Air battles in Kuban (1943)
Air battles in the Kuban - a series of large-scale battles between Soviet aviation and German aviation in April - June 1943 over the lower reaches of the river. Kuban, Taman Peninsula and Novorossiysk in the Great Patriotic War, with the aim of seizing strategic air supremacy over the bridgehead of German troops in Kuban.
In Soviet historiography it is considered as an integral part of the battle for the Caucasus. Air operations were carried out to support the actions of ground forces. In total, more than two thousand aircraft took part in the battles on both sides. Fierce air battles lasted continuously for many hours with a widespread build-up of forces on both sides; on some days, up to 50 group air battles were carried out with the participation of 50-100 aircraft on each side. As a result Soviet aviation won air supremacy in this section of the Soviet-German front.
Soviet fighters La-5 at a field airfield
 |
||
| Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov | Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin |
Previous Events
As a result of the encirclement and subsequent liquidation of the enemy's Stalingrad group, a favorable situation developed for a successful offensive by Soviet troops in the North Caucasus. The idea of the operation was to use coordinated strikes from the troops of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts from the northeast, south and southwest to encircle and defeat the main forces of Army Group A, preventing its withdrawal from the North Caucasus.
The German command, trying to avoid being captured, began to withdraw its units: the 1st Tank Army retreated to Rostov, and the 17th Army to Kuban, where by February 1943 it took up strong defenses in well-equipped positions. The enemy created a powerful defense using advantageous terrain - the smooth waters of the Kuban, Adagum and Vtoraya rivers. The section of the front that ran through the area from the Black Sea coast in the Novorossiysk region to the village of Krymskaya was especially strongly fortified. Almost all heights and settlements turned into strongholds and centers of resistance, the most powerful of which was the Krymskaya village. In Soviet and Russian historiography and literature, this line is widely known as the “Blue Line”, and in German - the “Goth Head” Line (German: Gotenkopf). The Kuban bridgehead was considered by Hitler as a springboard for future operations in the Caucasus. The number of German-Romanian troops left in Kuban amounted to more than 400 thousand people. The bridgehead was supplied from Crimea through the Kerch Strait. The daily demand was 1270 tons of cargo. Sea transportation was carried out by high-speed landing barges, Siebel ferries and landing boats. An “air bridge” was also organized with the help of military transport aviation. In addition, a cable car was built across the strait and construction began railway bridge and oil pipeline.
During February - March 1943 Soviet troops made repeated attempts to eliminate the Kuban enemy group. The troops of the North Caucasus Front (commanded by Colonel General I. I. Maslennikov) were 1.5 times superior to the enemy in infantry, tanks and somewhat less in artillery. On February 4, 1943, an amphibious assault was landed in the Novorossiysk area and managed to capture a small bridgehead on Cape Myskhako, which became known as Malaya Zemlya. On February 12, Krasnodar was liberated by troops of the North Caucasus Front. Then, within a month, they managed to advance 50-60 kilometers west of Krasnodar, breaking through the first line of enemy defense. On March 16, 1943, Soviet troops went on the defensive.
Plans of the parties
The actions of the aviation of the warring parties were closely linked with the course of military operations, since the main task was to support ground troops.
USSR
In order to free up the Soviet troops involved in this area, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the Taman bridgehead be cleared before the start of the summer campaign. In these battles, the Soviet command solved the problem of gaining air supremacy on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front and creating the most favorable conditions for carrying out offensive operations ground forces on the Taman Peninsula. At the end of March, the General Staff and the headquarters of the North Caucasus Front developed an offensive plan with the goal of breaking through German defense and liquidation of the bridgehead. In accordance with it, the main blow was delivered by the forces of the 56th Army in the area of the village of Krymskaya, where the communications center in the Kuban was concentrated. The main railway and dirt highways to Novorossiysk, Anapa, Taman and Temryuk passed through it. Offensive missions were also assigned to the other five armies of the front (18th, 9th, 47th, 37th and 58th). The actions of the Soviet troops in the first half of April were not successful; moreover, the enemy carried out private counterattacks, which posed a threat to the further conduct of the operation. Therefore, from April 18, 1943, control over the ongoing operation began to be exercised by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov. The operational management of the aviation and naval formations was carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal A. A. Novikov, and the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov.
The following tasks were assigned to Soviet aviation: to gain air supremacy, provide cover for ground forces, and support the offensive of the North Caucasus Front from the air. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the front air force headquarters developed an air offensive plan, which provided for: having gained air superiority, destroy the enemy's manpower, artillery and defense units with bomber and assault strikes, facilitating the advancement of Soviet troops. This plan was approved by representatives of Headquarters - Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and Air Marshal A.A. Novikov. During the battle, the Soviet command, in response to enemy actions, began to urgently increase the size of its aviation group. Thus, very quickly the scale and objectives of the air battle far exceeded the initial local goals of both sides and took on the character of a battle to destroy the most well-prepared enemy air groups on the eve of the decisive battles of the summer campaign of 1943.
On August 12, Russia celebrates Air Force Day. Russia is deservedly famous for its “air shield”. Today we will remember 7 famous air battles of Russian aviation.
First World War. Alexander Kozakov
The most successful Russian pilot - ace during the First World War was Alexander Aleksandrovich Kozakov. Kozakov’s combat record includes 32 victories, although many official sources indicate a different figure - 17. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that, according to the rule existing in Russian aviation, only the enemy airplane that fell on territory not occupied by the enemy was considered shot down. On March 19, 1915, in one of his first combat missions, the pilot of the 19th air detachment of the 5th Army, headquarters captain Alexander Kozakov, repeated the feat of Pyotr Nesterov, ramming a German Albatross. Under the fuselage of his Moran, a metal “cat” with long “paws” and a pyroxylin bomb was attached to a cable (and this was in 1915, when the French and Germans were already installing machine guns on their planes). Having deftly maneuvered in the air, Kozakov overtook the Albatross and, hovering above it, tried to throw off the cat. But, as luck would have it, she got caught in the skin of her own airplane. Kozakov decided to hit the Albatross from above with the wheels of his Moran. The blow turned out to be so strong that the Moran tore through the skin of the wings of the enemy airplane, as if riding it. In this position, Kozakov flew for several seconds and then “jumped off his horse.” The out-of-control German plane overturned and fell to the ground like a stone. Both enemy pilots died, but the Russian pilot still managed to land the wounded Moran on his territory. True, the airplane turned over during its run, but the pilot survived.
