From Afghanistan (date: May 15, 1988) and its completion (date: February 15, 1989). But first, let’s find out what Afghanistan was like during these years.

In this country, a policy of national reconciliation began to be implemented in 1987. According to it, the PDPA officially renounced its monopoly on power. In 1987, in July, the law on political parties was published, which was approved by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA. He regulated the activities and creation of various political parties. Only in October was a resolution approved and signed at the PDPA conference, which outlined the tasks of strengthening unity. After all, the split into “Parcham” and “Khalq” - two wings of one party - continued to operate.

Constitution and President of Afghanistan

The Supreme Council (Loya Jirga) was held in Kabul on November 29. It approved the country's constitution and elected the president of the state, Najibullah, who announced to parliament delegates that the policy aimed at a ceasefire would continue until July 15, 1988. Conclusion Soviet troops from Afghanistan it was supposed to be carried out by agreement of the parties within 12 months.

Cessation of major hostilities

Since the beginning of 1987, USSR troops stopped conducting offensive combat operations. They entered into military clashes only in the event of an attack on their places of deployment. According to B.V. Gromov, Colonel General who commanded the 40th Army, the commander should carry out reactive or preemptive actions depending on the situation only in order to exclude the possibility mass death of people.

Opposition offensive

Already in January 1987, in the second half of the month, a decisive offensive was carried out by the opposition against the Afghan and Soviet garrisons. Peaceful villages were also not ignored. For the Mujahideen, the presence of the 40th Army prevented them from achieving the goals they had set to overthrow the DRA government. At the same time, the opposition parties regarded the policy of national reconciliation as a manifestation of the weakness of state power, and therefore intensified the struggle aimed at overthrowing it. The combat activity of the Mujahideen increased under the conditions of a ceasefire by government and Soviet troops.

Operation "Highway"

In November-December of the same year, Operation Magistral was carried out, aimed at unblocking Khost. The Dushmans, taking advantage of the absence of Soviet units in the Khosta district, restored by the fall of 1987 one of the largest transshipment bases called “Dzhavara”. Soviet troops managed to defeat it in the spring of 1986. There was a danger of creating a provisional government of opposition forces in Khost. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a major military operation of Soviet and Afghan troops, to provide the population with food and other necessities, and to thwart the plans of the opposition aimed at forming Afghanistan’s own government.

Preparing for surgery

The forces of the 201st and 108th motorized rifle divisions from the 40th Army and others took part in this operation. The funds and forces of five infantry divisions, several special forces units, and one tank brigade were attracted from the Afghan army. In addition, more than 10 state security and Tsarandoy battalions took part in the operation.

The situation was difficult. At first it was planned to capture the Seti-Kandav pass. It is located at an altitude of about 3 thousand meters. In this area, the opposition group consisted mainly of the Jadran tribe, which was not subject to any government at all. The tribe acted as its leaders saw fit. Jalaluddin, one of his descendants, led the Mujahideen in the 1980s.

Progress of Operation "Magistral"

Since negotiations with Jalaluddin did not bring results, on November 23 it was decided to launch Operation Magistral. On November 28, the advanced units captured the Seti-Kandav pass. After this, negotiations began again with the leadership of the Jadran tribe. However, the troops on December 16 were forced to continue fighting. On December 30, trucks with food moved along the highway to Khost.

Geneva Agreements

M. S. Gorbachev in December 1987, during his visit to the United States, announced that it was planned to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan soon. In Geneva, the delegations of the USSR, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USA soon sat down at the negotiating table. The goal was to develop an optimal political solution regarding the Afghan problem. In 1988, on April 14, 5 main documents on stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan were signed. They came into force a month later - May 15. Under these agreements, Soviet troops pledged to leave Afghanistan, and Pakistan and the United States pledged to completely stop aid to the Afghan rebels.

Beginning of troop withdrawal according to the Geneva agreement

The USSR strictly fulfilled all the obligations it assumed. Already in 1988, on August 15, approximately half of the Limited Contingent troops were withdrawn. The following directions were determined along which the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was to be carried out: in the west - Kushka, Shindand, Kandahar, in the east the routes were united in Kabul for troops from Jalalabad, Gardez and Ghazni, then they were sent through Salang to Termez and Puli -Khumri.

