean isthmus with all their might and prevent the enemy from breaking through into Crimea.

The Crimean Peninsula has always been a strategic center in the Black Sea, first for the Russian Empire and later for the USSR. The Crimean operation was very important for the advancing Red Army, and at the same time Hitler understood: if he gave up the peninsula, the entire Black Sea would lose. Fierce fighting lasted for more than a month and led to the defeat of the defending fascists.

On the eve of the operation

From the end of 1942 to the beginning of 1943, a radical change occurred during the Second World War: if until that moment the Red Army was retreating, now it went on the offensive. The Battle of Stalingrad became a tragedy for the entire Wehrmacht. In the summer of 1943, the Battle of Kursk took place, called the largest tank battle in history, in which Soviet forces strategically outplayed the Nazis, capturing them in a pincer movement, after which the Third Reich was already doomed. The generals reported to Hitler that further continuation of hostilities was becoming pointless. However, he ordered to stand and hold positions until the last.

Operation Crimea was a continuation of the glorious achievements of the Red Army. After the Lower Dnieper offensive operation, the 17th German Army found itself blocked on the Crimean Peninsula without the possibility of replenishment and reinforcement. In addition, Soviet troops managed to seize a convenient bridgehead in the Kerch region. The German high command once again recalled the hopelessness of the situation at the front. As for Crimea itself, the generals specifically said that without possible ground reinforcements, they remain there to certain death with further resistance. Hitler did not think so - he gave the order to hold the defense of this important strategic point. He motivated this by the fact that in the event of the surrender of Crimea, Romania and Bulgaria would cease to be allies with Germany. The order was given, but what was the attitude of ordinary soldiers to this instruction and to the war in general when the Crimean defensive operation began for them?

War theorists often talk only about the balance of forces of the opposing sides and their strategies, presuming the outcome of the battle as a whole by the beginning of the battle, simply by counting the number of military equipment and the number of fighters.

Meanwhile, practitioners believe that morale plays a huge role, if not a determining one. What happened to both sides?

Morale of the Red Army

If at the beginning of the war the morale of Soviet soldiers was quite low, then during its actions, and especially after Stalingrad, it grew unimaginably. Now the Red Army went into battle only for victory. In addition, our troops, unlike the first months of the war, were battle-hardened, and the command acquired the necessary experience. All this together gave us a complete advantage over the invaders.

Morale of the German-Romanian army

At the beginning of the Second World War, the car was undefeated. In less than two years, Germany managed to capture almost all of Europe, approaching the borders of the USSR. The morale of the Wehrmacht soldiers was at its best. They considered themselves invincible. And going into the next battle, they already knew in advance that it would be victorious.

However, at the end of 1941, the Nazis encountered serious resistance for the first time in the Battle of Moscow. During the counter-operation, the Red Army pushed them back from the city to a distance of more than 200 km. It was a blow to their pride and, most importantly, to their morale.

This was followed by the Stalingrad breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad, and the Crimean strategic offensive operation began. The Third Reich was retreating on all fronts. Besides the fact that the German soldiers suffered defeat one after another, they were simply tired of the war. No matter how we treat them, they are people too, they had families that they loved and wanted to return home quickly. They no longer needed this war. Morale was at zero.

Strengths of the parties. USSR

Operation Crimea became one of the largest during the Second World War. The Red Army was represented by:

• 4th Ukrainian Front, commanded by F.I. Tolbukhin. It consisted of the 51st Army under the command of Ya. G. Kreiser; 2nd Guards Army under the command of G.F. Zakharov; the 8th Air Army under the command of T. T. Khryukin, as well as the 19th Tank Corps, initially under the command of I. D. Vasiliev, who was later replaced by I. A. Potseluev.
• A separate Primorsky Army, subordinate to General A. I. Eremenko, but on April 15, 1944, its command was entrusted to K. S. Melnik, who was a lieutenant general of the army.
• The Black Sea Fleet, commanded by Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky
• 361st Sevastopol separate radio division.
• Azov military flotilla, led by Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov.

Strengths of the parties. Germany, Romania

The defense of the captured peninsula was carried out by the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht. On May 1, 1944, its command was entrusted to Infantry General K. Allmendinger. The army included 7 Romanian and 5 German divisions. The main headquarters is located in the city of Simferopol.