Air raid on Berlin
Exactly a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, German aviation carried out its first massive raid on Moscow. Enemy raids prompted the Soviet military-political leadership to launch retaliatory strikes on Berlin. On June 26, 1941, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, had already visited Stalin with a proposal to bomb the German capital. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief liked the idea. It was necessary to prove that Soviet aviation had not been destroyed, as Germany’s chief propagandist Goebbels trumpeted. The operation was extremely dangerous; it was expected that the bombers would spend at least eight hours in the air. At significant altitudes, the temperature outside the aircraft could reach 50 degrees below zero. Considering that the cabins were not heated, warm fur suits and oxygen masks were prepared for the pilots. The cars had to be made as light as possible. And due to what? The armor protection was removed. There were anti-aircraft guns around Berlin within a radius of one hundred kilometers, and hundreds of fighters were on duty at the airfields. But three of our planes reached the capital of the Reich without firing a single shot. Even in Saaremaa there was an agreement: there would be no radio communications over the target, signals would be given by the commander of the operation, Colonel Preobrazhensky, with aeronautical lights. Berlin was not waiting for “guests”, it was all in lights, perfectly visible. Navigator G.P. Molchanov recalled the flight to Berlin this way: “It’s a matter of minutes to the goal. Beneath us is the lair of fascism! I’m carrying out bombing! The pulses of the separated FABs are counted like a heartbeat. 500. Only 35 minutes after the first bombs fell, an air raid warning was announced in Berlin. The city was plunged into darkness. Anti-aircraft guns opened fire. Our bombers had to break through a solid wall of fire. Preobrazhensky ordered the radio operator: “Krotenko, tell the airfield: mine place - Berlin. I’ve completed the job. I’m coming back.” The bombers took the opposite course. The reference books still say that all our crews returned to the airfield without losses. In fact, there were losses. Lieutenant Dashkovsky's plane did not reach its airfield by a little. It fell on the forest near Cahul and caught fire. The crew died. Years later, the German writer Olaf Greller would write: “What had never been possible before and no one else would be able to do until 1945 was accomplished by Preobrazhensky’s pilots: they took the fascist air defense by surprise, the strongest and most equipped it had ever been in 1941.” .
Although the Battle of Kursk is rightly considered a tank battle, the battle in the sky was no less important. The Luftwaffe provided its tank divisions with very valuable air support, but the Red Army Air Force ultimately proved its superiority in the air. The military operations of Soviet aviation in defense near Kursk received a much greater scope than in the defensive operations of the Battles of Stalingrad and Moscow. The battles became especially fierce in the area of the city of Izium, where our troops crossed the Seversky Donets River and were now fighting heavy battles on its right bank. German bombers in groups of 20–30 aircraft, under the cover of fighters, tried to bomb the crossings and delay the advance of our troops. The air battles during the Battle of Kursk were distinguished by the incredible intensity and heroism of the Soviet pilots.
According to the memoirs of Georgy Baevsky: “On August 15, covering my troops and the crossing in the Izyum area, “in a heavy air battle with 80-100 Xe-111 and Yu-88, 16–20 Me-109f,” as recorded in the flight book, I shot down a Xe-111, “the ammunition consumption was 380 ShVAK." And again, there were “hunters” among the enemy fighters. On the same day, six La-5s under the command of one of our best pilots, a veteran of the regiment commander of the 3rd Guard Squadron, Captain N.P. Dmitrieva, covering the crossings, was engaged in a heavy battle with enemy fighters. Suddenly - and in battle everything happens suddenly - a bright flash in front of the plane and a cutting sharp pain in the eyes for some fractions of a second Nikolai Dmitriev’s consciousness turned off. The flames engulfed the entire plane, it went into a steep tailspin and did not react to the control of the rudders. Dmitriev left his La-5 with great difficulty, the “Messers” tried to shoot the parachutist in the air, but our fighters reliably covered the commander, who, while descending, began to tear off his burning clothes. He fell on the front line, in the location of his troops, burned, unconscious. There was a bloody wound where the left eye used to be. The infantry took Dmitriev to the nearest field hospital, and from there he was sent to Moscow."
Battle of Kuban
The air battle that took place in the skies of Kuban in April-June 1943 became one of the largest air battles of the Second World War and was an integral part of the Soviet offensive in the Caucasus. New generation Soviet fighters played one of the main roles in the battle. For the first time during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet pilots imposed their will on the Luftwaffe, actively interfered with and opposed the Germans in carrying out their combat missions. In total, three air battles took place in the skies of Kuban. The first of them began on April 17, 1943 with an attempt to eliminate the bridgehead in the Myskhako area. In order to throw the paratroopers of the 18th Army into the sea, the enemy attracted about 450 of its bombers and 200 covering fighters. On the Soviet side, about 500 aircraft, including 100 bombers, were used to counter the Germans. From April 28 to May 10, an air battle unfolded in the skies over the village of Krymskaya. The intensity of these battles can be evidenced by the fact that during the 3 hours of the offensive, German aviation carried out more than 1,500 sorties. The last major air battles took place between May 26 and June 7 in the area of the Kievskaya and Moldavanskaya villages during the breakthrough of the German Blue Line. For some time, the Germans managed to seize air superiority, which made life very difficult for the advancing troops. The retaliatory countermeasure was attacks by Soviet aviation on German airfields. From May 26 to June 7, the Red Army Air Force conducted 845 sorties against Nazi airfields in Anapa, Kerch, Saki, Sarabuz and Taman. In total, during the battles in the skies of Kuban, Soviet aviation carried out about 35 thousand sorties.
Khalkhin Gol. Ram
The ramming method, mastered by Nesterov, was further developed and became one of the favorite methods of combat of Soviet pilots even before the Great Patriotic War. In 1938, in the battles of Khalkhin Gol, senior lieutenant Skobarikhin used a ram, but now it was made on a collision course and on planes that approached at a speed of about 900 kilometers per hour - this is three times faster than in 1914.
The second ramming attack on Khalkhin Gol was carried out on August 3 by the squadron commander
56th Fighter Regiment Captain V.P. Kustov. On this day the enemy wanted
launch a powerful air strike on the positions of Soviet troops. Japanese Armada
The bombers and fighters were intercepted by Soviet planes. Already
several enemy vehicles fell to the ground in flames. However, some
The bombers stubbornly rushed forward. One car was attacked by the captain
Kustov. At the decisive moment, the Soviet pilot ran out of ammunition.
In a few seconds, bombs could rain down on Soviet soldiers... With a screw
the captain of his fighter hit the fuselage of a Japanese bomber,
it flared up and, falling apart, fell down... Upon collision
Viktor Kustov also died, the first in the history of aviation to destroy a
strike by an enemy bomber.
The next day, August 4, a ram was carried out on Khalkhin Gol.
fighter pilot A.F. Moshin. In the air that began over Mount Khamar-Daba
During the battle, Soviet pilots shot down eight enemy aircraft. One of them destroyed
Lieutenant Moshin. While chasing the second car, he got behind it. However,
Moshin ran out of ammunition. Skillfully maneuvering, he came close to
enemy aircraft and hit the stabilizer with the propeller. Japanese fighter
crashed into the ground.
Moshin landed safely at his airfield. Except a little
bent propeller, his I-16 had no damage
Ram. The Great Patriotic War
During the Great Patriotic War, aerial ramming was not provided for by the military regulations, any manuals or instructions, and Soviet pilots resorted to this technique not by order of the command. During Great War Soviet pilots performed more than 600 aerial rams. It should be noted that Soviet Air Force pilots used rams on all types of aircraft: fighters, bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial rams were carried out in single and group battles, day and night, at high and low altitudes, over their territory and over the territory of the enemy, in any weather conditions. There were cases when pilots rammed a ground or water target. Thus, the number of ground rams is almost equal to air attacks - more than 500. Perhaps the most famous ground ram is the feat that was performed by the crew of Captain Nikolai Gastello on June 26, 1941 in a DB-3f (Il-4, twin-engine long-range bomber). The bomber was hit by enemy anti-aircraft artillery fire and made a so-called “fire ram”, hitting an enemy mechanized column.
