home Diagnosis and diseases Fight in the forest. Tactics - ambushes in the forest Interesting combat examples of a company advancing in the forest

Fight in the forest. Tactics - ambushes in the forest Interesting combat examples of a company advancing in the forest

Below is a selection teaching materials on guerrilla tactics.

March

ORDER OF MOVEMENT OF THE GUERILLA HUNDRED DURING THE MARCH

Covered on all sides by patrols, the hundred moves with the utmost caution. It should be remembered that humans, like all predatory animals, prefer to attack from behind or from the side. Therefore, the flank and rear patrols must be extremely careful!

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF 10 TO 30 PEOPLE

1. Dividing into groups of 7-9 people, the movement distance between groups in open areas of the forest is 30-40 meters, in open forests 20 meters, in the forest 10-15 meters, determined by the requirement for direct visibility between groups;

2. A reconnaissance group should move in front of the guiding group (within double the line of sight distance) to identify enemy ambushes at distant points. The reconnaissance group consists of 2-3 people, moving in a line of sight from each other, preferably having radio communication between themselves and the main group;

3. When a reconnaissance group detects an ambush or an enemy group, it is necessary (provided the reconnaissance group is not detected by the enemy) to immediately stop its movement, disguise itself, and transmit a message by radio to the reconnaissance group and the main group. Under no circumstances should you attack on your own unless you have a twofold numerical superiority.

Possible options:

If the scouts are not detected, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, call one group from the main column (7-9 people), so that this group splits into two detachments and circles the ambush site in two arcs, then striking in the rear and from the sides , in this case, the reconnaissance group will have to distract the enemy but will not expose themselves, firing from cover and from a safer distance;

If scouts are discovered, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, immediately find cover for firing and then proceed according to the previous scenario;

If the scouts are not detected or detected, and the enemy is a detachment of more than 6-8 people, the scouts disguise themselves and call two detachments from the main column (the point is that when attacking, a twofold superiority over the enemy is necessary).

One of the best and simplest tactics for fighting in the forest is the “double tail”. The main group moves in a column of two, staggered from each other, the right side of the column is responsible (observes) the right side of the path of movement, the left behind the left. When commanded to attack, the columns, starting from the “tail,” bend in a semicircle and move toward the place of conflict, as a result, the enemy’s location is encircled. For this type of attack, one important factor is necessary - as many radio stations as possible.

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF 4 TO 10 PEOPLE

It is best to move in two equal ranks in a checkerboard pattern, and the front rank should occupy protected positions (behind trees, stumps, in natural ravines, bushes, etc.), and the rear rank should quickly move 10-20 meters further than the front, then it occupies protected positions, and the group that covered itself must move forward and so on. When detecting an enemy or coming under his fire, realistically assess the number of the enemy and either attack him or retreat, but in the same order as the group moved on the march. The ranks should not be widely stretched, otherwise you can miss a camouflaged enemy; each fighter in the rank must have his own sector of fire (the direction of fire which for one fighter should not exceed 90 degrees).

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF UP TO 4 PEOPLE

If the number is even, it is advisable to break into twos and move in twos, and the advancement of each two can occur in any order (both in a column and in a line), you just need to not lose sight of the partner from your two and at least one person from the neighboring one. When moving, it is necessary to make stops (every two to three minutes) so that you can look around and listen to sounds that are not related to the natural sounds of the forest. Such a group is the least vulnerable to detection and can therefore be used for deep reconnaissance in neutral or enemy territory. It can also be used to launch a surprise raid (with a quick retreat) against larger enemy forces, but it is not recommended to engage ambushes or similar enemy groups due to early detection of the group's movements.

Before going out on the march, be sure to check and adjust the equipment of your people. A good, proven method is to simply make them jump in place and eliminate any sources of noise.

The best time to march is at night. A good cover is fog.

One of the rules of the march is no unnecessary sounds. To communicate with comrades, gestures and signals are quite enough.

TABLE OF CONVENTIONAL GESTURES-SIGNALS

These signals can be changed and supplemented at will. It is important that all your people know them.

Remember some more marching rules:

- Do not appear in open areas or against the sky under any circumstances. If this cannot be avoided, observe the area for a while and cross the open space quickly and one at a time, covering each other;

— Try to avoid places where traces remain. Sand, dirt, wet clay are your enemies. If there is absolutely no other way, deform the footprint using branches, tufts of grass, etc. tied to your shoes.

— Try to avoid populated areas and crowded places in general. There will probably be people there who, out of fear, for reward, or out of meanness in nature, will betray you. Communicate only through trusted persons, secretly and when necessary.

— Do not make noise when wading through water obstacles. Drag your feet along the bottom

— Don’t leave anything behind (food packages, paper and anything left of a person!)

The daily march rate is up to 30 kilometers (this figure can change dramatically depending on the situation, goals, weather, time of day and many other factors that make drastic and unexpected adjustments to partisan life!). If the march passes through territory that is unfamiliar to you, it is worth getting a guide or guide.

Despite the mysterious name, kroka is the simplest thing. This is an off-scale (unlike a map) drawing of a specific path to a specific goal, indicating the main landmarks and the distances between them in pairs of steps. Anyone can draw a map, and its value is that it can be read even by a person who does not know how to read a map, who will be led exactly to the goal, even if he has never been to the depicted area.

Ambush

More than 40% of the territory of Belarus is forest. This inspires confidence in the success of any guerrilla war. And the basis of guerrilla warfare is the ambush. The basis of an ambush is information (however, it generally constitutes the most important part of partisan life). You must know the strength of the enemy opposing you and build an ambush taking this knowledge into account.

The ideal place for an ambush is a forest path or road with steep edges. Although, in principle, this is not necessary and you can attack the enemy from a well-arranged ambush on any terrain.

To begin with, you should remember that most people are right-handed and hold their weapon with the barrel to the left, which means that the ambush must be organized in such a way as to attack the enemy from his right side.

NOTE: There are a few things to consider. The fact is that there are people by nature who can use both hands equally. In some units, the orientation of the trunks = 50/50 left-right.

It is best to organize ambushes if the number of your soldiers outnumbers the enemy by 2-3 times or if you are completely confident that you will immediately be able to disable most of the enemy soldiers. This is not cowardice at all, this is an ordinary calculation, and the one who, for the sake of false pride, strives to win victories over a stronger opponent, relying only on “heroism”, acts stupidly. Heroism is a good thing, but without brains it is extremely dangerous for the hero-commander and his subordinates.

AMBUSH ON A COLUMN

So, suppose you become aware that an enemy column is moving in the desired direction. The patrol begins the battle. He warns about the appearance of a column, clarifies its number, but at the same time does not enter into open battle and does not unmask himself in any way. When an enemy column enters a section of the road opposite the mined one and the front vehicle is detonated by a land mine, a pre-assigned grenade launcher (or better yet, two simultaneously!) sets fire to the tail vehicle, clogging the column on the path, as if in a trap. (If the terrain limits the road with natural obstacles - water hazards, ravines, steep slopes, etc. - this is just great!). After this, the main fire group unleashes the full power of fire on enemy vehicles and manpower. Those trying to escape in a ditch will fall on mines.

FAST COMBAT

If the enemy is small in number (half the size of your squad), then you should finish him off and capture prisoners and trophies. But if the number of the enemy squad is equal to yours or greater, then the entire fire contact should last no more than 7 seconds! After this, the main fire group begins to retreat deeper into the forest (with the exception of a couple of pre-assigned machine gunners, who, moving, cover the retreat for another 10-15 seconds and are the last to leave), even if the enemy has many alive and continues to actively resist! Do not under any circumstances get carried away with “finishing off”! Remember - reinforcements are 100% already on the way to the enemy! He must be met by a patrol - and the ambush will be repeated, only in a more fleeting version.

It may also happen that the unfinished enemy quickly came to his senses and organized pursuit. In this case, it’s not a sin to teach him a lesson. The main fire group, by its retreat, lures him to a pre-calibrated firing line opposite the ambush fire group, itself turns to face the enemy and organizes a finishing battle. Please note that the law of combat in the forest is movement. Having attacked the enemy in two groups - in the forehead and on the right, begin to move so as to keep his right side under fire at all times. This is called "twisting". Sandwiched between two constantly moving groups, spinning like a dog with its tail on fire, the enemy will certainly die, destroyed by fire from the flank and from the back.

Before leaving the completely defeated enemy, it is necessary to thoroughly search the corpses, take away everything of value and finish off the wounded (except for those who may be useful as prisoners.)

Each group leaves the battlefield along its own route. Having agreed in advance where the groups will meet, they discuss the signals for the meeting.

The diagram of an “ideal” ambush is described above. In life, this will not always happen, but the principle remains the same: a well-prepared trap applied to the terrain, a sudden and powerful fire attack, inflicting maximum damage on the enemy in a minimum of time and a quick retreat.

Environment

Anything can happen in battle, and it may turn out that you yourself find yourself in the enemy cauldron. In this case, you can also be saved only by lightning speed and decisive action applied to knowledge of local conditions.

1. Engage in combat with enemies and quickly determine by the density of fire the weakest point of the encirclement ring. 2-3 groups selected from the detachment must perform a diversionary maneuver in several directions, simulating a breakthrough. This will disorient the enemy. It will be useful if he decides that you are stunned with fear and are “breaking” out of his environment without any order,
whoever, under the motto “save yourself who can!” - the enemy will relax.

2. As soon as your groups make noise, the main forces go to break through at a predetermined weak point in the ring. The attack is carried out with a wedge, at the tip of which machine guns are placed, without looking back, with throwing grenades and shouting.

3. Having broken the ring with fire, immediately leave, if possible covering your retreat with natural obstacles. If the number of your people and their condition allows, you can arrange the same ambush for the enemy who rushed after him.

4. You can cover your retreat with a “path of surprises.” These are grenades on tripwires mixed with “empty” tripwires. For example: grenade - “dummy” - “dummy” - “dummy” - grenade - “dummy”... and so on. The enemy, tensed by the first explosion, will carefully check one or two subsequent tripwires, relax - and fall into the real one. And so on, as long as time and grenades last.

5. We must remember that even the most successful breakthrough is always associated with large losses. Therefore, it is better not to allow your squad to be surrounded by enemy forces.

6. But if it comes to this, only instant, bold and coordinated actions can save you and your people. Otherwise, encirclement will be the end of your partisanship.

Raid

A raid is an initiative open attack on stationary enemy targets: warehouses, bases, garrisons, etc. The purpose of the raid is to cause maximum harm to the enemy, both materially and morally.