The Crimean operation by the Wehrmacht in the spring of 1944 was defensive in nature. The Wehrmacht's territorial defensive strategy can be divided into 4 parts:

1. North. The command of these forces was located in Dzhankoy, and reserves were also concentrated there. Two formations were concentrated here:

• 49th Mountain Rifle Corps: 50th, 111th, 336th Infantry Divisions, 279th Assault Gun Brigade;
• 3rd Romanian Cavalry Corps, consisting of the 9th Cavalry, 10th and 19th Infantry Divisions.

2. West. The entire coast from Sevastopol to Perekop was guarded by two regiments of the 9th Romanian Cavalry Division.

3. East. Events unfolded on Here they defended themselves:

• 5th Army Corps (73rd and 98th Infantry Divisions, 191st Assault Gun Brigade);
• 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Rifle Romanian Divisions.

4. South. The entire southern coast from Sevastopol to Feodosia was patrolled and defended by the 1st Romanian Mountain Rifle Corps.

As a result, the forces were concentrated as follows: the northern direction - 5 divisions, Kerch - 4 divisions, the southern and western coast of Crimea - 3 divisions.

The Crimean operation was launched precisely with this arrangement of combat formations.

The balance of forces between the opposing sides

In addition, the Red Army had 322 units of naval equipment. These figures indicate a significant numerical superiority of the Soviet Army. The Wehrmacht command reported this to Hitler in order to obtain permission for the retreat of the forces remaining in the blockade.

Plans of the parties

The Soviet side saw Crimea, and mainly Sevastopol, as the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. With the receipt of this facility for its use, the USSR Navy could more conveniently and successfully conduct operations at sea, which was necessary for the further advancement of troops.

Germany was also well aware of the importance of Crimea for the overall balance of power. Hitler understood that the Crimean offensive strategic operation could lead to the loss of this important bridgehead. Moreover, Adolf was often informed about the impossibility of containing the Red Army in this direction. Most likely, he himself already understood the hopelessness of the situation, but he no longer had other considerations. Hitler gave the order to defend the peninsula to the last soldier, and under no circumstances to surrender it to the USSR. He saw Crimea as a force that held allies such as Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey close to Germany, and the loss of this point would automatically lead to the loss of allied support.

Thus, Crimea was very important for the Soviet army. For Germany it was vital.

The strategy of the Red Army consisted of a simultaneous massive attack from the north (from Sivash and Perekop) and east (from Kerch), followed by advance to the strategic centers - Simferopol and Sevastopol. After which the enemy had to be divided into separate groups and destroyed, without giving the opportunity for evacuation to Romania.

On April 3, using her heavy artillery, she destroyed the enemy’s defenses. On April 7, in the evening, reconnaissance in force was carried out, confirming the location of enemy forces. On April 8, the Crimean operation began. For two days, Soviet soldiers were in conditions of fierce fighting. As a result, the enemy's defenses were broken through. On April 11, the 19th Tank Corps managed to capture Dzhankoy, one of the headquarters of the enemy forces, on its first attempt. German and Romanian formations, fearing encirclement, began to retreat from the north and east (from Kerch) to Simferopol and Sevastopol.

On the same day, the Soviet army captured Kerch, after which the pursuit of the retreating enemy began in all directions using aviation. The Wehrmacht began evacuating soldiers by sea, but the forces of the Black Sea Fleet attacked the evacuating ships, as a result of which the Nazi allied forces lost 8,100 people.

On April 13, the cities of Simferopol, Feodosia, Saki, and Yevpatoria were liberated. The next day - Sudak, the next day - Alushta. The Crimean operation in the Second World War was coming to an end. The matter remained only with Sevastopol.

Partisan contribution

A separate topic of conversation is the partisan and underground activities of the Crimeans. The Crimean operation, in short, became the unity of the army and partisans in achieving a common goal. It is estimated that there were about 4,000 people in total. The objectives of their activities were the destruction of enemy rear lines, subversive activities, disruption of communications and railways, and blockages were made on mountain roads. The partisans disrupted the work of the port in Yalta, which greatly complicated the evacuation of German and Romanian soldiers. In addition to disruptive activities, the goal of the partisans was to prevent the destruction of industrial, transport enterprises and cities.

Here is one example of active partisan activity. On April 11, during the retreat of the 17th Wehrmacht Army to Sevastopol, the partisans captured the city of Old Crimea, as a result of which they cut the road to the retreating.