Akhtung-akhtung! Pokryshkin in the sky!
Talk about history military aviation and it would be wrong not to remember Pokryshkin. It is not necessary to retell all the exploits of the pilot; let us remember the main thing. The legendary battle of April 29, 1943 is widely known. Then the eight aircobras led by Pokryshkin scattered and turned back three echelons of Yu-87 (81 aircraft). In addition, they were covered by ten Me-109s. One pair pinned down enemy fighters, the other six, with a “falcon strike” through a powerful fire barrier (the shooters of 27 bombers sent more than 400 bullets per second towards them), twice repeating a mathematically calculated maneuver with a variable dive profile and a sharp upward movement, shot 12 “Junkers” (four of which - Pokryshkin). Returning to the airfield, he shoots down the fifth bomber.
In the essay “Master of the Sky - Alexander Pokryshkin,” front-line correspondents A. Malyshko and A. Verkholetov wrote: “Does he shoot? - friends say about him. “It comes with all the fire, burns like a blast furnace.” All firing points on Pokryshkin’s vehicle were transferred to one trigger. Four against 50, three against 23, alone against 8 Pokryshkin entered the battle. And I never knew defeat. Moreover, in every battle he took upon himself the most dangerous thing - the attack of the leader of the German groups.
In the spring of 1943, on the southernmost flank of the huge Soviet-German front, in the Kuban, fierce air battles unfolded, ending in a brilliant victory for the Soviet Air Force over selected squadrons of Hitler's aviation. The victory of Soviet aviation in Kuban was the most important stage in the struggle to gain air supremacy. In fierce air battles on the Taman Peninsula and in the Battle of Kursk, the former opinion about the superiority of German aviation in the air was finally overthrown.
Air battles in the Kuban unfolded at a time when the Nazis, having been defeated at Stalingrad and having lost dozens of divisions and a huge amount of military equipment, rolled far to the west. The successfully advancing Soviet troops advanced and cut off the fascist troops stationed in Taman. In front of this enemy group hidden behind the net defensive structures, called the “Blue Line” by the fascists, the task was set to hold the Taman Peninsula. Hitler's command intended to use the peninsula as a springboard for the deployment of new operations in the North Caucasus.
The group of Nazi troops, which took up defensive positions on the Taman Peninsula, was supposed, according to the plans of the Nazis, to divert large forces to itself Soviet army and thereby ensure the successful deployment of the offensive of their troops on other sectors of the Soviet-German front and, in particular, on the Oryol-Kursk and Belgorod-Kursk directions.
Thanks to early spring The airfields of Crimea and southern Ukraine quickly dried up and large aviation formations could be concentrated on them. The Nazis decided to take advantage of the created situation and relocated from the central areas to the south a large number of airplanes. At the airfields of Crimea, the Taman Peninsula and Southern Ukraine Selected fighter squadrons and large bomber aviation forces were concentrated.
By relying heavily on aviation in the defense of the Taman Peninsula, the Nazis hoped to gain air supremacy.
The intentions of the fascist German command were revealed in a timely manner.
Thus, the Nazis were unable to secretly maneuver their air units and formations and suddenly introduce them into battle in the Kuban region.
Taking into account the current situation, the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces promptly deployed fighter, bomber and attack aircraft to Kuban. Our aviation units were armed with remarkable aircraft designed by A. S. Yakovlev, S. A. Lavochkin, V. M. Petlyakov, A. N. Tupolev and S. V. Ilyushin, built by heroic workers of socialist industry.
By this time, thanks to the selfless work of workers, engineers and technicians of the aviation industry, the front began to receive aircraft in ever-increasing quantities. Heroically defending their homeland from the Nazi invaders, Soviet pilots destroyed 4,000 fascist aircraft in just three winter months of 1942/43. All this made it possible to eliminate the former quantitative superiority of Hitler's aviation. As for the quality of our aircraft, this was an advantage on our side from the first days of the war.
By the time of the air battles in Kuban, the Soviet Air Force had enriched itself with experience in warfare and contrasted the Nazis with its more advanced tactics and operational art. By this time, advanced Soviet aviation commanders had creatively developed a number of new tactical methods of combat in the air and the most effective destruction of ground targets. The headquarters of units and formations of the Air Force have significantly improved the control system for the actions of all types of aviation both over the battlefield and in the enemy’s military and operational rear. These and many other circumstances played a big role in the achievement of decisive successes by Soviet pilots in combat operations in the Kuban.
Long before the start of air battles, our aviation carried out a series of powerful attacks on enemy airfields. Attack aircraft, bombers and fighters, operating at enemy airfields, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, as a result of which the enemy’s aviation group was significantly weakened by the beginning of the battles.
Air battles in the Kuban began in March 1943 with fierce air battles between our fighters and large groups of enemy aircraft, which were trying to subject the areas of Rostov and Krasnodar to massive attacks. Skillfully using the excellent flight-tactical qualities of their aircraft, showing high skill, courage and bravery, Soviet pilots selflessly fought the enemy. Our fighters met enemy aircraft at distant approaches to protected objects and, entering the battle, inflicted great damage on them. Near Rostov and Krasnodar, Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft gunners destroyed hundreds of enemy aircraft.
However, the enemy continued to gather new aviation forces in the area of the Taman Peninsula. The Nazis hoped to oust Soviet fighters from the battlefield and, having seized the initiative, create a favorable environment for air strikes on our ground forces. But the initiative, both on the ground and in the air, was still in the hands of the Soviet troops. Events at the front unfolded in accordance with the plans of the Soviet command. Our ground troops and aviation dictated their will to the Nazis.
In April 1943, ground and air battles broke out in the Novorossiysk area. The enemy tried to defeat our troops and drive them out of the bridgehead in the Cape Jaco area. For about a week there were very fierce battles on the ground and in the air. To provide air support for the counterattack, for which three combined arms formations had prepared, the fascist German command attracted large aviation forces. It should also be noted that in this sector the enemy had an advantage in basing aviation, since its advanced fighter airfields were located closer to the line of combat contact than ours. This is explained by the fact that from our side the spurs of the Main Caucasus Range approached Novorossiysk. Our fighters could remain above the battlefield much less than enemy fighters.
Making 1000 or more sorties per day, the enemy not only sought to influence our positions on the bridgehead itself, but also tried to disable our long-range artillery located on the other side of Tsemes Bay.