A raid is a complex and dangerous thing, because in guerrilla practice it comes closest to what should be avoided at all costs: an open clash with regular enemy troops.

Therefore, the raid must be preceded by particularly thorough reconnaissance. Therefore, the raid can be postponed at the very last moment, if the enemy turned out to be at least a little stronger than you expected.

Remember: during a raid, it is the enemy who will be the defending party!

And according to the regulations of the armies of most countries of the world, the one who advances.
Must have at least four times superiority over the defender!
If there is no such superiority, then again it is necessary to rely on surprise and careful preparation of the operation.

Raid

What is a raid? A raid is a march plus ambushes plus raids plus whatever. Moreover, if the purpose of the march is to secretly arrive at some point, then during the raid the partisans brazenly run into clashes with enemy troops! This is the meaning of the raid! Not every squad is able to withstand it.

The first raid known to us in the history of mankind was carried out by Greek mercenaries under the command of Xenophon across Asia Minor in the 5th century BC. (read “Anabasis” - an interesting and useful book even for our times. And by the way, Xenophon himself admits that nothing more dangerous happened to him in his life!)

The raid tactics are simple and dangerous. The danger is that the enemy, of course, knows about the advance of the partisan detachment, and if the raid is successful, then very soon he begins to actively hunt for the partisans, and the partisans do not have the right to stop their combat activities. (Raids are used, as a rule, to divert the enemy’s attention from some more significant, albeit inconspicuous operation - or to actively support the combat operations of other units). In this case, the salvation will be mobility (due to vehicles or knowledge of the area - depending on the circumstances) and unpredictability of actions. It’s generally not worth conducting a raid with less than a squad. In this case, it is possible, moving along the rear, to throw out fifty strikes in all directions and even back, like tentacles, multiplying the damage, and most importantly, confusing the enemy regarding the plans of the partisans, their forces and the direction of movement.

At the same time - an explosion of a gas storage facility, shelling of a base, a cut out check point, an ambush on a convoy - and all in different places, and all unexpectedly, daringly, without a trace - and let the enemy guess who is attacking, where they are coming from, where they are moving, what their numbers are... The finale of the raid The squad should be scattered into hundreds and dispersed throughout the surrounding area until the enemy stops searching.

It is worth repeating: people decide to go on a raid only when the benefits from it clearly outweigh the possible losses (the real beginning of a mass uprising against the occupiers, support for a very important military operation, a gesture of desperate courage in a situation where death is inevitable anyway), and the commander is absolutely confident in his squad - from the first to the last person. But the moral effect of the raid is difficult to overestimate: the enemy, who feels himself the master and winner, suddenly and unexpectedly pays bloodily for his arrogant confidence.

A partisan group for fighting in the forest must have heavy weapons, three company-type machine guns - capable of penetrating basic cover, bushes, tree trunks and other objects at close range. The same scheme can be used by a counter-guerrilla group when conducting a counter-guerrilla operation in a collision with a small partisan group, even if approximately equal in number, going for sabotage, for example.

In the event of a sudden oncoming collision with the enemy, dense, heavy fire presses him to the ground, forcing him to lie down behind cover. those. force him to immobilize, deprive him of maneuver, and prevent him from raising his head for aimed shooting. This is done by a cover group with a PC. While this group “holds” the enemy, the main forces, using the terrain and camouflage on the ground, make a sharp dash forward to the enemy’s right flank. At this time, the enemy will turn into a chain against the covering group. The main forces at this stage have the opportunity to shoot the enemy from the right flank as a group target.

Moreover, in the first minutes of the battle, and the forest battle is fleeting, the enemy will turn his guns to the right, according to the rule right hand sticking the barrels into each other's backs, preventing them from shooting. After concentrated fire on the enemy’s flank, immediately noticing his changes in formation, continue to twist it clockwise until you reach the distance of dagger fire. This is an old trick of forest robbers, and it has not failed for several hundred years. The most difficult thing is to do this at extremely high speeds, that is, during the battle there will be no time for making decisions and issuing commands. That is, walkie-talkies are not appropriate here. What is more important here is to practice the action of the unit until it becomes automatic, and in various variations. As in hand-to-hand combat, the brain begins to work at the level of instincts, at the psycho-energetic level. Also, in these situations, there is no need to set out to encircle and destroy the enemy - in a hopeless situation, he will fight to the last. Then someone will definitely get hurt. For the group this is noticeable.

Yes, hand-to-hand combat is also not welcome. Someone will shoot anyway. Again... If the enemy acts with superior forces and pinches you, then with concentrated machine gun fire, the enemy’s chain is cut in one place, with its strong part (by chopping the weak part, the enemy will easily squeeze you again with strong parts), then under the fire cover of those who close the group from behind, a dash is made towards the enemy, the remnants of his formations are broken through with grenades, following the explosions they burst into his gap, close to the enemy, fanning out the machine guns - the main thing is not to let the enemy raise their heads and widen the gap, and in this case it will increase.

You must act boldly, sharply, brazenly and skillfully.

Comment! Teach fighters to shoot, and offhand. Combining the front sight with the rear sight - you will not be given such an opportunity. Only snipers and stand-up athletes are proficient in point-and-shoot shooting. If it happens that your squad will consist of ordinary people with training no higher than a conscript soldier, show your instincts, identify the most capable, accurate shooters in the group, and let them bring their skills to perfection. They will help you out later; one well-aimed shot can decide the outcome of the entire battle.

You should also learn to shoot from the point of view. Its meaning is that when you see an enemy with a machine gun or rifle, hiding behind cover (a tree), expect him to move from his right shoulder, it is so convenient for him to move after his weapon, the tree trunk and the long barrel of the weapon deprive him of maneuver. You need to aim to the right of the cover in an empty space. As the enemy begins to advance, you begin to squeeze the trigger, when the enemy is completely on the edge of the front sight, you press the trigger, the inertia of the movement will bring him right to your bullet. If the enemy is nimble and wants to outwit you by jumping out from his left shoulder, then it doesn’t matter, he needs to figure out his weapon, he will pull the barrel up or make an arc downward, and you also catch him only from the left side. In short, the one who is better trained will win in a forest battle.

And one more thing about fighting in the forest - the main thing is to constantly maneuver, stand up or lie down - you dramatically increase your chances of getting into group 200, and also keeping up with your own. One warrior in the field only in action films. One will always be pinned down, deprived of maneuver, not allowing you to raise your head, no one will support you with fire, no one will cover you, and you will not be able to regroup, that is, you will become a target.

Material found on the Internet

In the forest, the far limit of fire contact is no more than 40-50 meters, provided the enemy is moving, since if the enemy has prepared an ambush, then it is quite possible not to notice him at all. Therefore, let's consider several situations.

In the forest, the far limit of fire contact is no more than 40-50 meters, provided the enemy is moving, since if the enemy has prepared an ambush, then it is quite possible not to notice him at all. Therefore, let's consider several situations.

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF 10 TO 30 PEOPLE

Possible options:

If scouts are discovered, and the enemy is an ambush or barrage post, immediately find cover for firing and then proceed according to the previous scenario;

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF 4 TO 10 PEOPLE

PROMOTION OF A GROUP OF UP TO 4 PEOPLE

DEFENSE TACTICS

Necessary actions taken when preparing positions for defense:

1. Selection of a dominant position for observation and firing;

2. Masking positions for observation and firing;

3. Availability of escape routes;

4. Convenient exit from positions for counterattack;

5. Distribution of observation and firing sectors;

6. Relationship between other positions and with the command center;

Necessary actions taken when defending positions:

1. When an enemy is detected, immediately report this to other positions and the command center, report the approximate number of the enemy, the location of their detection and the expected direction of movement;

2. For the distant lines of defense, if they are poorly camouflaged, retreat to the main lines; if they are well camouflaged, let the enemy through and, after fire contact with the main lines of defense, hit the enemy in the rear;

3. To the main lines of defense, allow the enemy to reach the distance of a confident defeat and only after that open, if possible, simultaneous fire on their predetermined sectors;

4. When reloading weapons, be sure to notify your partners about this in order to cover the firing sector, and do not allow simultaneous reloading of weapons with more than one neighbor along the defensive line;

5. Counterattack on a common signal, simultaneously, but leaving fire cover in positions;

6. When breaking through the defense in any areas, it is advisable to send additional forces there; if such a step is impossible, retreat in an organized manner deeper into the defended territory;

7. If the enemy has a significant numerical superiority and is surrounded by defensive lines, gather the remaining fighters and simultaneously break through with all forces in one (pre-agreed) direction.

THINGS TO REMEMBER

When defending, the losses of the attackers are at least 50 percent greater than the losses of the defenders;

The better the defense positions are camouflaged, the later the enemy will discover them and, accordingly, the closer he will come and the more effective the defenders’ fire will be;

The more smoothly the process of weapon reloading occurs, the fewer “blind” sectors remain and, accordingly, the less likely the enemy will break through the defense line;

Based on materials from the site AirSoftClub.Ru

Let's look at combat tactics in the forest using the example of the forest area that is most familiar to us. temperate climate. For effective combat in the forest, it is necessary to regroup the platoon. Depending on the combat mission and the region in which the fighting takes place, the specifics, composition and weapons of the unit may change. But, since the main danger to the group is always ambushes, the platoon structure should ensure maximum resistance to them and minimize losses.

