At the beginning of the 20th century, the basis of any fleet was made up of battleships - large ships with strong artillery and powerful armor protection. Let's remember three Russian ships of this class - participants in the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

The battleship Sevastopol was commissioned in 1900. The ship carried four 305 mm main caliber guns. Eight 152 mm cannons were located in pairs in four turrets, and another four six-inch guns were located on the battery.

By the time the Russo-Japanese War began, the Sevastopol, along with the similar Poltava and Petropavlovsk, was far from a new ship, but destroying it in an artillery battle was very problematic.

"Sevastopol" took part in the battle on January 27, 1904, supporting the actions of ground forces at Port Arthur and the naval battle in the Yellow Sea. Several times the battleship was damaged by Japanese mines, but, unlike the Petropavlovsk, it happily escaped destruction. In October 1904, Japanese troops began methodically shooting down the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. Only when most of the squadron was killed under the fire of Japanese siege artillery, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Essen, on his own initiative, managed to obtain permission to take the battleship to the outer roadstead of the fortress in White Wolf Bay, where the crew began preparing to independently break the blockade.

However, the lack of people in the team and the lack of part of the artillery transferred to the shore forced them to postpone the breakthrough. Meanwhile, the Japanese command, having discovered the Sevastopol in the outer roadstead, decided to destroy the Russian battleship with destroyer attacks. Over the course of several nights, Sevastopol, protected by coastal batteries, the gunboat Groziashchiy and several destroyers, was subjected to numerous mine attacks.

Having fired up to 80 torpedoes at the Russian ship, the Japanese achieved one hit and two close explosions of torpedoes. On the Sevastopol, a number of compartments were flooded and the battleship suffered a significant list. True, this success cost the Japanese very dearly. Destroyer No. 53 and its entire crew were killed on a Russian barrage mine, and destroyer No. 42, damaged by the fire of Sevastopol, was finished off by a torpedo from the destroyer Angry.

Another two dozen Japanese fighters and destroyers were damaged, and some, apparently, were no longer put into service until the end of the war. The damage received by the Russian ship already excluded the possibility of a breakthrough, and the Sevastopol crew switched to the fight against Japanese batteries, which continued until the very last day of the defense of Port Arthur. In connection with the surrender of the fortress, the battleship was towed from the shore and scuttled at a depth of more than 100 meters. Thus, Sevastopol became the only Russian battleship sunk in Port Arthur that was not raised by the Japanese and did not fall into enemy hands.

Squadron battleship "Eustathius"

The squadron battleship "Eustathius" was a further development of the project of the battleship "Prince Potemkin Tauride". Unlike its prototype, the Eustathia has 152 mm. the guns at the extremities were replaced with 203 mm guns. However, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War forced us to reconsider the ship's design. As a result, the already lengthy construction was delayed.

In 1907, all battleships of the Russian fleet were reclassified as battleships. With the advent of the battleship Dreadnought in England, all the world's battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, including the Eustathius, instantly became obsolete. Despite this, both the “Eustathius” and the “John Chrysostom” of the same type represented an impressive force on the Black Sea and the Ottoman Empire, as the main potential enemy, in principle could not oppose anything serious to the Russian battleships.

To strengthen the Turkish fleet, the German command transferred the newest battle cruiser Goeben and the light Breislau, which Russia's Entente allies so helpfully allowed into the Black Sea.

The first collision with the Goeben took place at Cape Sarych on November 5, 1914. The battle, in essence, came down to a duel between the flagship Eustathius and the German cruiser. The remaining Russian ships, due to fog and errors in determining the distance, fired over long distances or did not open fire at all.

From the first salvo, the Eustathius gunners managed to cover the Goeben, which in 14 minutes of battle received, according to various sources, from three to fourteen direct hits. As a result, the German cruiser left the battle and then underwent two weeks of repairs. The Eustathius was hit by five German shells, which did not cause fatal damage.

The second collision between the Eustathius and the Goeben took place on April 27, 1915, near the Bosporus, when a German raider attempted to destroy the core of the Black Sea Fleet piece by piece. However, faced with three dreadnought battleships, the Germans did not tempt fate and hastened to withdraw from the battle after a short firefight. The fate of "Eustathius", which successfully operated in the First World War, turned out to be sad. In 1918, it fell into the hands of the German command, and then into the hands of the former Entente allies. Leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the Eustathia vehicles. The successful restoration of the battleship, which required skilled workers and a strong industrial base, immediately after completion Civil War It turned out to be impossible, and in 1922 the ship was cut into metal.

Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were built to protect the Baltic coast. Each of them carried four 254 mm guns (Apraksin three), four 120 mm guns and small-caliber artillery. Having a relatively small displacement (just over 4,000 tons), the ships were distinguished by powerful weapons.

After the fall of Port Arthur, the formation of the 3rd Pacific Squadron began, into which, along with the Apraksin and Senyavin, the Admiral Ushakov was included. The value of these ships lay, first of all, in their well-trained crews, who, as part of the artillery training detachment, were engaged in training fleet gunners. However, before the ships were sent, the crews were replaced, and the battleships were sent to Far East without replacing the main caliber guns, which subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the Admiral Ushakov.

IN Battle of Tsushima“Admiral Ushakov was part of the 3rd combat detachment, closing the column of the squadron’s main forces. In a daytime battle on May 14, 1905, the ship, at about 3 p.m., during a firefight with the armored cruisers of Admiral Kamimura, received two large holes in the bow and fell behind the squadron. The speed of the battleship dropped to 10 knots.

At night, sailing without lighting, the Admiral Ushakov managed to avoid attacks from Japanese destroyers, but the next day it was overtaken by the armored cruisers Yakumo and Iwate. At the Japanese offer to surrender, the Russian ship opened fire. Each of the Japanese cruisers carried four 203 mm and fourteen 152 mm guns, significantly surpassing the Russian battleship in speed. And if the first salvos of the Ushakov hit the Iwate, causing a fire on the Japanese cruiser, then later Japanese ships stayed out of reach of the battleship's guns at a combat distance favorable to them. After a 40-minute battle, the Admiral Ushakov, when further resistance became pointless, was scuttled by the crew. Among the 94 dead officers and sailors of the Ushakov was the commander of the battleship, Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukha (brother of the famous Oceania explorer N. N. Miklouho-Maclay). According to one version, he was mortally wounded by a shrapnel, and according to another, he himself refused to be saved, pointing out to the Japanese a sailor drowning nearby.

Content:
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..3 pages.
Chapter 1 Composition of the Pacific squadron……………………………..…..8 p.
1.1. Deployment and command staff of the Pacific Ocean squadron………..…..9 p.
1.2. Comparative characteristics Japanese and Russian fleets using the example of cruisers and battleships………………………………………………………..……...…..13 pp.
Chapter 2 Description of the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese War………………………………………….20 pp.
2.1. The ratio of enemy naval forces on the eve of the first naval battles………………………………………………………..…21 pp.
2.2. Beginning of naval battles: Chemulpo. The feat of “Varyag”……….…..22 p.
2.3. Blockade and defense of Port Arthur……………………………………...22 p.
2.4. The beginning of the Japanese Army's ground offensive in Manchuria. The first successes of the Russian fleet……………………………………………………......25 pp.
2.5. The death of the Russian fleet at Tsushima…………………………………26 p.
Chapter 3 Results of the Russo-Japanese War…………………………………...34 pp.
3.1. The reasons for Russia's defeat in the war……………………………..…..35 pp.
3.2. Analysis of the actions of the Russian fleet and its role in the military defeat..35 pp.
Conclusion………………………………………………………….……....37 p.
References……………………………………………………......41 pp.
Applications…………………………………………………………………………………44 pages.
Introduction
Relevance. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had political and economic prerequisites. Encountering resistance from China, Japan inflicted a crushing defeat on China during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed following the war, recorded China's renunciation of all rights to Korea and the transfer of a number of territories to Japan, including the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria. These achievements of Japan sharply increased its power and influence, which did not meet the interests of the European powers, so Germany, Russia and France achieved a change in these conditions: the triple intervention undertaken with the participation of Russia led to Japan’s abandonment of the Liaodong Peninsula, and then to its transfer in 1898 year of Russia for rental use. Japan considered itself offended and began a victorious war. The well-known historical fact of Russia's defeat is not in doubt among any of his contemporaries. It is believed that the mediocrity of Russian generals and the backwardness of weapons could not overcome the courage of Russian soldiers and officers, but the feat of the Varyag sailors. Defeat was a foregone conclusion. This position was formed in the recent past, which had ideologically determined attitudes about the “rotten tsarist regime.” The works of V.I. Lenin provide an analysis of two major defeats of the Russian armies and navy in the war of 1904-1905. (the fall of Port Arthur and the Tsushima defeat). V.I. Lenin mercilessly criticizes the command, generals, officers and the entire management apparatus of the tsarist armed forces. “The generals and commanders,” wrote Vladimir Ilyich, “turned out to be mediocrities and nonentities. The entire history of the 1904 campaign was, according to the authoritative testimony of one English military observer (in the Times), “a criminal disregard for the elementary principles of naval and land strategy.” The civil and military bureaucracy turned out to be just as parasitious and corrupt as during the days of serfdom.” In Lenin’s analysis of the two historical events mentioned, one can find significant differences in the assessment of the degree of training of the naval armed forces of Tsarist Russia that took part in the first period of the war (Port Arthur and 1904), and the second Pacific squadron, which was defeated at Tsushima. “It is believed that Russia’s material loss in the fleet alone amounts to three hundred million rubles,” wrote V. I. Lenin. - But even more important is the loss of tens of thousands of the best naval crew, the loss of an entire ground army". About Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, V.I. Lenin writes: “The crew was assembled from the woods and pine trees, the final preparations of the military ships for sailing were hastily completed, the number of these ships was increased by adding “old chests” to the new and strong battleships.” The Great Armada - just as huge, just as cumbersome, absurd, powerless, monstrous as the rest Russian empire..." - this is what he called the second Russian Pacific squadron. . But even now these derogatory assessments of our defeats are known to every high school student. But is this so certain? The Japanese army and navy also had the advantage of experience in conducting combat operations in this area - during the successful war with China in 1890. The supply of ammunition and manpower to the theater of operations was difficult - the only viable route was the CER - the Chinese-Eastern Railway, which had a capacity of only 9 trains per day. Our failures throughout the war become clear - in conditions of a threefold advantage of the enemy in manpower of 300 thousand against the Russians of 100 thousand, dispersed in the Irkutsk-Vladivostok-Port Arthur triangle. But we cannot speak in Leninist terms about our defeat. Russia has never lost a war like this, leading modern historians say. By August 1905, the Russians had 500,000 soldiers armed with machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, and the first airplanes against 300,000 thousand Japanese, already exhausted by the “Pyrrhic victory” at Mukden. The Japanese were the first to cry out for peace. And the Russian delegation at the peace negotiations in Portsmund had a strict order from Emperor Nicholas II: “Not a ruble of reparations, not a meter of Russian land.” The agreement on August 22, 1905 allocated half of Sakhalin to Japan. By this time, the tax burden in Japan had increased by 80%, in Russia by 2%. In May 1905, a meeting of the military council was held, where Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich reported that, in his opinion, for final victory it was necessary: ​​a billion rubles of expenses, about 200 thousand losses and a year of military operations. After reflection, Nicholas II decided to enter into negotiations with the mediation of American President Roosevelt to conclude peace (which Japan had already proposed twice) from a position of strength, since Russia, unlike Japan, could wage war for a long time. Thus, the tsar agreed to peace, which to this day is regarded as an unconditional defeat in the Russian-Japanese war.
However, this study concerns only a particular aspect of this war - the actions of the Russian fleet. Neither in numbers nor in combat effectiveness could Russian ships compete with Japan. A very important advantage of Japan was its developed infrastructure - the ports had convenient access to the sea, in contrast to the only developed military base in Russia - Port Arthur, which had very difficult access to the sea due to a shallow fairway, so this base was blocked from the very beginning of the war actions. Vladivostok, and even more so the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, were separated from the theater of military operations by thousands of kilometers, which still had to be overcome through numerous minefields, Japanese squadrons and earth-based artillery batteries. Military intelligence was well aware of all the movements of the Russians, while our intelligence was often content with fragmentary and unreliable information. This is the general picture of the events that took place from the point of view of modern historians. The actions of the Russian fleet are quite well known. However, specific aspects may be lost against the background of the overall picture of hostilities. It is precisely this description of the naval battles of the war that seems relevant based on the general picture of the war.
Object of study: Russian-Japanese War of 1905
Subject of research: the Russian fleet in this war
The purpose of this work is to describe the actions of the Russian navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, based on the general picture of defensive and offensive operations of the entire Russian army.
Tasks:
1. Analyze the composition of the Pacific squadron before the start of the war, its quantitative and qualitative characteristics.
2. Study the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese war
3. Summarize the Russo-Japanese War from the point of view of the participation of the Russian fleet
Elaboration in scientific literature: In the works of Alferov N. Bokhanov A.N. , Witte Oldenburg S.S. analyzed the general situation of Russia 1904-1905 during the reign of Nicholas II. In the works of Bykov P. D. Kuropatkin A. N., Levitsky N. A., . , Tsarkov A. ., Shishov A. V.; the general course of military operations. Egoriev V.E. , Zolotarev V. A., Kozlov I. A., Klado N. V., Koktsinsky I. M., Nesoleny S. V. describe individual actions of the Russian fleet. Based on these and other sources, the author tried to reconstruct the participation of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Scientific and methodological basis of the study: analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction; general scientific methods of scientific knowledge applied at the theoretical level of knowledge, comparative historical method
Structure: course work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of references from 35 sources.