The opposition resumes its activity

From May 15 to August 15, 1888, Soviet troops were withdrawn from garrisons such as Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Gardez, Faizabad, Lashkar Gah and Kunduz. However, the fighting with the opposition did not stop. Of course, the opposition would be incompetent if it did not take advantage of this opportunity. The beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was marked by the fact that the opposition began to act with even greater assertiveness at this time. Rocket attacks on Kabul have become regular since mid-May. The previously cut paths came to life. Through them, military equipment was supplied to the Mujahideen. Warehouses, bases, and fortified areas were urgently revived and created in areas bordering Iran and Pakistan. The supply of weapons increased sharply, including surface-to-surface missiles (their range reached up to 30 km), Stingers, etc.

Capture of the cities of Maidanshahr and Kalat

Of course, the result of this immediately affected. Afghan aviation activity has decreased significantly. From May 15 to October 14, armed opposition groups shot down 36 helicopters and 14 aircraft belonging to the Afghan Air Force. Attempts were also made to seize provincial centers. On June 24, Mujahideen troops managed to capture the city of Maidanshahr, which is the center of Wardak province, for some time. More than 2 thousand people took part in the battles for the city on the part of the opposition. Kalat, the center of the province of Zabol, was subjected to a long siege and assault in July. Troops brought here from other areas defeated the besiegers, but Kalat, a populated area with approximately 7 thousand inhabitants, was severely destroyed.

Results of the activities of the 40th Army in 1988

The year of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is 1989. However, before the army left, it had a lot of work done. B.V. Gromov (pictured below), Colonel General, summed up the results for 1988 in a book called “Limited Contingent”.

He said that during 1988, the activities of the 40th Army led to a significant weakening of opposition units. Together with units of the Afghan forces, work was carried out to clear areas located along the highways. During the operations, after unsuccessful negotiations with the opposition, significant damage was inflicted on the Mujahideen. Soviet troops captured more than a thousand mountain anti-aircraft installations, as well as more than 30 thousand rockets, about 700 mortars and 25 thousand mines. In 1988, in the second half of 1988, the forces of the 40th Army captured 417 caravans belonging to the opposition. They were coming from Iran and Pakistan. The Mujahideen nevertheless still posed some danger to the government.

Preventing a coup in Kandahar

After the withdrawal of troops in November, the oppositionists colluded with officials 2nd Army Corps and tried to jointly seize power in Kandahar. This coup was prevented. However, the situation did not calm down. As fewer and fewer Soviet units remained in the DRA, the situation continued to escalate in some provinces.

40th Army leaves Afghanistan

The Geneva agreements were implemented by the USSR. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed on February 15, 1989. It was then that the 40th Army left the country. The events that occurred after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan confirmed that the status quo in the state was maintained only thanks to their presence.

Final operation

On January 23, 1989, Soviet troops began the final operation - the capture of the Salang Pass. About 600 Mujahideen and 3 Soviet soldiers and were killed in 2 days of fighting. Southern Salang was thus cleared of the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud, after which it was transferred to the troops of Afghanistan.

End of Najibullah's resistance

In 1989, on February 15, in accordance with the previously signed Geneva Agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed. This largely meant the end of Najibullah's resistance. However, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan did not lead to the immediate collapse of the pro-Soviet regime in the country. For another three years, M. Najibullah not only controlled Largest cities, but also hit the opposition strong blows. An example is the defeat of opposition troops that took place in April 1989 near Jalalabad. Najibula simultaneously successfully transformed himself into a national leader, anticipating further events after the collapse of the USSR.

The day of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as you remember, is February 15, 1989. However, the leaders of the USA and the USSR only at the end of 1991 announced the cessation of military supplies to the Mujahideen and the Najibullah government from January 1, 1992. If Najibullah had not been abandoned by Moscow, power in a significant part of Afghanistan would probably still be in the hands of pro-Russian politicians. Further patronage of the communists in Afghanistan, of course, would hardly be accepted with understanding in the world. In addition, support for former communists after 1991 contradicted the foreign policy objectives of the then Russia. Therefore, Najibullah was doomed.

Significance of troop withdrawal

The date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is very important in modern history our country. The Afghan war, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, is a hot topic of debate to this day. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan took place 2 years before the collapse of the USSR. This is one of the last significant events in the history of the state. After 1991, there is already another country - the Russian Federation, where life has changed significantly and continues to change to this day. However, the events that happened in 1989 are still remembered by Russian residents today. In 2014, on February 15, Russians celebrated important date- 25 years of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On this day, Shoigu awarded the participants in the Afghan war with medals, and other ceremonial events were held.

The surrender of Nazi Germany occurred at 01:01 on May 9, 1945 Moscow time or at 23:01 on May 8, Central European time. Three weeks later, on May 29, a Directive was issued to rename the Soviet front into the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. The Soviet army, which reached Berlin with heavy losses in the last months of the war, remained in East Germany for the next almost half a century. Final conclusion Russian troops originated from Germany on August 31, 1994.