The platoon is divided into 4 squads of 4 soldiers each (“fours”) and 4 combat “twos”. The three combat “fours” are: machine gunner (PKM), assistant machine gunner (AK with GP), sniper (VSS), shooter (AK with GP). In one of the “fours” the sniper must have an IED. These are the three main combat units. The squad leader is a sniper. All the four fighters act in his interests. In one of the “fours” there is a platoon commander (VSS) and a radio operator (AK). The fourth combat “four” includes: a machine gunner (PKM), an assistant machine gunner (AKMN with PBS), a grenade launcher (RPG-7), an assistant grenade launcher (AKMN with PBS). This is the counter fire department. It follows the lead patrol. Its task is to create a high density of fire, stop and delay the enemy while the main forces turn around and take up positions to repel the attack. The squad leader is a machine gunner, and all the “four” fighters use their fire to ensure his work. Combat “twos” are the head and rear patrols and 2 side guards. Their armament is the same and consists of an AK with a GP; the AKS-74UN2 with a PBS is also appropriate. For machine guns, it is better to use RPK magazines with 45 rounds. Each fighter, except for the machine gunners, assistant grenade launcher and radio operator, carries 2-3 RPG-26, or better yet MRO-A or RGSh-2. After the start of the clash, the counter-fire “four”, following behind the lead patrol, also opens fire on the enemy, suppressing his activity with machine-gun fire and fire from RPG-7. The assistant machine gunner and the assistant grenade launcher of the fire countermeasures group are armed with AKMN with PBS. This allows them once again without being exposed, destroy the enemy who poses an immediate danger to the machine gunner and grenade launcher. If the enemy is detected from the front by the head patrol, but the patrol remains unnoticed, shooters with PBS destroy the enemy with fire from silent weapons. From the features of such a structure, it is clear that the fighters in the platoon are somehow grouped in pairs. This promotes combat coordination, the development of conditioned signals, and a better understanding of each other. At the same time, it should be noted that it is often appropriate to divide a platoon in half, 12 fighters each. Each group performs a specific combat mission. In this situation, the dozen will act differently. Each reinforced squad includes 2 PKM machine gunners (Pecheneg), 2 VSS snipers, 8 riflemen (AK+GP). The second squad includes an RPG-7 grenade launcher and two shooters with AKMN + PBS. With such an organization, in a squad on the march there are 3 soldiers (machine gunner and 2 riflemen), a core (4 riflemen, 2 snipers) and a rear guard (machine gunner, 2 riflemen) in the head patrol. In the event of a sudden collision with the enemy, the lead patrol opens heavy fire and holds the enemy while the rest turn around. In the event of a sudden collision with superior enemy forces, the rear patrol takes an advantageous position and covers the retreat of the entire group. In forest areas, open areas are not found very often - as a rule, these are the banks of rivers and lakes, burnt areas, hilltops, and clearings. That is, the area is basically “closed”. The range of fire contact in such conditions is minimal, and there is no need for long-range weapons (such as Kord, ASVK, AGS and even SVD), but fighters must have a pistol or submachine gun as an additional weapon. A great tactical advantage in the forest comes from the use of mines. The most convenient, in my opinion, is MON-50. It is relatively light and practical. Each of the group's fighters, except for the machine gunners, assistant grenade launcher and radio operator, can carry at least one mine. Sometimes it is convenient to use the MON-100, which, with a mass of 5 kg, provides a destruction corridor 120 meters long and 10 meters wide. It is convenient to install it on clearings and roads, directing along them or along the edge of the forest. POM-2R mines are also needed, truly irreplaceable. After being brought into firing position, the mine becomes armed after 120 seconds and throws four 10-meter target sensors in different directions. The radius of the circular lesion is 16 meters. Very convenient for mining when a group is retreating, or when you need to quickly create a minefield in the enemy’s path. Summarizing the above, we note: the result is a platoon armed with 4 PKM or Pecheneg machine guns, 3 VSS silent sniper rifles, 1 SVU-AS, 1 RPG-7; 17 fighters each have 2-3 RPG-26 grenade launchers (34-51 pcs.), 2 AKMN with PBS, 14 fighters are armed with GP and carry at least 18 MON-50 mines and 18 POM-2R mines. ORDER OF OPERATION OF WATCHES On the march, it is more convenient to move in a battle formation of the “arrow” type. There are machine gunners in front and on the flanks. Side protection is required. The lead patrol does not move more than 100 meters from the first “four”; visual communication must be maintained. Such a battle formation allows for the greatest security in the event of a surprise attack. In the event of an explosion on a directed mine, only one “four” is hit. Depending on the situation, the battle formation may change to a “wedge”, “ledge” or “chain”. Patrols and side guards must have special thermal imaging and acoustic reconnaissance devices, through the use of which the surprise attack factor can be reduced to a minimum.

While in an ambush, you need to follow some rules. Snipers and machine gunners must be evenly distributed along the front and must control the flanks. The latter, as well as the probable directions of the enemy’s approach, are mined. It is also appropriate to mine the front, preferably with a chain of several MON-50s. Sectors of continuous mine damage must overlap. When the enemy enters the affected sector, the entire mine chain is undermined. The infantry moving at this moment in full height , will be destroyed. This should be followed by a blow with all forces and means aimed at finishing off the enemy. The snipers' positions are located separately, and their single shots are lost against the background of general shooting. This allows them to calmly and systematically shoot the enemy. If there are no radio-controlled fuses, then you can build a homemade one and detonate it at the right moment using a sniper shot. A piece of glass is inserted between two pieces of tin, and the whole thing is (not very tightly) tied together at the edges. The contacts of a series-connected circuit of several minutes are suitable for the tin. This “sniper fuse” must be placed on the tree trunk from the side convenient for the sniper. When the enemy enters the affected area, a sniper shoots at the “fuse”, the glass between the pieces of tin crumbles, and the circuit closes. This is how you can kill an entire platoon with one shot, and many such traps can be set. It is even more effective to place a POM-2R mine in the affected area of the MON-50 chain. One or two enemy soldiers will be blown up by a mine, and the bulk of the enemy unit’s personnel will come to the aid of the wounded. The subsequent detonation of the MON-50 chain will cover them all at once. (In this regard, it is necessary to make it a rule that no more than two people provide assistance to the wounded in the place where the injury occurred.) During the mining process, when setting up an ambush, a calculation of 3-4 MON-50 mines per enemy platoon is taken. The problem is the need to hit the core without the patrol and side guards noticing the ambush ahead of time. The lead patrol should be allowed to go forward (usually two soldiers). They are neutralized separately after the mines are detonated. With flank protection it is much more difficult. To do this you need to use silent weapons. The enemy reconnaissance group will most likely not follow the path, but will move along it. The enemy may be much larger than expected, in which case the remaining forces will attack you in the flank. It’s convenient to place the POM-2R there. The surviving enemy soldiers will launch a lightning-fast counterattack, and if you do not open dagger fire on them, they can take the initiative into their own hands. During the battle, you must not forget that shots from RPGs and VOGs explode when they hit branches. This must be feared, but it must also be used. If the enemy is lying under a bush and you cannot reach him, launch the VOG into the crown of the bush above him, and he will be covered with fragments. When occupying a line, the place for the gap is chosen to the right of the tree, which plays the role of a natural shield. Nothing should block the field of fire or interfere with visibility. It is especially important to make sure that there are no anthills nearby. When digging a “scorpion hole,” as a shel is sometimes called, it is necessary to carry the soil into the depths of the forest, and ideally, if possible, pour it into a stream, swamp or lake. The gap should not have a parapet, since the mounds of dug sand will immediately give away your position. The front of the “scorpion hole” must be directed to the right edge of the firing sector. This is due to the fact that it is more convenient to turn the weapon to the left than to the right, where you need to turn with your whole body, which is inconvenient in a tight space. For a left-hander everything will be exactly the opposite. Lastly, think about the roots of the tree. If possible, you can squeeze between them, because a thick root can stop the splinter. The fighters are grouped in twos: this way they can cover each other in case of a delayed shot or when reloading a weapon, and also quickly provide first aid if wounded. As for stretch marks. If you set the normal (low) one, then the enemy’s lead patrol soldiers will be the first to blow it up. At the same time more important goal is the commander of the enemy group. To destroy it, a directed mine is installed at a height of 2 meters above the ground, and a tripwire is also carried out at this level. The patrolmen will pass under it unhindered, they focus on low tripwires and identifying enemy positions. High stretch marks can only be discovered by accident. Next comes the core. In it, next to the commander, there is a radio operator, who breaks the guy wire of the radio station’s antenna.

USE OF MANPADS IN THE FOREST. POSITIONING THE TREE

The wooded area complicates the work of MANPADS crews, since tree trunks and branches block the view and the firing sectors. To arrange a convenient position for calculating MANPADS, find the most tall tree and position yourself on top of it. Therefore, it is advisable to have special claws, ropes and suspension systems with you. You need to build a “nest” in a place where there are two close-set, strong horizontal branches. The space between them is braided with rope in such a way as to create a platform on which you can comfortably lie down or half-sitting. To protect against fire from below, unfold a bulletproof vest underneath you, and to camouflage your position, insert branches into the lower part of the weave. All items of equipment and equipment must be secured to branches and branches to prevent them from falling down, but so that they can be quickly used. It is necessary to have a fixed cord: if you immediately leave the position, you throw its end down and quickly go down it. It is even better to secure the second end of a long rope below the “nest”, at a height of about 2.5 meters from the ground. Then, to quickly leave the position, you will only need to attach the elements of your harness to the rope and slide down it, like Tarzan. So in a matter of seconds you leave the firing zone, and it is much more difficult to hit a person “flying” horizontally among branches and tree trunks than someone descending vertically. It is advisable to install 3-4 MON-50s in radio-controlled mode around the tree. If the enemy comes close to you, detonate the mines, because the directed beam of lethal elements does not pose a danger to you. But it is strictly forbidden to attach mines to the trunk of the tree you are on, as well as to the trunks of nearby trees (after the explosion, they may fall on your tree). You can spend a lot of time in such a “nest”, remaining unnoticed from below and from above. If it happens that your position is discovered and a firefight begins, do not try to use grenades. In this situation, they pose a much more tangible danger to you than to the enemy. It is much more appropriate to use small arms. The enemy will instinctively lie down after contact begins. A reclining human figure has a larger profile than in a vertical position; in addition, shooting upward from a prone position is extremely inconvenient - to do this you need to roll over onto your back. Your advantage is that you can escape the fire by hiding behind a tree trunk. A fixed cord and hanging system will help you with this. Being behind the barrel, as a last resort you can use a grenade, but then it is better to make it explode in the air.