But this time the enemy’s plan was thwarted. At the direction of the Soviet command, which was closely monitoring the hostilities unfolding in the Kuban, hundreds of aircraft were concentrated on this section of the front. Powerful air strikes exsanguinated a large enemy group. In air battles, he again suffered heavy losses, and the intensity of his aviation flights decreased significantly. Thus, Soviet aviation won the air battle. During these days, ground troops fought fierce battles, repelling from 5 to 13 enemy attacks per day. As a result of three days of fierce attacks, the Nazis penetrated our defenses by only 1 kilometer. On April 20, the enemy, having brought up fresh reserves, planned a decisive attack. But his plan was thwarted by our aviation: half an hour before the start of the Nazi offensive, Soviet bombers, under the cover of fighters, dealt a powerful blow to the enemy’s battle formations, who were preparing for an attack; A few hours later they carried out a second raid. This predetermined the failure of the Nazi offensive.
By this time, Soviet fighters had inflicted a heavy defeat on Nazi aircraft. There was a sharp change in the air situation. If on April 20, 1,400 enemy sorties were recorded on this section of the front, then the very next day this number decreased by half, and in the following days it decreased even more. Air supremacy has finally and irrevocably passed into our hands.
IN last days In April and early May, a tense situation developed both on the ground and in the air in the area of the Krymskaya village. Here our ground troops launched an offensive. Hitler's command, trying to stop the offensive, sent large forces of bombers here. At the same time, enemy fighters sought to dislodge our aircraft from the battlefield. A new air battle began. Soviet bomber and attack aircraft, supporting the offensive of ground forces, operated in large groups, continuously destroying enemy manpower and equipment. There were fierce battles in the air with enemy aircraft, in which hundreds of aircraft took part. And in these battles the enemy suffered heavy losses.
To replenish their already significantly battered air units, the Nazi command hastily transferred fresh squadrons to the Kuban area. But they too were subjected to crushing blows from Soviet pilots, who destroyed enemy aircraft both in air battles and at airfields. It should be noted that this method of action was successfully used here: many enemy airfields were blocked by small units of Soviet fighters, as a result of which the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to throw all his forces into battle at the same time and brought them into battle in parts, which was beneficial to our fighters.
Acting skillfully and decisively, Soviet pilots won the air battle in the area of the Krymskaya village. Air supremacy here too remained with our aviation. Thanks to continuous and effective air support, the troops of the Soviet Army successfully solved the task assigned to them: in early May they took a large stronghold of enemy defense on the Taman Peninsula - the Crimean village. The enemy was forced to retreat to new defensive positions.
However, the air battles in Kuban did not end there. At the end of May, the air battle flared up with renewed vigor in the area of the Kyiv and Moldavanskaya villages. Here our ground troops went on the offensive and broke through the enemy defenses. The fascist German command, trying to save the situation, sent large aviation forces into battle. In addition to units based in Crimea, aviation units located at airfields in southern Ukraine were involved. The fierce air battles that began demonstrated the power of Soviet aviation with renewed vigor: our fighters again inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy.
Fascist aviation tried to break through to our troops in groups of 25 - 50 aircraft. At the same time, the number of groups increased all the time, and at the end of the day on May 26, for a short time, the Nazis tried to strike our troops in 12 groups. But Soviet fighters, encountering groups of bombers at distant approaches, broke up their battle formation and dealt crushing blows, forcing them to drop bombs on their own troops.
Six fighters, led by officer Gorbunov, covered the battle formations of our ground forces. Eight enemy fighters that appeared in the air sought to dislodge Soviet aircraft and provide their pilots with the opportunity to bomb our troops. Officer Shevchenko, paired with Kankoshev, pinned down the enemy fighters in a vertical maneuver and pulled them to the side. At this time, a large group of fascist bombers was discovered. Four fighters under the command of Gorbunov crashed into the battle formation of enemy aircraft and scattered them. Having shot down two Junkers, Gorbunov's four forced the Nazis to retreat from the battlefield. Fascist pilots were forced to drop bombs on their troops.
A pair of planes, led by pilot Shevchenko, tied down eight enemy fighters and did not give them the opportunity to help their bombers. One enemy fighter was shot down. From this example it is clear that the Soviet pilots, acting skillfully, emerged victorious from the battle even with a large numerical superiority of the enemy.
Having been defeated in numerous air battles, the enemy in early June abandoned the idea of launching massive attacks on our troops on the battlefield. Soviet aviation won this air battle as well.
Thus, having gained air supremacy, Soviet aviation assisted ground forces in the battles at Cape Haco, in breaking through enemy defenses near the village of Krymskaya and in the battles for the key points of the notorious “Blue Line” of Hitler’s defense. During the violent air battles Enemy aircraft suffered enormous damage, losing a total of about 1,000 aircraft.
In single combat with a strong and treacherous enemy, our pilots showed high skill in both individual and group air battles. Despite the high intensity of combat operations, Soviet pilots persistently searched for and successfully found new fighting techniques. By quickly developing these techniques, they gained an advantage over the enemy and moved towards new successes.
During the days of the battle in Kuban, Soviet pilots developed very effective combat techniques, in particular, they fully implemented the basic formula of a crushing offensive air battle: altitude - speed - maneuver - fire. Soviet air combat masters, firstly, tried to conquer heights. This allowed them to freely maneuver, search for the enemy and conduct an offensive battle. Secondly, they achieved superiority in speed. This gave them a great advantage when catching up with the enemy and made it possible to achieve surprise in the attack. Having gained altitude and speed, Soviet pilots could, thirdly, use the maneuver with the greatest effect. Skillfully maneuvering in the vertical and horizontal planes, they confidently took their starting position and rushed into the attack. The high altitude and speed made it possible to quickly perform any maneuver. Finally, the fourth, final and decisive element of the formula came into play - fire. With precise targeted fire, opened only from a short distance, the fighters were sure to hit the enemy.
Air battles in Kuban showed that group combat became one of the main forms of air combat. In a number of cases, from a fleeting meeting it developed into a long fight.
The battles in Kuban are replete with many examples of the combat skills of Soviet pilots who achieved success in any combat mission. While studying with advanced air combat masters, young pilots A. Klubov, G. Golubev, M. Mudrov and V. Bazanov each won a dozen victories.
The heroic exploits of Soviet pilots and the success of our Air Force in the Kuban as a whole were a direct consequence of the fact that our aviation in its combat activities relied on the strongest Soviet rear in the world. The enemy's air forces did not and could not have such a rear. Soviet people inspired Communist Party, carried out enormous work to supply the Soviet Army and its aviation with everything necessary for a successful fight against the enemy. Back in the days of history Battle of Stalingrad New types of aircraft arrived at our front-line airfields, which, in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics, were significantly superior to enemy aircraft. By the spring of 1943, Soviet aviation was replenished with aircraft of the latest brands. The Soviet rear provided its front-line aviation with excellent aircraft in the quantities needed to defeat the enemy. In particular, the fighter formations operating in the Kuban were armed with the best aircraft of that time - the Yak-7 and La-5.
Brought up by the Communist Party, Soviet pilots deeply understood the just goals of the Great Patriotic War and firmly believed in the justice of their cause. Infinitely loving their socialist Fatherland, Soviet aviators religiously fulfilled their military oath and selflessly fought the enemy.
