The Battle of Tsushima took place on May 14-15, 1905 in the Tsushima Strait between the East China and Sea of Japan. In this grandiose naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated by the Japanese squadron. The Russian ships were commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky (1848-1909). The Japanese naval forces were led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934). As a result of the battle, most of the ships of the Russian squadron were sunk, others capitulated, some broke through to neutral ports, and only 3 ships managed to complete the combat mission. They reached Vladivostok.
Campaign of the Russian squadron to Vladivostok
The battle was preceded by an unprecedented transition of the Russian squadron from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan. This path was 33 thousand km. But why would a large number of a wide variety of ships perform such a feat? The idea of creating the 2nd Pacific Squadron arose in April 1904. They decided to form it to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron, based in Port Arthur.
On January 27, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, without declaring military action, attacked Port Arthur and opened fire on the warships stationed in the outer roadstead. Access to the open sea was blocked. Twice the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron tried to break out into operational space, but these attempts ended in failure. Thus, Japan gained complete naval superiority. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and gunboats were locked in Port Arthur. There are 44 warships in total.
At that time, there were 3 cruisers and 6 old-style destroyers in Vladivostok. 2 cruisers were blown up by mines, and the destroyers were only suitable for short-term naval operations. In addition, the Japanese blocked the port of Vladivostok, which led to the complete neutralization of the naval forces of the Russian Empire in Far East.
That is why they began to form a new squadron in the Baltic. If Russia had seized primacy at sea, the course of the entire Russo-Japanese War could have changed dramatically. By October 1904, a new powerful naval formation was formed, and on October 2, 1904, the great sea voyage began.
The squadron, headed by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, consisted of 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 battleship cruiser, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 6 transport ships and 2 hospital ships. The squadron was armed with 228 guns. Of these, 54 guns had a caliber of 305 mm. There were a total of 16,170 personnel, but this includes those ships that joined the squadron already during the voyage.
Campaign of the Russian squadron
The ships reached Cape Skagen (Denmark), and then divided into 6 detachments, which were supposed to unite in Madagascar. Some of the ships moved through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. And the other part was forced to go around Africa, since these ships had a deep landing and could not pass through the canal. It should be immediately noted that during the voyage, tactical exercises and live firing were carried out very rarely. Neither the officers nor the sailors believed in the success of the event. Hence the low morale, which is crucial in any company.
December 20, 1904 Port Arthur fell, and the naval forces going to the Far East were clearly not enough. Therefore, it was decided to create the 3rd Pacific Squadron. And before that, on November 3, a detachment of ships under the command of captain 1st rank Dobrotvorsky Leonid Fedorovich (1856-1915) was poisoned in pursuit of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron. Under his command were 4 cruisers and 5 destroyers. This detachment arrived in Madagascar on February 1st. But 4 destroyers were sent back due to systematic breakdowns.
In February, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849-1922) left Libau. The detachment included 4 battleships, 1 battleship cruiser and several auxiliary ships. On February 26, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was caught up by the Irtysh transport with large reserves of coal. At the beginning of the journey, the legendary Lieutenant Schmidt was his senior mate. But in the Mediterranean Sea he began to develop renal colic, and the future hero of the revolutionary uprising was sent to Sevastopol on the cruiser Ochakov.
In March, the squadron crossed the Indian Ocean. Warships were replenished with coal using longboats that transported it from transport ships. On March 31, the squadron arrived in Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). Here she waited for Nebogatov’s detachment, which joined the main forces on April 26.
On May 1, the last tragic stage of the campaign began. Russian ships left the coast of Indochina and headed towards Vladivostok. It should be noted that Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky accomplished a real feat. Under his command, the most difficult 220-day transition of a huge squadron was carried out. She crossed the waters of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. We must also pay tribute to the courage of the officers and sailors. They survived this transition, and yet there was not a single naval base on the ships’ route.
Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Heihachiro Togo
On the night of May 13-14, 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Tsushima Strait. The ships sailed darkened and could easily pass through a dangerous place unnoticed. But the Japanese patrol cruiser Izumi discovered the hospital ship Orel, which was sailing at the end of the squadron. All the lights were on on it in accordance with maritime regulations. The Japanese ship approached and spotted other ships. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was immediately notified of this.
The Japanese naval forces included 4 battleships, 8 battleship cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 42 destroyers and 21 destroyers. The squadron consisted of 910 guns, 60 of which had a caliber of 305 mm. The entire squadron was divided into 7 combat detachments.
Russian ships sailed through the Tsushima Strait, leaving the island of Tsushima on the left side. The Japanese cruisers began to follow a parallel course, hiding in the fog. At about 7 o'clock in the morning the enemy was discovered. Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the squadron to form into 2 wake columns. Transport ships, covered by cruisers, remained in the rearguard.
At 13:20, at the exit from the Tsushima Strait, Russian sailors saw the main forces of the Japanese. These were battleships and battleship cruisers. They walked perpendicular to the course of the Russian squadron. The enemy cruisers began to fall behind in order to position themselves behind the Russian ships.
The defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait
Rozhestvensky rebuilt the squadron into one wake column. After the rebuilding was completed, the distance between the opponents was 38 cables (just over 7 km). The Vice Admiral ordered to open fire. The Japanese returned fire a couple of minutes later. They concentrated it on the lead ships. Thus began the Battle of Tsushima.
Here you need to know that the squadron speed of the Japanese fleet was 16-18 knots. And for the Russian fleet this value was 13-15 knots. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Japanese to stay ahead of the Russian ships. At the same time, they gradually shortened the distance. At 14 o'clock it became equal to 28 cables. It is approximately 5.2 km.
The artillery on Japanese ships had a high rate of fire (360 rounds per minute). And Russian ships fired only 134 shots per minute. In terms of high-explosive capabilities, Japanese shells were 12 times superior to Russian ones. As for the armor, it covered 61% of the area of Japanese ships, while for the Russians this figure was 41%. All this already predetermined the outcome of the battle from the very beginning.
At 14:25 the flagship "Prince Suvorov" was disabled. Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, who was on it, was wounded. At 14:50, having received numerous holes in the bow, the battleship Oslyabya sank. The Russian squadron, having lost its overall leadership, continued to move in a northerly direction. She tried to maneuver to increase the distance between herself and the enemy ships.
At 6 p.m., Rear Admiral Nebogatov took command of the squadron, and the Emperor Nicholas I became the flagship ship. By this time, 4 battleships had been destroyed. All ships were damaged. The Japanese also suffered damage, but none of their ships were sunk. Russian cruisers walked in a separate column. They also repelled enemy attacks.
As darkness fell, the battle did not subside. Japanese destroyers systematically fired torpedoes at the ships of the Russian squadron. As a result of this shelling, the battleship Navarin sank and 3 battleship cruisers lost control. The teams were forced to scuttle these ships. During the same time, the Japanese lost 3 destroyers. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at night the Russian ships lost contact with each other, so they had to act independently. Under the leadership of Nebogatov, 4 battleships and 1 cruiser remained.
From the early morning of May 15, the main part of the Russian squadron tried to break through to the north to Vladivostok. 3 cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist turned south. Among them was the cruiser Aurora. They managed to break through the Japanese defenses and escape to Manila, but at the same time they abandoned the transport ships without protection.
The main detachment, led by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, was surrounded by the main Japanese forces. Nikolai Ivanovich was forced to give the order to stop resistance and surrender. It happened at 10:34 am. The destroyer Bedovy, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky was located, also surrendered. Only the cruiser "Izumrud" managed to break through the encirclement and went towards Vladivostok. It ran aground near the shore and was blown up by the crew. Thus, it did not fall to the enemy.
Losses for May 15 were as follows: the Japanese sunk 2 battleships that fought independently, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer. 3 destroyers were sunk by their crews, and one managed to break through and go to Shanghai. Only the cruiser Almaz and 2 destroyers managed to reach Vladivostok.
Russian and Japanese losses
The Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian fleet lost 5,045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were captured, including 2 admirals. 2,110 people went to foreign ports and were then interned. 910 people managed to break through to Vladivostok.
Of the ships, 7 battleships, 1 battleship-cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 vehicles were sunk and blown up. The enemy got 4 battleships, 1 destroyer and 2 hospital ships. 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 2 transport ships were interned. Of the entire squadron of 38 ships, only the cruiser "Almaz" and 2 destroyers - "Grozny" and "Brave" - remained. They managed to break through to Vladivostok. From this it is clear that the defeat was complete and final.
The Japanese suffered significantly fewer losses. 116 people were killed and 538 were injured. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. The remaining ships escaped with only damage.
Reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron
For the Russian squadron, it would be more correct to call the Battle of Tsushima the Tsushima disaster. Experts see the main reason for the total destruction in the movement of ships in a wake column at low speed. The Japanese simply shot the lead battleships one by one and thereby predetermined the death of the entire squadron.
Here, of course, the main blame falls on the shoulders of the Russian admirals. They didn't even make a battle plan. Maneuvers were carried out hesitantly, the battle formation was inflexible, and control of the ships was lost during the battle. And the combat training of the personnel was at a low level, since practically no tactical training was conducted with people during the campaign.