HOW TO INCREASE MINE DEFEAT SECTORS

When a directed mine placed on the ground explodes, part of the destructive elements goes into the ground, and more than half flies over the enemy’s head. To correct this situation, MON-50 mines, for example, must be placed on a tree, at a height of 2 meters and directed slightly down towards the expected appearance of the enemy (precisely aim the mine at a point at a distance of 30 meters). In this case, 100 percent of the killing elements will fly above the ground at a height of less than 2 meters, which is most effective. For MON-90, installed at a height of 2 meters, this point is located at a range of 45 meters. But MON-100 and MON-200 are better installed at a height of 3 and 5 meters, respectively, parallel to the surface of the earth. In addition to the vertical angle, the angle of the horizontal installation of the mine relative to the path or road along which the enemy will pass is extremely important. This is especially true for the MON-100 and MON-200 mines, which have a narrow sector of dispersion of lethal elements. Installed 25 meters from the path, these mines must be turned 60 degrees towards the road in the direction of the enemy's movement. If you place the same MON-100 against traffic, it can be noticed, otherwise it will “hide” behind a tree trunk. For MON-50 and MON-90 this system is ineffective. A much more effective way to increase the lethal range is to overlap the affected sectors. MON-50 mines must be placed perpendicularly along the road, every 30 meters, 35 meters from the road. MON-90 are installed 50 meters from each other, 45 meters from the trail.
OZM-72 all-round mines are installed in a “square”, 50 meters from each other (15 meters from the road in each direction). With this installation, 8 mines reliably hit the enemy over an area of 90x200 meters. OZM-72 is good because it is installed underground and cannot be visually detected. It “jumps out” when detonated and explodes at a height of one meter, providing a circular damage area with a radius of 30 meters. Installing a powerful directional mine MON-200 along the road is very effective. At a turn, it is convenient to place 2 mines and direct them along each side of the road. No matter where the enemy comes from, the explosion destroys all living things at a distance of 230 meters in both directions. This scheme is called “razor”. Near the road, you can install 3 MON-100 mines in the trees and direct one of them along the road, and the rest at an angle of 25 degrees on each side. As a result, an explosion “burns out” a corridor of 30x120 meters. When using the MON-90 mine in such a situation, the dispersion sector of the lethal elements is wider, but the corridor is smaller - 60x70 m.

The insurgent guerrilla movement is a form of struggle by armed opposition outside the city. The very presence of partisan resistance is not so much a military factor as a political one. Therefore, if in any state, during an aggravation of the internal political situation, there are no prerequisites for the emergence of insurgency, then they are often created from the outside, through the efforts of potential adversary countries, for which destabilization within the competitor’s state is extremely important.
In the struggle for power, home-grown politicians also add fuel to the fire - in the political process there is no better tool than a bloody conflict. Criminal groups hiding in the forests contribute their share to such a conflict. IN guerrilla warfare based on political intrigue, there are no prohibited techniques, and sooner or later it takes the form of mass terrorism. Any government fights this evil using two parallel methods: operational intelligence and military force.
Both military personnel and operational personnel need to know what they are dealing with, so as not to make gross mistakes and not add to their own unnecessary work. The military should remember that resistance arises spontaneously and intensifies many times over due to unjustified repressions and insults inflicted by the troops on the local population. One of the most cruel orders of I. Stalin for the oppression of the civilian population of the occupied regions of Germany prescribed execution in front of the formation in the presence of the victims. The leader did not want any unpleasant surprises in the rear of the advancing troops. Operatives need to know as much as possible about the human contingent that they will have to develop. Knowledge of the enemy's psychology speeds up the operational process and makes it more effective.

Photo 1. Sniper under shaggy camouflage.

People join the partisan movement for various reasons. There are religious fanatics. There are those who have lost loved ones or lost property. Both will fight to the death under any circumstances. Conflicting personalities, as well as those ideologically and romantically inclined, do not take root in the partisans. They do not have a fundamental connection to movement, and they will never come to terms with the dirt of life, which is always and everywhere present. This is the main reason why such people are relatively easily recruited by government counterintelligence. Many are fighting for a possible bright future, there are the offended, adventurers and criminals.

Photo 2. Submachine gunner from the capture group.

Photo 3. His task is to eliminate the unnecessary ones.

But the main partisan mass is peasants from the local population. The operational staff should pay attention to their detailed characteristics. The peasants are not as simple as they seem; they are extremely freedom-loving, difficult to control, cunning and resourceful. The primary life task of a peasant of any nationality is to survive. Survive any political process. The government changes, but the peasants remain. Family and economic ties are extremely important for them. The peasant will never go against this - in the village they do not forget or forgive anything. Peasants instinctively and constantly collect absolutely all vital information, from which they draw quick and error-free conclusions. They are very observant by nature, have the ability to quickly compare facts and instantly calculate the situation. During interrogations they are very artistic - with the most honest look they beat themselves on the chest: “I didn’t participate, I wasn’t, I didn’t take, I didn’t see, I didn’t hear, I don’t know, I don’t remember, etc.
It can not be so. The peasant's memory is phenomenal, and in any case he has information of operational interest. But he begins to tell the truth only after unsportsmanlike methods known to practical detectives are applied to him.
You cannot play psychological games with a peasant, especially if the initiative comes from his side. It is impossible to psychologically outplay a peasant - his thinking occurs not so much on a logical, but on a psychoenergetic level. A peasant can be deceived, but never fooled. The city operative does not understand this.
The peasant's weak point is fear. It is the fear of the indifferent cruelty of circumstances that makes the peasant accommodating, very accommodating. He is destroyed by fear of real power, unyielding and not accepting psychological provocations. And the more energetic arrogance a peasant has on the outside, the more animalistic and consciousness-paralyzing fear he has inside. The peasant is not averse to fighting, but under no circumstances with a superior enemy. And in troubled times, they are not averse to plundering, taking advantage of the lack of control of the authorities.

Photo 4. Setting up an ambush under shaggy camouflage.

Photo 5. Training process.

There are a lot of people in the resistance who were forcibly mobilized into partisans, according to the principle: “Whoever is not with us is against us.” During Patriotic War The task of many partisan commanders was to put under arms and partisan banners thousands of deserters who abandoned the front during German breakthroughs and fled to their homes.
To successfully conduct a guerrilla war, all this dense mass that does not like to obey must be organized, trained and kept under strict discipline. This can only be done by a leadership core of trained professionals who create the partisan infrastructure.
The guerrilla movement always strives to gain perhaps greater control over the population and its sentiments. And if the mood is not the same, they need to be formed and kept in the right direction. This initiative must not be let go. In a guerrilla war, the winner is the one whose side the population is on. The population is a reserve of resistance fighters, it is a source of food, very often there is nowhere else to get food from, it is a warm rest, a bathhouse, a hospital for the wounded, hot food, and finally, these are women, healthy men are fighting and you cannot order them to abstain. And finally, most importantly: the population is the agents, the eyes and ears of the resistance. But, on the other hand, the callous thinking of a naturally greedy peasant is determined by the current moment - whether it is profitable for him or not. Here he can cooperate with the authorities. The authorities are helped by those who are dissatisfied and offended, as well as out of a sense of revenge, past envy, or simply out of spite - the peasant is touchy, vindictive and petty. A more or less trained operative will easily identify such people. They will be found always and everywhere. To suppress intelligence cooperation with the authorities in each locality, the resistance identifies its informants at least three. These people do not know each other, because each of them gives information to the forest about everyone living in the village, including other informants. In this way, the reliability of intelligence and counterintelligence data is monitored. There must be a warning system from the populated area to the partisan forces through messengers who carry written reports into the forest and put them in hiding places - mailboxes or orally report information to the partisan reconnaissance group at certain points in the forest or nahutopax, at the so-called “lighthouses”.

Photo 6. Action of the liquidator, training process. Practicing a surprise attack from an ambush.

At "lighthouses" partisan scouts receive people from the city or, conversely, send people to the city, making their progress to their destination safe. Guerrilla counterintelligence regularly goes around populated areas and meets with informants in order to identify government intelligence agents who are constantly being sent into the resistance. Sabotage groups are constantly working, monitoring communications, tapping communication lines, collecting intelligence information and seizing reports from hiding places. Propaganda brigades are roaming around populated areas - it is necessary to convince the peasant, who wants to calmly go about his farming and does not want to have troubles from the authorities, to take up arms. There is a working exchange between the central resistance bases and peripheral detachments.

Photo 7. Capture. Educational and visual process. Knee to the kidney. You can also hit both kidneys with two knees while jumping.

Finally, the deployment of bases and detachments should not be permanent, otherwise the likelihood of penetration by government agents increases sharply and the danger of being covered by air strikes and “sandwiched” by military forces increases. There are still a lot of other tasks that need to be performed with effect, with noisy effect, otherwise such opposition is worthless. But for all this you need to constantly move. At first, everything turns out this way - with complete surprise and on a grand scale. The military successes of the opposition cause political resonance. The army forces allocated by the government turn out to be slow and ineffective against the age-old guerrilla tactics of flexible contact: raid - withdrawal. The partisans avoid open counter battle with superior forces - this is disastrous for them. The military doesn’t like fighting in the forest, just like they don’t like street fighting - you can’t do it with guns and armored vehicles. The troops, not knowing the terrain and the people they are fighting with, behave like a bull in a china shop, one way or another, infringing on the local population and increasing the number of dissatisfied people. IN different times and in different countries this scenario was repeated in the same version. Finally, it dawned on the higher headquarters (usually after a mass of reports from lower-level practical workers) to freely walk through the forests. From the archives, dust-covered old instructions were retrieved on the use of counter-guerrilla tactics of the rangers, which from time immemorial had been used against all kinds of insurgents. Specially trained, trained, well-armed, recruited from professional trackers, operational personnel, tactical and in-depth reconnaissance specialists, professional hunters, special groups sat on partisan paths and blocked movement through the forest. And from that moment on, military operations were transferred from government communications to the forest warpath. They were carried out quietly, unnoticeably and insidiously. Patient rangers, trained to survive in the forest, carefully disguised in shaggy camouflages (an invention also immemorial - photos 1,2,3) for the time being, conducted covert surveillance of everything that happened in their area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility. Attention was paid to the smallest details: the discovered traces and objects could tell a lot (in our time - spent cartridges, tin cans, cigarette butts, old bandages, etc.). It became known who, when, from which settlement went into the forest, it was established by following the traces of what he did there (at the same time, secret mailboxes were very often found, the information was intercepted and sent for prompt processing). Gradually, the routes of partisan reconnaissance and sabotage groups, economic routes emerged, and the locations of bases and “lighthouses” were discovered. The approaches to them, the presence and location of security guard posts, the order of changing duty squads at them, the routes of the guards, the frequency of wandering patrols around the base (and in our time - also alarm, detection and warning systems) were identified. The results of such observations made it possible to communicate with their agents working inside the partisan base. The agent placed the information in a cache located near the base or even on its territory (usually near a garbage dump or latrine, a visit to which is quite understandable), or on the march, in a designated place. The seizure of such information was entrusted to the huntsmen of the special group, and they also protected the agent as much as possible. Over the radio, the rangers were informed of additional information obtained promptly from other sources. Knowledge of the situation made it possible for the rangers to significantly harm the resistance. There are countless cases when spies, having moved beyond the perimeter of partisan secret posts, removed silent weapons partisan leaders. Special groups raided partisan warehouses and supply bases. There were also attacks on large partisan headquarters with a successful catch of captured documents (small detachments never conduct documentation for secret purposes). But; the main task was to obtain information, and special groups worked in sweatshop mode to capture living people. Most often this happened when a small partisan group moved on reconnaissance, sabotage or economic activity. Disguise under shaggy camouflages made the rangers practically invisible (see photos 1,2,3).