The air battles in Kuban demonstrated the exceptional flying skills of such brave and courageous pilots as A. Klubov, T. Rechkalov, V. Semenishin, V. Fadeev and others.
Among the pilots who took part in air battles in the Kuban there were many experienced soldiers who successfully fought the enemy near Moscow, Stalingrad and on other fronts. They not only improved their combat skills, but also taught young aviation personnel the art of air combat and precision bombing and assault strikes. The high military training of our pilots was clearly visible at all stages of the Kuban air battle.
The excellent Soviet aircraft were equipped with aircraft cannons and machine guns that had a high rate of fire. At the airfields there were sufficient aircraft maintenance facilities and various equipment necessary to control the actions of pilots in the air. Pilots and air commanders skillfully used the excellent weapons that Soviet people fully provided for its aviation.
Aviation in the Kuban operated in close cooperation with the ground forces of the Soviet Army.
During the air battle in Kuban, the commanding staff of our aviation units and formations showed high organizational skills. The superiority of our aviation operational-tactical thought over the enemy’s was clearly demonstrated in the Kuban battles.
All these factors ensured a brilliant victory for the Soviet Air Force over fascist aviation. Soviet aviation emerged from the Kuban battle even stronger and more seasoned.
Source: Three times Hero of the Soviet Union, Guards Major General of Aviation A. POKRYSHKIN. Air battles in Kuban - "Bulletin" air fleet"No. 5, 1953
AIR BATTLES IN KUBAN 1943, the actions of the Soviet Air Force against German aviation in April–June in order to gain operational air superiority.
At the beginning of April, owls. The troops, having superiority in forces and means over the enemy, began an offensive operation in order to complete the liberation of the North Caucasus (see. Battle for the Caucasus 1942–43). The Wehrmacht leadership decided to compensate for the lack of ground troops with the massive use of aviation. To this end, by mid-April, it concentrated 820 4VF aircraft (510 bombers, 250 fighters and 60 reconnaissance aircraft) at the airfields of Crimea and Taman, and also attracted up to 200 bombers based in the Donbass and southern Ukraine. As part of this aircraft. The grouping had the best units - the fighter squadrons “Udet”, “Mölders”, “Green Heart”, staffed by experienced pilots and aircraft of the new modification Me-109G and FW-190A5.
From owls Aviation from the North Caucasus, partially the Southern and Southwestern fronts, the Black Sea Fleet and a long-range aviation group took part in the air battles. By the beginning of the battles of the owls. troops had in Kuban approx. 600 aircraft.
Possessing superiority in aviation, the enemy seized operational dominance in the air. In response, the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred 3 aircraft from its reserve to Kuban. corps and a separate fighter division, increasing the number of its aircraft. groupings of up to 1048 combat aircraft (508 bombers, 170 attack aircraft, 370 fighters). General management of the actions of the owls. The Air Force was carried out by Air Marshal A.A. Novikov, and the immediate commander of the Air Force of the North Caucasus Front (since May 1943, commander of the 4VA) Lieutenant General. aviation K.A. Vershinin.
The first battle took place on April 17–24 during the fighting on the bridgehead in the Myskhako area on Malaya Zemlya– participated approx. 650 enemy forces and 500 Soviets. airplanes. Subsequent battles took place in the areas of the villages of Krymskaya (April 29–May 10), Kyiv and Moldavanskaya (May 26–June 7).
Air battles continued continuously for several hours with a widespread build-up of forces on both sides. On some days, in a relatively narrow area (23–30 km), up to 40 group air battles took place with the participation of 50–80 aircraft on each side. At the same time, airfields were attacked. With an acceptable rate of 3 flights per day, owls. The pilots flew up to 7 combat missions during the day.
Total owls aviation produced approx. 35 thousand sorties, losing approx. 750 aircraft. Enemy losses amounted to 1,100 aircraft, including more than 800 in air battles. The results achieved were an important step towards gaining strategic air supremacy, which was achieved by the Soviets. aviation in Battle of Kursk 1943.
During the battles of the Sov. The pilots demonstrated courage, courage, and ingenuity. 52 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Union. Among the owls pilots, the greatest number of victories in air battles were achieved by A.I. Pokryshkin(20 pp.), G.A. Rechkalov (16 s-tov) and V.I. Fadeev (15 councils personally and 1 council in the group).
Research Institute ( military history) VAGSH RF Armed Forces
Air battles in Kuban- a series of large-scale battles between Soviet aviation and German aviation in April - June 1943 over the lower reaches of the river. Kuban, Taman Peninsula and Novorossiysk in the Great Patriotic War, with the aim of seizing strategic air supremacy over the bridgehead of German troops in Kuban.
Previous Events
The German command, trying to avoid being captured, began to withdraw its units: the 1st Tank Army retreated to Rostov, and the 17th Army to Kuban, where by February 1943 it took up strong defenses in well-equipped positions. The enemy created a powerful defense using advantageous terrain - the smooth waters of the Kuban, Adagum and Vtoraya rivers. The section of the front that ran through the area from the Black Sea coast in the Novorossiysk region to the village of Krymskaya was especially strongly fortified. Almost all heights and settlements turned into strongholds and centers of resistance, the most powerful of which was the Krymskaya village. In Soviet and Russian historiography and literature, this line is widely known as the “Blue Line”, and in German - the “Goth Head” Line (German. Gotenkopf). The Kuban bridgehead was seen by Hitler as a springboard for future operations in the Caucasus. The number of German-Romanian troops left in Kuban amounted to more than 400 thousand people. The bridgehead was supplied from Crimea through the Kerch Strait. The daily demand was 1270 tons of cargo. Sea transportation was carried out by high-speed landing barges, Siebel ferries and landing boats. An “air bridge” was also organized with the help of military transport aviation. In addition, a cable car was built across the strait and construction of a railway bridge and an oil pipeline began.
During February - March 1943, Soviet troops made repeated attempts to eliminate the enemy Kuban group. The troops of the North Caucasus Front (commanded by Colonel General I. I. Maslennikov) were 1.5 times superior to the enemy in infantry, tanks and somewhat less in artillery. On February 4, 1943, an amphibious assault force was landed in the Novorossiysk area and managed to capture a small bridgehead on Cape Myskhako, which became known as Malaya Zemlya. On February 12, Krasnodar was liberated by troops of the North Caucasus Front. Then, within a month, they managed to advance 50-60 kilometers west of Krasnodar, breaking through the first line of enemy defense. On March 16, 1943, Soviet troops went on the defensive.
Plans of the parties
The actions of the aviation of the warring parties were closely linked with the course of military operations, since the main task was to support ground troops.