Kurt Tippelskirch, General of the Wehrmacht, described the last days of the battles as follows: throughout the entire operation, the partisans actively interacted with the Soviet troops and provided them with assistance.

Assault on Sevastopol

By April 15, 1944, Soviet troops approached the main base - Sevastopol. Preparations for the assault began. By that time, the Odessa operation, which took place within the framework of the Dnieper-Carpathian operation, was completed. The Odessa (and Crimean) operation, during which the northern and northwestern coast of the Black Sea was liberated, made a significant contribution to the cause of Victory.

The first two attempts to capture the city on the 19th and 23rd were unsuccessful. The regrouping of troops began, as well as the supply of provisions, fuel and ammunition.

On May 7, at 10:30, with massive air support, the assault on the fortified area of ​​Sevastopol began. On May 9, the Red Army entered the city from the east, north and southeast. Sevastopol was liberated! The remaining Wehrmacht troops began to retreat, but were not overtaken by the 19th Panzer Corps, where they took part in the final battle, as a result of which the 17th Army was completely defeated, and 21,000 soldiers (including officers) were captured along with the mass equipment and other weapons.

Results

The last Wehrmacht bridgehead in Right Bank Ukraine, located in Crimea, represented by the 17th Army, was destroyed. More than 100 thousand German and Romanian soldiers were irretrievably lost. The total losses amounted to 140,000 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers.

For the Red Army, the threat to the southern direction of the front disappeared. The return of Sevastopol, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, took place.

But the most important thing is that the USSR, after the Crimean operation, regained control in the Black Sea basin. This fact sharply shook Germany's previously strong positions in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

The most terrible grief in the history of our people in the 20th century is the Great Patriotic War. The Crimean operation, like all the others, had positive consequences for the offensive and strategies, but as a result of these clashes hundreds, thousands, and sometimes millions of our citizens died. The Crimean offensive operation was an important strategic goal set by the Soviet command. Germany needed it in 1941-1942. 250 days to capture Sevastopol. Soviet troops had 35 days to liberate the entire Crimean peninsula, 5 of which were required to storm Sevastopol. As a result of the successfully carried out operation, favorable conditions were created for the advance of Soviet armed forces to the Balkan Peninsula.

During the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), Crimea became the epicenter of fierce battles with the Nazis on land, in the air and at sea. In 1941, at the beginning of November, the invaders occupied the South Coast. Sevastopol fought against the Nazi invaders for 250 days. The city's residents showed tremendous heroism and endurance during the struggle for the freedom of their city. The rocks and sea on which the city is located became great helpers for its people.

In the east of Crimea in the winter of 1941-1942, a large Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of Soviet troops was carried out. The defenders of the underground garrison near Kerch will forever remain in the hearts of the Crimean people.

Fighting on Perekop, the shores of Sivash and the Kerch Peninsula continued throughout 1943-1944.

Crimea was liberated in the spring of 1944.

Partisans played a significant role in the liberation of Crimea from the Nazi invaders. There were more than 2 thousand of them in Crimea. They united into dozens of partisan detachments. Coordinating their actions with army detachments, the partisans descended from the mountains, destroyed the fascist garrisons, trying to prevent the destruction of resort bases and various enterprises.

In May 1944, with the liberation of Sevastopol, the entire Crimea became free. Agriculture had to be restored and Crimean health resorts had to be revived.

Section 3. Crimean defensive operation

The only land route to Crimea lay through the Perekop Isthmus. In general, the defense of the peninsula was entrusted to the 51st Separate Army formed in August, directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters, under the command of Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov. The northern direction was covered by three rifle divisions: 276th (Commander Major General I.S. Savinov) - Chongar and Arabat Strelka, 156th (Major General P.V. Chernyaev) - Perekop positions, 106th (Col. A.N. Pervushin) stretched for 70 kilometers along the southern bank of Sivash. Three cavalry divisions - 48th (Major General D.I. Averkin), 42nd (Regiment V.V. Glagolev) and 40th (Regiment F.F. Kudyurov), as well as the 271st The rifle division (regiment M.A. Titov) had anti-landing missions. Four divisions formed in Crimea - 172nd (regiment I.G. Toroptsev), 184th (regiment V.N. Abramov), 320th (regiment M.V. Vinogradov), 321st (regiment . I. M. Aliev) guarded the coast.