Photo 8. Fixation. Educational and visual process.

The ambush was set up flawlessly (photo 4, 5). Elimination of unnecessary ones (photo 6) capture in all possible, impossible conditions during training was practiced until it became automatic (photo 7,8,9,10,12,13) The one who walked behind was taken prisoner; they begin to speak faster and are easier to “cut off” . from the main group walking in front. Those in front were shot with silent weapons or cut out with knives. All this was done instantly and silently. During the training, the instantaneous jerk to grab was carefully practiced (photo 14-15).

Photo 9. Training grip for resistance. A hand-to-hand instructor works for the enemy and managed to knock the special forces soldier down. For such cases, the pistol is “grabbed” with a strap to the wrist (marked by an arrow).

And in our time, seizure from a car is also practiced (photo 16); even in the forest, few people now walk. There should be no traces left during capture. The taken "tongue" and the corpses of the dead were dragged to the side and away. The dead were buried, and the burial place was camouflaged. The prisoner was interrogated right there. They shook him until he came to his senses from the stress. The operative who was in the special group knew how this was done. In counter-guerrilla warfare, there are also no forbidden techniques. As a rule, the captured peasant began to speak. He knew that he needed to survive here and now so that he would not be killed on the spot. It was even easier with those who asked the commander to stay at home for a couple of days Or with those who went to the village for a wedding, christening, etc. For peasants this is very important events and you can't miss them.

Photo 10. Attempt to handcuff. Training process.

These were tracked at the edge of the forest and interrogated in sight of their own home. Almost always the detainees spoke immediately and in detail. At the appointed time, they returned to the base, but as informants for the intelligence services. There were many of those who were silent, and they were sent to the city. According to Gestapo statistics, every third person spoke in the dungeons. In the NKVD, where such statistics were not kept, everyone spoke. The Americans in Vietnam injected the prisoner with a huge dose of scopolamine, he gave out a huge dose of information, his further fate no one was interested. Scopolamine truth serum. Languages were often taken near the partisan base. The most convenient place for this was the same garbage man and latrine. Despite the warnings set out in reconnaissance instructions, studied in all armies of the world, in all garrisons the same mistake is constantly repeated - the above-mentioned despised and little-visited places are forgotten until the need for them arises. It is difficult to calculate how many military personnel (including those in the Soviet Army - remember Afghanistan) were kidnapped when leaving for vital reasons.
The same thing was done at all times with the duty squads of secret posts: there was a man on duty and disappeared along with his partner, no traces remained. The reconnaissance groups that met people from the city at the “lighthouses” were destroyed silently and without a trace. The “townspeople” were captured only alive and only unharmed; people knew a lot. The capture of the “tongue” was not necessarily carried out by physical attack. At all times (and now too) purely hunting methods were in use - nooses, traps, wolf pits and other ingenious traps.
In the course of events, the rangers also had to attack large partisan columns. The essence of this process was not to win, but to disrupt the partisan action for which the column was moving forward. The ambush was carefully prepared. The place for it was chosen so that the column. It was “sandwiched” by the terrain (ravines, slopes, etc.) or at least “squeezed” on one side and could not quickly disperse and deploy into battle formations. The side of the path along which the column was moving was mined with mines or tripwire grenades. Places more or less suitable for shelter from fire were also mined. Nowadays, guided mines and directed mines are used for these purposes. The area in front of the rangers' position was necessarily mined. They tried to place the ambush on the right side as the column moves, they do not interfere with each other and each is as closed as possible with their own cover (imagine yourself in the place of the shooter, whose position is opposite - on the left side of the column, how inconvenient it will be to shoot from the right shoulder turning to the right, how will the one in front of you interfere with you, and how will you interfere with the one behind you. If possible, choose a place so that the path or road turns to the left as you move. This allows you to place ranger firing points at the bend of the path, along the front and towards In addition, it provides greater freedom of maneuver for the special group when retreating, while reducing the likelihood of going out into the open (paths, roads, clearings) and coming under fire (Diagram 1).

Photo 11. Scheme 1.

If a small group was moving ahead of the column, alerting the guards, then it was usually allowed forward unhindered (however, there were cases, depending on the situation, when such a group was silently destroyed and a prisoner was taken, the corpses were instantly dragged to the side).

Photo 12. There are no prohibited techniques in grappling. In this case, it’s a banal clamp for...

The column was met with dense sudden fire from all barrels, at a distance of 70-80 meters, no closer, so that no one from the column could throw a grenade to the rangers’ position. The partisans are also trained in tactics and rush not to where it is quiet (there is danger), but to where they are shooting from, following the throw of their grenade. The column is a group target, and concentrated fire on it from small arms plus the activation of mines is directed: directed action has a monstrous effect. To create greater density and effectiveness of fire, the rangers used a machine gun method of firing from machine guns. To prevent the weapon from shaking and scattering bullets when firing in bursts, the machine gun is grabbed by the belt to a tree trunk (photo 17, 18). Simple and effective. Usually they shoot one magazine from a machine gun and a short belt from a machine gun. Not more. The entire fire attack lasts 10-15 seconds. And now the task of the special group is to instantly disappear and take the “tongue” with them, if there is one. We must disappear, despite the temptations to shoot more. Because return shooting will begin in 7-8 seconds, and organized resistance will begin in 20-25 seconds. Without waiting for him, you must already be on your feet and run away to a safe place - a hollow, a ravine, a reverse slope, etc.
The escape route must be determined and why the old instructions called for it to be done that way. We must not allow even one wounded person to appear in the special group. This means almost the end of the task. The wounded will be an enormous burden for the rangers, just as their wounded will be an enormous burden for the partisans. The most unpleasant thing on the warpath for both is not hunger and lack of ammunition, but the presence of wounded. This is a terrible disaster in partisan life. Only in low-quality literature are the wounded shot, in reality they are pulled out to the last possible opportunity.

Photo 13. The instructor, who worked for the enemy, was “pinned down” only by superior forces.

The partisan column, after heavy fire from the rangers, begins to crawl to the sides and ends up on tripwire mines. Burdened with wounded and dead, having lost initiative and time, with uncertainty ahead, the partisans are incapable of effective action.
The special group needs to break away faster for a reason stemming from the tactical features of the battle in the forest. Using a large number of tree shelters, it is very easy to surround those who are smaller. Therefore, a knowledgeable partisan commander immediately gives the command to bypass and encircle the rangers. If there is sudden silence and the shooting almost stops, this is a sure sign that such a command has been received.

Photo 14. Ambush out of the blue in a hollow. Position on the right side in the direction of the enemy's movement (it is more difficult for the enemy to shoot when turning to the right).

True, when the partisans are commanded by an experienced professional, their actions will be accompanied by distracting machine-gun fire. For those around them, this process is very difficult to identify and control in conditions of limited visibility of the forest. And for people who are keen on shooting, it is doubly difficult. And if the glue of the environment closes behind the back of the special group, the rangers will have a hard time. Their salvation lies in the speed of extinction. Therefore, the personnel of the special group is divided into threes with the obligatory appointment of a senior person, so that no one falls behind or gets lost. If there is still a pursuit (this has happened), the rangers will create a distraction with a fight: three people will run and shoot, and the rest will ambush in a convenient place, reload and shoot the pursuers from the flank. Sometimes, depending on the situation, you can return and bleed the enemy in an unexpected place. But there’s no point in tempting fate any further. The memoirs of partisan leaders (Kovpak, Bazymy, Vershigory) reluctantly and casually mention “increasing clashes with rangers.” This is what these skirmishes looked like...

Photo 15. A grab throw is practiced by special forces to the point of being impossible.

In a grab, this moment is perhaps the most important; the standard is heavy (from a jerk to handcuffs) - two and a half seconds. The task of the machine gunner (in the foreground) is to quickly and accurately “knock out” the extra ones coming in front.
The rangers work with sophistication, day and night, in any weather. They already know about them. They are ghostly and scary in shaggy camouflage and elusive, like shadows. There is fear in the forest. Going out for sabotage, reconnaissance, or accepting a person from the city becomes a problem. It is no longer the peasant who is sitting in ambush on someone, but they are sitting on himself. You can’t walk through the forest calmly; if you don’t run into a knife, you’ll definitely run into a mine. And a bullet from a silent weapon will fly out from nowhere. And people disappear. Jaegers do not accept open combat, and they cannot be tracked. People who are trained in where they live, what they eat, when they sleep are unknown, they have an animal instinct, they themselves track down anyone. It turns out that guerrilla tactics are the other way around - only now they are working in flexible contact with them, with the partisans. Based on a tip from the rangers, aviation and artillery are confidently operating at the partisan bases.

Photo 16. Capturing a prisoner from a car; the machine gunner’s task is to “knock out” the driver and those in the back.

The collected intelligence data makes it possible to carry out military operations in the forest with large forces. The partisan underground is being eliminated in populated areas. An information blockade is coming. Partisan bases are cut off from sources of supply. The actions of special groups, aviation, artillery and free battalions of rangers create unbearable conditions for the armed opposition. War for the peasant is no longer entertainment, but hard and terribly dangerous work. In the absence of food, smoke and real victories, morale drops. You have to fight far from home. The unknown is scary. The peasant's psyche cannot stand all this. After a hysterical outburst of emotions, desertion begins. The militants disperse to the villages, where they are identified operationally. And those who remained, blocked, without outside support, without ammunition and food, tired and lice-ridden, are forced to leave for hard-to-reach areas. Most often, out of hunger, they begin to rob the entire rural population, in difficult times, taking away the last. It happens that they commit outrages against women. This is a turning point when the peasants stop supporting the resistance, whose leaders by that time no longer represent any political force other than themselves. Taking advantage of the situation, government intelligence services create armed self-defense units from local residents and, moreover, set up garrisons to protect the population from robbery and tyranny. Thus, on the territory of Western Ukraine, already in September 1944, there were 203 combat fighter squads operating, which, along with military units of the NKVD, took part in the liquidation of the nationalist movement OUN-UPA. There, in populated areas, 2,947 armed self-defense groups were organized, the effectiveness of which is difficult to overestimate. In other regions of the USSR, where in the war and post-war years gangs of criminals and armed deserters were robbing, trained and armed youth of pre-conscription age took part with interest in raids and combing of forest areas carried out by the police and the NKVD.
The government's next step is to announce an amnesty. Desertion in the opposition is becoming widespread (under amnesties in the period from 1944 to 1953, 76 thousand OUN-UPA militants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, even those who had blood on them received forgiveness). What remains can hardly be called resistance. What remains are the leaders, obsessed with an obsession, who are frantically trying to improve the situation. Members of the opposition are kept from surrendering to the authorities by its leadership through repression and the destruction of those who waver. Connections are being established with criminal groups. Bandits are a real force, and the opposition is trying to take control of them or at least establish mutually beneficial contacts with them. At the same time, secrecy is deepening, mutual distrust and suspicion are increasing. This stems from a psychological pattern: the more energetic the leader, the greater his thirst for life.