But for the Japanese it was not like that. They seized the initiative from the first minutes of the battle. Their actions were distinguished by decisiveness and courage, and the ship commanders showed initiative and independence. The personnel had extensive combat experience behind them. We must also not forget about technical superiority Japanese ships. All this together brought them victory.
One cannot help but mention the low morale of Russian sailors. He was influenced by fatigue after a long march, the capitulation of Port Arthur, and revolutionary unrest in Russia. People felt the complete meaninglessness of this entire grand expedition. As a result, the Russian squadron lost the battle even before it began.
The finale of the whole epic was the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on August 23, 1905. But the main thing was that Japan felt its strength and began to dream of great conquests. Her ambitious dreams continued until 1945, when Soviet troops did not put an end to them, completely defeating the Kwantung Army.
Alexander Arsentiev
The Battle of Tsushima is the final period in the Russo-Japanese War. It happened on May 14, 1905 inside the Korea Strait. The forces were distributed approximately like this: the Russians had 8 squadron ships, 3 coastline battleships, 8 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and 5 auxiliary cruisers; The Japanese had 4 squadron battleships, 6 coastline battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. The Russian squadron was led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and the fleet of the Japanese Empire was led by Admiral Togo. The main forces of the Russian side were formed into three groups of four ships. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was on the battleship Suvorov. The fleet of the Empire of Japan was divided into eight detachments, two of which included squadron armored ships led by Togo and Kamimura.
In quantitative terms, the Russian fleet was not inferior to the Japanese. But the Japanese had much more large-caliber and medium-caliber weapons. The Russians were also inferior to the Japanese in the rate of fire. Japanese shells also had more explosives. Moreover, the Japanese were much more experienced than the sailors of the Russian Empire, who did not undergo such long training in shooting at different distances.
On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait, forming a marching order. Admiral Rozhdestvensky made a huge mistake by not giving the order for reconnaissance and not darkening the ship. Because of this, it was not difficult for the Japanese to notice the Russians. They were first discovered by the auxiliary cruiser, which informed Togo about this. Rozhdestvensky decided not to interfere with negotiations between Japanese courts. As soon as Togo learned about the location of the Russians, he sent his main forces to the enemy. It was planned to encircle the main forces of the Russian fleet, and, having disabled it, completely destroy the entire squadron at night.
On May 14, towards the morning, Rozhdestvensky formed the fleet into two wake columns. At half past two in the afternoon, the Russian squadron discovered a Japanese ship. The fleet was rebuilt again, but the opportune moment to attack the Japanese fleet was not used. 19 minutes after discovering the enemy, the Russians opened fire, but it was useless. The Japanese fired at the Suvorov and Oslyabya from six battleships and cruisers. By half past three both of these ships were out of action. After this, until the morning of May 15, almost the entire Russian fleet was destroyed due to the complete dispersal of the fleet. About five ships were captured: among them there were 4 battleships and one destroyer. Only two destroyers and the cruiser Almaz managed to survive and reach Vladivostok.
The Battle of Tsushima is a demonstration of the influence of large-caliber artillery on which side will have the advantage in the battle. Medium-caliber weapons did not particularly influence the outcome of the battle. For Russia, this battle showed the need to develop an updated form of artillery fire control and introduce torpedo weapons.
It's hard to say what and how it really happened. None of those who were at that moment with Admiral Rozhestvensky on the bridge of the flagship battleship, except the admiral himself, survived the battle. And Admiral Rozhestvensky himself remained silent on this matter, never explaining anywhere the motives and reasons for his actions in the battle. Let's try to do it for him. Offering your version of these events. Events that had such a strong impact on the fate of Russia.
In May 1905, the Russian squadron slowly entered the Tsushima Strait. And it seemed that everything was done to ensure that enemy patrol ships discovered her. The squadron was accompanied by several transport and auxiliary ships. Which limited her speed to 9 knots. And two hospital ships, according to the requirements of that time, shone with all the lights, like New Year trees. And the very first line of Japanese patrols discovered Russian ships. And precisely along these “trees”. Japanese radio stations immediately started broadcasting information about Russian ships. And the main forces of the Japanese fleet came out to meet the Russian squadron. Radio stations that also worked non-stop. Realizing the danger, the commanders of the Russian ships suggested to the squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. And the commander of the auxiliary cruiser "Ural", which had a first-class radio station for its time, proposed to jam the work of Japanese radio stations.
Hospital ship "Eagle".
Auxiliary cruiser "Ural". Four more similar ships separated from the Russian squadron and began raiding operations off the coast of Japan. "Ural" remained with the squadron.
But the admiral forbade everything. And open fire on Japanese intelligence officers and jam their radio stations. Instead, he ordered the squadron to be reorganized from a marching order to a combat one. That is, from two columns into one. But 40 minutes before the start of the battle, Rozhdestvensky ordered to rebuild the squadron again. Exactly the opposite: from one column to two. But now these columns of battleships were positioned with a ledge to the right. And as soon as the Russians finished rebuilding, the smoke of the ships of the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon. The commander of which, Admiral Togo, was completing a maneuver that guaranteed him victory. All he had to do was turn right. And place the formation of your ships across the movement of the Russian squadron. Bringing down the fire of all its guns on the enemy's lead ship.
Admiral Togo
But when he saw that the Russian battleships were moving in marching order, Admiral Togo turned left instead. To get closer to the weakest ships of the Russian squadron. Intending to attack them first. And immediately, the Russian squadron began to reform into one column. And opening fire, she literally bombarded the Japanese flagship with a hail of shells. At some point in the battle, six Russian ships fired simultaneously at the Japanese flagship. In a short 15 minutes, the “Japanese” was hit by more than 30 large-caliber shells. Admiral Rozhdestvensky did what the navy commander exists for, he led his squadron without losses and outplayed the Japanese admiral. Forcing him to expose his ships to the concentrated fire of rapidly approaching Russian battleships.
Scheme of the beginning of the Battle of Tsushima.
Rozhdestvensky did what he wanted, taking advantage of the only chance to win. He gave the enemy the opportunity to identify the squadron, made it clear that it was slow-moving and was traveling through the eastern, narrow strait. He did not interfere with the transmission of information by intelligence officers. And the work of the radio stations of the main forces of the Japanese. And at the last moment, before the collision, he rebuilt the squadron. Precisely timing the collision. Knowing that Admiral Togo will not have time to receive decrypted information about his maneuver.
The battleship Sagami leads a convoy of ships
Most likely, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was also counting on the two armored cruisers located in Vladivostok. Which three days before the Battle of Tsushima left the port. According to the official version, to check the operation of radio stations. But just in time to approach the Tsushima Strait together with the main forces of the Russian fleet. But then chance intervened. A year before, the Japanese had laid a minefield on the fairway. Several times Russian cruisers freely passed this minefield. But it was on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima that the flagship of this detachment, the armored cruiser Gromoboy, touched a mine and failed. The detachment returned to Vladivostok. Depriving Admiral Rozhdestvensky of the opportunity to strengthen his squadron during the battle. The fact that this was planned is indicated by the presence of the same auxiliary cruiser “Ural” in the squadron. Designed for raider operations on communications and completely unsuited for squadron combat. But it has the best radio station in the squadron. With the help that was supposed to lead the cruiser from Vladivostok to the battlefield.
The armored cruiser "Gromoboy" in the dry dock of Vladivostok.
Admiral Rozhdestvensky did this, knowing exactly where the Japanese squadron was located. And the Japanese themselves helped him in this. More precisely, their radio stations. Experienced radio operators, by the strength of the radio signal, or by the “spark”, as they said then, can determine the distance to another radio station. The narrow strait indicated the exact direction towards the enemy, and the signal strength of Japanese radio stations showed the distance to him. The Japanese expected to see one column of Russian ships. And they saw two, and hastened to attack the weakest ships. But the Russian columns moved in a ledge to the right. This gave Rozhdestvensky the opportunity to rebuild the squadron and try to attack the weakest Japanese ships himself. Covering which Admiral Togo was forced to continue the maneuver. Literally deploying their battleships sequentially. This is how he exposed his flagship to the concentrated fire of the best Russian ships. At this moment, about 30 large-caliber shells hit the Japanese flagship. And the next in line was battleship 18. In principle, this was enough to disable the enemy ships. But unfortunately, only in principle.
Damage to Russian and Japanese battleships in battle.