USSR
In order to free up the Soviet troops involved in this area, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the Taman bridgehead be cleared before the start of the summer campaign. In these battles, the Soviet command solved the problem of gaining air supremacy on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front and creating the most favorable conditions for conducting offensive operations of ground forces on the Taman Peninsula. At the end of March, the General Staff and the headquarters of the North Caucasus Front developed an offensive plan with the goal of breaking through the German defense and eliminating the bridgehead. In accordance with it, the main blow was delivered by the forces of the 56th Army in the area of the village of Krymskaya, where the communications center in the Kuban was concentrated. The main railway and unpaved highways to Novorossiysk, Anapa, Taman and Temryuk passed through it. Offensive missions were also assigned to the other five armies of the front (18th, 9th, 47th, 37th and 58th). The actions of the Soviet troops in the first half of April were not successful; moreover, the enemy carried out private counterattacks, which posed a threat to the further conduct of the operation. Therefore, from April 18, 1943, control over the ongoing operation began to be exercised by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov. The operational management of the aviation and naval formations was carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal A. A. Novikov, and the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov.
The following tasks were assigned to Soviet aviation: to gain air supremacy, to provide cover for ground forces, and to support the offensive of the North Caucasus Front from the air. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the front air force headquarters developed an air offensive plan, which provided for: having gained air supremacy, destroy manpower, artillery and enemy defense units with bomber and assault strikes, facilitating the advancement of Soviet troops. This plan was approved by representatives of Headquarters - Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and Air Marshal A.A. Novikov. During the battle, the Soviet command, in response to enemy actions, began to urgently increase the size of its aviation group. Thus, very quickly the scale and objectives of the air battle far exceeded the initial local goals of both sides and took on the character of a battle to destroy the most well-prepared enemy air groups on the eve of the decisive battles of the summer campaign of 1943.
Germany
Since the superiority in ground forces remained with the Soviet side, the German command hoped to compensate for the lack of its troops through aviation. At the end of hostilities in the Kharkov region, the main strike forces of the 4th Air Fleet were transferred to the airfields of Crimea and Taman: squadrons of dive and tactical (front-line) bombers. The main task was to support the German-Romanian group in defensive and offensive battles. Thus, the timing of the assault on “Malaya Zemlya” was postponed twice due to the impossibility of using aviation in bad weather. Great importance There was also an organization of air supply for the bridgehead. Remaining after an unsuccessful attempt to supply the encircled group at Stalingrad, the transport squadrons were replenished with equipment and personnel, and relocated to the airfields of the Crimea, as well as to Kherson. Command of the transport group consisting of 180 aircraft was entrusted to the headquarters of the 8th Air Corps.
Composition and strengths of the parties
USSR
The section shows the distribution of Soviet aviation forces that participated in the hostilities in Kuban from April 1 to June 10, 1943.
- 1st Aviation Corps (headquarters in Simferopol) - General G. Korten:
- 3rd Fighter Squadron "Udet" (JG3) - Colonel V.D. Wilkke, consisting of headquarters and two air groups:
- 52nd Fighter Squadron (JG52) - Colonel D. Hrabak, in full force:
- 4th air group of the 1st twin-engine fighter squadron (IV./ZG1):
- 3rd Air Group of the 4th Bomber Squadron "General Wefer" (III./KG4):
- 51st Bomber Squadron "Edelweiss" (KG51) - Major E. von Frankenberg und Pöschlitz, consisting of three air groups:
- 55th Bomber Squadron "Grif" (KG55) - Lieutenant Colonel E. Küchl, consisting of two air groups:
- 2nd squadron of dive bombers "Immelmann" (St.G.2) - Colonel E. Kupfer, consisting of three air groups (relocated to Kharkov in May 1943):
- 1st Air Group, 3rd Dive Bomber Squadron (I./St.G.3):
- 3rd Air Group of the 77th Dive Bomber Squadron (III./St.G.77):
- 2nd Air Group of the 1st Attack Squadron (II./Sch.G.1):
- 4th Air Corps (headquarters in Stalino) - Lieutenant General K. Pflugbeil:
- 27th Bomber Squadron "Böhlke" (KG27) - Colonel G-G. von Best, consisting of two air groups:
- 1st Air Group, 100th Bomb Squadron (I./KG100):
- 8th Air Corps (headquarters in Poltava) - General G. Seidemann:
- 5th Transport Group (KGrzbV5)(He 111H),
- 500th Transport Group (KGrzbV500)(Ju 52),
- 9th Transport Group (KGrzbV9)(Ju 52),
- 50th Transport Group (KGrzbV50)(Ju 52),
- 102nd Transport Group (KGrzbV102)(Ju 52).
- 1st Anti-Aircraft Corps - Colonel General O. Dessloch:
- 15th Anti-Aircraft Division
Armament of the parties
USSR
By the spring of 1943, Soviet aviation had practically recovered from the defeat suffered in the initial period of the war. During the winter campaign of 1942-43, she managed to gain operational air superiority in the Stalingrad direction. This happened both due to quantitative superiority and qualitative equalization in weapons. The share of new types of aircraft was constantly increasing: in fighter aircraft it was completely updated, in bomber aircraft it was more than 65%. In the battles over Kuban, the latest developments of leading Soviet designers: S. V. Ilyushina, S. A. Lavochkina, A. S. Yakovleva. It is also necessary to take into account that the power of the Soviet aviation group was significantly weakened by various subordination and inconsistency in the actions of its constituent forces.
The fighter aviation units of the Air Force of the North Caucasus Front were equipped with fighters, both Soviet-made and those supplied under Lend-Lease. Soviet aircraft, accounting for over 80% of the payroll, were represented by the following types: LaGG-3, La-5, Yak-1B, Yak-7, foreign-made - P-39 Airacobra, Spitfire Mk V and P-40E KittiHawk.
The LaGG-3s participating in the Kuban battles were significantly inferior to the main enemy fighters in maneuverability and armament. Created through a deep modernization of the LaGG-3, the La-5 fighter was slightly inferior to the enemy in speed and armament, having a slight advantage in turns. The Yak-1B was an improved version of the Yak-1 fighter, the best Soviet fighter during the initial period of the war. The Yak-7 is a combat fighter developed on the basis of a training aircraft. In terms of flight characteristics and armament, it was not inferior to the Yak-1, but in aerobatic qualities it was superior. The operation of Yak fighters in combat conditions has shown that they are capable of almost equal resistance to enemy fighters, slightly inferior to them in maneuverability. Common disadvantages were the lack of high-quality radio communications (as a rule, only command aircraft were equipped with transceivers, and receiving stations on combat vehicles began to be installed en masse in the spring of 1943) and low culture manufacturing, leading to numerous defects and accidents.
The most popular foreign-made fighter that took part in the Kuban air battles was the American Airacobra. They were more different from Soviet fighters powerful weapon, survivability, maneuverability and good controllability and inferior to the latter in the ability to withstand large overloads and perform sharp maneuvers. An undoubted advantage was the availability of high-quality transceiver radio stations. By the spring of 1943, the P-40 Kittyhawk was no longer suitable for Soviet pilots, as it was significantly inferior to the Cobras, Yaks or La. Therefore, in the front-line air units of the Air Force of the North Caucasus Front, these fighters were gradually replaced with more modern ones. British Spitfire Mk. The VBs, which arrived in Kuban after a year of service with the Royal Air Force in the Middle East, were inferior in flight characteristics to the new German fighters. In addition, they were often confused in the air with Messerschmitts, which led to losses due to “friendly fire”, both from ground troops and aviation.