On September 12, advanced German units reached the Crimea. The commander of the 11th Army, Manstein, decided to create a group of troops consisting of: the 54th Army Corps, the 3rd Romanian Army and the 49th Mountain Corps, removed from the Rostov direction, the RGK artillery, engineering troops and anti-aircraft artillery. Air support was provided by units of the 4th Luftwaffe Air Corps.

By mid-October, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Primorsky Army was transferred from Odessa. Thus, the Soviet troops began to number 12 rifle divisions (probably two to four of them were not fully formed) and 4 cavalry divisions. At the same time, the Germans were able to allocate the 11th Army, consisting of 7 infantry divisions (according to Manstein’s memoirs, six: 22nd, 72nd, 170th, 46th, 73rd, 50th) to capture Crimea. and the Romanian mountain corps of two brigades.

In September, troops of the German Army Group South defeated the Soviet Southwestern Front east of Kyiv.

The German command decided to carry out an operation to capture Donbass and Crimea until Soviet troops gained a foothold on new frontiers.

In mid-October, large forces were concentrated for the attack on Crimea. On October 18, the Germans launched an offensive. The main blow was delivered by the 11th German Army across the Perekop Isthmus. Auxiliary - Romanian corps across the Chongar bridge.

The Germans had a significant superiority of forces, since the Primorsky Army had not yet had time to approach. Therefore, on October 20, the Ishun positions were broken through. In the steppe part of Crimea there were no prepared lines that could be used for defense. Soviet troops found themselves in a difficult situation.

To improve coordination of troops, ground and naval forces in Crimea were combined. On October 22, the command of the Crimean troops was created, headed by Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko. Two ground armies and the Black Sea Fleet began to submit to him.

The Primorsky Army retreated to Sevastopol, waging continuous battles. The 51st Army was weakened by the fighting and retreated to Kerch. On November 16, she was evacuated to the Taman Peninsula.

As a result of the Crimean defensive operation, significant losses were inflicted on the German troops and their forces were pinned down. This made it possible to organize the defense of Sevastopol and the Taman Peninsula. The siege of Sevastopol began. Chaotic retreat, large concentration of troops in Sevastopol. Flight of the entire command and party elite, ill-conceived evacuation of civilians.

USSR, Crimea

Possession of the Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. Hitler called it a Soviet unsinkable aircraft carrier threatening Romanian oil.

On October 18, 1941, the 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Infantry General Erich von Manstein began an operation to seize Crimea. After ten days of stubborn fighting, the Germans reached operational space. By November 16, 1941, all of Crimea, except Sevastopol, was occupied.

On December 26, 1941, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation began. The troops of the Soviet 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front recaptured the Kerch Peninsula, advancing 100-110 km in 8 days.

Soviet troops stopped on January 2, 1942 at the Kiet – Novaya Pokrovka – Koktebel line. The Soviet 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades and 2 tank battalions were opposed there by one German infantry division, a reinforced infantry regiment and Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades.

Manstein wrote in his memoirs:

“If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and began to quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division, and also decisively hit the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would have been created not only for this new section of the 11th Army’s front. The fate of the entire 11th Army would have been decided "th Army. A more decisive enemy could have paralyzed all the army's supplies with a rapid breakthrough on Dzhankoy. The troops recalled from Sevastopol - the 170th and 132nd Infantry Divisions - could have arrived in the area west or north-west of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later."

The command of the Transcaucasian Front nevertheless planned an operation to liberate Crimea. The plan of the operation was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense on January 1, 1942. It was planned to attack Perekop with a strike from a motorized mechanized group (2 tank brigades and a cavalry division) and the 51st Army (4 rifle divisions and 2 brigades). 44th Army (3 rifle divisions) - reach Simferopol. Two mountain rifle divisions were to strike along the Black Sea coast. The Primorsky Army was supposed to pin down the enemy near Sevastopol and land troops in Yevpatoria, followed by a direction to Simferopol. The general task is to destroy all enemy forces in Crimea. The operation began on January 8-12, 1942.

However, the operation was not started as scheduled, and on January 15, 1942, the Germans and Romanians launched a counterattack, recapturing Feodosia on January 18. Soviet troops were pushed back 10-20 km, to the Karpacz Isthmus.