Paradoxically, the biggest Japanese secret of that time was Russian shells. More precisely, their insignificant impact on enemy ships. In pursuit of armor penetration, Russian engineers reduced the weight of the projectile by 20% in relation to foreign projectiles of a similar caliber. Which predetermined the higher speed of shells from Russian guns. And in order to make their shells safe, they were equipped with gunpowder-based explosives. It was assumed that, having penetrated the armor, the shell would explode behind it. For this purpose, they installed very crude fuses that did not explode even if they hit an unarmored part of the side. But the power of the explosives in the shells was sometimes not enough, even to explode the shell itself. And as a result, Russian shells, hitting the ship, left a neat round hole. Which the Japanese quickly repaired. And the fuses of the Russian shells were not up to par. The firing pin turned out to be too soft and did not puncture the primer. And Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was generally supplied with defective shells. With a high moisture content, in explosives. As a result, even the shells that hit Japanese ships did not explode en masse. It was the quality of the Russian shells that predetermined that the Japanese ships withstood the massive fire of the Russians. And they themselves, taking advantage of the advantage in squadron speed, began to cover the head of the Russian column. Here there is even a doubt that if the Japanese did not know about the mediocre quality of Russian shells, then Togo would have risked carrying out his risky maneuver. No, he could not know about the disgusting quality of the shells supplied to the second squadron. But it is quite possible that he correctly assessed the risk to his ships and carried out his maneuver. Which will later be called brilliant, but which no naval commander in his right mind would accomplish. And as a result, the Japanese won the Battle of Tsushima. Despite the heroism of the Russians and Rozhdestvensky’s victory at the maneuver stage of the battle.
Painting dedicated to the heroic death of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"
And yet Rozhdestvensky is personally to blame for this defeat. As the chief of the Main Naval Staff, he personally supervised technical issues in the fleet. And it was on his conscience that these unusable shells turned out to be. And in the Japanese fleet, there were 2 ships that could have been part of its squadron. But which he personally so recklessly refused. 2 armored cruisers were built in Italy for Argentina. The ships were already ready when the customer refused them. And the Italians offered these ships to Russia. But Rozhdestvensky, being the chief of the Naval Staff, refused them. Motivating that these ships do not fit the type of the Russian fleet. They approached the Japanese fleet. The Japanese immediately bought them up. And as soon as these ships reached Japan, the war began. At the same time, there was a squadron of two battleships, three cruisers and more than a dozen destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea. Heading to the Pacific Ocean. And the idea was put forward to accompany these ships with our own ships. And under the threat of destroying these ships, prevent war from breaking out until our fleet is strengthened. But for this, it was necessary to leave the destroyers without the supervision of large ships. And Rozhdestvensky forbade escorting the Japanese, ordering destroyers to be escorted. As a result, this squadron, before the start of the war, did not manage to strengthen our Pacific Fleet. But the armored cruisers bought by the Japanese made it in time.
Armored cruiser "Kasuga", which could also serve in the Russian Imperial Navy
Admiral Rozhestvensky, quite rightly, could show himself to be one of the greatest naval commanders in Russia. Who led the fleet across three oceans without loss, and did everything to defeat the Japanese. But as an administrator, he lost the war before it even began. Having missed the opportunity to strengthen your fleet, weaken the enemy fleet. And failing to provide the forces entrusted to him with ammunition of adequate quality. This is how he disgraced his name. Eventually being captured by the Japanese.
A ship that lives up to its name. On it, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was captured by the Japanese.
As we know, ignorance of history leads to its repetition. And the underestimation of the role of defective shells in the Battle of Tsushima once again played a negative role in our history. In another place and at another time. In the summer of 1941, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. At that time, our main tank and anti-tank ammunition was the 45-mm shell. Which was supposed to confidently penetrate the armor of German tanks up to 800 meters. But in reality, our tanks and anti-tank guns This caliber was useless from 400 meters. The Germans identified this immediately and established a safe distance for their tanks at 400 meters. It turned out that in the pursuit of increasing the production of shells, there was a violation of the technology and their manufacture. And overheated, and therefore more fragile, shells were sent en masse. Which simply split when they hit German armor. Without causing much harm to German tanks. And they allowed German tank crews to shoot our soldiers almost unhindered. Just like the Japanese did to our sailors at Tsushima.
45mm projectile mockup
The task, frankly speaking, is unrealistic. However, historians view all the actions of the tsarist government of Russia at the beginning of the last century as nothing more than a “chain of absurdities.” When the Japanese took the Kwantung Peninsula from China (1895), Russia, being at that moment much stronger than Japan, instead of diplomatic pressure, as Europe always did with it, simply bought the peninsula for 400 million gold rubles. At that time, the most first-class battleship cost 10 million. It was with this money that the samurai were then able to create a powerful fleet. No wonder smart people they joked bitterly: “Russia itself gave loans for its own defeat.”
On the night of May 14, 1905, Rozhdestvensky introduced the squadron into the Korea Strait in the following composition: five new squadron battleships (four of the Borodino and Oslyabya type), three old squadron battleships (Navarin, Sysoy Velikiy and Emperor Nicholas I"), an armored cruiser ("Admiral Nakhimov"), three coastal defense battleships ("Admiral Ushakov" type), four cruisers of the first rank and the same number of the second, nine destroyers and eight transports. The crews numbered 12 thousand people. The Russian squadron was waiting in the strait for the Japanese fleet consisting of four battleships, eight armored cruisers, 15 cruisers and 63 destroyers and torpedo boats. At first glance, the Russian squadron was not inferior to the Japanese squadron in terms of the number of armored ships (12 to 12), but inferior to it in quality. We will not dwell on the details of the battle; they are presented quite fully, moreover, for each ship, in the issues of Scientific and Technical Sciences for - years.
At 12:05 on May 14, the Russian squadron entered the battle in the formation of two wake columns: the eastern column was led by Z. P. Rozhestvensky himself on the battleship “Prince Suvorov”, the western column was led by the battleship “Oslyabya”. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934), decided to use the technique described by S. O. Makarov - covering the head of the wake column with the sequential destruction of the lead ships. At 13:49 the battle began. At first, Togo missed: he believed that the Russians had a speed of 12 knots, while they gave only 9. The Japanese admiral was forced to either take a risk - make a turn to the left, or delay the maneuver indefinitely. It is difficult to imagine how events would have unfolded if instead of Togo there had been a less decisive person on the bridge of the flagship, but he took the risk, although he understood that with an active attack by the Russians he would suffer heavy losses. But after 15 minutes, maneuvering at a speed of at least 16 knots, the Japanese fleet still managed to take an advantageous position (put a kind of stick on the letter T) and conduct concentrated on-board fire on the Suvorov and Oslyab. The shooting lasted only 10 minutes, after which the Japanese literally bombarded the Russian lead ships with shells. The entire brunt of the battle was borne by the five front ships against 12 enemy ships.
Although Japanese high-explosive shells did not penetrate armor, since even the new Russian ships had more than 60% of their sides unarmored, they caused great destruction and caused fires. In addition, well-trained Japanese gunners achieved a rate of fire almost twice as high as the Russians. To top off all the troubles, Rozhdestvensky at this time began to rebuild the ships from two into one column, so they reduced their already low speed.
At 14:25 the burning Oslyabya broke down and 15 minutes later capsized and sank. At 14:30, the Prince Suvorov went out of action, but for another five hours it repelled attacks from enemy cruisers and destroyers until it was sunk by torpedoes. So, 40 minutes after the start of the battle, the Russian squadron lost two modern battleships. The Russian ships also tried to conduct concentrated fire on one of the Japanese battleships, but due to lack of experience in controlling fire at a long distance, they were unable to do this.
The descending fog interrupted the battle for almost half an hour. But at 15:40 the squadrons met again. The Japanese again managed to capture the head of the Russian column. “Sysoy the Great” walked ahead. Unable to withstand the massive fire, he left the formation after 10 minutes. Its place was taken by the battleship of the guards crew "Emperor" Alexander III" The ship steadfastly led the squadron for almost three hours, but at 18:30 it broke down, and 20 minutes later it capsized and sank. The Borodino, which became the lead ship, on which the fire of the entire Japanese fleet was now concentrated, also capsized at 19:10. The last of the remaining new ships, the battleship "Eagle", which after the death of the "Borodino" was the lead ship, was also severely damaged until it was overtaken by the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I", where the junior flagship, Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849-1922), was located. So in a daytime battle the Russian squadron lost its best ships.
During the Battle of Tsushima, just 50 minutes after the first shot, a Russian 305-mm armor-piercing shell pierced the 6-inch frontal armor of the main caliber stern turret of the Japanese battleship Fuji and exploded directly above the breech of the left twelve-inch gun. The force of the explosion threw overboard a heavy armored counterweight plate covering the rear of the turret. Everyone who was in it was put out of action (eight people were killed, nine were wounded). But the most important thing is that the hot fragments ignited the powder charges raised from the cellars.
At the same time, over 100 kilograms of artillery gunpowder ignited, fiery splashes flew in all directions, and the flames ran down the elevator. Another second and instead of the battleship there was a column of thick black smoke hundreds of meters high and debris flying in the air. English cordite gunpowder was very prone to explosion when burned quickly. But in this situation, Admiral Togo’s ship was fabulously lucky: one of the fragments broke the hydraulic line, and the water gushing out under enormous pressure extinguished the dangerous fire, and did it no worse than a modern automatic fire extinguishing system.
Who knows what turn the whole battle would have taken when, almost at the very beginning, one of the four Japanese battleships had taken off. Of course, even if this would not change the fate of the entire battle, it would at least somewhat brighten up the shame of the severe defeat of the Russian fleet.
After sunset, at 20:15, the Japanese threw their 63 destroyers at the remains of the Russian squadron. By this time, the squadron ceased to exist as an organized fighting force; each ship acted on its own.
The cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh were the first to be torpedoed. Then the battleships Sysoy Veliky and Navarin received fatal blows. After this, only weak or outdated battleships remained in the Russian squadron (the new squadron battleship "Eagle" had by this time exhausted its combat capabilities). In the morning, Japanese ships intercepted and sunk the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov and the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana. The commander of the newest cruiser "Oleg", captain of the first rank Dobrotvorsky, considering that after the death of the battleships, a breakthrough to Vladivostok would lose all meaning, he decided to retreat to the south. “Aurora” and “Pearl” stood in his wake. The direct duty of these cruisers was to let the battleships through to the southwest and protect them from attacks by enemy destroyers, but they did the exact opposite - they abandoned them in the night without protecting them from mine attacks. This detachment of fast ships headed for Manila, where on May 21 the cruisers were disarmed and interned until the end of the war. The same fate befell the destroyer Bodriy and two transports.
On May 15, at 11 o’clock, the remaining ships (the battleships “Orel”, “Nicholas I”, the cruiser “Izumrud” and two coastal defense battleships) that made up the squadron of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, who took command after Rozhdestvensky was wounded, were surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet and by order of the admiral, St. Andrew's flags were lowered. Nebogatov subsequently motivated his decision to surrender by the desire to save two thousand lives from inevitable and useless death. It is, of course, possible to explain his action by humanistic considerations, but it is impossible to justify him on the basis of honor. On the battleship "Eagle" an attempt was made to scuttle the ship by opening the kingstons, which was noticed and stopped in time by the Japanese. In captivity, the sailors of the ships that surrendered without a fight met with a sharply hostile attitude from other Russian prisoners. The high-speed "Emerald" (25 knots), having heard the signal to surrender, did not carry it out. The cruiser made a breakthrough and easily broke away from the enemy. However, when approaching Vladivostok, it ran aground at night and was blown up by its crew.
The ships of the Pacific squadron traveled 33 thousand kilometers from Kronstadt to Tsushima and immediately entered the battle, in which on May 14-15, 1905, the Russian fleet suffered the heaviest defeat in its entire three-century history. The Battle of Tsushima ended with the almost complete destruction of the Russian squadron: out of 17 ships of the first rank, 11 were killed, two were interned, and four fell into enemy hands. Of the four second-rank cruisers, two were killed, one was interned, and only Almaz reached Vladivostok, two destroyers also arrived there. More than 5 thousand people (including 209 officers and 75 conductors) died ( in Tallinn (Estonia) Orthodox church Alexander Nevsky, to the right of the main entrance, there are two large plaques hanging on the wall with the names of sailors who died in the Battle of Tsushima), and 803 were injured (172 officers, 13 conductors). There were 7,282 sailors in Japanese captivity, among whom was the squadron commander, Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky. The losses of the Japanese fleet were much more modest: three destroyers were sunk, several ships were badly damaged, 116 people were killed, 538 were wounded. The consequence of Russia’s defeat in the war was its transformation from a subject into an object of the international politics of the great powers, i.e., its foreign policy became more dependent. The prestige of the empire's military power has been lost. From a country that had the third fleet in the world, Russia, having lost almost all the main forces of its fleet, turned into a minor naval power, like Austria-Hungary. The decline in Russia's prestige in the eyes of world powers led to the destabilization of the balance of power in the world, which became one of the many causes of the First World War.
Why did the Russian battleships die? For more than 100 years, Russian military historians and experts have wondered: how could this happen? A very common version is that the reason for the defeat was the complete mediocrity of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. However, this is not at all true. He was a capable organizer, had great energy, efficiency and willpower, strong character and perseverance, and was a demanding boss. In a word, he was an excellent administrator who was quite suitable for leading the difficult, unprecedented transition of the fleet to the Far East. However, for a real naval commander one must also have high tactical training, and most importantly, have the gift of foresight of a commander. Rozhdestvensky really lacked this, but at the same time, he did not make a single more or less serious mistake. Therefore, accusing a person of not being Nelson or Reuther is, to say the least, stupid. Of course, Rozhdestvensky was not mediocre, but he was not a genius either, and, alas, he could not perform such a miracle as the Dutch admiral did off the island of Texel (1673).
Damage to the battleship "Eagle" received in the Battle of Tsushima (photo 1905)
Many blame the admiral for the improper use of four new Borodino-class battleships with an 18-knot speed and turret-mounted medium-caliber artillery, built in 1901-1904. just counting on the supposed opponents. Indeed, if the 1st Armored Detachment had been a fully integrated formation with gunners well trained for squadron shooting and had it acted relatively independently on the battlefield, maneuvering at full speed, it could and should (according to calculations) turn the tide of the battle in favor of the Russian squadron. In fact, these ships in the same column with the “old men” were placed in completely abnormal conditions, which paralyzed their main combat advantages. The squadron's level of training hardly made it possible to implement this type of combat, since the battleships went into battle almost straight from the slipway.
Maybe it's the quality of the ships? If we compare the characteristics of the Russian battleships of the Borodino type and the Japanese type of Mikaza, we can see that the former are only slightly inferior to the latter only in the thickness of the armor. How then can we explain their inglorious death in the Battle of Tsushima?
The analysis of the sides' artillery explains a lot. Truly, the decision of the Marine Technical Committee (MTK) to adopt new lightweight projectiles for service in 1892, which should have contributed to a significant increase in their initial speed and, consequently, an increase in penetrating ability at short distances, had tragic consequences. This innovation was justified at combat distances of up to 2 miles (3.2 km), which Russian artillery regulations considered the limit. If a 305-mm projectile of the 1886 model weighed 445.5 kilograms, then the 1892 model weighed only 331.7 kilograms!
However, the general trend in the tactics of armored fleets, “not caught” by the MTK, was the rapid increase in combat distance, which reached 5-7 miles (9-13 km) in the Battle of Tsushima. This, as well as the use of smokeless powder, which almost tripled the range, negated almost all the advantages of light projectiles in close combat. But at long distances they had low penetrating ability and high dispersion. In addition, Russian shells had very little content explosive. There were often cases when shells did not explode when they hit an unarmored hull because they had a crude fuse. The flagship of the Japanese fleet, the battleship Mikaza, was hit by 30 Russian shells, 12 of which were 305 mm caliber. Most of them did not explode, and the Mikaza not only remained afloat, but also largely retained its combat effectiveness (105 killed and wounded). In principle, this number of “suitcases” should have been more than enough to sink it.
Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky understood well that it was impossible to engage in battle with untrained artillerymen. Therefore, while staying near the island of Madagascar, they planned multi-day artillery exercises. However, the steamship Irtysh, carrying ammunition for practical shooting, suffered an accident just before the squadron's departure. Another vessel was requested, but the transport was quickly repaired, and in early 1905 she joined the 2nd Squadron off the coast of Madagascar. To the displeasure of the squadron commander, the Irtysh delivered only coal and boots (?), and the expected shells, it turns out, were not planned at all.
One of the minor officials of the Ministry of Finance sent training shells “for greater safety” to the Far East by land. Quite sincerely arguing that you can study at the base, and the treasury will save 15 thousand rubles on transportation. While the transport that suffered the accident was being repaired in Libau, the shells were unloaded and sent along the Siberian Railway, without even finding it necessary to notify Z.P. Rozhestvensky about this. It was impossible to spend real ammunition on training purposes, so in three months only four firings were carried out at distances of up to 3 miles (5.4 km). It is interesting to note that the investigation did not find any selfish interests in the official’s actions. Our wise ancestors said correctly: “A fool is more dangerous than an enemy.” Alas, this attitude towards combat training of the army and navy in Russia has apparently been inherited by the modern Ministry of Finance.
Locks of the Russian turret 305-mm gun mod. 1895 Obukhov plant
Russian artillery had a low rate of fire due to the long time it took to open and close the locks of the 305-mm guns mod. 1895 and low speed ammunition supply. The elevation angles of the barrels were clearly insufficient for combat at long distances. The Japanese Armstrong guns gave the Russians a big head start in these matters. There were no good, modern sights either. New optical rangefinders have not yet been adopted by rangefinders. The training of the gunners of the new ships was at a low level, and they did not conduct the required number of firing exercises. They also did not have time to work out the organization of centralized fire control for several ships and the squadron as a whole. All this sharply reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire.
During the battle, deficiencies in the protection and design of the hull were revealed, which affected the survivability of the ships. The fire control devices were not covered by armor and failed upon the first hit. The ships were heavily overloaded, so much so that the armor belt almost completely went under water (the draft exceeded the design by almost a meter). That's why the Japanese fired high-explosive shells. In addition to “sinking” the armor, the overloaded ship quickly lost stability and instantly capsized. The main reason for the overload was the huge supply of coal (850 tons in excess of the norm), which the battleships were forced to take in order to reach Vladivostok. The speed decreased significantly due to intensive fouling of the underwater part of the hull during the many-month voyage in the tropics. All these troubles could have been avoided if additional forces had been transferred to the Far East in a timely manner. However, these design flaws were characteristic not only of Russians, but also of squadron battleships of all other countries. It became clear that the new battle conditions required fundamentally different ships. The battle revealed the high difficulty of zeroing in different caliber guns (with existing fire control systems), as well as the low importance of intermediate and medium caliber shells for hitting large enemy ships, which ultimately led to the abandonment of the existing principles of artillery armament placement in favor of dreadnoughts. That is, large artillery ships are no longer equipped with medium and intermediate caliber barrels.