My father was one of the Soviet conscript soldiers sent to serve in Germany (1978-1980, Bad Freienwald, East Germany). In this post I will show some photographs from the time of his service and tell general facts about Soviet troops in Germany.

Potsdam

At first, the unit was called GSOVG - Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (1945-1954). The head of the GSOVG was at the same time the head of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG) - that is, he had full power in the territory of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union. The first Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG was Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. After the formation of the GDR on October 7, 1949, the head of the GSOVG carried out control functions in the new state for several more years as chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany.


Potsdam

The headquarters of the Soviet troops in Germany since 1946 was located in Wünsdorf - where the High Command was based during Nazi Germany ground forces Wehrmacht. Due to the special nature of the town, the territory of Wünsdorf was closed to ordinary citizens of the GDR. Along with 2,700 German residents, 50-60 thousand Soviet military personnel and members of their families lived in the city.


Bad Freienwalde

About half a million Soviet citizens lived permanently in East Germany. GSVG - a group of Soviet troops in Germany (1954-1989) - had its own factories, Russian schools, sanatoriums, shops, officers' houses and other infrastructure. For crimes provided for by the criminal legislation of the USSR, Soviet citizens were tried according to Soviet legislation in special institutions. I have already written about one Soviet detention center in Potsdam.


Chernyakhovsk (formerly Insterburg), training part(my father is on the right)

The GSVG was a kind of state within a state. Its main task was to protect the western borders of the USSR from possible threats. In the context of the Cold War, the GSVG was the advanced unit of the Soviet army, so it was equipped with the most modern equipment and weapons (including nuclear weapons). In the event of a military conflict with NATO member countries, a group of troops was supposed to stay on the border line until full mobilization armed forces USSR and its allies.


Potsdam

The group owned 777 military camps throughout the German Democratic Republic - more than 36,000 buildings were listed on its balance sheet. 21,000 objects were built with USSR money. However, in many cases, barracks and other premises that once belonged to the Wehrmacht were also used to house Soviet troops.


Potsdam

Conscript soldiers received monetary allowance in GDR stamps, so service in the GSVG was considered prestigious. My dad remembers how he used the money he saved to buy last days of his stay in Germany before being sent home. Among the purchases were, for example, jeans that were rare at that time. In total, eight and a half million USSR citizens served in the Group during its entire existence.


Bad Freienwalde

In 1989, the Group was renamed again - from now on it bore the name of the Western Group of Forces (WGV). After the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany became inevitable. Due to the scale and complexity of the operation, the withdrawal of troops continued until August 31, 1994. A huge amount of equipment and weapons were removed. More than half a million people returned to the territory of the then collapsed Soviet Union. A farewell parade in honor of the withdrawal of Russian troops took place in Treptower Park in Berlin with the participation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.


Potsdam

PRIVATE BUSSINESS

BURLAKOV Matvey Prokopyevich

Born on August 19, 1935 in Ulan-Ude. In 1957 he graduated from Omsk military school them. M. V. Frunze. In 1968, after graduating from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze was appointed deputy regiment commander. Since 1969 - regiment commander, since 1973 - division commander. In 1977, after graduating from the Military Academy General Staff appointed commander of the army corps. Since 1979 - Army Commander, since 1983 - Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. Since 1988 - Commander of the Southern Group of Forces. Since December 1990 - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces. Since 1994 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. In stock since 1995. President of the public association "Union of Veterans of the Western State Military District/GSVG".


- Matvey Prokopyevich, before moving on to the main topic of conversation, maybe remember how your appointment as commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces took place?

For the uninitiated, it turned out, frankly, unexpected. The decision on my appointment was made by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Mikhail Gorbachev personally. Back in October 1990, I had a conversation with the Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov. He invited me in the spring of 1991 to lead the Western Group of Forces. Moscow noticed and, apparently, appreciated the successful withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces, which I led.

But man assumes, but fate disposes... A month later I was urgently summoned to Moscow and ordered to accept the post of Commander-in-Chief of the West Group. But that was only the beginning. At that time, the next plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was taking place in the capital. Suddenly there was a telephone call from the General Staff: “The General Secretary is calling you!”

And how did the meeting with the first and last president USSR and General Secretary of the Central Committee? Were you worried?

Not that word. After all, not many people, even taking into account the democratization of that time, had the opportunity to communicate with the leader of perestroika. The audience took place on the same day. During a break between sessions of the plenum of the Central Committee, Yazov and I approached Gorbachev. A little later Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov joined us.