On February 27, 1942, the Soviet offensive began both from Sevastopol and from the Karpacz Isthmus. There, Soviet 7 rifle divisions and 2 brigades, and several tank battalions acted against 3 German and 1 Romanian infantry divisions. The second echelon of Soviet troops included 6 rifle divisions, one cavalry division and two tank brigades. The Romanian division on the northern flank retreated again to Kiet, 10 km. On March 3, 1942, the front stabilized - now it arched to the west.

On March 13, 1942, Soviet troops (8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades) again went on the offensive. The Germans held out, and on March 20, 1942 they tried to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 22nd Panzer Division (which had just been reorganized from an infantry division) and two infantry divisions. The Germans were repulsed.

“There will be no increase in the forces of the Crimean Front at the present time. Therefore, the troops of the Crimean Front will firmly gain a foothold on the occupied lines, improving their defensive structures in engineering terms and improving the tactical position of the troops in individual sectors, in particular by capturing the Koi-Asan node.”

By this time, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle divisions and 3 brigades, a cavalry division, 4 tank brigades, and 9 artillery reinforcement regiments. The front had 225 bombers and 176 fighters (serviceable). The enemy had 5 German infantry and 1 tank divisions, 2 Romanian infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, as well as the Groddeck motorized brigade, which consisted mainly of Romanian units under the command of the German headquarters.

With this balance of forces (Manstein assessed the Soviet superiority in forces as twofold), the Germans and Romanians went on the offensive on May 8, 1942.

Manstein decided to turn the factor of the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops to his advantage. The front line consisted of two sections. The southern section from Koi-Asan to the Black Sea coast (8 km) consisted of well-equipped (since January 1942) Soviet defensive positions, occupied by the 44th Army. The northern section from Koi-Asan to Kiet (16 km) curved to the west. The Soviet command should have expected that the Germans would strike in the Koi-Asan area in order to cut off the northern group (47th and 51st armies).

Indeed, given the small number of his forces, Manstein could only count on encircling as many Soviet forces as possible in as small an area as possible and then destroying them with aviation and artillery. His forces were sufficient for operations on a narrow section of the front, but further east the Kerch Peninsula expands, and there the numerical superiority of Soviet forces could cost the Germans dearly.

The idea of ​​the German operation “Hunting for Bustards” was based on delivering the main attack not in the Koi-Asan area, but at the southern end of the front line, where it was least expected. Moreover, three German infantry and tank divisions, as well as the Groddeck brigade, were supposed to attack here, that is, at least half of all German-Romanian forces. In the northern and central sectors of the front, the Germans and Romanians were supposed to conduct a demonstration of the offensive, truly moving into it only after the breakthrough of the southern group. In addition, in the first hours of the operation, massive air strikes were carried out on the headquarters of units of the 47th and 51st armies.

The German ploy worked - Soviet reserves remained in the north after the start of the offensive. On May 8, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses in a 5 km section, to a depth of 8 km. On May 9, heavy rain began to fall, which prevented the Germans from bringing a tank division into battle, but before the downpour, the Groddeck motorized brigade managed to advance, cutting off the 44th Army from its rear positions. In addition, a German boat landing force landed in the rear of the 44th Army. This was only one battalion, but it assisted the German offensive.

On May 11, 1942, the German 22nd Panzer Division reached the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. It was followed by the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade. 8 Soviet divisions found themselves in the resulting cauldron, and on that day the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, died. On the same day, Stalin and Vasilevsky sent an angry directive to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, which began with the words

“The Military Council of the Crimean Front, including Kozlov, Mekhlis, have lost their heads, and to this day cannot contact the armies...”

and ending with the order: “do not let the enemy through.”

However, the Germans and Romanians advanced rapidly. On the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered:

“Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.”

However, already on May 16, 1942, the German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. On May 19, 1942, hostilities on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, with the exception of the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkay quarries.

Of the 250 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Crimean Front, 162,282 people were lost irretrievably in 12 days of fighting - 65%. German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in “History of the Great Patriotic War”:

“It was not possible to carry out the evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol.”

On June 4, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters declared the command of the Crimean Front to be responsible for the “unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation.”

Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis was removed from his posts as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to the rank of Corps Commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from his post as front commander and demoted to the rank of major general.

Divisional Commissar Shamanin was removed from his post as a member of the Front's Military Council and demoted to the rank of brigade commissar.

Major General Vechny was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from their posts as army commanders and demoted to the rank of colonel.

Major General Nikolayenko was removed from his post as commander of the front air force and demoted to the rank of colonel.