The front-line bomber and assault units operating over the Kuban used the Pe-2, Il-2 and DB-7 Boston. By the spring of 1943, the Pe-2 was the most popular Soviet bomber, distinguished by ease of piloting, maneuverability, powerful weapons and survivability. Along with the Pe-2, the American Bostons were used, which were in service with the aviation units of the Air Force of the North Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet, operating as a multi-purpose aircraft that performed various functions - a day and night bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, torpedo bomber and minelayer. It stood out for its good maneuverability, increased bomb load, ease of control, was obedient and stable in turns, its disadvantages included weak defensive weapons. For direct support of ground forces, the Il-2 was used, the only attack aircraft in the world that successfully combined good armor with powerful weapons. Starting from the end of 1942, there was a massive replacement of the single-seat aircraft model with a double-seat one, providing protection against attacks by enemy fighters from the rear hemisphere. As a result of the additional load, the maneuverability and other flight characteristics of the IL-2 deteriorated significantly.
In addition to front-line (tactical) bombers, Soviet long-range aviation bombers - Il-4 and Li2VV, used for night air strikes - operated in the Kuban. At night, light biplanes Po-2 and R-5 also operated, carrying out “harassment raids” in the front-line zone. Bombers of these types were practically not used in daytime, avoiding opposition from enemy fighters.
Germany
The winter of 1942/43 marked the beginning of the crisis in German aviation; the Luftwaffe was forced to fighting in several remote theaters of military operations, which, in conditions of extremely limited resources, led to the dispersal of forces and resources. It was not uncommon for air groups of one air squadron to simultaneously fight a thousand kilometers away from each other. Moreover, the constantly increasing raids of Allied aviation on the Reich forced the allocation of significant fighter aircraft forces to air defense. Thus, on March 31, 1943, about 60% of the number of day fighters was concentrated on the Western Front. Production could no longer cover the increased level of losses, which led to a decrease in the number of aircraft in first-line combat units. A number of failures in the adoption of new types of aircraft and the need to increase production forced the German command to continue producing existing types of equipment, carrying out their minor modernization. As a result, by the spring of 1943, up to 25% of the combat units consisted of obsolete aircraft types
Luftwaffe fighter units operating over Kuban were armed with Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of the latest G-2 and G-4 modifications. Its advantages included powerful weapons, increased survivability and equipment with transceiver radio stations (however, this was common practice for German aircraft). However, additional equipment and weapons increased the weight and worsened the maneuverability of the aircraft, and the increase in speed (achieved by installing a more powerful engine) resulted in a deterioration in the overall controllability of the aircraft. However, the Me-109G was highest point in the technological development of the model and was generally superior to enemy fighters. The twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf-110G aircraft were practically never used as a fighter, and were used for reconnaissance, attacks on ground targets and interception of night bombers.
Soviet historical literature and memoirs often mention a group of aces that used Fw 190 fighters. However, according to German data, the II./SchG1 armed Fw 190 A-5 was intended to provide direct support to ground troops and used an attack modification of this aircraft. It was distinguished by reinforced armor, which noticeably made the vehicle heavier, as a result of which the Fw 190 A-5 was significantly inferior to the new Soviet fighters in maneuverability. However, powerful weapons ensured a high probability of defeating the enemy on the first pass, which made him a dangerous adversary. The main striking force of the 4th Air Fleet was units of Ju-87D dive bombers. Despite low speed, lack of maneuverability and mediocre aerodynamics, the aircraft was one of the most effective weapons of the Luftwaffe, thanks to its ability to dive bomb. However, due to these characteristics, as well as weak defensive weapons, it could not withstand modern fighters.
Progress of the battles
In total, three major air battles took place over the Kuban. In terms of the number of air battles and the aircraft participating in them on a narrow section of the front, they were the first since the beginning of hostilities on the Soviet-German front. In Soviet historiography, the first day of the air battle is considered to be April 17, 1943, but in reality, fierce air battles began on April 15, during which the Luftwaffe flew over 1,500 sorties per day, disrupting the planned offensive of the North Caucasus Front. Only after this did it become obvious to the Soviet command that without gaining air supremacy it was impossible to count on the success of a further offensive by the front forces. It was decided to strengthen the aviation group and, having achieved a turning point in the fight against enemy aviation, to continue the offensive with the goal of eliminating the Kuban bridgehead.
Battles in the Myskhako area
The first major air battle took place between April 24 and 24 during fierce battles on the bridgehead in the Myskhako area, on the “Malaya Zemlya”, where German troops tried to destroy the landing group of troops of the 18th Army. The initiative to start the battle was with the German command. German troops, unexpectedly for the Soviet command - ahead of it in deployment, went on the offensive against the Soviet bridgehead at Novorossiysk. The actions of the advancing troops were actively supported by dive and horizontal bombers, operating in waves of 25-30 aircraft. Due to the fact that the enemy combat positions were too close to each other, air attacks were launched against heavy artillery positions on the shore of Tsemes Bay. In extremely brutal continuous battles, the Soviet ground troops withstood the onslaught of the enemy: his advance in two days of battle was only 1 kilometer, and then stopped completely.
However, in the air the nature of the battle turned out to be different: aerial reconnaissance did not establish the concentration of enemy aircraft and the direction of its main attack. While from the air German offensive According to Soviet data, they were supported by about 450 bombers and 200 fighters; in this area, the Soviet command could oppose them with no more than 300 aircraft. Theoretically, up to 500 Soviet aircraft could operate here, including up to 100 bombers, but their main airfields were located west and northeast of Krasnodar, 150-200 kilometers from the battle area. German dive bombers made over 500 sorties on this day, while the total number of Luftwaffe sorties on this day was 1560. While the Soviet aviation opposing them was only 538. Using this factor and numerical superiority, German aviation seized the initiative in the air on this section of the front. As a response, the command of the North Caucasus Front redirects the main forces of the 4th and 5th Air Armies to help the troops operating in the Novorossiysk area.
After April 23, German ground troops were forced to stop the offensive and retreat to their original position, and their fighters switched to defensive actions. In the first battle, the Soviet command estimated enemy losses at 182 aircraft, and losses of its own aircraft at less than 100 aircraft.
The first air battle showed that despite the overall superiority in forces, Soviet aviation did not have the initiative in the air. The presence of four command structures made it impossible to quickly maneuver forces and means, prevented the transfer of aircraft to “foreign” airfields, interfered with interaction, and weakened the power of airborne groups. Therefore, on April 24, all units of the 5th Air Army were transferred to the 4th Air Army, and the headquarters of the 5th Air Army went to the General Headquarters reserve.
To solve the third problem - the speedy development of tactical techniques and combat experience by young pilots, the Soviet command organized a wide range of measures: continuous generalization of combat experience, adoption of new tactical recommendations signed by Vershinin and their immediate distribution to units, popularization of the experience of the best aviation units, holding flight conferences and ostentatious training by the best pilots. The pilots constantly aimed at introducing a layered battle order, predominant actions on high altitudes, actions in pairs, maximum use of vertical maneuver in air battles. However, in practice, such work was not always carried out. Thus, the pilots who arrived from the General Headquarters reserve, the 3rd Fighter Corps of General E. Ya. Savitsky, according to the pilots of the 57th Guards Fighter Regiment, refused the help of veterans of the Kuban air battles, as a result of which they suffered significant losses in the first battles. Moreover, quite often the introduced principles of formations and air combat came into conflict with the passive tactics used by Soviet fighter aircraft, aimed at patrolling certain areas in order to cover Soviet ground forces.