Photo 17. Even the small AKSMU-74 “shakes” when firing if it is not pressed against a tree.

His own life. Convinced of the irreversibility of the course of events, many partisan commanders and criminal leaders are thinking about how to live next. And they see the only way out for themselves is to become an active agent of the authorities in exchange for life and freedom.
In the late forties and early fifties, middle-level leaders of the OUN-UPA began to surrender the OUN underground in the cities and directed military forces at the remnants of military formations hiding in “cache” in the forests. Possessed Bendery leaders, very cautious, suspicious and especially dangerous, were allowed; not to be taken alive, but to be destroyed on the spot.

Photo 18. In this way, even a strong AKM can be fired like a machine gun. When shooting, tighten the belt as much as possible.

Most often, liquidation occurred during gatherings, meetings, conferences, when after the official part the feast began. After a good drink, the agent shot his drunken drinking companions sitting at the table. Or he quietly cut out with a knife those who went out into the yard to relieve themselves. There were other options. Sometimes this was done by an operative or a huntsman from a special group embedded in the resistance. But most often the leader acted from among his own, earning forgiveness from the authorities. These were wolves among wolves, especially valuable agents who were worth much more than certified intelligence officers. One of the old ones; operatives told how during an operation carried out by the forces of a special battalion together with a group of such a “wolf”, the general from the MGB, who was conducting the briefing, warned “If one of you is shot, then to hell with him. But if they kill him (the wolf), you you will all go to court."
Some “wolves” had hundreds and dozens of surrenders on their account; shot dead with one's own hand former comrades. "Wolves" received forgiveness from Stalin. Some of them are still alive. Some even live under their real name. Stalin did not come up with anything new. It has been this way since time immemorial. Through the efforts of the special services, the rebel political movement always relegated to the category of semi-criminal.
This was no longer dangerous for the government.

Part 2
The warrior who is more patient and enduring on the forest path wins. The patience threshold of a trained intelligence officer is always higher than that of an untrained peasant. The threshold of patience is the ability long time endure hunger, cold, pain, insomnia and everyday inconveniences. But even for a trained professional it is not unlimited. The outcome of a forest war is determined by the availability of material supplies and a good base. The strongholds of special groups were usually classified and disguised as economic military units, which were located in zones calm from military operations. There were conditions for rest and recovery: a hospital, a bathhouse, a kitchen. The special group went to work only at night; the rangers were driven to the forest in a closed car (never in the same place). Then the rangers reached the search site on foot, 20-25 kilometers, in stealth mode. The same vehicle picked up the special group at the appointed place, which had completed its allotted time. The place and time were also different - it was communicated to the returning special group by radio.
The special group must be invisible and mobile. This reduced its number to 15-16 people. More people leave an “elephant trail” in the forest (sometimes such a trail was deliberately left, luring the enemy into a trap). The group had to be strong, so it was usually armed with 3 machine guns with strong ammunition (7.62x53 USSR; 7.92x57 Mauser and in our time 7.62x51 - NATO), capable of penetrating the main weapons at short distances in forest combat (about 200 m). shelters - tree trunks. Why three machine guns?
Because 3 machine guns, in the event of encirclement, can provide all-round fire, and when breaking out of the ring with concentrated fire, “break through” a gap in the enemy’s battle formations. To support the life of a group that was thrown into the forest for a long time (sometimes up to a month or more), a lot of cargo, ammunition, food, and medicine was required. All the cargo was not carried with us; the main and reserve base camps were set up in hard-to-reach places. To store cargo, caches were set up, carefully protected from dampness, which penetrates everywhere in nature. In Western Ukraine, caches left by Bendera soldiers, German rangers, and MGB special groups are still found (in our time - by an unknown person, photos 1-2).

Photo 1. A hiding place equipped in our time. Its walls are lined with birch bark to protect it from dampness. The cache contained ammunition, weapons and money. The cache was “guarded” by an F-1 grenade on a tripwire (indicated by an arrow).

Photo 2. F-1 grenade, placed on a tripwire to protect the cache.

Hiding places were visited to replenish portable supplies. The rest of the time the special group spent in ambushes and search activities. The area of responsibility of the special group was determined depending on the circumstances, often in a square of 15x15 km. The group commander was usually an army intelligence officer, but his deputy was an operative knowledgeable about people and the situation on the spot. They were given a task in which they could make decisions independently in the course of events.
Radio traffic was prohibited. The radio only worked for reception at a certain time. At the partisan base they immediately determined that a transmitter was working nearby (and in our time they can take direction finding). Going on air was allowed only when it was necessary to evacuate a wounded or captured person, when adjusting artillery (mortar) fire and directing aircraft at a partisan base.
The group worked silently and secretly, leaving no traces. It was as if it did not exist in nature at all. No fires, tin cans, broken branches, torn webs, etc. There was no question of smoking. The terrain in its area of responsibility was studied thoroughly. The group was on the warpath. And we had to sit in ambushes on partisan paths under shaggy camouflage for a long time - sometimes for 2-3 days. The camouflage must be impeccable - partisan reconnaissance is headed by the same professionals, and local residents, who will always be in the partisan reconnaissance group, remember every bush in the forest.
The main movements along partisan paths occur only at night. At the same time, enemy No. 1 is not fatigue, not hunger, but mosquitoes. The Germans were given clove oil - there is no better remedy against blood-sucking insects. The Americans in Vietnam were also given something. Russian special groups were never given anything.
Special groups of rangers worked in flexible contact with the opposition - forest conditions allowed this. The rangers, stationed several kilometers away from the partisan base, were practically invulnerable. It is pointless to comb the forest with partisan forces; only a search partisan reconnaissance group of approximately the same size can reach the rangers, and, as a rule, they will be ambushed by the rangers or run into mines. This is one of those cases where the one who needs it most loses.
The work of special groups is not limited to capturing “tongues”, striking partisan columns and monitoring partisan communications. Information received via radio directs the special group towards targeted actions. Depending on the situation, an order may be received to unite several special groups to strike a small partisan detachment, to destroy partisan headquarters and seize documentation.
So, in 1946 a daring and successful raid was carried out on the headquarters of the Bendery leader R. The village where the headquarters was located was located deep in the forests, the approach of large military forces to it would certainly have been noticed. Several special groups of the MGB, having united, made a diversionary raid on the village from the side; no one expected their appearance, but there was a strong rebuff. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy’s attention was diverted, one of the special groups entered the village from the other side and then moved through the streets according to the tactics of street fighting: machine gunners, under the cover of machine guns, advanced, consolidated, opened fire, under the cover of which the machine gunners pulled up. They advanced to the headquarters quickly and without losses, threw grenades at it, and seized archival and intelligence documentation. Half of the special forces were in Bendera uniform.
In guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, as already mentioned, there are no prohibited techniques. Creating false guerrilla units is a common method. These detachments are created on the basis of the above-mentioned huntsman special groups.
In addition, the Germans, while carrying out combing, as a preventative measure, fired at every suspicious rustle, at dense bushes, in shaded places, in hollows and ravines, at all places that were tactically dangerous for them, even without a visible target. And this technique also justified itself. Those who comb the forest move in two chains, no closer than 50 m from one another, but not moving away, within line of sight. This guarantees not so much the quality of combing, but also prevents the danger of a surprise attack from behind and from the side. In reality, you have to move not only along open places and ravines, but also across them. And when one chain or group overcomes such an obstacle, the other insures against a sudden attack (photo 3).

Photo 3. Proper combing of the forest or advance to capture. One group overcomes the ravine, the other protects against a surprise attack.

It would be wrong to overcome the obstacle all together - in this case, without backup with fire, moving from bottom to top facing the mountain, everyone is helpless and represents a group target (photo 4).

Photo 4. Incorrectly overcoming an obstacle - all together. In front of an obstacle, a natural “knocking together” occurs and turns into a group target, which is easy to destroy with a burst from the flank or a directed mine.
Places in the forest where the enemy instinctively gathers in front of an obstacle, as well as places that can serve as shelter from sudden fire (ditches, craters, ruts, hollows, etc.) in war are simply unreasonable not to mine.
If you have to move in hilly areas, it is preferable to walk with the ramp on your left side (photo 5).

Photo 5. The ramp to the left of the huntsman. From a machine gun it is convenient to shoot up the slope, to the right and with a turn to the left.

At the same time, it is convenient to shoot from the right shoulder in any direction and upward too. When the mountain (slope) is to your right, it is better to shift your weapon to left hand, imagine what it will be like for you to turn to shoot to the right and up from your right shoulder (photo 6).

Photo 6. Slope on the right. For the shooter, the position is unfavorable - it is inconvenient to shoot with a turn to the right, and even more so upward.

This is the so-called left-hand rule - shooting to the left is much faster and easier and should not be forgotten.
When a chain or group moves uphill, it is also covered with fire from below or from the side. The group that has risen to a height is fixed and supports with fire those who rise from the bottom up.
In the forest it is sometimes difficult to attack with a continuous front - the highly rugged terrain (as in the mountains) will almost always divide the attackers into separate groups, which have to move not in a chain, but in marching order, one after another. The combing takes the form of a collective search. Special groups operate in combined battalions, but structurally - in their own welded teams. Two special groups of 15-16 people were united into a regular combined arms platoon. And the terrain can lead such a platoon (or half-platoon) to the most unexpected place. It is impossible to predict the development of events, so rangers must be trained for a sudden oncoming collision - the main type of combat operations in the forest. The techniques of individual-group tactics of fire contacts in such conditions are specific. In the event of a sudden meeting with a group of the enemy in the forest, they always try to “press” him to the ground with dense, heavy fire, force him to lie down behind cover, “pin” him to the spot, depriving him of freedom of maneuver and not allowing him to raise his head for aimed shooting.