The Secretary General began with the question: “Have we already met?” I answered in the affirmative. In his recommendations, Gorbachev touched upon the economic and political problems associated with the withdrawal of troops from Germany. He advised to establish contacts with the local and federal leadership of Germany and addressed Special attention for the sale of real estate belonging to the USSR.

The press often mentioned fantastic figures for the value of USSR property in Germany. How much was everything actually worth?

In a conversation with me, Gorbachev suggested that our real estate is valued at 30 billion West German marks. A colossal number! However, there is nothing surprising in that. The group of troops was located in 777 military camps. There were 36,290 buildings and structures. More than twenty-one thousand objects were built with funds from the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, during the sale of all the property of the Western Group, conflicts and sometimes deadlocks often arose. According to the enslaving agreement between the USSR and Germany, implementation was entrusted to the German Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the current value of real estate, which is the property of the USSR, at 1990 prices was determined by a much smaller amount - about ten and a half billion marks. It is quite natural that the Germans were not interested in a profitable sale. Moscow, represented by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, did not show state will in this matter.

The Germans were ready to pay tens of billions of marks for the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But Gorbachev was content with a small amount.

According to interstate agreements dated December 16, 1992, all our real estate in the West Germany became the property of Germany. It was practically given to the Germans as a gift. This decision some leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia are akin to betrayal of interests own people, tens of thousands of homeless families of officers and warrant officers. This conclusion was even reached by some Western media.

God be with them, with the Western media. Russian newspapers and magazines wrote that the withdrawal of the Western Group resembled a swift flight. The Americans carried out the redeployment of only one division from Europe to the United States over the course of five to seven years. Who is to blame for the fact that dozens of our formations and units ended up in an open field?

The top leadership of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's inner circle, who pursued an extremely short-sighted and irresponsible policy. Mikhail Sergeevich himself achieved worldwide popularity and became " the best German"due to the fact that, for the sake of foreign policy dividends, he forgot about the country's internal problems. For the sake of the friendly smiles of the Western man in the street and the nickname "Gorby", he gave up on a lot.

Boris Yeltsin continued his anti-army policy with no less cynicism. To please his friend, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he shortened the already unthinkable deadline for the withdrawal of our troops by four months. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the military infrastructure of the Soviet Union was concentrated in the border areas - in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. So Russian divisions and regiments had to be stationed in completely undeveloped places.

Those same Americans withdrew their troops only after military camps were built for them in the States and appropriate living conditions were created. In 1992, the 7th Corps left Germany for its homeland, the USA. The Yankees were returning home without special problems, in good spirits, happy and satisfied.

During the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, Western intelligence allegedly successfully carried out an operation under code name"Giraffe", the purpose of which was to acquire state-of-the-art weapons. Is this a bluff?

Yes and no. They most likely carried out the operation, but I wouldn’t be so categorical about the success.

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, later renamed the Western Group of Forces, has always been a testing ground for the capabilities of the latest military equipment, the level of training of command personnel and personnel. The most modern types of weapons and military equipment came here first.

Before the start of hostilities in Afghanistan, conclusions on the characteristics of weapons and military equipment, the possibilities of their use in extreme conditions were done in the Armed Forces of the USSR mainly on the basis of exercises and maneuvers of formations and formations stationed in Germany.

In 1990-1994, “sensational” information regularly appeared in the German media that the Russians were selling weapons and ammunition left and right. One of the Germans fell for this “duck” and offered our soldier two thousand marks for a Kalashnikov assault rifle. This “businessman” was caught red-handed. And more than fifty such attempts to purchase weapons from our military personnel were recorded in 1992 alone. None of them were successful. Therefore, once again I allow myself to doubt the success of Operation Giraffe. The accounting of ammunition, weapons and military equipment in the Western Geographical Guard was properly organized.

Especially for skeptics, I will give the following argument. Over almost half a century of existence of the GSVG-ZGV, only 68 units were wanted small arms. One hundred percent of weapons and military equipment were exported to Russia.

Our military echelons were heading home through the territory of neighboring states, recent allies under the Warsaw Pact. Did you have any problems?

I don’t want to indiscriminately accuse entire peoples and label them, but the new “democratic” leaders of Poland and Czechoslovakia decided to improve their financial affairs at the expense of the troops being withdrawn from Germany. The leadership of the Polish Solidarity, for example, demanded to repair the bridges along which our trains were supposed to move. The “lords” presented us with truly enslaving, clearly impossible demands regarding payment. The cost of each axle of a railway car across the country was estimated at as much as four thousand West German marks. We were talking about tens of millions.