His Serene Highness Prince Vice Admiral A. A. Lieven (1860-1914)
However, not everything comes down to technical aspects - the main reason for the defeat lies much deeper, and not only in the field of shipbuilding. “Many people blame our technology. The shells were bad, the ships were slow and poorly protected, the battleships capsized, etc. But most of these accusations are unjust. Of course, our factories are not up to par with English ones, but these shortcomings only lead to the fact that we have to spend more time and money to achieve the same goals. If we take a closer look at the main shortcomings of our technology, we will be convinced that they arise not so much from unsatisfactory execution as from an incorrect concept. Why are our shells bad? Not because they don’t know how to make them, but because there is an established opinion among artillerymen that these are the types of shells that should be fired. They were considered good..." This is what His Serene Highness Prince Vice Admiral Alexander Alexandrovich Lieven (1860-1914), chairman of the commission to describe the naval part of the Russo-Japanese War, wrote in 1908.
He further pointed out: “Battles are not lost on purpose. Therefore, I consider it right to say that the poor condition and unfortunate behavior of our fleet arose from unfamiliarity with the needs of war of all our personnel. Why did this happen? Because the thought of war was always relegated to the background as unpleasant. Propaganda of the ideas of universal peace found a particularly favorable ear in Russia. We built battleships and preached peace, rejoiced at the revival of the fleet and hoped with this fleet not to defeat the enemy, but to maintain friendly relations... Who hasn’t seen that our reviews and maneuvers are fake, that firing is too rare. But all this was tolerated, everything was justified by the lack of funds. After all, time was running out, no war was in sight... That’s why we lied in theory and surprised the world with our orders. And there is one root cause for all this - WE DIDN’T RECOGNIZE OURSELVES AS MILITARY.” In the issues of the “Ship Catalog” on Russian battleships, we tried to reveal to you, dear readers, the reasons for this state of affairs; as you remember, they were both objective and subjective in nature.
Why did this situation arise?
Peter the Great said: “A brave heart and a serviceable weapon - best protection states."
The serviceability of a weapon depends on those in whose hands it is. That is, on the state of the people’s spirit. What was the state of this essential element combat power before the war? Considering that these days it is very fashionable to throw mud at the entire past (and not only the Soviet one), let’s give the floor to the participants of the Russo-Japanese War themselves.
This is what General Alexander Andreevich Svechin (1878-1938), one of the most competent General Staff officers of that time, wrote on the eve of the war:
“From departments, in literature and in the press, there are views that nationalism is an outdated concept, that patriotism is not worthy of a modern “intellectual” who should equally love all humanity, that the army is the main brake on progress, etc. From the university environment, from literary circles, from the editorial offices, these ideas, destructive for any state, are spread in wide circles of Russian society, and every stupid person who joins them thereby, as it were, acquires a patent for the title of “advanced intellectual”...
The logical conclusion from such a worldview is the denial of all military virtues and contempt for military service, as a stupid and harmful activity... The Japanese army enters the battle, accompanied by the enthusiastic sympathies of all its people - from the highest strata to the lowest. Behind the back of the Russian army there will be a directly hostile attitude of our “advanced intelligentsia” and everything that imitates it. This is where Japan’s true strength and Russia’s weakness lies.” The practice of martial arts believes that the outcome of a fight, as a rule, is decided before it begins. In this regard, the personnel of the Russian squadron were psychologically prepared much less than Togo.
History repeats itself, because it has this property. Therefore, let’s end our dive into the sad past with the words of Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov: “Every military man or person involved in military affairs, in order not to forget why he exists, would do the right thing if he kept the inscription in a visible place - REMEMBER THE WAR "
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Retired captain 1st rank P.D. BYKOV
Preparation and march of the 2nd Pacific Squadron
The first months of the Russo-Japanese War clearly showed that the tsarist government was unprepared for war.Underestimation of the enemy's strength and military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained dominance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take measures to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.
The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his representations and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was reconsidered with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, called the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
The squadron was supposed to include ships that were nearing the end of construction, as well as some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was planned to buy 7 cruisers abroad.
Due to the fact that the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent problems, its sending was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of Chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.
Ship composition of the squadron
The main core of the squadron sent to the theater of operations consisted of four new battleships: “Alexander III”, “Prince Suvorov”, “Borodino” and “Eagle”, of which only the first was tested in 1903, the construction of the rest was completed after the start of the war , and they have not yet passed all the required tests. In particular, the battleship “Eagle” did not have time to test large-caliber artillery. These new modern battleships, which reached a speed of 18 knots, were heavily overloaded before leaving for the Far East, as they had to take on board increased supplies of ammunition and food. In addition, during the completion of the battleships, various auxiliary devices were installed on them that were not provided for in the original design. As a result, the draft was 0.9 m higher than designed, which increased the displacement of the battleships by 2000 tons. The consequence of this was a large decrease in their stability, as well as the survivability of the ships. Of the other battleships, only Oslyabya belonged to the modern ships that had already sailed. But it was a weakly armored ship, which also had 256 mm guns instead of 305 mm.
The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Navarin” were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305 mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203 mm cannons, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had the most various weapons, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the remaining ships were of an outdated design.
The cruisers that were part of the squadron were even more diverse in their tactical and technical elements. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, the modern ones were “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearl” and “Emerald”. The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, “Svetlana” and “Dmitry Donskoy” were old ships, and “Almaz” was an armed yacht.
Of the cruisers, two - “Pearl” and “Emerald” - were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. “Oleg” and “Aurora” had deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. “Svetlana” had a speed of 20 knots, and “Almaz” - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, “Dmitry Donskoy” had only 16 knots. The weakness and inadequacy of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to assign five armed high-speed steamers to the squadron as high-speed reconnaissance ships - “Ural”, “Kuban”, “Terek”, “Rion” and “Dnepr”, which at different times joined the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very little. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Bravey”, “Bodriy”, “Bystryy”, “Bedovyy”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Loudy” and “Groznyy”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and reached a speed of no more than 26 knots.
Despite the fact that the decision to send a squadron was made in April, its formation and equipment took a very long time.
The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new ships and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.
Personnel
The majority of the squadron's personnel arrived on the ships in the summer of 1904, and only the commanders and some specialists were appointed earlier and were on them during construction. Therefore, neither the officers nor the crew had enough time to study their ships well. In addition, on the ships of the squadron there were many young officers released early from the naval cadet corps due to the war, as well as called up from the reserve and transferred from the merchant fleet, the so-called “reserve warrant officers.” The former did not have sufficient knowledge and experience, the latter needed to update their knowledge; others, although they had experience and knowledge of maritime affairs, did not have any military training. This staffing of the ships of the squadron with officers was caused by the fact that there was only enough personnel to fill the most responsible positions on the ships.
Preparation and organization of the squadron
Before leaving the Baltic Sea, the squadron in full force never sailed, and only separate detachments of ships made several joint voyages. Therefore, practice in joint swimming and maneuvering was insufficient. During the short period of stay in Reval, the ships of the squadron were able to carry out a very limited number of firings, especially since the amount of practical ammunition received for this was less than expected. There was also not enough torpedo firing from destroyers. The material part of the torpedoes was not prepared, so during the first firing many torpedoes sank.
The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the shores of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationships and influence of detachment commanders on their subordinates and on the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with resolving various minor issues that could have been resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander itself did not have proper organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag captain was only the executor of the commander's orders. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each one worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.
Thus, when the squadron entered the theater of operations, it did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.
Organization and conditions of transition
Ensuring the transition of the squadron from the Baltic Sea to the theater of operations, provided that Russia did not have a single base of its own along its entire route (about 18,000 miles), was a very complex and difficult task.
First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repairs and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.
The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.
Due to the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the commander of the squadron decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on the island. Madagascar. For greater safety of the transition, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments regarding the squadron’s entry into any specific ports, since this would make its route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some private issues, such as the length of stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron’s anchorage, and the possibility of relations with the squadron en route, etc. Some private issues, such as the security of ships traveling through the Suez Canal, were resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, no diplomatic preparations for the transition were made.
Because of this, the transition of the squadron became extremely complicated due to protests from foreign countries when the squadron entered a particular port, a reduction in the stay period, and the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.
A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, since the time of arrival of the squadron to the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be made abroad, it was decided to involve foreign companies in this.
Thus, the possibility of the squadron moving to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their fulfillment of contracts. As one would expect, such an organization of supplies could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on the island. Madagascar.
The squadron commander was so concerned about supplying the squadron with coal that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships took increased food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be made on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign companies. To repair ships en route, the squadron was assigned a specially equipped ship-workshop “Kamchatka”. This ship and several other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.
The news of the Russian government sending such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely to assume that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire route of the squadron’s movement, up to and including a direct attack on the squadron and acts of sabotage.
The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it was looking for ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where the squadron could expect various surprises. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.