CHAPTER 1
COMPOSITION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN SQUADRON
By the beginning of the war, the Japanese fleet had an almost twofold advantage in ships and their technical superiority over the Russian military Pacific Fleet - we do not take into account the campaign and death of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima.
By 1904, Russian naval forces in the Far East consisted of the Pacific Squadron of the Baltic Fleet (detachments of battleships, reconnaissance cruisers and destroyers in Port Arthur and a detachment of cruisers in Vladivostok) and the Siberian Flotilla (2nd rank cruisers "Robber" and "Zabiyaka", auxiliary cruisers "Angara" and "Lena", gunboats "Bobr", "Sivuch", "Mandzhur", "Koreets" and "Gilyak", 2 mine cruisers, 12 destroyers of the "Falcon" type and destroyers Nos. 201, 202, 208-211). With the beginning of the war, all the ships became part of the Pacific Fleet, the command of which was appointed by Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov. On April 17, 1904, by order of the Maritime Department, the squadron located in the waters of the Far East became known as the “First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet”, and the ships being prepared to strengthen it in the Baltic were formed into the “Second Squadron of the Pacific Ocean”. The commanders were appointed: the fleet instead of the deceased S.S. Makarov - Vice Admiral N.I. Skrydlov, the "First Squadron" - Vice Admiral P.A. Bezobrazov (both were unable to arrive in Port Arthur), the "Second Squadron" " - Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky. After the latter left for the Far East on 10/2/1904, on 11/22/1904 it was decided to equip the “Third Squadron of the Pacific Fleet” from the squadron battleships “Slava”, “Emperor Alexander II”, “Emperor Nikolai G”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral Ushakov” , "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin", cruisers of the 1st rank "Memory of Azov", "Vladimir Monomakh", 9 mine cruisers under construction and 8 destroyers of the "Falcon" type. In fact, instead of it, a "Separate detachment of ships" was sent the squadron battleship "Emperor Nikolai G", three coastal defense battleships and the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" under the command of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. He set out on a campaign on February 3, 1905, joining the 2nd Pacific Squadron on April 26, 1905, off the coast of Vietnam.
1.1. Deployment and command staff of the Pacific squadron
Squadron headquarters:
Squadron leader: Vice Admiral O.V. Stark (flag on "Petropavlovsk") Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov 02.24-31.03 (fleet commander), Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky 03.31-2.04 and 07.28-24.08 , Admiral General E.I. Alekseev 3.04-22.04, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft (v.i.d.) 04.22-28.07, captain of the first rank, from 29.08 Rear Admiral R.N. Viren 08.24-20.12)
Chief of Staff: Captain First Rank A.A. Eberhard
Senior flag officer: Lieutenant G.V. Dukelsky
Flag officers: Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev, Lieutenant S.V. Sheremetyev, midshipman I.M. Smirnov
Flagship miner: Lieutenant V.S. Denisov
Flagship artilleryman: lieutenant (2nd rank) A.K. Myakishev
Flagship navigator: sub A.A. Korobitsyn
Subsequently, the composition of the headquarters changed several times, and listing all ranks within the framework of this directory is not possible.
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky (flag on "Peresvet")
Flag officer: Lieutenant M.M. Stavraki
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral M.P. Molas (detachment of cruisers, flag on the Bayan)
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral M.F. Loschinsky (base security)
In Port Arthur:
Battleship "Petropavlovsk" - captain of the first rank N.M. Yakovlev
Battleship "Tsesarevich" - captain of the first rank I.K. Grigorovich (captain of the first rank N.M. Ivanov 2nd from 12.05, captain of the second rank D.P. Shumov 27.3-1 1.5 and 29.7-2.08)
Battleship "Retvizan" - captain of the first rank E.N. Shchensnovich
"Battleship "Peresvet" - captain of the first rank V.A. Boysman (captain of the second rank A. Dmitriev 2nd from 29.07)
Battleship "Victory" - cap. 1 rub. V.M. Steamed (captain of the first rank V.S. Sarnavsky 9-14.06)
Battleship "Poltava" - captain of the first rank I.P. Uspensky
Battleship "Sevastopol" - cap. 1 rub. N.K. Chernyshev (captain of the second rank, from 2.07 captain of the first rank I.O. Essen
from 17.03)
Cruiser 1st rank "Bayan" - captain of the first rank R.N. Viren (captain of the second rank F.N. Ivanov 6th from 24.08)
Cruiser 1st rank "Pallada" - captain of the first rank P.V. Kossovich (first rank captain V.S. Sarnavsky from 3.02,
captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th 9-14.06)
Cruiser 1st rank "Diana" - captain of the first rank V.K. Zalessky
(Captain of the first rank N.M. Ivanov 2nd 15.02-11.05, captain of the second rank A.A. Liven 1 1.05-27.08)
Cruiser 1st rank "Askold" - captain first rank K.A. Grammatchikov
Cruiser 2nd rank "Boyarin" - captain of the second rank V.F. Sarychev
Cruiser 2nd rank "Novik" - captain of the second rank N.O. Essen (captain of the second rank M.F. Shultz from 1 8.03)
Cruiser 2nd rank "Zabiyaka" - captain of the second rank A.V. Lebedev (captain of the second rank Davydov 1 -1 4.03, captain of the second rank Nazarevsky from 14.03)
Gunboat "Gremyashchy - captain of the second rank M.I. Nikolsky (captain of the second rank A.K. Tsvingman from 1 9.05)
Gunboat "Brave" - ​​captain of the second rank Davydov (captain of the second rank A.V. Lebedev 1.03-22.05, captain of the second rank A.M. Lazarev from 22.05)
Gunboat "Gilyak" - captain of the second rank A.V. Alekseev (captain of the second rank N.V. Stronsky 4th from 18.04)
Gunboat "Beaver" - captain of the second rank M.V. Bubnov (captain of the second rank A.A. Liven 10.03-1 1.05, captain of the second rank V.V. Sheltinga from 1 1.05)
Mine transport "Yenisei" - captain of the second rank V.A. Stepanov
Mine transport "Amur" - captain of the second rank Bernatovich (captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th 18.03-24.07, captain of the second rank E.N. Odintsov from 24.08)
Mine cruiser "Vsadnik" - captain of the second rank N.V. Stronsky 4th (captain of the second rank A.M. Lazarev 1 7.04-2 1.05, captain of the second rank L.P. Opatsky from 22.05)
Mine cruiser "Gaydamak" - captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th (lieutenant, then captain of the second rank V.V. Kolyubakin from 18.03)
The first detachment of destroyers - chief captain of the first rank N.A. Matusevich until 27.02 (captain of the second rank F.R. Skorupo acting, captain of the second rank E.P. Eliseev from 25.03, Lt. A.S. Maksimov acting )
Destroyer "Battle" - captain of the second rank E.P. Eliseev (Lieutenant A.M. Kosinsky 2nd 10.06-18.07, Lieutenant S.L. Khmelev from 18.07)
Destroyer "Bditelny" - Lieutenant S.L. Khmelev (Lieutenant A.M. Kosinsky 2nd 18.07-1.11, Lieutenant V.I. Lepko from 1.11)
Destroyer "Besposhchadny" - Lieutenant V.M. Lukin (captain of the second rank F.V. Rimsky-Korsakov 25.03-1 6.07, Lieutenant D.S. Mikhailov 2-Y1 6.07-2.08)
Destroyer "Besstrashny" - captain of the second rank G.V. Zimmerman (Lieutenant I.I. Skorokhodov 5.02-14.03, Lieutenant P.L. Trukhachev from 14.03)
Destroyer "Silent" - captain of the second rank F.R. Skorupo (Lieutenant A.S. Maksimov from 23.03)
Destroyer "Attentive" - ​​captain of the second rank A.M. Simon (Lieutenant I.V. Stetsenko 2nd from 5.02).
Destroyer "Impressive" - ​​Lieutenant M.S. Podushkin
Destroyer "Hardy" - Lieutenant P.A. Richter (until 7.05 and 10.06-11.08) Lieutenant A.I. Nepenin 10.05-10.06)
Destroyer "Vlastny" - Lieutenant V.N. Kartsev (before 12.06 and 12.09-20.12), Lieutenant D.N. Verderevsky 12-22.06, Lieutenant Mikhailov 2nd 22.06-1 3.07, Lieutenant A.A. Kovalevsky 1 3.07- 7.00, Lieutenant V.D. Tyrkov 2nd 7-12.09)
Destroyer "Grozovoy" - Lieutenant V.V. Sheltinga (Lieutenant V.M. Lukin 8-12.05, Lieutenant A.A. Brovtsyn 12.05-3.08)
Destroyer "Boiky" - captain of the second rank A.M. Simon (second-rank captain A.K. Tswingman 1 4.02-1 9.05, Lieutenant I.I. Podyapolsky 19.05-1.11, Lieutenant G.O. Gadd 1-7.1 1, Lieutenant M.A. Behrens 7.1 1-20.12)
Destroyer "Burny" - captain of the second rank Pogorelsky (Lieutenant I.I. Podyapolsky 8-1 8.03, Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev 18.03-3.04, Lieutenant N.D. Tyrkov 3rd 3.04-29.07)

1.2. Comparative characteristics of the Japanese and Russian fleets using the example of cruisers and battleships
By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, cruisers, powerful, modern, and fast, became the main combat force of the Russian fleet. They were called upon to cut off the supply of island Japan, which was heavily dependent on mainland supplies of raw materials, food, goods, trade, etc. Despite the significant failures of the Russian fleet in the war, it was the cruisers that inflicted the greatest damage on Imperial Japan at sea. Therefore, it would be appropriate to compare the combat effectiveness of the cruisers of Russia and Japan - or, more precisely, the cruisers of the USA and England, which cost Japan the most modern warships on their military lines.
TABLE 1 Elements of Russian cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment

Japan, ordering ships from Europe and blindly following British shipbuilding models at that time, chose a very successful version of the cruiser, which was a response to the “Russian colossi”.
It is interesting to note how Brassey (1899) praised the new Japanese cruisers at that time: “The Japanese Asama and those of the same type are excellent ships. Their hull is well protected... There is not a single cruiser in the world that is so well armored. They have very powerful artillery, well located.”
Indeed, from the point of view of the “response” to the construction of Russian cruisers, the Japanese (or rather, the British for their Japanese students) could hardly have done better. Six Japanese cruisers ("Asama", "Tokiwa", "Iwate", "Izumo", "Yakumo", "Azuma"), almost identical in their elements (Table 2), had superiority over their Russian rivals, who were part of the Vladivostok detachment, several advantages:
1) Much better armor, in particular artillery protection.
2) The arrangement of 203-mm guns in pairs in the turrets, which made it possible to concentrate twice on board more guns this caliber
3) Smaller displacement (9,300-9,700 m instead of 11-12 thousand for Russian cruisers), and therefore smaller sizes and smaller affected areas.
4) Some superiority in speed (20-21 knots instead of 18.0-19.8).