These conditions were unacceptable to us. Apparently, even then, recent colleagues in the Warsaw Pact were trying to earn indulgences, anticipating the imminent expansion of NATO to the east.

Of course, we didn’t have that kind of money to pay for transportation. The German side allocated only 1 billion marks to cover our transport costs. There is only one way left - by sea. But it was impossible to solve such a complex task without coordination with the German government authorities.

To be honest, at first I had little faith in the reality of the idea of ​​​​transferring a huge group by sea. And there were objective reasons for this. Within two or three months, the entire scheme and withdrawal plan had to be reworked, which in itself is quite problematic.

But the German side kept its promises and provided full political and financial support for sending our troops across the Baltic Sea.

Then in your native Fatherland you were not remembered with a “quiet kind word” unless you were lazy. They were accused of everything: abuse of official position, corruption, personal enrichment. Now it is clear that there were “puppeteers” behind all this. Did you really disturb someone?

To many! I think the time has not yet come when everything can be discussed openly. Although, some are no longer there, and those are far away.

Firstly, it was necessary to distract the Russian people from internal problems. Remember, there was a shortage of food, wages were not paid for months, plus rampant crime and all the “delights” of emerging capitalism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union buried the hopes of hundreds of millions of people for a stable and normal life. And here the notorious piano in the bushes came in handy - the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany. A current, so to speak, socio-political topic, when it was possible to talk about the mediocrity of command, about theft and corruption, about deserters and monster officers. At the same time, it was transparently hinted that all these loafers were sitting on the necks of the common people. In my opinion, an excellent valve for relieving excess pressure in the country.

Secondly, I did everything in my power to prevent unscrupulous businessmen from getting their hands on the withdrawal of troops. The Western group was surrounded by hundreds of different firms and small firms, the owners of which were located in Moscow, Bonn and Berlin and occupied not the least positions. They didn’t offer us anything. For example, purchase food, coal, and other necessary materials at astronomical prices.

In February 1991, we learned that we would not receive money from the two and a half billion interest-free loan allocated by Germany. I had to save on literally everything. And at this time, complaints were sent to all authorities about the objectionable and stubborn Burlakov. No one knows what it took to withstand this pressure except me and the West Group command. Naturally, I was not forgiven for such “willfulness”. But I don't regret anything.

Many high-ranking military leaders, at the end of their careers, smoothly move to well-paid positions as consultants, advisors, and heads of various companies and funds. What is pensioner Burlakov doing today?

As befits a pensioner, I raise children and grandchildren, or rather, they raise me. I'm doing housework. I don’t get involved in politics or dubious commercial transactions.

On a voluntary basis, I lead the Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces - Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. To forestall snide questions, I will say that we do not use customs benefits and, unlike some, we have not flooded the country with imported alcohol and cigarettes. We provide all possible legal and medical care veterans military service and their families, we meet the younger generation.

I look people straight in the eye. If someone considers this kind of work a “warm place”, I won’t try to dissuade you. Time will judge.

Is it true that the Germans attempted unauthorized penetration into our nuclear arsenals?

Yes, that happened. In 1992, in Altengrabow, three Bundeswehr officers tried to enter the territory of the missile and technical base. Ignoring the warning shouts of the sentry and even a shot in the air, one of them overcame the fence. Our soldier opened fire to kill. As a result, a German major was seriously wounded, and the perpetrators were detained. The German Defense Minister then offered us an official apology for the actions of his subordinates.

They say our Western partners were shocked when they finally found themselves in... empty nuclear weapons storage facilities? They really hoped to get acquainted with their contents!

I won’t boast, but they were never able to figure out the time and place of evacuation nuclear weapons. Together with the special services, we planned and successfully carried out a multi-step combination. At the same time, targeted disinformation was carried out and a number of distracting actions were carried out...

Since the early 1990s, Western media have not tired of shouting about the so-called “Russian mafia.” Did she cause any problems to her compatriots in uniform?

In July 1992, the robbery of the century might have taken place. The publicity would be enormous, and the consequences unpredictable. On the way of a transport with fifteen million German marks, Chechen criminal elements, already established in Europe, ambushed them. They calculated everything: traffic routes, departure times, security forces and much more. They did not take into account one thing - the professionalism of the Russian military and specialists from the special detachment criminal police Land of Brandenburg. Thanks to coordinated and prompt actions, the robbery was unsuccessful.