Battles near the village of Krymskaya
From April 28, major air battles unfolded in the area of the Krymskaya village, which continued with short interruptions until May 10. The German command tried to disrupt the Soviet offensive in the Crimean region, planned for April 29, with aviation actions.
In air battles in Kuban (from April 17 to June 7), the enemy lost over 1,100 aircraft, of which more than 800 were shot down in air battles (according to Soviet data). German historians deny the significance of the losses suffered by German aviation, considering them normal for military operations and many times less than the losses of Soviet aviation. In the last two decades, they have been repeated by some domestic researchers. Thus, O. Kaminsky in the article “Messerschmitts over the Kuban” (“Aviation and Time” No. 5, 2005) claims that in the battles from April 17 to July 7, only 24 German fighter pilots were killed, which corresponds to a loss of approximately 50 aircraft .
At the same time, such authors, as a rule, do not dispute German reports of victories, according to which in the battle over Kuban over 1000 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in air battles and 300 aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Thus, according to reports from both sides, more planes were shot down than the other side had available, that is, there is no need to talk about the reliability of reports of victories. The exact losses of the parties are unknown.
In the battles on the Kuban bridgehead, and especially during the battles for the Krymskaya village, Soviet pilots showed examples of heroism, courage and bravery. 52 pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Fighter commander aviation squadron Captain Alexander Pokryshkin of the 16th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment became twice Hero of the Soviet Union.
German data
According to a post-war RAF Intelligence Directorate report based on captured German documents:
During the first half of April<1943>The Germans concentrated powerful strike forces in Crimea - 550–600 aircraft.
<...>
However, Soviet intelligence apparently discovered the concentration of German aviation on the Crimean airfields, and the Soviet command managed to gather the necessary forces to repel the German threat. As a consequence, the Germans were unable to establish tactical air superiority. Soviet aviation struck German supply ships in the Black Sea and in Kerch Strait forced the enemy to maintain significant defensive forces in Crimea, which, in conditions of Soviet air superiority, suffered heavy losses.
Results of the battle
During the period from April 17 to June 7, Soviet aviation carried out about 35,000 sorties, of which: 77% were front-line aviation, 9% were long-range aviation, and 14% were Black Sea Fleet aviation. As a result, in early June 1943, Soviet aviation regained the initiative in the air. The intensity of the air battles began to subside. Both sides began to gradually reduce their aviation groups in the Kuban and transfer aircraft to the sites of future main battles on the central sector of the front. The task of destroying the 17th German army was postponed until the fall.
In general, as a result of the battles, Soviet aviation achieved its goal, which was important for gaining strategic air supremacy along the entire Soviet-German front in the summer of 1943. The air battles in the Kuban are assessed positively in Soviet historical science due to the significant erosion of the air power of the Luftwaffe on the entire Soviet-German front.
According to a British intelligence report:
The scale of hostilities in the skies over Kuban should not be underestimated.<...>Soviet pressure in this sector during May forced the Luftwaffe to fly an average of about 400 sorties per day. Therefore, German aviation, despite the need for rest, could not afford to neglect the battles over Kuban. These efforts were so intense that it became impossible to carry out major operations anywhere else, and the failure of the Germans to relieve enemy pressure on Novorossiysk forced the postponement of other plans.
“As a result of the air battles, victory undoubtedly remained on our side. The enemy did not achieve his goal. Our aviation not only successfully countered the enemy, but at the same time forced the Germans to stop air battles and remove their aircraft."
The air battles in the Kuban were a school of combat skill for Soviet pilots, and a school for improving the management of large aviation forces for aviation commanders and commanders. The experience of these battles became the main school for the training of pilots and aviation headquarters. The effectiveness of aviation operations was achieved:
- massive use of aviation in the main direction
- constant duty of aircraft controllers at the forefront using ground radio stations to control fighters in the air
- build-up of forces during an air battle
- the use of vertical maneuver in air battles
- wide exchange of combat experience during fighter pilot conferences
- the use of new battle formations ( see Kuban whatnot) and tactical techniques ( Pendulum patrol)
see also
Notes
- Team of authors Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Chapter 6. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved January 20, 2010.
- Ivanov V. Trophies of air battles 1941-1945. - M.: Strategy-KM // Front-line illustration No. 6, 2001. - P. 27.
- Kurowski, Franz. Black cross and red star. Air war over Russia 1941-1944.. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2011. - P. 297.
- Kozhevnikov M.N. Command and headquarters of the Air Force of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 Chapter 4. Archived
- Royal Air Force Ministry Writing Team. Great Britain. Combat operations Luftwaffe 1939-1945. - M.: Yauza-Press, 2008. - P. 321-323.
- Kornyukhin G.F. Soviet fighters in the Great Patriotic War Chapter 2. Archived
- Litvin G. A. 55 years of the battle over Kuban. // Aviation and astronautics: magazine. - M., 1998. - No. 4. - P. 1-3.
- Khazanov D. In the hot sky of Kuban // Aviation and astronautics: magazine. - M., 1993. - No. 5.
- Zablotsky A., Larintsev R. Luftwaffe losses on the Eastern Front. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- The Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945. Encyclopedia. - 1985. - P. 101.
- Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the War. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Mitchum, Samuel. Hitler's field marshals and their battles. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1998. - P. 136.
- Manstein E. Lost victories. - Rostov-on-Don: Phoenix, 1999. - P. 442.
- Moshchansky I., Stoyanov V.“Breakthrough of the Blue Line” // Military Chronicle 3-2004. - M.: BTV, 2004. - P. 2-7.
- Moshchansky I.“On the flanks of Stalingrad. Operations in the North Caucasus." //Military Chronicle 3-2002. - M.: BTV, 2002. - P. 123.
- Grechko A.A. Battle for the Caucasus. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Zhiltseva Elena, Stoyanov, Vasily. On the Kuban bridgehead. Tank battles in Kuban. February 5 - September 9, 1943. - M.: LLC "BTV-MN", 2002. - P. 56-57.
- Tike V. March to the Caucasus. Battle for oil 1942-1943 - M.: Eksmo, 2005. - P. 225.
- Zablotsky A., Larintsev R. Air bridge over the Black Sea. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Aviators of World War II 4th Air Army. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- List No. 6 of cavalry, tank, airborne divisions and directorates of artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, mortar, aviation and fighter divisions that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. - M.
- 60 years of Victory 5th Air Army. Archived from the original on June 18, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Aviators of World War II 5th Air Army. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Aviators of World War II Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Aviators of World War II 3rd Nikopol Fighter Aviation Corps of the Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov. Archived from the original on April 25, 2012. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
- Aviators of World War II