The superiority of Russian cruisers was determined only by their greater cruising range. It is impossible to deny the importance of this operational-tactical element for a cruiser in general and, in particular, for one that is intended for operations on ocean communications. But given the changed situation, this quality of Russian cruisers could hardly compensate for the above-mentioned shortcomings in other elements.
The Vladivostok cruisers had the same shortcomings as most ships of the Russian fleet, resulting from the low level of productive forces of Tsarist Russia, the backwardness of shipbuilding technology, led by a bureaucratic, isolated from the fleet, who had not sufficiently studied the experience of advanced foreign countries, the corrupt apparatus of the Maritime Ministry. The unfavorable location of the artillery, its insufficient armor protection, low speed and, as it turned out later, unusable artillery shells - all this gave significant advantages to the enemy - Japanese armored cruisers, built according to the latest English models abroad, taking into account the shortcomings of Russian cruisers. Despite the commonality mainly of type (“Rurik”, “Russia” and “Gromoboy”) and a number positive qualities these ships, they had shortcomings characteristic of the entire composition of the Russian fleet, characterized by the term “museum of samples” current at that time. This led to the need during operations to match the oldest slow-moving ship, the Rurik. The Bogatyr accident deprived the formation of Vladivostok cruisers of a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft at the beginning of the active period of their activity. If the second Pacific squadron was truly ingloriously defeated by the Togolese fleet near Tsushima, then more positive examples can be found in the actions of the formations and ships of the Port Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons. The ships were distinguished by the same backwardness in technology, organized and controlled by the same bureaucratic, uneducated, corrupt maritime ministry of the doomed Russian feudal-bourgeois empire. However, with all this, some Port Arthur ships (minelayer "Amur", battleship "Retvizan", etc.) and Vladivostok cruisers achieved a number of successes - in this war of 1904 - 1905, characterized by almost complete defeats. Despite all the shortcomings and mistakes, the Vladivostok cruisers over the course of a number of months in 1904 dealt significant blows to the Japanese transport fleet and Japanese maritime trade. These blows were painfully perceived by the Japanese economy, Japanese “public opinion” and stock exchange circles far beyond Japan. Confirmed by a number of foreign sources, the sinking of siege artillery carried by Japanese troop transports could not help but help slow down the actions of the enemy besieging Port Arthur. The successes of Russian cruisers over a certain period of time led to the undermining of the authority of Kamimura's Japanese cruiser squadron in Japan. The task of diverting part of the Japanese naval forces from the Port Arthur direction by Vladivostok cruisers was nevertheless completed. In certain decades of 1904, Kamimura's cruisers were diverted to the northern part of the Sea of ​​Japan. During the entire period of active activity of the detachment, the armored cruisers Kamimura and the light cruisers Uriu were forced to be based separately from the Japanese fleet, not near the Kwantung Peninsula (like the entire fleet), but in the Tsushima Strait
If Yegoryev’s position (remember, this is 1939) for ideological reasons was forced to take into account the opinion of Lenin V.I. (he has many articles about “mediocre admirals and generals tsarist army, who lost the Battle of Tsushima and a number of land battles"), then the opinion of the modern author Nesoleny S.V. not limited by censorship restrictions. However, he also characterizes Russian cruisers very positively: “The situation was even worse with armored cruisers. There were only 4 of them versus 8 for the Japanese and, in addition, the Russian cruisers were inferior to the Japanese in a number essential elements. Bayan's artillery was two times inferior to any of the armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet. When ordering the Bayan in France from the Forges and Chantiers company according to the design of the prominent French shipbuilder M. Lagan, the Marine Technical Committee included joint operations with squadron battleships in the task of this cruiser. But weak artillery armament did not allow the Bayan to be used in squadron combat as effectively as the Japanese used their armored cruisers. At the same time, during military operations, Bayan will show higher efficiency than Russian armored cruisers (although its cost was higher than that of the best armored cruisers Askold (the total cost with weapons and ammunition is 5 million rubles in gold) and “Bogatyr” (5.5 million rubles) - “Bayan” (without weapons cost almost 6.3 million rubles).
“Gromoboy”, “Russia” and “Rurik” were created primarily for cruising operations with the aim of disrupting maritime trade, but were not suitable for squadron combat. They were inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers in armor (including artillery protection), speed and broadside strength: their 203 mm guns were located in side mounts so that only two out of four guns could fire on one side. Japanese cruisers had 203 mm guns located in turrets and all four guns could fire on any side. Only on the cruiser Gromoboy did they try to take into account the requirements of squadron combat to some extent, and for this purpose, two bow 8-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns were placed in armored casemates. In a heavy battle on August 1, 1904, this allowed the cruiser to confidently withstand the fire of Japanese tower cruisers."
If cruisers operated far from naval bases, mainly in the ocean, then battleships took part in hostilities on the inland seas between Japan, Korea and China, in the Yellow, Japanese, and Okhotsk seas.
Therefore, our comparison of the two opposing navies will be incomplete unless we compare the battleships of Russia and Japan.
“The Japanese squadron battleships were the same type of ships of the latest construction, while the Russian squadron battleships, built according to various shipbuilding programs with a time interval of up to seven years, belonged to four different types of ships that had different tactical and technical characteristics.
Most of the Russian ships were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to the Japanese. Three Russian battleships - Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol and Poltava - were already outdated ships. By the beginning of hostilities, ships of the Poltava type could no longer compete on an equal footing with the newest Japanese battleships of the Mikasa type. Jane's famous reference book for 1904 correlated their fighting strength as 0.8 to 1.0 in favor of the latter20. In addition, the Sevastopol vehicles, manufactured by the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, were distinguished by low quality manufacturing and assembly. Even during official tests in 1900, Sevastopol was unable to reach the contract speed (16 knots), and by the beginning of hostilities it was difficult to reach 14. The unreliable power plant was the main drawback of this ship, which seriously reduced its combat effectiveness.
The two squadron battleships Peresvet and Pobeda were significantly weaker than any battleship, as they had 254 mm main-caliber artillery and insufficient armor. The battleships "Peresvet" and "Pobeda", the same type as the "Oslyabya", were more suitable for the type of strong armored cruisers, but for cruisers their speed was low. And only the two newest battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan”, both built abroad, were not inferior in their tactical and technical data to the best Japanese battleships. The diversity of Russian ships made it difficult to use them, especially to control them in battle, which is why the combat power squadrons. The Russian battleships that were part of the First Pacific Squadron were built according to three (!) shipbuilding programs.
In addition to all of the above, it should be noted that there is one more significant drawback that affected the combat readiness of Russian ships, namely, the imperfection of Russian shells.”
Thus, neither in numbers nor in combat effectiveness, Russian ships could compete with Japan in this war.
.
Chapter 2
Description of the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese War
A sudden, without an official declaration of war, attack by the Japanese fleet on the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur on the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, led to the disabling of several of the strongest ships of the Russian squadron and ensured the unhindered landing of Japanese troops in Korea in February 1904. In May 1904, taking advantage of the inaction of the Russian command, the Japanese landed their troops on the Kwantung Peninsula and cut off the railway connection between Port Arthur and Russia. The siege of Port Arthur was begun by Japanese troops by the beginning of August 1904, and on December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905) the fortress garrison was forced to surrender. The remains of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur were sunk by Japanese siege artillery or blown up by their own crew.
In February 1905, the Japanese forced the Russian army to retreat in the general battle of Mukden, and on May 14 (27), 1905 - May 15 (28), 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima they defeated the Russian squadron transferred to the Far East from the Baltic. The reasons for the failures of the Russian armies and navy and their specific defeats were due to many factors, but the main ones were the incompleteness of military-strategic preparation, the colossal distance of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the country and the army, and the extremely limited communication networks. In addition, starting from January 1905, a revolutionary situation arose and developed in Russia.
The war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on August 23 (September 5), 1905, which recorded Russia’s cession to Japan of the southern part of Sakhalin and its lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway.
Here's a short description major events this war. What are the actions of our fleet?
2.1. Ratio of enemy naval forces
on the eve of the first naval battles
The main theater of military operations was the Yellow Sea, in which the Japanese United Fleet under the command of Admiral Heihachiro Togo blocked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. In the Sea of ​​Japan, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers was opposed by the 3rd Japanese squadron, whose task was to counter raider attacks by Russian cruisers on Japanese communications.
The balance of forces of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Yellow and Japanese seas, by type of ship
Theaters of war Yellow Sea
Japanese Sea

Types of ships Russian squadron in Port Arthur Japanese United Fleet (1st and 2nd squadrons) Vladivostok cruiser detachment
Japanese 3rd Squadron
Squadron battleships
7 6 0 0
Armored cruisers
1 6 3 0
Large armored cruisers (over 4000 tons)
4 4 1 4
Small armored cruisers
2 4 0 7
Mine cruisers and minelayers 4 2 0 0
Seaworthy gunboats
7 2 3 7
Destroyers
22 19 0 0
Destroyers
0 16 17 12

The core of the Japanese United Fleet - including 6 squadron battleships and 5 armored cruisers - was built in Great Britain between 1896 and 1901. These ships were superior to their Russian counterparts in many respects, such as speed, range, armor coefficient, etc. In particular, Japanese naval artillery was superior to Russian in terms of projectile weight (of the same caliber) and technical rate of fire, as a result of which the broadside (total weight fired shells) of the Japanese United Fleet during the battle in the Yellow Sea was about 12,418 kg versus 9,111 kg for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur, that is, it was 1.36 times more. In addition to the 6 squadron battleships of the “first line”, the Japanese Navy had 2 more older battleships (“Chin-Yen”, German-built, a trophy of the Sino-Japanese War, and “Fuso” British-built).
It is also worth noting the qualitative difference in the shells used by the Russian and Japanese fleets - the content of explosives in Russian shells of the main calibers (12", 8", 6") was 4-6 times lower. At the same time, the melinite used in Japanese shells was The explosion power was approximately 1.2 times higher than the pyroxylin used in Russian ones.
In the very first battle on January 27, 1904, near Port Arthur, the powerful destructive effect of Japanese heavy high-explosive shells on unarmored or lightly armored structures, which did not depend on the firing range, was clearly demonstrated, as well as the significant armor-piercing ability of Russian light armor-piercing shells at short distances (up to 20 cables) . The Japanese made the necessary conclusions and in subsequent battles, having superior speed, tried to maintain a firing position 35-45 cables away from the Russian squadron.
However, the powerful but unstable shimosa collected its “tribute” - the destruction from the explosions of its own shells in the gun barrels when fired caused almost more damage to the Japanese than hits from Russian armor-piercing shells. It is worth mentioning the appearance in Vladivostok by April 1905 of the first 7 submarines, which, although they did not achieve significant military successes, were still an important deterrent that significantly limited the actions of the Japanese fleet in the area of ​​Vladivostok and the Amur Estuary during the war.
At the end of 1903, Russia sent the battleship Tsarevich and the armored cruiser Bayan, which had just been built in Toulon, to the Far East; followed by the battleship Oslyabya and several cruisers and destroyers. Russia’s strong trump card was the ability to equip and transfer another squadron from Europe, approximately equal in number to those located on Pacific Ocean at the beginning of the war. It should be noted that the beginning of the war caught a fairly large detachment of Admiral A. A. Virenius halfway to the Far East, moving to reinforce the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. This set strict time limits for the Japanese, both for the beginning of the war (before the arrival of Virenius’s detachment) and for the destruction of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur (before the arrival of help from Europe). The ideal option for the Japanese was the blockade of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur with its subsequent death after the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese troops besieging it.
The Suez Canal was too shallow for the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were closed to the passage of Russian warships from a fairly powerful Black Sea squadron. The only route for meaningful support for the Pacific fleet was from the Baltic around Europe and Africa.
2.2. Beginning of naval battles: Chemulpo. Feat of "Varyag"
On the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, before the official declaration of war, 8 Japanese destroyers conducted a torpedo attack on the ships of the Russian fleet stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of the attack, two of the best Russian battleships (Tsesarevich and Retvizan) and the armored cruiser Pallada were disabled for several months.
On January 27 (February 9), 1904, a Japanese squadron consisting of 6 cruisers and 8 destroyers forced the armored cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" located in the Korean port of Chemulpo into battle. After a 50-minute battle, the Varyag, which received heavy damage, was scuttled, and the Koreets was blown up.
2.3. Blockade and defense of Port Arthur
On the morning of February 24, the Japanese attempted to scuttle 5 old transports at the entrance to Port Arthur harbor in order to trap the Russian squadron inside. The plan was foiled by the Retvizan, which was still in the outer roadstead of the harbor.
On March 2, Virenius’s detachment received an order to return to the Baltic, despite the protests of S. O. Makarov, who believed that he should continue further to the Far East.
On March 8, 1904, Admiral Makarov and the famous shipbuilder N.E. Kuteynikov arrived in Port Arthur, along with several wagons of spare parts and equipment for repairs. Makarov immediately took energetic measures to restore the combat effectiveness of the Russian squadron, which led to an increase in military spirit in the fleet.
On March 27, the Japanese again tried to block the exit from Port Arthur harbor, this time using 4 old vehicles filled with stones and cement. The transports, however, were sunk too far from the harbor entrance.
On March 31, while going to sea, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit 3 mines and sank within two minutes. 635 sailors and officers were killed. These included Admiral Makarov and the famous battle painter Vereshchagin. The battleship Pobeda was blown up and out of commission for several weeks.
On May 3, the Japanese made a third and final attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor, this time using 8 transports. As a result, the Russian fleet was blocked for several days in the harbor of Port Arthur, which cleared the way for the landing of the 2nd Japanese Army in Manchuria.
Of the entire Russian fleet, only the Vladivostok cruiser detachment (“Russia”, “Gromoboy”, “Rurik”) retained freedom of action and during the first 6 months of the war several times went on the offensive against the Japanese fleet, penetrating the Pacific Ocean and being off the Japanese coast, then , leaving again for the Korea Strait. The detachment sank several Japanese transports with troops and guns, including on May 31, Vladivostok cruisers intercepted the Japanese transport Hi-tatsi Maru (6175 brt), on board which were 18,280-mm mortars for the siege of Port Arthur, which made it possible to tighten the siege of Port Arthur for several months.
2.4. The beginning of the Japanese Army's ground offensive in Manchuria. The first successes of the Russian fleet
On April 18 (May 1), the 1st Japanese Army, numbering about 45 thousand people, crossed the Yalu River and in a battle on the Yalu River defeated the eastern detachment of the Russian Manchurian Army under the command of M. I. Zasulich, numbering about 18 thousand people. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria began. Landing of the 2nd Japanese Army on the Liaodong Peninsula. Photo from Japanese archives On April 22 (May 5), the 2nd Japanese Army under the command of General Yasukata Oku, numbering about 38.5 thousand people, began landing on the Liaodong Peninsula, about 100 kilometers from Port Arthur. The landing was carried out by 80 Japanese transports and continued until April 30 (May 13). The Russian units, numbering about 17 thousand people, under the command of General Stessel, as well as the Russian squadron in Port Arthur under the command of Vitgeft, did not take active actions to counter the Japanese landing.
If the 2nd Japanese Army landed without losses, then the Japanese fleet, which supported the landing operation, suffered very significant losses.
On May 2 (15), 2 Japanese battleships, the 12,320-ton Yashima and the 15,300-ton Hatsuse, were sunk after hitting a minefield laid by the Russian mine transport Amur. In total, during the period from May 12 to 17, the Japanese fleet lost 7 ships (2 battleships, a light cruiser, a gunboat, a notice, a fighter and a destroyer), and 2 more ships (including the armored cruiser Kasuga) went for repairs in Sasebo.
But after the surrender of Port Arthur and the defeat at Mukden, the Russians were only separated from the end of this war by the Tragedy of Tsushima
2.5. The death of the Russian fleet at Tsushima
May 14 (27) - May 15 (28), 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet almost completely destroyed the Russian squadron transferred to the Far East from the Baltic under the command of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky. Of its 17 ships of rank 1, 11 were killed, 2 were interned, and 4 fell into enemy hands. Of the 2nd rank cruisers, two were killed, one was disarmed, and only one (the yacht Almaz) reached Vladivostok, where only two of nine destroyers also arrived. Of the 14,334 Russian sailors who took part in the battle, 5,015 people, including 209 officers and 75 conductors, were killed, drowned or died from wounds, and 803 people were wounded. Many wounded, including the squadron commander (a total of 6,106 officers and lower ranks) were captured.
The Tsushima naval battle, which took place on May 14-15, 1905 near Tsushima Island in the eastern part of the Korea Strait, became the most tragic disaster in the history of the Russian navy, and the heaviest defeat for Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. The ratio of Russian and Japanese losses following the Tsushima battle is simply terrifying: the Japanese had only 117 people killed then, but the Russians had 5,045 killed and 6,016 captured, that is, the loss ratio was 1:95 (!), and taking into account the destruction 28 ships, including 7 battleships, the Russian fleet virtually ceased to exist after Tsushima.