But this did not stop the mafia. The ZGV safe was a very tasty morsel. The gang was sent reinforcements from Chechnya. High-class “experts” in robbery and robbery were sent to Germany. In January 1993, the criminals repeated their robbery attempt. But the command and counterintelligence received the necessary information in time... On the territory of the former GDR, by the way, there were then over a dozen ethnic gangster groups. We realized that it is simply impossible to foresee everything. And the money was delivered by plane.

Alas, today experts’ forecasts have been confirmed that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, organized crime will rush to Western Europe.

Ten years since the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces is more of a sad date than fun party. Who were we in Europe - occupiers, as some people sometimes say, or liberators?

During the 49 years that our troops were in Germany, we never intimidated anyone, but we were not afraid of anyone either. Being the most powerful group of the Soviet Armed Forces, the GSVG-ZGV honestly fulfilled its historical mission to ensure peace and stability in Europe. It is still unknown how the post-war world structure would have developed if there had not been Soviet troops in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

One of the military journalists, touching on this topic, aptly noted:
In the Western Group of Companies everyone was selected
And the orders of the fathers were revered sacredly,
If we were still there,
It is unknown where NATO would be!

I think there is a lot of truth in these words. Russian soldiers and officers who served in the Western Group of Forces deserve only the respect and gratitude of their descendants. I am sure that after a short time, Lady History will put everything in its place and give everyone what they deserve.

August 31 marked 15 years ago since the solemn ceremony of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the former GDR took place in Berlin. 500 thousand military personnel and 12 thousand tanks returned to Russia from Germany.

Western group troops (ZGV) - operational-strategic territorial association of the armed forces (AF) Russian Federation, temporarily stationed in Germany. Until March 1992, it was part of the USSR Armed Forces.

The history of the creation of the Western Civil War is associated with the implementation of the political and economic principles post-war structure of Germany, whose territory after the end of World War 2, according to the Declaration of the Defeat of Germany, was divided into 4 occupation zones: Soviet, American, British and French. To implement the occupation regime in the Soviet zone, part of the troops from the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts was united in June 1945 into the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (GSOVG). Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG and at the same time Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany by a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 6, 1945. The field administration of the Group, formed on the basis of the field administration of the 1st Belorussian Front on June 14, 1945, was located in the city of Potsdam (later in Wünsdorf).

In the first post-war years, the Group's troops were involved in protecting the border of the Soviet zone of occupation and took part in the implementation of activities carried out by the Soviet military administration aimed at providing the necessary conditions for eliminating the consequences of the fascist regime and militarization in Germany.

After the formation of the GDR (1949), the GSVG, according to the directive of the General Staff of March 26, 1954, received the name Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG). According to the Treaty on Relations between the USSR and the GDR (1955) and the Agreement on the Temporary Stay of Soviet Troops on the Territory of the GDR (1957), the protection of the state border was transferred to the border troops of the GDR, and the Group retained the right to control the passage of military personnel from the USA, Great Britain, and France into West Berlin and other control functions agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. The Agreement also specified legal status Soviet military personnel, members of their families, workers and employees Soviet army, provisions were included on the non-interference of Soviet troops in the internal affairs of the GDR, on agreement with government agencies GDR the number of Soviet troops, their deployment, training areas, etc.

In the 1970-1980s, the GSVG was the most powerful and combat-ready operational-strategic formation of the Soviet Armed Forces, which was intended to solve the main tasks in the operations of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in the European theater of military operations. The GSVG included several combined arms and tank armies, an air army, formations and units of military branches, special forces and rear services. The troops were fully equipped and equipped with the most modern weapons. They numbered more than 1.5 million people and 111 thousand units of weapons and military equipment, including over 4 thousand tanks, about 8 thousand armored combat vehicles, 3.6 thousand artillery pieces, 1.3 thousand planes and helicopters, 100 thousand units of other equipment. Among the formations and units, 139 were guards, 127 bore honorary titles, and 214 were awarded orders. In the Group in different years 1,171 Heroes of the Soviet Union served, 26 people were awarded this title twice, and Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Kozhedub - three times.

In June 1989, the GSVG was renamed the ZGV.

(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing House. Moscow. in 8 volumes - 2004. ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)

On September 12, 1990, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev signed an agreement regulating the presence and withdrawal of troops. The treaty stipulated that all Soviet troops stationed in Germany had to leave it from the end of 1990 to 1994.

After the collapse of the USSR, by the Decree of the President of the RSFSR of March 4, 1992, the Western Geographical Front came under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, which assumed obligations for further withdrawal of troops, which was completed on August 31, 1994.