Photo 7. Scheme 1.

Photo 8. Scheme 2.

At the same time, immediately, while the cover group with a machine gun (in diagrams 1 and 2 indicated by numbers 1,2,3) keeps the enemy pinned to the ground, the main forces, taking advantage of the terrain, hiding behind the trees, make a sharp dash to the left - forward, trying to enter from side of the enemy's right flank. According to combined arms tactics, the enemy from the marching formations will begin to turn into a chain against your group! cover. Shoot this chain from the side, like a group target. Use the advantage that the above-mentioned left-handed rule gives - with the enemy turning to the right in the first minutes of the battle, it will be inconvenient, unusual for him to shoot, his arrows will turn to the right with their barrels at each other’s backs. On the side, the enemy will be open to your fire for some time; he will lose this time reforming the chain to the right. The winner will be the one who reacts first upon meeting and creates an instant advantage with concentrated fire from the side towards the enemy’s right flank. The same scheme of action applies in the event of a surprise attack on a special group - the cover pins the enemy to the ground, the rest move forward with a sharp maneuver to his flank, preferably to his right. The terrain and circumstances do not always allow this, but if there is such an opportunity, it should not be missed. Depending on the situation, the battlefield and the enemy himself must be “twisted” clockwise, approaching the enemy at a distance of dagger fire.
The above-described technique of forest robbers and horse thieves is not new - it has justified itself over the centuries. The challenge is to do all this at extremely high speeds. Combat by small units in the forest is fleeting. Situational options with personnel must be practiced in training until they become automatic. In a combat situation, there will be virtually no time to make decisions and present opportunities to teams. The tactical reaction of both individual fighters and the entire special group must be worked out to the level of the collective instinct of a wolf pack, where everyone without a team knows what to do.
If you are moving in a chain on level ground, the beginning of fire contact is similar - the enemy is pinned to the ground by fire. At the same time, while your machine gunners with dense fire do not allow him to lean out and shoot accurately, cover the enemy from the sides, “squeeze” him from the flanks, shooting targets unprotected by shelters from the sides (schemes 3, 4).

Photo 9. Scheme 3.

Photo 10. Scheme 4.

Make the main attack with fire again from the enemy’s right flank - the left-hand rule gives, albeit a short-term, but very noticeable advantage. If there are many of you, the enemy can be surrounded, if not, leave him a “way out” of the pincers and give him the opportunity to break away. Beat him next time. Do not turn fire contact into hand-to-hand combat unless necessary. If you are few and have nowhere to go, do not wait to be squeezed. With the concentrated fire of your machine guns, “cut” the enemy’s chain in one place, under the fire cover of those who close the group from behind, make a dash towards the enemy, “pierce” his battle formations with grenades, following the breaks of your edges, rush into the punched “hole”, turning your machine guns “in a fan”, do not let the enemy raise his head - you will see how the gap will immediately widen and deepen. Always critically evaluate whether it is worth cutting the enemy’s chain at a weak point: from its stronger areas, between which you may find yourself, you can easily be “pinned down” by fire and shot from the flanks. Sometimes it makes more sense to attack where the enemy's chain is thicker. In the resulting confusion, enemy fighters will be afraid of hitting each other. Depending on the situation, you can make a sharp throw to the left - forward, from the right flank of such a crowded place, but be sure to “get in touch” with the enemy. Let him turn to shoot to the right and “stick” the barrels into each other’s backs. If possible, a dash towards the enemy is made unexpectedly, from behind cover, at a very close distance. If not, they will cover with heavy fire those who will make a dash to throw a grenade. If possible, use the terrain, infiltrate through ravines and hollows, but always under fire cover (see above). Don’t break away from your own people - those who break away are lost. Act only as part of your unit. Organized actions are much more effective.
In all the situations described above, act sharply, impudently and brazenly, faster than the enemy, this is called leaving the initiative behind you.
When combing, they do not get carried away with the pursuit of small groups conducting intense fire; as a rule, this is a distraction by battle from the main forces or luring them into a trap. The main goal and the main danger is where there is deathly silence.
If the combing runs into a wall of dense fire and lies down, the best support is 82 mm mortar fire. This caliber in the forest is optimal in terms of the destructive effect of the mine and the maneuverability of the weapon. It is better not to use aviation during an oncoming maneuverable battle in the forest: it is poorly controllable from the ground, targets and landmarks from the air in the density of the forest are little distinguishable, and therefore aviators often hit their own. Another thing is mortars, controlled by you on the spot, from the overhead fire of which shelters are useless. A very effective weapon of fire in the forest is a heavy machine gun. Its powerful ammunition penetrates even centuries-old trees, and there is no escape from it. One heavy machine gun is capable of punching a “hole” in any defense (again, from the practice of German rangers).
Fighting in the forest requires a considerable amount of ammunition and shooting skills at emerging targets. That's why they try to pin the enemy to the ground. It is better when it lies behind shelters (trees), rather than flashing between them and immediately disappearing. Not everyone is trained in the method of shooting “offhand” even at short distances, especially at real distances of forest combat, usually 150-200 m. Shooting with a weapon “sighted” is only possible for trained professional snipers or stand-up athletes. For mass use, the so-called “poke” shooting method is most acceptable.
Notice which tree the target is hiding behind and guard it. The target will definitely appear from behind cover - it needs to shoot and move. And the target will most likely move to your right. Why? If the enemy shoots from behind cover from the right shoulder with a long-barreled weapon (machine gun, rifle), its length will not allow him to turn around or move to the left. When he goes on the attack, he will instinctively move out from behind cover towards his weapon.
Aim at an empty space along the course of this possible movement and observe (photo 11).

Photo 11. The size of the weapon makes it difficult for an enemy shooting from behind cover to turn around or move to his left. If necessary, change position or go on the attack, he will instinctively move towards his weapon. Wait for him there, “pull” the descent a little.

As the enemy begins to advance, begin to “select” the descent, and as soon as he “sits” on the edge of the front sight, press on (photo 12).

Photo 12. The enemy jumped out from behind cover and “sat down” at gunpoint. Press down.

While you wait, he will advance further and “bump into” your bullet. If the enemy needs to move to his left, he will definitely raise the barrel of the weapon upward, because the tree prevents him from turning around (photo 13).

Photo 13. The enemy raised the barrel, a sign that he is moving to his left. Wait for him to appear on the other side of the tree...
Based on this sign, take the lead in the same way, but only on the other side of the tree (photo 14).

Photo 14. ...now press on...

When shooting in the forest, look not only in front of you - with your peripheral vision, capture the situation on the right and left. An enemy who is not opposite you, but to the side, will very often be open to your fire from the side. Use this opportunity (photo 15, 16).

Photo 15. A stationary enemy will sooner or later open up from the side.

Photo 16. You can’t stay still in the forest.
In any case, try to go around the enemy, preferably to his right, while your comrades prevent him from sticking out with fire. It will open from the side; in the forest you cannot stay still; whoever does not maneuver is exposed and dies. Most often, such a person is collectively “twisted” according to the left-hand rule and shot, placing him in conditions unfavorable for shooting and defense.
In a fast-paced forest battle, everything happens very quickly. You will have to think for your opponent faster than he can think for himself. He hasn't run anywhere yet, and you need to know where your bullet will meet him (see above). This is called a "shoot skirmish". This method is also hundreds of years old; it is used with great success even now, in the jungle and taiga, in the tropics and in the north.
Combing the area usually aims to push the enemy into the open, cut him off from the forest, and put him under machine gun, artillery, and aviation fire.
Footprints in the snow always work against those who are smaller. In winter, rangers spend little time on the trails. Large military forces are being pulled up, and garrisons are stationed in every village, cutting off the partisans’ path to warmth and food. In the zone of partisan activity, the strictest access control regime is introduced and curfew. Aviation is operating at partisan bases.
A blockade in winter and spring is terrible for partisans. With the onset of spring thaw, massive combing of the forest begins. The task is to oust partisan groups from their habitable places. Lack of heating and a roof over your head, dampness underfoot, hunger and the presence of a mass of wounded are taking their toll. The bulk of the Bendery OUN-UPD resistance in Western Ukraine was destroyed during the February-April blockade of 1946. They still remember this to this day.
Naturally, the Germans had the greatest experience in fighting partisans, who acted pedantically and rationally. The rangers were organized into battalions. The battalion in the forest is mobile and controllable, but the regiment is no longer there. The destruction of the partisan base was subject to thoughtful planning and precise execution. After an exhausting battle, the partisans were allowed to calm down in a convenient parking place for them. Vigilance was lulled by inaction. The encirclement of the parking lot began in the evening, in the last rays of the setting sun. Low-flying planes forced the partisans to “keep their heads down” and made external observation difficult. Under such cover, assault groups arrived from different directions, each no more than a company strong. At the designated line, the rangers scattered into chains that closed with each other, surrounding the partisan camp in a semi-ring. Everything was done secretly and quickly, in the gathering twilight, while it was still possible to control the process visually. They immediately secured themselves for insurance against a sudden breakthrough. At night, special groups cut out partisan secret posts. The offensive began at dawn, as soon as the target could be distinguished. They attacked from the east, from the direction of the rising sun. A trap awaited the retreating partisans in the west. The rangers had a day ahead. The tactics were based on completing the operation before nightfall, the time most convenient for breaking out of the boiler. Twenty years later, the Americans used these tactics in the fight against the Viet Cong.
A counter battle is disastrous and terrible for partisans when, after some events or military operations, their battle formations are scattered, while for a while there is no single command and the threads of control are lost, which makes organized resistance difficult. In the complex landscape of the forest, the Americans used the same German technique for this: they “cut down” the partisan column with mortars, cut off the convoy, supplies, and headquarters, and immediately transferred the fire to the head of the column. The out-of-control mass was attacked from the sides in the usual manner.
A counter battle in the mountains is very unpleasant for partisans, where it is impossible to dodge it. On mountain paths that are squeezed by the terrain, it is impossible to deploy large forces; the outcome of the event depends on the level of tactical thinking of the commanders, the degree of preparedness of the fighters, and the quality of their weapons and equipment. The cup of success is tilted in favor of trained mountain rifle units (for the Germans, mountain rangers).
Without special groups working on the warpath, the large-scale actions described above would hardly have been possible. The method of ambushes and forest searches in the post-war years was widely used against ordinary rural gangs of groups - peasants worked on a collective farm during the day, gathered into a gang at night and went to rob. This method was used both against armed deserters and against gangs of formations masquerading as military units. The tasks and methods were the same: to detect, track, bleed in short night skirmishes, provoke a bandit group to go out for destruction. This method is still used today, especially in the fight against poachers, in the capture of escapees from places of detention, etc. Bandits are drawn to housing for the same reasons as partisans. And special groups ambush them for days near farmsteads and on the outskirts of villages. You can't make noise. You can't sleep. No smoking. Stealth must be absolute. The peasants are observant, and their connection with the forest exists through many channels. In the village, all the relatives and all the acquaintances, everything instantly becomes known. And if the peasants suspected something was wrong, those in the forest would know about it almost immediately.
When sitting in ambush, do not yawn. The forest calms and lulls you to sleep. You may not even notice how someone sneaks into the farm. This person will also watch the farm for more than one hour. Be especially careful in the morning: morning is the time for intruders. Wolf hour. Anyone who spent the night on the farm will leave at dawn. He did not observe the situation, but you did, you have the advantage. Your weapons and equipment are chosen by you according to the situation, but for combat in the forest, a larger caliber and stronger ammunition are preferable. Good camouflage, a periscope, a night vision scope and a silent weapon are a must.
Mosquito and dog repellents are highly desirable. Nowadays, there are many detection devices - capacitive, infrared, ultrasonic, etc. But for some reason they are never in the right place at the right time, and besides, they have learned to deceive them: at night they tie a prisoner in a clearing, he is detected by an infrared device, and their own people finish shooting him. Therefore, in search activities, the main load is on the animal instinct of a trained intelligence officer, who can also think and act in an extraordinary way. When searching the forest, you are on the warpath. The unknown awaits you. Learn to respect this word. You will have to rely only on yourself. Even in action movies, a helicopter does not always arrive to help. He did not always fly even to the Americans in Vietnam.