What are the reasons for such a terrible defeat? Let's name a few of them.

1. Technical unpreparedness. Outdated, but in case of timely modernization (especially artillery), quite combat-ready battleships “Emperor Alexander II”, “Emperor Nicholas I”, “Navarin”, “Sisoy the Great” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” were in the Baltic. Most of the ships were recently transferred from Port Arthur, just for modernization and repair, but the replacement of artillery was never carried out on any ship, and the hasty repair of the Navarina's mechanisms even worsened its pre-repair characteristics. All this subsequently turned the listed ships into floating targets for Tsushima. This was a serious miscalculation of the fleet leadership, the Navy Ministry and Russian diplomacy. Thus, having a significantly superior Japanese fleet and an obvious threat of war, the Russian fleet (as well as the army) in the Far East was not ready when it began. In the reserve of the Baltic Fleet, there were three more coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type. These lightly armored ships had powerful artillery and, although they were not designed for linear combat, could provide significant assistance to the troops defending Port Arthur (as confirmed by the active use by the Japanese of the old Chinese battleship). The Borodino-class battleships were in a state of completion (the first one had already entered service). This, the largest series of battleships in the history of the Russian fleet (5, “Slava” was completed after the war), was supposed to form the backbone of a new, modern fleet. However, as a result of inconsistency in the government (or successful actions of British agents), their commissioning was postponed from 1903 to 1904-1905, and Russian diplomacy was unable to delay negotiations until this point. The weakness of the armor of Russian ships and the superiority of Japanese artillery also played a role. Here is a comparison table:

2. Combat unpreparedness. A direct participant in the Battle of Tsushima, who served on the battleship "Eagle", A.S. Novikov-Priboy wrote the book “Tsushima” and in this book he describes in great detail all the events that preceded the battle, the battle itself, and what happened to the Russian sailors in Japanese captivity. Particularly interesting are the small details that make up the overall picture, explaining why the Tsushima disaster simply could not help but happen. The situation in the Russian fleet at the beginning of the 20th century was such that it would have been simply surprising if Russia had won at Tsushima.
The Japanese victory at Tsushima is not at all explained by their numerical superiority - the forces of the parties were equal, and in terms of battleships the Russians even had a significant superiority over the Japanese!
The Japanese victory cannot be explained by the qualitative superiority of their naval artillery shells - although "shimoza", that is, high-explosive shells filled with melinite, produced more fragments during the explosion and a stronger blast wave, Russian shells certainly surpassed them in armor penetration.
The problem was different - Russian shells, as a rule, did not hit the target! For the simple reason that Russian commissars (naval gunners) simply did not know how to shoot accurately!
When the Russian squadron (in fact, it was the entire Baltic Fleet in full force) under the command of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky sailed to the Far East to help the besieged Port Arthur, the fleet command simply did not bother to train
A.S. Novikov-Priboy in the book "Tsushima" describes daily life fleet, and most of the time was spent not on combat training at all, but on... cleaning. The command, more than anything else, was concerned that everything on the ships would shine and sparkle.
In philosophical terms, there is a predominance of form over content.
A.S. Novikov-Priboi in his book “Tsushima” gives an example of how back in 1902, the Baltic Fleet (commanded by the same Admiral Rozhdestvensky) staged demonstration shooting in the presence of Emperor Nicholas II and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who came to visit - the target shields were fixed like this it was weak that they fell from the air wave caused by the shells flying past, and the distinguished guests, seeing how the shields were falling one after another, thought that all the targets were definitely hit. Nicholas II was so shocked by such “unsurpassed accuracy” that Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was enlisted in the retinue of His Imperial Majesty by the highest decree.
Yes, Russian admirals knew how to curry favor with their superiors, and in the matter of showing off and deception they were ahead of the rest. But they never got around to preparing their fleet for a real war.
Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky remembered that he needed to learn to shoot for real only when the Russian squadron approached the island of Madagascar! We conducted training shooting, and according to their results, not a single shell hit the target! And this is in ideal conditions, during exercises, without any opposition from the enemy!
After this, it’s generally surprising how, during the Battle of Tsushima, the Russians sometimes managed to hit Japanese ships; perhaps these were purely accidental hits.
In the Russian fleet of the early 20th century, there were problems not only with the combat training of the “lower ranks”, but also with the tactical and strategic thinking of the admirals. For some reason, the Russian admirals of that time adhered to linear tactics, the inconsistency of which was proven back in the 18th century by the English admiral G. Nelson and the Russian admiral F.F. Ushakov.
If, with linear tactics, the ships of the opposing sides line up opposite each other in two lines, and each ship begins to shoot at the enemy ship that is opposite it, then Admiral F.F. Ushakov, for example, used completely new naval combat tactics.
Its essence was to go around the enemy squadron from the front, and with all your might simultaneously begin shelling the ship in front (usually the flagship), and after it, due to the concentration of all efforts on one target, is destroyed in the shortest possible time, attack with all your might the next ship, and so on. Roughly speaking, Ushakov acted on the “all against one” principle, shooting enemy ships one by one. Therefore, he never lost a single battle in his entire life.
In the squadron Z.P. Rozhdestvensky sailed the battleship "Admiral Ushakov", but for some reason the Russian admirals completely forgot about Ushakov's tactics, which became one of the reasons for the Tsushima tragedy, a real disaster for the Russian fleet.
But the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, knew very well about Ushakov’s tactics, and he defeated the Russian fleet during the Battle of Tsushima precisely according to Ushakov’s method - the Japanese ships bypassed the Russian squadron in front, and with a consistent concentration of fire they shot one ship after another.
3. Psychological unpreparedness. One cannot help but mention the oppressive moral situation that developed in the Russian fleet on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima. A.S. Novikov-Priboy in his book “Tsushima” writes that scuffles (literally - a natural beating in the face) were the most common, everyday occurrence in the navy. Non-commissioned officers beat sailors, officers beat both sailors and non-commissioned officers. As A.S. says in Tsushima. Novikov-Priboy, “my non-commissioned officer rank gave me a decent advantage over ordinary sailors: if I hit one of them, in the worst case, I would be put in a punishment cell for several days; if a private did this to me, he risked going to prison However, there was nothing to be proud of here. The officer had an even greater advantage over me: if he beats me, even for nothing, then he won’t even be reprimanded; but if I hit him, even if justly, then he threatens me the death penalty". Admiral Z.P. himself distinguished himself most in beating sailors. Rozhdestvensky. The entire book by A.S. Novikov-Priboya "Tsushima" is riddled with descriptions of the massacre committed by Admiral Rozhdestvensky: either he knocked a sailor down with one blow and knocked out four teeth at once, then his blows to the ear burst the eardrums and the sailors went deaf, then he hit the sailor on the head with binoculars, and binoculars split into pieces, etc. What kind of relationship could the sailors have with the officers and admirals beating them, what kind of “combat partnership” can we talk about here?
As we can see, the Russian fleet, sailing to the Far East, and meeting the Japanese near the island of Tsushima, was a rather curious sight: admirals and officers who did not know the basics of naval tactics; gunners who cannot hit the target; sailors with knocked out teeth and burst eardrums.
Could such a fleet defeat anyone?

What brief conclusions can we draw based on the material presented in this chapter? The feat of the "Varyag" and the successful actions of Russian cruisers to blockade Japan of supplies from the mainland, individual daring raids of destroyers that sank several large warships and transports could not turn the general course of the war. The only naval base of the Russian army is Port Arthur after heroic defense fell, and Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Baltic Fleet was completely destroyed during Russia's largest defeat in naval operations - the Tsushima tragedy. Neither the Vladivostok squadron nor the Black Sea squadron could significantly help in these battles - the Dardanelles were blocked, and the path from Vladivostok was both long and dangerous. Japan, on the other hand, had excellent naval bases, multiple superiority during major combat operations, and excellent reconnaissance. So on March 31, while going to sea, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit 3 mines and sank within two minutes. 635 sailors and officers were killed. But the Japanese did not lose a single ship or a single person. The number of those killed included Admiral Makarov and the famous battle painter Vereshchagin - the Japanese knew about the movements of the most dangerous admiral for them and did everything to destroy him. Their mines were raised in front of the Petropavlovsk's bow, and its fate was sealed.
However, critics of the Russian army and navy, when listing our defeats, forget about two wars of the 20th century - World War 2 and Vietnam of 1966-1976. In these wars, the United States could take into account the experience of our defeats. But Pearl Harbor and Vietnam show how difficult it is to fight far from your main bases. In the first case, the Americans were defeated at their own naval base...
. Chapter 3
Results of the Russo-Japanese War
Strengths of the parties
300,000 soldiers 500,000 soldiers
Russian military losses:
killed: 47,387;
wounded, shell-shocked: 173,425;
died from wounds: 11,425;
died from disease: 27,192;
total permanent losses: 86,004, killed: 32,904;
wounded, shell-shocked: 146,032;
died from wounds: 6,614;
died from disease: 11,170;
captured: 74,369;
total deadweight loss: 50,688
The Japanese army lost killed, according to various sources, from 49 thousand (B. Ts. Urlanis) to 80 thousand (Doctor of Historical Sciences I. Rostunov), while the Russian from 32 thousand (Urlanis) to 50 thousand (Rostunov) or 52,501 people (G. F. Krivosheev). Russian losses in battles on land were half that of the Japanese. In addition, 17,297 Russian and 38,617 Japanese soldiers and officers died from wounds and illnesses (Urlanis). The incidence in both armies was about 25 people. per 1000 per month, however, the mortality rate in Japanese medical institutions was 2.44 times higher than the Russian figure.
In his memoirs, Witte admitted: “It was not Russia that was defeated by the Japanese, not the Russian army, but our order, or more correctly, our boyish management of the 140 million population in last years» .
3.1. Reasons for Russia's defeat in the war
General Kuropatkin, Commander-in-Chief of the Manzhchurian Army, in the opinion of many, the main culprit of our defeat in the Russian-Japanese War, in his memoirs names the following among our reasons for defeat:
1. The small role of our fleet during the war with Japan.
2. The weakness of the Siberian Railway and the East China Railway.
3. Lack of diplomatic preparation for the free use of our armed forces to fight Japan.
4. Late mobilization of reinforcements assigned to the Far East.
5. Disadvantages of “private mobilizations”.
6. Transfer to the reserve from the districts of European Russia during the war
7. Untimely staffing of the active army with officers and lower ranks.
8. Weakening during the war the disciplinary rights of commanders to impose punishments on lower ranks.
9. Slowdown in the advancement of those who distinguished themselves in the war.
10. Our shortcomings in technical terms.