The historical event was marked by a farewell parade in front of the monument to the Soviet soldier-liberator in Treptower Park in Berlin, which was attended by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and in the evening a festive concert of Russian and German artists was held in Lustgardem Park.

More than 3 thousand spectators gathered at the ceremony in Treptow Park. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who hosted the last parade of Russian troops on German soil, expressed confidence that this day will go down in the history of “Russia, Germany, and all of Europe.” In his speech, he emphasized the role of the USSR in the defeat of the Hitler regime, and, paying tribute to the memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers, focused on the future of Russian-German relations. Yeltsin expressed confidence that their transition to a new quality is now possible, and the mutual trust and understanding achieved in the process of withdrawing the BGV is the most important contribution to their formation.

By order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated September 5, 1994, the Western Group of Forces was abolished on September 1, 1994.

(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing House. Moscow. in 8 volumes - 2004 ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

February 15, 1989 at 10.00 local time, the last Soviet soldier crossed the border dividing Soviet Union and Afghanistan on the bridge over the Amu Darya River near the small Uzbek city of Termez. This soldier was Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who brought up the rear of the last column of the 40th Army, thereby symbolizing completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after many years of bloody war.

Having crossed the invisible line - state border, the army commander paused and, turning towards Afghanistan, quietly but clearly uttered several phrases that do not fit on paper, and then told the correspondents: “There is not a single soldier of the 40th Army left behind me.” Thus ended the Afghan war, which began and lasted for more than 9 years. A war that claimed the lives of more than 14 thousand and maimed more than 53 thousand Soviet citizens and more than a million Afghans.

On February 7, 1980, a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took place, where the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was considered. The Soviet leadership spoke negatively at the meeting regarding the withdrawal of troops.
In particular, D.F. Ustinov said: “I think that it will take a year, or even a year and a half, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and before that we cannot even think about withdrawing troops, otherwise we can get into a lot of trouble.” L.I. Brezhnev: “I think that we even need to slightly increase the contingent of troops in Afghanistan.” A. A. Gromyko: “After some time, the troops will certainly be withdrawn from Afghanistan. It seems to me that we should think about what contractual obligations to establish between the parties after such a thing happens that it is possible to withdraw troops. We need to ensure complete security in Afghanistan.”

At the end of February 1980, again on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev, the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan was considered. It was believed that by overthrowing Kh. Amin and consolidating the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had completed their task.
But Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov and, possibly, A. A. Gromyko opposed the withdrawal of troops, so they did not do this. The decision was probably influenced by the sharp escalation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February: the Soviet embassy was shelled and several of our citizens were killed. Then government forces barely managed to disperse the crowds of thousands of fanatics.

In May 1981, the USSR Ambassador to the DRA F.A. Tabeev, at a meeting of military advisers, outlined the official point of view on the prospects for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: “It was assumed that in short time, no more than a year, using the army as a deterrent force, without getting involved in fighting, let us create conditions for the establishment and strengthening of a new leadership and the development of a new stage of the revolution. And then, before world public opinion has time to react negatively, we will withdraw the troops. But a year has passed and it turned out that the Afghan leadership does not have its own military support to protect the country. Therefore, now, for the next two years, the task has been set to create an Afghan army that is combat-ready and loyal to the government.”

At the beginning of 1982, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, his deputy D. Cordovez and others took an active part in resolving the Afghan problem. 12 rounds of negotiations and 41 discussions were organized with the participation of Soviet, Afghan, American and Pakistani diplomats. As a result, a package of documents on the withdrawal of troops was prepared.
In Moscow, immediately after Yu. V. Andropov came to power, these proposals were responded positively.
On May 19, 1982, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and the DRA to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops. Yu. V. Andropov was ready to present an eight-month program for the withdrawal of troops. But during that period, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA intensified. Yu. V. Andropov passed away. D. Kardoves sent his project to Moscow and Washington, but received no response.

After K.U. Chernenko came to power, the negotiation process on Afghanistan was suspended, although the military more and more persistently raised the issue of troop withdrawal.

The negotiation process resumed only in 1985 after the election of M. S. Gorbachev Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU. In October 1985, the Politburo was tasked with speeding up the resolution of the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At the same time, the Afghan authorities were notified of our firm intention to withdraw their troops. B. Karmal commented on this decision: “If you leave now, next time you will have to bring in a million soldiers.”

In February 1986, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev announced that a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops had been developed and would be implemented immediately after a political settlement. In May 1986, instead of B. Karmal to the post Secretary General The Central Committee of the PDPA elected Najibullah (Najib). B. Karmal went for “rest and treatment” in the USSR.
At a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, a large-scale task was set: to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan within two years (in 1987, withdraw half of the troops, and in 1988, the remaining 50%).