After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agents of the security department of the police department, which willingly took upon itself the organization of protecting the squadron’s route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent who were supposed to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.
All of the above measures did not guarantee uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, nor provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, protecting the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the established organization for guarding the squadron along the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident during the squadron’s passage of the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hullic Incident.”
Departure of the squadron and the Gull incident
The completion of new ships, supply issues, etc. - all this delayed the departure of the squadron. On August 29, the squadron arrived in Revel and, after staying there for about a month, moved to Libau to receive materials and replenish coal reserves; On October 2, the squadron set sail for the Far East. However, not all ships left on October 2. Two cruisers, some of the destroyers and transports were not yet ready and had to catch up with the squadron on the way.
The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about suspicious ships spotted and about an allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were supposed to weigh anchor sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. The first two detachments were destroyers, the next two were cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last to weigh anchor was a detachment of new battleships. Admiral Rozhestvensky considered this dismemberment of the squadron to be the most appropriate from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - the battleships.
However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of them colliding at night, in case of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not given the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would have given the main forces, who were also marching without security, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhestvensky in no way met the requirements for organizing the transition of the squadron in wartime.
The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22:00. About 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment was approaching the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the Kamchatka transport workshop reported on the radio that it was being attacked by destroyers.
As Dogger-bapka passed ahead of the detachment of battleships, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which were crossing the detachment’s course and approaching it. The squadron decided that the battleships were under attack and opened fire. But when the spotlights were turned on, it turned out that fishing boats had been shot. The fire was stopped. However, during the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left abeam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were noticed, on which fire was also opened. But after the first shots, it became clear that these were the Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. On the Aurora, two people were wounded and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.
Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel and arrived in Vigo (Spain) on October 13. Here the squadron stayed until the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called “Hull Incident,” was resolved.
There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in an alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which would worsen Russia's position in the Far East.
After the “Ghull Incident,” the British government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that arose, agreeing to compensate for losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.
Transition of the squadron to the island. Madagascar
On October 19, a detachment of new battleships left Vigo and on October 21 arrived in Tangier (North Africa), where by this time the entire squadron was concentrated. Having loaded coal, provisions and taken on water, the squadron, according to the previously developed plan, was divided into two detachments. The battleships “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin”, together with the cruisers “Svetlana”, “Zhemchug”, “Almaz” and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, went through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to Madagascar, where they were supposed to join the squadron again.
The voyage of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way took place without any particular complications. By December 15, all ships had reached their destination.
The remaining ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Orel”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with the transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. “Korea”, “Malaya” and “Meteor”, led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, went around Africa.
The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stopover along the way, and coal loading was carried out on the open sea. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long transitions. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. So, for example, new battleships took double the amount of coal - instead of one thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To accept such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in living decks, cockpits, mine artillery batteries and other places, which extremely constrained the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in intense heat on the ocean swell and waves was very difficult and time-consuming. On average, battleships took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and thus, the parking time was spent on loading and urgent repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, were left without rest. Moreover, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were filled with coal, it was impossible to conduct any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment arrived in Madagascar. Here Admiral Rozhestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.
On December 27, both detachments of the squadron united in Nosi-be Bay (west coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stay. Here the squadron stayed from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.
1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron and the need to strengthen it.
2. The need to repair some ships in the roadstead.
3. Complications in the further supply of fuel to the squadron.
The situation at the time of the squadron’s arrival in Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron’s campaign
The defeat of the Russian Manchurian Army and the 1st Pacific Squadron, which ended with the surrender of Port Arthur, caused serious concern in ruling spheres Russia. By getting involved in this adventure, the government hoped for an easy and quick victory. However, these calculations did not come true. Defeats at Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur are what the war brought Russia instead of the desired victory.
The moment the 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron the 2nd Pacific Squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of the squadron's further movement, since after Russia lost Port Arthur the squadron was forced to move. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,
Rozhdestvensky believed that due to the changed strategic situation, the squadron’s immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had completely failed. In this regard, Rozhestvensky was ordered to wait for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov in Madagascar.
The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud” and destroyers “Gromky” and “Grozny”, was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after Rozhestvensky left. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.
This squadron included the old squadron battleship “Nikolai I”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov” and the old armored cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”. “Nicholas I” was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305 mm guns. Coastal defense battleships were armed with 256 mm guns, which, although long-range, were not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. There was not a single modern ship in this squadron.
Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina
When Rozhdestvensky received news of the fall of Port Arthur and learned about the government’s point of view on the further goals and objectives of the 2nd squadron, he decided to go to the East alone, without waiting for the 3rd Pacific squadron, which he looked at only as a burden. Believing that the Japanese fleet would not have time to repair all the damage received during the blockade of Port Arthur and in the battles so quickly, Rozhdestvensky hoped that he would still be able to break through to Vladivostok, and decided to leave as soon as possible. The government allowed him to do this, but unexpected complications with coal supplies delayed the squadron's departure for almost two months.
Unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy renovation work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inaction due to the lack of coal and shells for practical shooting - all this had an extremely negative impact on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.
Discipline, which had noticeably decreased by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting commanding officers and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.
The lack of a supply of shells did not make it possible to make up for the most important deficiency—teaching the squadron to shoot. The Irtysh transport, which was loaded with additional ammunition for firing practice, was delayed when the squadron left Libau. There was an accident on it and it was abandoned for repairs. At the same time, the ammunition was unloaded from it, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhestvensky was not notified about this. After the repairs were completed, the Irtysh set out to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of much-needed ammunition for firing training en route. During their stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The squadron's joint maneuvering showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.
Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and stay on the island. Madagascar did not improve at all and it remained as before unprepared for the task.
On March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was able to move on and weighed anchor.
When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not communicate his further route in order to achieve secrecy of the transition. And at this time, the 3rd Pacific Squadron, which had left Libau in February, was en route to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East with the same goal, knew where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.
Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Along the way, coal was accepted six times on the open sea. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, dropped anchor in Cam Ranh Bay, where the ships had to carry out repairs, load coal and accept materials for further travel. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, it was joined by the 3rd Pacific Squadron.
The stops in Cam Ranh Bay and then in Van Phong Bay were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, and on the other, a Japanese attack could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg in which, citing poor health, he asked to be replaced by another commander upon arrival in Vladivostok.
Transition from Indochina to the Korea Strait
After the addition of Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment, the 2nd Pacific Squadron moved on on May 1. Admiral Rozhdestvensky considered the squadron’s immediate task to be a breakthrough to Vladivostok, based on which the squadron was supposed to develop actions against the Japanese fleet.
The squadron could enter the Sea of Japan through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperuzov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to choose the shortest route through the Korean Strait, the widest and deepest of all the others. However, this route lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great difficulties in navigation, and besides, the strait could be mined (the depths allowed this). The passage through the Strait of La Perouse in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky due to the prevailing fogs, navigational difficulties and lack of coal for this longer passage.
The decision to go through the Korean Strait created the most favorable conditions for the battle for the Japanese fleet, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting the Japanese, but still the latter would have been in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would have been able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The route through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific Squadron at the most disadvantageous position.
Having decided to go through the Korean Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers “Rion” and “Dnepr” were sent to the Yellow Sea, separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports when the squadron approached the Sedelny Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest trading port, connected by telegraph cables to all major port cities, including Japanese ones.
The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freed from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.
After the separation of the auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: in the right column were the battleships - 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhestvensky flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - “Oslyabya” (Felkerzam’s flag), “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”; on the left - the 3rd armored detachment - “Nikolai I” (Nebogatov’s flag), coastal defense battleships “Apraksin”, “Senyavin”, “Ushakov”, cruisers “Oleg” (Enkvist flag), “Aurora”, “Dmitry Donskoy” , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, consisting of the cruisers “Svetlana” (the pennant of captain 1st rank Shein), “Almaz” and “Ural”, walked ahead in a wedge formation - at a distance of 3-4 cabins. from the squadron. The cruisers “Pearl” and “Emerald” stayed on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left with the squadron walked in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the lead Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, tugs Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships “Orel” and “Kostroma” were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The progress of the squadron was determined by the progress of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward of the formation; On hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate Red Cross signs.
In this order, the squadron approached the Korean Strait. The squadron was in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming steamships, only one was detained; the rest were not even inspected. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full lighting. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any kind of secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korean Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet there. In addition, he believed that the deployment of reconnaissance officers would only help the enemy detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that given the Japanese superiority in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by reconnaissance to carry out any maneuver.
Refusal of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s reference to the desire to maintain the secrecy of the squadron’s movement does not stand up to criticism at all, since the squadron could easily have been detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which in fact happened.
There was no compelling justification for leaving six transports with the squadron, since they did not carry any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their defense. In addition, the presence of the low-speed transport Irtysh reduced squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to conceal the movement, did not organize reconnaissance of the enemy, and did not speed up the movement of the squadron itself.
On the night of May 13–14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to large number ships that were part of the squadron, its marching order was very complex. The squadron marched in formation of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; The masthead lights were extinguished. On hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron, all lights were open, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.
Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, whose proximity it knew from intercepted radiograms.
On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested in places provided for by the combat schedule.