3.2. Analysis of the actions of the Russian fleet and its role in military defeat
As we can see, the land general puts the mistakes of the Russian fleet in the first place. The general's notes in Russia caused such a negative resonance that they were published in Germany - in 1908 and 1911. So what exactly is the fault of the domestic naval forces in this war, according to the general? He believes that in many ways we underestimated military power Japan and missed its militaristic plans and preparations. He writes: “If our fleet had been successful over the Japanese, then military operations on the mainland would have been unnecessary. But even without victory over the Japanese fleet, until the Japanese acquired complete supremacy at sea, they would have been forced to leave significant forces to guard their coasts and, most importantly, could not risk landing on the Liaodong Peninsula; forced to move through Korea, they would give us time to concentrate. With an unexpected night attack on our fleet in Port Arthur, before the declaration of war, Japan gained a temporary advantage in the armored fleet and widely used this advantage, gaining supremacy at sea. Our fleet, especially after the death of adm. Makarov, during the most important period of concentration of Japanese troops, did not offer any resistance to the Japanese. When they landed, even near Port Arthur, we did not even make attempts to interfere with these operations. The consequences of this situation turned out to be very painful... Having gained supremacy at sea, Japan could move its entire army against our ground forces, without worrying about protecting its shores... This, contrary to our calculations, gave Japan the opportunity to field superior forces against us in the first period... Having become the mistress of the seas, Japan had the opportunity deliver by sea to the armies all the supplies they need.”
Kuropatkin’s criticism would be fair if, when speaking about the remoteness of the theater of main combat operations from the main forces of Russia, he took into account not only the difficulties for the ground forces, but also spoke about the fleet...

Conclusion
The Russian fleet played an important role in the defense of Port Arthur, stopping Japanese military supplies, and carried out a number of successful operations. But in general, he was plagued by failures associated both with technical backwardness in comparison with the latest Japanese ships, and with failures in strategy - the defeat at Tsushima clearly reveals both of these factors. The distance from the main naval bases is another factor in our defeats at sea.
During the armed struggle in the land and sea theaters, Japan achieved major successes. But this required enormous strain on her material and moral resources. The economy and finances were depleted. Dissatisfaction with the war grew among broad sections of the population.
Despite the fact that the war, as S. Yu Witte put it, ended in a “decent” peace, ego could not obscure the fact of the defeat suffered by Russia.
But Japan managed to end the war on time. “If the negotiations had broken down and hostilities had resumed,” writes the American historian H. Barton, “then Japan would not have had the troops to achieve a quick victory.” War heavy burden fell on the shoulders of the working masses. It cost the peoples of both states great sacrifices. Russia lost about 270 thousand people, including more than 50 thousand killed. Japanese losses were estimated at 270 thousand people, including more than 86 thousand killed.
The noted phenomena did not go unnoticed by foreign observers. Thus, the English military observer Norrigaard, who was with the Japanese army during the siege of Port Arthur, testified to the turning point in the patriotic mood that had occurred in Japan since the spring of 1905. According to him, reservists from the main districts in Japan (Yokohama, Kobe and Osaka) expressed to him a desire to end the war as quickly as possible. He also mentions that one of the Japanese army regiments, recruited from these districts, refused to go on the attack.
The country's international position has worsened. The United States of America, which played a large role in starting the war, was concerned about Japan's successes. Its strengthening was not in their interests. Therefore, they wanted both warring parties to reconcile as quickly as possible. England took a similar position. Bound by an alliance with Japan, she nevertheless began to refuse her financial support.
Japan found itself in an almost hopeless situation. Further continuation of the war turned out to be impossible. There was only one thing left to do - to look for a way to make peace with Russia. Immediately after the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese ambassador to the United States was instructed to contact President Theodore Roosevelt with a request for mediation. Roosevelt agreed. The American ambassador in St. Petersburg received instructions to persuade Russia to negotiate.
Russia was in a different position than Japan. She had enough strength and resources to win the war even after the Tsushima disaster. Military resources were enormous. However, the tsarist government was also interested in concluding peace as quickly as possible. The decisive factor was the desire to free one’s hands in the Far East in order to fight the revolution that had begun. May 24 (June 6), 1905. A special meeting in Tsarskoe Selo called for an immediate end to the war. The next day, Nicholas II informed the US ambassador that Russia was ready to begin negotiations with Japan.
On July 27 (August 9), 1905, a peace conference opened in Portsmouth (USA). The Japanese delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Komura, the Russian delegation by Chairman of the Council of Ministers S. Yu. Witte. The negotiations ended on August 23 (September 5) with the signing of a peace treaty. The Russian delegation was forced to agree with the claims of the Japanese side: to renounce the lease of Kwantung in favor of Japan and cede to it the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel. Only after the Second World War, as a result of the defeat of militaristic Japan, was our country able to restore its legal rights to the original Russian territories - the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

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The actions of the destroyers of the First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet during the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905, being one of the components of the actions of the entire fleet, were largely determined by the general state of the naval forces of Russia and Japan on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, therefore, to analyze them it is necessary consider the following aspects: 1) the state of the Russian and Japanese navies on the eve of the war; 2) mine fleets of Russia and Japan at the beginning of hostilities.

For a comparative analysis of the state of the naval forces of Russia and Japan on the eve of military operations, it is necessary to study the following issues: 1) the numerical composition of the fleets of both opposing powers in the Pacific Ocean; 2) tactical and technical characteristics of ships of all classes in the fleets of Russia and Japan; 3) the system of basing the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Pacific Ocean.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean consisted of the Pacific Ocean Squadron and the Siberian Military Flotilla. From April 17, 1904, Order No. 81 of the Naval Department ordered the squadron located in the waters of the Far East to henceforth be called the “First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet.”

The Japanese Combined Fleet included three squadrons: the 1st under the command of Vice Admiral Togo, the 2nd under Vice Admiral Kamimura and the 3rd, commanded by Vice Admiral Kataoka. Naval agent in Japan, captain 2nd rank A.I. Before the war, Rusin compiled characteristics of Japanese admirals. Admiral Togo received a very low rating: “Vice Admiral Togo has little knowledge of tactics and strategy. The permanent squadron under his command maneuvered poorly.” Kamimura, on the contrary, received high praise: “Admiral Kamimura knows a modern warship well and will no doubt be a good squadron leader.” Rear Admiral Deva received the highest rating from Rusin, who in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. commanded a detachment of cruisers: “Based on his talents, knowledge of maritime affairs and experience acquired during his voyages, Admiral Deva occupies one of the first places among the admirals of the Japanese fleet and will be an outstanding figure in the future war of Japan.”

The numerical composition of the fleets of both opposing powers in the Pacific Ocean by January 26, 1904 is shown in the table. This list does not include obsolete ships whose combat value was small. In addition, the Japanese also had the coastal defense battleship Chin-yen and the small armored cruiser Chiyoda. Two newest armored cruisers, Nisshin and Kassuga, were purchased by Japan from Italy and became part of the active fleet on April 11, 1904. In addition, after the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese fleet included two light cruisers and three destroyers. From these data it is clear that in terms of the number of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, which represented the main striking power of the fleet, the Japanese had an advantage in numbers - 14 versus 11.

It must be said that after the victory over China in the war of 1894-1895. Japan began to intensively build up its naval forces. In Russia, this did not go unnoticed, and in November 1895, by order of Nicholas II, a Special Meeting was formed, which came to the following conclusions: 1) Japan is pushing the end of its shipbuilding program to the year the Siberian Route ends, which indicates the possibility of an armed conflict in 1903-1906. 2) Russia must now, without missing a beat, develop a shipbuilding program for the Far East in such a way that by the end of the Japanese shipbuilding program, our fleet in the Far East will significantly exceed the Japanese one.

By the end of 1897, the Navy Ministry developed a new military shipbuilding program, which aimed to build a fleet specifically for the Pacific Ocean. In 1898, this program was approved by the Tsar. According to this program, it was planned to build (in addition to those already planned by the 1895 program): 5 battleships of 12,000 tons, 6 cruisers of 6,000 tons, 10 cruisers of 2,500 tons, 2 minelayers of 2,700 tons and 30 destroyers (they were then called fighters) according to 350 tons. They decided to order some of the ships abroad, since domestic shipyards were overloaded. In the same year, construction of the planned ships began. But in our 1898 program we made one mistake that became fatal: its completion was envisaged during 1905, while Japan was finishing the creation of its fleet intended to fight Russia in 1903.

This mistake was made due to the position of the Minister of Finance S.Yu. Witte, who at that time had great influence on Nicholas II. He insisted on reducing allocations for the new shipbuilding program, and when this failed, he achieved installments of these allocations until 1905 (the Navy Ministry considered it necessary to complete the construction of ships under the new program in 1903). S.Yu. Witte believed that it was impossible for Russia to spend the amount required by the shipbuilding program (200 million rubles) within 5 years (from 1898 to 1903). In addition, he believed that Japan, due to its difficult financial situation, would not be able to complete the creation of its fleet before 1906. This delusion of the all-powerful Minister of Finance would cost Russia dearly.

In his memoirs, S.Yu. Witte modestly keeps silent about this, at the same time emphasizing that at that time he was well aware of the need to strengthen the fleet: “It was absolutely clear to me that since we got into the Kwantung region, we need to have our own fleet in the Far East” and all from He did everything in his power to achieve this. Of course, S.Yu. Witte was, without a doubt, a talented statesman who did a lot, in particular, for the development of heavy industry and the railway network in Russia. But it is common for any person to make mistakes, and the higher the post held by a statesman, the more severe the payment for his mistakes becomes for the entire country. Unfortunately, in his memoirs S.Yu. Witte is not always self-critical. In addition, in his “Memoirs,” which undoubtedly contain enormous factual material and are a most valuable historical source, S.Yu. Witte sometimes comes into conflict with real facts. For example, he places responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations with Japan (they continued until mid-January 1904) only on the Russian side.

In fact, in response to the Japanese ultimatum of December 31, 1903, a Special Meeting was convened on January 15, 1904, chaired by Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, at which it was decided to satisfy all Japanese claims. On January 20, the text of the response was approved by the tsar. But the Japanese no longer required any concessions: already at the end of 1903, the ruling Japanese circles came to the conclusion that war with Russia was necessary. On January 24, the Japanese broke off negotiations and diplomatic relations. Telegram with a response to the Japanese ultimatum to the Russian ambassador in Tokyo P.P. Rosen was detained by the Japanese and handed over only on January 25, i.e. after the severance of diplomatic relations. S.Yu.'s point of view Witte, in fact, coincides with the opinion of official Japanese historiography: the Japanese place all the blame on the Russians: “having lost hope for a peace agreement, Japan was forced to stop diplomatic relations.”

Regarding the shipbuilding program of 1898, it should still be noted that its implementation, in addition to the lack of financial allocations, faced many other problems and, first of all, the backwardness of the domestic shipbuilding industry: the capacity of the existing shipyards was insufficient, the technical equipment of shipbuilding industry enterprises was weak, there were not enough qualified personnel, the production culture was weak. In addition, the Marine Technical Committee constantly delayed the consideration of ship designs; changes were made to the designs of ships already on the stocks, which affected the construction time.