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements, according to which the USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period starting from May 15, 1988. During the first three months, it was planned to withdraw half of all troops.
Pakistan and the US should have stopped all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The schedule for the withdrawal of troops on April 7, 1988 was signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal D. T. Yazov. By this time, their number in Afghanistan was 100.3 thousand people. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out in parallel through two border points - Termez (Uzbekistan) and Kushka (Turkmenistan).

While carrying out the planned withdrawal of troops, the USSR continued to provide significant military assistance to Afghanistan. Afghan specialists were trained at an accelerated pace and reserves were created material resources in key areas and at outposts. The 40th Army continued to participate in battles with the Mujahideen, and strikes were carried out against militant bases with R-300 missiles and aircraft from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The closer the start of the second stage of troop withdrawal approached, the more concerned the Afghan leadership became. In September 1988, President of Afghanistan Najibullah, in a conversation with generals V.I. Varennikov, head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and B.V. Gromov,
commander of the 40th Army, attempted to delay Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military command clearly opposed this proposal. However, this position of the Afghans was understood by some leaders of the USSR. Under their pressure, the troop withdrawal schedule was changed. The second phase of the withdrawal of troops from Kabul was supposed to begin in November 1988, but in accordance with the new directive of the Ministry of Defense, it began only on January 15, 1989.

But the matter did not stop there. In January 1989, President Najibullah, during meetings in Kabul with USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze and
KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov persistently asked to leave 12 thousand volunteers from the 40th Army in Afghanistan for security international airport in Kabul and the strategic Kabul-Hairaton highway.
E. A. Shevardnadze gave instructions to prepare proposals for the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan.
General V.I. Varennikov conveyed his negative answer, despite the fact that it was proposed to establish cash payments volunteers - officers 5 thousand rubles, and soldiers 1 thousand rubles monthly. At the same time, the military emphasized that if a decision is made, then it is necessary to leave a group of at least 30 thousand people.
Before the final decision was made, V.I. Varennikov gave the order to suspend the withdrawal of troops, since otherwise the abandoned objects would then have to be recaptured with battles and losses.
The pause lasted 10 days, until January 27, 1989. And yet common sense prevailed. At a meeting of the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan, it was decided not to leave troops, but to ensure their complete withdrawal within the established time frame.

On February 4, 1989, the last unit of the 40th Army left Kabul. In the capital, in addition to the Soviet embassy, ​​only a small security force remained, the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the office of the chief military adviser, who already flew to their homeland on February 14.

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent (OKSVA), Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

There is still a debate about the reasons that prompted the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the advisability of this step. The only thing that needs no comment is the terrible price our country has paid. About a million Soviet soldiers and officers passed through the Afghan war, which claimed the lives of almost 15 thousand Soviet citizens and disabled tens of thousands, in addition to the deaths of countless Afghan rebels and civilians.

Winners or losers?

Disputes continue over the status of the Soviet military contingent that left Afghanistan in 1989—as a winner or a loser. However, no one calls the Soviet troops the winners of the Afghan War; opinions are divided as to whether the USSR lost or did not lose this war. According to one point of view, the Soviet troops cannot be considered defeated: firstly, they were never officially tasked with a complete military victory over the enemy and control over the main territory of the country. The goal was to relatively stabilize the situation, help strengthen the Afghan government, and prevent possible external intervention. According to supporters of this position, the Soviet troops coped with these tasks, moreover, without suffering a single significant defeat.

Opponents say that in fact there was a goal of complete military victory and control over Afghan territory, but it could not be accomplished - tactics were used guerrilla warfare, in which final victory is almost unattainable, and the main part of the territory has always been controlled by the Mujahideen. In addition, it was not possible to stabilize the position of the socialist Afghan government, which was eventually overthrown three years after the withdrawal of troops. At the same time, no one disputes that significant military losses and economic costs played a major role in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was estimated that during the war the USSR annually spent 3.8 billion US dollars on Afghanistan (3 billion on the military campaign itself). The official losses of the Soviet troops were 14,427 killed, more than 53 thousand wounded, more than 300 prisoners and missing. At the same time, there is an opinion that the real death toll is 26 thousand - the official reports did not take into account the wounded who died after being transported to the territory of the USSR.

However, despite all the complexity, inconsistency and political assessment of these events, it should be noted that the Soviet military personnel, military advisers and specialists who were in the DRA were faithful to their military duty to the end and fulfilled it with dignity. Eternal glory to the heroes!