The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhestvensky was on the squadron battleship “Prince Suvorov”. The junior flagships, rear admirals Nebogatov and Enquist, were: the first on the battleship “Nicholas I”, and the second on the cruiser “Oleg”. Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.
The tactical data of the ships that were part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were the 4 new Borodino-class battleships. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and heavy overloading of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their combat qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship Oslyabya was very different from them - a seaworthy ship, but weak in armor and artillery (Oslyabya was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoi the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with the previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, the three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.
The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all the ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the characteristics of the Far Eastern theater.
According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.
From a comparison of these figures it is clear that the Japanese ships were better armored and had greater speed. The artillery on Japanese ships had a rate of fire twice as high as that of the Russians, which allowed the Japanese to fire a significantly larger number of shells per minute.
Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosive, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones in terms of high-explosive effect. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimoza) in Japanese shells was approximately twice as strong as the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that Japanese ships were significantly superior to Russian ships in terms of artillery preparation, and also that Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than Japanese ships (60 versus 39 percent) .
In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. The Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers against 9 Russians. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of various types of obsolete and auxiliary ships.
When the 2nd Squadron entered the Korea Strait, the Japanese fleet was at its base in Mozampo. The fleet commander, Admiral Togo, was on the battleship Mikasa. The flag of the head of the 2nd squadron, Vice Admiral Kamimura, was on the armored cruiser Izumo. The observation line was deployed between the island. Kvelpart and the Goto Island group.
About 2 o'clock. 25 min. The auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, the left flank ship of the patrol chain, discovered the lights of the hospital ship Eagle, and then identified the entire squadron. At 4 o'clock. 25 min. a radiogram was given about the appearance of the Russian squadron. The Japanese fleet immediately began preparing for deployment. The reconnaissance cruisers began to converge on the spot where the Russian squadron was discovered. By dawn they had taken positions around her. At 5 o'clock. All warships went to the places assigned according to the deployment at Fr. Okinoshima.
The Russian squadron, based on the intensive work of Japanese telegraph stations, concluded that it had been discovered, however, Admiral Rozhdestvensky made no attempts to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.
At dawn, Japanese cruisers were discovered, sailing on a course parallel to the Russian squadron. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. Counting, ; Because the distance to the Japanese cruisers was too great to fire successfully, he decided not to send his cruisers out of fear that they might encounter superior Japanese forces in the fog.
Day fight May 14
On the morning of May 14, the weather was hazy, visibility 5-7 miles, wind 3-1. At 7 o'clock Admiral Rozhestvensky ordered the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment to take places in the rear and cover the transports. Thus, he not only did not interfere with Japanese reconnaissance, but he himself voluntarily abandoned it and walked forward, not knowing where the enemy was. At 9 o'clock The armored detachments formed into one wake column, with 4 new battleships in front. The transports and the cruisers covering them came from the right behind. Japanese scouts remained in sight of the squadron all the time. At 12 o'clock the squadron set course 23°. Then Admiral Rozhdestvensky made an attempt to deploy the squadron into the front line.
Having no doubt that the Japanese cruisers observing the squadron were reporting to Togo all the data about its movement, on the basis of which the Japanese commander was also preparing for a corresponding deployment before the battle, Rozhdestvensky decided, using the finding stripes of fog, to shoot down the enemy’s crews. To do this, he thought to change the formation at the moment when he found fog and the Japanese cruisers lost sight of him. But as soon as the rebuilding began, the fog cleared, and it was not possible to fulfill the plan. Without finishing the started rebuilding, Rozhdestvensky raised the cancellation signal. The squadron found itself in two wake columns: on the right - four new battleships, on the left - all the rest.
Since the movement of the Russian squadron continued to take place in front of Japanese reconnaissance officers, Admiral Togo had all the information about the composition of the Russian squadron, its course and formations. After weighing everything, he decided to strike at the left column, which consisted of weaker ships. Admiral Togo's plan was to attack the head of the Russian column with armored ships, and for this purpose, taking advantage of his advantage in speed, he crossed its course. At the same time, the light cruisers were supposed to attack the transports and the cruisers covering them.
The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into two detachments: the 1st detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Togo and the 2nd detachment (6 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Kamimura.
At 1 p.m. 30 min. from the Russian squadron, on the right bow, the Japanese fleet was discovered, heading to cross the course. Admiral Rozhdestvensky immediately began to line up his ships in one wake column. This restructuring was not yet completed when the Japanese, having moved to the left side of the Russian squadron, began to make a consistent turn to the left in order to cross its course. This turn put the Japanese ships in a risky position. Turning successively at 24 points, they described a loop almost in one place, without being able to shoot.
At the moment of the turn, the distance between the lead ships of the Russian squadron and Togo’s flagship, the Mikasa, was no more than 38 cables. At this moment, at 13 o'clock. 49 minutes, the flagship battleship of the Russian squadron “Suvorov” opened fire. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron had the opportunity to strike the enemy’s lead ships at the very beginning of the battle. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky failed to take advantage of the unfavorable position of the Japanese during the turn. Remaining in one wake column, he deprived his new high-speed battleships of the opportunity to get close to the enemy at a distance favorable to them. In addition, in the middle of the Russian squadron, some ships prevented each other from firing, and the end ones fell behind. Therefore, the fire from Russian ships did not cause much damage to the Japanese.
Three minutes later, the Japanese ships returned fire. The distance by this time had decreased to 35 cables. Four lead Japanese ships concentrated fire on the Suvorov, six on the Oslyaba, and two on the Nicholas I. Having an advantage in progress, the Japanese began to overtake the Russian squadron, entering its head.
Japanese artillery caused great destruction on Russian ships; The two flagships especially suffered. At 2 p.m. 25 min. The battleship Oslyabya, having a large list, failed and after 25 minutes capsized and sank. At 2 p.m. 30 min. Due to damage to the rudder, the battleship Suvorov was disabled to the right. Its masts and yards were knocked down, all the halyards were burned, so it was impossible to raise any signals. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The lead was the battleship "Alexander III", which, not knowing why the "Suvorov" was out of action, first followed it, but then turned left, intending to pass to the north under the stern of the Japanese battleships, which were on the right of the Russians.
This was the decisive moment of the battle. After the failure of the flagship battleship, the Russian squadron, which had no battle plan and was now also deprived of leadership, was doomed to defeat. Valiantly fighting the Japanese, she tried to somehow get through to Vladivostok.
Noticing the turn of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned “all of a sudden” to the opposite course in order to again reach the head of the Russian squadron. At the moment of the turn, they were covered by their armored cruisers, which increased fire on the Russian ships, remaining on the same course, and then turned behind the battleships. Due to the fact that the darkness thickened and visibility decreased, the battle temporarily stopped. All attempts by the Russian squadron to break through to the north failed. Each time the Japanese crossed the course, hitting mainly the lead ships.
At 16 o'clock. 20 minutes. The fog again thickened so much that the battle stopped. The Russian squadron, now with Borodino as its lead, turned south. The Japanese temporarily lost the Russians. In search of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned north, and the armored cruisers headed south. Russian battleships, following south, approached their transports and cruisers, which were fighting off Japanese cruisers. With their fire they drove away the Japanese cruisers, and one of them was so badly damaged that it had to go to the nearest port. Japanese armored cruisers approaching the battlefield opened fire on the Russians. “Borodino,” and behind it the entire squadron, gradually turned north.
At 6 p.m. 06 min. Japanese battleships approached and, walking on an almost parallel course, concentrated 32 cabs from a distance. fire on “Borodino” and “Alexander III”. The Russian ships veered to the left. At this time, the destroyer “Buiny” was approaching the squadron, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was located, photographed together with his headquarters at about 17:00. from “Suvorov”. The signal was raised on the destroyer to transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov. Although this signal was rehearsed by some ships, it was not noticed on “Nicholas I”, and therefore at about 19:00. The destroyer Bezuprechny approached him, from which Rozhdestvensky’s order was transmitted to lead the squadron to Vladivostok.
Meanwhile, the squadron continued to move north. At about 19 o'clock she lost two more battleships: at 18 o'clock. 50 min. "Alexander III" capsized and died at 19:00. 10 min. “Borodino” died in the same way. At 7 p.m. 10 min. Japanese destroyers attacked the broken Suvorov and sank it.
The moment of the death of these ships coincided with the end of the day's battle. The sun set, dusk was coming, and Admiral Togo led his armored ships north, to about. Evenlet, lying on the way from Tsushima to Vladivostok, hoping that Russian ships would go this way. He sent destroyers for night attacks against Russian ships.
During the daytime battle, the Russian cruisers, following the orders of Admiral Rozhestvensky, stayed close to the transports, guarding them, and did not conduct reconnaissance. Therefore, the Russian squadron had absolutely no idea where the Japanese fleet had gone.
In the growing darkness, Japanese destroyers were visible from the Russian squadron approaching from the north, east and south, and only in the southwest was it clear.
Admiral Nebogatov, who took command of the squadron at this time, went to the head of the squadron and turned to the southwest in order to evade the attack. The cruisers also turned and walked ahead of the armored squadron, the formation of which was broken, and the ships only approximately held their positions.