So, the mistake in the installment program of the shipbuilding program of 1898 was the most important, but not the only one in a number of mistakes in our preparation for the war at sea. Another serious mistake was that in 1902, an entire squadron was taken from the Pacific Ocean to the ports of the Baltic Sea for repairs: three squadron battleships (Sisoi the Great, Navarin, Imperator Nicholas I) and four armored cruisers (Admiral Nakhimov", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", "Admiral Kornilov"). All of them, with the exception of “Kornilov” and “Nicholas I”, will find their grave in the Tsushima Strait in 1905 (“Nicholas I” will be captured, and “Kornilov” will survive only because he will remain in the Baltic), and during his stay in the Baltic, they will not undergo all the expected repairs and modernization, and what they managed to do on them, all this could have been successfully carried out in Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

One more fact should also be mentioned. Chile and Argentina, preparing for war with each other, ordered a number of first-class warships abroad (Argentina - six excellent armored cruisers from Italy). Then both powers entered into an agreement with each other, according to which they stopped building up their navies and had to simultaneously sell two ships each, which were still at a high degree of readiness in foreign shipyards. Russia received an offer to purchase two Argentine cruisers, but the Navy Ministry rejected this offer. These cruisers (the future Japanese Nisshin and Kassuga), built to an outstanding design (with a displacement the same as that of the Russian cruiser Bayan, they carried twice as powerful artillery and were perfectly armored), purchased by Japan at the end of 1903 g., successfully acted against our fleet. In addition, there was a real opportunity to buy other four Argentine cruisers built according to the same project - Argentina’s financial situation at that time was extremely difficult and it was interested in improving it by selling ships of its fleet. After the outbreak of hostilities, the Russian government will make desperate but unsuccessful attempts to acquire these ships.

It cannot be said that the Russian naval command did not understand the need to strengthen the fleet in the Far East and did not take any measures in this direction. The governor of Nicholas II in the Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev, realizing the inevitability of a military clash with Japan, urgently demanded the sending of reinforcements by ships from the Baltic Fleet. In the autumn of 1903 from Mediterranean Sea a detachment was sent to the Far East under the command of Rear Admiral A.A. Virenius. This detachment included: the squadron battleship "Oslyabya", the 1st rank cruisers "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Aurora", the 2nd rank cruiser "Almaz", 7 squadron destroyers, 4 numbered destroyers and 3 transports. However, due to insufficient organization and support, as well as frequent breakdowns of destroyers, the detachment moved extremely slowly. Events in the Far East developed very quickly, and the need for the presence of a naval detachment in the Pacific Ocean became more and more obvious every day. Meanwhile, Admiral A.A. Virenius was clearly in no hurry. When the detachment finally approached Djibouti, he received in response to his request via wireless telegraph the news that it was already the third day since the war with Japan began.

On February 2, the “highest order” followed to return to Russia. An attempt to strengthen the Pacific squadron with ready-made ships with a total displacement of 30,000 tons even before the start of the war ended in complete failure. It should be noted that at the same time, two armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga, purchased by the Japanese in Italy, were sailing from the Mediterranean Sea to the Far East. Despite the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific Ocean, they safely reached Japan and in April 1904 joined the active Japanese fleet. Sending Virenius's detachment back to the Baltic should be considered a mistake. If this detachment had continued its movement, it most likely would have also reached its destination.

Along with the numerical composition of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Pacific Ocean, the tactical and technical characteristics of ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets of all classes were important for subsequent military operations, since the actions of destroyers were one of the components of the actions of the entire fleet. The point is not only and, perhaps, not so much in the numerical superiority of the Japanese in armored ships, but in their quality. The Japanese squadron battleships were the same type of ships of the latest construction, while the Russian squadron battleships, built according to various shipbuilding programs with a time interval of up to seven years, belonged to four different types of ships that had different tactical and technical characteristics.

Most of the Russian ships were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to the Japanese. Three Russian battleships - Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol and Poltava - were already outdated ships. By the beginning of hostilities, ships of the Poltava type could no longer compete on an equal footing with the newest Japanese battleships of the Mikasa type. Jane's famous reference book for 1904 correlated their fighting strength as 0.8 to 1.0 in favor of the latter. In addition, the Sevastopol vehicles, manufactured by the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, were distinguished by low quality manufacturing and assembly. Even during official tests in 1900, Sevastopol was unable to reach the contract speed (16 knots), and by the beginning of hostilities it was difficult to reach 14. The unreliable power plant was the main drawback of this ship, which seriously reduced its combat effectiveness.

The two squadron battleships Peresvet and Pobeda were significantly weaker than any battleship, as they had 254 mm main-caliber artillery and insufficient armor. The battleships "Peresvet" and "Pobeda", the same type as the "Oslyabya", were more suitable for the type of strong armored cruisers, but for cruisers their speed was low. And only the two newest battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan”, both built abroad, were not inferior in their tactical and technical data to the best Japanese battleships. The diversity of Russian ships made it difficult to use them, especially to control them in battle, which reduced the combat power of the squadron. The Russian battleships that were part of the First Pacific Squadron were built according to three (!) shipbuilding programs.

The situation was even worse with armored cruisers. There were only 4 of them versus 8 for the Japanese and, in addition, the Russian cruisers were inferior to the Japanese in a number of important elements. Bayan's artillery was two times inferior to any of the armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet. When ordering the Bayan in France from the Forges and Chantiers company according to the design of the prominent French shipbuilder M. Lagan, the Marine Technical Committee included joint operations with squadron battleships in the task of this cruiser. But weak artillery armament did not allow the Bayan to be used in squadron combat as effectively as the Japanese used their armored cruisers. At the same time, during military operations, Bayan will show higher efficiency than Russian armored cruisers (although its cost was higher than that of the best armored cruisers Askold (the total cost with weapons and ammunition is 5 million rubles in gold) and “Bogatyr” (5.5 million rubles) - “Bayan” (without weapons cost almost 6.3 million rubles).

“Gromoboy”, “Russia” and “Rurik” were created primarily for cruising operations with the aim of disrupting maritime trade, but were not suitable for squadron combat. They were inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers in armor (including artillery protection), speed and broadside strength: their 203 mm guns were located in side mounts so that only two out of four guns could fire on one side. Japanese cruisers had 203 mm guns located in turrets and all four guns could fire on any side. Only on the cruiser Gromoboy did they try to take into account the requirements of squadron combat to some extent, and for this purpose, two bow 8-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns were placed in armored casemates. In a heavy battle on August 1, 1904, this allowed the cruiser to confidently withstand the fire of Japanese tower cruisers.

As the Russo-Japanese War showed, Russian cruisers performed well in reconnaissance and in operations on enemy sea communications, but turned out to be ineffective in squadron combat, and it was this type of fleet combat that turned out to be predominant in the Russo-Japanese War. By the beginning of the war, the Rurik was already an outdated ship; its speed, due to worn-out vehicles, was only about 17 knots versus 21 knots for the Japanese armored cruisers. Moreover, “Rurik” could develop even such a speed for a short period of time, but for a long time it could maintain speed of no more than 15 knots.

Against 7 Russian armored cruisers, the Japanese had 14 and 1 more small armored cruiser "Chiyoda" at the beginning of hostilities. True, out of 14 armored cruisers, 7 were already outdated. All Russian cruisers of this type were new construction, three of them - “Varyag”, “Askold” and “Bogatyr” - were the strongest ships of this type, which had no equal in the Japanese fleet. However, soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese fleet was replenished with a new armored light cruiser, the Tsushima, and in September 1904, another one, the Otowa, entered service. In addition, of the Russian cruisers, “Varyag” was lost on the first day of the war (January 27, 1904), “Boyarin” was blown up on January 29 and died on a minefield laid by the Russian minelayer “Yenisei”, and “Bogatyr” on May 2, 1904 In the fog, he ran into the rocks at Cape Bruce, received heavy damage and did not take part in further hostilities.

In addition, it should be noted that the Russian cruisers "Diana" and "Pallada", created as "trade fighters", had weapons that were too weak for their displacement (eight 6-inch guns, not counting small-caliber ones) and low speed for ships of their class - they could not develop the design 20 knots even during acceptance tests (with difficulty they achieved just over 19).

In addition to all of the above, it should be noted that there is one more significant drawback that affected the combat readiness of Russian ships, namely, the imperfection of Russian shells. The most severe consequences in this regard were the decision of the Naval Technical Committee to adopt new lightweight projectiles for service in 1892, which was supposed to increase their initial flight speed by up to 20%, and, consequently, significantly increase the penetrating ability and flatness of the trajectory. The latter significantly improved shooting accuracy, which was considered the most important property in the Russian fleet. But these conclusions were valid only for combat distances up to 20 kb., which were considered limiting in Russian artillery service rules. The main trend in the tactics of armored fleets was the rapid increase in combat distances, which reached 55-70 cabs in the Battle of Tsushima. This circumstance, along with the use of charges with smokeless powder, which almost tripled the range of projectiles regardless of their mass, reduced the advantage of light projectiles to zero. At long distances they had low penetrating power and large dispersion, which sharply reduced shooting accuracy. In addition, Russian shells had a low high-explosive effect due to insufficient explosive pyroxylin and its weaker effect compared to Japanese shimosa (melinitis). The Russian 12-inch shell weighed 331.7 kg versus 385.5 for the Japanese. The explosive charge in the Russian 12-inch projectile was: armor-piercing - 4.3 kg, high-explosive - 6.0 kg. In a Japanese 12-inch projectile: armor-piercing - 19.3 kg of explosive, high-explosive - 36.6 kg. The war fully demonstrated the advantages of Japanese shells.

Thus, with regard to the armored and cruising fleet, the Russian fleet in the Far East at the beginning of the war was inferior to the Japanese not only in numbers, but also in the main tactical and technical characteristics of the ships. An important aspect When analyzing the state of the navies of Russia and Japan on the eve of the war, the conditions for their basing are considered. By the beginning of the war, the forces of the Russian fleet were largely dispersed. The ships of the Russian squadron were separated between two bases with a distance of 1060 miles between them.

The dispersal of the Russian fleet was carried out according to a plan adopted on March 19, 1901. According to it, the main task of the Russian fleet was to seize supremacy at sea in the Gulf of Pecheli, as well as in the Yellow and South China Seas in order to prevent the landing of enemy troops in Chemulpo or at the mouth of the Yalu River. The plan said: “To successfully complete this task, it was necessary to group our naval forces into appropriate tactical units, of which: 1) the main forces, having Port Arthur as their base, could block the path of the enemy fleet into the Yellow Sea. 2) our secondary forces would divert part of the enemy fleet from the Pecheliysk and Korean basins, which was achieved by forming an independent cruising detachment based in Vladivostok, from which the cruisers were supposed to operate behind enemy lines, threaten his communications and pursue transports and commercial ships, as well as carry out raids and attacks on poorly fortified points on the Japanese coast.” Subsequently, this plan was repeatedly discussed at meetings of the Russian naval command and was left unchanged.

This plan was criticized after the war, as it was believed that the division of the forces of the Russian fleet was not justified by the situation. Nevertheless, this criticism is unfair: while in Vladivostok, “Rurik”, “Russia” and “Gromoboy” diverted much larger Japanese forces from Port Arthur (4 armored cruisers of Vice Admiral Kamimura and a number of smaller ships). It was much more convenient for this cruiser to leave Vladivostok for operations on Japanese communications - but they were originally created as raiders, while they could not provide significant support to the battleships in Port Arthur, since due to their design features they were not suitable for a squadron battle. According to this plan, approved by E.I. Alekseev, the main forces of the fleet in the Pacific Ocean were based in Port Arthur, 3 armored ships and 1 light cruiser, as well as 10 numbered destroyers in Vladivostok. In addition, 1 light cruiser and 3 gunboats were stationed in the ports of China and Korea.

The basing system of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean had significant shortcomings, and the condition of the naval bases was unsatisfactory. The Russian Pacific Fleet had only two naval bases - Port Arthur and Vladivostok. As already noted, the distance between these bases was quite large and in the event of war, communication between them became very difficult. The shipping lines linking both bases passed through an area that was controlled by the entire Japanese fleet, so communications between the bases were unreliable. The land communication between Port Arthur and Vladivostok was also difficult, and during the war it was completely interrupted.

Port Arthur and Vladivostok were not prepared for the outbreak of war; their real capabilities were limited. The creation of land defense lines and coastal batteries was not completed. The defensive structures of Port Arthur were planned to be completed only by 1909; their construction was estimated at 15 million rubles. By 1904, only 4.6 million rubles were released from this amount. The plan for the construction of defensive structures of Port Arthur, developed by the outstanding Russian military engineer Velichko, was only 30% completed by 1904. The equipment of the bases did not support the deployment of all types of combat activities, the repair capabilities of Vladivostok and Port Arthur were very limited, and there were not enough spare parts to repair ship mechanisms. In addition, in Port Arthur, the construction of a dock capable of accommodating battleships was not completed. The absence of a dock for battleships in Port Arthur subsequently had the most severe consequences for the course of military operations.