Photo 17. Hidden disguised surveillance.

Presented here general principles counter-guerrilla warfare. This is how the Germans acted on our territory. This is how the Americans fought in Vietnam. This is how the USSR liquidated the Basmachi, Bendery’s OUN-UPA movement in Western Ukraine, the Green Brothers in the Baltic States, and criminal gangs that were engaged in robbery everywhere after the war. So in Latin America liquidate numerous revolutionary and drug-mafia neoplasms. Practice shows that the partisan movement fades away if it is fought for real. Fighting in the forest requires non-standard solutions and does not fit into the framework of instructions, orders and regulations. From search engines operating on the warpath, remarkable ingenuity, originality of thinking and hellish patience are required.
The Germans called these people huntsmen, the Americans called rangers, the Russians did not call them anything - Lavrentiy Beria instilled in his subordinates a high culture of silence. In different countries, all these wolfhounds had the same feature - war in the forest was their way of life.

Alexey Potapov
"Training of a special forces soldier." SPC "People's Health", LLC "VIPv".

Combat operations in wooded areas have a number of features: maneuver and the pace of the offensive are “bogged down,” visibility and effectiveness of fire are reduced, the use of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery is difficult, and some types of equipment are completely impractical. The forest creates ideal conditions for ambushes, creating engineering barriers, etc. At the same time, one should not overestimate the influence of wooded areas on combat operations. And if, for example, in urban conditions, occupying a defensive position is almost always profitable, then in the forest much depends on tactical ingenuity and taking advantage of natural conditions.

Features of the offensive

It is believed that it is more expedient to conduct an offensive in the forest with reinforced brigades, but the leading role will be played by motorized infantry (infantry) units, which operate in dismounted formation and often without the support of tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.

With reliable protection of tracks and roads, the main blow should be delivered in a less accessible and less expected direction. When attacking from several sides, the use of helicopter landings behind enemy lines is considered effective.

The nature of the terrain separates the battle formations of units and subunits and forces them to operate on a wider front. Thus, a motorized infantry battalion in a forest can advance on a front of 2 km or more. However, small units (in order to improve their management) will operate more compactly with shorter intervals between soldiers. As a result, the gaps between squads, platoons and companies will inevitably increase.

When setting up combat missions, one should be “tied” not to objects, but to clearly visible landmarks of the area: roads, water bodies, forest edges.

In conditions of reduced visibility, there is a high probability of a face-to-face collision, including with one’s own units and subunits (with poor coordination or loss of communication). In order to prevent friendly fire and air strikes, mutual identification signals must be observed and developed.

An important role in the offensive is played by tanks, which in wooded areas can accompany infantry in many places. However, not everywhere. Combat vehicles cannot penetrate swampy areas and large tracts of forest. Experts believe that it is more effective to use tanks for joint actions with infantry: in a dense forest - somewhat behind it, mainly along roads, clearings and edges, and when advancing in a sparse and young forest, as well as in clearings and clearings - together with infantry battle formations to support them with fire and assist in overcoming the rubble.

The wooded area makes it difficult to use massive artillery and mortars in the offensive.

Direct fire is effective, so artillery in an offensive, especially deep in the forest, will be used, as a rule, in a decentralized manner and assigned tasks to fire at targets identified during the offensive.

The nature of the terrain dictates the widespread use of melee weapons: small arms, grenade launchers and flamethrowers.

An important role when operating in the forest is played by close combat weapons: small arms, grenade launchers and flamethrowers. The use of anti-tank guided missiles is practically excluded, since trees and their crowns will interfere with the flight of the projectile.

The most important tasks in an offensive are carried out by engineering troops and sapper units, which can operate in the attacking battle formations, assisting infantry and tanks in overcoming rubble, anti-tank barriers, minefields and other obstacles. Cables with hooks, chain saws, demolition charges, fire extinguishing agents, etc. may be useful for this.

Defense in the forest

The success of a defensive battle in a forest is determined not by numbers, but by the degree of preparation, good knowledge of the terrain and the use of its features to carry out maneuvers, deliver flanking and counterattack attacks to the rear.

- As a rule, attackers suffer two or more times more losses than the defending side.

Proper camouflage of positions allows you to bring the enemy closer to you, and, accordingly, inflict more damage on enemy troops.

It is believed that it is best to stop the enemy near the edge of the forest, and it is best to defeat him in the depths of the forest.

If the task is to hold the lines occupied in the forest, then the defending units and formations will build their defense continuous and deeply echeloned. It will be based on battalion and company areas, adapted for all-round defense. All clearings and roads are blocked by rubble and abatis, minefields and engineering obstacles are created in tank-dangerous directions, a fire system is carefully developed, second echelons and reserves are located near road junctions in readiness for counterattacks in various directions.

It is recommended: to create a forward defensive line in the forest at some distance from the edge, to keep trees in front of the front at a distance of 100-150 m (they serve as a kind of cap that causes premature shell explosions), and to improve visibility, to cut down the lower branches of trees and young growth. Riflemen, machine gunners and grenade launchers choose firing positions in such a way as to have the largest possible sectors of fire. Tanks, anti-tank guns and ATGMs will be located in tank-hazardous areas along clearings and roads both at the front line and in the depths of the defense. Combat guards can take a position on the ledges of the forest or in front of it at a distance of 150-200 m.

During the defense, significant damage to the enemy can be inflicted by artillery and mortar fire, even taking into account the low accuracy of artillery and forest fire and the difficulties in aiming. After such firing, securely camouflaged defending troops will be difficult to detect among fallen trees and branches, and the attackers will have to overcome difficult areas after shelling, often without the use of tanks and their own artillery.

Due to the rapid change of situation in wooded areas and the great importance of small units, foreign tacticians advise equipping them with guns and mortars for a quick and “serious” response to an emerging threat.

At large quantities paths in the forest, when organizing defense, they should be blocked, creating rubble. When setting them up, it is advisable to create various kinds of traps and organize ambushes, and mine the rubble themselves, braid them with barbed wire and position them in such a way that the advancing troops fall into the so-called “corrals”, covered from the flanks by fire weapons. It is assumed that the defending troops will let the attackers into these “corrals”, and then, with artillery, mortar and small arms fire from the flanks and subsequent counterattacks, they will cut off all escape routes. The Americans tried to practice something similar, only over a larger area, in Vietnam. They created so-called “death zones” in the jungle, pushing the partisans into pre-designated areas. Then they were hit by air strikes, as well as artillery strikes, after which American troops entered these zones and “cleared” them of the enemy.

Practical examples

When moving in a small group (10 – 30 people), you can use the “double tail” tactic: a column of two, staggered from each other. The two sides of the column observe from their side of the path of movement. When commanded to attack, the columns, starting from the “tail,” bend in a semicircle and move toward the place of conflict, as a result, the enemy’s location is encircled.

On the march, it is more convenient to move in a battle formation of the “arrow” type. There are machine gunners in front and on the flanks. Side protection is required. The lead patrol does not move more than 100 meters from the first “four”; visual communication must be maintained. Such a battle formation allows for the greatest security in the event of a surprise attack. In the event of an explosion on a directed mine, only one “four” is hit. Depending on the situation, the battle formation may change to a “wedge”, “ledge” or “chain”. Patrols and side guards must have special thermal imaging and acoustic reconnaissance devices, through the use of which the surprise attack factor can be reduced to a minimum.

When installing tripwires, you should remember that during normal installation, the enemy’s lead patrol soldiers will be the first to be blown up. To destroy the commander, it is necessary to install a mine and a tripwire at a height of 2 meters. With a high probability, the patrolmen will pass under it and not detect it, because their attention is aimed at the low tripwires. And since a radio operator usually moves next to the commander, he can disrupt the radio station’s antenna cable.

In an ambush, snipers and machine gunners must be evenly distributed along the front and must control the flanks. The latter, as well as the probable directions of the enemy’s approach, are mined. It is also appropriate to mine the front, preferably with a chain of several mines. Sectors of continuous mine damage must overlap. When the enemy enters the affected sector, the entire mine chain is undermined. Infantry moving at full height at this moment will be destroyed. This should be followed by a blow with all forces and means aimed at finishing off the enemy. The snipers' positions are located separately, and their single shots are lost against the background of general shooting. This allows them to calmly and systematically shoot the enemy.

Prepared based on materials from online sources

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Fight in the forest. Tactics - ambushes in the forest Interesting combat examples of a company advancing in the forest

Ambush

In the forest, the far limit of fire contact is no more than 40-50 meters, provided the enemy is moving, since if the enemy has prepared an ambush, then it is quite possible not to notice him at all. Therefore, let's consider several situations.

Features of the offensive