This ended the day's battle. On this day, the Russian squadron lost three new battleships and one old one. Many ships received heavy damage.
Of the Japanese ships, the cruiser Kasagi, which was out of action, received the most severe damage. Of the other ships, Admiral Togo's flagship battleship Mikasa was the most damaged, being hit by more than thirty shells. The inside of the front conning tower, the front and rear bridges were damaged, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, several casemates were broken, and the decks were pierced. More than ten Russian shells hit the Shikishima. The Nissin suffered several hits to its gun turrets, destroying three large guns and demolishing part of the bridge. There were 95 sailors and officers killed and wounded on this ship; Vice Admiral Misu, who was holding the flag on the Nissin, was wounded.
The battleships Fiji and the armored cruisers Asama, Yakumo, Iwate, and Kassuga were also damaged. This day of battle was replete with many examples of endurance and courage of Russian sailors, who showed knowledge of their business and fulfilled their duty to the end. Thus, artillery conductor Kalashnikov from the “Sisoi the Great” caused a large fire on the Japanese cruiser “Iwate” with a successful hit from a shell. The artillery quartermaster from the same ship, Dolinin, and the 1st class sailor, Molokov, when the ship’s magazine was flooded with ammunition, took turns diving into the water and taking out shells. The helmsman of the cruiser “Oleg” Belousov and signalmen Chernov and Iskrich promptly noticed a torpedo fired by a Japanese destroyer. The cruiser managed to turn away. and the torpedo passed by. The Aurora, which was heading in the wake, was also “warned by signalmen from Oleg” and managed to evade the torpedoes. One of the officers of the cruiser “Aurora” wrote about the behavior of the sailors in battle: “Our teams behaved in battle above all praise. Every sailor showed remarkable composure, resourcefulness and fearlessness. Golden people and hearts! They cared not so much about themselves as about their commanders, warning about every enemy shot, covering the officers at the moment of the explosion. Covered with wounds and blood, the sailors did not leave their places, preferring to die at the guns. They didn’t even go to bandages! You send it, and they say, “It’ll be in time, later, now there’s no time!” It was only thanks to the dedication of the crew that we forced the Japanese cruisers to retreat, sinking two of their ships and putting four out of action, with a large list.” What the officer from the Aurora wrote about the sailors was typical not only for this cruiser, but also for all the ships of the Russian squadron.
Battle on the night of May 14-15
With the onset of darkness, the Japanese launched a series of attacks, using all their destroyer forces - about 40 large and small destroyers. The attack began at about 21 o'clock and lasted until 23 o'clock, when the Japanese destroyers lost sight of the Russian squadron. Four Russian ships were hit, and one of them was killed. Repelling attacks and dodging Japanese destroyers, the Russian ships lost each other and subsequently acted independently.
Only Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment held together, with which the only surviving new battleship “Eagle” and the cruiser “Izumrud” were sailing. Having retreated to the southwest, Admiral Nebogatov turned north at about 21 o'clock to go to Vladivostok. Taking into account the experience of Port Arthur, Admiral Nebogatov did not open searchlights at night and evaded attacks from destroyers; none of the ships were damaged. However, on the morning of May 15, at about 10 o'clock, the detachment found itself surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet. Without offering any resistance, Nebogatov surrendered his ships (4 battleships). And only the cruiser “Emerald”, having heard the signal of surrender, gave full speed and, breaking through the ring of Japanese ships, headed towards Vladivostok. On the way there, he entered Vladimir Bay, where he ran into rocks and, on the orders of his commander, was blown up. The team arrived in Vladivostok by land.
The cruising detachment led by the cruiser “Oleg”, evading Japanese destroyers, went south. Some of the cruisers fell behind and, having lost their flagship, turned north to go to Vladivostok.
Only the cruisers Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug remained united. They walked south all night and in the morning they found themselves south of the Korea Strait. The commander of the cruisers, Rear Admiral Enquist, intending to independently break through to Vladivostok, tentatively decided to call at a neutral port to make some corrections. Believing that Shanghai was too close to Japan, Enquist went to the Philippine Islands, where he arrived on May 21. Here in the port of Manila the cruisers were interned.
The remaining Russian ships sailed in single order. The ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron, repelling attacks from destroyers, unmasked themselves by turning on searchlights, and as a result received torpedo hits.
The cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was the first to be torpedoed at about 21:00, then the battleships Sisoy the Great, Navarin and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. However, at night only one battleship Navarin was killed by a torpedo; the rest survived on the water until the morning and were then destroyed by their crews.
On May 15, at about 4 p.m., the destroyer Bedovy, to which the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff were transferred, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and, without making any attempt to fight or escape, surrendered. Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, along with his entire staff, was captured.
The destroyer “Grozny”, traveling together with “Bedov”, seeing that the latter raised the signal of surrender, gave full speed and went to Vladivostok, pursued by a stronger Japanese destroyer. Having entered into battle with him, “Grozny” caused him such severe damage that the Japanese destroyer was forced to stop pursuing him. Without a compass, with serious damage, “Grozny” nevertheless arrived in Vladivostok.
Around the same time that “Grozny” was fighting, the battleship “Admiral Ushakov” died valiantly. This old ship, due to damage received in the day's battle, fell behind and was heading north alone. At 5 p.m. 30 min. Two Japanese armored cruisers approached him and offered to surrender. The commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Miklukha-Maclay, opened fire in response to the Japanese proposal. At 6 p.m. 10 minutes, when all the combat reserves were used up, by order of the commander, the battleship was destroyed by its crew.
Somewhat later, at about 7 p.m., the cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, approaching the island. Dazhelet was overtaken by six Japanese light cruisers. Despite this inequality of forces, the commander of the Dmitry Donskoy, Captain 1st Rank Lebedev, entered the battle, firing on both sides. With the onset of darkness, the cruiser, having a number of serious damages, took refuge under the shore of the island. It even flies. The Japanese ships lost it and retreated to sea. Although this heroic ship fought off an enemy superior in strength, the damage it received in this battle was so significant that the Dmitry Donskoy could not go further and was scuttled at great depths, and the crew was brought ashore.
In addition to the destroyer Grozny, the 2nd rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyer Bravy arrived in Vladivostok. The latter, having been separated from the squadron, evaded the shores of Japan and thus avoided meeting with Japanese ships. This was all that remained of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
Results of the battle
In the Battle of Tsushima, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, the rottenness of the autocracy and the disastrousness of its policies were fully revealed. Tsushima went down in history as an ominous monument to tsarism. At the same time, Tsushima serves as a symbol of the courage and greatness of Russian sailors. They, despite enormous difficulties, carried out the first 220-day voyage in the history of the fleets of an entire squadron from the Baltic through the North Sea, the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, having traveled 18,000 miles.
Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the ships in the squadron were outdated, the shells were poor, and the incompetent tsarist admirals were essentially unable to control the battle, the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy. They heroically and selflessly fought the Japanese.
This battle completely revealed the incompetence of the squadron's high command.
1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who ignored all the experience of the battles at Port Arthur, did not prepare his ships for the battle, which he himself considered inevitable.
2) There was no battle plan. Therefore, the only desire of the squadron was to get to Vladivostok one way or another.
3) There was no reconnaissance, so the appearance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet caught the Russian squadron having not completed its combat formation.
4) Battle management and transfer of command were not organized.
5) The Russian squadron entered the battle at a disadvantage; only the lead ships could fire.
6) The combination of new and old ships in one wake column was impractical, since it made it impossible to fully use the most powerful ships.
7) Maneuvering in one wake column, which was the only thing the squadron was capable of, allowed the Japanese to encircle the head.
8) The incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron helped the Japanese destroyers successfully attack the Russians.
9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having completed a seven-month journey.
Regarding the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:
1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modernly equipped, faster and better trained. This provided more flexible maneuvering.
2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.
However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in battle.
1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized; the Japanese cruisers did not follow the main forces of the Russians, being carried away by the battle with transports. Because of this, the Russian battleships were separated from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.
2) The deployment of Japanese destroyers was incomplete. Admiral Nebogatov's maneuver confused their crews, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.
The results of the attacks show insufficient preparation of the destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three hit the same ship.
conclusions
1) The Battle of Tsushima was decided by artillery weapons, the growth of which during the war was expressed: a) in the transition to new shooting methods, which made it possible to conduct concentrated fire from several ships at one target; b) in the use of new high-explosive shells of considerable force, which caused enormous destruction in the unarmored parts of the ship and caused large fires.
2) In the Battle of Tsushima, an attempt was made to use torpedoes in daylight combat. Although it did not have serious results, it led to the further development of this issue. The destructive effect of torpedoes turned out to be insufficient. Only one ship was killed by torpedoes.
3) The battle at Tsushima confirmed the previously identified need for the success of an attack to point destroyers at the enemy. At the same time, the need was confirmed. refusal to use searchlights when repelling an attack by destroyers.
4) The Battle of Tsushima showed the need to strengthen the freeboard armor in order to provide the ships with the necessary combat stability.
The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had a huge impact on the further course of the entire war. All hopes for a favorable outcome were completely destroyed.
The government of Nicholas II hastened to conclude peace, which was signed in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905.