It should be noted that Viceroy E.I. Back in 1900, Alekseev presented a work plan to expand the Arthur port, but loans for this were allocated in completely insufficient amounts. As the famous military historian A.A. rightly noted. Svechin: “Generally speaking, Vladivostok and Arthur, and especially the latter, were so weak as a repair base for the fleet that even in Peaceful time with difficulty they damaged the squadron - and a squadron of smaller strength than the one that subsequently fought. Our base's supplies were also insufficient. In particular, the shortage of shells was especially serious, of which the fleet did not have two complete sets.” E.I. Alekseev, seeing the danger of the situation and without waiting for the appropriate allocations, just before the war, at his own risk, managed to make some necessary supplies, mainly coal. Port Arthur had another major drawback: the only entrance to the base was shallow and large ships could only enter and leave the base during high tide.

The lack of a deployed and properly prepared preparatory basing system had an extremely negative impact on the actions of the Russian fleet. As the commander of the cruiser “Oleg”, Captain 1st Rank L.F. Dobrotvorsky, subsequently wrote: “Without well-equipped private bases, a modern fleet cannot operate, because without them it is impossible to preserve ships and mechanisms.”

It should be noted that at a time when there was a constant lack of funds for the construction of fortifications and equipment of the port in Port Arthur, S.Yu. Witte allocated significant funds for the construction of a commercial port in the city of Dalny, 20 miles from Port Arthur. By 1904, Dalny had absorbed over 20 million rubles. The Japanese subsequently did not fail to take advantage of the amenities of Dalny, making it a base for their fleet during the war. In 1906 A.N. Kuropatkin, during the war of 1904-1905. the commander of the Russian ground forces in the Far East wrote sadly: “We spent many millions of rubles on equipping the piers and the Dalny dock, but Port Arthur was left without a dock.”

The Japanese fleet had an extensive basing system with well-equipped bases such as Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and others. By the beginning of the war, the Japanese were preparing to use Takeshiki on the island of Tsushima and the Korean ports of Chemulpo and Mozampo as forward bases. Japanese bases, due to their advantageous geographical position, dominated the routes leading to the Russian coast. The short distance between Japanese naval bases and Korean ports (from 60 to 300 miles) allowed the Japanese navy to shortest time without much effort to concentrate the main forces in any of them, and also facilitated the concentration of Japanese troops on the mainland.

Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, the Japanese navy was superior to the Russian fleet in the Pacific in quantitative and qualitative terms, and also had a significantly better basing system.

Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.

1st rank cruiser "Askold"

Laid down in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Entered service in 1902. In 1903 he went to the Far East. One of the most actively operating ships. In July 1904, he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to escape the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became part of the Siberian Flotilla and was stationed in Vladivostok. During WWII he participated in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of Allied ground and naval forces against Ottoman Empire, whose goal was a breakthrough to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). After which he went to Toulon, where he was undergoing repairs (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon the cruiser went to Murmansk, where it became part of the Arctic Ocean fleet. In 1918, in the Kola Bay, it was captured by the British and became part of the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". In 1922 it was bought by Soviet Russia. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. Also in 1922, "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation, Askold fought alongside the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one that the Varyag team switched to.

before launching

hull "Askold" (left) in the water

at the outfitting wall - installation of the bow pipe, 1901

the cruiser has almost taken on its final form, winter 1901

drydocking in the Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901

sea ​​trials, 1901

additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany

acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, there is a state (tricolor) flag on the flagpole, and not a naval (Andreevsky) flag

in the Kiel Canal, 1902

Great Kronstadt raid, 1902

already part of the Baltic Fleet, 1902

Dalian Bay, 1903

Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard combat paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive

on a combat course, 1904

during the Dardanelles operation, 1915

in Toulon, 1916

as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917

note from the magazine "Niva", 1915

drawing and axonometric projection, "Modelist-Constructor" magazine. An axonometric view of anti-mine networks shows them in combat position

"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing

livery of the cruiser "Askold" during service in the Pacific Ocean

livery of the cruiser "Askold" during combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea

Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901 and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libau and further to the Far East, it was equipped with a Guards crew.
In the Battle of Tsushima he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship of the Borodino EBR. Due to the loss of speed, he found himself under fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. A fire broke out on board. Water entering through the holes worsened the situation and at 18:50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew died. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, Captain 1st Rank, crew commander of the EBR "Emperor Alexander III" Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov said 2:

You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory! I'm afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us: they have a more serviceable fleet and they are real sailors. I guarantee one thing - we will all die, but we will not give up.

The squadron reached the Tsushima Strait without losses, and died there. But the honor remained untarnished. N. M. Bukhvostov and his crew died all together. Your coffin is an armadillo. Your grave is the cold depths of the ocean. And faithful sailors family of origin- your centuries-old protection... 1


squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

before launching, 1901

during outfitting work at the Baltic Shipyard

transition from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt

in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903

at the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904

August 1904

on the Revel roadstead, September 1904

view of the starboard side, a crane with a steam boat is given away

at one of the stops during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EDB "Navarin", EDB "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"

The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of its class with full sail weapons in the Russian Navy

The last Russian cruiser with full sails. Development of the project "Memory of Azov". The subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Gromoboy" - became the development of this project (initially it was planned to build them according to the same project as the "Rurik"). The main task is to conduct combat operations and raiding operations on British and German communications. The peculiarity of the ship was that when loading additional coal reserves, it could travel from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional coal loading at a 10-knot speed.
Construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down in May 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In the battle on August 1, 1904 near Fr. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 crew members, 139 were killed and 229 were injured.

on a voyage, view of the deck from the top of the foremast

painting the side in preparation for the show

on a hike

"Rurik" in black paint

"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896

in the eastern basin of Port Arthur

in the dock of Vladivostok

Port Arthur

cruiser on a voyage, Far East

the cruiser's stem - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "nose figures" of sailing ships

squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched May 25, 1895. Entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was scuttled by its crew. The last ship of the Poltava class.

near Galerny Island before being transferred for completion to Kronstadt, 1898

"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901

on the right (near the wall) is the Sevastopol EDB. A crane carries a faulty 12-inch gun from the Tsesarevich, Port Arthur, 1904

EDB "Sevastopol" on the march

"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" near the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903

ventilation deflector torn by a shell, 1904

in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsesarevich", in the distance in the background - "Askold"

in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik

after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904

sailors leave for the land front. after this, the Sevastopol EDB will be sunk in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color postcard

Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"

Laid down at Burmeister og Wein, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official laying took place on September 24, 1900. On May 26, 1901 it was launched.
Entered service in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903, arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the port of Dalniy on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team abandoned the ship, which remained afloat for another two days and only sank after a repeated explosion at a minefield.

still under the Danish flag, sea trials, 1902

1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before moving to Kronstadt.

"Boyarin" in the Far East, 1903

in the Denmark Strait, 1903

in Toulon

Port Arthur, 1904

Armored cruiser II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard

1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, a cadet of the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps, graduated in 1910. It is completely engraved on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are a memory to all those who remained with their crew, with their ship, until the last. Such as N. M. Bukhvostov, S. O. Makarov and many others...

Sleep, northern knight, sleep, honest Father,
Taken untimely by death, -
Not laurels of victory - crown of thorns
You accepted with a fearless squad.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold depths of the ocean
And faithful sailors' family
Your age-old protection.
Shared laurels, from now on with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry with rain
And the shroud will be spread with a thick cover
There are thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
The thunder will be given to him with a roar.

Let me remind you that Admiral Makarov died along with the Petropavlovsk nuclear submarine, which was blown up by a mine in Vladivostok. The Russian battle painter Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin (author of the paintings “The Apotheosis of War”, “Before the Attack at Plevna”, “Napoleon on the Borodino Heights”, “Skobelev at Plevna”, etc.) also died along with the ship.
2 - who regularly follows the TV project "Living History" of the TV channel "Channel 5 - St. Petersburg", could have heard this quote in one of the parts of the film about the Russian fleet "Yablochko". True, Sergei Shnurov shortened it - he removed the words regarding the loss of ships during the voyage.

Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet

A detachment of cruisers on the roadstead in Vladivostok

Total information

Number of members

Military conflicts

Vladivostok cruiser detachment(Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet) created in the spring of 1903. With the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, it carried out tasks for the naval defense of Vladivostok and disrupting enemy sea communications in the Sea of ​​Japan. The detachment included the armored cruisers "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik", the armored cruiser "Bogatyr" and the auxiliary cruiser "Lena". During the operation, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner. After the disbandment of the Vladivostok detachment, the cruisers arrived in the Baltic in March 1906 and became part of the Baltic Fleet.

Story

The decision to create

The formation of a detachment of cruisers based in Vladivostok as an independently operating formation was envisaged back in March 1901. The detachment, in addition to the cruisers "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" in different time included other cruisers (“Admiral Nakhimov”, “Varyag”, “Askold”).

The decision in 1901-1903 to create a detachment of cruisers into an independent detachment was motivated by the following:

1. Armored cruisers are not battleships and are built specifically for cruising warfare. The effect of their action on a wide theater should be much greater than as part of a squadron.
2. By distracting 6 Japanese armored cruisers, the detachment will weaken the superiority of the main forces of the Japanese fleet over the Russian one.
3. Raiding along the enemy's coast, thereby disrupting the supply of enemy troops in the continental theater of operations.

This was also the task that was assigned to the detachment.

The correctness of this allocation of the best cruisers into a separate detachment was confirmed by the experience of the Russian-Japanese War.

Formation

Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich"

The final composition of the Pacific squadron was announced at a meeting in Port Arthur on April 17, 1903. As a result of this meeting, naval forces in the Far East were distributed as follows:

1. “Combat squadron” based in Port Arthur (I and II squads of battleships, detachments of long-range and short-range reconnaissance ships (cruisers), 1st squadron of destroyers) and a defensive detachment.

2. A separate cruising detachment and a defensive detachment based in Vladivostok.

In addition, groups of auxiliary vessels (transports) were formed based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

The separate cruising detachment in Vladivostok was to include the armored cruisers "Russia" (flag of the 1st junior flagship of the squadron), "Gromoboy" and "Rurik", the armored cruiser "Bogatyr" and the steamships of the Voluntary Fleet "Moscow" and "Kherson". In addition to the designated ships, the Vladivostok detachment included: gunboats “Koreets”, “Mandzhur”, “Beaver” and “Sivuch”, mine transport “Aleut”, military transports “Kamchadal” and “Yakut”, destroyers No. 201, 202 and 209 , as well as six destroyers.

In July-August, 6 more numbered destroyers transferred by the cruisers Boyarin and Rurik arrived in Vladivostok, but the gunboats and the 20-knot steamship Moskva never reached Vladivostok. At the same time, “Kherson” (renamed “Lena”), due to defects in the boilers, was unable to develop a full 19.5 knot speed, which was reflected in the failure better side on the initial plans for the use of the detachment.

Armored cruiser "Russia"

Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on May 20, 1895. Launched April 30, 1896. Entered service on September 13, 1897. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. The flagship of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.

Displacement 12580 tons. Armament - 4 - 203/45, 22 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47/43, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 5 NTA. Speed ​​- 19.74 knots, cruising range 7740 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 811 sailors.

Armored cruiser "Gromoboy"

Laid down on July 14, 1897 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Launched April 26, 1889. Entered service in October 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.

Displacement 12455 tons. Dimensions: 146.6/144.2/140.6x20.9x7.9 m. Initial armament - 4 - 203/45, 16 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47 mm, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 4 PTA. Speed ​​20.1 knots; cruising range 8100 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 846 sailors.

Armored cruiser "Rurik"

Unofficial construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down on May 19, 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service on October 16, 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.

Displacement 11930 t. Dimensions: 132.6x20.4x8.3 m. Armament - 4 - 203/35, 16 - 152/35, 6 - 120/45, 6 - 47/43, 10 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des ., 6 NTA. Speed ​​18.84 knots; cruising range 7790 miles. Crew of 27 officers and 692 sailors

Armored cruiser "Bogatyr"

Laid down in December 1898 in Stettin (Germany) on the shipyard of the Vulcan company. Launched on January 17, 1901. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. On May 2, 1904, in the fog, he jumped onto the coastal rocks at Cape Bruce in the Amur Bay and, having received a hole in the hull, lay down on the ground. On June 18, 1904, she was refloated and docked for repairs, where she remained until the end of the war.

Displacement 6650 t. Dimensions: 134.1x16.6x6.3 m. Armament 12 - 152/45, 12 - 75/50, 8 - 47 mm, 2 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm (des), 2 NTA, 2 PTA. Test speed up to 23.55 knots; cruising range 4900 miles. Crew: 23 officers and 550 sailors.

During design and construction, all of these cruisers were designed for raider operations on the enemy’s ocean lines of communication. Because of this, in order to increase their cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect protection for deck artillery.

Squad names

The order to form the detachment was signed on June 7, 1903. In which it was given its first name: “Detachment of Cruisers of the Pacific Ocean Squadron.”

After the start of the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the squadron was given the rights of fleet commander. As a result, on February 25, 1904, the detachment was transformed into a “Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.”

On May 12, 1904, the structure of the fleet was changed and the detachment received a new name: “Separate detachment of cruisers of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet.”

On December 20, 1904, after the death of the remnants of the squadron in Port Arthur, the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers was given a new name “Cruiser Detachment in the Pacific Ocean”.

Fighting

First campaign (January 27 - February 1, 1904)

On the night of January 26-27, 1904, an order was received from the command, which read: “The detachment should begin military operations and inflict the most sensitive blow and damage to Japan’s communications with Korea.” The ships were prepared for combat operations in advance and went to sea on the same day. But the campaign was not particularly successful, despite the absence of serious enemy forces. During the voyage, only one steamer IJN Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) was sunk and another one was shelled. A storm at sea forced us to return to our home port.

Second campaign (February 11 - 14, 1904)

The next trip to sea took place on February 11, 1904. The area of ​​the second campaign was the coast from the border with Korea to the port of Genzan. But this campaign was even less effective - apart from small coastal vessels, the cruisers did not meet anyone.

Third campaign (February 24 - March 1, 1904)

Having gone to sea on February 24, the detachment again headed to the shores of Korea, to the ports and bays located in the Korean Gulf and to the north of it, as well as to the approaches to them from the coast of Japan, in particular, from the ports of Wakasa Bay.

Based on the results of a very superficial inspection of a number of bays on the Korean coast, the commander of the detachment, Reizenstein, reported the following information to the governor: “Two-time cruising gave the right to assume that the presence of our detachment here will not prevent the Japanese from conducting operations in the Sea of ​​Japan; they are not conducting them here. Troops to Genzan they do not transport, there is no trade or transportation of goods along the Korean coast; having walked along the entire coast of Korea, seeing all the bays clearly, not a single signal station was seen, which also confirms the absence of operations."

Bombardment of Vladivostok by Japanese cruisers (March 6, 1904)

But even such small successes of the detachment were enough to alarm the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against the detachment. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored and two armored cruisers entered the Ussuri Gulf on March 6, 1904 and shelled Vladivostok. Immediately after the shelling of the city began, a detachment of Vladivostok cruisers began to weigh anchor, but leaving the bay was complicated by ice conditions and minefields. Upon entering the Ussuri Gulf, the ships saw only the smoke of the Japanese squadron on the horizon, so they did not pursue it and returned to the roadstead. The shelling resulted in the death of one woman and the injury of five sailors.

Inactivity (March 1 – April 9, 1904)

Among the first measures taken by S.O. Makarov to increase the combat effectiveness and intensify the actions of the fleet, the order of February 24 was the appointment of Rear Admiral K.P. as head of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. Jessena. And Jessen was given a new task for the detachment: to actively prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Korea.

But Jessen, for a number of reasons, could not begin to carry out orders:

1. It took time to master units that were new to him and to train them appropriately for combat.
2. It was necessary to choose the direction in which the cruiser detachment should strike. This required reliable information about the intentions and actions of the Japanese fleet.

However, the information about the enemy that the Russian command had during this period was very contradictory.

Fourth campaign (April 10 - 14, 1904)

But due to ice conditions, the detachment was able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. The detachment headed to the Korean coast to attack the port of Genzan. But Jessen did not know that on April 9, Admiral Kamimura sent his squadron to Vladivostok, after entering the same Genzan to replenish water and coal supplies. The reports note that there was thick fog at sea. On the morning of April 12, the detachment, entering Genzana Bay, sank the steamer IJN Goyo-Maru, which was stationed in the roadstead, and then in the afternoon they sank the coaster IJN Haginura-Maru. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22:20, the IJN Kinsu-Maru transport appeared on the way of the Vladivostok detachment. He was also sunk. After this, the detachment commander, having numerous prisoners from sunken ships on board the cruisers, decided to return to Vladivostok.

Second approach of Kamimura's squadron to Vladivostok (April 16, 1904)

Admiral H. Kamimura

On April 15, 1904, the Japanese squadron approached Shkota Island, where it remained for some time, producing signals, then went south. On April 16, the destroyers IJN Sirakumo, IJN Asasivo, IJN Akatsuki and IJN Asagiri laid three mine banks at the entrance to Ussuri Bay. Russian cruisers did not go to sea for fear of running into mines. Eight Russian destroyers were sent to monitor the Japanese ships. The trawling of Japanese mines was very poorly organized. Because of this, on July 4, destroyer No. 208 hit a mine in the Ussuri Gulf and sank.

Accident of the cruiser "Bogatyr" (May 2, 1904)

On May 2, 1904, the cruiser Bogatyr hit rocks at Cape Bruce in Slavyanka Bay. Soon the cruiser was removed from the rocks and docked for repairs. But due to a poorly equipped port and a lack of materials for repairs, the cruiser remained in dock until the end of the war.

Fifth campaign (May 30 - June 7, 1904)

The next time the cruisers went to sea and headed for the eastern passage of the Korean Strait only on May 30. On June 1, the detachment went to about. Tsushima, where Japan's main communications routes were located and where Admiral Kamimura's base was located in Ozaki Bay. On the same day, the steamships IJN Idzuma-Maru and IJN Hitachi-Maru were sunk by the Thunderbolt. IJN Hitachi-Maru carried 1,095 Japanese Army soldiers and officers, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers, which were intended to bombard Port Arthur. Another IJN transport, Sado-Maru (with 1,350 soldiers and officers, was stopped by warning shots from the Rurik. The Japanese officers refused to surrender and the Russians had no choice but to sink the transport, which was done. A detachment of cruisers went into the Sea of ​​Japan. Kamimura, who was at the base, received a report about the Russian detachment and went out to search for it. But to no avail. On June 3, Russian cruisers inspected the English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with smuggled cargo to Japan.

On June 6, Russian cruisers returned from a successful raid in Vladivostok. Kamimura also returned to his base.

Sixth campaign (June 15 - 20, 1904)

On June 15, the detachment again went to Genzan. In order to achieve great success in the campaign, the auxiliary cruiser Lena and eight numbered destroyers joined the detachment. On June 17, the detachment entered Genzan and sank the schooner IJN Seiho-Maru and the coastal steamer IJN Koun-Maru in the roadstead, losing one destroyer due to the accident. After this, the Lena and the destroyers went to Vladivostok, and the cruisers to the Korean Strait. But having met Kamimura’s squadron in the Tsushima area, the detachment did not accept the battle and retreated. On June 19, on the way to their native shores, the English steamer Cheltenham, which was transporting timber for the Fuzan-Seoul-Chemulpo railway that was under construction, was detained and delivered to Vladivostok. On June 20, the detachment entered the port of Vladivostok.

Seventh campaign (July 4-19, 1904)

The active actions of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers under the command of Jessen forced the Japanese government to send the bulk of transports with troops and military cargo to Korea and Manchuria through the Yellow Sea. Because of this, an order was received from Alekseev to proceed to the east coast of Japan for active operations on the routes of communication with America.

On July 7, 1904, a detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait and turned south. On July 9, the cruiser was inspected by the English steamer Arabiya; it was carrying contraband cargo; the ship was sent to Vladivostok. On July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here the English steamer Night Commender was inspected, carrying smuggled cargo, and sunk due to the lack of opportunity to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners were sunk, the German steamer Tea, which was traveling with smuggling, and the English steamer Kalhas was also captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. After this, the cruisers headed back to Vladivostok. On July 19, the cruisers arrived in Vladivostok.

The actions of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, excited the whole world. The world stock exchange reacted very actively to the actions of our cruisers; the price of freight increased greatly, but even high price could not stop some companies from refusing to operate flights to the shores of Japan.

Eighth campaign (July 30 - August 4). Battle in the Korean Strait (August 1, 1904)

On July 29, a telegram came from Admiral Alekseev to Vladivostok (which did not yet know about the results of the tragic battle on July 28), stating the order for the cruisers to immediately proceed to the Korean Strait. The purpose of this campaign for the detachment was to meet with Vitgeft’s squadron and provide assistance to him. But the telegram did not indicate which will go the way Vitgeft's detachment, as well as the exact time of his departure to sea is also unknown. Therefore, it was reported that the meeting was expected to take place north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were prohibited from entering south of the Fuzan parallel. According to the instructions, when meeting with Kamimura, the cruisers should retreat to Vladivostok, taking the Japanese with them. The cruiser should not be distracted by any other tasks during the cruise.

Early in the morning of July 30, "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" left Vladivostok. On the morning of August 1, in the southern part of the Korea Strait, as was written in the order, a detachment of cruisers stopped to wait for Vitgeft's squadron.

Cruiser IJN Iwate

When it began to get light, at 4:50 a.m., signalmen from the Rossiya spotted four ships that were sailing parallel to the detachment. The cruisers IJN Izumo, IJN Tokiwa, IJN Azuma and IJN Iwate were soon identified. Enemy ships cut off the detachment's path to retreat to Vladivostok. The fight was inevitable.

The battle began at 5:20 am. The Japanese cruisers were the first to open fire. Soon retaliatory salvos followed from "Russia" and "Gromoboya". Immediately there were strong explosions at IJN Iwate and at IJN Azuma. The beginning of the battle was left to the Russian cruisers. As it became known later, a heavy shell hit IJN Iwate, destroying three 152 mm and one 75 mm guns.

But soon the Japanese artillerymen took aim and began hitting Russian ships, killing and wounded appeared. Around the fourteenth minute of the battle, a fire started on the Rurik. The fire disabled the cruiser, but not for long. The fire was soon put out. About 40 minutes after the start of the battle, the light cruiser IJN Naniwa approached the Japanese to help. The Russian cruisers changed course and headed northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, took a parallel course.

About an hour after the start of the battle, “Rurik” suffered the fate that experts predicted immediately upon entering service: a Japanese shell, hitting the unprotected tiller compartment, disabled the steering. And the cruiser raised a signal: “The steering wheel does not work.” The cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboy" turned around to help the damaged "Rurik". But they could not fix the damage on the Rurik.

Seeing that there was no way to help the damaged cruiser, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment decided to break through to Vladivostok. Kamimura, with his detachment, pursued the Russian cruisers, but the light cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho remained to fight the immobilized Rurik.

The battle ended at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy ships ceased fire and turned back.

Kamimura’s decision was influenced by the following factors: casualties among personnel; shortage of shells and damage to ships. In addition, he did not know about the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea and had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or start a battle with the Russian squadron that had broken through from Port Arthur.

Cruiser "Rurik"

"Rurik" continued to fight the Japanese cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho, but soon all its guns were knocked out, almost the entire command staff was killed or wounded. The cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Trusov, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Khlodovsky died from their wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; almost half of the entire crew was out of action.

When Kamimura's cruisers, who had returned from the chase, began to approach the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, in order to prevent the ship from being captured, decided to scuttle it by opening the seams.

According to data from Japanese cruisers, at half past ten o'clock the cruiser "Rurik" completely disappeared under water. Outdated and poorly armored, it fought for five hours against superior enemy ships. The behavior of his team was heroic.

According to Japanese official figures, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. But according to other sources, on IJN Iwate alone, one shell killed 40 people and wounded 37. The flagship IJN Izuma had up to 20 holes; the cruiser IJN Azuma received 10 shells, IJN Tokiwa - several shells.

Last actions (August 1904 - November 1905)

The battle in the Korea Strait was actually the detachment's last active combat action. Due to the weak capacity of the repair base of the Vladivostok port, the repair of serious damage on the Rossiya and Gromoboe took a long time.

On October 13, 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy, immediately after repairs, ran into rocks while moving to Posyet Bay and spent the entire winter in the dock undergoing repairs.

In the spring of 1905, the detachment made a small raid on Hokkaido and sank the schooners IJN Yaya-Maru, IJN Senrio-Maru, IJN Koyo-Maru and IJN Hokuzey-Maru.

In the summer of 1905, in view of the real threat of the war spreading to the Russian mainland (Sakhalin was captured by the Japanese in July 1905) and the creation of a unified regional defense command headed by the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General G.N. Kazbek subordinated the detachment of cruisers to the head of the Separate detachment of ships assigned to protect the waters of the Ussuri region (led by the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve).

On November 11, 1905, in accordance with the instructions of the General Naval Staff (dated October 11), a detachment of cruisers set out for the European part of Russia. On March 30, 1906, upon arrival in Libau, the detachment's headquarters ended the campaign, and the detachment itself was disbanded.

Conclusion

The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers did not fully live up to the hopes that the Admiralty had placed on it. But still, during the entire raid, the detachment sunk 3 Japanese transports, 5 Japanese steamers, 1 English steamer, 1 German steamer and 14 sailing schooners. In addition, 4 foreign ships were captured (2 of which were later released) and 1 Japanese schooner.

But the experience of raiding enemy communications during the Russo-Japanese War was the basis for the German action plan for their raiders (auxiliary cruisers) at the very beginning of the First World War.